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The use of scientific knowledge in medical field brings happiness in human life especially from last fifty years. Scientists and medical professionals manufactured many new electronic types of equipment that play a handy role to eradicate epidemics, disease and other dangers in presence of which in olden days, human societies present a ghostly picture. Ultrasound is one of modern medical equipment. Its use is spreading rapidly for early pregnancy assessment, high-frequency sound waves are use to view internal organs and produce images of the human body. But from last two decades, this medical technology is widely misused in many parts of the world and it endangers for the sex ratio balance. It is creating an impetus for pre-birth sex selection for the children among parents. Parents, by use of Ultrasound come to know about the sex of fetus before its birth. In case of female fetus, it is aborted. While, if the fetus is male then each and every effort is put in practice for the proper health and nutrition of the mother. The wide-use of ultrasound is shaping and encouraging the practice of ‘son preference’. In India, where trend towards its use is getting enormous support from the local people, female ratio as compare to male is in danger as female share in sex ratio is reducing continuously. From previous some years the sex ratio calculated, as numbers of girls for every 1000 boys in the 0-6 age group, was only 927, as compare to 945 in 1991 and 983 in 1951. In Amritsar it is 783, which is dangerously lower. In this race, China has also not left behind. In china conditions are not much different as that of India. For china, there were 120 boys for every 100 girls. Chinese people do not feel any reluctance to use Ultrasound and most parents want their first child to be born a male; otherwise female fetus is illegally aborted without mother’s constant (in majority of cases). It further put mother’s life at risk because a woman bears a child for at least five months before abortion. The service is achievable in less than $100 and a human life is only a matter of less than $100 in modern ‘civilized world’. Chinese government has initiated "care for girls" project in order to promote and to protect the rights and interests of girls. As compare to its neighbors, although there is some balance in sex ratio between male and female in Pakistan, but this new trend of pre-birth gender choice might create the same situation like that of china and India in next future due to economic importance attached to the son. The service is not very cheap but deep-rooted social preference for male child, the service is increasingly popular. This phenomenon exists without any class difference between poor and rich. The rich are keen towards the use of service and know the sex of their child, they want a male offspring to take care of family business. The poor consider it better to spend money in initial stages than to take huge burden of responsibilities, one of them is dowry. In reality, ultrasound has also affected the human social behavior to some extent and in modern days it is just like a double edge sword that can be use either for positive purpose or vice versa. People, in order to pursue male child, take such things like a routine matter, which are contributing new trend, for son preference and excessive female infant mortality, an increasing incidence of prenatal sex determination and subsequent sex-selective abortion of female fetuses. Poverty is one of the major factors, which create an urge among the people towards the use of this service. But, only poverty could not be blame as the sole cause, infect the roles socially attached to the son and economic productivity of the son, heavy burden of dowry and lower status of female that are underneath the surface like a silent sea are also equally attributed. This son preference phenomenon could lead us towards a condition of resulting imbalance in family structure, foresee future marriage and economic crisis it could destroy the social fabric of the society at all. The loss of female births due to illegal prenatal sex determination and sex-selective abortions and female infanticide will affect the true sex ratio at birth and at young ages, creating an unbalanced population sex structure in the future and resulting in potentially serious social problems. The service is legally banned in many parts of the world but still it is very popular and widely used. There is need to discourage the doctors and other paramedical staff who are providing their services extensively after the mushrooming of ultra sound clinics. Such clinics and medicals centers should be close on permanent basis and licenses of such doctors should be cancelled. Cultural based stereotypes and prejudices about female are also need to eradicate to avoid illegal sex abortions and female infanticides. Proper implementation of law is required to discourage such phenomenon. Religious and political leaders along with human rights activists should raise their voices against the misuse of technology that is a blessing, if positively use. The basic aim of knowledge is to add happiness in the human life not feelings of grief or remorse. A lot of effort is needed to pour consciousness among the masses about this killing by the use of modern scientific knowledge.
Pakistan has responded to its environmental problems by passing laws, establishing environmental protection institutions and by developing human resources and technical capacities through local resources and foreign assistance. The constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan confers concurrent legislative on the Federation and the Provinces to legislate in respect of environmental pollution and ecology. Pakistan has had laws that contain provisions for environmental protection. These laws which were partly inherited from British India dealt with air and water quality, canal irrigation, land tenure and use, forest conservation, wildlife protection, energy development, pesticides use, noise, public health etc. Not only these laws were ineffective, and punishment for violation was mild and easy to circumvent, but these laws also did not adequately cover the subject areas and several were outdated. Many aspects of the environmental degradation remained uncontrolled and under-regulated. Prior to Pakistan Environmental Protection Act 1997 (PEPA-97), the first major consolidated environmental legislation and the only piece of Pakistani legislation dealing specifically with the environment was Pakistan Environmental Protection Ordinance, promulgated in 1983. The 1983 ordinance did not have a broad scope. It was limited to creating an institutional base and a high-level policymaking forum, the Pakistan Environmental Protection Council (PEPC). Five Environmental Protection Agencies (EPAs), one at Federal and four at the Provincial levels, were also created under the Ministry of Environment, Local Government and Rural Development. However, EPAs while founded remained practically inoperative for over a decade due to lack of funds and support staff. The 1983 ordinance had the provisions for enforcing national environmental quality standards (NEQS) and environment impact assessment (EIA). The Pakistan Environment Protection Act, promulgated in December1997 is an improvement over 1983 ordinance, achieved through an extensive and prolonged consultative process with all stakeholders. PEPA-97 is a single comprehensive law, which provides for the protection, conservation, rehabilitation and improvement of the environment, for the prevention and control of pollution and promotion of sustainable development. The Act covers air, water, soil and noise pollution, also including hazardous waste disposal and motor vehicular pollution. Under PEPA-97, Pakistan Environmental Protection Council (PEPC) and Pakistan Environmental Protection Agency (Pak-EPA) have been established (Section 3 & 5, PEPA-97). As one of Pakistan government's policy responses to the environment, "Environment Cells" have been established in the Planning Commission and provincial planning and development (P&D) departments. Several provisions to enhance the enforcement powers of the government have been included in the Act (Section 7,PEPA-97). The Act also empowers all affected citizens to approach the courts for any environmental damage (Section 22, PEPA-97). Two "Environmental Tribunals" have already been set up in the country and constitution of more such Tribunals as well as "Environmental Magistrates" are planned in the country. These institutions have, under the Act, power to start legal proceedings on receiving a written complaint by Federal or provincial agency or local council or any aggrieved person about violation of the provisions of the Act (section 20, PEPA-97). Pak-EPA has been empowered (Section 7) to: a) summon and enforce the attendance of any person for the conduct of any enquiry/investigation into any environmental issue: b) enter and inspect any land, building and premises to verify an offence under the Act being committed; c) take sample of effluents, wastes or air pollutant being discharged or emitted; and d) arrange for test and analyses of the samples at a laboratory certified by Pak-EPA. The federal government has delegated powers to the provincial governments for implementation of the Act. National Environmental Quality Standards (NEQS) The process for the development of Pakistan national environmental quality standards (NEQS) started in 1983 under the provision of Pakistan Environmental Protection Ordinance. However, after almost ten years, NEQS came into effect for 32 liquids and 16 gaseous pollutants on 1 July 1994. Pakistan. According to the statuary notification, all units coming into production after 30 June 1994 were to comply immediately with the NEQS, while the existing units, ie, those already in production at that time were required to comply by 1 July 1996. The industry was of the view that the proposed NEQS were too stringent and impractical and some time was required to prepare for taking corrective action to control pollutants levels in the industrial emissions. To rationalise the NEQS and to work out modalities for their implementation, PEPC constituted an Environment Standards Committee (ESC). NEQS were revised through a long and exhaustive consultative process among all the stakeholders. The revised NEQS, "Industry Specific Standards" and "Receiving Body or Receptor Specific Standards" have been notified. When measured against the NEQS used by other Asian countries with a similar industrial base, Pakistan environmental quality standards are neither too relaxed nor too stringent. Enforcement Mechanism for NEQS and EIA In the 8th and 9th PEPC meetings held in August 1999 and February 2001, respectively, the Pakistan Environmental Protection Council supported and approved a number of recommendations of ESC for enforcement of NEQS in the country, including guidelines based on PEPA Section 11 (Prohibition of certain discharges or emissions) & 12 (Initial environment examination, IEE) and environment impact assessment, EIA). These recommendations were formulated by ESC in full consultation with the stakeholders through discussion in the roundtable meetings. PEPC also approved the following rules and regulations for implementing NEQS, prepared by Pak-EPA under PEPA Section 6:
Self-Monitoring and Reporting System for Industry The self-monitoring and reporting (SMAR) concept, which is entirely based on self-respect and self-honour emerged from dialogue between the government and the representative of industry, Federation of Pakistan Chamber of Commerce and Industry (FPCCI). This new system does not involve all times role of environment inspectors. On one hand it saves considerable expenses, time and efforts of EPAs and on the other hand it involves industry in evaluation of environmental performance, leading to pollution controls measures. PEPA-97 Section 6(1)(i) provides a legal basis for this system. Under SMAR system, industries in Pakistan are made responsible for systematically monitoring their environmental performance (industrial emissions) and reporting of the data to EPAs periodically. Self-monitoring and Reporting Tool (SMART) In view of the limited capacity of EPAs, both in trained personnel and equipment, for enforcing compliance of NEQS in the country, Pak-EPA with technical support from Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI) developed a self-monitoring and reporting tool (SMART), under PEPA Section 6. SMART will be used by the industrial units to generate report of the emissions levels (environmental data) and send the same to EPAs for compilation and analyses. SMART has been developed on "Self-monitoring and Reporting Rules, 1998" already notified. SMART has been further developed in line with the revised NEQS and made more user-friendly, which (SMART 2) is now ready for country-wide use as a tool for expediting and effectively implementing NEQS in the country. Pak-EPA in collaboration with SDPI has installed SMART provincial modules in the Head-office of all provincial EPAs at provincial capitals, provided operating manuals, standard analytical methods/procedures and trained staff for operating SMART. Environmental Assessment Procedures (IEE/EIA) Pursuant to PEPA-97, Section 12, all government ministries, departments, agencies and establishment and private sector project sponsors are required to prepare "Initial Environmental Examination" (IEE) or where the project is likely to cause an adverse environmental effect, an "Environmental Impact Assessment" (EIA) prior to the approval of their proposals for projects. Detailed guidelines about carrying out IEE and EIA have been notified along with the category of projects, which require IEE and those, which require EIA. IEE/EIA review and approval powers primarily vests in Provincial EPAs. Public defense of a few EIA reports have been held at Karachi and Islamabad. Pollution Charge Regime The concept of pollution charge, based on "Polluter Pays Principle" is a key element of the implementation of NEQS programme in the country. PEPA-97 Section 11, Sub-Section (2) provides legal basis for levying pollution charge. The modalities for the determination and implementation of pollution charge were evolved through extensive discussions, in several consultative roundtable meetings, among representatives of industry, businesses, government, environmental NGOs, academic researchers and the private industrial sector. The consensus of all stakeholders has also been to adopt a market-based approach, ie, a pollution charge combined with fiscal incentives to industries, rather than a "Command and Control" approach through regulations to ensure compliance with NEQS. It has been agreed upon by all stakeholders and strongly recommended by ESC that the money collected as pollution charge would be made available for environmental services to benefit industry. Financial Incentives For Industry Following extensive negotiations with the government in the ESC, the Pakistan Environmental Protection Council approved a detailed proposal for provision of fiscal incentives to industry for pollution abatement and compliance with NEQS. Challenges And Recommendations Pak-EPA has not been able to implement the NEQS effectively for many reasons but mainly due to continued lack of implementation capacity and resistance from industry, especially in the early phase of NEQS implementation. Despite legal requirements, under PEPA Section 11 & 12, the procedures for IEE/EIA have not been fully institutionalised. Some of the difficulties faced in this regard include lack of skills/experience for preparation of IEE/EIA, week capacity of environmental protection agencies to review IEE/EIA and lack of co-operation of public sector agencies to prepare and submit IEE/EIA of their projects. The pollution charge regime has been agreed by all stakeholders, but the modalities of collection and disbursement of funds are still being worked out. For the effective implementation of PEPA-97, the financial implications are needed to be further worked out and financial provisions be made, accordingly. The administering and implementation machinery is only partly in place, is inadequate and demands immediate action for technically skilled human resource development. A monitoring and evaluation mechanism to review environmental performance under the law is also still lacking and needs to be developed and placed at the earliest.
The South also needs to understand in assuming its negotiating positions that the North more often than not negotiates on behalf of multinational corporations (MNCs). Understanding that they are negotiating with "the profit motive" should inject a dose of realism into the positions adopted. Contrary to the uncritically accepted position, foreign direct investment (FDI) via the agency of MNCs, is not necessarily advantageous to Southern countries. Several studies have documented that resource outflow from the South often exceeds the resource inflow and other potential benefits from the FDI. Each investment has to be examined on a case-by-case basis and instead of competing and passing on all the advantage to the MNC, the South could use WTO negotiating platforms to press for maximum advantage. The South has little room for maneuver when it comes to dealing with the private sector. Dr Shahrukh Rafi Khan notes that the South must distinguish between restrictions imposed by Northern governments and those imposed by Northern businesses. If Northern governments impose import restrictions because Southern countries are not doing enough about child labour or cleaning up production technologies, this constitutes a non-tariff barrier. However, this is not the big danger that faces Southern exporters. Increasingly, businesses in the North are being required by their boards/shareholders to do businesses with firms that meet certain 'voluntary' environmental and quality standards. This is a very important distinction...The only option Southern exporters have is to conform or lose markets." Searching for a common denominator: Special and Differential Treatment The South never was and certainly is not now one homogeneous grouping with identical interests. Differences in levels of economic development, location, and resource endowments among other factors generate different interests. Thus, with regard to the AoA, Southern countries are part of four often overlapping groupings with differing agendas including the Group of 20 (G-20), Special Product Group (SP), the Cairns Group, and the least developed country (LDC) Group. This adds to the existing complexity of attaining a common position to pursue "a Southern agenda" for sustainable development. Further, Southern unity when achieved is often fragile. While an effective coalition, called the Group of 20 plus, managed to aggressively and effectively push a Southern agenda on agriculture at Cancun, the US persuaded Columbia, Costa Rica, and Peru to leave the G-20 reducing it to 17 members. Donors and independent groups in the North are encouraging Southern countries to understand and articulate their agendas in the context of multilateral negotiations. This contribution to awareness-raising is certainly needed and welcome, but it will also challenge Southern unity as individual countries speak from a more informed position. Yet Southern unity is critical for the South as a block to be able to shape trade rules to further their sustainable development agendas. Given the heterogeneity in the South earlier mentioned, this requires an agreement among Southern countries on broad negotiating principles and mechanisms for reaching agreement among themselves. For instance, the South has and continues to demand SDT in its negotiations on grounds that it has much lower income and more distance to travel in initiating sustainable development. This principle can indeed be applied to its approach to negotiations. However, just as the South is heterogeneous in resource endowments and level of development, individual Southern countries are perhaps even more heterogeneous internally. It would seem that if SDT is invoked by the South because of its lower income status, this really should be on behalf of the lowest income quintile in the South. If this principle is accepted, it would become much easier for the South to come together as a negotiating block to achieve poverty alleviation and sustainable development. For example, the position that the South assumes on the interface of trade and the environment needs to be driven by how environment depredations resulting from trade rules affect the well-being of the lowest income groups. Assuming such a negotiating principle would enable them to capture a high moral ground and a position of negotiating strength given the lip-service universally accorded to poverty alleviation. Regional approaches Simon Tay from Harvard University notes that the perception after Doha was that energies and focus would shift for many states from the global regime of the WTO to trade liberalisation at the regional and bilateral levels. Indeed, global governance could be seen as diffuse and plastic systems that needed to generate more diverse activities and approaches, not only at the international level, but also at the regional level and within individual states. Essentially, this can be seen as complementing the global trade liberalisation agenda, in as much as links from the regional and bilateral levels can be drawn upwards to the global level and downwards to the national levels. In this context, an alternative architecture for strengthening trade and environment (T&E) links can be envisioned. It would entail:
Building research capacity in developing countries is very important as they are unable to shape their own positions because if they lack such capacity. The South should look into building intra and inter-institutional linkages (increasing co-ordination between economic and trade agencies and their environmental counterparts at the national level) and building capacities where they counted, as in negotiation processes, national research and analysis and domestic dissemination and implementation. Conclusion Hopefully, the article is not abstruse. Its basic purpose is to expound some home truths. Briefly, it is in the South's interest to comply with the environmental and social regulations the North is beginning to stipulate as a condition for trade. In macro terms, this will sustain Southern exports. However, regulations can easily become instruments of protection. Further, even if applied transparently, their impacts can be asymmetric. In order, therefore, to be credible such regulations need to address sustainable development concerns. For instance, poor farmers and small businesses risk being marginalised in a global trading environment, which has added non-tariff (technical) barriers to its existing menu of trade restrictions. In short, the North needs to build compliance capacity of the poor South. But there is a caveat here as well. The allure of financial and technical assistance can trigger a rush for funds across countries, compromising its intent. Therefore, such assistance should be pitched at the lowest income groups, regardless of which country they reside in. Compliance with environmental regulations has many facets. Cultural and environmental differences are often cited as reasons for not complying with Northern environmental and social standards. Can this be viewed as a knee-jerk reaction? Is it not a first imperative that the South develop its institutional capacity to comply with such standards and, thereby, qualify to develop standards, which reflect such differences. Also, how can such capacity be developed efficiently. A regional approach, which builds upon national strengths in the various areas of compliance (information, certification, accreditation) is more cost-effective than purely national mandates. Ultimately, such an approach could also hook into regional trade agreements, which, presently, are thin on environmental and social compliance. Finally, does compliance generate economic benefits in addition to environmental and health gains? Yes it does. Evidence suggests that both in-plant measures and collective end-of-pipe treatment lower unit production costs for firms, specifically through increased energy efficiency, chemicals and water recycling and use of waste products. In short, against a backdrop of proliferating voluntary standards, growing compliance can be a win-win for the South but it needs capacity building in the South as well.
The context This article addresses trade environment links within a broader context of sustainable development. The substantive argument is that linking trade with the environment serves a purely Northern agenda and for it to have resonance in the South, it is important that the environment be linked with poverty and economic efficiency. The ramifications of both cut across gender; while implied, this paper does not specifically address gender equality.
Four perceptions dominate the discussions concerning trade-environment linkages. South/Southeast Asia. First, trade-environment linkages formally recognised at the Doha ministerial meeting of the WTO are the reality we have to live and work with. Second, environment tends to be viewed exclusively as a Northern agenda. For the South, environment cannot be divorced from its broader sustainable development context, which subsumes both intra-generational, as well as inter-generational justice. Third, the global South is amorphous. Negotiating priorities and approaches should, therefore, reflect regional perspectives, interests and differences. Fourth, the South should accept and deal with the reality of multinational corporations and, in general, the reality of the market. Southern unity: post-Cancun background The momentum of WTO negotiations has stalled post the Cancun ministerial. Bolstered by China's joining their ranks, the increasing assertiveness of the South ground the Northern juggernaut to a halt. The Seattle ministerial had already demonstrated that the South had woken up after the Uruguay Round (UR), during which most Southern governments were caught napping, and realised that trade rules, as established in the UR, and the Northern agenda setting post-UR were not consistent with their sustainable development agendas. As a consequence of this deadlock, the US continued to push its alternative track trade policy, ie, to engage in bilateral and regional trade agreements. The European Union's negotiations with regional groups like the Mercusor suggest that it, too, might decide to aggressively pursue an alternative track. In bilateral and even regional agreements, Southern countries or groupings are more likely to get overwhelmed. Thus, the survival of multilateralism is clearly in the Southern interest. However, while current US and EU trade policies may be cause for some concern, an element of posturing is also built into its recent moves. The WTO continues to be of great importance to both the EU and the US, since much of what was agreed to in the UR that is in their interest, such as the implementation of Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), needs the agency of the WTO and its dispute settlement body. Thus, the US met resistance in the negotiations for the FTAA (Free Trade Association of the Americas) as it did at Cancun, given that the G-20 was represented there. This was followed by a flurry of US activity in early 2004 including sending letters to all the WTO country capitals and the US Trade Representative making a tour of many Southern nations perceived to be influential in trade negotiations. The message, quite clearly, was that the Doha Round needs to be put back on track. The EU has made similar statements followed by concessions at the recently concluded talks at Geneva. Thus, multilateralism in trade negotiations suits both the North and the South. In our view, there are likely to be setbacks but given this convergence of interests, multilateralism, eventually, will prevail. Ultimately, the possibility of an alternative track for the economic giants does also demonstrate that there are limits to Southern intransigence in trying to mold trade rules to suit their sustainable development agendas. While multilateralism remains on track, both the North and the South have to take additional steps to ensure it does not get derailed. And an encouraging message is while both poles will continue to defend their respective economic, social and environmental interests, there exist common grounds where, potentially, these interests converge--an overused but appropriate term is win-win. The challenge is to identify them and craft the right approaches for mutual gain Martin Khor of the Third World Network notes that the WTO and its predecessor organisation, GATT, has contributed to the global trade system through the provision of a framework of rules within which member countries conduct trade and other commercial relations among themselves. This has contributed to a measure of stability and predictability as contrasted to an alternative scenario in which arrangements are dominated by unilateral policies and bilateral arrangements. It was in this spirit that the 2001 ministerial meeting of the WTO in Doha (2001) formally recognised the trade-environment linkage and brought it within the ambit of a rules-based framework. Doha fundamentally changed the rules of the game on trade and environment. The issue is no longer whether trade and environment are linked. This is now a given. The challenge is how best to address environmental problems within a rules-based multilateral trading system--a system, which ensures that environmental regulations and restrictions stop short of becoming non-tariff barriers, which limit market access. The formal articulation of these links has subsumed arguments by the environmental and trade community questioning the rationale for such links. Similarly, the South can no longer advert to the stance that trade-related environmental measures are protectionist, anti-development, or that existing GATT/WTO regulations already address environmental concerns. Consumer pressure, expressed through the market, provides an additional lever for the Northern position. Indeed, as in the case of voluntary environmental standards, the WTO encourages compliance with such standards under voluntary codes of conduct. The challenge for the South in this changed scenario is to craft a Southern agenda which can counterbalance - as well as benefit from - asymmetries related to affluence, bargaining power, science, technology and institutional capacity. Fortunately, there exists considerable leeway for negotiation: The Doha mandate on trade and environment was left purposely vague because the issue is new to multilateral trade negotiations and its many implications and manifestations have not yet been fully explored. For this reason the mandate provides an opportunity for all parties to shape the agenda on future trade and environment issues. Negotiating principles for the South Persisting with sustainable development Clearly, the South needs to persist with its stance that environment cannot be divorced from its broader context of sustainable development. The reasons for this are three-fold. First, the South is concerned justifiably--and it is supported in this by Northern NGOs--that linking trade and environment in a rules-based regime, while ignoring broader equity and poverty concerns in the South, would weaken the scope for negotiations. Thus, it makes little sense to talk of reducing or pre-empting non-tariff barriers when tariffs (for instance, on agricultural products) continue to remain high and development assistance continues to decline. Second, poverty and environment are linked inextricably. These links are evident across the areas falling within the WTO negotiating agenda. For instance, compliance with environmental standards has implications for distribution. Specifically, small and medium enterprises (SMEs) have limited coping capacity and risk becoming marginalised as environmental standards multiply. However, within this broad category, there are dynamic sectors and evidence from research by Khalid Nadvi and Sajid Kazmi points to their remarkable capacity to respond to limited institutional and technical support. Similarly, biodiversity concerns whether under TRIPS or related to market access--as in the shrimp turtle case--cannot be separated from their livelihood implications. Nor can agricultural subsidies targeted at environmentally friendly practices. Third, and illustrating the win-win premise, environmental compliance can lead to both environmental and economic benefits for the South. This has particular relevance for market access issues, where compliance is driven by Northern environmental concerns as articulated in environmental standards, whether of a regulatory or voluntary (market driven) nature. Economic benefits ensue from in-plant measures such as modernisation, input and waste recycling, energy efficiency. However, separate research undertaken by the authors points to built-in advantages by large firms (financial and information based), which position them favourably towards realising such benefits, SMEs need special incentives (subsidies, technical support). The point is that the North needs to address trade-environmental linkages within the holistic framework of sustainable development to ensure more equitable treatment for the South. In particular, poverty-environment linkages in the south create asymmetries both in terms of impacts, as well as realisation of economic benefits. There is a strong case for capacity building of poor and disempowered groups, who stand to lose within the framework of the formal environmental negotiations. They need to be adequately represented by the South in the negotiations (a challenge given the prevailing socio-political dynamics) and supported by the North through financial and technical assistance. To sum up, one can pose the following question to understand the distinction between the interfaces of trade and the environment and trade and sustainable development. What is it that sustainable development incorporates that the environment does not? The answer lies in exploring what the environmental movement has contributed to an improvement in the conception of social justice, ie, the focus on inter-generational justice. However, in the exclusive focus on inter-generational justice, it left out intra-generational justice that sustainable development reintroduced. To attain sustainable development, or more specifically to eradicate poverty, a goal endorsed by the preamble to the WTO treaty, poor countries need resources. Trade must serve this end via the agency of measures within the WTO, such as Special and Differential Treatment (SDT) and market access, and also by ensuring that trade is not immiserising.
Unidentified fatal disease identical to Leprosy has so far killed 11 and caused deformity to 17 persons from a family of the Khaskheli clan in Chiroli Village and a family of Hajam tribe in Thoorao village in the vicinity of Thar in Sindh. Chiroli is situated near Dhoro Naro, some 25 km north of Umarkot Town, Achhro Thar and Village Thoorao is situated some 50 km northeast of Khipro in the lap of moving sand dunes of Achro Thar. The villages though fall in Khipro's jurisdiction, District Sanghar, but due to its geographical setting the business and livelihood of the villages area is connected with Umarkot Town. The Leprosy like disease has been prevailing for the last 25 years in the descendents of a family of Khaskheli clan. An elder male victim of the disease Gul Muhammad Khaskheli told a group of journalists along with a team of Makhi Welfare Organization, a partner of Oxfam GB Pakistan, during a visit to this village that the disease reportedly first occurred to his grandmother. But after wards, they inherited the disease. He talked about syndromes of the disease which he said, first of all appears on the fingers of feet when the victim is at the age of 6 months. After Wards it eats up the fingers and the feet slowly but in between the age of 15-30 years, it almost kills the victim. Three males and two females had been killed by the disease of the same family, while two girls, a woman and a male are still suffering from this disease. One of the deceased Abdul Rahim Khaskheli, was twenty and became infected during his childhood. He was treated at Army Hospital Karachi. He and his brother remained there for one month. They recovered a little but because of being poor and illiterate they could not stay and tolerate the hospital environment. He then died 8 years ago. Kanbhoo was younger brother of Abdul Rahim. He was second next to him infected with the same disease. He was also admitted at Karachi and Kunri hospitals, but could not recover from the disease and died six years ago. Allah Bux was third brother of Abdul Rahim. He was suffering from the same disease and died three years ago. Mooli was the aunt of Abdul Rahim. Her age was 30 years when she was first infected with this disease in the family at this village. She died 20 years ago. Noori was the daughter of Mooli. She also suffered with the same disease and died 15 years ago. Among those still suffering from the disease include one Gul Muhammad alias Guloo Khaskheli. He is an elder brother of all the three, who died before in the family. He is 35. The symptoms of the disease appeared on his feet when he was still a child. He was also admitted at Army Hospital Karachi for two months and then he ran away from there for the fear of operation of his toes. Guloo told the team that had he been at the hospital little longer, he might have had recovered from the disease. Presently the disease has eaten up his both the feet and he is now handicapped and cannot walk. The team saw a big clot of blood on the infected feet-bones. An injection of Penicillin is given to him daily to stop bleeding from his feet-bones. Ms Satul is also suffering from this disease from early childhood. She is now 16. She has lost the upper part of her nose and her feet are seriously infected with the disease. She is afraid of the treatment. She was weeping and saying "What will I do to my life? It is not of any worth. Give me a little help; I want to go for treatment." Jeeandi, 10, is younger sister of Satul. She was also weeping and was afraid of her infected toes. Khatoon is 25 years old. Her feet are also infected with the disease and have disfigured. In another village Thoorao, six adults have lost their lives due to this disease. Thirteen others have become serious patients and got paralysed the lower half of their bodies. The disease occurs with symptoms of pain in the joints, kidneys and muscles resulting in deformation of bones, hands, feet and knee, and the loss of eyesight. Most of the victims get paralysed due to the long ailment and dearth of medical facilities around far and near of the vicinity. Living solely on the survival of cattle and goats, the people of this part of Thar settle around newly dug up wells for potable water. Water being a mainstay of their daily life, is the prime blessing for these shepherds. It is interesting that the villagers (Hajams and Rajar) in these areas, where this deadly disease reigns for the last thirty years, fetch water from one well. Finding the team of journalists and Makhi Welfare Organization among them, the victims began to narrate their woes and burst out on lack of facilities and apathy of the govt. "We have gone to Sanghar, Khipro and Ummarkot for the treatment of this disease. They (the doctors) are incapable of understanding it. They said that we should move somewhere else because it is the water we are suffering from. How can we move? Those who died in Thoorao village include Ishaque S/O Mohammad Rahim Hajam, Haider S/O Bhooro Hajam, Ms. Ratana Hajam, Begam W/O Lukman Hajam, Majanoo Rajar (committed suicide four years ago to rid the continuous ailment) and Qaima Rajar. The ailing patients included Sehat w/o Jalal Hajam, Sarna w/o Qabool Hajam, Khatoon Hajam, Adam S/O Naseer Hajam, Haneef S/O Ali Hajam, Basran D/O Ali Hajam, Mohammad Salih S/O Naseer Hajam, Naseer S/O Mohammad Raheem Hajam and Haseena w/o Ali Mohammad. Fatima w/o Jee'an is the latest addition to the list of victims of the disease. Of the 35 family people, 13 have gone disable and deformed and many others are waiting for their turn. Their subsistence depends mainly upon livestock, which too have been giving in against the black drought haunting this part of Thar for seven years. On the one hand they lack food, vegetables and milk, on the other they are drinking underground water carrying chemicals. According to the doctors people are facing acute deficiency of calcium, vitamin A and vitamin D. A doctor of Talukai Hospital Khipro who has often been dealing the cases of that village said that their health lies in shifting to another place. When contacted ADO health Sanghar said it might be GB syndrome or Hemi Playa. Others said there may be arsenic or chloroform in the water. Each doctor has his own interpretation, but no one has the solution to peoples miseries. Achro Thar covers 16.66% of the 88000 square km of total and Sindh. According to 81's census 3,12,381 people inhabited this part of Thar. Now twenty years after the population may have reached 600000 people. Despite this flare up in human population, nothing has been set up for their health problems. A district council dispensary, in Mohammad Khan Junejo's time at Ranahoo for a cluster of 10 to 15 villages could not see doctor even for a day. Another dispensary at Sadao Tar is also non-functioning due to unavailability of doctor.
Clock is ticking for the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing The clock is ticking for global trade in textiles and clothing: In only 75 days, the sector will make a quantum leap towards freer trade. In January 2005, the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC) under the World Trade Organisation (WTO) will be fully implemented and will give way to more liberalised global trade in textiles and clothing. Liberalisation of trade in textiles and clothing was an important issue for many developing countries, amongst which Pakistan. Accounting for more than two thirds of its international sales, the textile and clothing industry is Pakistan’s major export engine. The ATC was agreed upon at the Marrakesh ministerial meeting of the WTO in 1994. It advocates a successive expansion of imports under the existing quotas in a ten years period until January 2005. Since the 1950s, industrialised countries like the US and various European countries have placed some form of quantitative restrictions on the import of textiles and clothing. They wanted to protect domestic industries facing damage from increasing imports particularly from developing countries. The Multi-Fibre Arrangement (MFA), enforced in 1974, established the most far-reaching limits. It allowed industrialised countries to apply quotas unilaterally on textiles and clothing imports, complemented by high tariffs, and other non-tariff barriers to trade. Since, 1995, the ATC has taken over from the MFA. A lot has been said about the economic implications of the ATC for Pakistan. Whereas some observers expect the Pakistani textile industry to do well as a global supplier in cotton yarns and fabrics due to its cheap labour supply, access to local raw cotton, and favourable business climate, others emphasise under-investment in technology and the lack of product diversification as factors detracting from competitiveness. The effects of the ATC on workers in the industry, however, on those who are most vulnerable to the ups and downs of the international market have mostly been neglected. It is estimated that up to 27 million jobs worldwide may be lost as a result of the quota elimination. That is why textile and clothing associations from almost 50 producer countries have asked for an extension of the quotas after January 2005. This issue was put on the agenda of the recent meeting of the WTO Goods Council on October 1 by seven producer countries, amongst them Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. They demanded the establishment of a WTO work programme to mitigate social and economic costs incurred by the quota removal. This proposal was not adopted, however, due to a cool reaction from China and other WTO members. Gender dimension in global trade in textiles and clothing important but ignored. What is completely ignored is the distinct gender dimension of the textiles and clothing production. The textile and clothing sector absorbs a disproportionate share of female employment globally, and particularly in South Asia. Women represent more than two thirds of the global labour force in the sector, and employment in textiles and clothing accounts for almost one fifth of the total world female labour force in manufacturing. Pakistan is no exception. The textile and clothing sector is the largest employer of female workers in Pakistani manufacturing. An estimated 30% of the sector’s workforce of about 2.3 million workers is female as compared to a national average of 15%. This is lower than in other South and Southeast Asian countries where relative female employment may be up to 90%. However, in the context of the social seclusion of women in Pakistan, which negatively affects female employment, the strong representation of women in the textile and clothing industry makes the phase out of the quota regime a gender equality issue - impinging on one of the few sectors that provides paid employment to women in Pakistan. Whereas the overall relative employment of female workers in the Pakistani textile and clothing industry is about 30%, relative female employment in stitching units is considerably higher, up to 75% of the total workforce in the respective units. Whereas commonly workers are regular employees of the respective companies, the majority of workers in these stitching units are employed via sub-contractors and paid on a piece rate. Women workers victims of ATC expiry What does this mean for employment and for the gender composition of the workforce? In the short-run, the current preparations for more liberalised trade in textiles and clothing may increase relative female employment in the industry in Pakistan. This is because the workforce in the units affected by labour-saving investments is predominantly male. The long-term effects of the full implementation of the ATC for the gender composition of the workforce are less clear. They depend on the structure of the industry after the abolition of the quota regime, and thus on the competitive position of the Pakistani textile and clothing industry in the post-quota era. It is probable that Pakistan will not be competitive in made-ups (such as bedwear) and garments but specialises in cotton yarn and cloth. This is because of the fact that the clothing industry has not been the focus of technology upgrading, improvement of workers' skills, and quality improvements. This scenario would lead to a large number of job losses, as it is the clothing industry that is considerably more labour-intensive than earlier stages of textile processing. Due to the concentration of women workers in this sub-sector, it would also imply a significant decrease in relative female employment. This might destroy these women workers' hopes for economic and overall empowerment, and uplifting of their families. Apart from the gender composition of the workforce, the regime change will impact upon working conditions. Increased competition in global trade in textiles and clothing will lead to downward pressure on prices and increased demand for shorter lead times and better quality. Increased cost competition for the Pakistani textile and clothing industry might lead to an increase in insecure forms of employment, in particular piece rate payments in stitching. They provide more flexibility to the employer and reduce overhead costs. For the worker, such contract types imply an increase in health and safety risks as well as a decrease in fringe benefits, e.g. health insurance. Again, due to the concentration of female workers in stitching this can be assumed to affect female rather than male workers. Special mitigation strategies for women workers needed
In order to further develop strategies for mitigating harmful employment effects of the ATC’s expiry, the Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI) together with the Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation (FES) Pakistan, organises a workshop for trade unionists and women workers organisations from 18-19 October in Islamabad.
Regardless of whom they affect, suicides are a tragic and puzzling phenomenon and to ascertain the reasons why individuals so callously end their own lives is often difficult. On the global level, studies have shown that about 1m people kill themselves every year--a figure that is comparable to those who die of malaria annually. At these current trends, it is estimated that this figure could climb up to 1.5m by 2020. As such, suicide has been labeled as a major public health problem, one that is alarmingly growing among the young. Leading psychiatrists now call it an "emerging epidemic". Although suicides have often been associated with the elderly, and traditionally are highest among geriatric men, there has been a steady increase in the suicides committed by the youth of society today, to the extent that now it attributes to a third of all youth deaths globally. The World Health Organisation (WHO) estimates that in the last 45 years suicide rates have increased by 60% worldwide. Suicide is now among the three leading causes of death among those aged 15-44 (both sexes), with a global suicide rate of 16 per 100,000 with one death every 40 seconds. Suicide attempts are 20 times more frequent than successful suicides. Considering these facts and the socio-economic, environmental and health problems that Pakistan faces today, it is essential to investigate the rise in suicides amongst the youth of this nation. Over three years alone, poverty and unemployment in Pakistan has been steadily increasing. If one considers the UNDP definition of poverty, ie, those earning $2 per day or less, then nearly 85% of the population is currently living under the poverty line; and if one takes the government and World Bank definition ($1 or less per day) then 40% is currently living below the poverty line. Regardless of which figure one takes, according to Human Development Report 2002, the poverty situation in Pakistan is extremely severe and encompassing anywhere from 58-123m people. According to the Social Policy Development Center (SPDC) Report 2002, the unemployment figures are not too encouraging either, as government reports indicate that nearly 8% of the current work force is unemployed, with over 350,000 workers being laid off over the past three years alone. A study of Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI) undertaken by these authors, a first of its kind, on suicide cases reported in the province of Sindh over a period of four months, was designed to ascertain the predisposing factors that may have a direct, or indirect correlation with the increase in suicide rates among the youth. The objective of this study is to determine if poverty, unemployment and socio-economic conditions are associated with the rise in suicides, or if there are other factors that may account for such happenings. Since there is no database available that has documented the number of suicides in Pakistan, and the added fact that it is illegal to attempt suicide, no government survey has encompassed this aspect. Hence, the data of the 366 cases of attempted suicides was collected from local media reports published in various newspapers over a four-month period (September-December 2002). All the relevant information was obtained from articles, reports and stories published in Sindhi newspapers, which have the widest network of reports of any newspaper in Pakistan. The age, sex, religion, location and marital status of suicide victims, the mode of suicide and reasons given for attempting suicide were obtained from the reports and broadly divided into six categories for reasons, namely; social, economic, failure in love, police torture, mental disorder and those with unreported reasons. The method used was also divided into categories as reported by the newspapers for calculating attempted or completed suicides. The results of the study reveal that a total of 366 attempted suicides were reported in Sindhi dailies, over a period of four months (September-December 2002), of which 227 (62%) perished, while 139 (38%) survived. Of the total who attempted suicide, 257 (70%) were males and 109 (30%) females, showing a predominant trend of the higher rate of suicides among males. Among the 366 victims of attempted suicide, the vast majority was Muslim (87%), while the remaining were Hindus. As for the marital status of those who attempted suicide, 187 (51%) were single, 172 (47%) were married and only 7 (2%) were divorced (Table 2). The vast majority of those who attempted suicide were young, as 229 (63%) were in the 15-24 years age category and 117 (32%) in the 25-45 years age category. At the same time, this study showed that 15 (4%) of the individuals who attempted suicide were young children below the age of 14 years. Regarding the regional distribution of the reported suicides identified by this study, 302 cases (83%) were from the rural areas of Sindh, with the highest being in Sanghar (19%), Dadu (15%) and Larkana (10%). Only 17% of the total attempted suicides occurred in the urban centers of Sindh, with the highest number reported in Karachi (36%), followed by Dadu and Larkana. As for the reasons allocated by the suicide victims, this study reveals that economic and social injustices played the main role in this act, as 192 (52%) claimed that poverty and/or unemployment had driven them to suicide. 117 (32%) claimed that social exclusion and pressures had driven them to suicide. Other reasons elucidated in this study included, failure in love (11%), mental disorder (3%), and police torture and unreported (1%, each). The most popular method to attempt suicide, chosen by victims was the consumption of any household poison (40%), followed by specific use of pesticides, as the poison of choice (27%). Hanging and shooting oneself (12% and 11%, respectively) were the next most common modes of attempting suicide. Other methods included drowning, cutting and burning oneself. Upon further analysis of the findings, when only looking at the committed suicides, this study does not show any significant deviation from the results of the overall attempted suicide cases. Of the 227 who committed suicides, 75% were males, 85% Muslim and 82% were from the rural areas of Sindh. In addition, the study also shows that of the 227 suicides, 52% were unmarried, 47% were married and only 1% were either widowed, or divorced. The age-wise distribution pattern among the 227 individuals who completed suicide also shows a similar trend, in that 61% belonged to the youth age category, 34% were between the ages of 25-45 years, 3% were young children (aged below 14 years) and only 2% above the age of 46 years. Such is the case throughout Pakistan, but none more prevalent than in rural Sindh, where large areas have been deprived of their basic rights of access to fundamental needs to ensure a quality life. Districts like Sanghar, which have one of the highest literacy ratios in Sindh, are amongst those areas with the highest deprivation index (SPDC Report 2002). Not surprisingly so, of the reported suicides in the rural sectors discussed in this study, Sanghar tops the list with 18.5%. Badin, Mirpurkhas, Thatta, Tharparkar, Jacobabad and Ghottki also have the highest deprivation value and together with Sanghar constitute 39% of the reported suicides in the rural sector of Sindh. SPDC Report 2002 says that other districts, like Dadu, Larkana, Khairpur, Nowshera Feroze, Nawabshah, Sukkur and Shikarpur constitute a group whose deprivation index is designated as 'medium'. The study under discussion cumulatively reports 51% of suicides that occurred within the stipulated period. In other words, 89% of the reported suicides in this study are from regions within Sindh that have a 'high' or 'medium' deprivation index. Such findings, indeed, reflect the skewed nature of development in Pakistan and strengthen the hypothesis that, aside from being a mental disorder, the high rate of suicides amongst the young, at least in Sindh, may be attributed to the poor socio-economic status and lack of opportunities and employment. To date, the policymakers have failed to develop employment-oriented budgets or fiscal systems. Thousands of people have been laid off from their, once thought of as secure jobs, with the government justifying its act by claiming that these appointments were to start with politically motivated; and second, due to the economic recession, 'down-sizing' was the only way to make ends meet in the government expenditure sector. If these arguments are to be believed than one must argue that alternative arrangements should have been made to ensure employment in different sectors before such "across the board" measures were implemented. More than 350,000 people lost their jobs over the past three years, in the name of downsizing, rightsizing and smart sizing. To date, the policymakers have failed to develop employment-oriented budgets or fiscal systems. The largest groups among the affected were the youths of Pakistan. Amazingly, Sindh contributes 65% to the national exchequer, yet receives less than 23% of the annual budgetary allocation. According to the Human Development Report for Pakistan (2003), rural Sindh has the lowest ranking for human development nationwide. As a result, numerous reports have ranked various districts of Sindh as the most deprived areas of Pakistan, where the populace does not have the bare minimum essentials to sustain a respectable livelihood, the cause of which is as confounding as the possible solutions. One can easily point to failed government policies, skewed towards urban, rather than rural, development, coupled with grossly mismanaged projects and programmes for poverty alleviation, as being the primary reason for the deplorable plight of rural Pakistan today. Yet, the problem seems to be the result of a cascade effect encompassing the former, as well as, lack of proper and fair representation in the local, provincial and national governments, actions of vested interest groups, illiteracy and lack of awareness resulting in exploitation and abuse of the system. The people, too, seem to have accepted their fate and are more willing to fight amongst themselves, than to unite and advocate for the common cause of sustained development and livelihoods and improved infrastructure. The answer, therefore, is as complex as the problem itself, with the youth bearing the brunt of the ineptness to address these issues. The study under discussion has revealed that the main causes, which contribute to this effect, are: financial constraints, unemployment, or poverty. Other researchers have also reported that of the people who committed suicide over the past 10 years, most were either laid off work or lost their source of livelihood, due to decades of political instability and economic chaos. Increasing poverty is forcing people even to the extent of committing suicides. Price hikes have made life impossible--never was this statement more true than it is today. A huge group off middle class, the entire lower middle class and lower class are unable to purchase the basic necessities of life. These price hikes are not likely to be for the legislators and the elite; it is always the masses that must shoulder these burdens. As far as employment is concerned, it does not only mean that Pakistan is producing less than what it can, but that the many people seeking jobs cannot find any. Large families depend on the income of all the members of the family and there are no safety nets, or unemployment benefits. Unemployment has severe repercussions for the family involved, and women and children are most vulnerable. This is the situation in Pakistan, where the military government has been propagating its role as a Welfare State by focusing on development. Yet, government schemes, such as poverty alleviation fund and the repeated announcements that the economy of the country is now on track and even certification from IFIs has not trickled down to the people who need it most, but instead are limited in focus and are often badly implemented. This is not to say that these schemes do not have potential, or that the sector the government is focusing on does not need reform and restructuring, but it is to make the point that restructuring does not mean that government should give up its social responsibilities. The findings of this study highlight the urgency of the need for an effective youth policy, which enables a strong partnership between the public and private sectors. Furthermore, implementation of affective sustainable livelihood programmes in the most vulnerable areas must be assured by these sectors, through transparency and across-the-board accountability, as the first step in addressing the socio-economic problems of Pakistan, thereby curbing the suicide rate. In addition, subsequent, more comprehensive studies must be carried out to determine the suicide rates among the youth in Pakistan, and to ascertain the impact of these programmes through follow-up studies/surveys.
Sanctity of 'nikahnama' (marriage contract) is tarnished when police unlawfully demand for its production before them from the couples moving out for work, socialization or fun and when the 'nikahkhwan' (the one who administers and registers the marriage contact between the coupIe) crosses out the column that gives the' bride the right to divorce without her genuine and informed consent. Law and moral ethics provide bride with this right and the 'nikahkhwan' takes it as granted to cross it out. This is a wrong practice. Brides and their parents and guardians should ensure that 'nikahnama' is filled in by the 'nikah' registrar in a legal manner and that ensures informed consent of the bride, which is mandatory for the 'nikah.' This column only deals with the police way of misusing the powers by demanding 'nikahnama.' Police highhandedness and violations of citizens' rights by them is nothing new' as police officials, despite being mostly half educated and ignorant of the laws that guarantee' fundamental civic liberties, are always given too much powers by Successive governments at the cost of laws and civil liberties. Despite being reportedly ‘corrupt' and having no understanding of the spirit of the laws, most of the police even enjoy the power to exercise the Hudood laws. They bargain with the criminals by offering them the facilitation whether they should be booked under common laws or under Hudood laws. Most of the criminals prefer not to be booked under Hudood laws, so they pay huge bribe to save them from Hudood and anti-terrorism laws. Recently, media covered a painful story telling that some gangsters, posing as CIA Rawalpindi police' officials, stopped a couple in the Shamsabad public park and demanded 'nikahnama' and threatened the couple to send them to police lock up. The frightened husband was asked to bring the 'nikahnama' from home and till that time her wife would be in their custody. When the husband of that ill-fated housewife reached the park, he found nothing there. He approached the nearest police station and reported the incident and he was, told that none of the police officials brought any such woman to the police station. When the shattered husband reached home after searching her for hours and hours, he found her wife broken and destroyed. Why did it happen? The answer is simple. Police always demand 'nikahnama' and threaten couples while on their way even on the roads in the federal capital, particularly' from couples on the drive on the Shakarparian-Lotus Lake road and on the road leading to Murree. The situation in the provinces on this count is the worst. Dhokri and Bhara Kahu police check posts in the capital are the places where usually, 'police detain couples, coerced them to pay them bribe. Now the gangsters have also started similar tactics. Reports regarding police officials involved in raping women, at police station or their 'save houses' (private torture centres run by certain police officials) approaching them to lodge any complaint, are also seen in media or heard through the victims. A married woman victim told a reporter that she was threatened by staff of Taxila city police station if she did not extended sexual gratification, she along with her husband would be charged for theft. Another novel tactics of our police is that they blackmail people by charging them of being drunk by mouth sniffing. This practice is used to extort money from them. Even those who take homeopathic medicines containing alcohol are blackmailed. Mouth sniffing for alcohol testing has no legal ground. This is again an illegal third degree method of police harassment. Both mouth sniffing and demand for 'nikahnama' are serious violations 'of the law. Superintendent of Police (SP) Islamabad Mahboob Aslam on Tuesday warned all police stations to ensure that policemen at the pickets should not practice illegal tactics such as mouth-sniffing and demand for 'nikahnama' from the couples. But very next day on Wednesday, policemen at Dhokri police picket demanded "nikahnama' from the same SP Mahboob Aslam while he was on the move with his wife in a private car. The SP then had to introduce himself. He suspended three police officials and announced to start random checks of such police pickets. Even if a citizen male or female is going with a friend either woman or man, no police official has the right to stop them unless they are creating law and order situation or disturbing public peace or if they are identified as criminal suspects. Whenever any policeman is suspended for negligence or crime, he is restored after some days. The three officials suspended by SP Mahboob Aslam would soon be re stored. No policeman is even convicted for killing a citizen by torture at police station or outside police station. We make tall claims of good governance and police re forms. Police could not be re formed in this country unless they are subjected to continuous public accountability. There should be a powerful citizens' commission with judicial powers where people could lodge complaints against police violating fundamental rights of the people.
Political impediments are unlikely to allow operationalisation of the concept in its present form In March this year the Indian army leaked news about its new war doctrine called “cold start” Although details of the concept remain classified, what has been released provides some valuable insights. Notwithstanding the optimistic conclusions of most Indian analysts who have conducted a preliminary analysis of the new doctrine, it seems highly futuristic. The doctrine’s overriding goal seems to be to enhance the Indian military’s offensive punch by transforming the military into a more mobile, technologically effective group. Given that in present-day wars, technological superiority and its effective use, and not excessive manpower prove decisive, this is a step in the right direction. For the Indian military, this means addressing what is perhaps its biggest weakness – lengthy mobilisation time spanning between two to three weeks. The new doctrine will allow the Indian military to plan and execute a swift and targeted surprise offensive, something that is not possible under the current Indian war doctrine. In this context, the concept is revolutionary (not to be confused with revolution in military affairs) and could result in a quantum leap in India’s war-fighting capabilities. However, there are serious operational and political impediments to the plan’s implementation. They are likely to keep it dormant for the foreseeable future. The concept demands near-perfect operational execution for its success. There exists a considerable gap between current Indian capabilities and what is required to make cold-start executable. Two are very important to any fast-paced, targeted military offensive: close air support and logistic support. The cold start strategy relies on eight “integrated battle groups” conducting swift-targeted operations inside Pakistani territory. The very concept implies the use of highly mechanised units (artillery, armour) on the ground with a key role for integrated air support. To ensure the success of any such operation, the IAF would have to establish complete air superiority and provide continuous close air support to army units on the ground. With the existing force structure, the IAF is unlikely to achieve this. As Brig. Shaukat Qadir pointed out (“Cold Start: the nuclear side” – Daily Times, May 16, 2004) “although the PAF is greatly outnumbered by the IAF, when supported by our air defense forces, fighting within our own air space, the PAF could extract an unacceptable price from the IAF” This is especially true since under the new concept, where ground movement and air operations would have to be concurrent, the IAF would be unable to precede an army offensive in order to establish air superiority as it can afford to do at present. Most analysts believe the IAF would require around 70 combat squadrons in order to command complete supremacy in the skies, something that is extremely unlikely to materialise in the near future. Second, an essential aspect of fast-paced, mechanised military operations is the rapid logistic support to fighting units. The Indian army’s current logistic support is mainly ground-based. Given the pace of operations under cold start, a ground-based capability, incapable of timely cross-country transportation, cannot suffice. The concept necessitates an effective role for Army aviation and IAF transport helicopters. Here, the Indian military’s capabilities are modest and unless upgraded manifold, will leave the cold start concept hamstrung, and too risky to be executed. Considering India’s projected military build up, operational impediments to cold start are likely to be overcome, but at their own pace. But the political impediments to the implementation of cold start are even greater. Indeed, to overcome them New Delhi would need to overhaul its political thinking. The first is the issue of civilian control over India’s military. India’s political leadership maintains complete control over the military to the extent that the latter’s operational planning and effectiveness is said to be compromised. In order for the cold start concept to be operationally effective, the country’s leadership would have to sanction military action ex-ante, once the decision to mobilise has been taken. The military commanders will have a free (at least freer) hand to unleash full combat potential upfront, without requiring periodic clearances from the DoD. Although ex-ante political approval does not alter the fundamental civil-military equation, the fact is that this would represent increased operational autonomy for the military, which the Indian military has long desired. Since the Centre remains obsessed with maintaining complete control over the military, it is not likely to accept any development that hints at this tight control giving way – at least not under its current mindset. Second, cold start would require a change in New Delhi’s mindset as far as war objectives go. The issue here is that of losing its own territory to the enemy. Indian views highlight that Indian leadership’s principal concern in all previous wars has been to not lose its own territory to the enemy (this is of course disputed by the Pakistani strategic enclave). Looking at cold start from this prism provides another reason to doubt if the leadership would be amenable to such a doctrine. In a military conflict where disparity between the two sides is not overwhelming, mobile warfare can result in rapid changes in territorial control. For India, cold start would blur the division between its strike corps and defensive formations. What have traditionally been defensive formations could now be used for offensive operations. In addition to the frequent change in positions, in such operations, directions of attack change frequently as well, and can result in loss of territory even for the military set to achieve its objective on the whole. Given the capabilities of Pakistan and India, and presuming that Pakistan alters its war-fighting formations to meet the cold start challenge, a conventional war could very well result in a loss of limited territory for India. This would in no way be acceptable to any Indian government, given the massive political fallout from such a development. Finally, and most important, is the leadership’s unwillingness to accept the possibility of a nuclear retaliation from Pakistan. Contrary to what the Indian strategists seem to believe, cold start would necessitate that India flirt with Pakistan’s nuclear threshold. There are two aspects to it. First, if Indian forces carry out deep long-range strikes to inflict harm on Pakistani reserves in order to negate it an opportunity to retaliate strategically, a nuclear retaliation would become a realistic possibility. Second, and less talked about is the fact that even a limited Indian operation cannot guarantee that Pakistan will not consider the nuclear option, or at least threaten to do so. The Indians have argued that Pakistan has proved through Kargil that a limited conflict is possible without tampering with the nuclear red lines. However, while that is so for Pakistan, it does not hold for India. This stems from the fact that Pakistan’s involvement in Kargil or attacks in Kashmir remain a question mark. Pakistan’s denial of any active role absolves it of direct involvement, making Kashmiri struggle groups and Pakistan (the state) two independent targets. This warrants an Indian attack against the struggle groups and not Pakistan (the state). As an Indian strike under cold start would be officially sanctioned and acknowledged, Pakistan’s retaliation against India (the state) would be warranted. Granted, a single or even two or three surgical strikes are not likely to bring unconventional retaliation. But it is almost certain to prompt Pakistan to issue nuclear threats in order to bring international pressure to bear on New Delhi, deterring it from conducting repeat strikes. The point is that cold start, whether limited in its execution or otherwise, will end up inducing a nuclear dimension to the conflict. No political leadership would be willing to face such a situation, especially if it is almost certain to develop as part of an offensive strategy. If Indian military’s strength could be brought in line with what cold start envisions, the concept could potentially enhance Indian military’s operational effectiveness. Yet, political impediments are unlikely to allow operationalisation of the concept in its present form. And it is just as well, given that this Pakistan-specific doctrine would upset the balance of power between the two neighbours. Moeed Yusuf is a Consultant on Economic Policy at the Sustainable Development Policy Institute in Islamabad.
It was after the government’s massive overreaction in anticipation of Mr Sharif’s arrival that his reception party gathered momentum. After all, the government itself had provided the Sharifs’ well-wishers what they were desperate for — publicity It took the authorities only 87 The deportation ended the month-long hype about Mr Sharif’s anticipated arrival in the country. Analysing the event in retrospect, two major questions need to be addressed. Why did Mr Sharif decide to return? And what led to the government’s decision to deport him — and was it the right choice? Mr Sharif’s decision to return was an astute political move. He correctly calculated that there were only three options available to the government in dealing with him — deportation, arrest and jail or allowing him to go free. He stood to gain from all three. The government decided to deport him. This now gives him an opportunity to portray his sincerity to the people of Pakistan in general and his supporters in particular. One can now expect rampant political rhetoric to regain public support from the Sharif camp. Among other issues, Shahbaz Sharif will be looking to highlight his proclaimed willingness to face charges and imprisonment upon arrival, through which he will seek to revise the impression that the Sharifs had deserted their supporters in a ‘cowardly’ act to save their own skins. In essence, the move to ‘transit’ Pakistan is sure to bring the Sharifs future political gains. The other option with the government was to arrest Mr Sharif and follow up on all charges against him. This might not have been Mr Sharif’s preferred option since it would have meant spending a considerable amount of time in jail. But politically, this could have brought lasting dividends to his party. Given that there are no charges of any consequence against Mr Sharif and most of them seem politically motivated, we would most likely have had a political hero return from behind the bars once the political set-up changed. This would have provided a new life to a party that is currently in the doldrums. The final option was the dream scenario for Mr Sharif. He could have enjoyed the streets of Lahore while setting the ground for a reinvigorated party and eyeing the PM house, either for himself or his brother. But that option was already dismissed when the supreme court threw out his petitions and adjudged that while he could not be stopped from entering the country, the cases against him will not be quashed. In light of the above, some recent reports signalling that Mr Sharif’s arrival was preceded by an underhand deal, must be discounted. Considering that he would have gained politically, in varying degrees, no matter how he was dealt with by the authorities, it made no sense for him to cut a deal. His arrival in Lahore was indeed a well-calculated political move. But why did the government respond in the way that it did? This is important since the deportation has elicited much criticism. The fact is that the government took the route that was in its best interest. Political considerations left the government with little choice but to deport Mr Sharif. Two major factors led to the decision. First, allowing Mr Sharif into the country, regardless of whether he was arrested or set free, implied the de facto expiration of whatever agreement the government had with the Sharifs. The government would have accepted the fact that either the agreement did not exist or it was not legally tenable. More than causing embarrassment to the authorities, this would have meant that the other Sharifs were free to enter the country. This would also have led to the return of Nawaz Sharif, which would have meant a new political challenge for Musharraf. In the current political situation, where Musharraf is toying with every idea he can think of to consolidate his position after he gives up his uniform (if he does) and where rumours about a major political change are rampant, Musharraf is desperate to evade further political distractions. Second, the propensity of those advising Musharraf to see the Sharifs stay away. Key partners in the current coalition, like the Chaudhrys, were once Sharif loyalists. Sharifs return to strength, no matter how dawdling, would have meant the end of the political innings for most of them. Even so, the government shot itself in the foot in the way it went about executing the plan. Mr Sharif is a political minnow. There was no way his arrival would have attracted significant crowds to the streets. Nor would PMLN activists have caused any major law and order problem. All this could have taken place only in one scenario — if the government had overreacted to the situation and exercised unnecessary heavy-handedness. This is exactly what the government forced itself into. There was little excitement in the streets of Lahore a week before Mr Sharif’s arrival. Even the PMLN cadres had not been fully mobilised at that point. All this changed as soon as the government began its preparations, which were reminiscent of a classic military style administrative crackdown. Entry points to Lahore were blocked and thorough security checks were exercised to identify PMLN supporters. Hundreds of them were arrested; the electronic and print media were pressurised including forceful closure of the CNN’s Lahore office; hijacking alerts were put in place; the Lahore airport was sealed for all non-travellers on the day Mr Sharif was to arrive; cameras were banned and confiscated and some journalists detained at the scene of his arrival. It was after the government’s massive overreaction in anticipation of Mr Sharif’s arrival that his reception party gathered momentum. After all, the government itself had provided the Sharifs’ well-wishers what they were desperate for — publicity. What was otherwise an event that deserved little more than a few press reports was transformed into breaking news. The government made a mistake that not only proved harmful to the country’s image, but will also surely come back to haunt it politically. Moeed Yusuf is a consultant on economic policy at the Sustainable Development Policy Institute in Islamabad. These views are his own
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In each agreement that the South is negotiating, it has important bargaining chips. Thus just as it is important to know the underlying reality of who one is negotiating with, it is equally important to know the strengths and weaknesses of the negotiating hand the South is working with. In other words, it is important to carefully work out the costs and benefits of the negotiated positions. Sometimes these may be quite different for what intuitively appears to be the situation. Having said that, in many cases, the South may simply be in a situation of damage control because they already signed the dotted line in the UR agreement and in subsequent understandings. Thus, they are in a situation of trying to make the best of a bad situation with the leverage they still have in hand.