Shaheen Rafi Khan
shaheen@sdpi.org
The absence of constitutional rule and democratic pluralism in Pakistan reflects institutional failure at many levels. First, alternating military and civilian rule has undermined institutional growth. Second, efforts at institution building lack an indigenous context and, hence, credibility. Third, geo-strategic imperatives have diffused external efforts at promoting democratization. This inherent duality is reflected in the support to and the perpetuation of military regimes. Consequently the ‘transitional’ character of democracy in Pakistan is more conducive to conflict than to peace building.
Pakistan does not have an enduring democratic tradition. During its 60-year existence it has experienced three extended periods of military rule, interspersed with short spells of democratic government.
Though elections were held periodically, they usually reflected regional populist loyalties. Civilian and military government alternated with each other. No elected government has ever served out its term The difference between feudal leaders who wear uniforms and those in civilian clothes is in their constituencies, not in their commitment to a pluralistic process as we understand it. (Kissinger, H.A. 2008)
One view is that frequent military interventions, with the army linked in a security nexus with the US, have stymied the democratic process in Pakistan. By centralizing power and authority military rule has, almost axiomatically, led to the systemic destruction of legislative, judicial and executive institutions. By the same token the media and civil society have found their space constricted. The idea is that if such institutions are allowed to endure -- no matter how imperfect at inception -- they will, in time, produce mature leadership, good governance and accountability. These attributes are vital to intra and interstate peace. So the initial premise is that the lack of electoral continuity has prevented democratic evolution. In its stead authoritarian regimes have masqueraded under various quasi-constitutional facades.
[Pakistan has seen] 61 years of varied ruling structures embracing martial law, khaki (army) democracy and dictatorial democracy. Legitimizing frameworks have ranged from provisional constitutional orders, hurriedly passed constitutional amendments to military coups legitimized by the doctrine of necessity. (Zehra, N. 2008)
The outcome has been constitutional, economic, security, ideological and sociological disasters for Pakistan. Economic policies have delivered growth without addressing poverty or income inequality. Such policies have combined with under-spending on education and health to create a palpable sense of injustice and deprivation. Inequities are further compounded by the interweaving of religious and secular law (with, among other things, its inherent gender biases), the arbitrary enforcement of law and absence of judicial recourse, and the supremacy of federalism with its attendant appropriation of provincial resources. In turn, economic, social and judicial excesses have bred secular and religious militancy. While the latter has both global (Al Qaeda) and cross-border (Taleban) origins, the alienation engendered by national policies provides fertile grounds for such movements to burgeon. A culture of crime, conflict and confrontation pervades Pakistani society today.
Having said that, Pakistan has also enjoyed limited spells of democratic rule. It is fair to ask whether this has established a foundation for more enduring institutions to emerge.1 The jury tends to rule negatively on this. According to the IDRC (2008):
Transitions to democracy are also often inconclusive and the resulting states of ‘semi-democracy’ can be more conflict-prone than either genuine democracies or full-blown autocracies. While they provide an impetus for political contestation and the organization of interests, these systems typically lack institutional mechanisms for interest mediation, much less the capacity to address the underlying grievances. Especially in ‘politically difficult environments’, where violent conflict is a recent memory or where social, political, or ethnic tensions are running high, this can make for an explosive mixture.
As validation, Pakistan’s history of democratic rule suggests that elected governments have fared no better than their military counterparts. These periods have been prone to economic mismanagement, policy reversals, inter-provincial discord and the miscarriage of justice. Further, civilian governments have aggressively instigated cross-border provocations with India, inviting damaging reprisals. In a comparative sense, inter and intrastate violence has been an endemic feature across regimes. At first glance, one can attribute these outcomes to the transitional character of democracy – while space has been created for ‘political contestation’, these governments have not been able to advance to the state of institutional maturation where ‘interest mediation’ becomes possible and national interests subsume parochial concerns.
A dynastic-feudal politics prevails where populism masks the surgical divide between the politicians and their constituents. Internal party decisions flow through hierarchical channels rather than through consultative processes. |
The explanation for the intermittent nature of democratic rule and the failure to institute pluralistic processes partly lies in the military-executive nexus. The army represents a unified chain of command, which has remained intact even during times of crisis such as the loss of Bangladesh in 1970 and the withdrawal from Kargil in 1999. It has maintained a stranglehold over the country’s economic resources, and, over time, through a process of resource capture, has increased these resources, establishing an economic base at par with that of a large global corporation.2 To a large extent, the army’s economic and political clout derives from its strategic alliance with the US and other western powers, initially in the fight against communism and, more recently, against the terrorist threat. It also maintains a mutually reinforcing relationship with the executive branch with a similar hierarchical mindset inherited from its colonial past. However, over time, tensions have started to emerge as the military has begun to take over and manage civilian ministries, state industries and public utilities.
Whether through the agency of the executive or through direct intervention, the military’s control over the legislative and judicial branches of government has had the most emasculating effects on the growth of democratic pluralism. Structural weaknesses within the political parties have left them vulnerable to military takeovers. In other words, these parties are defined by their feudal constructions or by their ethnic, religious and sectarian divisions. A dynastic-feudal politics prevails where populism masks the surgical divide between the politicians and their constituents. Internal party decisions flow through hierarchical channels rather than through consultative processes.
The two feudal-type organizations – the military and the major political parties – have more of the character of those among Italian city states during the Renaissance described by Machiavelli than of the party politics of traditional democracies. The difference between feudal leaders who wear uniforms and those in civilian clothes is in their constituencies, not in their commitment to a pluralistic process as we understand it. (Kissinger, H.A. 2008)
The army has been quick to exploit political fissures. Opposition parties have been complicit in military takeovers, often instigating the process through informal negotiations. On the face of it, the legislature has demonstrated a measure of independence; for instance, Nawaz Sharif (1997-1999) dismissed one chief of army staff and was on the verge of throwing out another when his government was dislodged. However, such displays of independence are driven by power imperatives rather than the public weal. Thus, in the famous Sajjad Ali Shah case (1998), in a patent show of authority, Nawaz Sharif ordered his henchmen to storm the Supreme Court. His right-wing sympathies led to efforts to impose Sharia law, a move aborted by the army which overthrew him in a coup in 1999. Benazir Bhutto and her consort, Asif Zardari, although relatively secular, were no less autocratic. Ultimately, they too fell from grace, charged with crimes ranging from corruption to the outright murder of family members in an internecine power struggle. Much as in Renaissance Italy, factional politics has prevailed over constitutionalism, leading to destabilizing alliances with the military.
The judiciary, for the most part, has remained subservient to both military and civilian governments, legitimizing extra-constitutional acts through diverse constitutional amendments and the infamous and much invoked ‘doctrine of necessity.’ A corollary to the loss of judicial independence has been the traditionally low importance given to public litigation against economic, social and human rights excesses. Similarly, the media has been severely repressed and civil society groups are denied access to the corridors of power, unlike their counterparts across the border. Thus, the three entities with the strongest penchant for constitutionalism have traditionally been the most marginalized.
Not surprisingly, growth oriented economic policies, unconstrained by fiscal accountability, have widened income disparities. There is no evidence that suggests that elected governments have been more successful in eliminating poverty or income inequality than their military counterparts. In the latter case, growth performance has been better (easier to impose taxation and make hard economic decisions) but without the reputed ‘trickle down’ effects. The military actually comes out ahead in social legislation, having successfully modernized family laws, reduced gender disparities and tempered the harsher aspects of Islamic law. In contrast, through intent or religious intimidation, civilian governments have only paid lip service to progressive social legislation and empowerment.
Political instability breeds both intra and inter state conflict, which tend to be linked. The several manifestations of intra-state conflict are sectarian conflict, crime, militancy (of the Al Qaeda and Taleban varieties), dissident movements and civil unrest. A relevant research question then is: “what is the correlation between these various types of conflict, political instability and regime change?”
A series of related and unrelated events in the recent past, highlighted by the dismissal of the Supreme Court bench, appear to have nudged Pakistan toward a constitutional course. Do these changes presage more tangible and long-lasting political change?
First, donors launched a series of initiatives aimed at generating constitutional awareness and responsibility, governance improvements, judicial reform, departmental strengthening and political decentralization. Concurrent economic initiatives include fiscal decentralization and improvements in fiscal governance. The key donors (mostly multilateral) are the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the UNDP, the European Union and USAID. It may be added that the bulk of these initiatives occurred under a military dispensation with a focus on institutional strengthening. It can be argued that regime change was never an intended outcome of these reforms; a key objective was to create a stable political and socio-economic climate in Pakistan, aimed at keeping the rising threat of religious fundamentalism and militancy at bay. Essentially, this has bred duality where efforts to give democratic impulses material shape co-exist with the acceptance of barely concealed authoritarianism. Thus, foreign governments obsessed with the war on terror have tended not to cavil too much about democratic transgressions which have taken the form of engineered elections, human rights violations, and the suppression of the media and judiciary.
Second, over the past three years or so, the media has been given unprecedented rein, allowing open debate and discussion on a wide range of subjects. However, the frequent disclosures of government misdemeanors forced a reconsideration and an attempt to circumscribe press freedoms.3 But having let the proverbial genie out of the bottle, the attempt has not entirely succeeded.
Third, the Musharraf government adopted the mantra of ‘enlightened moderation.’ While the intent was to convince the west of its secular credentials, rising anti-west sentiment combined with the entrenched strength of the militants made compromises necessary. Such compromises diluted the progressive thrust of social legislation.4 The government did, however, increase women’s representation in the legislature, the armed forces and in government departments. Civil society has latched on to such opportunities and been relentless in pushing its social and political agenda. Unlike its Indian counterparts, it lacks a direct entree in decision making circles but its network of carefully crafted alliances and sustained advocacy have begun to give it both space and influence in policy circles.
Musharraf overplayed his hand in dismissing the Chief Justice in September 2007. It was a miscalculation which underestimated the strength of an aware and aggressive polity. The immediate cause was a series of judgments in the public interest and against executive authority. The consequent civil unrest, led by the legal community and civil society activists, supported by the media, led to his reinstatement. Shortly thereafter Musharraf forced his own re-election for another 5-year term, which was challenged in the Supreme Court. Anticipating a negative judgment, Musharraf declared a state of emergency and dismissed the entire Supreme Court bench. The decision was a disastrous one and isolated him politically. The national unrest that followed was matched by censure from western governments, which are beginning to consider legislative options in the fight against terrorism.
Benazir Bhutto’s assassination garnered considerable support for the PPP, which won the most seats in a closely monitored election — the King’s party lost handily. Subsequently the two main parties, the PML-N and the PPP, which traditionally have been at loggerheads, united to form a national government. With a two thirds majority the elected government is contemplating three measures to circumscribe presidential powers. The first is to reinstate the Supreme Court bench; it has already ensured the release of the judges from house confinement. Second, it aims to vote out Article 52 (B) of the constitution, which empowers the president to dismiss parliament and call new elections. Third, it intends to take away the president’s power to appoint the chief of army staff and the provincial governors. A fourth move to impeach the president is internally contested; however, the reinstated judges’ may preempt such a move by declaring the presidential elections unconstitutional.
While the future brings opportunities it also presents many risks. The elected government’s survival will depend on whether it can move beyond vendettas and factional politics into the realm of public policy making. The challenges are enormous, ranging from the war on terror, to inflation, the scarcity of food, energy and water and crime. In the institutional development context, the government will need to respect judicial autonomy, make space for civil society, respect media freedoms, decentralize decision making authority to the provinces and divide national resources more equitably. Under the present circumstances, these are minimum prerequisites for political stability.
1 The first elected (Bhutto) government lasted seven years (1972-77). The Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif governments each shared power twice during the late eighties and nineties. Without exception, every elected government was dismissed before serving its term, either through executive fiat or martial law.
3 In the shape of the Press and Electronic Media Regulatory Ordinance (PEMRA).
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