Pakistan and India have commenced on yet another effort for settling their outstanding disputes. An unprecedented level of optimism has surrounded the latest initiative. Official statements from both sides and comments from most analysts suggest that there is something unique about the current lot of white doves being released from both sides; it is likely that this time the two sides will move past the deadlock. Both parties are being credited with a change of mindset in the desired direction. Great hope has been generated by India's upfront acceptance to discuss Kashmir, Musharraf's four-step proposal, and the ceasefire along the LoC. Unfortunately, much of this optimism is unwarranted.

It is agreed among South Asian analysts that any peaceful solution to Kashmir can only come about if both sides alter their traditional maximalist positions on the issue. There are few, if any, who deny that the current stance of the two sides on Kashmir renders the issue irreconcilable. It would follow from the above that if both sides continue to hold fast to their inflexible claims, there is little hope of breaking the deadlock. However, despite the fact that there is no indication of any flexibility from either side, there is a strong sense that the current impetus might lead to a peaceful end.

Pakistan's unchanged position is obvious from the recent official statements, which have made it clear that peace between the two South Asian neighbours remains linked to a compromise on Kashmir. Musharraf's four-step formula is very reasonable, but only if one examines it from the Pakistani perspective. His proposal necessitates a compromise on the status quo, an outcome that New Delhi is not even willing to consider. And Pakistan's acceptance of a ceasefire along the LoC is also inconsequential, given that it only addresses the shelling across the LoC. Pakistan's willingness to accept any solution other than transforming the LoC into a permanent border has been revealed time and again in the recent past. Present Pakistani overtures are not inconsistent with this position. In fact, they only reinforce Pakistan's demand to compromise on the status quo.

New Delhi remains equally entrenched in its traditional stance on the issue. India's efforts to take advantage of the ceasefire by stepping up the construction of the fence along the LoC will only dim the prospects of an acceptable compromise. An erected fence virtually means that any option but turning the LOC into an international border would no longer remain in the pipeline. For only the utopians could imagine India softening its traditional stance and bringing down the fence after having erected it if a compromise necessitates such an action in the future.

Furthermore, contrary to recent press reports that seem to indicate that both states are exhausted because of their involvement in Kashmir, personal conversations with some Indian intellectuals suggest that New Delhi believes it is within reach of subduing the insurgency in Kashmir. It is hard to imagine India agreeing to shimmy down from its maximalist position on the conflict amid such a mindset.

Hence, the spontaneous acceptance of both sides to engage in another peace dialogue must be a result of international pressure where an aversion to peace talks would have provided a diplomatic victory to the other side. As for the widespread optimism on the sidelines, that is something, which is witnessed every time such an effort is made. For even an agreement to talk is more than what the two sides have managed for most of their history.

But such optimism is counterproductive in that it raises hopes of an outcome that is nowhere in the making. Consequently, it makes inevitable a post-negotiations blame game from both sides, as they attempt to pin down the culpability for shattering the masses' hopes on the adversary.

Any Pakistan-India peace initiative that is held hostage to negotiations on Kashmir, as this one is, must be preceded by lengthy drawn-out groundwork to prepare the masses for a solution in which both sides meet the other halfway. Current political realities simply do not allow governments in both countries, whether civilian or military, to alter their respective traditional positions. Until and unless a concentrated conscious effort is made by authorities on both sides to remove the deep-rooted mistrust between the two nations, one can expect little from the peace efforts.

Expecting the current initiative to result in a historic breakthrough is wishful. What can, however, be achieved from this opportunity is for both sides to agree to developing a constituency among their respective citizens that will accept a mutually agreeable compromise on the issue. Restoring air and road links, and cricketing ties will help. But far more important is the need for both parties to attempt to remove the bias in the state-controlled media and school textbooks, and to alter the threat perception of the other side that the authorities in both countries are responsible for creating in the first place.

The above is a necessary prelude to a step-by-step process that could actually lead to lasting peace. Only after such an effort has been successfully undertaken can one really expect political realities to favour a genuine compromise that takes into account the interests of Pakistan, India, and the Kashmiri people. The next step ought to be Track-II diplomacy between designated officials, similar to the one conducted after the Lahore Declaration.

However, to conduct any such negotiations before developing a constituency willing to accept compromise as the Lahore Process allegedly did, would inevitably fail. Musharraf's four-step proposal could then conceivably be applied to the Track-II stage to find a mutually amenable solution, which when supported by the masses could bring the two sides to a workable compromise.

What I have suggested here is a long-term plan. But as the situation stands today, a lasting solution will necessarily require extreme patience. Taking the time to till the soils for a lasting solution ought to be preferable to grabbing every chance to be involved in a peace dialogue whose outcome is inevitable from the onset.

Until the two sides alter their traditional stance, the Kashmir issue will remain irreconcilable. And neither of the two parties can be realistically expected to give up their positions unless their country's populace is amenable to such a switch. That, in turn, can only be achieved by a conscious effort of the authorities to transform the general sentiment. The emphasis should be on changing the terms of the negotiations so that the Kashmir question does not remain diametrically opposed. For history has shown that irreconcilable issues are seldom resolved, but through an all-out war. Every failed Pakistan-India initiative only propels us closer to that dreaded threshold.