PEACE AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTH ASIA

THE WAY FORWARD

SANG-E-MEEL PUBLICATIONS
LAHORE — PAKISTAN
338.927 Sarah S. Aneel, U. T. Haroon, I. Niazi
Peace and Sustainable Development in
South Asia: The Way Forward/ Anthology
editors: Sarah S. Aneel, Uzma T. Haroon,
Imrana Niazi.-Lahore: Sang-e-Meel
1. South Asia - Sustainable Development.
I. Title.

© SDPI & Sang-e-Meel Publications
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be
reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted,
in any form or by any means, digital, electronic,
mechanical, or otherwise, without the prior permission
of the Publisher.

2012
Published by:
Niaz Ahmad
Sang-e-Meel Publications,
Lahore.

Edited by:
Sarah S. Aneel
Uzma T. Haroon
Imrana Niazi

Cover design by:
Nasir Khan

Disclaimer
The findings, interpretations and conclusions expressed
in this anthology are entirely those of the authors and
should not be attributed to the Sustainable Development
Policy Institute or Sang-e-Meel Publications. Any text
that has not been referenced or cited as per the Authors’
Guidelines is the sole responsibility of the author(s).

ISBN-10: 9 6 9 - 3 5 - 2 4 7 7 - 2

Sang-e-Meel Publications
Phones: 37220100-37228143 Fax: 37245101
http://www.sang-e-meel.com e-mail: smp@sang-e-meel.com
25 Shahrah-e-Pakistan (Lower Mall), Lahore-54000 PAKISTAN

Sustainable Development Policy Institute
38 Embassy Road, G-6/3, Islamabad
Tel: (92-51) 2278134, 2278136 Fax: 2278135
Table of Contents

Preface
Acknowledgements
About SDPI

Section I
Peace and Conflict

1. Federalism and Potential Conflicts: Reflections from Nepal—Bishnu Upreti 3
3. Shame and Fury—Ayesha Salman 47

Section II
Environment and Climate Change

4. Financing of Climate Change-related Actions: Recent Developments (Review of COP16 Outcomes) — Shafqat Kakakhel 67
5. Environmental Governance, Climate Change and the Role of Institutions in Pakistan—Aneel Salman


Section III
Governance and Urbanisation

7. Surveying Municipal Programme Engagement of the Urban Poor in South Asia's Mega Cities—Faisal Haq Shaheen

8. Running with the Power: Agricultural Land Acquisition by Foreign Investors in Pakistan and the Anti-Politics of the Development Project—Antonia Settle

9. The Need to Re-focus SAARC on an Urban South Asia—Faisal Haq Shaheen

Section IV
Water and Sanitation

10. Social Mobilisation: An Innovative Approach to Meeting Water-Sanitation Related MDGs in Bangladesh—Badiul Alam Majumdar and John Coonrod
11. Urban Storm Water Management – Capital and Community Considerations for Municipal Pakistan—Faisal Haq Shaheen 239

Section V
Food Security

12. Livelihood and Food Security for Socially Backward Communities: Constraints in Improving the Himalayan Mountain Ecosystem—Prakash Tiwari and Bhagwati Joshi 267

Annexure: Conference Programme 285
Preface

After the fall of the Berlin Wall, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the sixth Secretary General of the United Nations, said that there could be ‘no development without peace, and no peace without development.’ It seems quite a simple equation, however, this paradigm was ignored during the Cold War between the East and West and is still being ignored among various neighbours in South Asia.

The governments in South Asia cannot spend enough on social sector development as after debt servicing, the major part of their current account expenditures comprises of military expenditures for the purpose of ‘achieving peace and security’. This neglect of social sector development in turn gives rise to income inequality and skewed distribution of whatever little ‘development’ takes place. The story does not stop here. In the absence of strong social safety nets and in the presence of huge income inequalities, when perceptions of individual marginalisation, social exclusion, and poverty get a collective identity (whether based on ethnicity, creed, gender, class or region) it ultimately leads to social conflict and contestation over scarce resources.

In order to think through the way forward for peace and sustainable development in South Asia, the speakers at SDPI's Thirteenth Sustainable Development Conference (21-23 December 2010) deliberated upon various themes such as post-flood situation in Pakistan, food insecurity, energy and financial crisis, land acquisition, trade and financial liberalisation, social protection, eradication of violence against women, role of think tanks in peace and sustainable development, sound management of chemicals, climate change, religious diversity and labour issues amongst others.

This volume contains selected peer reviewed papers which were presented at the Conference and covers a range of topics that pertain to the issues discussed above. The volume proposes possible ways forward to reduce conflicts, achieve
peace and ultimately sustainable development by: managing disputes between federation and federating units; empowering internally displaced people and tackling the challenges of climate change by means of better governance, institutional financing and green buildings. The volume also proposes innovative solutions for achieving food and land security, and provision of water and sanitation through social mobilisation.

We sincerely hope that this anthology will lead to more research and subsequent studies will have more concrete recommendations and ideas for achieving peace and development together.

Dr. Abid Qaiyum Suleri  
Executive Director  
Sustainable Development Policy Institute  
Islamabad, Pakistan
Acknowledgements

Donors and Partners
SDPI’s Thirteenth Sustainable Development Conference was held in collaboration with the Royal Norwegian Embassy (RNE); UNDP’s Strengthening Democracy through Parliamentary Development (SDPD); Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES); Heinrich Boll Stiftung (HBS); International Labour Organisation (ILO); WaterAid Pakistan; United States Institute of Peace (USIP); Minorities Rights Group (MRG), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the UK Aid.

In order to ensure academic honesty, the Higher Education Commission (HEC), Pakistan provided SDPI access to their web-based plagiarism detection software.

Review Panel
This anthology was peer reviewed by experts having diverse academic and technical expertise. The independent reviews provided critical and honest comments that assisted the authors, as well as anthology editors, in making this publication as reliable and thorough as possible. The Institute wishes to thank the following individuals for their peer review:

Dr. Aneel Salman is a Fulbright Scholar who has a doctorate in Economics (USA) and recently completed his post-doc from the University of Berne, Switzerland. He has diverse research interests including climate and behavioural economics; institutional governance and public policy; and business management. He is the author of *A coastal ecosystem and a people in peril: The story of Keti Bunder in Pakistan* (2011).
Dr. Avanish Kumar is an Associate Professor and Chairperson (Public Policy and Management) at the Management Development Institute, Gurgaon, India.

Mr. Ayub Qutub is the Executive Director of the Pakistan Institute for Environment and Development Action Research (PIEDAR), Islamabad, Pakistan.

Dr. Babar Shahbaz is an Assistant Professor at the University of Agriculture, Faisalabad, Pakistan and a Visiting Fellow at SDPI.

Dr. Benktesh Dash Sharma is a forest carbon scientist with ten years experience in modeling and simulation of forest management, terrestrial carbon sequestration and land based GHG emission reduction and credit generation. He received his Ph.D. in Forest Resource Science from West Virginia University, USA.

Dr. Dibalok Singha, M.D, is a public health consultant and Executive Director of Dushtha Shasthya Kendra (DSK), Bangladesh.

Dr. Edward Gonzalez is a political scientist and the Democracy, Governance, and Reconstruction Officer at USAID, Lahore, Pakistan.

Mr. Faisal H. Shaheen is a Ph.D. candidate at Ryerson University's Policy Science Programme. He is also a Business Management Analyst with the Municipality of Toronto and serves as a Visiting Research Associate at SDPI.

Ms Foqia S. Khan is an Associate Research Fellow at SDPI. She did her M.Phil. in Development Studies from the University of Cambridge, UK. She is also the co-author of Initiating devolution for service delivery in Pakistan: Ignoring the power structure (2007).

Dr. Iffat Idris is a freelance development consultant based in Islamabad. She holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from UK. She works on issues of governance, disaster management, capacity development, social protection and others for a range of international and local development agencies.

Dr. John M. Gowdy is a Rittenhouse Professor of Humanities and Social Science, Department of Economics, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute in New York, USA. He
is the author of over 150 published articles and ten books. His recent publication is *Microeconomic theory old and new: A students guide* published by Stanford University Press in 2010.

**Ms Kiran N. Ahmed** is an Assistant Professor at the Centre of Excellence in Gender Studies at Quaid-i-Azam University. She has over ten years of experience in research and an academic background that spans philosophy, gender and international relations.

**Dr. Lubna N. Chaudhry** is an Associate Professor at SUNY, Binghamton, USA. She teaches Human Development; Women's Studies; and, Asian and Asian Diaspora Studies. Her work focuses on structural and direct violence in relation to disenfranchised communities in Pakistan and Muslim immigrants in USA.

**Dr. Muhammad A. Rahman** has done his MBBS from Bangladesh and is presently a Ph.D. candidate at the School of Population, Health and Clinical Practice, University of Adelaide, Australia. He has worked in public health research and programmes in Bangladesh, Afghanistan and Australia.

**Mr. Muhammad M. Aslam** is an independent consultant at the Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) project, Islamabad, Pakistan.

**Dr. Nathalène Reynolds** has a doctorate in the History of International Relations from the University of Paris I, Panthéon-Sorbonne. She has written a historical study *Le Cachemire dans le conflit indo-pakistanais, 1947-2004* (Kashmir in the Indo-Pakistan Conflict, 1947-2004 published by Harmattan, Paris in 2005.

**Dr. S. Akbar Zaidi** has a doctorate from the University of Cambridge and is presently a Visiting Scholar in the Carnegie Endowment’s South Asia Programme. His research focuses on development, governance, and political economy in South Asia. Zaidi’s twelfth book, *Military, civil society and democratization in Pakistan* was published in October 2010.

**Ms Sarah S. Aneel**, a Chevening Fellow, is presently a Visiting Associate at SDPI. Apart from academic editorship and publications, her areas of interest include
environmental governance, leadership, human security, gender and child sexual abuse.

Mr. Shafqat Kakakhel is presently a member of SDPI’s Board of Governors. He has served as the former Deputy Executive Director of the UN Environmental Programme (UNEP).

Dr. Syed Nazre Hyder is the Senior Economic Adviser at SDPI. Previously, he was Director General of the Pakistan Manpower Institute, Ministry of Labour and Manpower, after serving various desks of the Ministry of Finance, Government of Pakistan. He has also taught at the National University of Science and Technology (NUST) and International Islamic University, Islamabad, Pakistan.

Dr. Urs Geiser is a Senior Researcher at the Department of Geography, University of Zurich, Switzerland and a Visiting Fellow at SDPI. His research focuses on the contestation and negotiation of institutions.

Editors and Cover Designer
Apart from the cooperation of panel organisers and the entire SDPI staff, the Thirteenth Sustainable Development Conference (SDC) and this publication would not have been possible without the constant support of the following SDPI colleagues:

- Ms Sarah S. Aneel (Editorial Consultant and Visiting Associate)
- Ms Uzma T. Haroon (SDC Coordinator)
- Ms Imrana Niazi (Associate Coordinator SDC)
- Mr. Abdul Nasir Khan (Software Support and Cover/Graphic Designer)
About the Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI)

To catalyse the transition towards sustainable development, defined as the enhancement of peace, social justice and well-being, within and across generations.

Introduction

SDPI, founded in August 1992, focuses on independent interdisciplinary research, rigorous advocacy and capacity building. The Institute is committed to the promotion and implementation of policies on all issues of sustainable development.

SDPI is a unique and dynamic entity since it came into existence on the recommendation of Pakistan's National Conservation Strategy (NCS), also called Pakistan's Agenda 21. The NCS placed Pakistan's socio-economic development within the context of a national environmental plan. This highly acclaimed document, approved by the Federal Cabinet in March 1992, outlined the need for an independent non-profit organisation to serve as a source of expertise for policy analysis and intervention; and advisory services. SDPI is registered under the Societies Registration Act XXI of 1860.

The Institute's activities are, therefore, designed to provide:

- policy advice to government,
- a forum for policy dialogue,
- support to in-house, visiting and external researchers,
- research publications for public and private sector use,
- a conduit for North-South dialogue,
- an environment for information dissemination and training, and
- a base for national and regional advocacy and networking.
Goals
To

- serve as a source of expertise and advisory services for the government, private sector, and non-governmental initiatives supporting the implementation of Pakistan’s environment and development agenda.
- conduct policy-oriented research on sustainable development from a broad multi-disciplinary perspective.
- promote the implementation of policies, programmes, laws and regulations that advocate sustainable, just development.
- strengthen national capacity as well as infrastructure for research and advocacy.
- provide high quality trainings to the public, private, NGO sector organisations and individuals and build their capacities for sustainable growth and development.
- initiate and participate in activities and networks with like-minded organisations within and outside the country.

Approach
SDPI produces knowledge that can enhance the capacity of government to make informed policy decisions and to engage civil society on issues of public interest. The Institute acts as a generator of original research on sustainable development issues, as well as an information resource for concerned individuals and institutions. Its function is, thus, two-fold: an advisory role fulfilled through research, policy advice and advocacy; and an enabling role realised through providing other individuals and organisations with resource materials and training.
Section I
Peace and Conflict

- Federalism and Potential Conflicts: Reflections from Nepal—Bishnu Upreti
- Placing Internal Displacement in the Sustainable Development Agenda: The Case of Nepal—Anita Ghimire
- Shame and Fury —Ayesha Salman
Federalism and Potential Conflicts: Reflections from Nepal
Bishnu Raj Upreti

Abstract
The experience of countries that adopted federalism after conflicts such as Mexico (1971), Argentina and Venezuela (more than once), Nigeria (1966-70), Ethiopia (1991), Spain, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sudan, Iraq, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Australia, Germany, India, Canada, Malaysia, Russia, Brazil, South Africa and Pakistan have been mixed (Watts 2008; Upreti et al. 2009). Nepal became the youngest country to adopt federalism after ending its ten-year armed insurgency in 2006. However, complications still exist in designing federal structures, resource sharing models and more importantly their politicisation. It is, therefore, too early to say whether a federal system has the ability to address all of Nepal’s social and political conflicts and contradictions.

This paper, based on a four-year research of the Swiss National Centre of Competence in Research (NCCR) North-South in Nepal\(^1\) presents experiences of the ongoing debate on federalism, arguments for and against it, identifies potential areas of dissent within the proposed federal system and offers some possible mechanisms and provisions to address future problems.

\(^1\) Dr. Bishnu Raj Upreti has a Ph.D in conflict management from Wageningen University, the Netherlands and over the past 29 years has been actively engaged in conflict transformation and peace related research and teaching. Currently, he is the Regional Coordinator of South Asia Coordination Office of the Swiss National Centre of Competence in Research (NCCR) North-South based in Kathmandu, Nepal.

\(^2\) Opinions expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect the official view of the NCCR North South or its sponsoring agencies.
1. Causes of the Conflict

Nepal endured a bloody conflict from February 1996 to November 2006 when the CPN (M)\(^2\) waged an armed insurgency against the state. The research findings of the author on the causes of armed conflict show that the insurgency was a combination of various factors such as rampant poverty and inequality; exclusion and marginalisation; discrimination based on caste, gender and geographical areas; corruption; poor governance; widening gaps between rich and poor; digital divide; radical ideological orientation of the CPN (M); external interference in internal politics; development mismatch; and selective application or lack of proper implementation of rule of law (Upreti 2004; 2008; 2009a; 2010). The public expectation after the political change of 1990 (from a party-less political system with active monarchy to multiparty democracy and constitutional monarchy) was very high, but delivery from the subsequent governments did not match the peoples’ aspiration and this led to public frustration discrediting the political parties and governing system. CPN (M) very strategically used this to start their armed insurgency and presented federalism as one of the state restructuring instruments to address the problems that were not addressed in the past by the unitary system. Ruling parties and the government not only failed to realise the degree and intensity of public frustration, but also undermined the potential impact of the CPN (M) revolt. They simply treated it as a law and order problem to be contained by use of force that turned out to be detrimental since the armed conflict spread all over the country.

During the later part of the armed conflict (2001 November onward), the CPN (M) declared their own government and exercised ethnic federalism and henceforth federalism in general and ethnic federalism in particular came into public discourse.

2. Historical Background of Federalism in Nepal

The concept of federalism started in Nepal following the 1951 political change. But, it was not seriously discussed for thirty years. Later, during the 80s and 90s,

\(^2\) In January 2009, Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) and Unity Centre (another communist party) united and the name of CPN(M) was changed to the Unified Communist Party of Nepal (UCPN Maoist). However, CPN(M) is used in the paper to avoid confusion while referring to archival text.
various politicians including Gajendra Narayan Singh and other Madeshi leaders started demanding federalism, but it was not given enough attention at the political level. The CPN (M) brought forth this issue more strongly during their armed insurrection (1996-2006) period, particularly at the time of declaration of their own government in November 2001 where they divided the country into ethnic federal units (Upreti et al. 2009). However, it was not concretely stated in the Twelve-Point Agreement reached between the Seven Party Alliance (SPA) and the CPN (M) on 22 November 2005 (Upreti 2009). Similarly, the Comprehensive Peace Accord signed on 21 Sept. 2006 did not explicitly discuss federalism and when the Interim Constitution 2007 was negotiated by the major political parties, only state restructuring provisions were enshrined in it.

On the day of the promulgation of the Interim Constitution 2007, leaders of Madeshi Janaadhikar Forum (a newly established regional political party from Madesh-Terai) publicly burnt it and declared their agitation accusing that major political parties were not committed to federalism. As a consequence of their agitation in Madhesh-Terai, the Interim Constitution 2007 was amended. The fifth amendment to the Interim Constitution on 12 July 2008 states, ‘Accepting the aspirations of indigenous ethnic groups, and the people of the backward and other regions, and the people of Madhesh, for autonomous provinces, Nepal shall be a Federal Democratic Republic.’ The amendment further provides that, ‘The provinces shall be autonomous, with full rights. The Constituent Assembly shall determine the number, boundary, names and structures of the autonomous provinces and the distribution of powers and resources, while maintaining the sovereignty, unity and integrity of Nepal.’

Following the 10 April 2010 elections, the Constituent Assembly was established and the federalism agenda once more entered the limelight. The Constitutional Committee is vitally important in drafting the constitution since its work is based on the conclusions put forth by the other Constitutional Assembly thematic committees. The State Restructuring and Resource Allocation Committee developed the concept of how to restructure the state and allocate resources to minimise conflict. Similarly, the Minorities and Marginalised Communities Right Protection Committee prepared a report to address the issues of exclusion and protection of minority rights, which was one of the main causes of conflict in the past. The Natural Resource, Economic Rights and Revenue Allocation Committee
developed a concept of resource allocation in such a way so as to minimise future potential conflict. The National Interests Protection Committee put forward concepts and proposals about vital national interests to be protected (NIPC-CA 2009; Upreti 2010). However, political tensions, suspicion and strong positions of the main political parties on issues of federalism and state restructuring created severe problems and delays in drafting the constitution.

3. Current Debate on Federalism

Conceptual confusion in understanding unitary and centralised states is causing problems in properly debating federalism in Nepal. Those in favour of federalism in general and ‘ethnic federalism’ in particular interpret unitary and centralised state as being similar and therefore present the weaknesses of the ‘centralised’ state as the weakness of unitary state. In Nepalese discourse, these two terms are used interchangeably. In reality, a unitary system can be decentralised (one source of power, but exercised at different levels: central, district and local). Or a federal state can be centralised and autocratic. Hence, categorising a federal state as one which is always democratic; and the unitary system as one which is always undemocratic is misleading. Conceptually, unitary state can also be decentralised and federal states can be centralised. As Nepal was both a unitary and centralised state since its inception in 1768, it becomes difficult to differentiate between them. Federalism in Nepal is highly supported and also strongly opposed. Even more contested is ‘ethnic’ federalism. In this section these supportive and opposing arguments are presented:

3.1 Arguments in support of Federalism

Federal system is needed because the unitary system in Nepal:

- Failed to address the needs and aspirations of its multi-ethnic, multi-religious and multicultural society.
- Concentrated power and resources at the centre and in the hands of the powerful elite and excluded large sections of society (women, Dalits, ethnic groups, people from remote regions and other marginalised
groups). Centralised bureaucracy, judiciary and security were largely inaccessible to those outside the mainstream culture.

- Promoted corruption and irregularities, favouritism and nepotism.
- Strengthened monopoly of elite in politics and economy.
- Failed to achieve economic development and employment generation.

Federalism promotes involvement of excluded people in the state building process and hence is seen to promote stability, democracy, economic growth, prosperity and peace.

3.2 Arguments against Federalism

In Nepal, all the political parties represented in the Constituent Assembly have accepted the federal political system, despite reservations of some of their party members. Only, Rastriya Janamorcha vehemently opposes federalism\(^3\). The party's concerns and arguments are that federalism:

- Weakens sovereignty and increases the risk of disintegration of the nation.
- Promotes communal disharmony and ethnic conflict because when states are based on ethnicity, it promotes hatred against each other.
- Erodes national feeling and weakens national identity, while strengthening ethnic and communal identity.
- Is not the Nepali people's agenda, but is coming from the vested interests of India to keep Nepal weak and unstable.
- Leads to the breakdown of national political parties into regional ones, which causes tensions.
- Leads to discrimination within the nation as the rules of different states vary.
- Results in ineffective delivery of government services.
- Is operationally expensive and not sustainable for Nepal.
- Brings unanticipated consequences and problems.

---

\(^3\) See the interview of Mr Chitra Bahadur KC, leader of Rastriya Janamorcha in Budhabar Weekly, 22 April 2009 for more details on their perspective and understanding of federalism.
Some intellectuals argue that federalism is mainly suitable for unifying small, separate states, and that it is not appropriate to separate a unified state. On the political front, *Rastriya Janamorcha* argues that federalism was introduced by a few elite politicians under external influence who wrongly equated a centralised state with a unitary state. They believe that decentralisation would be sufficient to address the concerns that other politicians want to address through federalism.

The opposition of *Rastriya Janamorcha* to federalism has provided ample input to decision makers to ponder the challenges involved in implementing federalism and the measures that need to be taken to address their concerns. Proper debate on the benefits and limits of federalism can help to avoid deficiencies in design and implementation. Political decision makers may have to learn from countries like Ethiopia, Nigeria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sudan, Russia and the North-East states of India on how ethnic federalism is delicate and what problems these countries are facing.

### 3.3 Emergence of ethnic federalism

The ethnic dimensions of the political change from a unitary to a federal system in Nepal are very strong. There are wide differences between ethnic and caste groups in Nepal based on language, religious practices, legal and judicial systems, indigenous arrangements, representation, citizenship and distribution of state privileges. Although the ethnic movement existed earlier, it emerged strongly during the popular movement of the 1990s. The political change of the 1990s failed to properly address the aspirations of the various ethnic groups. CPN (M) insurgency capitalised on this by supporting ethnic groups to seek their rights and articulate their demands, bringing the ethnic movement to a turning point. In the beginning, the pro-Maoist ethnic movement focused on the right to self-determination (it was not clearly explained whether it is cessation right or full autonomy within the sovereign country), whereas the non-Maoist ethnic movement focused on guaranteed autonomy through a federal system. The CPN

---

*The term ‘ethnic’ is used to refer to non-Aryan people of Mongolian origin who do not fall into the traditional Hindu caste system (Brahman, Kshetri, Vaishaya and Sudra). Fifty-nine ethnic groups are identified in Nepal and constant debate is going on about how many more ethnic groups exist. Historically, they often depend on natural resources and are concentrated in specific areas, which are now changing.*
(M) documents during the ten years of the armed conflict clearly highlighted this issue. However, after signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in November 2006 this distinction ended and the focus shifted to a radical ethnic identity demanding ethnic federalism with the right to self-determination coloured by anti-caste radicalism. Now, the ethnic demands coming from ethnic leaders are one sided and deny co-existence, seek special privileges such as prior rights and impose ethnic supremacy over other people (e.g., naming provinces based on certain ethnic groups such as Limbuwan, Tamsaling or Khumbuwan, etc.) and even threatening that if these demands are not fulfilled they will opt for violence. Hence, the challenge for the political decision makers is to make sure that federalism will not become a perennial source of communal tension and ethnic conflict.

In late 2010, the State Restructuring Committee of the Constituent Assembly proposed fourteen federal provinces. Out of them nine provinces are ethnic based and five are non-ethnic. The provinces proposed by the State Restructuring Committee are (CCD 2010):

- Lumbini-Awadh-Tharuwan
- Magarat
- Tamuwan
- Tamsaling
- Newa
- Mithila-Bhojpura-Koch-Madesh
- Sherpa
- Kirat
- Limbuwan
- Khaptad
- Jadan
- Karnali
- Narayani
- Sunkoshi
Figure 1: Nepal – Proposed Federal Units (Autonomous Provinces)
By Constituent Assembly Committee on State Reconstruction and Distribution of State Power (January 2010)

Source: Centre for Constitutionnel Dialogue (2010).

This proposal was passed by majority vote where majority of the members were from CPN (M), but there is strong opposition from other political parties.

4. Potential Conflict in Federal System

Federalism is both a source of conflict and a means of resolving it. But, it is not a magic wand that can solve every issue that exists in Nepalese society. The improper implementation of federalism can cause civil wars and disintegration of a country (e.g., Yugoslavia and the USSR in 1991; the splitting of Czechoslovakia in 1992; Serbia and Montenegro in 2006; and the civil war in Nigeria in 1967) (Upreti et al. 2009). It can even be argued that the kind of federalism introduced is as important as its introduction or vice versa. A conflict in a federal system is not a new phenomenon (Pennock 1959).

The comprehensive work of Watts (2008) on comparing federal systems across the world highlights that the sources of tension and stress within federal systems
are the cumulative effect of different factors and that no single condition, institutional arrangement or strategy is responsible. When different social 'cleavages' reinforce each other, the process of polarisation starts and conflict develops. Therefore, one of the fundamental tasks of federal institutions is to address these 'cleavages' before they turn into conflict (ibid.). In this context, federal state structures need to devise effective strategies and mechanisms for negotiation that help reduce polarisation.

The following are some potential problems with federalism and areas of potential conflict that must be anticipated in the federal design:

### 4.1 Potential Ethnic Tensions and Communal Conflict

Global experiences of ethnic federalism and current day to day reality of Nepal has clearly demonstrated that opting for ethnic federalism could potentially lead to protracted conflict and serve as a perennial source of instability. It is very hard to find theoretical and even pragmatic reasons why some ethnic groups (e.g., Limbu, Tamang, Magar, Gurung and Rai) have privilege (differential treatment such as naming, prior rights, etc.) over other ethnic groups (such as Jirel, Surel and Majhi) simply because they are smaller in number. In a country with more than 103 ethnic groups and more than 80 languages and none of the ethnic group in majority, proceeding to ethnic federalism in the interests of a few ethnic groups/leaders at the cost of the majority would be extremely risky in terms of communal conflict and ethnic division. The following will be some of the major sources of ethnic conflict if a discriminatory mode of ethnic federalism is practiced:

- If federal system introduces discriminatory provisions of privileges to some sections of society and bars other sections of society to exercise their rights equally, conflict is inevitable.
- The current debate on ethnic federalism is mainly arising out of the:
  - retaliatory mental framework (Chhetri-Brahmin elites had exploited the ethnic groups in the past and therefore ethnic groups have to retaliate now through ethnic federalism by imposing prior rights, language, culture etc.);
immediate political benefits to political parties (to ensure ethnic support, or to retain their ethnic vote bank or ethnic leaders in their parties), which could give immediate benefit to certain political parties or some ethnic leaders, but, will potentially cause social tension, communal disharmony and ethnic conflict.

- The emergence of *Khas Samaj, Brahmin Samaj* after their non-recognition (neither in the constitution nor in the federalisation process) is an indication of potential ethnic tensions.
- Imposing a particular language, culture or excluding certain groups from certain rights in the new federal system is not only conceptually similar to the *Panchayat* system, but also against fundamental human rights.
- When state and rulers deviate from the principles of equal rights for all citizens and exercise discriminatory treatment in favour or against certain groups the structural basis for a perennial source of conflict is provided.

Hence, political decision makers must consider the potential risks and danger of opting for ethnic federalism (see the map). One of the best ways to address this problem is to name the provinces based on historical places, mountains, rivers and geography; ensuring equal rights to all citizens within each province; and making provisions of affirmative action for a certain time to address inequality issues. A federal system adopted by Nepal must not introduce discriminatory arrangements like prior rights, barring certain caste or ethnic groups from accessing state power and resources.

### 4.2 Conflict over Sharing Fiscal Power and Resources

The sharing of fiscal power and resources is one of the main potential areas of conflict in a federal state. If appropriate mechanisms for the distribution of fiscal power are absent, it can create conflict later. Federal countries like Australia, Spain, Malaysia and Germany are relatively centralised in their distribution of fiscal powers (i.e., the central government has the main power to collect taxes and other revenues), compared to Switzerland (which divides the right to taxation amongst three levels), Brazil and Canada (which leave the right to raise revenue mainly in the hands of the federal units) (Majeed et al. 2006; Upreti et al. 2009).
If revenue means and expenditure needs for the various federal units are mismatched, it can lead to tension and dysfunction. Shah (2007, p.9) argues that ‘vertical fiscal gaps and revenue autonomy at sub-national orders of government remain areas of concern in federal countries where the centralisation of taxation powers is greater than necessary to meet federal expenditures, inclusive of its spending power. This leads to undue central influence and political control over sub-national policies, and can even undermine bottom up accountability. This is a concern at the state level in Australia, Germany, India, Mexico, Canada, Malaysia, Nigeria, Russia, Spain and South Africa.’ Hence, clearly defining fiscal relations, tax assignment and tax-based revenue sharing mechanisms is crucial (Majeed et al. 2006; Upreti et al. 2009).

Once the central government starts developing direct relations with local government, the relevance of the federal units in terms of economic issues may also be in question, despite their constitutional or political roles like in Brazil, USA or Canada (Ibid.). Indian states are facing severe water disputes and difficulties in settling them. In this context, while addressing an international conference on federalism in New Delhi in November 2007, Dr Manmohan Singh said that ‘Water sharing and water disparities are major challenges to federalism in India.’ He further said, ‘It is perhaps no exaggeration to say that we have found it easier to manage bilateral agreements with neighbours on river water sharing than domestic disputes between states.’ India instituted tribunals for settling interstate water sharing conflicts, but they were largely unable to settle the water conflicts. Controlling water of the Euphrates and Tigris rivers is becoming highly contentious between Basra, Baghdad and other states of Iraq (Upreti 2009b). Sharing of water and associated fiscal benefits/resources between the provinces, development and sharing of energy infrastructures (e.g., managing national grids) are often sources of inter-state conflict within a country.

Other sources of inter-provincial water conflict are pollution discharge, flood control (e.g. basin based flood control policy v/s one state action or inaction), licensing, tendering and administration of hydropower projects (Ibid.).
4.3 Conflict over Jurisdiction

Experiences of different federal countries demonstrate that jurisdictional tensions and conflicts are common when there is no clear definition of jurisdiction (distribution of powers) between the national and sub-national governing units (Majeed et al. 2006; Upreti et al. 2009). Often inter-provincial tensions are also related to sharing of transboundary resources. Water conflict is one clear example (e.g., 15 of 28 states of India are in water disputes on determining upstream-downstream and prior use water rights). Australia is another example where the Murray and Darling River conflicts between four states namely New South Wales, Victoria, South Australia and Queensland are frequent and difficult to settle (Upreti et al. 2009). To avoid such problems, the constitution must clearly delineate between the jurisdictions of the various constitutional bodies; the different states; the states and the centre; and the states and local governing units (CCD 2010). Dispute resolution mechanisms must also be in place to deal with any ambiguities. Jurisdictional tensions between provinces and the central government are common in a federal political system.

4.4 Social Divergence and Conflict

Language, race, religion, social structures and cultural traditions in a federal system must be mutually and simultaneously reinforcing. If some factors or actors negatively highlight ‘cleavages’ associated with these structures, social divisions mount and cause tension and conflict within and between federal units. In multicultural societies like Nepal, it is important to recognise the diversity and respect specificities of minority groups. Nepal needs to learn from the intensity of language-related resentment in Pakistan, Malaysia, India and Nigeria (Upreti et al. 2009; Majeed et al. 2006). Institutional arrangements must be flexible enough to allow for a needs-based adjustment. The experiences of Sudan, Sri Lanka and Spain show that political polarisation based on social divergence can lead to separatist movements and that state reactions and counter-reactions can make these demands stronger (Upreti 2010). Imposing identity, language and culture of one group, whether it is ethnic or caste group, over others will serve as a perennial source of conflict.
4.5 Conflict over Institutional Arrangements

The nature, type and mandates of the institutional structures under federalism determine their degree and ability to address differences, conflict and tension within the federation (Landau 1973). How institutions accomplish tasks related to the electorate, bureaucracies, political parties, business sector and civil society, and how they deal with political conflict determine whether or not conflicts that emerge from social divergences and cleavages are resolved or escalate. Hence, the ability of institutions and the design of processes to generate cooperative approaches to bring about consensus are crucial to minimise conflict and promote self-rule and shared rule. Ensuring that the issues, concerns and voices of the people within the federal units are accommodated in decisions and that all concerned groups are represented in the legislature, civil service, executive and political party structures is also important. If certain groups are not adequately represented in the institutions of the federal units and centre they feel alienated and may start separatist activities, as observed in East Pakistan, which separated from Pakistan in 1971 to become Bangladesh (Upreti et al. 2009).

The experiences of India and Nigeria demonstrate that if there are extreme differences between the federal units in terms of wealth and the size of the population it can create tension and stress and lead to demands for the reorganisation of the boundaries of the federal units. If one federal unit dominates demographically or economically, tension and conflict between federal units is unavoidable (Elazar 1993; Upreti et al. 2009).

5. Response Provisions and Conflict Resolution Mechanisms

The proper functioning of a federal system requires dynamic conflict resolution mechanisms that are open, responsive and flexible (Elazar 1993; Majeed et al. 2006; Upreti 2010). The following are some of the particularly important options or mechanisms for addressing potential conflict between the centre and states, and between states and local governments:
5.1 Inter-state Council

Overlaps and interdependence in the use of power and resources between federal units and between the centre and federal units require frequent and often intensive engagement, coordination and collaboration to minimise conflict and tensions (Elazar 1993). An inter-state council (or council of states) is one of the possible mechanisms for resolving the political nature of conflict and any ambiguities arising between two or more federal units. Although their decisions may not be binding in nature, this mechanism can help to diffuse tension and facilitate collaboration. Such a mechanism may be even more effective in dealing with conflicts of interests, such as conflicts in the content of laws and decrees, which need political agreement (Upreti 2010). The Inter-State Council of India and the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) are two prominent examples of arrangements to oversee the collaboration process, to deal with potential conflict issues and to make the governing system more effective. Similarly, the Conference of Cantonal Governments in Switzerland has developed strong collective negotiation with the central government (Upreti et al. 2009).

Different formal arrangements have been made in different federal countries to deal with intergovernmental financial issues. For example, Malaysia has the National Finance Council, Australia the Commonwealth Grant Commission and South Africa the Financial and Fiscal Commission, which are all active in dealing with financial issues and related conflict (Hicks 1978; Upreti 2010).

In addition to a general Inter-State Council, different specialised independent thematic commissions and tribunals may be required to settle contested issues. For example, sharing of natural resources among the federal units can generate enormous and frequent conflict between federal units. In such cases, an independent and powerful authority (such as a natural resources commission) established to address issues related to land, water, mines and minerals, hydropower, and other resources, is necessary. The constitutional creation of a natural resources commission is a useful mechanism for resolving conflict and confusion related to the sharing and use of natural resources (Upreti 2009b).

For dealing with inter-state water disputes, special tribunals may be set up. For example, in India four tribunals were set up to settle inter-state disputes: the
Narmada tribunal (for settling conflict between Gujarat, Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan); the Krishna and the Godavari tribunals (for settling conflict between Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh and Orissa); and the Cauvery tribunal (for settling conflict between Karnataka and Tamil Nadu (Upreti 2010; 2009b)).

5.2 Provision for a Referendum

The most contested problems are related to ‘ethnicisation’ of the governing structures (provinces, barring certain groups to be chief ministers, etc.) prior rights to certain groups at the cost of other groups, contestation in resource use may need to be decided by the people through a referendum. Global experiences show that numerous inter-state conflicts occurred mainly because of the inadequate, inappropriate use of federal principles by the decision makers and politicians. Hence, very clear provisions for a referendum on highly contentious issues and issues of national importance should be included in the constitution to minimise conflict and strengthen democracy (Franck 1966; Watts 2008). Although a referendum is a means of conflict resolution, if not properly drafted, it can serve as a ‘majoritarian’ device, which may divide the population into a majority-minority and serve as a source of conflict (Upreti 2010). Hence, a careful assessment should be made when deciding on a referendum and all other possible options should be explored to narrow the issues for referendum.

5.3 Dealing with Extremes

Some federal countries such as USSR (former), Yugoslavia and Spain have faced problems of separation. Ronald L Watts (2008) argues that the constitutions of all federal countries explicitly or implicitly prohibit the unilateral secession of federal units. However, wherever separatist movements appear, they act extra constitutionally anyway. In the case of a unilateral decision by a federal unit to secede, the central government often enforces federal constitutions on unwilling federal units. In some cases, such enforcement has resulted in civil war (like in Pakistan in 1971 and Yugoslavia from 1991 to 1995). In others, such enforcement has succeeded in keeping the country intact, such as in the USA (1861-1865),
Switzerland (1847 though there was a short civil war) and Nigeria (1967-1970) (Upreti et al. 2009). But, sometimes, secession from a federation happens without bloody conflict or civil war. Malaysia expelled Singapore in 1956 after two years of its inclusion because of political tensions (Upreti 2010). The separation of Czechoslovakia in 1993 (into the Czech Republic and Slovak Republic) was largely based on the mutual interests of regional parties to separate, and, therefore, they accelerated political polarisation (Upreti 2009a). The separation of Serbia and Montenegro in 2006 was very much guided by the hope of gaining individual membership to the European Union (Upreti et al. 2009). Various cases of federal countries demonstrate that dealing with extremes requires a combination of political, diplomatic and security approaches, and willingness by the central government to listen and share more power and resources, as well as the willingness of all groups to cooperate within the country.

Although the risk of secession is often associated with federation, it is important to realise that secession or separatist movements can happen in any system. Numerous domestic conflicts and civil wars have occurred in countries with unitary governing systems. Ethnic radicalisation and extremism in multiethnic societies without tolerance and co-existence may contribute to ethnic conflict and may turn into civil unrest.

6. Conclusion

Federalism is not magic means to solve all the problems of a country. Success or failure of federalism depends upon the degree of public acceptance of the form of federalism adopted and the degree of implementation of the basic values and process of federalism by political decision makers. The conflict or cooperation in Nepal depends upon the development of ownership of people, responsive institutional arrangements and regulatory framework and most importantly effective implementation of the provisions of the federalism.

One of the main causes of the armed conflict in Nepal was the exploitation, discrimination, marginalisation and social exclusion of certain communities/groups. The demand for a federal governing system arose largely to address these problems. Extreme radicalisation of issues and undermining the existence
and identity of others will only create conflict and make the federal system dysfunctional. Recognition of multiple identities; accommodation of the needs and interests of others; understanding and sensitivity; not imposing the language, culture, values of one group over others; respecting pluralism and individuality are some of the fundamental elements required, particularly at the beginning, to operationalise federalism. If political decision makers fail to address these issues and another ethnic form of discriminatory practice is constitutionalised, conflict will be inevitable in the federal structure in Nepal.

Ethnic federalism is not suitable for a multiethnic society like Nepal where none of the ethnic groups are in majority. Ethnic federalism is more suitable in a country with few ethnic groups with clear demographic clusters (Upreti et al. 2009). Federalisation has been used as a means of conflict resolution in many countries in the past few decades. For example, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sudan, Iraq and the Democratic Republic of Congo all opted for federalism as a way of resolving civil war and armed conflict (Upreti 2010). One of the big challenges in such a situation is to establish mutual trust and the necessary conditions for a federal system.

Some researchers, like Daniel Elazar (1993), argue that a federal system with a highly ethnic orientation in a multiethnic society may not be workable and has a high risk of erupting into ethnic conflict and civil war. Nepal must certainly take care in designing its federal system to minimise the risk of this happening.
References


National Interests Protection Committee of the Constituent Assembly (NIPC-CA) 2009, 'A report of the National Interests Protection Committee', Constituent Assembly, Kathmandu, Nepal.


Placing Internal Displacement in the Sustainable Development Agenda: The Case of Nepal
Anita Ghimire*

Abstract
The phenomenon of internal displacement is a common issue for the South Asian nations with people displaced due to violence, conflicts, natural disasters and development projects. Among them, conflict has been a regular cause of displacement across these countries. Even when mostly underestimated, the number of such conflict-induced internally displaced persons (IDPs) already makes a significant proportion of the total population of the countries. For example, they make 0.2 per cent of its total population in Nepal, 0.7 per cent in Pakistan, 2 per cent in Sri Lanka, 0.9 per cent in Myanmar, 0.3 per cent in Bangladesh and 1.1 per cent in Afghanistan (IDMC 2010). Alarmingly, the number is increasing. The year 2009 saw an increase of such IDPs in South Asia by 23 per cent over the year 2008--i.e. the largest increase compared to the other regions of the world (Ibid.).

The issue of IDPs thus has a crucial link to sustainable development in these countries. Lack of sustainable development lies at the heart of many conflicts. However, in most cases, addressing internal displacement and development efforts are envisaged apart and sometimes contradictory to each other. Their issues are neglected in the post-conflict development agendas. This is because IDPs are predominantly seen from a politico-humanitarian perspective. The lens has created certain myths around the notion of IDPs, which obstructs their possible inclusion in development. Such overlooking proves to be an "Achilles heel" to programmes and policies targeting sustainable development. The first objective of this paper is, thus, to scrutinise such myths with empirical evidences from the livelihood studies of IDPs in Nepal. The second objective is then to discuss sustainable development and response to internal displacement issues that cannot be overlooked in the post conflict agendas of sustainable development. Overall, the paper aims to contribute to a broader understanding of sustainable development in the post conflict situation.

The paper is based on a doctoral study conducted in five districts of Nepal from 2006 to 2009. Theoretically it follows the concept of Structuration Theory (Giddens 1984) and Theory of Practice (Bourdieu 1977). Methodologically it follows macro-micro integration approach (Ritzer 2000) and uses qualitative methods for data collection and analysis.

* Dr. Anita Ghimire is a post-doc fellow working on migration issues at the Swiss National Centre of Competence in Research (NCCR) North-South. The author acknowledges support of the NCCR North South for the paper.
1. Introduction

According to the globally accepted definition Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs hereafter) are 'persons or group of persons who have been forced or obliged to leave their home or place of habitual residence in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects or armed conflict situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural and human made disasters and who have not crossed an internationally recognized state border' (GPID). Such a phenomenon of migration is called internal displacement. Among the causes of internal displacement mentioned above, the paper focuses on displacement caused due to conflict, violence, and human rights violations in South Asia.

2. Methodology

The findings are based on a doctoral study conducted in the urban areas of five districts- Kathmandu, Bhaktapur, Lalitpur, Dang and Bake of Nepal. These districts according to the then existing data hosted the highest number of IDPs. The study was carried out between 2006 and 2009. The research used micro-macro integration approach (Ritzer 2000) and looked at both micro and macro factors that affected livelihoods of IDPs. As the study mostly dealt with non-statistical realities, it used qualitative methods for data collection and analysis. A total of 270 IDPs (150 males and 120 females) who were living in different forms of residence, such as camps, slum settlements, rented rooms and self-owned houses and who belonged to different generations within the family, were interviewed.

3. Conflict and Internal Displacement in South Asia

Approximately 27.1 million people have been displaced in 54 countries around the world due to conflict, violence and human right violations (IDMC 2010). This number is alarming given the fact that international conflict has decreased in the world (HIIK 2010). However, there is still a challenge for Asia as it is prone to internal conflict, which is on the rise (Banerjee 2006).
According to the conflict barometer (HIIK 2010), out of 365 incidences of conflict in the world, one-third, i.e. 113 incidences of conflict were located in Asia in 2009. These incidences of mostly internal conflict, placed Asia amongst the third highly conflict affected continent (according to the number of states). Asia saw the highest increase in incidences of internal displacement. The year 2009 saw a rise of internal displacement by 23 per cent, the highest in the world, leaving Africa second where internal displacement increased by 11 per cent over the previous year (IDMC 2010). More than 6.8 million people were displaced in Asia in 2009 alone making a total population of IDPs to be 4.8 million in 2009 (Ibid.).

Below I present a brief description of the conflict and related displacement status of the South Asian nations.

Conflict over natural resources, primarily land, strife for regional or national control and autonomy, lies at the heart of many conflicts in South Asia (Jonhson 2006; Upreti 2004). Among the South Asian states, Pakistan has the largest increase in the number of IDPs when three million people fled their homes within a week from the north-west region of the country in 2009. This massive displacement was caused due to the government forces' operation against the Pakistani Taliban in the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (IRIN 2011). This placed Pakistan in the sixth place among countries having highest IDPs in the world in 2009 (IDMC 2010). Pakistan now has at least 1.2 million IDPs -- 0.7 per cent of its total population (Ibid.). Nearly half of the total new IDPs in Asia were from Pakistan. However, Pakistan also had the highest number of returnees in 2009 (Ibid.).

Similarly, intensification of armed conflict between the armed opposition group and government forces in Afghanistan led to a massive displacement in the eastern, south-eastern and southern part of Afghanistan (IRIN 2011; Ruiz 2002). It is estimated that there were at least 297,000 IDPs, equivalent to 1.1 per cent of the total population in Afghanistan during 2009 (IDMC 2010).

In Sri Lanka, even though the protracted armed conflict between the government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) ended in May 2009, displacement continued (Badurdeen 2010). Around 280,000 people were
displaced and came to settle in the northern part of the country\(^1\) between October 2008 and June 2009. The number of IDPs is estimated to be 400,000, which is equivalent to around 2 per cent of the total population of the country (IDMC 2010).

In India, international conflict between India and Pakistan over the Line of Control and continuous internal conflict in different pockets of the country -- the North-East, between the Naxalite forces and the government, communal violence between Hindus, Muslims and Christians has been the main source of conflict leading to massive displacement (Banerjee et al. 2005). Conflict-induced IDPs are not recognised under the Indian law and there are no state bodies responsible for taking up IDPs’ case (IDMC 2010). These and other complications related to enumeration of IDPs globally makes it very difficult to ascertain the number of IDPs in India. Moreover, India has a very acute case of protracted displacement like the case of Kashmiri Pundits who have been leading a displaced life for over 15 years (Das 2005; IDMC 2010.) This makes enumeration even more difficult (Banerjee 2006). The present estimates show that there are at least 500,000 IDPs among which 33,000 were displaced in 2009 (IDMC 2010).

Similarly, internal armed conflict between the government and indigenous political groups in the Chittagong Hills between different indigenous political groups and human rights violations has led to displacement in Bangladesh (Banerjee et al. 2005). It is estimated that the number of IDPs range from 60,000 to 500,000 which is equivalent to 0.3 per cent of the population of Bangladesh (IDMC 2010).

In Myanmar, there is very little access to the IDPs because the people are primarily displaced by the government that launches sweeping operations in villages (Shukla 2008; Johnson 2006). Burma has a protracted case of displacement which dates back to the 1960s (Banerjee et al. 2005; Brees 2008). New fighting erupted in 2009 when the government demanded that the groups which had a ceasefire agreement with the government give themselves up to the army-led Border Guard forces. This led to displacement of around 75,000 people (IDMC 2010). It is estimated that there were at least 470,000 IDPs, nearly 0.2 per cent of the total population in 2009 (Ibid.). However, a large majority of the IDPs

---

\(^1\) Controlled by the government.
like those living in jungles and in urban areas with their extended families and other social networks remain virtually unaccounted for (Chaudhary 2005).

In Nepal, though the decade long armed conflict came to an end in November 2006, lack of a safe environment for return to the rural origin and thus the unwillingness of IDPs to return has led to a significant number of IDPs living as displaced in the urban areas (Kernot and Gurung 2003; Poudel 2003; OCHA 2008). Moreover, a lot of IDPs who have been assumed to have returned in the data of the government and other agencies have come back to the urban areas (Ghimire 2009). It is estimated that there are around 50,000 to 70,000 IDPs, which is equal to 0.2 per cent of the total population of the country. However, this is derived by subtracting the above mentioned returnees. Thus, this does not give the true picture. Moreover, some few who returned have been displaced again due to unsettled property cases. Similarly, new conflict that erupted in the plains of the country led to a significant displacement of people of hilly origin (Poudel 2010).

4. Conflict, Internal Displacement and Sustainable Development

The above mentioned country cases show that whether it is fight for autonomy or regional control; or control of natural resources; inequality and discrimination or domination and lack of human security, unsustainable development lies at the heart of all South Asian conflicts. For example, different researchers have concluded that lack of better living conditions was the main cause of the Maoist conflict in 1996 and still remains so. The Maoists who waged the armed struggle were of the opinion that ‘the conflict was necessary to smash the old production relations which had blocked development forces’ (Bhattarai 2003, pp. 118-119). Similarly, analysts are also of the opinion that poverty and exploitation; exclusion and discrimination; and a high discrepancy between urban and rural areas in terms of development were the causes of the conflict (Upreti 2006; Pfaff-Czarnecka 2004; Karki and Seddon 2003; Paffenholz 2002).

All this shows that conflict and its resulting internal displacement and sustainable development -- be it seen as an option for improved livelihoods or the realisation of human security by the local people, are intricately linked. However,
when the state-building programmes are developed, existing consequences of conflict like internal displacement are rarely considered together. Addressing internal displacement and sustainable development are envisaged apart and sometimes contradictory to each other. Thus, the existing situation faced by a significant number of populations, be they IDPs or hosts, are left out in post-conflict sustainable development agendas.

South Asian states have not been able to find effective solutions to internal displacement, especially given the large number of people who either do not return to their area of origin or come back to the host society or still those who have been experiencing protracted displacement for generations. Lack of sustainable development and livelihoods in the place of origin is responsible for the poor return rate, as well as a cause of recurring and protracted internal conflict, which creates most of the IDPs in South Asia.

My research has found that this failure to address the issue of internal displacement as a part of sustainable development is due to the prevailing notion towards IDPs. In many cases in South Asia, states are themselves the agents of displacement or in other cases are left very weak after conflict. The state sees the IDPs either as enemies or as an additional burden to cope with after conflict. Similarly, when international agencies intervene, it is mostly the humanitarian and the human rights agencies both within the UN and outside that take responsibility. It is only very recently that development agencies within the UN like the UNDP are working together with humanitarian agencies through the cluster approach. So the information regarding IDPs is collected from a human rights and humanitarian perspective. As such, IDPs are either seen from a political or a humanitarian perspective. The paper briefly discusses some basic concepts used to study the livelihoods of IDPs.

5. Conceptual Framework

The study uses concepts from two theories which emphasise the integration of micro-macro levels in social analysis. They are ‘Structuration Theory’ (Giddens 1984) and ‘Theory of Practice’ (Bourdieu 1977). Both these theories emphasise the dialectical relationship between individuals and society. To look at
livelihoods, the study uses the concept of base, space and orientations from the Rural Livelihoods System (RLS) framework (Baumgartner and Högger 2004). The basic concepts as described by the RLS framework used in the study have been briefly given in the following section:

5.1 Base

According to Baumgartner and Högger (2004), the base consists of the total capital that a family possesses in the form of their knowledge and activity. It refers to all such activities which have an economic purpose, but at the same time are also tied to traditions, emotions and specific forms of self-esteem. Base is seen at three levels: the public base (macro), which consists of the assets held by the community; the family base (micro); and, a more individual centred base (Ibid.). For my study, individual and family bases are seen from the micro level, while the community base is seen as the macro level. The individual base is taken as the person's individual capacities and capital such as one's skill, knowledge and emotional entities such as fear, attachments and memories of place of origin, and what one had to endure during the different phases of displacement. Family base refers to sources of family income and their social/political capital. Community base refers to the resources, services and structures that are present in the community.

5.2 Space

Based on Baumgartner and Högger (2004)'s work, this study looks at space as a demarcation based on different attributes like gender, age, generation and the state of being an IDP in a host community. At the macro level, space denotes the socio-economic space of the IDPs in the host area; for example, the relationship between the host and the IDPs; participation of the IDPs in the social and economic activities in the host area, and their integration into the host area. At the micro level, space refers to factors such as the gender relations within the family, position of the individual within the household that is based on one's responsibility, age, relations within the family, and on more individual
considerations and qualities of a person like integrity, awareness, courage, and the capacity to accept change and to integrate (Ibid.).

5.3 Orientations

In the RLS framework, orientations are mental perspectives that shape and guide actions. It is what one looks up to as a member of a community, family or as an individual (Ibid.). The study used the same concept of orientations. At the macro level, orientation is the collective perception of the host community, or the worldviews of the host community, their perception of the IDPs, traditions, norms and values which are common to the whole community. At the micro level, orientations are the values and convictions of the displaced families such as family aspirations, perception of social status and ancestral pride. At the individual level, orientations are individual considerations of the displaced persons themselves and personal qualities like visions, hopes, and aspirations which influence the intimate space of people and govern their main decisions notwithstanding the world and family views (Baumgartner and Högger 2004).

6. Deconstructing Myths about IDPs

The following section discusses some of the prevailing perceptions about IDPs and with empirical evidence suggests how these need not be true. Based on these findings, it discusses how IDPs could be considered as stakeholders in the sustainable development agenda in post conflict states. The findings, which are a result of my work in Dang, Banke and Kathmandu Valley in Nepal, are as follows:

1. IDPs are not a homogeneous mass.
2. IDPs are active agents even after displacement.
3. Absolute return of IDPs to rural areas cannot be achieved.
4. Short term relief cannot bring ‘durable’ solutions.
6.1 **IDPs are not a homogeneous mass.**

The first myth surrounding IDPs is that they are often taken as a homogeneous mass, vulnerable and poor. Deviating from the manner in which IDPs are understood and portrayed in most studies (Cohen 2006; Korn 1999; and Cohen and Deng 1998a, 1998b) and in an array of publications by humanitarian and human rights agencies (UNHCR et al. 2006; Rai 2005; OCHA 2008), this study finds that IDPs who take refuge in urban areas are not a homogeneous group. Depending upon the variable bases, forms of capital and their relevance in the urban area, IDPs occupy different positions in the host community. The relative positions are determined by the weight of capital that they possess in the urban area as a social field. Those who have strong economic conditions or have good political connections are differently positioned in comparison to those who do not have any of these. They differ in terms of the levels of their access to resources, chances of integration and the power relations they enjoy with other actors in the host community. Hence, their livelihoods and orientations in terms of their aspirations and hopes are not always the same.

Table 1 and section 6.1.1 describe some of the characteristics of the different groups of IDPs. Based on their relative positions after displacement, this researcher has grouped them into three categories listed below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category of IDPs</th>
<th>No. of IDPs</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>General characteristics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>Well-established livelihoods, good access to influential people in government and non-government organisations, to policy and programmes at local and central level, and access to other support structures.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>56.7</td>
<td>Professionals with relatively stable source of income who are fairly well-established in host community; having good access to support structures.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>37.8</td>
<td>Poor and vulnerable, with very little chance of finding livelihoods in host community. None or passive access to support structures.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>270</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Field Survey 2008.*
Thus, IDPs occupy different niches in the socio-economic and political space and their livelihood strategies and practices depend upon their position in the host area. This makes their priorities and needs after displacement different from one another. This classification, based on my observations, is generally true of all conflict induced IDPs in Nepal, though the number may not be enough to make it representative.

Though there is not enough evidence to prove this to be true for all South Asian nations, the fact that a lot of IDPs cannot be identified across South Asia because they build their post-displacement life themselves, mingling with the host community is a strong evidence that IDPs are not homogeneous in terms of their vulnerability. The following section gives a brief description of the three different categories of IDPs:

6.1.1 First Category of IDPs in Nepal

The first category of the IDPs (Table 1) consists of those who were displaced by the Maoists. Their displacement started from the first phase of ‘elimination of selected enemies’ under the ‘strategic defence’ period announced by the Maoists. These people included wealthy landowners, local elites and politically active members such as local mayors and chairmen of the Village Development Committees. After displacement, people of this category have been able to support themselves through their own resources, are able to integrate with the host community, and enlist the help of the government and non-government agencies by means of their political and social capital.

IDPs in this category want to return to their place of origin. However, they are under the Group A list of criminals and wrongdoers in the eyes of the Maoists and hence unable to return. Almost all of them have had their property confiscated by the Maoists and negotiation of property return is still in process.

Apart from their confiscated property, the restoration of their social and political space after return is also a major issue for them. A majority of the category ‘A’

---

2 For a description of the phases of Maoist conflict and related displacement, see Ghimire 2009.
displaced people were targeted by Maoists due to their political affiliation\(^3\) and socio-economic status. There is bound to be a clash of political ideology if they return in the present context. This could trigger fresh conflicts in critical periods, such as during election times, during distributions of government allocated development funds at the local level, or in the functioning of village and district development committees, when inter-party coordination would be the most desirable political condition to have.

6.1.2 Second Category of IDPs in Nepal

The second category (Table 1) of IDPs were people targeted by the Maoists because of the profession they pursued, such as individuals and family members of the army, police, civil service or who were journalists, teachers, and health workers. A large number of village youths caught up between the atrocities of the warring sides were also in this group. Others in this category included those who have suffered from the indirect effects of conflict, such as disruption of education and of other services, damage to critical infrastructures and loss of livelihood opportunities. My research found that this category of displaced people have supported themselves by means of their physical and human assets, activities and knowledge base. However, many of them became de-skilled, or due to loss of opportunities had to resort to doing menial jobs in a competitive urban labour market after displacement.

Despite this, these people have been able to find new sources of livelihoods for themselves in the host area and increase their and their family members' human capital like education and skills in the urban setting. They are fairly well integrated in the host society as shown by their own perception of space. Their main plights are related to loss of property back home, as well as their need to sustain themselves in the face of their vulnerability in the urban areas.

There is no obstruction by the state regarding the return of these groups. To the Maoists, they fall under category B – people who will be allowed to return after fulfilling certain criteria the Maoists lay down. However, a majority of the IDPs in these groups are not willing to return, but continue living in the urban settings

\(^3\) If they return, these people are likely to hold important local positions as political party representatives.
because they think they have better access to education, employment and health services. They are able to maintain relationships with their place of origin at the same time.

6.1.3 Third Category of IDPs in Nepal

The third category of IDPs includes people displaced due to the direct or indirect effects of conflict. This group consists of very poor people who have no stake and interest in the war. Ironically, both the warring parties have been victimising them. The security forces accuse them of spying for Maoists and for providing them food and shelter. On the other hand, they were blatantly used by the Maoists in their strategy of ‘expanding mass base’, or as service providers in the form of porters and labourers. Indiscriminate use of civilians by the Maoists in the war affected them directly and led to their displacement. These factors, combined with the loss of general security, degradation of local economy, availability of services, and other negative ramifications in the economic and social life created by conflict, caused their displacement. These groups were displaced particularly after the intensification of the conflict in 2001. Traditionally a majority of the people from the far-western and mid-western development regions had their male members working as labourers in India. Their male members could not return to the villages and the women, children and the elderly who were left behind, could no longer live in the rural areas. It is they who became the internally displaced in the urban areas of mid-western Nepal.

The IDPs of this third category are the most vulnerable in terms of their social, economic and human capital. Their skill is in less demand in the urban labour market. They have virtually no access to the support system provided by the state and have weak social capital to use as assets in times of crisis. However, people of this category feel that their cash income is better in the urban area and the urban centre provides more opportunity for their children’s education and health needs. They feel that since they have nothing to lose in the rural areas, they would prefer to work and stay in the urban areas.
Though there are specific concerns faced by an IDP, the priority for each IDP depends upon their status after displacement. Since the nature of internal conflict and trends of displacement are similar in the South Asian states, it is safe to assume that instead of all the IDPs having similar issues and concerns, there may be groups within the IDPs whose issues and concerns (as those found above in case of Nepali IDPs) may be different from other groups of IDPs. In such a situation, depending upon their status of base and space in the host area and in their area of origin, these people can be used for post conflict reconstruction of the country. On the one hand, it would be ideal to address their reintegration, return, repatriation and rehabilitation needs, and on the other, the state can find human resources in the conflict affected groups thereby solving the problem of having to provide them livelihood opportunities. As agents who are sent with a mission, these groups are likely to feel ownership of the development efforts in their rural areas, which would make such development more sustainable.

6.2 **IDPs are active agents even after displacement.**

Except for camp settlements and in a few individual cases, our finding goes against the traditional notion that IDPs are passive recipients of assistance and a burden on the host community. Studies held in different countries across different regions in Uganda (Peterson 2006), in Afghanistan (Bradley 2008) and in Sudan (IDMC 2008) show that severe restrictions on socio-economic activities by the IDPs in the host communities makes them more dependent on assistance and protection from the government and non-government actors. According to the reports of IDMC (2009) and Korn (1999), this has been a great issue in Europe, Central Asia, and the Middle East. For example, in Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Iraq, due to restrictions put on socio-economic spaces (employment opportunities and general movement), IDPs had to depend entirely on government assistance. A report by Save the Children Foundation-USA (2005) showed the same case for IDPs in the camp settlements of Nepal; and IDMC (2010) observes similar cases for IDPs in Myanmar, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. Humanitarian assistance has lent significant economic support to many IDPs. When my fieldwork was done in late 2007, no cases of IDPs were found in which they said that they did not work and depended entirely on such assistance.
Peterson’s (2006) study shows that the IDPs, even in the midst of crisis, desperation and uncertainty have become important agents of development in the host community in Uganda. My field work found similar evidences in most cases of IDPs in Nepal. In the informal settlements around Dang and Kathmandu, IDPs got together with other non-displaced members of the community to build a self-sufficient community contained with physical infrastructures, which by local standards was fairly ideal. In the Patu River settlement in Dang (Picture 1), all infrastructure planning was done by the IDPs and local community and new houses were built according to their plan. Drains on either side of the roads were built in front of each house. Electricity throughout the community was distributed by means of local efforts. A house that was registered would provide electricity to the community and the people in the community would pay their bills to the house, which in turn would pay to the government. Telephone facility was agreed to be installed in the same manner but with the coming of the mobile phones, this became unnecessary. A school was similarly established and the school administration was run by the local communities and IDPs acting together. The children of the community went to this school for their primary education. For higher education, they went to the school established by the host community. The IDPs were equally involved in all these activities and they had access to these services equal to their non-IDP hosts.

Picture 1. Patu River settlement-a new settlement built and developed by IDPs with the help of local community.

To get electricity, a house needs to be registered with the government. For this, the land where houses are constructed must be private land. However, the land on which the settlement was situated was public land. Houses built on it, therefore, cannot be registered.
Another example comes from the slum settlements of Kathmandu. The IDPs, along with other *sukumbashi* (landless people), have formed associations to work for the benefit of all slum settlers. With the support of other organisations, this slum community has drawn up administrative records for the whole community. The community has been divided into four *wards* (the smallest administrative unit) with a specific number of houses in each. Civic facilities are accordingly divided. They have established basic health services, schools, tuition centres, library, and youth clubs within their slum settlements. Dykes have been constructed with their own efforts for safeguarding the settlement during the flooding of the river. The IDPs hold significant leadership positions together with other non-IDP members of the community amongst whom they live. IDPs did not report any discrimination from the host community.

Beside social space, the cases mentioned above have implications for the economic space of IDPs. To the extent the individual and family base of the IDPs helped, they did not feel restricted in their economic space in the host area and in maintaining social relationships with the host. However, their inability to invest the property of their origin impeded them to make bigger investment in the host area. This is seen to go against the general trend observed by Moser (1998) that urban poor do not invest in housing as they do not have legal entitlements to it. The IDP respondents invested money in their dwelling or made it better to the extent possible. They seemed confident of obtaining ownership of the land one day and kept struggling for it. Their hopes surged with the visit of politically affiliated leaders. The organisations devoted to land rights operating inside such slum areas, and their own political connections with national organisations and international organisations, seemed to have encouraged the IDPs to make investment in land and housing in the slum settlements. For example, LUMANTI, an NGO supported by the UN-habitat, was very active in most slum areas of Kathmandu. This made way for economic and social integration of the slum areas within the host community.

The above cases provide an interesting new perspective that can help transcend the present boundaries of looking at the IDPs as passive recipients of assistance and burdens on the host communities and intervening agencies. Studies done

---

5 Mud houses which I saw during my initial fieldwork were later replaced by block houses. Blocks are made of sand acquired from the adjacent river.
both outside Nepal by (IDMC 2009; Cohen 2006; Korn 1999) and in Nepal (RUPP 2006; UNHCR et al. 2006; Gyawali 2005; Rai, 2005; Kernot and Gurung 2003),
show that with the arrival of IDPs increased pressures were felt on infrastructure, and basic services got constrained. However, this study finds that
when given a feasible environment, IDPs have also through their agency, contributed positively to the development of the host community. IDPs are,
therefore, active agents in the host area even after displacement.

6.3 Absolute return to rural areas cannot be achieved.

In most cases of internal displacement, the state and international agencies
support the IDPs return to their place of origin rather than integration into the
host area or resettlement in a new one. The success of interventions is measured
based on the number of returnees to their area of origin. The importance of
return as a solution can also be seen in the global database on IDPs where the
internal displacement crisis is assumed to be less if there are a higher number of
returnees. The database quotes the number of returnees, but not the number of
IDPs who have integrated in the urban area or choose to stay in a new area.

However, this study found that though return is taken as a success by the state
and international agencies, most IDPs do not want to go back permanently to
their area of origin when they are displaced to urban areas. Displacement trend
in South Asia (as in most cases of displacement) is from rural to urban areas. In
such a case, the assumption that IDPs will return to villages is not largely true
due to the following two primary reasons as discussed below:

Firstly, most internal migration all over the world is generally from rural to
urban areas. Though forcibly displaced, the displacement in Nepal coincides with
the normal migration route (Ghimire 2009). Secondly, sociological theorists like
Bourdieu (1997) and Giddens (1984) and migration theories and researches in
their pull-push models have very often proved that human beings are affected by
the social field in which their daily livelihoods are embedded. Existing studies on
the IDPs and various interventions on their behalf have taken human agency as
being a rather static process. They have disregarded the effect of the social field
on the disposition of individuals. When a person comes to an urban area, which
has better facilities and services than the rural area, return decisions are taken considering the livelihood options in urban areas. The study finds that the pull factors of the urban area, though in condition of displacement, have changed the orientation towards return for many IDPs. Their strategy and practices preferably are centred on making livelihoods that oscillate between the rural and urban areas- rather than opting for an absolute return. Table 2 shows the perspectives about return of the IDPs. Most did not want to return and preferred to remain in the urban as it gave them better opportunity in terms of education and health services for their children. In a study by Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) et al. (2009), the same two reasons were cited by the IDPs for liking the urban areas.

Table 2: Perspectives on Return

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Youth (35 males/ 35 females)</th>
<th>Males</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Females</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Want to go back permanently</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Want to stay in urban area</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>91.4</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>88.5</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not sure</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Parents’ generation (80 males/ 40 females) | | | | | | |
| Want to go back permanently | 13 | 16.2 | 2 | 5 | 15 | 12.5 |
| Want to stay in urban area  | 67 | 83.75| 35| 87.5| 102| 85  |
| Not sure                    | 0  | 3    | 7.5| 3 | 2.5 |  |

| Grandparents’ generation (35 males/45 females) | | | | | | |
| Want to go back permanently | 11 | 31.4| 8 | 17.7| 19 | 23.7 |
| Want to stay in urban area  | 12 | 34.2| 19| 42.2| 31 | 38.7 |
| Not sure                    | 12 | 34.2| 18| 40  | 30 | 37.5 |

*Source: Field Survey 2008.*

This study found that out of 70 youth, 63 (90 percent) wanted to continue their studies and live in the urban environment rather than going back to their origin
in the present condition (Table 2). The remaining four were not sure what was right for them. These groups had greater capacity to adapt to changes at their personal individual base, made more friends beyond their immediate kin networks at work and elsewhere and shared group interests. This provided them new space beyond their immediate kin within the host.

Besides this, the study found that individual qualities like awareness, education, capacity to change and identify themselves with the urban population helped young people to move beyond their identity as IDPs and to accept new identities of their sub-fields (as students and job holders). It enhanced their chances of integration and contributed to a better perception of the host community. With this positive attitude, young people were found to have a stronger capacity to resist outside forces (pressures on return of family) in their individual decision-making.

The largest per cent (23.7 per cent) of people who wanted to go back was of the grandparents’ generation (Table 2). They said they missed the community and way of life at their place of origin. The difficulties facing them in the urban area ranged from the weather to appropriation of physical and non-physical (their status) space within the house (absence of special puja or prayer rooms and the place of worship of ancestral God and their old lifestyle. However, 37.5 per cent in this group (Table 2) were not sure whether they would be happy if they returned. For this group, the dilemma lay in having to choose between the comfort of the village way of life and the future of their younger family members.

6.4 *Short term relief cannot bring durable solutions.*

Muggah (2006) observes that a ‘durable solution’ is an elusive concept. However, the study finds that more elusive is why certain programmes and policies are carried out ritually without evaluation of their impacts. Though IDPs spell out clearly what they need, responses often fail to take into considerations their voices. Interventions should be designed based on impact studies rather than carried out ritually.
This research has found that for IDPs in Nepal, the foremost concern is finding a sustainable source of income. Studies across South Asia such as in Bangladesh, India and Sri Lanka (Ferris 2008; Banerjee et al. 2005) have shown that most IDPs in South Asia want help in making them able to build their livelihoods themselves rather than seek support for food, shelter, etc., that the intervening agencies provide. Their foremost concern is to find a sustainable and durable source of income and income opportunities so that they can be independent. Similar concerns were also shown by studies carried out in other countries like Colombia where, in the words of a displaced woman, ‘We do not want more humanitarian aid; we want income from jobs’ (Ferris 2008, p.11). Similarly in another instance Ferris (2008, p.11) observes the same sentiment in Sudan ‘What we will grow is better than the relief given to us.’

It shows that though a ‘durable’ solution is hard to achieve, our understanding of this is different from the IDPs’ expectation of what constitutes a solution. On the one hand, the IDPs want to build their lives themselves and need the state’s assistance to do so, while on the other, the state views them as someone who cannot do anything and thus need what it defines as “basic needs” delivered at the IDPs’ door. This quest for self-sustainability on the part of the IDPs is in contrast to the state’s understanding of IDPs where the state takes them as a burden. Because the state views them as such, it has failed to use the IDPs as human resources.

7. Conclusion

The phenomenon of internal displacement due to conflict is common to all the South Asian states. The reason for conflict, the trend of displacement and certain aspects of livelihoods after displacements, which are tied to traditions and local culture are also mostly similar. Also similar is the understanding of IDPs among the intervening agencies. This understanding of IDPs has stemmed from the structures and the orientation of the intervening agencies. This study of IDPs in Nepal has shown that some of the prevailing understanding on IDPs is not always true. Due to this, the issue of IDPs and steps towards addressing internal displacement are taken separately from the sustainable development
programmes in post-conflict states. The study shows how these two aspects are not different and should be taken together.

The paper shows that if we can transcend our perspective of looking at the IDPs and acknowledge their agency, heterogeneity and orientation after displacement and their wish to support themselves despite difficult circumstances, there will be ample spaces whereby the IDPs themselves can be used as agents of sustainable development in the rural villages. Many IDPs do not want a complete return to their rural origin under the present circumstances, but also do not want a complete disconnect from their villages. Because of their preference for multi-local livelihoods- living in cities while continuing to have links in villages, their links in both these areas and their knowledge, skill, ability to work hard and their experience of the rural areas, the first and the second category of IDPs can be mobilised as agents to undertake sustainable development of rural areas of the country.

If Nepal can create jobs where IDPs can pursue multi-local livelihoods and employment opportunities, it can not only provide opportunities for jobs, but also make them owners of development in their rural origins and create a sense of pride and fulfilment. This can also help in reconciliation/repatriation efforts and contribute to the development of the rural areas. At the same time, this can be a natural and sustainable way out of the present livelihood concerns of the IDPs and the states’ concern in terms of addressing the issues of IDPs in the post-conflict sustainable development agendas.
References


Save the Children Foundation 2005, ‘Major findings of initial assessment at Rajhena IDP camp 2000’, Save the Children, USA.


**Shame and Fury**  
Ayesha Salman*  

> Nonviolence is a powerful and just weapon, which cuts without wounding and ennobles the man who wields it. It is a sword that heals. Nonviolence means avoiding not only external physical violence but also internal violence of spirit. You not only refuse to shoot a man, but you refuse to hate him.  
> ~ Martin Luther King, Jr.

**Abstract**  
A woman once said to me, *'When I was growing up all I wanted to be was like the other children, but every morning when I went to school I was told I was different and I wondered what was wrong with me. They told me I had bad blood, they told me I was soiled, but I still didn’t understand. Now I know I am different. I am not like the others.'* The woman who told me this was the daughter of a Christian woman and a Muslim man. She was referring to her childhood years when she was incessantly teased and berated at school for being the product of a mixed religious background. She was repeatedly asked what her beliefs were, she was attacked physically and she was told she was a lesser human being because she had ‘dirty’ blood.

The paper will begin by providing a brief overview of some of the major political events spanning the last decade that have led to extreme brutality and mass murder perpetrated by nations against nations often using religion as a guise, and by groups of individuals with extremist religious beliefs. The story of Zaib follows as an example of how religious discrimination begins in our homes, spreading like a disease leading to many of the atrocities that will be described at the outset of the paper. I will quote excerpts of direct conversations with her as well as incidents she faced throughout her life to shed light upon the destruction that can be caused by deeply embedded bigotry in our society and indeed many societies across the globe. I will end by posing a few important questions that pertain to where we are today and how that is reflected in the socio-political fabric of our country and the societies that we create. I will ask us to look within ourselves and question how many Zaibs we give birth to everyday and how many we kill - with a gun, derogatory look, a gesture or simply a few choice words.

*Ms. Ayesha Salman graduated in Philosophy from the University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK and has since worked as a writer and editor for the development sector in Pakistan. Her areas of special interest are issues relating to child abuse and religious minorities. She is a published poet and her first novel will be published shortly by Roli Books, India.*
On 11 September 2001, there were a series of attacks on the Twin Towers of the World Trade Centre in New York, USA when two planes hit them. Nineteen hijackers died and 3,000 civilians were killed. Soon after, the USA enacted the USA Patriot Act and launched The War on Terror as a first step to fight terrorism, attacking Afghanistan to depose the Taliban.

Ironically, the USA attack on Afghanistan was known as ‘Operation Enduring Freedom’ that caused ‘3,000 - 3,400 (7 October 2001 through March 2000) civilian deaths in the US air war upon Afghanistan...’ (Herold 2002). This number does not refer to post war deaths caused by starvation, lack of health facilities, injury and disease. An analysis in the Guardian estimated that 20,000 Afghans died in total as a result of the war in 2001 (Steele 2002).

The justification for the attack given by the US government was that Islamic extremists (Al-Qaeda) were using Afghan soil to plan further anti-terrorist attacks against the US. The USA executed the attack despite lack of legal grounds for its action. The United Nations Charter specifies that all nations should settle their disputes peacefully (United Nations n.d). Moreover, the United Nations Security Council did not authorise the attack on Afghanistan. Both these factors have contributed to the wave of mistrust against the US that has spread throughout the world following the Afghanistan War. I share the opinion with many critics of the war that the attack on the Twin Towers was executed by a group of individuals, not by a nation so the USA had no justification for attacking an entire nation in retaliation. Again critics of the war believe that the intentions of the US had little to do with the Taliban, and more with the need to explore these countries for oil reserves to support the unstable US economy of 2001 among other political factors at the expense of thousands of lives, hence its interest in both Afghanistan and Iraq.

The situation was further exacerbated when, in continuation of the War on Terror, America attacked Iraq in March 2003 once again under the slogan of ‘freedom’ calling it ‘Operation Iraqi Freedom’. A joint attack with the UK was justified with a claim that Iraq was harbouring weapons of mass destruction, which threatened the US and the UK along with their regional allies as was reported daily in the media at the time. Despite strong opposition from neighbouring European countries, the UK formed an alliance with the US and
embarked on a full-fledged attack on Iraq to depose Saddam Hussein, Iraqi president from 16 July 1979 until 9 April 2003, and uncover the alleged weapons of mass destruction. It has now been established that no weapons of mass destruction were ever found.

Harold Pinter’s speech at his Nobel Prize ceremony of 2005 was brutal in his condemnation of America’s foreign policy and in support of his argument and the fact that religion is often used simply as a tool to further a particular nation’s own interests, he said,

*Direct invasion of a sovereign state has never in fact been America’s favoured method. In the main, it has preferred what it has described as ‘low intensity conflict’. Low intensity conflict means that thousands of people die but slower than if you dropped a bomb on them in one fell swoop. It means that you infect the heart of the country, that you establish a malignant growth and watch the gangrene bloom. When the populace has been subdued - or beaten to death - the same thing - and your own friends, the military and the great corporations, sit comfortably in power, you go before the camera and say that democracy has prevailed. This was a commonplace in US foreign policy* (Pinter 2005).

The malignant growth, as I see it in this case, was religious hatred and it was used as the perfect tool to infect the minds of millions.

From that point onwards the ‘world order’ as we knew it, changed. The ‘War on Terror’ dominated international politics. Under the guise of the threat of the Taliban, the USA’s foreign policy became even more aggressive. Thousands of Muslims were interrogated and put on trial. Some were convicted of terrorist activities, others were released after thorough investigations and in many cases, extreme forms of torture were used against Muslim prisoners as has been documented from various prisons, such as Guantanamo Bay in Cuba. Several case studies of torture inflicted on prisoners because of their religious beliefs or practices are given in a report by the Center for Constitutional Rights (CCR) titled *Torture and Cruel, Inhuman, and Degrading Treatment of Prisoners at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba*. One such case study is cited here to shed light on the extent of cruelty inflicted on individuals based on religious extremist views--in
this case, the views of the American soldiers. The first example given here is of a prisoner, Mr. Mustapha Ait Idir, who was asked to take off his pants and give them to the soldier. He refused saying he could not do so as he was a Muslim and could not pray without his pants on. Subsequently, he was beaten and spray was used to block his vision in his cell.

*His eyes were blurry and stinging from the spray... the enforcers jumped on him... The first team member landed on his back while he was face down. The second did the same. Both landed on their padded knees... While he was down on the ground his assailants stuffed a hose in his mouth and forced water down his throat... and after he was fully in their control one of the guards slowly bent his fingers back until one of them broke. The pain was excruciating... he was not given medical treatment despite... the clear deformity of his hand... Then a soldier jumped on the left side of his head with full weight forcing stones to cut into Mr. Ait Idir’s face near his eye... as a result of this incident Mr. Ait Idir’s face became paralyzed for several months* (CCR 2006, p.27).

The section in the report with examples on humiliating punishments describes in detail the kind of physical and psychological abuse the prisoners suffered when they tried to practice their religious beliefs. Pages of the Holy Quran were frequently torn out and the Holy Quran itself was often thrown on the floor as a sign of disrespect. The American soldiers would bark like dogs when it was time for prayer mocking the call to prayer (Ibid., p.26). During the month of Ramadan food would not be given to the prisoners at the time the fast had to be broken. These examples and others like them are just some of the instances of extreme violence at Guantanamo Bay (Ibid.).

As a reaction to the treatment of Muslims across the globe, massive atrocities were taking place in the name of Islam. In June 2004, a Lockheed Martin Corp. employee Paul Johnson was kidnapped in Saudi Arabia. Abdel Aziz Al-Muqrin who was the ‘self proclaimed leader of Al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia’ had demanded amongst others that the Saudi government ‘release Al-Qaeda prisoners’ and unless it did so Johnson would be killed. A week later, his dead body was found. His head had been severed. Photographs of his decapitated head placed at the
back of a headless body were splashed all over the newspapers. After the body was recovered, Muqrin issued the following statement:

As we promised, we the mujahedeen from the Falluja Squadron slaughtered the American hostage Paul Johnson after the deadline we gave to the Saudi tyrants... So he got his fair share from this life and for him to taste a bit of what the Muslims have been suffering from Apache helicopter attacks. They were tortured by its missiles (CNN World 2004).

Similarly, in Pakistan kidnappings started to become more common, with religious extremists making various demands from the government in exchange for kidnapped hostage(s). Probably one of the most widely covered cases was that of Daniel Pearl who was an American journalist and South Asia Bureau Chief for the Wall Street Journal, when he was kidnapped. His killer Khalid Sheikh Mohammad proudly announced that he had personally beheaded him. Those who claimed responsibility for kidnapping him had various demands including:

The release of US held prisoners in Guantanamo Bay, b) the return of Pakistani prisoners to Pakistan, c) the end to US presence in Pakistan, d) the delivery of F-16 planes to Pakistan that were never received (Wikipedia-Daniel Pearl).

Daniel Pearl left a wife and child behind and less than two minutes before he was killed his video statement read:

We can't be secure, we can't walk around free as long as our government policies are continuing and we allow them to continue. We Americans cannot continue to bear the consequences of our government's actions, such as the unconditional support given to the state of Israel. Twenty-four uses of the veto power to justify massacres of children. And the support for the dictatorial regimes in the Arab and left-wing world. And also the continued American military presence in Afghanistan (Derfner 2008).

Coupled with numerous beheadings in the name of Islam, a wave of suicide bombings has rocked Pakistan particularly in the last five years as has been seen in the media and in today's world Pakistan is known as the country with the highest incidence of suicide bombings. Between 2002 and 2006 there were 25
suicide bombings across the country (Iqbal 2010). Thousands of people have been killed. More are being slaughtered and others are being put to trial. In Pakistan, the recent incidence of violence in the name of religion has increased and is not only directed at other religious minorities living in Pakistan, but is also directed at various sects within Islam. A few recent examples were the attacks on Ahmadis in May 2010. Terrorist attacks were launched on two Ahmadi mosques, both in Lahore. Gunmen started to shoot indiscriminately killing a total of 88 people and injuring several others as was reported in media. There have been several attacks on Shiites including the latest one in January 2011 when a suicide bomber detonated his bomb in the middle of a Shiite procession. Thirteen people were killed and many more injured. Numerous bombings and killings have been linked to the Taliban as they continue to send threatening messages to the government with a promise to continue to terrorize the nation if their demands are not met.

How can entire groups of people be capable of such acts of cruelty against people from different religious faiths? From what we have seen above, these factors are often intrinsically linked to various government policies and agendas, but this still does not explain how it becomes possible for thousands of people to engage in such acts of extreme cruelty.

I believe (as do many others) that the ‘crimes’ committed in recent times are reminiscent of the crimes perpetrated against the Jews during the Holocaust. One of the most shocking aspects of the Holocaust was the common disbelief that so many Germans actually participated in the killings and tortured millions of Jews. How could thousands of Germans be flawed? How did they bring themselves to carry out such remorseless acts of violence without guilt? Some of them had never committed a crime in their lives previously, then how did so many people change so drastically under the dictatorship of one man, Adolf Hitler. There are numerous theories about what went wrong and how people changed overnight so drastically. Browning (1998) quotes Dawidowicz from book The war against the Jews: 1933-1945,

*The insecurities of post-World-War I Germany and the anxieties they produced provided an emotional milieu in which irrationality and hysteria became routine and illusions became transformed into delusions. The delusional disorder assumed mass proportions... In*
Modern Germany the mass psychosis of anti-Semitism deranged a whole people (cited in Browning 1998, p. 253)

Most theorists believe that people are easily convinced by authority and group pressure and once they start to participate in cruel acts they a) begin to become immune to it and, b) go on rather than stop because stopping would mean admitting that they did something wrong in the first place, so it is easier to continue. Though this does not serve as a justification, it is an insight into how huge populations and even nations can be convinced to act in an irrational and unpredictable manner through coercion and brainwashing.

One of the top priorities of most governments today is peace and security. Whether it is Israel or Palestine, Afghanistan, Iraq, or Pakistan, wherever there is conflict between different religions and different Islamic sects, dissension is widespread and threatening. Religious prejudices remain irrational and often grounded in myths and unrealities that are either a remnant of the political agenda of different countries or are born out stereotyped images of people from various sects or religions which result from ignorance and a lack of education. Enlightenment has to come through education and awareness. The media too, as a pivotal player in influencing the masses, is part of the machinery that steers nations. The way the media presents the news alters our perceptions and forms our thought processes. It is, therefore, imperative that the media be involved in changing peoples’ attitudes and perceptions towards religious differences / intolerance.

In Pakistan, we are constantly exposed to graphic images of dead bodies littering the streets filling our minds like a dye. Our children are becoming immune to these scenes and we are no longer surprised by what we see, rather fearful of what this will do to us as individuals. It is from this stupor that we have to rise and correct our actions as individuals so that we can benefit collectively.

Most of our beliefs are formed when we are at an impressionable age and the most influential people in our lives are our parents and immediate relatives. What they say is sacrosanct in most cases and we believe their truth as ours. I have seen a woman telling her young children not to touch any utensils touched by a Christian and I have seen ‘academically educated’ people calling Christians
‘dirty’ and ‘black’ as if having a dark complexion were a sign of inferiority to be associated only with Christians. These children will grow up thinking that all Christians are intrinsically flawed, that they are inferior and unholy. I assert that judging a person by their religious beliefs is not only irrational, but it is also against human instinct. You are immediately attaching a set of preconceived notions to a person that have nothing to do with them. You also suggest in your way of thinking and your perception of them that somehow they are made differently- as if their blood was different or that perhaps they were somehow structured differently. Imbued in those who discriminate is the belief that difference of religion means that you are somehow inferior or superior, that your ‘faith’ is the only right one or conversely the wrong one. It is those of us who fall into this trap and start believing our untruths that begin to discriminate. Eventually those of us who start to believe these myths develop the potential to commit crimes such as those mentioned above but, as touched upon above, it all begins at a much smaller scale, when our children interact with other children at school, when children from different social backgrounds and ethnicities interact in social gatherings. When we begin to recognise differences we either accept them or we discriminate depending on what we are taught at home. It is at that stage that prejudices begin to develop and hatred is borne. The victims of that prejudice will inevitably grow up with psychological problems, as will those who inflict the pain on them as aggressors giving rise to more hatred and more violence.

Every person that is affected by religious discrimination and every victim that is hurt, is not hurt alone. Entire families are deeply affected and generations are affected. To re-iterate once again, hatred breeds hatred and once the cycle is set in motion more deaths take place, more homes are destroyed and societies are tainted.

Renowned thinkers and philosophers have analysed and discussed the various forms of social injustice that are perpetrated at the individual and state level breeding corruption and injustice. An excellent critique of the state and its power is reflected in Anthony Burgess’s 1962 futuristic visionary novel *A clockwork orange* (1962). It offers us a serious indictment of the actions of a totalitarian ‘state’ in which Alex, the main character, is caught in a cycle of violence and disassociation. After committing murder and being engaged in a series of violent
crimes Alex, is taken to prison and punished by the ‘state’ with violence. Burgess gives a graphic narration of Alex' torture; where his eyes are forcibly held open with metal instruments while he is forced to watch a string of violent images on the screen in the hope that it will ‘cleanse’ him. Alex's crimes are unjustified, but the state’s violent reaction is painful in itself and does not solicit the sympathy of the reader.

In order to look at the larger picture, we must look within ourselves and assess our actions and our behaviours. To best exemplify this, I will present the story of a woman, who was a victim of religious discrimination and who I have given the fictitious name of Zaib. What happened to her takes place every day to people from all walks of life. Her story is one of many such stories.

Stereotyped views of people from various religious backgrounds and sects are a part of our societies and indeed part of many of our drawing room conversations. The constant flow of images of war and death have anaesthetised the masses to the extent that we forget that ‘real’ people are dying of this ‘disease’- people with families- mothers, children, fathers, brothers, and wives. It is vital to remind ourselves that every individual has a responsibility to ensure that they should not exclude those who come from different faiths. Pinter (2005) makes the point that we have to constantly re-assess ourselves in the endeavour to better society, though he is not, here, restricting himself just to religious differences:

\textit{When we look into a mirror we think the image that confronts us is accurate. But move a millimetre and the image changes. We are actually looking at a never-ending range of reflections. But sometimes a writer has to smash the mirror - for it is on the other side of that mirror that the truth stares at us.}

\textit{I believe that despite the enormous odds, which exist, unflinching, unswerving, fierce intellectual determination, as citizens, to define the real truth of our lives and our societies is a crucial obligation which devolves upon us all. It is in fact mandatory.}

\textit{If such a determination is not embodied in our political vision we have no hope of restoring what is so nearly lost to us - the dignity of man (Ibid.).}
Keeping in mind an overview of the last ten years as a backdrop, the reader is asked to reflect upon some of the arguments that have been made above and take a walk with me into the world of Zaib, born half Christian and half Muslim, a woman born with two religions and who grew up with two religions. The paper briefly traces the life of Zaib through excerpts from my first novel *Blue dust* (forthcoming). I chose this story because it epitomizes the devastation that can be caused by religious discrimination and I hope that it will help us to recognise and move beyond our own limitations. I would like to begin by emphasising that identities are wiped out when you relate to a person purely by the religion they belong to and we are left with ideals only. The person behind the façade is stripped of their worth and individuality and no longer remains a living breathing human being, but a man-made construct.

Zaib struggled with the incessant psychological abuse she suffered as a child. Her story is a testament to the fact that it is not just the sword or the knife that can cause irreparable damage, but even a derogatory look, a gesture or simply what is said. A number of excerpts from the novel will be quoted below along with their context, which depicts incidents from her life as she told them to me. This first excerpt is from a chapter in which Zaib has just been sent to a convent by her mother because she was unable to fit into her old school where most of the girls were Muslim:

*In the first few days no one spoke to her, in fact most of the students avoided her. At meal times they looked at her suspiciously. At night when she couldn’t sleep she bit back the tears and /counted backwards from hundred to one to try and get to sleep. Her head was filled with thoughts of her mother. She just wanted to be with her and hated her for sending her here. It usually took at least an hour, but sleep was welcome when it came because at least it meant she could escape to her dreams.*

*The next morning Zaib had just finished her Maths class and was walking down a long grey corridor when Saira, one of the girls in her class, came and stood in front of her.*
“Hey Zaib listen! I know whose daughter you are.” “So?” she said defiantly. “So I know that your father is Muslim and your mother is Christian”, Saira said.

Zaib felt faint. Fear has many faces, but the fear she felt now, she knew well because it was the same fear she had felt in her old school, walking down her old street and in her worst nightmares. Inside she prayed, please God please not again, please let her go away somehow. God was not with her now. The girl went on, “So what do you believe in, Christianity or Islam?” She heard herself say, “I believe in both.” The girl looked horrified, “you can’t believe in BOTH!” she said shocked.

The next day the news had spread and the disgusted looks Zaib received from various students was a familiar one. She stayed as close to Pretima as possible as a refuge from them. Pretima told her to ignore them as everyone else had always told her to do. “They tell me I pray to statues because I am Hindu and I have learnt to ignore it. They even tell me I am dirty because they think I pray to cows “But I can’t, thought Zaib. If only it was that simple…” (Salman forthcoming)

This next excerpt is from an earlier chapter:

Zaib grew up with two halves, ‘the clean half’ and the ‘dirty half’, sometimes the ‘clean half’ became the ‘dirty half’ sometimes the ‘dirty half’ the ‘clean half’, it all depended on where she was. Just like the two ends of a rope that look the same but aren’t. At school it was her Christian half, which was the ‘dirty half’.

She was told she was ‘black like a Christian and ugly like a Christian’ that she stank, that she dressed ‘like a Christian’ that she ‘was dumb and stupid.’ By the time she was in secondary school she had started believing she was dirtier than the other girls and somehow less human. She washed her hands constantly, trying to make them fairer and somehow cleaner. She stared in the mirror and tried to make expressions, such as pouting her lips, to make
herself look prettier. She dreaded the summer because she thought no matter how much deodorant she used she would still smell more than the other girls, after all there was something intrinsically wrong with the way she was made. She remembered several occasions when she stood in queues and was told by one or the other student how much she ‘stank.’ ‘Er Zaib you stink, stay away from me!’ (Ibid.).

The following excerpt describes a dream Zaib had. She was constantly in turmoil because of her ‘dream-world’, which often merged with her ‘real’ world and she would wake up terrified and disorientated:

Outside, the sun was burning holes in fruit. Zaib crushed a grape between her teeth. She looked up at the cracking leaves of an old palm tree, veins breaking the stone blue sky. The sound of crashing glass startled her; a boy had kicked an empty coke bottle across the road into a dustbin. Lizards were a common sight in Zakar and she had got used to them but today this one she could see from the corner of her eye had her pinned to the footpath with its charcoal eyes and mocking tongue. She recalled the last time she had killed a lizard. Centipedes crawled all over the pavement. She could hear the constant sound of church bells in the distance and began to feel desperate to get to the church. She pulled herself away from the boy, the lizard, the heat and walked in short quick paces following the trail of the church bells. On the way ants scurried across the sun fractured earth, a footstep away from death. A man in a Mercedes pulled over and rolled his window down, ‘A beautiful woman like you should not be so lonely like this, come for a ride with me, come on darling!’ He shrugged his shoulders and drove off. She had the smell of fish in her nostrils from the day before and couldn’t get rid of it. Fish behind glass, past street vendors shining with sweat and lanes of leaking dust light. She had to find the church. The second turning had come and the chimes were louder but she still couldn’t see the church. Her breathing became uneven and she was suffocating.

‘Mama mama. Where is the church?’
A woman in white took her hand. She had big pink lips, ‘Zaib you need sugar.’ ‘I hate sugar please don’t make me.’ Her chest tightened.

‘Sugar is good for you.’

‘I think her blood pressure is falling.’

‘Take her to the other room.’

‘She has always been sickly.’

‘She hasn’t eaten for days.’

‘Is she very ill?’

‘She looks like a rake.’

‘Have you thought about a psychiatrist?’

‘She is sick.’

‘Zaib wake up it’s only a dream, Zaib! Zaib! Zaib! Zaib! It’s me, daddy, open your eyes!’

‘Dada you are back, where were you? ...the church is too far away.. I tried to...’ She had eggshell feet.

‘Zaib, wake up, it’s me, Hassan!’ She woke up with sweat trickling down her temples... ‘Hassan, where is the church? I have to find the church (Ibid.).

The following excerpt is from the point of view of one of her daughters, Sonia. It shows the anguish that her children suffered through her mental torture and illness that lasted for over 20 years. The context is that Zaib’s husband, Hassan, not being able to cope with her neurosis, has just left her.
The day Hassan left, Sonia had looked at Zaib’s closed eyelids moving in her sleep. She examined the veins on them feeding her body, it made her shudder to think that she could just as easily stop breathing. She picked up her mother’s limp, sleeping hand. One day insects would eat that hand…. How was it possible that such a beautiful creature could be mutilated in such a cruel way? The indignity of it astonished her. She defaced Zaib over and over again; it was the mental action of someone outside themselves making a reckless attempt to play the role of the onlooker. It didn’t help; instead it just made her realize how frugal nature had been in bestowing its creatures with pleasures and how generous it had been with its dreams (Ibid.).

As we follow the events in Zaib’s life she becomes so insecure that her relationships begin to become negatively affected. In this excerpt, Zaib is desperately trying to get her husband Hassan’s attention, but he is unable to cope with her increasing dependency on him. She struggles with this realisation:

Quietness spreads like ink between people and that means they do anything to escape the dread of each other’s thoughts, each other’s questions, but Hassan’s feelings of isolation and helplessness spread through his days and Zaib could see it. She suggested they use some of their savings in Zakar to take a holiday and travel the world without the girls. There was a sudden panic in Hassan’s eyes. He just looked anxious and she dwelled on it until the room was bleeding with crows. What was he really thinking about? Why did he seem hesitant? Was being with her that unbearable to him? Was there someone else? (Ibid.).

In this next excerpt, Zaib has become an alcoholic and these thoughts are her husband’s as he tries to come to terms with this ‘new’ Zaib that he can hardly recognise:

Today Hassan and Zaib are celebrating their eighteenth wedding anniversary. He is developing a fear of her shaking hands and morning nausea…He is sitting in front of her, thinking of something to say. She keeps smiling at him nervously and he detects a small
pink twitch that wasn’t there before, it is located just above her upper lip on the right hand side of her mouth. It becomes the focus of her face and Hassan feels that if he doesn’t walk away he will die of claustrophobia.

...He hears her laughter but he doesn’t see her. He wonders if it was all inevitable. He can smell red wine from the gutters on the streets of Lahore, he can smell it on his hands after he washes them in the sink and in the morning when he takes a shower. He blames himself. He thinks it’s his fault. He recalls how his hands tremble when he removes the bed covers from their bed after he comes home from work. He wakes up shaking with demons in his head and spiders on his palms and he has imagined suffocating Zaib under the pillow many times (Ibid.).

As Zaib’s situation worsens, she tries to commit suicide several times. This excerpt is taken just after she is taken to hospital after one of her suicide attempts. These are her thoughts.

"Around me the white hospital room tells me that I am now living in a cardboard box. There are no birds or ants here with me, I am alone. They have lost me on their important journey, yet I have seen them all, night after night in this room with me, while I slept, but now they have abandoned me. Hassan stands in the doorway, morning after morning holding tea in his hands and waiting for me patiently to emerge from this stupor that has stayed with us for so long. I cannot disappoint him anymore. In this dim light of dawn, when the nurses have given me their last smile as a token, I know that in my father’s garden, at home in Pakistan, there will be crows waiting to hear what I have to say to my sister and what she has to say to me, but today they will miss our morning conversation. Is it morning now? Today they will be ignorant of our chat and we will not see them, it may be our last chance. My daughters are home, sleeping. I can see them in bed. They are resting. Devi\(^1\) is touching my sheet. I have no love for these doctors and nurses. I feel sorry for my family. Devi is praying, I can see that from the way she is holding

\(^1\) Devi, Zaib’s elder sister.
on to my sheet, she keeps her mouth shut so she thinks I don’t know what she is doing. It is her habit because she thinks I am really an atheist. I will let her believe what she wants. I will wait until she has finished. Then I’ll ask her what God has told her.

They discharged Zaib from the hospital two days later (Ibid.).

In my conversations with Zaib I saw pain, anguish and frustration but above all, I saw desperation. Perceptions of people’s emotions are largely subjective, as were mine, and Zaib was dealing with a number of other issues which are not relevant for the purposes of this paper, but the issue of her ‘identity’ as she saw it was closely linked with her religious background. For much of her life, she struggled with this identity. She tried hard to ‘fit into’ either one of the religions and found herself veering between the two; unable to reconcile herself to either, yet at the same time she was a huge advocate for peace between religions and refused to entertain any sort of religious prejudice.

In the end, I felt that her dilemmas were actually a plea to those who perpetrated extremist views. The reason why she felt she had to find her religious identity was because she grew up in an environment where she faced people with extremist views, where she felt ashamed of belonging to one religion or the other and where she saw that she was often ‘defined’ by her religious identity. Zaib struggled with depression for more than 20 years and many of her troubles were rooted in this lack of a sense of belonging that stemmed from her religious background. During her battle with depression her children suffered, unable to understand their mother’s complex emotions and sometimes unable to accept her unpredictable behaviour, yet all times trying to pull her out of her pain. During the last five years of her life she became an agnostic and refused to be associated with any religion.

She despised the injustices she saw around her that stemmed from religious dissent. One day, as I was sitting with Zaib she turned to me wistfully and said, ‘I look at myself in the mirror and I see a woman with tiny beady eyes and I can never forget the day that that girl came to me in school and said, I have never seen someone with such small eyes in my life.’ At that time she was 50. There were many days when she reminisced about the past but the issue of her
‘religious identity’ was always there somewhere in her conversations at some level lingering between her words and she'd come back to it again and again.

When Zaib was 52 she made her final suicide attempt and succeeded. She leaves behind a husband and five children. What happened to her remains a dilemma for her family, while they continue to struggle with the trauma of her death. Zaib died long before her time and that was because she was made to feel worthless. She told me that if there was a God then surely he had made all religions, then where was the sense in hating each other because of religious reasons? We need to think about these kinds of questions and look deeper within ourselves for answers. We need to understand that with blood on our hands, society cannot move forward and our children will continue to die.

Religious prejudices are often rooted in our childhood and result in similar tragedies to the one I have described above. Causing conflicts based on religion is often used by governments as a guise, a front, to foster a different political agenda as described earlier in the paper. Yet, sadly it remains a fact that in many instances the violence that is being inflicted on nations and individuals is purely due to religious differences, even differences within religions based on castes or sects. Post 9/11, the world has witnessed a more confrontational clash of religious forces especially by the creation of a chasm between the Muslim world and the rest of it, yet religious dissention has been there for centuries causing untold deaths and destruction. Moreover, even if religion is used as a political tool it would not become a catalyst for such violent outbursts if there were homogeneity between different religious faiths and groups. Clearly such homogeneity does not exist and is leading us to catastrophic consequences.
References


Salman, A. forthcoming, Blue dust, manuscript submitted for publication to Roli Books, India.


Section II
Environment and Climate Change

• Financing of Climate Change-related Actions: Recent Developments (Review of COP16 Outcomes) — Shafqat Kakakhel
• Environmental Governance, Climate Change and the Role of Institutions in Pakistan — Aneel Salman
• Encouraging Green Buildings in Pakistan’s Domestic Sector — Javeriya Hasan
Financing of Climate Change-related Actions: Recent Developments (Review of COP16 Outcomes)
Shafqat Kakakhel

Abstract

Since the early 1990s, funding for enabling the developing countries to cope with the adverse impacts of climate change (adaptation) and to adopt low-carbon development (mitigation) have been recurring issues. The UNFCCC (1992) and the Kyoto Protocol (1997) contain the solemn commitment of developed countries (whose historic and current carbon emissions had created and exacerbated climate change) to pay the full incremental costs of climate related actions of developing countries.

Financing was one of the ‘building blocks’ of the global actions for addressing climate change agreed at the Conference of Parties (COP) in Bali in 2007. However, consensus on the quantum and sources of external funding for developing countries could not be achieved even at the 2009 COP in Copenhagen. The Copenhagen Accord agreed by a small number of developed and developing countries envisioned a financial package comprising $30 billion to be provided by a few developed countries as ‘fast-start finance’ during 2010-12 and a Green Fund of $100 billion yearly to be mobilised by the rich countries from a variety of public and private sources. This framework was incorporated in the Cancun Agreements adopted at the climate conference held in Cancun in December 2010.

The Cancun Agreements established the proposed Green Fund to be run by a 24-member board, according to operational guidelines to be framed by a 40-member Transitional Committee, with the World Bank serving as Trustee. The financial arrangements agreed in Cancun have been criticised because the amounts promised are considered inadequate and the sources of funding have not been specified.

---

* Mr. Shafqat Kakakhel is the former Deputy Executive Director of the UN Environmental Programme; and member of the Board of Governors, Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad, Pakistan.
Background: The UNFCCC 1992

The UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), adopted during the Rio Conference on Environment and Development in June 1992, acknowledged that ‘change in the Earth’s climate and its adverse effects are a common concern for human kind’ (UN 1992, p. 1) and had been caused by human activities, especially the atmospheric concentrations of Green House Gases (Ibid.). Countries adopting the Convention agreed to cooperate and participate in responding to this global problem ‘in accordance with their common, but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities and their social and economic conditions’ (Ibid., p.1).

In the section of the Convention on ‘Commitments’, developed countries agreed to reduce their GHG emissions as well as provide ‘new and additional financial resources to meet the agreed full costs incurred by developing country parties in complying with their obligations’ (Ibid., p. 8) to address the common challenge of climate change:

The extent to which developing countries will effectively implement their commitments under the Convention will depend on the effective implementation by developed country parties of their commitments under the Convention related to financial resources and transfer of technology and will take fully into account that economic and social development and poverty eradication are the first and overriding priorities of the developing country parties (UN 1992 Article 4.7, ‘Commitments’, p. 8).

The ‘framework’ of actions contained in the Convention was to be elaborated and agreed at the annual meetings of the parties, or the Conferences of Parties (COP).

Article 11 of the UNFCCC established a ‘mechanism for the provision of financial resources on a grant or concessional basis, including for the transfer of technology’ (UN 1992, p.14) whose operational details were to be worked out by representatives of both developed and developing countries. Developed countries would also provide ‘financial resources to developing countries through bilateral, regional and other multilateral channels for the implementation of the Convention’ (Ibid., Article 11, p.15). The Global Environment Facility (GEF) which
was set up in 1991 by the UN Development Programme (UNDP), the UN Environment Programme (UNEP) and the World Bank for funding environmental actions of developing countries became a small, but significant source of funding climate change related activities.

**Kyoto 1997**

COP 3, held in Kyoto (Japan) in 1997, adopted an agreement, known as the Kyoto Protocol, under which developed countries (mentioned in the Annex I of the Convention) committed to reduce their overall emissions of six greenhouse gases by an average of 5.2 per cent below 1990 levels from 2008-2012 (Secretariat of the UNFCCC 1998, Article 3, p.3). Developing countries had no binding emissions reductions obligations under the Kyoto Protocol.

Soon after the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol, congressional opposition led the US Government to opt out of the Protocol, and delayed its ‘entry-into-force’ till 2005. The US, joined by several other developed countries such as Japan, claimed that the Kyoto Protocol could not achieve the objective of the UNFCCC to stabilise the climate because several countries, especially the rapidly industrialising developing countries such as China, were emitting huge amounts of GHG but had no legally binding commitment to reduce them.

The COP agreed that a new round of negotiations was necessary to build up on the modest commitments contained in the Kyoto Protocol (KP); and because the reductions obligations of developed countries set out in the KP would expire in 2012.

**Bali 2007**

At COP 13, held in Bali (Indonesia) in December 2007, parties agreed to launch negotiations for adopting new arrangements for ushering a second commitment period under the Convention that would include binding emissions reductions for developed countries and new programmes on adaptation for developing countries, deforestation, finance, technology transfer and capacity building. This
became possible due to the last minute agreement of developing countries to carry out emissions reductions through the development and implementation of Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs) on a voluntary basis with financial and technology support from the developed countries (Secretariat of the UNFCCC 2007, Decision 1(b) (ii), p.1).

The agreements reached at COP 13, also known as the ‘Bali Road Map’, called for an agreed ‘shared vision for long term cooperative actions’ (Secretariat of the UNFCCC 2007, p.1), including a long term global goal for emissions reductions (mitigation) and agreements on adaptation, technology transfer, financing and capacity building. Toward this end, the Bali COP established, in addition to the Ad-hoc Working Group on Implementation of the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP) set up in 2005, a new Ad-hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperation Action (AWG-LCA) to draft the agreements comprising the shared vision and mitigation, adaptation, technology and financing, the so-called inter-related building blocks as well as capacity building and deforestation (Ibid., Decision 2, p.3).

Copenhagen 2009

In pursuance of the Bali Roadmap, a series of workshops were held in 2008 to elaborate the operational details for the building blocks with a view to facilitating negotiations in 2009 culminating in a new agreement or agreements adopted by COP 15 held in Copenhagen (Denmark) in December 2009.

The several sessions of formal and informal intergovernmental negotiations held in 2009 failed to achieve consensus mainly due to the unwillingness of developed countries to agree to legally binding, time-bound deep cuts in their greenhouse gas emissions and to agree to provide new, additional, and adequate financial resources and technology support to developing countries (Khor 2010, p.11). Developing countries stubbornly refused to agree to legally binding curbs on their GHG emissions. However, on 18 December 2009, the concluding day, it was announced that heads of state and governments of 26 countries had negotiated a two-and-half page document called the Copenhagen Accord. When it was submitted to the plenary of the COP, the Accord could not receive the requisite consensus and the COP merely agreed to ‘take note’ of the document meaning it
had no legal status and validity. COP 15 decided to extend the mandates of the two AWG’s and requested them to continue to meet with a view to reaching an agreement at COP 16 in Cancun, Mexico.

The Copenhagen Accord stated that ‘scaled up, new and additional, predictable and adequate funding as well as improved access shall be provided to developing countries, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Convention, to enable and support enhanced action on mitigation, including substantial finance to reduce emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD-plus), adaptation, technology development and transfer and capacity building for enhanced implementation of the Convention’ (Secretariat of the UNFCCC 2009, Decision 8, p.3). It added the ‘collective commitment’ of developed countries ‘to provide new and additional resources, including forestry and investments through international institutions, approaching $30 billion for the period 2010-2012 for the most vulnerable developing countries, such as the least developing countries, small island developing states and Africa’ (Ibid., Decision 8, p. 3). Further:

Developed countries commit to a goal of mobilising jointly $100 billion a year by 2020 to address the needs of developing countries. This funding will come from a wide variety of sources, public and private, bilateral and multilateral, including alternative sources of finance. New multilateral funding for adaptation will be delivered through effective and efficient fund arrangements, with a governance structure providing for equal representation of developed and developing countries. A significant portion of such funding should flow through the Copenhagen Green Climate Fund (Ibid. Decision 8, p. 3).

The Accord mentions the establishment of ‘a High-level Panel... under the guidance of and accountable to the Conference of the Parties to study the contribution of the potential sources of revenue, including alternative sources of finance, toward meeting this goal’ (Ibid., Decision 9, p.4). Finally, the Accord refers to the ‘decision’ to establish the Copenhagen Green Climate Fund ‘as an operating entity of the financial mechanism of the Convention to support projects, programmes, policies and other activities in developing countries related to mitigation including REDD-plus, adaptation, capacity-building, technology development and transfer’ (Ibid., Decision 10, p.4).
It is commonly believed that the promises of $30 billion for the period 2010-2012 and $100 billion from 2020 enticed scores of developing countries, especially those in Africa, to endorse the Accord in one form or the other. Eventually, by the end of 2010, the developed countries did not produce the $10 billion needed for implementing the key provision of the Copenhagen Accord.

After several months of confusion over the legal status of this Accord, in April 2010, governments embarked on a fresh process of negotiations through meetings of the Ad-hoc Working Groups on the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol and Long-term Cooperative Action. The U.S., however, seemed to insist that the Copenhagen Accord should provide a basis for the negotiations. In February 2010, the UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon established an Advisory Group (AGF) in pursuance of the Copenhagen Accord to make recommendations on the various sources of financing. The report of the AGF was issued in the first week of November 2010 and although it did not enjoy any legal status it was repeatedly mentioned inside and outside the meeting rooms in Cancun in 2010.

**Cancun 2010**

Several documents containing bracketed texts on the outcome of the negotiations (29 November–10 December 2010) under the aegis of the two Ad-hoc Working Groups were circulating in Cancun (Mexico). Negotiations were held in various forms, including consultations among delegates from 40-50 states selected by the host country. On 11 December 2010, texts produced by the host country were presented for approval without, however, allowing any amendments. The documents adopted, despite the spirited opposition of the Bolivian delegation, represented the outcome of negotiations under both the AWG-KP and the AWG-LCA and cover a whole range of issues such as shared vision, mitigation, adaptation, finance, technology, REDD plus, and capacity building.

**Provisions of the Cancun Agreements Relating to Financing**

The Cancun Agreements established a Green Climate Change Fund for financing actions by developing countries to be governed by a 24-member Board, with
equal number of members drawn from developed and developing countries. The designing of the Fund has been entrusted to a Transitional Committee comprising 40 members. According to the composition contained in the Cancun Agreements, 15 members will come from the developed countries; 25 from developing parties (7 from Africa, 7 from Asia, 7 from Latin America and the Caribbean; 2 from the Small Island Developing States (SIDS) and 2 from the least developed countries). An annex to the agreement contains the Terms of Reference for the Transitional Committee.

The World Bank has been invited to serve as the Trustee of the Green Climate Fund on an interim basis for an initial period of three years and subject to review thereafter. The Trustee will be accountable to the Board of the Fund. The Cancun Agreements also established a standing committee under the Conference of the Parties to assist in exercising its functions with respect to the financial mechanism of the Convention in terms of improving coherence and coordination in the delivery of climate change financing, rationalisation of the financial mechanism, mobilisation of financial resources and Monitoring, Report, and Verification (MRV) of the support provided to developing country parties. The Parties will further define the rules and functions of the Standing Committee.

The Cancun Agreements repeat the finance goals contained in the Copenhagen Accord – a collective commitment by rich countries to provide $30 billion in ‘fast-start finance’ for developing countries in 2010-2012; and to ‘mobilise’ $100 billion annually in public and private finance by 2020 ‘in the context of meaningful mitigation actions and transparency in implementation’ (Secretariat to the UNFCCC 2011, p. 17).

The Green Climate Change Fund has been described as an ‘empty shell’ by developing countries, which point out that the amounts to be made available for the Fund and the sources of funding remain unspecified (Khor 2010), and the language describing the amount of the Fund ($100 billion) has been reproduced from the Copenhagen Accord (Ibid.).

The Cancun Agreements’ reference to ‘a wide variety of sources of funding’ which the text list as ‘public and private, bilateral and multilateral, including alternative sources’ (Secretariat to the UNFCCC 2011, p. 17) is largely based on the
Copenhagen Accord (Khor 2010, p. 14) and is in stark disregard of the demands of the developing countries that most of the money should be ‘in the form of grants or payments, and not loans and should be sourced from the public sector, rather than the private sector or markets’ (Ibid. p.14). Khor (2010, p.14) also pointed out that the Cancun text talks only of ‘mobilising’ funds, not paying, and that that too has been placed in the ‘context of meaningful mitigation actions and on transparency’. This means that:

...funds will be raised only if developing countries take on “meaningful” actions and implement “transparency” mechanisms (MRV and ICA)\(^1\) to the satisfaction of the developed countries’ (Ibid., p.14).

The $100 billion to be mobilised from 2020 onwards is far below what many studies, including those undertaken by the United Nations Department of Economics and Social Affairs (UNDESA) and the World Bank, estimate is needed by the developing countries for their climate actions, and also far below the G-77 and China’s proposal mentioned during the negotiations that developed countries contribute 1.5 per cent of their GDP (which currently adds up to $600 billion) for funding climate change related actions of the developing countries (Ibid., p.14-15).

Spokespersons for the developing countries criticize the 50 per cent seats given to developed countries on the Board governing the Green Climate Change Fund which is what was proposed by developed countries whereas developing countries (and China) had proposed ‘equitable representation’ which would have ensured that majority of the Board members came from developing countries which accounts for four-fifth of the world population (Ibid.).

The decision to designate the World Bank as the trustee of the Fund came in the face of the demand of developing countries for the selection of the Trustee on the basis of competitive bidding. The reluctance of the developing countries to accept the World Bank as the Trustee of the Fund also reflects their frustration in accessing funding from the Bank.

\(^1\) MRV stands for Measurement, Reporting and Verification. ICA stands for International Consultation and Analysis.
Conclusion

Although the Cancun Agreements, including those relating to financing, did respond to the concerns of developing countries, the agreements contained in them were based largely on the positions voiced by the U.S. and other developed countries during the negotiations. The chief U.S. negotiator, Todd Stern, confirmed this view when he said soon after the adoption of the Cancun Agreements, ‘The reality is we really got what we were looking for.’

Leading experts from the developing countries such as Martin Khor as well as others have criticised the Cancun Agreements, which have been seen as a negation of the UNFCCC and the key Rio Principles of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities of countries. They are also seen as being in violation of the letter and spirit of the UNFCCC which had enshrined in unmistakable terms the solemn commitment of the developed countries to bear the full incremental costs of the climate actions of the developing countries. This solemn commitment had never been questioned by the developed countries except in recent years by the U.S.

Most experts believe that developing countries acquiesced in the flawed framework contained in the Cancun Agreements in order to save the multilateral decision-making process, which faced a mortal threat. Rejection of the documents they were asked to endorse as a ‘take it or leave it’ non-negotiable package by developing countries would have provided the leading developed countries (which were evidently unenthusiastic about the legitimacy of global decision making through the UN) an alibi to undermine the UN. Others such as Professor Donald Brown of Pennsylvania State University assert that the:

* Cancun Agreements of the 2010 UN Climate Summit do not represent a success for multilateralism; neither do they put the world on a safe climate pathway that science demands, and far less to a just and equitable transition towards a sustainable model of development. They represent a victory for big polluters and Northern elites that wish to continue with business-as-usual.*
References


Environmental Governance, Climate Change and the Role of Institutions in Pakistan
Aneel Salman*

Abstract

This paper looks at the institutional mechanisms in place to deal with environmental and climate changes in Pakistan, especially at the formal (state and non-state) and informal (local) levels. The country's formal institutional environmental framework is explored, followed by brief examination of the evolution of informal 'rules of the game' and their functions at the local level. Given the gaps in state policies and processes in dealing with a rapidly changing environmental portfolio, the concluding section advocates for a shift in the state-centric approaches towards mainstreaming, strengthening and empowering local institutions and communities to build resilience in combating the country's environmental and climate change challenges.

The overarching theme presented is that it makes sense to build on what exists. At the top is the state or government and their departments, non-government organisations or the third sector would do well in resource management, building community resilience, as well as poverty alleviation by working with the state, or alternatively by making the state work. An important insight from literature on NGO-government interaction is an increasing global trend that there is a more cooperative rather than confrontational relationship between the two sectors (Andreassen 2008; Batley and McLoughlin 2010; Brinkerhoff 1999; Business and Society 2009; Craig and Taylor 2002 and 2004; Fisher 1998; Najam 2000; Neal 2008; Rosenberg et al. 2008; Salamon 1994; Sanyal 2006; Young 1999). As catalysts and facilitators, these non-state actors can be the missing link (or the 'midwife') for bridging sustainable development gaps. At the bottom (not in order of importance), are indigenous/local/organic community institutions that evolved to serve local needs. Once again, it may make sense for the non-state institutions to work with what exists as explained in the analysis that follows.

* Dr. Aneel Salman is an Assistant Professor at the Ghulam Ishaq Khan (GIK) Institute of Engineering Sciences and Technology, Pakistan. He has authored the book A coastal ecosystem and a people in peril: The story of Keti Bunder (2011).
1. Introduction

Climate change is a ‘global phenomenon’ which requires macro mitigation solutions, but also adaptation strategies which will have to be ‘inevitably and unavoidably local.’ While each country may be facing similar climate risks, impacts will vary in every region, locality and even across groups within those regions and locales based on their ‘institutional links, material endowments, occupational patterns and asset portfolios, and social networks’ (Agarwal 2008, p.15). The importance of institutions is, therefore, very crucial as they ‘affect the impacts of climate-related phenomena, shape the access of individuals and groups to assets and services, and allocate available and external resources by structuring impacts of actions and decisions’ (Ibid. p.15).

Since the 1960s, the study of institutions has gained a lot of renewed attention in social, development and environmental literature under the title of ‘The New Institutionalism’ and ‘New Institutional Economics’. However, there is still no single overarching definition of institutions given the complexity of their political, socio-economic and even environmental roles and functions.

Veblen in 1899 (2003 electronic reprint, p.126) proposed that institutions were not only formed by the:

...selective and adaptive process which shapes the prevailing or dominant types of spiritual attitude and aptitudes; they are at the same time special methods of life and of human relations, and are therefore in their turn efficient factors of selection.

North (1991, p. 97) defines them as:

...the humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic and social interaction. They consist of both informal constraints (sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions, and codes of conduct), and formal rules (constitutions, laws, property rights).

Knight (1992, p.2) and Hodgson (2006, p.2) see them as ‘a set of rules that structure social interactions in particular ways’ and ‘systems of established and prevalent social rules that structure social interactions,’ respectively. Ostrom (2005, p.125) defines institutions as tools
that fallible humans use to change incentives to enable fallible humans to overcome social dilemmas.

Jutting (2003) classifies institutions as formal and informal on the basis of formality, levels of hierarchy and area of analysis. Formal institutions are usually based on written rules/constraints, frameworks in which human interactions take place. These constraints may be in the form of the constitution, law, sanctions or codes of conduct. The jurisdiction and implementation of these institutions may be universal (United Nations bodies), regional (North American Free Trade Agreement-NAFTA, South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation-SAARC), national (state, provincial or local). Informal institutions exist in every society, class and community. These institutions are based on cultural norms, traditions, customs and taboos, usually based on unwritten, albeit strictly implemented codes of conduct. When the state is considered weak and formal state structures less developed, people seek out their local-level institutions rather than state institutions to deal with everyday conflicts, land and inheritance disputes, as well as domestic matters:

*To resolve disputes and clarify ambiguities in social rules, they typically do not rely on the state-sanctioned system of law and justice, at least not primarily, but rather on a heterogeneous set of clan leaders, village elders, official or semi-official councils, tribal chiefs, formally elected or appointed village heads, religious and spiritual leaders, and similar individuals who are collectively thought to maintain and dispense customary or informal justice (Gauri 2009, p.2).*

Given the conceptual ambiguity surrounding the definition of ‘institutions’, for the purposes of this paper, a more pragmatic approach is taken whereby institutions are defined as stable structures, linkages, relationships of norms, values, laws and expectations that directly or indirectly shape, impact and ‘constrain’ social, political and economic interactions and behaviour. Adapting from Mezzera and Aftab (2009), Soysa and Jutting (2006), Helmke and Levitsky (2003), ‘formal institutions’ are seen to include well defined, ‘official’, codified laws, procedures and rules such as the constitution, enforced for example by the state. The term ‘informal institutions’, on the other hand, refers to deeply embedded, generally un-codified, socially shared and accepted as legitimate norms, expectations and
processes that evolved organically over a long period of time, in many cases in existence even before the development of formal institutions. Because such institutions evolve outside ‘officially sanctioned channels’, they are often difficult for outsiders (and even formal institutions) to understand and work with. They are ‘largely self enforcing through mechanisms of obligation, such as in patron-client relationships or clan networks, or simply because following the rules is in the best interests of individuals who may find themselves in a “Nash equilibrium” where everyone is better off from cooperation’ (Soya and Jutting 2006, p.3). Communities have a wealth of indigenous ecological knowledge and better understanding of their problems; therefore, informal institutions are more effective at the community/local level.

Civil society (especially non-government organisations-NGOs1) is a different type of institution distinct from state and private (tribe, family, corporate) institutions. Individuals formally organise themselves in groups or associations for common causes such as economic growth, environmental conservation, sustainable development and peace to primarily influence state policies and decision making. These institutions have gained popularity and mushroomed in the recent years often filling the gaps of state inefficiencies. Communities who have natural capital, but may lack the capacity to organise themselves, have increasingly been organised, given a voice and presence in formal policy circles with the help of non-state or non-government organisations (institutes). In Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka studies have shown the positive role of local institutions supported by NGOs in environmental governance and resource management.

In most poor and developing countries such as Pakistan, a situation of institutional pluralism exists and therefore, it is important to understand the way both formal and informal institutions are structured and interact to deal with environmental and socioeconomic issues. One of the reasons for institutional ineffectiveness lies in the broken links and gaps and even overlaps of functions at different levels between institutions. In Pakistan, where certain formal, state institutions are considered weak, there is often greater conflict with local institutions. The policies deemed successful at the state and formal level do not have the

---

1 While some academics make a distinction between ‘organisations’ and ‘institutions’, such a distinction lies outside the purview of the present paper and given the use of the two terms almost synonymously in Pakistan, the same is being done so here.
same impact at the local, grass roots level. This broken linkage not only affects economic growth outcomes, but also retards human development. Since we can not intervene individually in the development of new resources or environmental degradation, it is hoped that a well integrated institutional design can alter these processes and bridge gaps over time.

2. Environmental Governance and Formal Institutions

2.1 The State

Khan (2002) has pointed out that the environmental effects of climate change and modernisation on Pakistan are remarkably similar – infrastructure degradation, disruption of water supplies and soil fertility, and pressure on resource use. Environmental and poverty reduction concerns, especially under a climate change regime, need to be dealt with holistically and integrated in national development plans and sectors such as rural/urban development, forestry, fisheries, energy, health, infrastructure, agriculture and so on. In the case of Pakistan, while the relative importance of climate change and its impacts on the country have been ‘recognised’ at the highest level since 2005 with the establishment of the Prime Minister’s Committee on Climate Change headed by the Prime Minister (GoP 2010) and the subsequent formation of the Task Force on Climate Change (TFCC), the country has yet to adequately understand its vulnerability to this phenomenon, much less take adequate and urgent steps to address it. Overall, environmental indicators of the country are dismal (Salman 2011b). It is important, therefore, to look briefly at some of the formal, state institutional frameworks and structures that govern the environment sector in Pakistan.

---

2 Both executive bodies.
2.1.1 National Legal Framework and International Environmental Obligations

Under Pakistan’s constitution, both the federal and provincial governments share responsibility for ‘environmental pollution and ecology’ management. The Ministry of Environment (MoE) is the primary body that develops:

....national policies, plans and programmes regarding environmental planning, pollution and ecology, and to conduct dealings and agreements with other countries and international organisations in the fields of environment. The MoE coordinates its climate change related activities with other Federal Ministries and various relevant organisations through its Inter-ministerial Committee on Climate Change established in 2008 (GoP 2010, p.52).

The Ministry’s second-in-command is the Planning Commission (PC) which not only makes national socio-economic plans, but is also a monitoring and evaluation body that oversees all major development initiatives. In order to ensure cross-sectoral coordination, the Pakistan Environmental Protection Council (PEPC) has also been formed, chaired by the Prime Minister and made up of provincial Chief Ministers, federal and provincial ministers of environment, civil society and private sector members. Despite being a high profile forum, it has failed to mainstream environmental concerns across the board.

The Pakistan Environmental Protection Ordinance (PEPA 1997) is the ‘cornerstone of environmental legislation’ in the country (The World Bank 2006) which lays down the rules and regulations for pollution control/prevention and sustainable development. The Pakistan Environmental Protection Council (PEPC), Pakistan Environmental Protection Agency (Pak EPA), provincial EPAs and environmental tribunals are all established under this Act. Under PEPA, the MoE sanctions the federal government to entrust its environmental role and responsibility to provincial governments, state agencies, or local bodies. Provincial EPAs can, in turn, delegate environmental management responsibilities to local

---

3 Editors’ Note: The Ministry of Environment and its relevant departments (as well as other ministries) were devolved to the provinces under the 18th Amendment (Article 140A) of the Constitution of Pakistan during the finalisation of this anthology.

4 Such as planning, coordinating, developing policies related to climate change, as well as monitoring dealings and agreements at the international level about this issue.
governments/agencies. The concurrence of the parallel environmental responsibilities has strained effective environmental governance in the country. While environmental federalism is excellent on paper, in reality, it poses the double challenge of defining rules for oversight, and of building the capacity necessary to fulfil delegated responsibilities. To date, these challenges remain largely unmet in Pakistan. Oversight guidelines for the delegation of federal powers to the provinces have not been established, environmental management capacity at the provincial level is uneven, and little capacity has been developed at the local level (Ibid. p.25).

Figure 1 is a graphic presentation of Pakistan’s national institutional governance structure for addressing climate change and environmental concerns.

From 1970-2005, Pakistan also signed and ratified a number of international conventions governing biodiversity conservation and climate change. These include (but not limited to):

Figure 1 Pakistan’s Governance Structure for Addressing Climate Change and Environmental Concerns

Source: GoP 2010.
At the national level, Pakistan has made amendments to its Liquefied Natural Gas Policy, finalised its National Drinking Water Policy and standards and has ongoing progress on the National Land Use and Forestry Programme, National Sanitation Policy and the National Strategy for Sustainable Development (NSDS). However, as pointed out by Dr. Parvez Hassan, President, Pakistan Environmental Law Association:

All the national and international milestones notwithstanding, there remains, in Pakistan, a wide gap between legislative goals, declared national policies and their implementation. Whether it is constraint of resources, financial or technical, or lack of capacity or lack of will to commit to environmental protection and sustainable development, the harsh reality is that our laws and policies are not effectively enforced.  

2.1.2 The Governance Nexus- Federal, Provincial and Local

Under the 1973 constitution, the federal government is responsible for the foreign affairs, military defence, foreign exchange/loans/aids, state currency, stock exchanges, legal tenders, nuclear security, national, economic, industrial development, planning, censuses, building national highways and exploitation of minerals and natural gas. Provinces, on the hand, are primarily responsible for law and order, construction of local roads, city transport, education, agricultural development including irrigation and land reclamation, amongst a few others. Unfortunately, historically the federal centre has kept the provincial governments under-funded and inefficient due to poor human and financial resources making their relationship uneasy and strained. As in the case of federal systems, if there is a legislation conflict between these two tiers of government, constitutionally the federal centre prevails. However, in the case of Pakistan, this relationship is rather lopsided and often dilutes the ability of provincial governments to perform their functions effectively (Mezzera and Aftab 2009). For example, as explained by Khan et al. (2005), Pakistan’s Deep Sea Fishing Policy formulated in 1982 has seen frequent changes due to the problem of dual jurisdiction. The policy was designed to raise exports in the fishing sector and hence, joint ventures between
foreign and local investors were allowed. However, in 1989 this rule was changed and only local vessels were allowed to catch from the waters. The provincial government failed to implement this change in spirit since local private investors began to front for foreign trawlers and so they continued to fish. Since then the policy has been altered twice. In, 1995, to create a buffer zone lying between 12-35 nautical miles (NM) to protect territorial waters from foreign trawlers; and in 1999 to abolish the buffer zone which has led to foreign commercial fishing trawlers transgressing into the coastal waters and creeks once again.

Constitutionally, jurisdiction over the sea is shared both by the federal and provincial governments. The 12 nautical miles (NM) territorial zone bordering the coast falls under provincial jurisdiction. The 12-200 Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), where trawlers and local launches are free to operate, falls within the federal government’s remit. In addition, federal control has traditionally extended into territorial waters in the shape of agencies in charge of maritime security, shipping and ports. In recent years, this control has become more pervasive via the Maritime Pollution Board and the Karachi Fishermen Cooperative Society (Ibid, p.11).

In order to improve service delivery, enhance political commitment and accountability to the public, the government under the Local Government Ordinance 2001, has been implementing the Devolution of Power Plan. This Plan devolves various administrative, political, environmental and financial functions from the federal and provincial level to the local tiers. Provinces were divided into three tiers: district governments, tehsil municipal administrations (TMAs) and union councils (UCs). The UCs are the smallest local, state institution with its nazims or councillors elected by the village or town people directly.

While on paper these three layers are ‘expected to function as autonomous local bodies with their own responsibilities, financial shares and revenue sources,’ the situation on the ground is once again much different. These local tiers do not have access to any financial resources from either the federal or provincial exchequer. This is a classic catch 22 dilemma since under Pakistan’s constitution the provinces are not capacitated to raise funds themselves nor levy taxes for their development plans and are totally dependent on the federal centre for administrative and financial support. The transfer of financial and human re-
sources from the provincial to the local, the amendments required in specific laws, systems and procedures, as well as the behavioural changes/acceptance of these new power relations has, therefore been evolving at a much slower pace than expected by the public (Mezzera and Aftab 2009).

2.2 **The Judiciary**

*An independent judiciary and judicial process is vital for the implementation, development, and enforcement of environmental law* (Global Judges Symposium 2002).

The Supreme Court of Pakistan has been fundamental in according environmental rights the highest status in Pakistani law - that of constitutional legitimacy with the landmark 1994 case of Shehla Zia vs WAPDA.6 It was in this case that the Supreme Court included the right to a clean environment in Articles 9 and 14 of the Constitution of Pakistan as a fundamental right, which had till then been absent in the Constitution. The Court, also for the first time in the country's judicial history, set up a commission of technical experts to look into the technical aspects of the case and submit a report in this regard. This case gave birth to a new model in public interest litigation on environmental issues since it made the courts more open to the idea of appointing commissions to guide them on environmental rights cases (Hassan 2006). The appointment of commissions, has, since then, been undertaken by courts in several public interest litigation cases.7

The superior courts have frequently intervened to regulate or stop public and private entities from converting public parks into shopping plazas; calling for enforcement of solid waste disposal and clean air; and banning two-stroke rickshaws in Lahore on the recommendations of the Lahore Clean Air Commis-

---

6 In this case, individuals of a residential area in the capital Islamabad brought a petition to the Court about the construction of a high voltage grid station by the Water And Power Development Authority (WAPDA)-a state owned utility. The petitioners, led by Ms. Shehla Zia, pointed out that the electromagnetic radiation of the grid station could be dangerous for their health. The Supreme Court stayed the construction of the grid station until further research was conducted to understand the nature and extent of the threat posed by the radiation emitted by electric power plants. For complete details see Zia (1996).

7 For details on these cases see Hassan 2006; and Hassan and Azfar 2004.
sion set up by the Lahore Court. The Supreme Court took *suo moto* action based on newspaper articles cautioning the federal government to conduct in-depth environmental assessments during its New Murree Development Project which was going to harm the forestation and environment of this hill town. The Supreme Court also took several *suo moto* actions against private developments projects authorised by the Government that had not passed their environmental standards and also called for legal penalties to be enforced by the Federal Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) against factories causing severe pollution.

### 2.2.1 Environmental Tribunals

Unlike the technical commissions set up on a case by case basis by the courts, the federal government is authorized to set up as many environmental tribunals as are needed. To date, there are four environmental tribunals, one each in Karachi, Lahore, Quetta and Peshawar. However, according to the Ministry of Law and Justice, only the Lahore tribunal is fully functional, due to lack of staff in the other tribunals. Apart from lack of technical staff, it is important that the institutional capacity of these tribunals be strengthened through capacity building about environmental issues, environmental risks and their impacts. Also, these tribunals will remain ineffective until there is a monitoring mechanism in place to ensure that the decisions taken by them are implemented (The World Bank 2006).

### 2.2.2 The Civil Society

The contemporary social sciences and development discourse in Pakistan use the word *'civil society'* as an umbrella term for a range of non-state and non-market citizen organisations and initiatives, networks and alliances operating in a broad spectrum of social, economic and cultural fields’ (Sattar and Baig 2001, p.1). However, the development of civil society in Pakistan has been relatively slow and lies in pre-independence informal institutions of religious values, *biraderies*.

---

8 On its own initiative.
(clans) and *Panchayats/Jirgas* (councils of village elders). With economic development and changing social structures, civil society began to evolve and gain recognition as institutions that allow greater participation of citizens than state institutions (Qadeer 1997). In terms of their outreach, most work in cities, with only a few with strong networking at the local, village and grassroots levels. Zia (1996, p.2) defines non-governmental organisations (NGOs) as being:

...non-governmental, non-profit entities that are engaged in relief, development, and advocacy activities. The entities can be formally constituted or informally organised; are usually voluntarily set up; are largely independent of government; and have humanitarian or public interest objectives.

Pasha and Iqbal (2003, p.10) classify non-government organisations into four categories:

1. National level capacity-building, research, advocacy, and/or funding organisations;
2. Implementation and/or support organisations which work directly with communities to establish community-based organisations (CBOs) in specific regions, helping them to shift from welfare orientation to participatory development, and supporting their development projects;
3. Umbrella NGOs that attract a large quantity of funds from donors or governments acting as conduits to channel funds to smaller NGOs and even to the CBOs which deliver services;
4. NGOs involved in social service delivery such as basic education, health, and family planning.

The World Wide Fund for Nature, Pakistan (WWF-P), for example, falls under all four categories. The organisation, formed in 1970, addresses Pakistan's environmental, biodiversity and conservation issues with the help of regional/project offices and approximately 340 employees scattered throughout the country.9 WWF-P has been working for example in Keti Bunder10 for several years and its

---

9 For details see the official WWF-P website <http://wwfpak.org/index.php>
10 Where this researcher has conducted extensive field-based research on the impacts of climate change on local communities.
role in strengthening community resilience and environmental conservation has led to positive changes in the area (Gowdy and Salman 2010).

CBOs are also generally recognised as being a subset of NGOs in the Pakistani context, and may be considerably smaller in terms of their locality since unlike most NGOs, CBOs generally work in small rural and semi-urban areas. Alam (1996) categorises them based on three characteristics: organised locally; controlled by those who benefit directly or indirectly from their activities; provide consumption oriented services to their target areas. These CBOs are important for two reasons. One, they collaborate and organise to provide welfare services to the marginalised members of the communities; and second, under the Devolution Plan mentioned above, it is these CBOs which act as monitoring and accountability mechanisms to ensure that their Union Councils are working effectively. However, it is also important to understand that it is not always possible to distinguish between NGOs and CBOs given the varied characteristics given to them in official, as well as academic documents.

3 Environmental Governance and Informal Institutions

In recent years, the role of grass root, local, informal institutions achieving development goals under climate constraints has received much attention from development scholars, policy makers and government agencies (Agarwal 2008; Jütting 2003; The World Bank 2009). Several studies also show a positive impact of local level, community-based institutions on natural resource management (Becker 2003; Heltberg et al. 2008; Lanjouw and Levy 2002; Nemarunde and Kozanayi 2002; Ostrom 1990, 2002, 2005).

As discussed, institutions are required to structure social interactions (Hodgson 2006). These are the rules humans use to facilitate their repetitive and structured situations at multiple levels of analysis (Ostrom 2005, 2008). In the above analysis, a review of formal institutions in Pakistan was provided. However, in order to bridge policy and implementation gaps, participation of affected individuals in decision making of natural resources is critical for sustainable development (Agarwal 2010; Koontz 2006; Ostrom 1990). James Howard Kunstler in his book Home from Nowhere (1998) proposes to replace consumers with
citizens as it brings more responsibility and obligation toward common good. Citizen participation and their empowerment at the local level is a pre-requisite for sustainable communities (Cuthill 2002; Deb 2009; Koontz 2006).

The effects of climate change will be felt first and foremost at the household level. In Pakistan, meeting this challenge will require a variety of policy approaches including technological innovations, empowering local communities with the tools and information they need to adapt, and setting up mechanisms to provide relief from the effects of climate change. Helmke and Levitsky (2003, p.17) write that:

...spontaneous informal institutions emerge independently of (and frequently predate) formal institutional structures. Although they generally coexist and interact with formal rules, spontaneous informal institutions are created in response to incentives that are unrelated to those rules. Examples include indigenous or “traditional” institutions such as custom laws and kinship-based norms, as well as norms of clientelism, patronialism, and other particularistic institutions that coexist with new electoral and market institutions in much of contemporary Africa, Asia, Latin America, and post-communist Eurasia.

Pakistan's traditional informal institutions are social and political power structures that have their origin in the pre-colonial, pre-independence institutions like Village Communities (VCs) which are now part of the country's grass-roots, local systems of governance (Pasha 2005). In the famously oft quoted words of Sir Charles Metcalfe, Acting Governor General of India (1830):

VCs are little republics, having nearly everything they want within themselves, and almost independent of any foreign relations. They seem to last where nothing else lasts. Dynasty after dynasty tumbles down; revolution succeeds to revolution; Hindu, Pathan, Mughal, Mahratta, Sikh, English are masters in turn; but the Village Communities remain the same. In times of trouble they arm and fortify themselves; a hostile army passes through the country; the Village Community collect their cattle within their walls, and let the enemy pass unprovoked. If plunder and devastation be directed against themselves and the force employed be irresistible, they flee to
friendly villages at the distance, but when the storm has passed, they return and resume their occupations.

Hence, local and indigenous institutions, codes of conduct though varied have always existed in Pakistan and India pre and post-independence.

The concept of community integration needs to be understood in the broader context of Pakistan’s poor, rural communities which have rich folk and religious traditions that promote self actualisation through stronger community integration:

When the poor are empowered, the isolation of the individual is replaced by integration with the community. This relatedness with the other and with the inner self creates a sense of freedom and opens the space for autonomous initiatives by the poor. Integral to this sense of freedom is the ability through community action to acquire better access over input and output markets, credit, training and government institutions for security and justice. Empowerment of the poor signifies relatedness, and acquiring the confidence and material basis for taking autonomous initiatives for development (Hussain and Hussain 2006, p.10).

Increasing resilience and empowering communities calls for a change in their economic, ecological, behavioural and social conditions. The participatory development paradigm as proposed by Ostrom’s analysis of the ‘third sector’ and what Banuri (2002) calls ‘civic entrepreneurship’ enables communities at the village level to build their human, natural and economic capital based on group identity, skills and natural resource management. Through social mobilisation, dialogues within communities are initiated building on local informal institutions which lead to the formation of community organisations that can then collectively undertake various income generation, environmental conservation and infrastructure development projects. Attainment of new skills and vigorous participation allows communities to exert new control and influence over the socio-economic and environmental forces that impact their lives. A brief look at these local, indigenous, informal institutions and practices in Pakistan ensues.
3.1 The Panchayat

One of the oldest informal, local level institution is the Panchayat Raj in India, Pakistan and Nepal. The literal meaning of Panchayat is yat (assembly) of panch (five) wise and respected elders chosen and accepted by the village community to settle disputes, land/inheritance issues and even domestic squabbles among individuals and villages (Gauri 2009; Mitra 2001). In most parts of rural Punjab, this counsel of wise men settles the legal, political and even in some cases environmental justice issues. In Punjab, biradri (clan or caste networks), while in Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, tribal structures with hereditary leaders (e.g. Maliks and Sardars) define social and political affinities and interactions.

In Balochistan, Gilgit-Baltistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, the Jirga is defined as ‘a council of elders from amongst a community, appointed by the general consent of the community or by the special recommendations of the parties in dispute to deliberate upon issues to reach a consensus based on the precedents and in line with the social, ethical and religious order of the community/society’ (Gohar and Yousafzai 2003). Jirga rules and norms, like the British Constitution are independent, organic and unwritten but exert almost complete control over the Pakhtun communities in Pakistan.

3.2 Pakhtunwali

Since pre-colonial times, the Pakhtun communities living primarily in Gilgit-Baltistan have followed a traditional form of tribal code/law known as Pakhtunwali (way of the Pakhtuns). This code of conduct encompasses every facet of Pakhtun communities whether it is treatment of guests, badal (revenge or justice as a reaction to death or injury etc.), conflict resolution or distribution of resources based on the Pakhtun values of siali (social equality) and khapalwaki (self-rule). However, numerous scholars and academics have argued that erosion and manipulation of indigenous institutions and structures through external state interventions aimed at short term political or security aims, without due

---

comprehension of the complex historical dynamics/systems, has led to a host of conditions that are causing the present instability and problems in this region (Sammon 2008).

Behind these changes is the dismantling of a system of political control through the gradual destruction of legitimate political structures. Previously, the malik—the secular leader of the village or tribe—was the local political authority. He was elected by a jirga in the village and through an Islamabad-appointed political agent received government funds and handled relations with the state. The mullah—the local religious authority—was clearly subordinate, and in most cases completely apolitical. However, from the regime of General Zia ul-Haq onward, the state started to fund the mullahs directly, giving them financial independence. Over the years the mullahs took on an enhanced political role in the tribal community and gradually became more powerful than the malik (Weinbaum 2007, p.3).

Sir E.B. Howell,\(^{12}\) pointed out almost a century ago, ‘A civilisation has no other end than to produce a fine type of man. Judged by this standard the social system in which the Mahsud\(^{13}\) have been evolved must be allowed immeasurably to surpass all others.’ The FATA administrative system enforced by the British colonisers, therefore, according to Sammon (2008) has had harmful long-term costs for the legitimacy of local institutions and leaders. ‘The system’s fundamental flaw was that by co-opting the traditional tribal leadership they undermined the social dynamics that were essential to its legitimacy and effectiveness’ (Ibid. p.57).

While critical of the British and Pakistani FATA political administrative model, Ahmed\(^{14}\) (1983) also asserts that the indigenous nang (honor) customs and institutions make it ideal for the tribal region, provided that the political agent (appointed by the government) act within the pakhtunwali. Sammon (2008, p.12) also warns that the legal ban on civil society, political parties and judicial

---

\(^{12}\) Former Foreign Secretary to the Government of India pre-Partition and Political Agent for the tribal areas.

\(^{13}\) A principal Pakhtun tribe of Gilgit-Baltistan.

\(^{14}\) Akbar Ahmed was a renowned Political Agent of South Waziristan from 1978-1980 and is now the chair of Islamic Studies Department at the American University and the U.S. Naval Academy.
institutions under the 1973 constitution and the Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR) present ‘a grave threat to the Pakistani state itself.’ Any policy, programme or initiative introduced in this region, therefore, needs to understand the role, importance and deep embeddedness of this way of life.\textsuperscript{15} No institutional system is perfect, but as mentioned earlier, one should work with what already exists and in efforts to improve, strengthen or alter the system, involvement and participation of the local communities, who will be the most effected, must be guaranteed in the change process.

\textbf{3.3 Goth Kath (Village Assemblies)}

Keti Bunder is located in the province of Sindh where coastal and rural communities discuss their issues in a \textit{kachery} or \textit{Goth Kath} (Village Assembly). In case of issues requiring arbitration and conflict resolution, selected heads of tribes make decisions in special \textit{baithak} (sit-down). These Village Assemblies are, however, not as strong and embedded as the \textit{Pakhtun jirgas} of the \textit{Panchayats} in Punjab, and so in many coastal communities they have become less viable when it comes to development and village planning issues (Gowdy and Salman 2010). Jan (2005) analyses a Democratized Education Management and Ownership (DEMO) project being undertaken by an non-government organisation\textsuperscript{16} in which these Village Assemblies are being revitalised and reorganised around educational and school reforms in Khairpur Mir, Thari Mirwah and Kotdeji in two districts Sukkur and Khairpur. Gowdy and Salman (2010) look at how these Village Assemblies are being re-organized into community-based institutions and self-help groups working on specific environmental issues in their localities.

Pain (2004, p.1) discusses the importance of understanding such village level institutions in the context of Afghanistan and writes that they:

\begin{quote}
\textit{...play an important role in regulating household access to key resources on which livelihoods are based. In particular they are often concerned with the management of common pool resources such as}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{15} For more details see Sammon (2008); Ahmed (1983, 1993, 2007) and Beattie (2002).

\textsuperscript{16} LEAD, Pakistan.
water, pasture and fuel; provide support networks to villages...when state institutions have been severely weakened or damaged.

He warns, however, that:

....such institutions may also become extremely susceptible or vulnerable to the influence and actions of individuals such as commanders and local power holders who through force have placed themselves beyond the reach of state or village level sanctions (Ibid. p.1).

Therefore, while developing new village institutions:

....attention must be given to the existing rules that structure social relations at the village level. The superimposition of new organisations into a village does not mean that existing norms will necessarily change (Ibid. p.1).

3.4 Traditional Conservation Practices

Kareez or Qanat is an ancient water supply and distribution system which is a mix of surface and underground channels used to transport water from natural sources like aquifers, mountain springs or lakes. While difficult and laborious to construct, life in the arid Aryan regions (where this system was first found), Iran and Egypt, would not have been possible without these channels. The kareez not only made life possible in these desert lands, rather converted many areas into flourishing oasis.\(^{17}\) This institutional management system has proven to be socially and environmentally sustainable since it does not dry out aquifers (Bigas, et al. 2009). Kareez channels were traditionally also constructed in Balochistan. The introduction of tube wells and electricity has pushed this traditional system into non-existence, with excessive water extraction reducing not only the water table, but also community sharing and widening socio-economic gaps.\(^{18}\)

---

\(^{17}\) For more details see Eduljee, “Kareez Ancient Water Distribution Channel.

\(^{18}\) Personal insights from the project “Conserving Kareez Heritage in Qillah Saifullah” at WWF-Pakistan.
Historically, the main focus of Pakistan’s agricultural policy has been increasing agricultural growth through modernisation and technology. Unfortunately, such a policy given its dependence on expensive inputs, association with intensive land usage, high pesticide use leading to infertile lands has remained unsustainable and hard to implement in the long-term. On the contrary, traditional ecological practices such as sustainable use of land resources, encouraging crop-livestock interaction and crop rotation are reported to be replicable and environmentally friendly in the long run. Chaudhry et al., (2000) discuss, for example, unique land use patterns of the people of Chitral in the mountainous areas of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa who grow two crops (wheat and maize) during their seven month agricultural season based on a maximum input system instead of maximum output. The locals are also able to grow apricot, plum, pear, walnut, cherry and apple trees around the boundaries of their farms and houses which sustain them during the harsh winter months when food supply is limited.

Parkes (1999) who has done pioneering work on the 4000-4,500 Kalash Kafirs occupying three isolated mountain valleys in Chitral points to the intentional collective management of subsistence economy patterns that place fewer demands on their natural resource base organised by informal traditional institutions which evolve and change on an annual basis. These include, for example, the yearly appointment of the roi (a group of youths) in charge of ‘coordinating ritual offerings and subsistence activities throughout the year. Among their duties are the supervision of household contributions to the clearing of irrigation channels in spring, the regulation of the ascent and descent of the goat herds, and the imposition of a ‘closed season’ on fruit and walnut harvesting in summer’ (Ibid. p.9). When overcutting of communal oak forests became visible, the community elders institute stronger rotational systems of den (bans) on cutting in specific regions for a number of years overseen by a group of older youths called the den-wal. Parkes writes:

Grain crops, together with fruit and walnut trees, are cultivated on tiny irrigated and terraced fields at an altitude around 1800 metres; while herds of goats are taken to high mountain pastures in summer, returning to winter stables around evergreen oak woodland above their villages. A wide range of natural resources at different altitudes is thus exploited, enabling most households - with half a hectare of arable land and a few score goats - to be largely
self-sufficient...Combined with a highly labour intensive tillage of hoeing, weeding and watering, performed by women, Kalasha crop yields are thereby many times higher than those reported of other small farmers in Chitral despite comparable average holdings of cultivated land (Ibid, pp.8-9).

Access to pastures by using cooperative herding groups who pool their resources to form a joint camp, sharing herd management and dairy production tasks are some of the other communal arrangements. These collective, traditional subsistence institutions and practices are efficient and environmentally sustainable within their regional context (Parkes 1999, 1987).

3.5 Ismaili-Based Institutions

In the northern mountainous area of Shimshal (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa), three clan groups used to be the most ancient established informal institutions which collectively managed marriages, funerals and agricultural activities. With rising populations, these three clans have been replaced by skuins (sub-clans) and the area is now home to more formalised Ismaili institutions like arbitration committees; the Tariqa religious education board; boy and girl scouts; village council; volunteers; and the community-based organisation called the Shimshal Nature Trust (SNT). These institutions have rotational leadership positions and are connected with the Jamat Khana (religious and community centre). These relatively more ‘formal’ institutions have built on already existing informal norms and practices and according to the people of Shimshal led to greater community cohesion, social and financial empowerment and well-being (Salman 2011).

---

19 Neighbouring farmers have adopted the use of inorganic, chemical fertilizers, genetically modified seeds to allow perpetual double cropping of wheat and maize introduced by the Agha Khan Rural Support Programme (AKRSP).
20 Followers of Prince Karim Agha Khan. His work in Gilgit-Baltistan under the Agha Khan Rural Support Programme (AKRSP) is discussed ahead.
21 Personal communications with the researcher during his field visits to the northern areas.
3.6 Mosques and Madrassahs

Another important institution is the mosque and madrassah which in the context of Pakistan are both formal and informal since despite government efforts to have them registered officially, a large majority remain informal and private. Madrassahs have transformed from Islamic learning centres that primarily focused on secular education to the present day institutes that focus almost exclusively on Islamic education in Pakistan (Ali 2005; Ansar 2003; Moulton et al. 2008; Peri 2004). The word madrassah post 9-11 has become a widely misused and misunderstood one since in the Arabic language it merely means ‘school’, whether it is a day school or boarding one, and whether it has a focus on religious education or one with a general syllabi (Ali 2005; Bergen and Pandey 2006). Since many of these institutions remain largely unregistered, their exact number in Pakistan is hard to determine. It has been reported that while twenty years ago approximately 7,000 children attended madrassahs, now more than two million attend them due to:

...the government’s inability to provide a quality education for its citizens, political instability, the war in Afghanistan, and continued funding of religious education by outside sources (Peri 2004, p.89).

These institutions, (attached with local mosques), scattered throughout Pakistan, are concentrated in greater numbers in the rural areas where the focus is on instilling students with the basic tenets of Islam, the Holy Quran, Hadith (sayings of the Prophet Mohammed), and Fiqh (jurisprudence). However, there is little focus on more secular, modern subjects like science, English and math (Ali 2005; Ansar 2003; Moulton et al., 2008). These institutes also:

...dispense religious counselling and rule on various community matters. Moreover, because charity and philanthropy are central to Islam, madrassahs provide shelter and education for poor people and are often the headquarters of humanitarian work and also co-ordinators of philanthropic giving (Peri 2004, p.90).

Shah et al. (2001) and WWF-P (2008) have also discussed the role of the maulvi (religious leader/in-charge of mosques and madrassahs) in awareness raising about environmental issues such as water conservation in local communities. Since their involvement is a relatively new initiative it is too early to determine
the impact it has had. However, due to the important role this institution has in community affairs, it can certainly be a key actor for building and strengthening adaptive capacities in poor, rural areas.

3.7 Village Organisations (VOs) and Women Organisations (WOs)

Based on the Daudzia or Peoples’ Approach of Akhtar Hameed Khan which emphasises peoples’ participation, encourages self-help, recommends complementing traditional knowledge with suitable scientific and modern inputs, as compared to blind intensive use of technological inputs like fertilisers, pesticides and machinery to increase agricultural production in Pakistan, the Agha Khan Rural Support Programme (AKRSP) can be considered representative. The AKRSP has been working in the Gilgit-Baltistan areas of Pakistan since 1982 mobilising communities into self-governed institutions for collective decision-making and facilitation of development programmes. This function is complemented by AKRSP’s sister organisations, the Agha Khan Education Services and the Agha Khan Health Services, which are the chief providers of private education (Harlech-Jones et al. 2005) and private health services (Nanan et al. 2003) in Gilgit-Baltistan. These institutions function under the umbrella of the Agha Khan Development Network. The AKRSP is credited for pioneering a ‘bottom-up, community driven development using a flexible, autonomous, politically neutral approach’ (Rasmussen et al. 2004) of ‘organising the poor into self-governed institutions’ (RSPN 2008, p.9). Under this Programme, social capital is developed by organising village and intra-village institutions for joint collaborations; raising funds and awarding grants with the help of micro-credit programmes; capacity building through trainings for education, health and sanitation etc. These village-level institutions also strengthen physical capital by funding maintenance of irrigation channels, construction of bridges and roads.

Village Organisations (VO) are the most important pillar of the AKRSP model. These are ‘self-sustaining development institutions at the village level that can enter into a partnership for development with governmental and private agencies’ (AKRSP 1984, p.4). AKRSP provides seed funds to a VO when seventy five percent of the village households have been organised and a primary project which will deliver tangible benefits formalised. Each household makes regular
contributions to its own savings account administered through the VO. Members elect a VO Manager and Bookkeeper who can be removed by a majority vote. While VOs are male dominated, Women Organisations (WO) work on similar pattern, as well as provide a forum for discussion, decision-making and carrying out various collective activities. A relatively recent change in this institutional structure has been the addition of Local Support Organisations (LSO) which are made up of clusters at the intra-village level (10-30,000 people) under which communities can continue to mobilise after the AKRSP scales down or pulls out (Settle 2010).

3.8 Informal Credit System

While the AKRSP’s work in Gilgit-Baltistan has created strong institutional credit systems and microcredit programmes, other rural areas in the provinces have been less fortunate. In the coastal areas of Sindh, for example, a perverse informal system of credit has existed for several decades that keep the local fishing communities in a perpetual ‘vicious circle of indebtedness’ (Khan et al. 2005, p. 22). According to their study, there are five equally exploitative variants of this system as explained below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commission system</th>
<th>The nakhuda (boat captain) owns his boat, nets and engine, but borrows from the mole-holder (fish auctioneer) or beopari (middleman) to meet running expenses. He is not compelled to sell to the same beopari but must pay him a commission (varying from five to ten percent of the value of the catch) as repayment for the loan.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gaatu²² system</td>
<td>The nakhuda often does not have the finances to buy his own boat, equipment or even cover running costs. He obtains these by taking loans from the beopari (mole holder).²³ The nakhuda is forced to sell his catch at a lower price to the beopari in lieu of the loan.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

²² Highly skilled fisherman.
**Pati**\(^{24}\) system  
The highly skilled fishermen hire boat helpers to help in chores like cooking, cleaning and salting fish etc while at sea. After subtracting running costs, the net earnings are divided into *patis* according to a formula. If the better skilled fisherman is also the boat owner, he gets 4.5 percent. If the boat is leased from an investor, then he gets three *patis*, while the boat helpers get 1.5 *patis*. The financial value of the *pati* depends on the volume and price of the catch.

**Loan sharking**  
Loan sharks are usually Pathans who charge exorbitant interest rates for running expenses. They usually take advance payments by deducting a certain amount upfront. Fishermen go to these Pathans in especially dire circumstances, occurring with rising frequency.

**Contract system**  
Designated *beoparis* working for sea lords provide fishing permits and loans to fishermen, secure and pay them for their catch without any consideration of the market conditions.

*Source: Khan, Ali and Tanveer 2005, p.23.*

This researcher has found that due to the absence of communally owned and managed institutionalised credit facilities and risk insurance, poor communities like the ones in Keti Bunder are caught in extremely difficult circumstances.

### 3.9 Mohallah/ Neighbourhood Savings Committees

These are informal institutions formed by housewives or households having low or middle income levels and *mohallah* (neighbourhood) in scattered parts of the country. These committees are purely voluntary and membership is not mandatory. They are organised and managed by one individual or housewife in the neighbourhood or group who collects and retains all the financial contributions.

---

\(^{24}\) Share.
on a monthly basis and then distributes the total amount collected to each member of the committee. Since the existence of such an informal institution is known only to its members no empirical research has, hitherto, been conducted on the number and impacts on household savings.25

4 Summary

This paper looked at the types and forms of formal and informal institutions, practices, and the role of non-government actors in Pakistan. From analysis of Pakistan’s socio-economic and environmental profile (Salman forthcoming, Gowdy and Salman 2010, Salman 2011b), and the literature on new directions in institutional economics (Salman 2011), it can be inferred that inefficiency, inequity and corrupt practices can lead to poor conservation of natural resources under formal institutions, and to sustainable, ecological use under community management (Salman 2011b). Formal, state institutions in Pakistan, have historically been less efficient in dealing with environmental issues (the Supreme Court is an exception) than traditional, informal ones, especially if the latter are supported by non-government institutions as has been shown in the case of AKRSP and WWF. Furthermore, nepotistic and corrupt state interests can also lead to overexploitation of the resources (as in the case of forests in northwest Pakistan) making communities more vulnerable (Khan et al. 2007; Khan and Khan 2009).

In comparison, local institutions like roi in Chitrал, SNT in Shimshal, Villages Communities (VCs), Village and Women Organisations and indigenous practices like Kareez, mohallah savings, sharing herd management and dairy production tasks etc. are more resourceful, ensure just sustainability, and are answerable to their communities. Therefore, wherever local institutions have management responsibility, natural resources are used more sustainably, communities are more resilient in responding and adapting to environmental (even economic) changes and the ecosystem is healthier (Agarwal 2008; Coleman and Steed 2009; Ostrom and Nagendra 2006, Salman 2011b).

25 The researcher has been a part of these committees and found them to be very beneficial since instead of putting savings in a bank or investing them in unpredictable ventures, mohallah savings are reliable, trustworthy and ensure returns that are not based on sud (interest), which is ethically and religiously questionable in most Islamic countries.
Despite the budget allocation for environment of PKR 5.7 billion, including allocations for climate change research for the period 2005-2010\(^{26}\), the state itself has pointed to the lack of adequate data and information about the country’s vulnerability to environmental stresses and risk. Despite the government’s experience with environmental governance, an extensive review of government documents, statements and notifications shows that the:

...present government policies accord simplistic recognition to the fact that there are threats to agriculture from climate change that can have negative impacts, but do not give them adequate importance in the formulation of water and agriculture policies...none of the documents after 2000 recognizes the negative or positive aspects of climate change as the driver of policy instruments and prescriptions (Amir 2009, pp.4, 6).

The review found that in nearly all the five year planning and strategy documents, including the Medium-Term Development Framework (MTDF), climate change issues are virtually invisible.

It is often unclear how climate change is included as a cross-sectoral issue that impacts all aspects of agricultural enterprise production, marketing, processing and transportation. Likewise, the policies in agriculture are duplicative and at times contradictory to climate change mitigation and adaptation, for example, granting loans for additional sugarcane mills and enhancing sugarcane acreage in a situation where water shortages are anticipated. Another example is the electricity subsidization issue in Balochistan that has depleted the aquifers beyond recovery. These policies are counterintuitive in the context of climate change, and need to be rationalized and reformulated without delay (Ibid. p.6).

Pakistan clearly lags behind other regions in terms of availability of comprehensive technical details of its climate. The country has no provincial and district-specific socio-economic climate profiles; has problems in data collection, quality control, archiving, retrieval, preparation and analysis (GoP 2003 and 2010); and hardly any comprehensive studies on possible adaptation measures at the local

---

\(^{26}\) In the June 2010 national budget, environmental allocations were slashed by fifty percent.
and grassroots levels and cost-benefit analysis of adaptation options (Salman 2011b).

The effectiveness of adaptive strategies depends on the nature of an institution and environmental threat, culture of the community, geographic location, economic and social factors. At the institutional level, states play a critical role in the development and implementation of policies and measures to address climate change. However, the issue of expertise and awareness loom large. Local institutions, on the other hand, remain disempowered in spite of their vast knowledge of the environment and natural capital. A key to a sound climate change adaptation strategy will be the strengthening of both local and state institutions and defining their functions which include information gathering and its dissemination, resource allocation and mobilization, capacity building, applications of modern technology (telecommunications and alternative energy), leadership and social networking with other institutions. This enhances the capacity to manage climate-sensitive assets and natural resources and increases the resilience of communities. Approaches that emphasise a bottom-up approach and that recognise rural coping strategies and indigenous knowledge must be understood and documented, since these will add to local adaptive capacities.
References


Agarwal, Bina 2010, 'Rethinking agricultural production collectivities', Economic and Political Weekly (EPW), vol. xlv, no. 9, Feb. 27.


Anzar, Uzma 2003, 'Islamic education- A brief history of madrassahs with comments on curricula and current pedagogical practices', Draft report.


Chaudhry, Ghaffar, Ahmed, Javed et al. 2000, 'Personalising development: Policies, processes and institutions for sustainable rural livelihoods- Findings from the Pakistan case study, Policies that work for sustainable agriculture and regenerating rural economies', International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED), London, UK.


Fisher, J. 1998, 'Non-governments: NGOs and the political development of the third world', Kumarian Press, West Hartford, CT.


Ostrom, E. and Nagendra, H. 2006, 'Insights on linking forests, trees, and people from the air, on the ground, and in the laboratory', *Proceedings of National Academy of Sciences*, vol.103, no. 51, pp. 19224–19231.


Parkes, Peter 1999, 'Enclaved knowledge: Indigent and indignant representations of environmental management and development among the Kalasha of Pakistan', University of Kent, Department of Anthropology, UK.


Salman, Aneel, 'Sectoral vulnerability to climate change: The case of South Asia and Pakistan', Social Science Research Network, USA, forthcoming.


Sammon, Robert Lane 2008, ‘Mullahs and maliks: Understanding the roots of conflict in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)’, The Lauder Institute, University of Pennsylvania, USA.


Encouraging Green Buildings in Pakistan’s Domestic Sector
Javeriya Hasan*

Abstract
An incredible growth in electricity consumption is fuelling Pakistan’s present energy crisis. Efforts are underway to encourage alternative sources of energy generation so as to reduce the generation-consumption deficit. It is important for Pakistan, however, to adopt an approach focusing on energy conservation, as this can help in mitigating the increasing domestic consumption. The consumption of the domestic sector for the year 2007-08 stood at 33,704 GWh, which constitutes 45 per cent of Pakistan’s total consumption (Hub 2010).

The objective of this paper is to explore energy conservation by means of encouraging energy efficient buildings in Pakistan’s domestic sector. Due to an increasing population, it is envisaged that in the future, there would be great pressure on the urban areas to accommodate more housing units. Given Pakistan’s current energy situation, it is important that these new dwellings are built according to energy efficiency standards. Therefore, it is a great need of the hour to look into mainstreaming the concept of green buildings in the country. In addition to saving energy, the holistic design of the buildings would cumulatively help lower the water and transportation footprints.

A commitment to reduce energy consumption in buildings is a sustainable way to approach economic development in Pakistan. A building's planning, design, construction and management are very meticulous stages, necessitating thorough consultation. This engagement process, known as an Eco-Charrette, brings together stakeholders from different disciplines and is instrumental in consolidating the sustainability credentials of any proposed building.

The paper looks at the different aspects of the Pakistan’s Building Energy Code (2008) and examines its drawbacks. It is noteworthy that there have also been sporadic instances of good practice in green building in Pakistan. The paper, therefore, delves into the successful retrofitting of the Pakistan Engineering Council (PEC), which has subsequently brought about tremendous cost benefits. In order to garner momentum towards energy efficient buildings, the paper concludes with policy measures that can be enacted and sets outs specific recommendations that can be implemented by the government and financial institutions.

* Ms. Javeriya Hasan is a Research Associate with the Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, Pakistan. She has completed her M.Sc in Structural Steel Design and Sustainable Development from Imperial College London. She has interests in energy efficiency, energy conservation and green buildings.
1. **Introduction**

Worldwide, the building sector is the largest contributor to Green House Gas (GHG) emissions and constitutes a great share of total resource consumption (UNEP 2011). A green building is a structure that does not have a large environmental footprint, is resource efficient along its lifecycle and meets the occupants’ requirements of comfort and economy (Wikipedia 2011). Therefore, the fundamental components of an energy efficient building include an efficient usage of energy, water and other resources; improved health of the occupant; reduced pollution, waste and can also include power generation through renewable energy sources present locally (Ibid.). Modern green construction entails synergising all the different components of a green building. During the building lifecycle, there are a number of practices and techniques that have a bearing on the environment and occupants residing in it. The operational phase generally has the highest consumption of energy (80-85 per cent) during the lifecycle of a building (Sharma et al. 2011). Executing a lifecycle analysis facilitates green building development. This involves monitoring physical material use and energy inflows during the different stages of a building’s lifecycle. The ventilation, heating and cooling processes constitute about 40 per cent of the total energy consumption in a building (Ibid.). Each of the practices involved right from the initial conceptualisation of a building to its disposal need to be optimised. Construction/design practices and technologies adopted in a green building are constantly upgrading and these may vary from region to region depending on the local conditions. Buildings nowadays are expected to meet complex levels of performance (Kolokotsa et al. 2010).

2. **The term ‘Green Building’**

The term ‘green building’ is interchangeable with the following terms:

i. Sustainable building

ii. Eco-friendly building

iii. Natural building

iv. Energy-efficient building

v. Zero energy building

vi. Positive energy building.
Of great importance are the zero energy/positive energy buildings which have garnered significant attention from researchers globally. The net energy consumption of these buildings is generally zero or negative. In such buildings, the energy expended for meeting the heating and electricity requirements is generated from locally available renewable energy sources (Kolokotsa et al. 2010). Despite Pakistan's relatively low contribution to greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, the current energy crisis merits legislations promoting adherence to zero-energy and emissions standards by developers.

In order to improve energy efficiency and indoor environment, a number of technologies are employed. The concept of a Net Zero Energy Building (NZEB) and a Positive Energy Building (PEB) entails adoption of measures other than 'passive design measures' and these are given below (Kolokotsa et al. 2010):
1. Building envelope,
2. Shading devices such as overhangs and vertical fins (WBDG 2011),
3. Heating and cooling equipment that harness solar energy (Sustainable Sources n.d.),
4. Renewable energy sources such as wind, solar and geothermal energy, and
5. 'Intelligent' devices to execute energy management e.g. smart meters (Fraunhofer 2011).

While 'passive design measures' reduce a building's energy consumption, a net-zero/positive energy building (NZEB/PEB) reduces its energy footprint by adoption of 'active energy production techniques' which help meet energy requirements by taking advantage of local conditions in the production of energy. These techniques include the usage of photo-voltaics and wind generators. In places where this has been employed, it has led to a production of excess energy that can be fed back into the grid. Coupling mechanisms between energy production and demand are a hallmark of NZEB/PEB. Such buildings respond effectively to internal and external disturbances (such as unpredictable occupant behaviour) by regulating the ensuing deficit between energy generation-consumption.
3. Pakistan’s Energy Crisis

Pakistan’s energy crisis has escalated due to the snowball effect of a number of factors ranging from a widening generation – consumption deficit, high line losses to burgeoning energy consumption (Siddiqui 2011). Additionally, issues such as governance failures and financial constraints due to the circular debt problem have been instrumental in exacerbating the situation (Ibid.). Over the years, there has been no significant addition to Pakistan’s power generation capacity, which has remained confined to 20,190 MW, as of 2009-10 (Hub 2010). The supply-demand gap will further expand given the growing requirement for fossil fuel sources for energy due to the increase in population growth rate and developmental progress.

In order to ease power shortages, short-term solutions entailing procurement of rental power plants have been adopted (Siddiqui 2010). However, their induction into the power system poses a significant economic hurdle i.e. the problem of circular debt that has become a challenge to Pakistan’s economic development. Additionally, a continued reliance on imported fossil fuel is not a sustainable option to steer the country out of its energy woes. Fuel prices are constantly subject to change and supply constraints have made it difficult to ensure continuity in power supply to consumers, as is evident with the frequent power outages. Efforts in promoting power generation from alternative sources have evidently been slow and lacklustre. Pakistan’s power infrastructure merits rehabilitation and upgrading, as in the current state, there are significant Transmission and Distribution (T&D) losses. In 2009-10, the losses stood at 19.6 per cent, however, these can be as high as 30-40 per cent in some areas (Hub 2010; Siddiqui 2011). In order to make up for the power system inefficiency resulting from high T & D losses, the government has constantly raised the power tariff (Siddiqui 2011). Despite the growing need to revamp the power infrastructure and enhance the power generation capacity of Pakistan, steps taken to improve the situation have been ineffective. For instance, the objective of Pakistan’s 1994 Private Power Policy is to ‘assist Pakistan in mobilising resources from the private sector required to meet the anticipated deficit in power supply’ (Fraser 2005, p.). There are concerns, however, that the policy has indirectly compromised the financial viability of the power sector (Ibid.). The current supply of hydrocarbon sources of energy (oil) is insufficient to meet the
country's growing energy demand (Weynand 2007). As a corollary to this, the supply-demand deficit is widening annually.

Therefore, in the backdrop of no worthwhile change in power sector performance, it is prudent to examine Pakistan's growing energy consumption and the need for that to be reduced. Electricity demand from the household sector adds to peak loads, which in turn requires that the power generation capacity be increased. As of May 2010, Pakistan's circular debt stood at a value of US$ 2.18 billion (PKR 120 billion), which has stemmed from the disparity between the cost and tariff of electricity (Hub 2010). In 2009-10, the household sector had a significant share of total gas and electricity consumption at 19.5 per cent and 45.5 per cent respectively. The high consumption in domestic sector underlines the fundamental relationship between a building's operation and its overall energy requirements. Buildings are regarded as energy intensive units with all constituents contributing individually to the energy footprint. Improving the energy efficiency credentials of all building operations be it cooking, heating, lighting, electrical appliances and building insulation can have a significant bearing on energy consumption of a building, and can offer a saving of up to 60 per cent energy use (Mughal 2011). Factors that influence energy demand of a household include cost of fuels and electronic appliances; 'disposal income of the household'; 'availability of fuels and appliances'; and socio-cultural traditions (Dzioubinski and Chipman 1999).

It has been observed in developing countries that a growth in per capita income results in an increase in the demand for certain fuels over others. Households that traditionally relied upon biomass fuels for cooking and heating purposes may be substituted with other fuels such as Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG). This change in choices indicates the 'increasing desire for comfort', which is commensurate to the level of financial empowerment attained (Ibid.). In the developing world (including Pakistan), the trend is that there is a diminishing share of energy used for cooking and lighting purposes. However, the share in energy consumption of 'space heating, water heating, air conditioning, refrigeration', electrical appliances and other significant operations has increased (Ibid.).
Building operations are to a great degree influenced by the local climate. Pakistan falls under the temperate region having hot summers and cold winters in many areas. Due to extreme temperatures during certain months, there is a high reliance on appliances for either heating or cooling in the urban areas. The extent of a building’s imprint on the environment is, therefore, greatly intertwined with the ambient climatic conditions. ‘Buildings account for about 50 per cent of energy use and about 90 per cent of electricity consumption’ (Mughal 2011). In Karachi, for instance, it is believed that 1500 MW of electricity can be saved with the adoption of energy efficiency measures. This magnitude of electricity can serve to bridge KESC’s\(^1\) power deficit (Ibid.). It is noteworthy that overall energy consumption of a household in Pakistan is derived from internal space heating, cooling, lighting, cooking and appliances (Asif 2011).

A growing energy shortage and a decline in resources have cumulatively impacted Pakistan’s exports which fail to compete internationally, thereby spearheading the dwindling of its national exchequer. Substantial shortfalls in gas are expected; high gas prices and their interrupted supply have had repercussions on heating homes during winters. A significant dependence on oil as fossil fuel to meet energy needs is costing the country large sums of money annually. A major chunk of the energy expended is in construction processes, in addition to the lighting, heating and cooling of buildings in urban areas, etc. About 67 per cent of the total electricity generated comes from fossil fuel such as natural gas, oil and coal (Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Resources 2010). During recent times, tremendous fluctuation in global oil prices and a commensurate decline in supply have rendered electricity increasingly unaffordable. As a result, electricity distribution companies have raised their electricity tariffs which in turn has had ramifications for the domestic consumer.

In addition to enhancing energy and water conservation in buildings, planners in Pakistan need to ensure that a mechanism exists whereby the intended policies and regulations (Pakistan’s Building Energy Code, Seismic Code for Buildings, etc) are implemented. The country’s experience in enforcement of regulations has been quite poor. An example would be the Kashmir 2005 earthquake which caused widespread devastation attributed to the lack of enforcement of the

\(^1\) KESC stands for Karachi Electric Supply Company. KESC is involved in the generation and distribution of electric power to Karachi.
Seismic Code in the area (Haseeb et al. 2011). Therefore, efforts need to be made in overcoming barriers in mainstreaming green buildings as a holistic concept. Additionally, the nature of the building design process should be made more inclusive, whereby all the concerned stakeholders are involved.


In the past few years, a steady population growth has led to unprecedented levels of urbanisation in Pakistan. This inevitably presents the need to plan for more houses and develop an infrastructure for the provision of electricity (UNEP 2011). Like many other developing countries, Pakistan is grappling with a severe shortage of housing units. It is estimated that there is already a demand for 6 million homes and work on this remains pending/unfinished. The demand of houses is growing at a rate of approximately 300,000 units per year (Shehzad 2009). Inadequate housing and the absence of infrastructure for the provision of basic services have indiscriminately affected those living in the urban areas, particularly the migrant labour class. The average occupancy per house in Pakistan is 6 persons; the average room density is 3.5 persons, which is greater than the international standard of 1.1 persons per room (Ibid.).

Pakistan's population growth has been projected to reach 240 million by 2030 (see Figure 1), many of whom would reside in the urban areas. Half of the population in cities reside in slums and unplanned settlements, which highlights the dire housing situation existing today (Ibid.).
The rate of urbanisation in Pakistan is 3 per cent, whereby it is projected that by 2030, about 50 per cent of the population would reside in urban areas as shown in Figure 2:

As per the National Housing Policy 2001 (NHA 2011), the Government of Pakistan is expending efforts to help relieve the housing sector of regulatory complexities (World Bank 2006). Three pertinent issues, i.e. weak land development framework; nascent property development framework; and, a
poorly regulated emerging building industry have mired the progress of Pakistan’s housing sector (Ibid.). The building industry is characterised by a number of potent factors such as economic costs and the state of the financial sector. This brings up the a priori assertion that effective regulatory, legislative and policy control steps would be beneficial in spearheading change in the building sector (UNEP 2011). The policies need to be supplemented by pricing instruments, incentives and a mixture of carrot-sticks measures, which would consolidate the mainstreaming of green development in Pakistan. The institutional framework governing the building sector has to be strengthened and the following steps need to be taken (Shehzad 2009):

1. A long-term plan for the housing sector, involving authorities at the centre as important stakeholders.
2. Collaboration with the private sector, NGOs, community organisations and consumer protection groups in formulation of housing policy.
3. Studies on impact assessment of regulations on housing initiatives in Pakistan (Ibid. p.5).

Uncontrolled urban growth has been brought about by weak governance at local and national levels, in addition to absence of a coherent master plan for the building sector. Master plans till date have been weakly enforced and resultantly, have led to the degradation of the urban landscape (Shehzad 2009, p.3). In Pakistan, financial institutions are reluctant to dole out construction loans (Ibid. p.2). This has serious ramifications as far as the intent to greening the sector is concerned (World Bank 2006). There is also an absence of sound governance practices, which is propelling developers to fall short of providing finance for housing development. There need to be audits that examine important legislations and regulations pertaining to the housing sector, which would also help identify their influence on the demand for houses, their supply and prices.

The mode of living in urban areas encapsulates to a great degree reliance on appliances and equipment which require significant amount of energy. In Pakistan, most of the energy inefficient appliances include locally manufactured fans and heaters. They are not designed according to strict energy efficient criteria, due to which they consume a considerable amount of power. These appliances are ironically a great necessity due to the local weather conditions.
Furthermore, a number of existing and new buildings are by default designed according to the conventional approach. This is generally devoid of adequate design and construction essentials that could potentially enhance energy efficiency credentials of the buildings, and in turn help eliminate the need for considerable monetary expenditure on appliances.

Additionally, Pakistan’s water situation may become precarious in 20-30 years due to climate change. It is predicted that the country is fast becoming a ‘water scarce’ country as a consequence of factors such as steady growth in population, mismanagement of water resources and outdated irrigation practices (The News 2011). This merits the need to carefully manage water at homes, as profligate usage may contribute significantly to water rationing among communities and supply outages in the future. Due to depleting water resources, Pakistan’s water supply per capita declined to 1000 cubic metres in 2010 (The Nation 2011). In Islamabad, it is estimated that 30 million gallons of water is wasted in faulty pipelines (Ibid.). There is a dire need to initiate water conservation, which includes curbing the enormous amount of wastage already taking place. Grey water recycling, wastewater recycling and rainwater harvesting are some of the techniques that need to be explored. There have been scattered instances of grey water recycling in the rural areas of Pakistan, partly due to the spatial nature of the surroundings. Similarly, rainwater harvesting has been employed in a few buildings of eminence like the Faisal Mosque in Islamabad. However, in Pakistan, the progress in exploitation of these techniques, vis-à-vis other countries, has been slow.

In Pakistan, the building design process generally does not involve consultation with all the relevant stakeholders. This is seen as the prime reason why important input on energy efficiency design measures is missing. It is important that all those involved in the design and construction of a new building convene on the same platform to engage in discussion, which may yield productive results in consolidating the notion of a ‘green building’ into reality. As far as retrofitting of existing buildings is concerned, there must be a realisation on part of building owners and occupants of the need to target ‘energy guzzling’ hotspots, thereby actively seeking the incorporation of measures to mitigate its overall energy footprint. A commitment to reduce energy consumption in buildings is a sustainable way to approach economic development in Pakistan (Shiers 2000).
An energy efficient building not only increases occupancy levels but also brings monetary benefits that accrue from improved living conditions. The stages of its planning, design, construction and management are very meticulous, whereby the lifecycle costs of the building are calculated in accordance to the construction materials, site, transport links and the likes.

It is noteworthy that the building sector is responsible for 40 percent of the greenhouse gas emissions. Therefore, buildings have a strong environmental footprint and construction industry activities are contributing to climate change (UNEP 2007). A ‘green building’ is a holistic concept and is not restricted to building design alone, rather includes all functions and paradigms associated with a building. It is more than just technological props, it is a mindset that has to be adopted. The planning stage is essentially the most critical stage of a building’s development. It is at this critical conjecture of time that the planner, architect, engineer, contractor or the likes decide which approach should be opted. A building has to be viewed as a system and not an amalgamation of eclectic components. If it is viewed as the latter, sustainability credentials of building design may be greatly compromised.

Homes in Pakistan’s rural areas are more affiliated with the concept of energy efficiency as opposed to those present in urban areas. In addition to adoption of locally sourced construction materials, which offer great saving in transport costs, rural homes are designed to adapt to the prevailing climatic conditions and generally have good ventilation and regulation of indoor temperatures. Homes in urban areas, on the other hand, generally have improperly designed internal spaces with inadequate lighting and ventilation, which is one of the most visible design deficiencies. Therefore, the costs involved in illuminating internal spaces and making up for the high/low ambient temperatures by central heating and air conditioning are tremendous. There is a belief that building a sustainable structure involves high costs. However, this claim is without adequate justification as ‘green buildings provide financial benefits that conventional buildings do not’ (Kats 2003, p.3). These financial benefits include reduced electricity consumption, which in some cases can be as high as 30 per cent (Ibid. p.4).
Right at the onset of conceptualisation, project stakeholders (engineers, architects, developers, etc) need to agree on engaging proactively for promoting an interdisciplinary approach. This would help consolidate the sustainability credentials of the design in consideration and would in essence be beneficial in avoiding the conventional ad hoc approach. The ad hoc approach is observed to be devoid of a systems perspective to designing a building, whereby only the cost and functional requirements of a proposed facility (building) are looked at. Without adequate consultation in the design process, the project deliverable i.e. the building is many a times constrained in its functions (such as poor ventilation, inadequate day lighting provisions, etc).

In Pakistan, however, the process starts with an owner’s need to have a facility and a vague description of what it should look like. The architect draws out a sketch of the proposed building and this is passed down to the engineer, who finally works out the building’s dimension and designs it according to engineering specifications. Next comes the contractor who is not usually involved in the process until the end when the building needs to be built. The materials the contractor employs are supposed to be according to specification, but many a times the contractor is tempted to innovate, if not tweak, the specifications to cut down costs. The result is a building which may or may not be designed to standard, and is likely to have inefficiencies.

5. **Improving Building Design Processes in Pakistan**

There are important stages pertaining to the development of a green building, i.e. site selection, design, construction, operation, maintenance, refurbishment and demolition. This covers important aspects such as the materials used for construction, water conservation, waste reduction, decrease in air pollution, power generation from renewable resources and good indoor air quality. For example, buildings oriented towards the south benefit from passive solar energy, which can be used to heat homes during winters. Furthermore, appropriate positioning of windows can allow for ventilation, which again can help in cooling houses during hot summers. Green design features such as insulation, water heating and cooling, improvement of lighting system arrangements should be integral part of the buildings.
5.1  Eco-Charrette

Undoubtedly, as shared above, the building design process in Pakistan is more in tune with an authoritarian approach, which is devoid of any room for consultation and engagement. There also exists resistance to the introduction of new and innovative mechanisms in building design planning, as old methods are considered to be tried and tested and supposedly do not pose any hidden threats. This, however, in the long run compromises the very essence of planning.

The developed world has seen considerable advances in the planning and decision-making phases of building design. One specific consultation process is known as an Eco-Charrette, which is essentially a meeting or discussion between all stakeholders involved in which it is unanimously agreed at the beginning that the proposed building would be designed to achieve sustainability goals; hence, the strategies and objectives in making the said goal a reality are brainstormed upon (Solar for Energy 2011). The benefit of an Eco-Charrette is that it serves as a platform where all stakeholders can participate proactively and exchange their views on how the sustainability credentials of building design can be achieved. If the relevant stakeholders are made to feel part of the process at the early stages, they would have more sense of ownership of the facility in consideration. As an Eco-Charrette comprises of participants who hail from all types of professional backgrounds, they all bring with them their expertise and knowledge of niche subject areas. However, the mere nature of the meeting enables an environment conducive to sharing of ideas; hence, solutions to practical problems, which would have otherwise been overwhelming can be achieved. A unanimous agreement on what needs to be underpinned as important criteria against which the sustainability of the building would be compared against, is definitely an enduring commitment to success (Ibid.).

5.2  Day-lighting

In Pakistan’s urban areas, there is great dependency on resorting to artificial lights, i.e. tube lights and bulbs for lighting purposes rather than harnessing sunlight for illumination during daytime. Pakistan is naturally endowed with
sunshine the year round and it is unfortunate that light being a valuable natural resource, is not adequately made use of. A building’s features that take this into account are primarily its orientation and window glazing, which is in the path of the sunlight. Day-lighting is a fundamental component to a green building and is essentially the use of natural daylight to illuminate an indoor space. The basic concept behind day-lighting is the reflection of sunlight from outside and inside surfaces, thereby allowing them to illuminate the indoor space. The benefit of this is that the negative effects associated with direct sunlight are screened out due to the medium that comes in between the indoor space and the outside. There are technologies and design modifications that can enable the harnessing of the sunlight for lighting purposes. On the other hand, the costs involved in lighting a building are considerable. Daylight savings are greater for the summer months, and in essence contribute greatest to the energy savings. Electrical lights serve to heat up the indoor space, therefore with their absence; the cooling load from air conditioners is greatly eased. With a shift from heating due to electrical lights, passive solar heating can be used as a substitute for the same function.

5.3 Onsite power producing units

Another step towards self-sufficiency includes setting up independent power producing units onsite. These could include energy harvesting from local renewable resources, which have immense potential for commercial exploitation. Connection to a centralised power grid is no longer a necessity nowadays, given the numerous viable alternatives present in the market already. It is envisioned that the use of photovoltaic systems for generating electricity at a household level can be encouraged, given Pakistan’s advantage of having considerable solar exposure, which is consistently available throughout the year and is not affected by seasonal changes in weather.

5.4 Green cooling systems

During the summer months, there is considerable reliance on air conditioners for cooling indoor spaces. The high summer temperatures lead to an increase in electricity consumption, leading to electricity shortages. During the summer
months, frequent power outages are common, further aggravating the common person’s woes. If in hindsight, buildings were designed according to specifications whereby the occupants did not depend on air conditioners to cool off, the pressure on electricity consumption in the domestic sector would not be prevalent to the extent observed today. Green cooling systems consist of stack cooling; cross ventilation and cool towers. Most of these systems have vents near the ceiling that direct the cool air inside and the warm air out of the building. This system does not require fans or electricity. The fundamental concept of ventilation systems involves distinguishing the role of cool and warm air and how they are selectively managed for maintaining the required temperature and air quality.

5.5 Whole Building Design

A building needs to be designed as a single entity, and the approach is known as the Whole Building Design (WBDG) which basically entails the planning stage taking into account all the energy savings and gains made (WBDG 2011). It is believed by default that self-power generation and energy self-sufficiency have more to do with extraordinary renewable energy technologies and less to do with dependency on the national grid for electricity. In urban areas, where the national grid is well in reach with all other constituting parts, it is debated whether having installed these technologies is feasible at all considering the close proximity of the grid. However, self-sufficiency and reduced reliance on electricity from elsewhere can play a significant role in the empowerment of citizens. It can, as in the case of some Californian homes, be of monetary benefit to having installed the sophisticated electricity generating gadgetry.

5.6 Using biogas

Another example of harnessing clean energy is biogas, which greatly depends on local conditions such as presence of livestock and availability of adequate water for proper functioning of biogas plants. Biogas plants have been introduced at a community level, which makes use of manure for gas production. This gas is used for heating and cooking purposes. Pilot projects were set up in the Union Council
Mandehran and District Dera Ismail Khan in Jhoke Mohana and Jhoke Obechart in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. In urban areas, a similar concept can be employed on a neighbourhood level making use of household waste. This would not only help reduce burden on the already stressed waste management system but can also be exploited for energy production.

6. Building Footprint: Issues for Consideration

6.1 Transportation

Energy consumption in Pakistan’s transportation sector constitutes about 30.1 percent of the overall consumption (Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Resources 2010). It is important to carefully chalk out a transport plan as the savings made in energy in a green building may be offset by travel choices. According to estimates, the energy expended in transport is almost twice as much as that used in a building’s operation (Wilson and Navaro 2007). The energy intensity from the transportation sector is considerable, whereby the location of a building and its additional facilities are great influencing factors.

Sound travel choices (such as usage of public transport) have overarching benefits in terms of better water management, reduced urban heat island effect and ecosystem preservation. Therefore, the energy expenditure on transportation is directly related to the situation of a building. At the time of a building’s conceptualisation, site selection and land use planning need to be executed comprehensively as these are integral to the success of the building in its entirety.

6.2 Water

Water footprint is defined as ‘the total volume of freshwater that is used to produce the goods and services consumed by the individual or community or produced by the business’ (Water Footprint Network 2011). The average water footprint of Pakistan is 1331 m³/yr per capita, whereas the global average water
footprint is 1385 m$^3$/yr per capita (Ibid.). In comparison to other countries, Pakistan has a lower water footprint. However, it is about time construction companies in Pakistan reengineer the way they operate, as there lies much room for improvement in water conservation and treatment. The notion of water footprint is increasingly applicable to construction companies, which heavily spend water for their various vital operations. In order to keep the water footprint to as minimal an extent as possible, those construction materials must be used which require less water than traditionally used construction materials. There has to be introduction of equipment that saves water; and onsite wastewater treatment so that it can be reused for other related processes. Additionally, to save water in the future, there has to be an integrated system for wastewater treatment and efficient supply system.

As a result of widespread extraction of groundwater, water scarcity in Pakistan has reached unprecedented levels in recent times, with the per capita water availability falling from about 5000m$^3$/yr to about 1000m$^3$/yr in 2010 (The Nation 2011 quoting World Bank and ADB figures). For the construction industry, contemporary problems such as fresh water shortage and widespread water pollution present a challenge, yet also an opportunity to boost efficiency in building design, especially with regards to water usage. Studies have shown that reducing water usage not only helps in water conservation, but leads to an overall decrease in energy usage. Sustainable building design encapsulates low water usage and maintenance of water quality. There must be an effort to use water that has been recycled, reused or purified, in order to boost water conservation. In Pakistan, there is considerable demand for water in the agricultural, domestic and industrial sectors. Presently, there is a dearth of storage reservoirs, due to which the supply of water faces many hiccups.

Here, there is an absence of a water footprint accounting system, which is basically an inventory system that monitors and checks the quantities of water drawn on. For instance, a tremendous wastage of water from pipelines results due to an inefficient monitoring system (Khan 2006). There has been positive development with regards to urban rainwater harvesting in Pakistan, and the first system was introduced in Faisal Mosque in Islamabad (CDA News 2011). This serves to provide clean drinking while preventing the depletion of groundwater reserves. In rural areas, rainwater harvesting has been done
domestically too. In these places, cisterns and underground tanks are seen to be integral parts of a house’s configuration. An additional wall on the outside provides a buffer against flood water, and also serves to act as a pool where water collects.

The construction industry contributes significantly to water pollution. The pollutants are notably diesel oil, chemicals, construction debris, etc. Another issue with pollution from the building process is the contamination of the groundwater resources from surface water runoffs. Groundwater is used for drinking purposes and with the passage of time runoffs can severely debilitate the health of people living in the vicinity. In order to offset the environmental and social impacts of water usage, there needs to be an investment in technology, water conservation measures, wastewater treatment and increasing efficiency of the water supply system. Furthermore, overall water pollution can be effectively mitigated by introduction of pollution control measures in all parts of the supply chain.


The National Engineering Services Pakistan (NESPAK) in contract with the National Energy Conservation Centre (ENERCON) formulated the Building Energy Code of Pakistan (BECP) in Feb. 2008. The purpose of the BECP is to provide a minimum standard for design and construction of energy efficient buildings. The Code is, however, restricted to new buildings and systems and covers ‘building envelopes; building mechanical systems; service water heating; lighting; and electric power and motors’ (ENERCON 2008a, p.2).


i) Building Envelope
Detailed considerations are given about the building envelope to include fenestration, insulation provisions to decrease air leakage. Emphasis has been

² Editors’ Note: The author was able to obtain a copy of the draft Code 2008 from the Pakistan Engineering Council. An updated and revised Code was formulated in 2011 during the publication phase of this anthology.
laid on replacement of glass in windows with glazing that has an equal or lower U-factor and SHGC. The Code stipulates modifications of the roof, floor and wall cavities by including insulation and appropriately sealing all openings. As per the Code, the U-factor is restricted to 0.86 and the minimum threshold value for air leakage is 2.0L/s/m² (ENERCON 2008a, p.7) Trees need to be planted around the building in the southern and western regions, so as to boost energy conservation (Ibid.p.14).

ii) Heating, ventilation and air conditioning
Through ventilation, the internal temperature of the building can be regulated. It involves the flow of cool outdoor air into and heated air out of the building through designated internal openings (ENERCON 2008a). The Code stipulates the usage of double glazed windows, as they are effective in controlling the quantity of heat that passes through the building. Ideally, temperature cooling needs to be regulated by in-built design measures which adjust the flow of air around the building. In the absence of a mechanical air-conditioning unit in place, the natural ventilation system can only cater to the cooling needs of the occupants. The cooling requirements of a building should be followed under the National Building Code of Pakistan and the ASHRAE Codes (ENERCON 2008a). The Code provides minimum performance requirements for HVAC equipment for special conditions. With the exception of the ‘residential sector with non-centralised system/s’, the Code stipulates that there should be a clock, which controls the operation of the mechanical cooling and heating system (Ibid. p.28). The Code also provides the temperature and humidity threshold levels for various types of buildings.

iii) Service water heating
The Code stipulates that the water heating equipment should meet the minimum heat recovery criteria for homes, hotels and hospitals which is a fifth of the total design capacity. Additionally, the Code also puts down minimum requirements for piping insulation, heat traps and swimming pools. The design for service water heating should ensure that 20 per cent of heating should be derived

---

1 U factor is a rating assigned to a window given the ‘amount of heat loss it allows’ (ecomii 2011). Solar Heat Gain Coefficient (SHGC) is a rating assigned to a window which indicates how much heat from the sun it allows to pass through (ecomii 2011).
2 American Society of Heating, Refrigerating and Air-Conditioning Engineers.
through solar heat/heat recovery, whereas the rest should be met with electrical heating. If there is gas available, 100 per cent of the heat should be provided by gas (Ibid.p.37).

iv) Lighting
The BECP 2008 recommends devices that work along the lines of occupancy sensors and lighting controls and indicates that windows should be situated on the south-west side of a building. There are mandatory requirements for both internal and external lighting including automatic lighting shut-off, space control and luminaire wattage (Ibid. pp.38-46).

v) Electrical power
In order to ensure compliance to Code stipulations, local authorities would need additional information such as calculations, worksheets, manufacturer’s literature, etc.

vi) Building Efficiency Cost Budget
The Building Efficiency Cost Budget method is a substitute to regulatory stipulations laid out in the Code. Compliance would require that the following documents be submitted to the relevant authority:

a) The annual energy use for the proposed design and the standard design.

b) A list of the energy-related building features in the proposed design that are different from the standard design.

c) The input and output report(s) from the simulation programme including a breakdown of energy usage by at least the following components: lights, internal equipment loads, service water heating equipment, space heating equipment, space cooling and heat rejection equipment, fans, and other HVAC equipment (such as pumps). The output reports shall also show the amount of time any loads are not met by the HVAC system for both the proposed design and budget building design (ENERCON 2008a, p. 52).

Furthermore, the Code stresses devising a simulation of the building’s anticipated energy consumption by using a computer programme, as mentioned above. It stipulates that the ‘simulation should model energy flows for all 4400 hours per year and hourly variations in occupancy and building operation’ (Ibid. p.52).
programme would take into account climatic data pertaining to city/region in consideration and subsequently enable cost simulations involved in integrating energy efficiency measures in the building. (Ibid. p.53)

7.2 Analysis of the Building Energy Code of Pakistan (BECP) 2008

In the draft 2008 Code, there is great stress on mechanical equipment and devices to help control the energy consumption of a building. The glitch of this approach is the exaggerated technologically intensive dependency to boost energy efficiency credentials of a building. It does not underpin the need to change occupant behaviour and lifestyle, which is an important component to enhancing efficiency in building operations. In Pakistan, the employment of computer programmes to simulate energy consumption is not employed extensively and may take time before it is fully accepted as a means to enhance energy efficiency.

Additionally, the Code employs a prescriptive approach to encouraging energy efficiency, particularly as regards the equipment used in building operations. For service water heating, the Code does not provide substantial relief from the dependency on fossil fuels such as gas. There is no significant mention of solar heat technologies that could be used in heating water. There is a great need for the Code to be updated according to global trends in building energy efficiency measures, by including modern technologies based on renewable energy sources. Similarly, there is also no mention of active and passive design measures. In lighting, there is no emphasis on harnessing day lighting for the purpose of illuminating internal spaces. This has numerous financial and health benefits; research shows that day lighting can improve occupants' health and enhance their productivity.

The BECP should have included provisions of water usage, as that also has a bearing on the overall footprint of a building. As is evident by the selective importance on equipments used in a building, the Code is not entirely a holistic document, which would in essence cover all aspects of what constitutes a ‘green building’. It also does not discuss behavioural change, particularly awareness on energy conservation, which is critical in improving a building’s energy footprint.
The document should have taken into account in greater detail the environment-society-economy connections (Potbhare et al. 2009).

8. Status of the BEC and ENERCON/PEC Initiatives

An updated version of the Building Energy Code (BEC) was formulated in 2011. However, it is still in its draft stage (ENERCON 2011). The Pakistan Engineering Council (PEC) has the authority to regulate the building by-laws and collaborate with the respective municipal authority in ensuring that it is complied with. Currently, the status of the updated BEC document is that it needs to be vetted before being enacted as a Statutory Notification (S.R.O). Once this has happened, it will be binding for all municipal authorities in the country to ensure that the stipulations laid out in the BEC concerning new buildings are followed.

ENERCON has identified a potential saving of 30 per cent through energy conservation in buildings. In addition to running campaigns for promoting energy conservation, ENERCON has conducted the following interventions in order to promote greening of the building sector:

i) Ensuring that development authorities and owners promote energy conservation/energy efficiency in government, commercial and community buildings.

ii) Ensuring that the Federal Board of Revenue (FBR), Ministry of Investment (MoI) and development authorities allow easy provision of equipment, materials and fixtures (insulation, HVAC, lighting equipment, etc.) that can be employed to enhance energy efficiency.

iii) Ensuring that development authorities (CDA, LDA, etc.) make it binding that all new buildings designed in the future are based on energy efficient building codes (this is, however, still in progress) (ENERCON 2011).

Furthermore, ENERCON is involved in the implementation of the BRESL Project in Pakistan. With the objective of energy conservation, ENERCON is involved in spearheading development of energy efficiency labels and standards for home appliances. This will help advance awareness amongst individuals about the

---

5 Editors’ Note: ENERCON finalized the Code in June 2011 during the publication phase of this manuscript.

6 Barrier Removal to the cost-effective development and implementation of Energy Efficiency Standards and Labeling.
need to engage in energy conservation and also about energy efficient appliances that can be employed to achieve this aim (Pakistan Energy Standards and Labels 2011).

The Pakistan Engineering Council (PEC) has been establishing Pakistan’s building codes which stipulate energy efficiency measures that can be incorporated in new and existing buildings. According to Zuberi (2010), in order to set a precedent, PEC has retrofitted its own building first which is now Pakistan’s first success story in retrofitting. The move not only boosted energy efficiency credentials of the PEC building, but simultaneously led to significant monetary savings (Ibid.). The retrofitting initiative started with carrying out an energy audit of the building which entailed carrying out an inventory of building components that consumed energy or had sustainability impacts.

The energy audit of PEC determined that the total amount of electricity load experienced was 345.66 kW. By virtue of the audit, options for reducing energy waste and associated implementation of sound energy practices were adopted. The PEC also started its initiative of solar power, whereby a 110 kW on-grid solar system for PEC was installed (Ibid.). The energy efficiency measures have also included removal of objects that were obstructing light sources; reduction in usage of electronic appliances; generation of awareness among staff about energy conservation measures; replacement of the CRT monitors with LCD monitors/displays and employing a series load to reduce power consumption. Lighting retrofits have also been carried out in conference rooms leading to power saving as high as 1980 kW (Ibid.).


9.1 Policy

Over the past few years, there has been a tremendous growth in formulation of green building guidelines worldwide (Potbhare et al. 2009). Despite the fact that there are instances of good practice in building energy efficiency in Pakistan, especially in the rural areas, there is no regulatory system in place to mainstream
the approach in urban areas. The incorporation of energy efficiency measures depends greatly on the client and the funds available for investment. According to observation, Pakistan's peculiarly patchy situation in boosting energy conservation through green building can be attributed to the rather loose ended and prescriptive Code that exists and its non-alliance with ground realities. It is important that the Building Energy Code should be in conformity with best practices internationally, but also updated according to new developments. Additionally, green development requires an implementation strategy which advances the rapid adoption of the guideline in society. The acceptance of a building Code needs to have roots in its comprehensibility, flexibility, public-private partnerships and vast scope in addition to other important factors (Ibid.). Municipal authorities such as the Capital Development Authority (CDA) and others need to collaborate with urban planners, engineers, architects, contractors, building owners/ client to chalk out a comprehensive framework to enable green building to be fundamental to development plans. Currently, the converse is true, with the trend towards green building being confined to voluntary needs rather than an overarching regulatory system to ensure compliance.

In Pakistan, a governmental initiative in advancing the goal of green building is merited. This should reflect in the form of a policy, which would encourage organizations, be whatever sector they are part of, to wholly adopt green principles in their development plans. Among the many steps that the Pakistani government can take in promoting green development, some of the following can be adopted to yield positive results:

1. Those incorporating green measures should be provided incentives by giving them tax benefits and subsidies;
2. Non-governmental organizations should be capacitated to undertake research and advocacy by providing them data and funding;
3. Encouraging awareness amongst the public about energy issues;
4. Making green guidelines such as the BEC easy to comprehend (Potbhare et al. 2009).
9.2 Institutional structure and governance for green buildings

Against the backdrop of unstable oil prices and disrupting energy supplies, energy security constitutes a significant concern for Pakistan. Secure provisions of energy supply for the different national sectors are vital for achieving developmental objectives. While addressing the growing need for enhancing energy efficiency and greening the building sector, it is imperative to examine the legislative and research structure in place that deals with the overlapping paradigms of energy, building and policy (Melchert 2007).

Given the nascent nature of progress on green building in Pakistan, it is yet to achieve attention at a level observed in the developed countries, where the building industry is at the forefront of all efforts to counter climate change. Some of the barriers to greening buildings include financial constraints as well as market and industry structures (UNEP 2011). Developing green buildings with the intent of setting a precedent for other buildings by virtue of projecting them as symbols of energy efficiency may garner significant momentum in radicalising the way energy consumption/conservation is viewed amongst individuals. Furthermore, it may help instil a culture of sustainable living, conservation and environmental consciousness.

The example of Netherlands delineates how green buildings took precedence in policy; this was spearheaded by two important phases during the country's history. These were the 1970s oil embargo on western countries and the mid 1980s. The corollary was the institutionalisation of green building development as a means of reducing vulnerability to oil price volatility and in turn enhancing the nation's energy security (Melchert 2007). This had been propelled by the civil society and non-governmental actors who played an important role in pressurizing the government to take initiatives in checking high energy consumption witnessed in the building sector. Therefore, in order to advance the aim of greening the building sector, the government offered subsidies on renewable energy projects and energy efficiency became integral to the policy on new buildings.

Pakistan’s market needs to be receptive to radical changes in the building sector. Unless there is support in this regard (with introduction of energy efficiency
labels, technology transfer, competition between products, etc.), it would be quite difficult to mainstream sustainability goals nationally. The National Energy Conservation Policy has been prepared by ENERCON after a rigorous process of consultation with different stakeholders (The Daily Times 2011). The foundation stone for the overarching legislative framework, which is a prelude to the realisation of energy conservation in the country, has been set by the drafting of the Pakistan Energy Efficiency and Conservation Bill 2011. The bill, however, needs to be approved by the Senate in May/June 2011 (Ibid.).

Once the bill is approved, progress towards the institutionalisation of the concept of green building would be boosted. It is noteworthy that the success of this may greatly be enabled by a more competitive and liberalized energy sector (Melchert 2007). The market would greatly benefit from the collaboration between all stakeholders (government, construction companies, developers and authorities) to infrastructure development. Through their domains, each of the stakeholders has their respective roles to play; whereby, the overarching goal is to facilitate promotion of green building in Pakistan.

i. Role of the government
The government needs to provide a legislative and regulatory framework conducive to green development in the country. For example, the Chinese government is advancing green building with three concomitant legislations: i) The Renewable Energy Law; ii) 65 per cent Efficiency Law; iii) Green Building Assessment System7 (The Green Dragon Media Project 2008). Additionally, there are policies and subsidies to enable the enhancement of energy efficiency of buildings. In 2005, China advanced The People’s Republic of China Science and Technology and long-term Development Plan (2005-20), which underscores the importance of undertaking research into building energy conservation and green building as a long term science strategy (Miao et al. 2009). The government also provides subsidies for solar thermal heating units and green power8 (The Green Dragon Media Project 2008). The government in China has also invested in demonstration projects (prototypes), with the intent of establishing an enabling environment for green building development in the country.

---

7 The Chinese Green Building System is similar to the Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design Rating System (Miao et al. 2009).
8 Power generated from renewable/alternative energy sources.
The Pakistani government must collaborate with all actors (be it researchers, academics, non-governmental institutions, consultants, etc.) interested in green development by providing a level platform for engagement where all can congregate and by virtue of dialogues, perspectives can be shared. As awareness about green buildings continues, it may become a standard for individuals to opt for. In the long run, the incentives offered by the government may become penalties for non-compliance (David Gardiner & Associates, LLC 2010).

In comparison to regulatory tools, there are dialectic views on the tools the Pakistani government can employ in advancing the goal of greening the building sector. In some places, it is contended that providing a market based incentive is a better option in advancing green building development (Frej 2003). However, the other argument is that on the basis of democratic principles and accountability, regulatory instruments may prove to be more effective (Rivers and Jaccard 2006 as quoted in Chan et al. 2009, p. 3063). It is, therefore, inferred that there is no generic role of the government; rather, it should take a diverse range of measures given the local, political and economic situation (Chan et al. 2009). This is, however, not to discount the importance of the government in spearheading green building development. Certain measures such as fiscal incentives are particularly helpful in offsetting high initial costs, thereby increasing the acceptability of green building on a larger scale (Ibid.). The connection of the government to the public is another advantage of increasing awareness and knowledge about the subject.

The enactment of the aforementioned bill and a Building Energy Code (BEC) would be helpful in driving people to more proactively engage in green building development. Some of the policy incentives that the government can make are as follows (Chan et al. 2009; UNEP 2011; Kallmorgen 2009; Potbhare et al. 2009):

i) Establishing a structure for the implementation and enforcement of building energy codes, training of individuals to build a capacity base and carrying out demonstration projects. (It is, however, the onus on the municipal authority to ensure the implementation of green practices in buildings according to policy guidelines).

ii) Mandatory execution of energy audits of buildings and energy performance certificates to be fundamental to the sale and lease to potential customers/tenants.
iii) Enforcing regulatory mechanisms, both normative and informative, in influencing choices in energy conservation (building codes, energy audit, eco-labels, energy management system, etc.).

iv) Economic incentive schemes to mitigate the daunting combination of high upfront costs and payback periods, which is a concern to developers and home owners, as they would prefer reaping benefits of greening a building within a short timeframe.

v) Promoting the link up of fragmented aspects of the building industry so that new energy efficient buildings can opt for CDM under the Kyoto Protocol.

vi) Promulgation of the concept to the public so as to create a demand market with awareness campaigns being advocated by NGOs. Enhancement of knowledge about standards, labelling technologies, energy issues and rendering advice on the green building market. This can be achieved by organising workshops, seminars and conferences as well as disseminating information via internet, brochures and books. Therefore, an effective communication strategy needs to be instituted.

vii) Making available information about the cost savings associated with green building, health productivity and material conservation. Presently, in Pakistan, there is great dearth of data about the apparent benefits of green buildings, and this is considered one of the major stumbling blocks to the adoption of green building practices in developing countries.

viii) Instituting a mechanism whereby those investing in green buildings can be direct beneficiaries of the investment made. Incentivising property developers to consider life-cycle costs in the design and construction phases. As the awareness about green buildings increases, more and more people would want to opt for non-conventional homes. That would result in higher occupancy levels, which in turn would be a strategic means to augment revenues.

ix) Supporting clean technology markets by formulation of green procurement policies and funding research and development in universities and educational institutions.

x) Instituting reward schemes (monetary and publicity), say in liaison with the media, to acknowledge the accomplishment of adopters of green buildings.
xi) Initiating a South Asian regional roundtable dialogue on green building breakthroughs; benchmarking against best practices and chalking out a framework of collaboration on this area. A database containing case studies from the area can be created henceforth. This can also expedite the formulation of regional building energy code/guideline.

xii) Fostering public-private partnerships for energy efficiency and conservation projects.

ii. Role of financial institutions

It is generally seen that financial institutions are wary of investing in green buildings primarily due to genuine obstacles such as low financial returns, risk and uncertainty and the perceived complexity of determining accounting costs (capital and operation costs); in addition to the small scale nature of the proposed projects (Chan et al.2009; UNEP 2011). Financial institutions can play an effective part in green building through the following roles (David Gardiner & Associates, LLC 2010):

i) Owners: setting an example for energy efficiency at their premises.

ii) Lenders: making lending on green building development a key constituent of their lending policy.

iii) Insurers: in view of the costs incurred due to damage to a building, insurers can enhance their capacity by playing an advisory role on how to improve a building’s ‘green’ credentials. It can lead to the creation of an asset class, thereby enabling the diversification of the institution’s portfolio.

iv) Investors: channelling funds for green building development.

Those getting involved in the green building process earlier on would have a competitive advantage over others; for banks in particular, this may also be a manifestation of sound Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) values. For instance, the Doha Bank recently won the ‘Gold Peacock Global Award’ for CSR; its new headquarters in Qatar boast of state-of-the-art green building features (The Gulf Times 2011). Through the adoption of energy efficient measures at their branch premises, financial institutions can greatly influence and market such endeavours to their customers, as well as positively contribute to greening of the building sector. Furthermore, financial institutions need to develop expertise on green building by creating especially designated departments for
this purpose. Staff can be trained and imparted skills requisite to understanding the green building process; this next generation of experts can help bridge the gap between actors of the construction industry, owners and the government (David Gardiner & Associates, LLC 2010).

There is a tendency for building owners to increase their revenues, whereby the tenants would like to cut down their costs. However, the crux is the initial investment by the building owner that would consequently determine the level of occupancy in the future and the extent of costs incurred due to building operations and maintenance. One of the barriers to the greater involvement of the financial sector with green building has been the dearth of data (Ibid.).

iii. Role of others

Figure 3. Linkage between all stakeholders to green building development.


Similarly, the civil society, engineers, architects, contractors, etc., can take initiatives (against the backdrop of governmental policies) in adopting green measures in building projects. Their proactive involvement would serve to create
a snowball effect in the advancement of sustainability goals and alleviation of any associated inconsistencies. Furthermore, electricity distribution companies need to be encouraged to develop energy conservation guidelines, which they could enact with the support of users. These companies can enable energy profiling of buildings and provide recommendations to potential users on improving the energy management of a building (Melchert 2007). Developers have a prime interest in maximizing their profits, whereby contractors aim to build facilities in as effective a manner as is possible (Chan et al. 2009). It is recommended that a primer is developed identifying how different energy sector actors can liaise together to forge efforts in the achievement of a common goal. For this purpose, the media can be utilized as a tool for publicity to encourage the adoption of green building guidelines (Potbhare et al. 2009).

The construction industry is seen to be very fragmented, with different actors playing their respective roles in their own cocoons. This needs to change, whereby the engineers, architects and contractors need to organise themselves on one frequency level. This could be achieved by the establishment of an institution (similar to the likes of Pakistan Engineering Council or Institute of Architects, Pakistan) where all professionals can meet together and engage in meaningful discourse on the way forward for green development in Pakistan. Property developers and potential owners/clients need to be educated about the benefits of green buildings (monetary, health and environmental) and associated guidelines, so as to generate interest along these lines. Once the market for green technologies develops in Pakistan, technical expertise on the products would subsequently expand on part of the sub-contractors and manufacturers (Potbhare et al. 2009).

9.3 **Fiscal Measures**

Investment in greening the building sector entails taking account of the inter-sector linkages that exist i.e. the links between the building, manufacturing and transport industries. It includes adopting a diversified and multi-disciplinary perspective on how fiscal incentives can promote green buildings on a mainstream level (UNEP 2011). There needs to be preferential monetary allocations for the development of the green building market. For instance, in
order to spearhead green development, China has imported requisite technologies necessitated to improve sustainability credentials of a building (Miao et al. 2009).

The applicability of green building to the Pakistani market would be derived from important factors such as the prevailing economic structure, institutional set-up and status of governance in the country. Thereby, in light of these, the driving forces and challenges of development can be better understood. Pakistan has great potential to create an indigenous manufacturing base of energy efficient technologies, which can in effect feed in to the need to revamp the building sector. Such linkages need to be identified and consolidated, as they help attain the overarching goal of greening the economy. For example, the Pakistani market for energy efficient appliances has been progressively increasing and in recent years, there has been a growing influx of energy saving bulbs, LEDs, etc. However, the perceived benefits of this as a whole have been based on monetary reasons; users have been motivated to opt for these on grounds of cutting their electricity bills, health and aesthetic reasons. The adoption of such devices is yet to be done under the principle of augmenting the sustainability of their dwellings, which is generally an overlying objective in the developed world.

According to Pakistan's Finance Act 2006, a 2 per cent capital value tax on the purchase of an urban property has been levied by the Federal Government (Rahman 2009). Furthermore, all revenue from development projects is taxed on a net income basis at a rate of 35 per cent of net profits (Ibid.). Some fiscal measures the government can take are as follows:

i) Taxes revenues can be used to invest in green building development.

ii) Those individuals who would like to carry out energy efficiency improvements need to be provided loans; furthermore banks can be encouraged to lower interest rates for customers on provision of fiscal incentives by the government.

iii) Property taxes can be suspended temporarily in order to reward investment in green building measures.

---

9 The success of governmental policy favouring green building development would essentially depend on this.
iv) Public benefit charges (energy tax) could entail requirement of utilities to spend a certain proportion of their revenue on energy efficiency improvements.

v) Developing a market for green bonds, which would give tax incentives to consumers and the proceeds, can be used to fund green building projects. This could be done in joint collaboration between public finance institutions and the government (UNEP 2011; Kallmorgen 2009).

vi) Grants can be provided by the government to be invested in energy efficient appliances and facilities (Melchert 2007).

10. Conclusion

Pakistan’s energy crisis has propelled the need to divert attention to the domestic sector, which has a significant share of the country’s total energy consumption. Green building design is a holistic concept, which includes taking into account the energy, water and transportation footprint. This is of immense significance to Pakistan as power outages, growing water scarcity and increasing traffic congestion on roads is posing an enormous socio-economic hurdle to the country’s progress. The concept of green building is not alien to the region; in fact, many aspects of energy efficiency have been observed in rural houses, which have been present for ages. However, buildings in urban areas necessitate a change in the way they are operated, whereby energy and water conservation should rank top priority for reducing the building’s impact on the environment. There needs to be an understanding among planners, owners, engineers and architects about the importance of engaging in thorough consultation prior to starting the building design process, as that is the stage meriting considerable input in order to integrate in the energy efficiency measures. Around Pakistan, there have been sporadic instances of good practice in encouragement of energy efficiency measures in buildings. However, in order for there to be a tangible effect on reducing the country’s overall energy consumption, a lot more needs to be done in the form of policy, fiscal and regulatory initiatives. The barriers to green building development need to be identified and measures need to be taken by the government to create an enabling institutional environment.
References


ENERCON 2008a, ‘Building energy code of Pakistan’, developed by National Engineering Services Pakistan (NESPAK) under contract with the National Energy Conservation Centre (ENERCON), Ministry of Environment, Government of Pakistan, February.


Pakistan Energy Standards and Labels 2011, *About us*, Barriers BRESL, 


Shehzad, Kamran 2009, 'Pakistan housing finance sector, challenges and opportunities', *Workshop on Housing Finance in Pakistan*, International Finance Corporation (IFC), The World Bank, Jakarta, Indonesia, 


The Daily Times 2011, ‘Senate briefed on energy conservation campaign’,

Dragon Media Project, <http://www.greendragonfilm.com/government_role.html>,
accessed 5 May 2011.

<http://www.gulftimes.com/site/topics/article.asp?cu_no=2&item_no=432200&version

The Nation 2011, ‘Pakistan facing acute water paucity’,
<http://www.nation.com.pk/pakistan-news-newspaper-daily-english-
online/Regional/Islamabad/21-Mar-2011/Pakistan-facing-acute-water-paucity>,
accessed 21 March 2011.

The News 2011, ‘Pakistan rapidly becoming ‘water deficit’ country’,

UNEP 2007, ‘Buildings and climate Change- Status, challenges and opportunities’, United
Nations Environment Programme,
<http://www.unep.fr/shared/publications/pdf/DTIx0916xPA-BuildingsClimate.pdf>,
accessed 31 March 2011.

Environment Programme,
>, accessed 31 March 2011.

Water Footprint Network 2011, ‘Water Footprint- Introduction’, University of Twente,
March 2011.

WBDG 2011, ‘Sun control and shading devices’, Whole Building Design Guide,
ENCOURAGING GREEN BUILDINGS IN PAKISTAN’S DOMESTIC SECTOR


Bibliography


Section III
Governance and Urbanisation

• Surveying Municipal Programme Engagement of the Urban Poor in South Asia’s Mega Cities—Faisal Haq Shaheen
• Running with the Power: Agricultural Land Acquisition by Foreign Investors in Pakistan and the Anti-Politics of the Development Project—Antonia Settle
• The Need to Re-focus SAARC on an Urban South Asia—Faisal Haq Shaheen
Surveying Municipal Programme Engagement of the Urban Poor in South Asia’s Mega Cities
Faisal Haq Shaheen

Abstract

South Asia’s urban informal sector (IS) has been the subject of context specific research on poverty and globalisation in recent years. Socio economic assessments and descriptive surveys of the street realities of ‘mega cities’ across South Asia reveal a sharp contrast between the substance of national ‘pro poor’ policies and the state of impoverished urban communities. A number of factors have contributed to the formation of slums and the marginalisation of IS communities across South Asia’s mega cities. State policy neglect, multiple stakeholder approaches, the absence of accountability mechanisms and a project-based approach all avoid critical institutional reforms and resource sustenance required for adequate urban services.

The paper’s objective is to survey existing administrative arrangements and programmes that engage the urban poor in South Asia’s larger municipalities. Evidence from the existing programme portfolios of South Asian mega cities reveals common challenges of intra governmental alignment, policy neglect towards the IS and a subservience to economic goals of development, which originate from beyond local government jurisdiction. Evidence points to the potential of innovation and collaboration between non-profit organisations, donors and district governments. It is argued that before success in national and provincial policy reforms can be expected, interactions between the IS and lower tiers of the state should be recognised and developed. Findings show that despite the existence of such partnerships, ultimate responsibility and optimal engagement of the IS has yet to be assigned, along with sufficient resources to local government agencies. The paper’s findings recommend that well resourced, accountable capacities of mega-city governments are best suited to engage the challenges of urbanisation and the IS. Evidence also points to the benefits of civil society’s engagement with lower tiers of government to ensure the direction of existing programmes to their intended beneficiaries.

* Mr. Faisal Haq Shaheen is a Ph.D candidate in Policy Studies at Ryerson University, Canada. He is a civil servant with the City of Toronto and a Visiting Research Associate at the Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad, Pakistan.
1. Introduction

The administrative challenges of engaging the urban Informal Sector\(^1\) (IS) have been raised in the contemporary development literature. Socioeconomic assessments and descriptive surveys of the street realities of ‘mega cities’\(^2\) across Asia, Latin America and Africa reveal a sharp contrast between national ‘pro poor’ market based policy designs and the outcomes that impact the urban poor (Laquian 2006). Both external (colonial\(^3\), neo colonial\(^4\) and urbanisation) and internal (administrative culture, capability and class conflict) factors restrict the equitable provision of basic services\(^5\) by municipal agencies to the poor and all segments of urban society. Under the rubric of national ‘aid and development programmes’, foreign interventionist states have overlooked the complexity, context and challenges faced by developing country municipalities\(^6\). Developing countries’ governments have also neglected investing in the public sector and remain ill equipped to convert imported policy prescriptions into sustainable service delivery mechanisms (Batley and Larbi 2004). A convergence of financial and infrastructure based interests has resulted in a project driven culture of policy development dependent upon disbursement. Projects are divided into measurable phases with deliverables based on concrete material outcomes. Limited attention is paid to resource (institutional) allocations for ongoing maintenance. As a result, the mindset of civil servants\(^7\) has continued to alienate the public (Islam 2004). This has resulted in an artificial state structure with limited engagement of the IS (Haque 1996).

---

\(^1\) The ILO defines the Informal Sector as those economic units that typically operate at a low level of organisation, with little or no division between labour and capital as factors of production and on a small scale. Labour relations - where they exist - are based mostly on casual employment, kinship or personal and social relations rather than contractual arrangements with formal guarantees (ILO 1995).

\(^2\) ‘Mega City’ populations are 10 million and over, while ‘Meta City’ populations are 30 million and over.

\(^3\) Colonialism in the context of developing country urban governance refers to the struggle of indigenous civil service staff to adapt and adjust their social and cultural sensibilities to utilising an administrative structure imposed from the outside. In spite of the independence of many developing countries from colonialism, the legacies of these structures persist and result in alienation between the civil service and the populations they serve. The colonial mindset of top down, hierarchical and class oriented relations within the bureaucracy has also complicated relations within the civil service.

\(^4\) The dominating influence of foreign governments and supranational bodies, such as the IMF, World Bank and WTO have thrust developing countries into free markets, along with ill prepared cities with fragile infrastructures.

\(^5\) In turn, these colonial structures have a bearing on the internal linkages that connect with neo colonial forces and pressures that also impact municipal structures.

\(^6\) The interventionist state refers to donor countries that have increasingly placed the emphasis on market models and approaches to development and have ignored the administrative realities and contexts of the developing countries.

\(^7\) Civil servants, having inherited the hierarchical organisational framework from their colonial predecessors, also share a similar elitist mindset, which polarizes the senior levels of the bureaucracy from the lower levels.
2. **Constraints to State-IS Engagement**

Four broad challenges hinder the development of the relationship between the state and IS. Firstly, the spread of neo-liberal approaches and market primacy (based upon policies of structural adjustment, export led growth and market interests) are overwhelming municipal services and structures by polarising the needs and service to the wealthy and the impoverished (Brockeroff and Brennan 1998). While national economic policies of trade openness, tax cuts and free markets are creating a favourable urban context for capitalists within the formal economy; there is little in the way of domestic or municipal policy enforcement to shield labour, middle and vulnerable low income groups within the informal economy (already excluded from economic benefits) from the adverse effects of market-centred development (Batley 2006). The result is social polarisation and inequitable service delivery in employment (Rakodi 2002), transportation, housing and health (Laquian 2005b) where the poor experience persistently lower levels of services. Southern commentators have also observed that the crisis of the administrative and policy development cultures in recent times has been driven by the increased attention paid by politicians and civil servants to wealth accumulation over policy implementation (Dwivedi 1989). Despite state’s neglect, the IS has continued to grow unchecked and unabated.

Secondly, policy discussions surrounding urbanisation in developing countries have neglected rural support and rehabilitation. The expansion of ‘meta-cities’ and ‘greater urban regions’ continues to erode the efficacy of state policies in balancing urban/rural development with the needs of a flexible labour market (Laquian 2005a). State policies across many developing countries fail to equitably address the linkages between growing cities and the rural agricultural towns that support them (Mahbub ul Haque Human Development Centre 2002). Polarisation, socio economic disparities and a state of insecurity are prompting increased migration from rural heartlands to under serviced segments of the

---

8 Referred to the ones outside the business or formal economy, not essentially disconnected. There are many within the formal economy that arguably depend upon inputs from service providers, goods and services from the informal economy in order to operate (Devas 2005).

9 In turn, these colonial structures have a bearing on the internal linkages that connect with neo colonial forces and pressures that also impact municipal structures.

10 Urban cities in the developing world are often closely surrounded by an agro urban periphery that supplies raw materials for inputs as well as cheap wage labour.
urban periphery (Bhagat 2005). As a result, new IS settlements continue to flourish in parallel with the expansion of under-serviced existing settlements.

Thirdly, physical insecurity, as a result of environmental and economic deterioration, continues to threaten communities of the marginalised, urban poor. Social dislocation, exacerbated by institutional failures (reduced services, lack of faith in the police, harassment and unaffordable utilities) and market volatility (increased prices of essentials, land speculation and market driven development) result in low income communities being evicted from their homes. The absence of relocation plans results in these communities resettling illegally in other areas where after a period of time they are evicted again (Reza 2003; Weinstein 2008). The cycle is perpetuated by the government’s active withdrawal from its responsibilities as the guarantor of equitable development (Winton 2004). Over-burdened municipalities have become the sites of conflict due to limited resource rights and entitlements along ethnic, religious, class and geographic fault lines (Hasan 2002). Limited municipal staff is allocated reactively to maintaining law and order rather than proactively addressing the root causes of inequity, communal violence and instability; namely deficient basic services (Moser 2006).

Fourthly, the political and administrative culture of municipal agencies is undergoing significant transformation and polarisation. While developing country governments have historically prioritised the creation of employment through civic duty, structural adjustment and market primacy is exerting downsizing pressure on public-sector staff levels. Furthermore, the sheer volume of services that need to be delivered by a dense and complex network of overlapping policies, procedures and departments has facilitated the growth of patronage and corruption (Subramaniam 2001). Poorly developed programmes and policies create a context ripe for bribery and malfeasance. There is then the disappointing inability of many governments to deliver consistent public services and minimize the persistence of corruption, poverty, and macroeconomic mismanagement within their various agencies (Tendler 1997).

While these criticisms are warranted, many of the drivers that create these structural constraints are aggravated by a lack of funding, poor management and an increasing concentration of power in the wealthier elites, through favouritism
Managers being hired and fired based on kinship and political loyalty rather than merit perpetuate the crisis of leadership, as Tendler outlines. The result of the increased centralization of power, far removed from the realities of service delivery, is that it paralyses the potential, capacity and agency of the lower tiers of the bureaucracy. Socially capable civil servants within this lower tier (and arguably more representative members of society) are withheld and discouraged from exercising and serving in their full administrative capacities. The potential of these public servants continues to be constrained by an elitist framework that redirects resources towards sustaining market momentum, preserving the bureaucratic status quo and maintaining structures of patronage and technology until the talented among the elite leave the public sector for better opportunities elsewhere, often abroad (Khan 1991).

The result is the social polarisation of government into a two-class system of elite (higher level) and common (lower level) bureaucrat. A critical public administrative perspective suggests that while the upper tier is more disconnected from the needs of society, the lower tier is more exposed to the realities of the IS. However, as the lower tier is bound by the lack of vision from higher orders of the state, they are disabled from delivering services within their capacity, articulating service delivery models and engaging the IS.

Many studies address the four challenges with recommendations based on private sector operation, political/institutional reforms and civil society offloading as part of service delivery improvement efforts. The equitable functioning of such recommendations is weakened as these prescriptions allow the shifting of transparency, accountability and agenda control from the marginalised to the middle class and the elite (Cheema et al. 2005; Tandon et al. 2001). The result of such shifts is that challenges facing the IS are left unresolved as programmes and services are focused on catering to paying user groups, namely the higher income classes. Furthermore, their strategic frameworks and

---

11 Patronage and favouritism can be traced to social interactions within developing countries where gifts serve as a means of binding and maintaining relationships. While the use of gift giving is not condoned – it is practiced. A distinction is required between reciprocation among peons and clerical staff to simply process work – which does not hinder the system and bribery, which allows certain parties favourable access to services beyond normal levels.

12 Many of the success stories that emerge from civil society in South Asia are the result of vision and agency by ex civil servants or members of the state funded agencies. The erosion from which such individuals and communities emerge will only restrict the vibrancy of IS sensitive networks and resourced leadership.

13 Lower level bureaucrats are not excluded from corrupt practises. In many cases their poor socio-economic circumstances may stoke their desire for wealth and engaging in rent seeking behaviour to obtain it.
financial models are based on cost recovery, rather than on equitable service provision and subsidy.

3. Research Context and Study Objectives

South Asia’s engagement of the urban IS has been challenged by factors common to most developing country municipalities. The ‘context less’ state, plagued by a dependency on foreign ‘aid’ and influence, has ignored the reality that most of the benefits of pro-poor policies are captured by upper-class stakeholders. Restructured, polarised, politicised and overwhelmed municipal bureaucracies continue to find their capacities unable to serve all segments of society. As a result, a vast number of marginalised citizens are excluded from urban development and service delivery machinery. On rare occasions, where effective policies are implemented, they are foreign funded pilot projects and are consistently less sustainable or substantial than indigenously developed support offered to marginalised segments of society (Chaudhry and Devarajain 2006). In light of these realities, there is an urgent need to examine the policy context within which South Asia’s municipalities engage or neglect the IS and uncover the constraints to more engaging and proactive urban service delivery mechanisms.

The objective of the study is to obtain a comparative understanding of the policy attention that is paid to the realities of the IS by the administrative capacities of South Asia’s mega-cities. This paper examines the nature, content and substance of ‘pro-poor’ programmes and IS considerations that presently exist within the larger mega-cities of South Asia. The policy ‘entanglement’ of constraints facing local governments makes the analysis of the effectiveness of state response insufficient. The experiences of engagement between lower tiers of the state, primarily municipal agencies, donors, NGOs and representatives of the IS are analysed in terms of interest convergence, sustainability and institutional presence (Krishna 2003). Common threads of programme evolution are then focussed on in the ensuing discussion. The condition of local government programmes and an overview of the common elements that emerge from the service delivery departments inform the likelihood of higher-level policies being

14 In light of the overwhelming media attention that Pakistan is receiving as a ‘vulnerable state’, largely derived from national political and economic indicators, an examination of the issues facing urban areas presents a balanced perspective on the realities that face large segments of the disenfranchised.
realised or achieved. The next sub-section provides a study framework on South Asia that is employed to guide the exploration.

4. Municipal South Asia: Engaging the Poor

Public administration literature on the engagement between municipal bureaucrats and constituents within the IS are limited. Many of the studies on public administration across South Asia are confined to national policy hierarchies and are retained to provincial and state contexts. In the case of municipalities such as Karachi and Dhaka, there is engagement with the federal government directly, without any influence by the province. There is some benchmarking and comparative work that takes place in India, but most of the work remains within the boundaries of the state and limited attention is paid to civil society actors (Caseley 2006). Despite such relations, the IS continues to grow in all urban areas and experiences varying degrees of marginalisation. In response to the gaps in service delivery, a myriad of NGOs have flourished taking up the task of advocating for the condition of the IS (Martin 2004; Binswanger and Nguyen 2005). The common modes and scales of engagement by the not for profit sector, with the local government, forms the basis of the study context.

As South Asia continues to experience surging levels of urbanisation, large and medium sized centres are experiencing continued growth beyond their current administrative capacities. Several large centres (more than 10 million) will constitute the region’s continued growth in the years to come, namely Dhaka, Delhi, Kolkata, Mumbai in India, and Karachi in Pakistan. Medium sized centres (7 to 10 million) will also play a role, alleviating some migratory pressure from their district neighbours and distributing wealth to peripheral centres. Bangalore, Chennai, Hyderabad (India) and Lahore (Pakistan) are the drivers in this area. Improved planning and managed growth has been a function of policy learning from their older and larger counterparts. This has, in a way, enabled them to avoid the development pitfalls of historical urban development. Smaller centres (5 to 7 million) are continuing to grow, but without adequate policy and planning resources they will face similar problems as their larger counterparts. There are a number of cities that are approaching this size, but among the most significant are Chittagong, Ahmedabad and Pune (India). While our focus will be on the
larger municipal agencies, it is critical to acknowledge\textsuperscript{15} the swelling numbers of medium and smaller sized cities and the role they will play in the region.

While development commentators point to the proportion of slum dwellers dropping, the reality is that the density of urban areas and slum dwellers is increasing. In terms of sustainability, the dense habitation of slum dwellers will place pressure on infrastructure and will require state engagement for maintenance. However, the environmental footprint of slum dwellers is significantly smaller than their middle class counterparts and that of higher income groups. Tight family and social based networks contribute to increased resource sharing and results in a lower environmental footprint and greater social handprint (Briassoulis 1999). The benefits of engaging the IS in sustainable development terms of basic entitlements, flexible labour market/pool and adding a competitive advantage to developing municipalities cannot be understated (Daniel 2004). Hence, a rational institutional case for sustainability and research can be made for increased engagement between marginalised municipalities and the IS. How and which municipal programmes have made strides is examined in South Asia.

5. Methodology of Examining Municipal Engagement

In surveying the policy landscape of South Asia’s mega cities, we employ a comparative institutional approach to the current programmes that are offered in the housing, shelter and water and sanitation sectors. In light of the state’s insufficient response to service delivery shortfalls, we include civil society organisations as subjects within the case study survey. As such, the study considers critical assessments and reviews of both municipal capabilities and not for profit capacities in addressing urban challenges. The political administrative dichotomy that exists in South Asia is accounted for in two ways. Firstly, within and between provincial/municipal agencies and secondly, in the placement of lower ranking posts in municipal agencies and programmes in closer proximity to the poor. By examining the actual programmes that are in place, this study summarises and compares local government administrative structures and

\textsuperscript{15} It is hoped that urban associations in the sub-continent to meet future challenges will share sustainable solutions and innovative initiatives increasingly.
policies which engage the IS. In spatial terms, the proximity of municipal level programmes to the poor makes it the most realistic state actor in terms of policy and programme attentiveness. The absence of programme features project the constraints to IS engagement.

6. Review of Local Government Institutions

The following section provides an overview of South Asia’s mega city agencies, departments and their programme portfolios that have been developed to engage the IS. Each of the city programmes and social service delivery contexts is reviewed by country and city (Van den Haak and de Jong 2009).

6.1 Municipal Pakistan and the Urban Poor

The polarisation in Pakistan between municipal north and south is sharp, given the evolution and development of Karachi vs. the medium sized cities in Punjab. While lessons learnt from Karachi are being noted by Punjab cities, the proliferation of community based organisations in Karachi and Sindh is now surging northward, highlighting the need for policy makers at higher (and northern) levels of government to pay more attention to urban issues (ASB 2010).

6.1.1 Lahore

In Lahore, a strong provincial reliance on the network of medium sized cities has contributed to a prosperous city, operational local government and collaboration with a small, yet growing civil society sector. The City District Government of Lahore (CDGL 2010) is responsible for majority of the operational and maintenance concerns of the cities’ planned infrastructure, often initiated by the provincially based Lahore Development Authority (LDA 2008). The city district

---

16 While the discussion and critique of ‘formal policies’ at the federal levels is common to many developing countries’ political discussions and their implementation is soon after critiqued, there is a limited analysis and discussion on the resource and capacity given to local government policies and programmes. This is due to a lack of tax/financing as well as the fact that cities are still struggling with devolution and a colonial imprint.
government agencies that engage the IS are the Department of Community Development, which is separated into the Department of Community Organisation and the Department of Social Welfare. The Lahore Development Authority, an arm of a stronger and more resilient provincial government, oversees planned development across the city (LDA 2008). The Katchi Abadi Authority is a branch of the LDA that is mandated with engaging and recognising slum communities in Lahore. Across Punjab, this organisation has experienced success in upgrading slums (Anwar and Zafar 2003). The local Water and Sanitation Authority of Lahore is currently engaged in outreach and advocacy with community based organisations through the facilitation of the Punjab Government’s Urban Unit. The establishment of the ‘Urban Unit’ signals the recognition by the provincial government to the challenges of planning and operations and maintenance of local government machinery (GoP 2011).

As the population of the city has continued to grow, Lahore now has a number of NGOs that are dealing with housing and shelter related issues. The most prominent, that is modelled after SAIBAN in Karachi, is MUAWIN, also a member the Community Development Network (CDN), which advocates for the needs of IS housing. Their collective focus on policy engagement and disentanglement with housing bodies at the local and provincial levels has enabled the development, establishment and proliferation of the SAIBAN pioneered ‘incremental housing’ model that ensures targeted shelter to the poorest of the poor. With the assistance of SAIBAN, MUAWIN is engaging the Punjab government stakeholders as well as municipal authorities as an advocate and facilitator for the social mobilisation and engagement of slum communities in Lahore (MUAWIN 2010). The profile of urban issues in Lahore has also been elevated by the Punjab Urban Resource Centre (URC), an NGO that gathers information on municipal and urban issues much in the same way as its counterpart in Karachi (URC).

### 6.1.2 Karachi

Karachi’s turbulent history has led to the proliferation of community-based organisations (CBOs) engaged in advocacy and service delivery, often in cooperation with state actors. A diverse ethnic base, antagonistic political relations, foreign intervention, class politics, corrupt and nepotistic development
dynamics and a volatile relationship with the federal government has marginalised the local government's management capacity. A review of Karachi's municipal department history reveals fractured departmental mandates, marginalised agencies, programme duplication, improper implementation and dysfunctional service delivery machinery (KCDG 2009). While recent administrations have celebrated development achievements, many of their 'pro poor' projects have benefited higher income groups and added further burden to the livelihoods of the IS. The City District Government Agencies, responsible for social service engagement are most notably the community development department, which serves only to recognise NGOs working in the sector. The provincial agencies active in the municipality are the Sindh Katchi Abadi Authority, which through the visionary success of previous leadership, had established itself as a model of one window service delivery to the poor. After years of marginal recognition, the authority is being reinvigorated with limited resources (GoS 2009). In the absence of reliable, continuous mechanism of pro poor engagement, the public sector has continued to experience service delivery shortfalls across Karachi.

To bridge the gaps with the marginalised poor, a strong civil society movement has taken up advocacy, research, networking and service delivery to the poor. The most notable activity is in the core service delivery areas, shelter, water and sanitation. In shelter and housing, the SAIBAN Action Research Centre for Shelter has expanded and disseminated its pioneering incremental housing model. The CBOs administer tracts of vacant state land (provided under contract by the government) and give them out to homeless families with the condition that they will personally occupy the land and build on it. The incremental housing approach ensures that screened and deserving individuals and families obtain the 'land asset' rather than the benefit being captured by higher income groups as happens in state social housing projects. This approach has also taken the form of collective housing projects, such as the Khuda Ki Basti (God’s House) community, which are inspiring replication across the country. However, the current reality is that land is running out and evictions are on the rise. With fractured and corrupt councillors and in the absence of leadership, evictions are likely to continue.

In the water and sanitation sectors, the Orangi Pilot Project, pioneers of low cost solutions, are engaging the City of Karachi Water and Sewerage Board to
establish a component-sharing model of state-community infrastructure management for water and sanitation (Pervaiz et al. 2008). As community mobilisation has increased with the momentum created by the low cost water and sanitation experience, more community services are now being set up. Municipal stakeholders have also benefited from the component-sharing model, as the documentation (mapping, connection information and point of service use) is being used within municipal plans. The OPP model has served as a springboard for the community development network (CDN) and a growing number of CBOs are engaging their municipalities to establish similar water and sanitation ‘component sharing’ based solutions (Ibid.).

One of the most active policy forums for civil society-state engagement in Karachi is the Urban Resource Centre (URC). The NGO conducts critical research on development efforts and serves as a forum for state and non-state stakeholders to discuss Karachi’s problems and urban challenges. Stakeholders have also used the URC to galvanize support for the development of national water, sanitation and housing policies. Civil society in Karachi has served to create and preserve infrastructure and institutional memory for use by municipal agencies, such as the Karachi Water and Sewerage Board (KWSB 2008). This approach has assisted in establishing relationships with the state as well as non-state actors. The research and advocacy efforts of various civil society members are captured in the centre’s library and are often used to educate policy makers and analysts within the donor community on the successes and failures of past urban policy initiatives.

6.2 Municipal Bangladesh and the Urban Poor

While the medium sized municipalities of Bangladesh are gaining more social and economic policy attention, the surging density and vulnerability of the mega city Dhaka, has few remedies, particularly with respect to the IS.
6.2.1 Dhaka

The City Corporation of Dhaka (DCC) has been overwhelmed by urbanisation, more than many other of its urban mega city counterparts. The lack of capacity and political will of the DCC has led to the proliferation of NGOs and donors to address the concerns of rampant poverty and service delivery demands of the urban poor. Dhaka has one advantage in that the provinces have limited control over the policy environment or urban cities in Bangladesh. Dhaka is, therefore, more autonomous, and deals solely with the national government on major policy issues (Haque 2004; DCC 2010). However, as the DCC has been criticised for not doing enough to engage the poor, flourishing civil society organisations and actors have spread to make up for shortfalls in service delivery (Banks 2008).

In terms of housing and ‘shelter’, the DCC has established (as a result of donor and civil society insistence) a specific department, dedicated to slum development. The department for social welfare also engages the poor and extends limited support to slum communities. A number of smaller NGOs provide make shift shelters for the poor, but are challenged by the sheer lack of space in this highly dense urban centre. An innovative programme that has resulted from donor funding, NGO engagement and state sponsorship (albeit reluctant), has been the ‘Amrao Manush project for pavement dwellers’ (DCC 2010). It provides spatially focussed facilities to the homeless pavement dwellers for education and health care. Through these centres, members of the IS can obtain basic services and acquire a national identity card, which serves as a pre-requisite to accessing additional health and education services. Foreign donors including Irish Aid and Concern International coordinate the efforts of local NGOs including the Coalition for the Urban Poor (CUP), SAJIDA, Nari Maitree and SEEP to maintain the programme (DCC 2009).

In water and sanitation, the donor WaterAid funds community engagement and service delivery to the poor through the Dhaka Water and Sanitation Authority (WaterAid 2011). By leveraging the technical capacity building and social mobilisation of NGOs through groups such as Dhustha Shasthya Kendra (DSK), in its engagement with slum communities, service delivery is extended to the poor as paying users of DWASA’s services (DSK 2006; DWASA 2010). Communities are
engaged through stand-alone water hand pumps, as slums are unplanned and prone to seasonal flooding. The community hand pumps allow for some service delivery to the poor and as payments are received by DWASA, service provision becomes feasible in both social and economic terms (DSK 2006).

On the policy front, the Centre for Urban Studies provides a space for urban research on pressing urban issues. The NGO serves as a clearing-house for information and analysis by civil society organisations on urban issues. The offices are also engaged in the development of information assets such as maps and detailed documents to facilitate improved decision making on urban development.

6.3 Municipal India and the Urban Poor

India’s experience with urbanisation has also been overwhelming, with current paths of economic growth outpacing the administrative capacity of local government to ensure equity. A number of mega cities in India are shouldering the burden of expansive urbanisation (Tandon et al. 2001). However, the programme support received from provincial agencies appears to be generating returns with respect to citizen engagement (Jain 1999).

6.3.1 Mumbai

The Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai is one of the largest municipal corporations in India. Its programme attempts to engage the urban poor who are focussed more on community water and sanitation provision due to the lack of organised shelters and space constraints for the poor (MCGM 2009).

Water and sanitation solutions are the result of active citizen engagement both as users and providers of services. Water supply is provided through stand post schemes and sanitation is extended to the poor through the MSDP. Provincial agencies and efforts in Mumbai focus more on organising citizen participation in decentralised service delivery, such as rainwater harvesting areas. While the city does not actively engage in the creation of storm water infrastructure, private
participation and community based harvesting are being encouraged to alleviate pressure from flooding on municipal infrastructure. With regard to sanitation, Mumbai, like many Indian cities, implements a community based public toilet programme where local groups are charged with managing and maintaining community toilets. The state also operates a 'people's participation' department, which serves to galvanize the engagement of people in the actual service delivery to the marginalised. For example, in Mumbai, there is a Slum Adoption Programme for Waste Collection, a programme designed to coordinate citizen collection of garbage and feed the market for waste pick up, which is largely managed by slum dwellers.

On the shelter side of service delivery, the provincial Slum Redevelopment Authority and Slum Rehabilitation Scheme, is designed to facilitate development and deal with evictions. While some gains have been realized in terms of slum improvements, criticism has pointed out the unfulfilled promises of the scale planned for (Burra 2005). Land values and speculative prices have led to aggressive development schemes and pressure from market interests. The persistent dependency on rising land values\(^{17}\), is maintained by the Housing and Development Authority, which is charged with allocating lands in a market environment to the more economically focused developers (Nijman 2008). The resulting complexities of the housing production for low-income groups are far more extensive than what can be managed by the state (Mukhija 2003). Shelter relocations have experienced positive outcomes where communities have been part of the relocation process and programme measures have been implemented to assure successful outcomes. However, the participatory models of relocation are limited in number and specific to public lands and city redevelopment projects (Patel et al. 2002).

6.3.2 Kolkata

In Kolkata, the Municipal Corporation (KMC 2011) is influenced by ongoing political pressure and mobilisation by a broad representation of poor through the political process. The state and the municipality have a range of public-private

\(^{17}\) Conflict between stakeholders where private, public and not-for-profit interests are involved are only quelled in cases where land values are increasing. Market dynamics add to the complexity of low-income housing.
partnership efforts that strive to provide social housing to the poor. A number of ‘Bustee Services’ exist, which are designed to provide Basic Minimum Services and Slum Development support. A municipal housing department and slum development schemes are also a part of the municipality's programme portfolio. A social sector department has also been set up to target marginalised communities and address their needs as far as basic services provision is concerned. The Metropolitan Development Authority also has a body designed to provide basic services to the poor. However, critics counter, that the scale is not high enough to encompass the pace of urbanisation, and more is required to include lower income communities (Sengupta 2005).

6.3.3 Delhi

The Municipal Corporation of Delhi (MCD 2011) has a history of attempting inclusive service delivery, which is now threatened by the consolidation of market forces and interests. The municipality has a department that lists community service groups and furnishes grants to recipient NGOs. Water, solid waste and other civic services are allocated contracts and provide services to slums, ‘bastees’ and ‘katras’ through this community services department. The city initially relocated and resettled slum dwellers, and programmes shifted to upgrade and improve marginalised communities, which have been living alongside the elite New Delhi (Singh 1991). However, due to rising land prices, surging levels of evictions have taken place beyond the control of city government or official plans. Rather, development rulings are being made by judicial institutions, indicative of the consolidation of market forces and players (Bhan 2009). In terms of interaction with the state, NGOs and CBOs engaged with IS leadership are experiencing shifts in representation and engagement with governmental figures (Mitra 2004). Where rural ties of kinship, family and social networks guided representation in the past, the entrepreneurial segments of the IS and wealth are driving engagement and networking (Jha et al. 2007). In Delhi, the results demonstrate the rising force of the market and the inability of the IS to develop alternatives, as land values continue to rise.
6.3.4 Chennai (Madras)

Chennai is similar to Mumbai in that the corporation agency (CC 2008) recognises the need to provide to all segments of the population. Through the land and estates department, there are tenements and huts approved for sleeping and residence for the municipality's vast populations of homeless. However, there is also a slum clearance board, which clears away sites that are in conflict with formal (state or private) development plans and objectives. The province based municipal development authority is responsible for housing and construction enforcement and facilitates the clearing of sites. As with Delhi, state policies for engaging the poor are being superseded by market forces and development objectives. However, there is also a strong advocacy programme named 'People's Participation' that guides citizen engagement in activities such as rainwater harvesting. Such programmes that involve people allows the state to share its responsibility for the municipality's storm water and sewage infrastructure with the private sector. The recognition of such issues and citizens engagement is a common thread through Indian cities.

7. Assessing Administrative Differences

This brief survey of mega city policies and programmes has focussed on only two of South Asia’s urban service delivery sectors. Nevertheless, the constraints, enablers and dynamics of state engagement with low income groups and the IS are noticeable. While additional research is required to obtain a more comprehensive understanding of city level policy and programme dynamics, a number of common variables from across the regions mega cities demonstrate the shared challenges faced by state-IS engagement.

Firstly, in all of the region's mega cities, federal agencies and provincial authorities maintain an active role in the guidance and prioritisation of 'Capital Development and Implementation' projects. This is distinct from the role that provincial and federal authorities play in other governance contexts, where legislated oversight and responsibilities related to monitoring are the limit of higher tier state involvement in municipal activities. While planning capacities may benefit from the centralisation, capacity and coordination of upper tiers, the
lack of local government engagement at the agenda stage of policy and programme development risks burdening the latter with unforeseen operations and maintenance responsibilities. The inability of local district governments in mega cities to cope with the implications of large-scale projects (in which they have not been involved) contributes to distractions from equitable service delivery. In light of such policy disconnections, donor agencies and civil society efforts are attempting to fill service delivery shortfalls. The challenge in terms of sustainability with civil society models is that while innovative pilot projects work, they are vulnerable to donor dependency and rarely absorbed by the state. There is a need for development efforts to engage city district government stakeholders at the agenda setting stages of project conceptualisation.

Secondly, each mega city is characterised by varying degrees of recognition by state actors of civil society and a willingness to collaborate with non-state service providers. Self help, component sharing and low cost sanitation models have evolved and matured across South Asia, and are hailed as success stories of community-based development across the world (Sansom 2006). However, there is little elaboration on the recognition, transparency or accountability of partners within mega city administrative structures. In the absence of state leadership in engaging with non-state actors, donors seem to be intervening with civil society and formalising innovative models and frameworks. City district governments and municipal corporations seem to be eager in terms of off-loading responsibility through education and outreach to the general public. In some cases, they appear to be unwilling to recognise the need to engage actors beyond the state to reach out to marginalised segments of society. This is in contrast with examples from the developed north, where resource constrained municipalities are recognising and engaging non-state actors in sectors of shared responsibility (e.g. storm water management in Toronto and Melbourne).

Finally, each mega city is also impacted by the divergence or convergence of specific interests. In Karachi, ethnic disparities and the politicisation of local governance has led to a culture of misrepresentation and petty corruption at the council level. In cities such as Kolkata, the active participation of the poor in state programmes and politics, has led to the recognition and specific policy and programme engagement of the IS and urban poor through programme development and resource allocations. In many Indian cities, for example, it is
acceptable for the homeless to sleep in any public space at night, without fear of harassment by property managers or owners. The legitimacy of political representation, underpinned by social mobilisation may lead to policy and programme recognition of the realities of the urban poor and the IS.

8. Recommendations

Given the limitations of top down planning, recognising the capacity and role of the IS will be critical to managing urban sustenance / development. In order for formal-informal sector relationships to develop to a collaborative engagement level and meet the challenges of long-term sustenance, a number of issues must be addressed. There is a pressing need to deal with devolution in a way that aligns state responsibilities and engagement of the IS.

Firstly, in order to ease the dominance of foreign fund momentum and increase local ownership, there is need to facilitate a ‘phased’ engagement between NGO initiatives and ownership by municipal agencies. The paper shows variance between municipalities in recognising inherent shortcomings to policy and programme extension to the poor. In order to engage the poor, there is a need for mega city administrators to recognise service delivery limitations and engage citizens and communities through policy and programme outreach. Such a move would result in coordination and implementation between entrepreneurial service recipients and providers at the city district level, rather than through donor arrangements (The Economist 2008).

Secondly, there is a need for Operations and Maintenance reforms to emerge from within local government in response to project focussed capital goals of specific development actors. Internal challenges must be met with renewed efforts on capacity and capability extension. Whether the poor are engaged by separate/clustered departments, should be driven by management capacity and not by politicised capital-intensive agendas. Programmes should speak to and feed into policy agendas at the higher tiers of the state. In competing for higher tier policy attention, mega city departments need to develop more systems for improving reporting, transparency, and accountability to the public sector and civil society. Once such efforts are mobilised, there is then the imperative to
migrate from donor to state/externally funded programmes. Engagement of the IS may serve as a tactic to secure support and budgets for operations and maintenance. However, in engagement with non-state service providers, there must be evidence and mechanisms to ensure reporting. Skewed relations will foster subservience, rather than an environment of collaboration.

Thirdly, the relationship between federal and provincial governments plays a significant role in municipal management. Lahore arguably receives more provincial support than Karachi, but experiments in ‘ringed fence’ municipal management in Sindh, may generate lessons for long term service delivery sustenance. Irrespective of the management model, the issue of policy and programme duplication in municipalities between federal and provincial governments must be addressed. In Lahore, for example, there is an issue with a stronger province building and developing much of the city with little budget allocations for operations and maintenance work. This is common across many of South Asia’s mega cities where provincial planning and development authority polarizes internal systems between capital and operations and maintenance concerns. The result is that poor neighbourhoods continue to experience deteriorating and neglected infrastructure, while areas of new development and rising land values absorb limited operations and maintenance fund streams.

Finally, it is self-evident that the success of local level cooperation and initiatives is not constrained by higher orders of the state. However, local initiatives will require recognition at national and provincial levels if improved outreach and scope is to be realised. A number of efforts are being made in other municipalities, where activity between state and non-state stakeholders is cooperative and sometimes collaborative. Without the adequate role and oversight by higher orders of government, local government IS programmes and initiatives risk erosion by shifting economic priorities, private sector interests and intra governmental policy conflict. In ensuring that public accountability and transparency is fostered in an environment where limited resources are available, engagement with civil society is of utmost importance to the municipal administrative machinery. For example, increased public support for municipal service providers through robust service delivery relationships, may provide coverage from political client relations and rent seeking behaviour. There is a need to end this and to phase NGO/donor projects to ownership by local
governments, while maintaining low cost service delivery in cooperation with communities. Over time, as community development is fostered, the ability to pay, sustain and expand infrastructure service can then be realised, from the ground up. Costing to this end, of low cost solutions can be coupled with taxation and revenue generation efforts for directed service diversion and subsidisation of the poor.

### 9. Conclusion

In a challenging urban context, local level government can utilise its position to facilitate citizen and stakeholder engagement as it is the ultimate owner of solutions to urban challenges. Engagement with donor/not-for-profit actors and their facilitation/engagement will only increase in the future as state capacities are overwhelmed by urbanisation. In any event, developing a common understanding of challenges facing South Asia’s mega cities could generate alternate service delivery solutions which would alleviate pressure from over burdened municipal programme capacities. Feasible relationships between municipal-non state service providers could also serve to align relationships with federal/provincial stakeholders. Such measures that recognise, resuscitate and rehabilitate the IS will not only build support for local service providers, but will also buttress municipal budget reforms. Through direct programme engagement, the marginalised and poor can be employed as partners to legitimise the accountability of municipal agencies and guard against patron client behaviour. It is here that South Asia’s public sector management culture must harness the potential at the bottom of the pyramid, similarly to what has been done in the private sector (The Economist 2008). Solutions based within the flourishing informal communities of the largest mega cities, will have to be considered as challenges faced by South Asia’s larger municipalities proliferate in the years to come.
References


Bhan, G. 2009, 'This is no longer the city I once knew – Evictions, the urban poor and the right to the city millennial Delhi', *Environment and Urbanization*, vol. 21, no. 1, pp. 127-14.


Caseley, J. 2006, 'Multiple accountability relationships and improved service delivery performance in Hyderabad City, Southern India', *International Review of Administrative Sciences*, vol. 72, no. 4, pp. 531 – 546.


Laquian, A. 2005a, *Beyond metropolis*, Johns Hopkins University Press, Bethesda, Maryland, USA.


SURVEYING MUNICIPAL PROGRAMME ENGAGEMENT OF THE URBAN POOR IN SOUTH ASIA’S MEGA CITIES


Mukhija, V. 2003, Squatters as developers? Slum redevelopment in Mumbai, Ashgate Publishing Limited, UK.


Running with the Power: Agricultural Land Acquisition by Foreign Investors in Pakistan and the Anti-Politics of the Development Project
Antonia C. Settle

Abstract

Based on fieldwork in Sindh and Punjab, the present paper considers emerging agricultural land acquisition processes in Pakistan as a part of the mainstream development project's wider attempts of broadening market processes in Pakistan. This paper argues that discrepancies between development theory, based on neo-classical economics, and likely social and economic outcomes of agricultural land acquisitions in Pakistan, reflect the limited nature of the mainstream paradigm of development, as it is operationalised by governments, development agencies, the international financial institutions and NGOs, termed here the generalised development project of the mainstream development industry. The potentially disastrous implications of foreign agricultural land acquisitions for local communities reflect the failure of the development project to consider social, historical and ultimately political factors in a market-oriented analysis that protects the business and financial interests associated with sponsoring bodies, such as the World Bank and IMF. It is, thus, argued that the spectre of foreign agricultural land acquisition in Pakistan provides a salient example of how the development project fails to address the political issues that underlie continued and extreme poverty in Pakistan, likewise across the globe.

*Ms. Antonia C. Settle is a Visiting Research Associate at the Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad, Pakistan.*
1. Introduction

Pakistan has become a major destination in a new trend in foreign agricultural investment that has arisen since the global food price inflation of 2008. The sudden rise in prices indicates not only an increased profitability for speculators and other investors, but also food security vulnerabilities of countries with high food import ratios. In the years since the food price hikes, a spate of negotiations has been reported in the press pertaining to large-scale agricultural land acquisitions in developing countries. Behind these deals lies a complex web of financial interests, including institutional investors and other mainstream global investors, as well as sovereign wealth funds, representing the interests of food insecure Middle Eastern nations, which remain central players (McNellis 2009).

Unlike plantation investments of the past, the current round of agricultural investment is characterised by the acquisition of the land itself on 99-year leases, as well as the cultivation of staple food crops, rather than cash crops, for direct delivery to external markets.

This paper explores the prospects of foreign agricultural land acquisitions in Pakistan and the wider development project, in order to exemplify the narrow nature of mainstream development and the implications to those peripheral to the cash economy. The paper proceeds in three sections, the first of which considers the link between the wider development project, including Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) as an icebreaker for Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), with the recent trend in foreign agricultural land acquisitions.

The second section reviews the present status of foreign agricultural land acquisitions in Pakistan and some of its likely implications, pointing towards the socio-political relations, which are put into relief by the land acquisitions process.

The third section argues that the gap between theory and expected outcomes, in the case of foreign agricultural land acquisitions in Pakistan, can be explained by the apolitical nature of the market orientation of mainstream development theory, including the economic policies that underlie the dominant paradigm of development, and the hegemony of a financialised global economy. This situation benefits the owners of international capital at the cost of disenfranchising local communities on and around the land offered for foreign acquisition; although the
land acquisitions present a good example of economic development under the dominant paradigm, a series of social and politico-economic issues spell further disenfranchisement of various marginal communities that lie on the periphery of the market-based economy. Consequently, it is argued that these processes can only add to the burgeoning forces of political instability.

2. The Development Project and Agricultural Land Acquisition

Structural Adjustment Programmes are one of many tools used by the international financial institutions (IFIs) to support economic development in countries with weak economies. The underlying strategy of the mainstream development paradigm rests on a faith in market functions, namely general equilibrium theory, which is identified with neo-classical economic thought. The general strategy seeks development through the key process of broadening markets in weak economies, while an interest in the capacity building of crucial institutions is increasingly recognised in support of the foundational aim of protecting private property rights (Stiglitz 1998). Thus, although 'social capital' as well as 'physical capital' is increasingly grafted onto this strategy, the focal point of the mainstream development project remains on market functions, with for example, social capital and governance issues appendages to markets rather than a starting point for a vision of development (Jomo and Fine 2006). In seeking the efficient allocation of scarce resources through the invisible hand of the market, the dominant development strategy seeks liberalised trade, investment and finance, along with the privatisation of state owned assets. This strategy is undertaken in order to avoid the distortions associated with government inefficiency and red tape, which is seen as unnecessary government intrusions into the market.

Such an approach, which ultimately seeks the widening of market functions in developing economies, represents a clear consensus across major international bodies and financial institutions, development agencies and most governments on how best to eradicate poverty and achieve development. Moreover, such a market-based approach to development sees the free market, and thus the entry

---

1 General equilibrium theory refers to a fundamental principle of neoclassical economic theory that predicts the natural equalisation of forces in the economy that favours the maximisation of efficiency.
of foreign capital and corporations into the markets of the Global South, as intrinsically beneficial to all actors, not least developing countries themselves. The possibility of the transfer of technology and managerial know-how from capital rich countries to under-capitalized economies, as well as the opportunities created by Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in facilitating access to foreign markets projects FDI as to developing countries (Ocampo et al. 2007, p.30). A free market approach heavily supporting the entry of Western corporations into Southern markets through loan 'conditionalities' and structural adjustment, has long been a central aim of the international financial institutions and major development agencies (Hayter 2005).

In the dominant paradigm of development, agricultural land acquisitions by foreign investors are seen as major stimuli for foreign trade and foreign investment through FDI, which constitute important steps towards achieving economic development. Such crucial steps in the development process are catered to through the general as well as the particular stipulations of Structural Adjustment Programmes. Likewise, the World Bank supports these two aims through various measures, including a very active arm of the Bank, the Foreign Investment Advisory Service, which works by collaborating with the Pakistan Government in enabling foreign investment through agricultural land acquisitions (Oakland Institute 2010). Specific programmes of both the World Bank and the IMF thus attend directly to FDI, foreign trade and even foreign land acquisition, like various development agencies that work directly and indirectly towards simplifying land acquisition processes and streamlining formalities for foreign investment and trade within a wider vision of development through broadened markets. The development project in general thereby stands for and works on supporting exactly such business projects as foreign agricultural land acquisitions based on the underlying theoretical assumptions mentioned above.

A salient element of the phenomenon of foreign agricultural land acquisitions is that of the privatisation of state land. While the discourse has revolved around bringing 'wasteland' under production, it is more precisely a question of bringing what is formally state owned land, but is used as communal land, into the purview of the private market. The privatisation of communal land, as the myth of 'the tragedy of the commons' instructs (Cox 1985), finds a comfortable place within the neo-classical story of private property optimising efficiency. Thus,
within the dominant paradigm, it is understood that foreign agricultural land acquisitions provide important new sources of investment in a crucial sector of developing economies. Benefits are understood to include the technology and managerial skills’ transfer and increased agricultural efficiency, as well as a boost to foreign trade, which provides foreign exchange, particularly crucial to heavily indebted countries. Furthermore, this process can help optimise productivity by bringing unproductive land under the discipline of the market economy. According to the dominant theory of economic development, the food crisis of 2008 has provided a new incentive for international capital to step into under-capitalised agricultural markets and expand their capacity in national markets, an act, which was previously deemed too risky an investment. Such a shift by international capital, then, provides a new avenue for modernising the agricultural sector and boosting food production across the world market, thereby meeting the end of the optimal use of scarce resources.

3. Targeted Land for Foreign Agricultural Land Acquisition and Likely Impact

Pakistan has arisen as a major destination for foreign investment through agricultural land acquisition due to the availability of vast state-owned lands and the eager support of the Government of Pakistan in facilitating agricultural land acquisitions by foreign investors (Sadeque 2009). Although there is little evidence of finalized deals and actual development of land by foreign investors, the Government of Pakistan’s Board of Investment (BoI) has issued a long list of available land and the media has picked up on various negotiations between the Government of Pakistan and various foreign corporations. Research studies on the agricultural land acquisition policy issued by the government are still limited, although a detailed review of these processes has been undertaken by an Islamabad based NGO, Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI) focusing on the socio-geographical characteristics of the land being offered and the legal foundations of the ownership and transfer of the land in question (Settle 2011).

In broad terms, the state land offered by the Board of Investment falls into two categories: state farms and uncultivated ‘wasteland’. Of state farms, over 92,000 acres are on offer (a figure which excludes Sindh province due to data
unavailability), of farms ranging between 50 and 15,000 acres; 70,000 of which are found in Punjab. The Anjuman-e-Mazarin organisation of Punjab (AMP) estimates that over one million tenants and their families live on state farms in Punjab alone (AMP 2010). These farms are listed on the BoI's website as available to foreign investors, along with the infrastructure and cattle head count details of each farm. The onsite population of hereditary farmers on each farm, however, is not listed. This suggests that farmers on state farms, where villages, mosques, schools and graveyards can be found, will be evicted in the event of foreign acquisition. Some tenants on state farms have already been told that they should prepare to leave. It is noted that the AMP's Long March in early 2010 secured a written promise from the Punjab Chief Minister's Secretariat, offering security against eviction only to sharecroppers on state farms. However, these constitute a minority of hereditary farmers on state farms. Furthermore, the Tenancy Act in fact already protects the same group from eviction and is relevant only to sharecroppers and not to tenants paying cash rents, grazers or those otherwise deemed by the authorities as illegal squatters.

State land offered to foreign investors that is not held as state farms constitutes a far larger acreage. This land is generally found in the semi-arid regions of Balochistan and the Indian border region, notably Thar and Cholistan. While the BoI has issued some lists of 'cultivable waste', notably 31,000 acres in Punjab\(^2\), details of uncultivated land made available for foreign acquisition are far more secretive than those of state farms. Negotiations that have surfaced in the press suggest that this land is being allotted in deals pertaining to hundreds of thousands of acres each (Sadeque 2009).

The state owns these vast lands by virtue of the colonial land settlement, which issued uncultivated land as state owned, or to tribal leaders in the case of Balochistan (Gazdar 2009; Gazdar et al. 2002; Settle 2011). This land is, thus, by definition peripheral and water poor, and is generally used by grazing communities under local customary law. These communities constitute some of the lowest development indicators and least political representation in the country (Malik et al. 2007). Interviews with community leaders in Cholistan, southern Punjab, Thar and Balochistan revealed that the prospect of foreign

---

\(^2\) This figure was taken from the Board of Investment website and cited in an unpublished study by Dr. Sultan Janjhi of Hyderabad-based NGO Bhandar Hari Sangat (pers. Comm., 30 May 2010, Hyderabad, Pakistan).
agricultural land acquisitions are being interpreted in terms of historic centre-periphery conflict between upper Punjab and peripheral regions at the local level. For example, in the majority Seraiki region of Cholistan, it is said that powerful ex-military bureaucrats from the Punjabi speaking community control the Cholistan Development Authority, which is presiding over the acquisition of land in Cholistan. The Cholistan Development Authority is, thus, not expected to be loyal to local needs, while, employment opportunities on foreign controlled farms are expected go to better-skilled Punjabi workers from outside the region. The same sentiments are expressed in other areas of the Seraiki belt, in Thar and in Balochistan, where key decision-makers are understood to be outsiders who do not represent local communities and their interests. Their involvement is understood as continuing the historical disenfranchisement of local people to the benefit of the upper-Punjabi elite, also known as 'the Establishment' (Settle 2011).

Given the historical disenfranchisement of the peasant and otherwise economically peripheral classes in Pakistan, hereditary land users (both hereditary farmers on state farms and grazing communities) are unlikely to be aided by the law in resisting eviction. The imperial aims of the colonial land settlement policy, which did not grant individual title to uncultivated land and "froze" the peasant class out of land ownership (Gazdar 2009), could be conceived to deem the legal basis of the acquisitions highly questionable. Yet there is no evidence to suggest that the judicial establishment may shift its position from historical support for the status quo (Mushtaq Gaadi, Quaid e Azam University, pers. comm., 14 June 2010, Islamabad, Pakistan). Moreover, the judicial establishment is itself a beneficiary of the allocation of state land to influential individuals based on the colonial-era statutory body and norms related to land ownership and allocation. The judiciary, like the bureaucracy and military, continues to enjoy the allocation of land as a reward for their service. Such predictions of the failure of the judiciary to challenge land acquisitions by foreign investors fall in line with a sociological analysis of Pakistani society that finds the prevalence of both neo-patrimonial relations and deeply entrenched elitism central to institutional functioning as well as daily life in Pakistan.

Beyond the eviction of local communities from the land, other implications of foreign land acquisition rest in the expropriation of water resources, which
impact both at the micro and the macro level. Pakistan has been identified as a severely water stressed country by the World Bank (2007) and the canal system, which is the source of a series of local inter-provincial conflicts, is bearing a great deal of pressure. Despite this, the establishment of new canals to channel water to foreign-owned agricultural land is suggested in Balochistan and Thar.3

With regard to groundwater supplies, a series of studies show that rising arsenic and salination, which is linked to over exploitation of groundwater is already problematic in a number of areas, and notably so in many of those peripheral lands targeted for foreign acquisition (Steenbergen and Gohar 2005; Malik et al. 2007; SLMP n.d.). Moreover, as Steenbergen and Gohar (2005) highlight, the lowering of the water table through excessive ground water use necessitates the installation of electric tube-wells, with costs of extraction rising sharply as the water table drops. Indigenous manual water extraction methods may, thus, become redundant while the poisoning of ground water supplies will likely be exacerbated. It is noted that details of the contracts made available to foreign investors for land in Cholistan specify the right of foreign owners to exhaust groundwater supplies (Settle 2011).

Aside from disenfranchisement of local communities, the use of water and soil resources for agricultural production on foreign owned land in Pakistan is particularly problematic given the direct delivery nature of the contract between foreign investors and the Government of Pakistan. This not only allows full repatriation of profits, but also full repatriation of produce. At the macro level, the state of Pakistan has little to gain when water and soil resources may be exploited without contributing to the national economy either in terms of agricultural produce or, it would seem, even of hard currency through exports, especially while reducing government control over food security at the same time. Furthermore, the nature of corporate farming would suggest that few employment opportunities will likely arise, especially for local communities that exhibit low development indicators.

Agricultural land acquisitions in Pakistan may, thus, do more harm than good to

3See Sadeque 2009 regarding Balochistan. With regard to Thar, the establishment of new canals was suggested, but not confirmed, in interviews relating to the Canadian company, Kijani Energy, which held negotiations pertaining to 150,000 acres for a bio-fuel plantation (Rouhsana Anjum, Director, Arid Zone Research Institute, Pakistan Agricultural Research Council, pers. comm., 25 June 2010, Bahawalpur, Pakistan).
Pakistan as a nation at the economic, ecological and political levels, while forcing marginalised communities to bear the burden of giving up their land and reducing their access to water. At the sectoral level, the acquisitions will add major stimulus to the ongoing process of phasing out subsistence and sharecropping farming methods and fully integrating the agriculture sector into the cash economy (Gazdar et al. 2002). While rural communities struggle with the prospect of being pushed out of the agricultural economy, the forced alienation of hereditary farming and grazing communities from the land through foreign acquisitions will cause further migration to urban slums.

The lack of legitimacy that the foreign acquisition policy carries in the eyes of local communities reflects poorly on the government at a time when civilian democratic governance must secure its legitimacy for the democratic system to permanently take root in Pakistan. It is noted that resistance to the acquisitions policy is being predominantly voiced by those representing various separatist struggles (such as Seraiki, Sindhi and Bolochi nationalists) and that only in upper Punjab is the issue, voiced by the AMP's campaign, being interpreted as something more of a class, as opposed to an ethnic struggle.

The beneficiaries, on the other hand, include consumers in controlling stake investor's home countries, chiefly Middle Eastern states who will be provided cheap agricultural supplies that circumvent world markets and market prices through direct delivery contracts. The interest shown by financial markets in foreign agricultural land acquisitions (McNellis 2009) suggests that financial owners will benefit from high rates of profit redistribution.

4. Locating the Gaps between Land Acquisition and Development Theory

What is missing between the theory of FDI contributing to beneficial economic growth and wider progress in the economy through spill-overs, as described in section one, and the implications of foreign agricultural land acquisition, as described in section two, is the failure of the dominant paradigm of development to recognise complicated and historically rooted socio-political patterns. This has contributed to the narrow vision of development upon which the very
foundations of the mainstream paradigm stand. The theoretical foundations of the dominant paradigm posit a market-orientation that assumes that unfettered market functions naturally fall into equilibrium to optimise the distribution of resources. Yet, as numerous others have pointed out, such an approach has equates to a simplistic and one-dimensional market fundamentalism (Jomo and Fine 2006). In the case of Pakistan, for example, general equilibrium theory assumes, at the very least, a just legal system and a clear and fair property ownership regime, while remaining blind to historical disenfranchisement, let alone ecological costs or issues of the wider social good that lie beyond the economic sphere.

Based on these foundations, the development project sees the market as the primary tool with which to bring about development to the nation as a whole. However, the socio-economic circumstances of many communities in Pakistan equates to a subsistence existence, based on small-scale cultivation and grazing, supplemented with remittances from largely male migrant or agricultural labour. These communities may simply not be equipped to participate in the market, be it through paying canal taxes, working as agricultural labourers or buying individual rights to agricultural property. Their inability to survive may ultimately force them to migrate to urban slums where their human security is only further weakened. The poor standing of these communities in terms of wealth and political representation and their difficult and insecure prospects is the complex product of history.

Moreover, the terms of the offer made by the BoI to foreign investors reflect the nature of historically rooted socio-political relations that the dominant paradigm fails to fully take into account, such as neo-patrimonialism, distorted civilian-military relations, pervasive elitism and stark poverty and disenfranchisement. Recognition of such forms of socio-political relations throws light on a set of circumstances that may explain the eagerness of the Government of Pakistan in establishing agricultural land acquisitions by foreign investors in Pakistan. Such circumstances include that business ties between Pakistan's political elite and the Gulf states are well established (Deutsche Orient-Stiftung 2009). This suggests that various kick-backs are likely involved, while military strategic and economic interests may stand to gain, not least in Balochistan (Settle 2011). The failure of Pakistan's government to represent Pakistanis of all classes and the extreme
powerlessness of some peripheral communities, moreover, is the key to the initiation of policies such as the foreign acquisition package. In the face of such complex and unjust socio-political relations, the voluntary guidelines published by the World Bank (2010) with regard to foreign agricultural land acquisitions, are not only blatantly inappropriate but reflect the market fundamentalism of the dominant paradigm. The fact that the guidelines are voluntary, reflect the superiority of the market in mainstream thinking whereby, corporate voluntarism, disciplined by share-holder activism, is deemed a better mechanism for ensuring ethical practice than regulatory authority.

The case of agricultural land acquisitions in Pakistan, thus, demonstrates that a wide-scale shift from non-cash economies to the cash economy demand not only the availability of employment and safety nets, but the educational development of the population as a whole along with a substantial degree of equality between citizens, which could usher in meaningful democratic participation, state legitimacy and the normalization of institutional mechanisms.

While these supply-side concerns are addressed as appendages to the primary goal of market expansion through development, (e.g. attending to ‘social capital’) demand-side questions relating to the norms of investment under a financialised global economy remain largely off the agenda within the mainstream discourse of development. The investors in question seeking agricultural land acquisition are not rogue Middle Eastern sheikhs, but mainstream corporations that constitute the central pillar of the global economy. These are often institutional investors, such as pension funds, investment banks and hedge funds that cross-invest in various funds to undertake land acquisitions, while controlling stakes are often linked to the Middle East and Middle Eastern food security policy (McNellis 2009). In light of the financialisation literature (Krippner 2005; Balakrishnan 2009), which plots the central role of the banking sector in a new economic landscape of declining profits from the ‘real’ economy in the Global North against rapidly expanding rentier financial profits, the expansion and normalisation of the rentier economy since the 1980s has been extremely successful. The resultant global financial elites include powerful bankers and investors whose ‘revolving door’ includes managerial positions in the World Bank and IMF, amongst top banking, financial corporation and government positions. The close links between those that set the agenda for the development sector and global
financial elites within the hegemony of a financialised rentier economy, render a whole series of issues linked to the legitimacy of profiting off the food crisis and extracting resources from foreign lands through corrupt government officials largely invisible.

5. Conclusion

The present paper reflected on how foreign agricultural land acquisition is deemed a beneficial process within the dominant paradigm of development. However, by outlining the potentially grave implications for peripheral communities as well for Pakistan's national economy as a whole, the paper has demonstrated how the potential for disastrous outcomes can result from theoretical shortcomings. It is argued that foreign agricultural land acquisitions in Pakistan are a case in point that the market orientation of the dominant development paradigm denies recognition of the historical, social and ultimately political formations that underlie the complex processes of development.

In order for meaningful development to be achieved, significant political participation must be fostered, which can only arise through substantial equality between citizens (to which land reform is mandatory) and access for all to quality education. This, rather than market fundamentalism, should constitute the foundations of development practice. Yet the IMF, World Bank and other leading forces within the development project, are at once guided by a remarkably limited theoretical construct of development, do not possess the legitimacy to push through wide ranging reform and, as representatives of the financial and business community, they have vested interests somewhat in line with the national elites that have historically blocked land reform and other measures that may depolarise Pakistani society.

By presenting the stark implications of Pakistan's foreign agricultural land acquisition policy, the paper aims to emphasise the crucial factor of the political, linked to historical context and social relations; the crucial factor that the development project continues to ignore in order to render development a simple, safe and possible project, and not least lest its own legitimacy issues become exposed. The promotion of foreign agricultural land acquisition in
pursuit of FDI through SAPs is only one problematic outcome of an entire global industry based on a vision of development that, by the nature of its sponsoring institutions, cannot look beyond market fundamentalism to address the political problems that underlie persistent and extreme poverty in countries like Pakistan and across the globe.
References


Cox, S. J. B. 1985, 'No tragedy on the commons', Environmental Ethics, Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana, USA, p.7.


McNellis, P. E. 2009, 'Foreign investment in developing country agriculture – The


The Need to Re-focus SAARC on an Urban South Asia
Faisal Haq Shaheen

Abstract

Urban areas are growing rapidly, inequitably and unsustainably across the Global South. In South Asia, the informal sector (IS) is expected to grow exponentially as ‘meta’ cities outpace municipal development and management capacities relative to other parts of the world. Given that economic growth patterns depend on the productivity of low wage labour (emerging primarily from the IS), there is a pressing need to address basic urban service shortfalls. Administrative challenges, exacerbated by insufficient intra-governmental policy support are being experienced across the region. As a result, the paper argues that advocacy for municipal issues should be included in SAARC’s policy-making scope. Urban research and advocacy forums outside South Asia have increased over the past decade and a comparative public administration approach would benefit SAARC urban policy stakeholders. In developing such an understanding, this paper surveys regional municipal associations that advocate for the concerns of municipalities in provincial, national and regional forums. Associations are surveyed for policy research, advocacy and capability building capacity. Similarities between the mandates of surveyed organisations and the potential of SAARC stakeholders are highlighted. The latter is promoted as the most appropriate forum for regional urban knowledge sharing and municipal capacity building. An obvious policy objective is to institutionalise the regional policy and programme development and implementation of national human development programmes. Such an initiative will be critical as the challenges facing urban administrations and marginalised communities increase across the region’s larger cities. The paper concludes with suggested components of an urban agenda for South Asia, vis-à-vis SAARC and multi lateral engagement to institutionalise regional knowledge sharing and city-to-city capacity building in a sector long neglected in the region’s policy research field.

* Mr. Faisal Haq Shaheen is a Ph.D candidate at Ryerson University’s Policy Studies Programme in Canada. He is also a civil servant at the City of Toronto and a Visiting Research Associate at the Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad, Pakistan.
1. Introduction

Urban growth management has been experienced differently by southern municipalities as compared to their northern counterparts. As of 2009, over 50 percent of the world’s population resided in or around urban areas. By 2050 this figure is expected to rise to 69 percent, with all of the expected growth in the world population concentrated in the urban areas of less developed regions (APC 2011). A number of factors differentiate the experience of the urban North from that of the South. In developmental terms, the urban north was able to transition, at a controlled pace, from agrarian to mixed, and then finally industrially based economies. As the challenges associated with urbanisation resulted in sprawl, planners alleviated pressure from their larger municipal centres through policy measures and incentives encompassing land development and transportation planning. The result was the development of medium sized, suburban or ‘satellite’ cities. These measures, among many others, enabled northern urban growth to progress in a relatively controlled fashion. In contrast, urban development across South Asia has consisted of periods of rapid growth, intense transition, neglect and deterioration. The combination of misinformed policies, failed development programmes and external policy discontinuity has crippled many urban governance contexts. Insufficient management capacity within municipal corporations has created complex and asphyxiating political and public administration environments. Privately motivated development plans, albeit limited and disconnected from ground realities, continue to be outpaced by industrial development, intensifying urban interests and a flourishing of informal settlements (Robinson 2002). Despite recent efforts at medium city development, an exponential increase in urbanisation is expected for many of the mega cities of South Asia as industry/services led development coupled with marginalised agrarian policies, draw social capital to urban centres. This research paper explores the case for regional policy capacity to address the challenges of South Asia’s largest cities.

1.1 Mega City Context

Southern mega cities, faced with overwhelming and unprecedented levels of population growth, will require unique policy and programme solutions that are
distinct from previously imported development models. In 1800, the average population of large cities was less than 200,000. By 1990, the average population of large cities was 5 million. In 1950 there were only two ‘mega cities’ (New York and Tokyo) or metropolitan areas with a population of more than 10 million people. By 2009 there were 21 mega cities globally, and by 2025 demographers anticipate there will be 29 in total, with 24 of these projected mega cities outside Europe and North America (United Nations 2011). The merging of mega cities and their peripheries has led to the introduction of the term ‘meta city’, defined as an urban region populated by over 20 million people (United Nations 2011). The uncontrollable expansion of mega cities across the South has outpaced municipal capacity and capabilities, particularly in a spatially limited South Asia (Rothenberg 1998). Dhaka, Karachi, Delhi, Chennai, Kolkata and Mumbai will continue to lead growth, followed by a number of medium sized cities (See Appendix I). Despite their varying approaches to development and devolution, their forecast growth levels will place an increasing strain on institutional capacities with implication for social organisation, community development, service delivery and municipal management. Continued pressure on already overwhelmed municipalities will result in the costs of poverty and social exclusion being borne by municipalities in the south, as has been in the case in the Global North (United Nations 2006).

While urban centres are increasingly regarded by market centred policy makers as drivers of national growth, their resilience as economic producers is linked with the migration, settlement patterns and social capital of informal sectors of the urban populations. Rural to urban migration and unabated urban sprawl is blurring the rural urban divide, which in turn is impacting the relationship between the formal and informal sector behaviour (United Nations 2011). There is a pressing need for integrated policy solutions that manage the demands of urban areas while resuscitating and rejuvenating the ‘productivity’ of rural areas. Positive outcomes linked to the latter will subsequently alleviate the pressure of urbanisation on larger cities. Urban policy capacity is required to meet such challenges and coordination policy and programme research, advocacy and evaluation both nationally and regionally. The requirement for such capacity will increase as the future places increased demands upon the largest cities of South Asia. In order for equitable programmes to be implemented that address the
unique challenges facing urban South Asia, municipal interests will have to appear as institutional partners of policy and development decision-making.

1.2 The Role of Municipal Associations

As cities have grown across the Global North, their value as economic drivers and conduits of financial flows has increased in the eyes of national and municipal stakeholders. As a result of their role in the 1980s national economic policy reforms, cities have been targeted by state policy makers to facilitate financial transfers and coordinate economic flows between local, national, regional and global markets. Where higher orders of government recognise popular municipal policy issues, provincial and national policies have alleviated pressure through political, administrative and resource support. In many cases, this has meant engaging and addressing the needs of municipalities which are disaggregated and fragmented across a large geographic and intra governmental policy landscape.

Cities have responded to this challenge by establishing associations to promote municipal policy issues at provincial and national forums. This trend has grown to benefit municipal policies, programmes and resource transfers. In the Global South, the attention given to cities has been largely reactive and ad hoc, where most of the policy decisions are linked with planning rather than ongoing management.

Urban development across the Global North has mapped, planned, developed and sustained larger cities as part of a gradual transition from agrarian based economic development to one of industrial led growth. North American cities are among the most autonomous globally, set within state jurisdictions and serving as the forums for state laws in development. Many of these cities have also dealt with the pressures of complying with legislative downloading and adapting to changing management paradigms. The result has been the participation of municipalities in benchmarking exercises such as performance measurement and coordinated response to macro level policies (Kloot and Martin 2000). Growing cities across the US have navigated challenging policy contexts, while older cities have struggled with deteriorating infrastructure to the neglect of state policy dialogues. For instance, the recent post recession closure of industrial units.
across the US manufacturing belt will test the resilience of all municipalities to generate revenues. Large cities in the European Union are close enough geographically and governmentally (to revenue streams and subsidised tax bases) to avoid the alienation of ‘stagnant urban areas’. A stronger state and welfare system has supported the development of smaller and medium sized cities, and alleviated pressure from larger urban centres. In Europe, the debt driven reforms on state support mechanisms, coupled with increasing numbers of refugees and migrants from Eastern Europe and former Soviet Republics, will place pressure on urban support programmes and economic stability. While their growth was relatively smooth, the impact of the economic downturn will test the resilience of urban management frameworks and capacity across these countries and region.

In contrast, cities in the Global South have dealt with developmental experiments, structural reforms and market liberalisation since modernisation policies transitioned national growth from agricultural support to industrial development. East Asian cities have been at the vanguard of economic growth since the 1990s starting with Japan and then extending to the ASEAN tigers. At present, China’s largest municipalities are surging in size as industrial growth propels rural to urban migration. However, an increasing polarisation between rich and poor is found in many cities, which is often overlooked. African and South Asian cities are struggling with the proliferation of slums and struggle to engage marginalised communities and a growing informal sector (Bhagat 2005). South American cities have also struggled with growth, but are finding economic policy support as state initiatives are now focussing on medium sized city development strategies. Despite the surging growth of southern cities, there has been limited institutional mobilisation in terms of addressing the needs of urban areas in national policy plans of action (Davis 2006). The need for a common, elevated, regional municipal policy voice is obvious.

1.3 **SAARC as a regional urban facilitator**

While population growth predictions make an urgent case for South Asia, neither the capacity nor capability exists at the municipal institutional level. The majority of provincial and national policy and programmes have responded to state
developmentalism, market liberalisation and trickle down economic growth imperatives, largely driven by donor interventions. While national economic policies continue to focus primarily on export-led growth, the infrastructure that is required to support the actors and interests that support those economic goals continues to be underfunded. Where funding does take place, it is ad hoc, exclusionary and often at the expense of social issues and the concerns of the marginalised. The ineffective allocation of funding is in part linked to the continued restructuring of national and provincial state capacities, which despite politically instituted reforms, fail to pursue decentralisation, monitoring or resource initiatives and the strengthening of municipal capabilities (Mathur 1985).

While economic primacy in urban centres has been accepted as part of the course of development and modernisation, limited attention beyond planning reforms is paid to managing South Asia’s urban context. As rates of urbanisation continue, the capacity of urban policy makers, programme offices and advocates will have to be elevated provincially, nationally and regionally. The region’s cities will continue to grow unabated and common challenges and concerns provide the opportunity for knowledge sharing and common platforms of advocacy. Several large centres populated by over 10 million, will account for the regions continued growth in the years to come (Dhaka, Delhi, Kolkata, Mumbai and Karachi). Medium sized centres, populated by 7 to 10 million, will also play a role, taking some pressure off national counterparts and distributing wealth to peripheral centres (Bangalore, Chennai, Hyderabad and Lahore). Their recent growth and learning from their older and larger counterparts has enabled them to avoid through proactive policies, the development pitfalls of historical urban development. Finally, smaller centres are also forecast to grow, where centres of 5 to 7 million, are facing resource constraints and are likely to face similar problems as their larger counterparts. There are a number of cities that are approaching this size, but among the most significant are Chittagong, Ahmedabad and Pune. The formation of municipal advocacy bodies nationally and regionally will contribute to alleviating the urban ‘growing pains’ that they are likely to experience in the decades ahead.
2. **Methodology**

In order to obtain an understanding of the mandates and organisational strategies of municipal policy advocacy groups, the paper reviews institutions and organisations across the Global North and South that influence municipal development policies and programmes. First, a survey of multilateral and non-government organisations is conducted for their policy and programme attention to and research on urban issues. Second, national and regional institutions across the Global North (state and non-state) are surveyed for their activities in promoting, engaging and advocating for the concerns of municipalities in state forums. Finally, national and regional institutions across the Global South (state and non-state) are surveyed for similar urban policy attention and mandates. A gap analysis between northern and southern municipal organisational capacities will then serve to identify areas of engagement and consideration for South Asian municipal policy and programme decision-makers.

3. **Institutional Review**

At the global level, a number of supra national organisations (independent/affiliated with multilaterals) impact and influence urban development, information flows and municipal policy across the Global North and South. Multilateral institutions, bound to broader institutional mandates, have historically focussed on ‘hard development’ providing loans and project funding. International non-government organisations have more recently emerged. While they operate on the same scale as multilaterals, international non-government organisations (INGOs) facilitate ‘soft development’ such as research, advocacy and service delivery policies on national urban development efforts. Some of these organisations receive funding from multilateral institutions where their focus facilitates or diverges from existing multilateral policy.

3.1 **Multilaterals and Non-Government Institutions**

Global multilateral and non-government capacities generate rigorous analysis on a range of cross-country urban issues. The Cities Alliance (www.citiesalliance.org)
is an organisation funded and formed by the World Bank and the United Nations (UN Habitat) mandated with sharing experiences in pro poor policies and programmes, and scaling up successful approaches to poverty reduction. Local authorities, governments, NGOs and multi-lateral organisations are all members of this alliance and are focussed primarily on the issues of urban slums and shelter. Project areas of advocacy and research are spread across Central and Latin America, South and East Asia, with a concentrated effort in Africa.

The Global City Indicators Facility (www.cityindicators.org) is a collaborative effort between academia, civil society and municipal stakeholders to encourage benchmarking between municipalities around the world. Through the establishment of a set of city indicators (defined indicators of performance) the facility seeks to serve as a ‘self help’ open data warehouse on benchmarking, research knowledge sharing for municipal practitioners. The programme ‘Metro Match’ is an output of this ‘data enriching’ effort, which seeks to share information between municipalities that share common socio-economic and operational contexts.

A number of global non-government organisations exist that seek to tackle urban issues. Their funding bases are more diversified and include nation states, supra national actors other than the multilateral institutions and other private actors. The Metropolis Association (www.metropolis.org) is an organisation representing the major metropolises around the world and their research interests (Metropolis 2011). Only the largest mega cities are engaged in a largely academic and research focused effort. The research and advocacy oriented group engages academia and other non-state researchers in providing policy and programme advice to municipal policy actors along specific themes such as gender empowerment, recycling and climate change with measurable success in municipal case studies (Macdonald and Vopni 1994). The organisation’s policy and research focus largely on social issues and marginalised communities.

The United Cities and Local Governments (www.cities-localgovernments.org) organisation is the amalgamation of two large associations representing the interests of local governments on the world stage. Based in Spain, the UCLG seek to increase the role and influence of local government and become the main source of support for better local government and representative of nations.
across the world. Their primary focus is the coordination and implementation of UN policies on urban development through related UN agencies. The organisation focuses mainly on issues related to urban management, capacity building, networking, best practices and lessons learned (UCLG 2011).

Local Governments for Sustainability (www.iclei.org) was established following the conclusion of multilateral talks on sustainable development. This not for profit association (Canada and Europe) provides management solutions, programme initiatives and policy advice on urban sustainability. A range of services is linked with best practices, training, conferences, research and consulting (Macdonald and Vopni 1994). The municipal response to sustainable development concerns and the challenges of climate change have surprised urban researchers as their emergence has been independent of national or provincial mandates (LGSW 2011).

The City Mayors (www.citymayors.com) portal serves as a web based think tank on urban affairs. It is designed to facilitate communication between the world's major cities on political and administrative issues relevant to urban affairs. It is built on its independence and captures much of the news on current political dynamics impacting the world's urban areas. The professionally driven group addresses a diversity of urban challenges related to technology, and social security, which impact cities. The independent think tank provides consulting services to support its operations and highlights critical commentary and analysis on urban related issues (USCM 2011).

### 3.2 National and Regional Municipal Institutions – Global North

Regional and national initiatives across the Global North adopt a more active policy development and advocacy approach addressing urban issues in a more immediate and specific manner. This is particularly relevant as across the Global North, a number of countries are characterised by advanced levels of urban development. Where countries possess a high concentration of towns and municipalities, associations are present which serve to organise and mobilise municipal policy capacity and raise issues at provincial and national levels of government.
In Australia, the Australian Local Government Association (ALGA) serves as a voice for the 560 councils across the country. They represent local government on national bodies and councils and provide submissions to government on inquiries related to policy issues of relevance to membership. Research with non-state actors is also initiated, with groups such as private sector industry interested in the trends of sectors of industrial concentration and clustering (Enright and Roberts 2001). The Australians also participate in the Asia Pacific Cities Summit, an urban policy and interest forum that engages regional municipalities.

In North America, there are a number of national associations that serve as policy focal points for national level policy engagement. In Canada, the Federation of Canadian Municipalities has been serving as the national voice of municipalities since 1901, for 1,900 members on policy and programme matters that fall within federal jurisdiction. The 18 provincial and territorial municipal associations are also represented. A host of research issues related to specific urban issues are funded. The FCM is also active internationally and provides capacity building effort to a range of projects in urban forums (FCM 2011). In Mexico, the Association of Mexican Cities represents 400 municipalities in areas of finance and local government management to benefit the municipal sector. In the United States of America, the National League of Cities is a DC based lobbying body that lobbies for the rights of cities as they fall into federal jurisdiction (Browne 1976; NLC 2011). It is a legally more intensive organisation and finds itself in the melee of DC politics most often where it actively publishes and advocates for a policy role and voice for the American cities, on behalf of political and administrative stakeholders (Rutledge 1974). Where a national ‘metropolitan policy’ is non-existent, it is one of many urban interests that struggle for the attention of the federal administration (Clark 1997). The United States Conference of Mayors is a non-partisan organisation of cities with populations of over 30,000 and its mandate has been to strengthen relations with federal policy and national programmes and engagement (Browne 1976). At the national level, there are a number of cities that also cooperate in a range of issues to address the needs of special interest groups and other political actors (Cooper et al. 2005).

In Europe, there are several organisations that serve specific areas addressing the needs of growth clusters in various sub regions (van den Berg et al. 2001).
Energie Cities is a network of municipalities that are part of a network of stakeholders and environmental practitioners re-examining their energy future (Kern and Bulkeley 2009; Energies Cities 2011). The council of European Municipalities and Regions (CEMR) serves as an umbrella organisation to encourage cooperation across nations and urban regions (Heinelt and Niederhafner 2008). EUROCITIES is a network that serves to influence EU policy by coordinating responses from organised member cities on policy issues of relevance (Sampaio 1994; EUROCITIES 2011). The EU, in and of itself, has a number of departments that engage urban issues, such as urban development, focused on planning, and JESSICA which engages in sustainable development for urban planning (Mega 1996; EU Jessica 2011). A critique of the trans-regional networking effort is that in many cases, the outcomes are not linked with any shared European identity, rather it only succeeds in a forum for competition/shared private investment (Phelps et al. 2002). At the national level, there are a number of nation-based organisations that engage municipal policy. In the United Kingdom, the Local Government Association (LGA) serves as a lobbying voice for the local government sector (LGA UK 2011). Established in 1997, it has membership of over 422 authorities over England and Wales. In Germany, the German Association of Towns and Cities works to engage the parliament, the government, federal council, information network and exchanging experiences (GATC 2011). In France, the Association of French/French City Mayors represents all of its 95 members through a series of organisations and commissions that defends the interests of the largest cities.

Regardless of policy aims, mandates and ideological objectives (private sector engagement or public sector strengthening), municipal advocacy associations across the Global North have established themselves as prominent policy research and advocacy resources for urban stakeholders.

### 3.3 National and Regional Municipal Institutions – Global South

Across the Global South, there is considerably less activity on urban affairs and issues at the regional level, despite the surging levels of growth that have been experienced by urban centres across the region. Even at the national level, there are only a handful of associations and organisations that are engaging urban
issues in a systematic and planned manner. In South America, despite the flourishing cities of Sao Paulo, Rio de Janeiro and Buenos Aires, there is no major policy hub for urban issues.

In Africa, the Municipal Development Partnership serves actively in the process of facilitating decentralisation, regional integration and strengthening the continental mobilisation of communities. It also leverages to build the supervisory capacity of local communities to disseminate knowledge. At the national level, the South Africa Local Government Association (SALGA) performs a similar role, and ensures that local government achieves its developmental mandates (SALGA 2011).

In East Asia, there is no permanent regional or national body that serves to advocate for the policy interests of municipalities. An annual forum, the Asia Pacific Cities Summit is hosted by different cities across the region to share concerns and policy issues. However, as the meetings are largely rotating and the secretariat is located in the host city of Brisbane, the focus tends to be more economic and development based rather than one that is indigenously focussed on domestic rural/urban issues. There is a significant amount of city-to-city relationships that are experiencing success in linking municipal bureaucrats (Tjandradewi and Marcotullio 2009).

In South Asia, the activities of most organisations are fragmented and tied to INGO activities. Prominent NGOs and multilaterals such as OXFAM, WaterAid, CONCERN, the WB, ADB and IDRC serve as conduits for information sharing, but are not as dynamic in facilitating local professional-to-professional interaction between managers. For example, Pakistan's Punjab Government houses an urban focussed capacity building centre that facilitates medium sized city development to take pressure off of Lahore. The Urban Unit provides technical assistance and facilitates capacity building in medium and small sized cities based on the lessons learned from the larger municipalities both in Pakistan and abroad (Pakistan Urban Unit 2011).
4. Analysis and Comparison of Mandates

Our brief institutional review raises some key questions regarding the contrast between urban policy activity in the Global North with that within the Global South (See Appendix II). While one can dismiss the differences as a function of levels of advancement and maturity of state policies and programmes, the risks of inactivity and continued neglect far outweigh the real costs of resource allocations to urban policy discussion. In expanding upon the current analysis, this section assesses some of the key gaps between areas of activity. While a broad, high-level discussion is not intended to neglect the subtle and sector specific concerns, the gaps are disaggregated and grouped in the categories discussed below:

4.1 Policy Advocacy

In terms of advocacy for the concerns of urban interest groups and challenges, organisations in the Global North have a more organised mechanism for influencing national and provincial policy dialogue, relative to their southern counterparts. For instance, larger organisations engage their smaller research counterparts through regular engagement and while the latter’s voice is minimal in influencing policy, they are able to table issues in larger forums (homelessness, public transit, tax increases) and add legitimacy to the larger groups. However, while Northern knowledge capacity gathering may be greater due to increased institutional machinery, the ability to foster communication across a range of stakeholder groups may be greater across the Global South. For instance urban civil society stakeholders have increased their profile in recent years with state and donor groups. The regular engagement and community leadership at urban forums (such as URC in Karachi) provides an opportunity for scaling up dialogue and knowledge sharing at a regional level. Such an approach across South Asia could also serve to institutionalise citizen engagement between urban centres in ways that are more sustainable and sustain the momentum often generated in conferences and symposia. Furthermore, such networks of urban policy dialogue and engagement would serve to counter balance antagonistic and nationalistic overtures from national levels of government, which sideline social development policy issues. The challenge of such networks, would be to avoid appropriation by
narrow interests (social or economic) and ensure that linkages and balanced policies incorporate the needs of rural areas and clusters of smaller cities in order to alleviate the pressures of urbanisation.

4.2 Regional Policy and Programme Research

As demonstrated by Northern think tanks, academic organisations and interest groups, the capacity for collaborative research is great if appropriate levels and forms of coordination takes place. For example, international think tanks such as the City Mayors site, UN HABITAT and the World Urban Forum engage local researchers and foster collaborative and comparative studies. However, it does require critical reflection and engagement on behalf of municipal stakeholders to recognise their constraints and engage, officially or unofficially, in urban forums, which are seeking to increase information sharing. At present, many municipal practitioners operate independently from academic and civil society groups. A sharp divide often separates the efforts of such groups in the North, as compared to the fluid engagement by groups in the urban South. For instance, it is not uncommon for civil society professionals to cross over into the civic service and back in South Asia, whereas this may be relatively difficult in the Global North. Individuals with an understanding of both civic and civil society concerns could serve as representatives on regional bodies such as SAARC. Such efforts could also promote transparency and accountability for the municipal sector and improve capacity and capability. SAARC could serve as a regional facilitator in this respect, by ensuring that all meta cities are represented and serving as a repository for comparative research, best practices and urban knowledge. At the least, relevant comparators could be drawn between South Asian urban policy solutions, and withdraw from the trend to rely on extra regional examples such as Latin America or East Asia. While such comparators may be better than North American or European city examples, they are still more capital driven and rely on an industrial capacity that is relatively dissimilar from the South Asian urban experience.
4.3 Knowledge Sharing and Benchmarking

Across Northern municipal associations, there is continuity, institutional memory and at least a project based history of performance measurement and knowledge sharing. In most municipalities, information and performance sharing is a controlled benchmarking exercise rather than one that is used to actively engage the public. While the larger INGOs are concerned with broader benchmarking initiatives, networks of municipalities are perhaps in many cases, more interested in the exchange of knowledge and experiences on programme development and sustainment. An example of recent studies is the success that European organisations are experiencing in climate change policy. While there is evidence that points to the cooperation and benefits over competition – there is still a large literature dedicated to the costs of cooperation (McCarthy 2003). Given the costs and lack of capacity across municipal contexts in South Asia, information on sector specific concerns and competition might not be as closely guarded. Knowledge sharing by municipalities may be lacking in developing country contexts, but the absence of silos and adversarial relations between various urban stakeholders may allow for more active engagement and cooperation. There is an urgent need to benchmark common issues rather than against measures which are context less and reliant on foreign indicators, advice, and policy initiatives. For example, there is a difference in context when Southern municipalities choose to develop performance measures on the effectiveness of one-window programmes that engage the urban poor in slum communities. Such an indicator is meaningless to northern municipal management sensibilities where efficiencies and cost savings trump social policy development. Such efforts, of course, must guard against a) context specific studies, which avoid policy considerations as well as b) non-critical reports of policies, which assume the benefit of a dysfunctional status quo. The participation of broad segments of civil society and state actors should be encouraged to ensure either extreme is avoided.

5. Discussion - Policy and Programme Implications for SAARC

The benefits of a SAARC based network for municipal policy and programme knowledge sharing, research and advocacy are beneficial to the region’s state and
non-state interests. The results could accelerate the recognition and lessons learned across urban centres for all South Asians and focus attention on relevant examples and programme successes that strive to meet the specific challenges of the region's urban centres. Advancing the necessary steps towards establishing such a body will require the recognition of roles and benefits for state and non-state stakeholders and interests. The responsibility of adhering to these roles will also be required for such a body to be effectively engaged in the region's urban development and management agenda.

5.1 State

State interests committed to participating in such a forum will find the returns optimal if there is recognition of state limitations in addressing common urban challenges, policies and programmes. In addressing future needs, technical and governance commonalities could be built upon and shared, much in the same way that regional commissions are set up on issues such as climate change. Lateral discussions and engagement between technocrats at the provincial and municipal levels should also be encouraged, independent of competing national concerns. Engagement with East Asia and modelling European urbanisation may be beneficial, but the focus should be on subcontinent experience.

Information flow and policy evaluation by national, provincial and municipal orders of government could also serve to improve a number of institutional capacities. Firstly, the region lacks a centre for urban knowledge sharing. Such a forum could serve to develop common benchmarking measures that capture and assess service cost comparisons between municipalities and service delivery units.

Secondly, the forum could build capacity in sharing mechanisms for extending and sustaining services to marginalized and poor communities. As such, a number of successful case studies and processes for equitable service delivery could be developed, which elevate the profile of pilot projects and phase them into effective national and provincial policies and programmes. Such engagement would mirror the engagement that exists between civil society organisations across the region, where the lessons learnt are measured by the donor
community. Specifics of service extension, supported by technology, could be discussed at related forums.

Thirdly, such an association could also serve as an alternative track for civil service and civil society engagement. Urban stakeholders (state and non-state) and sectors deal most immediately with issues that are common and tangible. Engagement and professional exchanges across sectors would be valuable in building capacity. The association could also serve as a secretariat for community and civil society engagement. Such engagement is elevated in the associations of Europe and Canada, where training and engagement is often the main purpose of municipal advocacy bodies.

Finally, such an association could sustain urban administrative concerns in the national and provincial policy sphere. Where there is divergence on national issues, convergence on municipal issues exists across the region. This has been demonstrated by the municipal policy community in the United States as well as in Canada. At the national policy agenda, municipal programme monitoring and evaluation concerns need to be asserted beyond the horizons of political administrations.

5.2 Non State

A number of common experiences could be shared between non-state stakeholders, similar to the initiatives mentioned for the state, building the urgency for alternate modes of engagement. One key feature is the avoidance of policy neglect, a recommendation long warned of by critics of post-modern policy research. The current academic environment has fragmented to such a state (as a result of factors that will not be discussed here) that various influencers of policy have been neglected, avoided or even dismissed as unimportant. Non-state stakeholders in urban contexts must avoid the pitfalls related to such approaches, despite frustrations and opposing positions with state actors, and engage the state in policy forums. While such engagement has increased in recent years, institutionalisation and continued, regular linkages with state stakeholders is required. One benefit may be the de-escalation of animosity between national and regional neighbours, as issues and challenges of common social and
economic dimensions are focussed on. More informal and dependency based community development initiatives could also encourage track two diplomacy and citizen engagement within the region. The result of such efforts would conceivably be the increased mobilisation of grassroots organisations seeking to draw attention to urban concerns.

6. Conclusion

This brief, comparative institutional analysis provides an outline of the obvious case for municipal advocacy at the national and regional levels of South Asia. In depth analysis of any one of the three broad areas of activity could be conducted and is warranted by provincial and national institutions with urban concerns. In order to elevate the profile of urban issues at the regional level, however, a number of constraints to pursuing such a recommendation should be admitted to, at least in principle. A range of political and administrative hindrances stall progress on national and regional knowledge sharing on municipal issues. Until these issues are recognised and addressed, limited success in engaging, assessing and acting on municipal concerns collectively, will be realised.

First and foremost, the state must recognise its inability to address the challenges of rural-urban dynamics and development on a number of fronts, primarily politically. The political leadership in cities are focussed on short-term successes and in turn are dependent for their survival on appeasing the economic and industrial interests of development. The concentration of ethnic interest groups, criminal elements and the desire to 'let the market guide' have blockaded efforts to come to terms with the realities of South Asia's urban crisis. While political engagement is required, hopes in such stakeholders with limited interests, must be constrained. Other citizen and administrative actors, must be mobilised in the theatre of regional cooperation in order to generate results. However, the capacity and risk management returns of focussing such actors the medium to long term priorities of cities, as well as learning from neighbours will likely set off political risks which must be mitigated.
In terms of the administrative bureaucracy, there are a number of challenges that civil service elites and frontline actors must come to terms with. The state needs to admit to common challenges that face the local levels of government. Addressing these challenges must be seen as a means of harnessing social capital, internal and external, to the state. The fear of continued and increased urbanisation, in the event of social betterment, must be overcome by current provincial and municipal administrators. Rather, urban stakeholders should realise that in public relations terms, municipalities are behind in building alliances with the public. The need for increased transparency and shared accountability must be engaged through pluralistic engagement with the public. The benefits of making the public the allies of administration must be expanded upon. Furthermore, the will to share technical capability requires a culture of understanding between members of civic society.

With regard to non-state entities, there are a number of ideological constraints to the current context of research. As discussed earlier, postmodern policy research has diverted policy research away from city management actions and policies, thereby neglecting the agency and capabilities of local government actors. This despite the fact that historically, most of the region's successful civil society initiatives occurred with the assistance of active or retired municipal actors. Improving the state-society relationship will require an examination, appreciation and deeper understanding of the factors that impact urban society across regions and the implications for state policies and programmes. Context based research has revealed sufficient similarities in social challenges that face South Asia's urban contexts. There must be a shared value for both groups of stakeholders for engagement and cooperation in the policy dialogue process. Similarly, there is a need and persistent effort by local government administrators and civil society to recognise the contribution of non-state actors in sustaining urban service delivery.

As a regional institution whose member states will continue to confront the challenges of urbanisation, it is imperative for SAARC to shift from an exclusively national development and policy oriented body to one that gathers consensus and institutional capacity at the municipal and urban levels of society. The scan of institutions in the urbanised North reveals the benefits of this trend and the active role that urban institutional advocates play in shaping urban policy. As
urban issues in South Asia’s mega cities continue to intensify, any effort to consolidate concerns, galvanize knowledge sharing will contribute to regional understanding and mutual appreciation of common challenges.

In closing it is not suggested that a SAARC based committee for municipal development could single-handed resolve the urban issues of the region. Rather, it could serve to draw more attention to the needs of urban South Asia, much in the way that has been done politically in the US, administratively in Canada and with the aims of innovation across the EU. A combination of all three, at least in principle, would serve to guide a SAARC based committee in coordinating municipal management efforts among its member countries.
Appendix

Appendix I  A Profile of South Asian Mega Cities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Municipality</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Constituencies</th>
<th>Density (/km²)</th>
<th>Area (km²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dhaka</td>
<td>13,000,000</td>
<td>10 parliament</td>
<td>23,029</td>
<td>304</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karachi</td>
<td>13,000,000</td>
<td>18 towns</td>
<td>3,700</td>
<td>3,527</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lahore</td>
<td>10,000,000</td>
<td>9 towns</td>
<td>5,643</td>
<td>1,772</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mumbai</td>
<td>14,000,000</td>
<td>24 wards</td>
<td>22,922</td>
<td>437</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chennai</td>
<td>7,500,000</td>
<td>155 wards</td>
<td>26,532</td>
<td>1,74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kolkata</td>
<td>15,600,000</td>
<td>141 wards</td>
<td>27,462</td>
<td>1,750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delhi</td>
<td>18,500,000</td>
<td>27 district subs</td>
<td>11,463</td>
<td>1,483</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s compilation.

Appendix II  Areas of National Municipal Advocacy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Inter Gov</th>
<th>Capacity</th>
<th>Research</th>
<th>Network</th>
<th>Outreach</th>
<th>Advocacy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Asia</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Asia</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s compilation.

1 It should be noted for developing countries, the regional summaries of municipal advocacy are a combination of national level efforts, rather than concerted and coordinated regional advocacy associations.
References


McCarthy, L. 2003. 'Competition in the United States and Western Europe? The good of the many outweighs the good of the one: Regional cooperation instead of individual’, *Journal of Planning Education and Research*, vol. 23, no. 2, pp. 140-152.


UN Habitat 2006, 'Urbanisation, mega and meta cities – New city states?', UN Habitat Backgrounder, UN Habitat, London, UK.


Section IV
Water and Sanitation

• Social Mobilisation: An Innovative Approach to Meeting Water-Sanitation Related MDGs in Bangladesh—Badiul Alam Majumdar and John Coonrod

• Urban Storm Water Management – Capital and Community Considerations for Municipal Pakistan—Faisal Haq Shaheen
Social Mobilisation: An Innovative Approach to Meeting Water-Sanitation Related MDGs in Bangladesh
Badiul Alam Majumdar* and John Coonrod**

Abstract

Meeting the Millennium Development Goals for safe water and sanitation is an enormous challenge, and Bangladesh is unlikely to meet its targets. Traditional top-down, service delivery approaches have not produced sustainable results or led to the behavioural changes necessary. The Hunger Project has partnered with Bangladesh’s Hygiene, Sanitation and Water Supply (HYSWA) programme to develop and assess a systematic bottom-up methodology based on social mobilisation and partnership with grassroots-level government, namely the Union Parishads in eleven clusters of villages. External evaluators have concluded that this approach has advantages in terms of cost, ownership and sustainability.

* Dr. Badiul Alam Majumdar is the Vice President and Country Director of the Hunger Project in Bangladesh.
** Dr. John Coonrod is the Executive Vice President of the Hunger Project in Bangladesh.
1. The Challenge of the Century

Access to clean water is widely seen as the main challenge of the 21st century (UN-Water 2007; Voelker 2004). The World Health Organization has identified water-borne disease as the world’s deadliest killer, taking 3.4 million lives per year, mostly children (WHO 2001). Some 900 million take drinking water from unsafe sources, and 2.6 billion lack safe sanitation – a Millennium Development Goal that the world is not on track to meet (WHO / UNICEF 2010).

Water and sanitation are not isolated problems – they are inextricably linked with poverty, malnutrition and environmental degradation, including climate change. In Bangladesh, inadequate access to safe water and sanitation, along with poor sanitation practices, kills 110,000 children every year from diarrhoea, cholera, typhoid and other water-borne diseases.

Although Bangladesh has made great strides over the years in providing water and sanitation facilities, it still has a long way to go to meet the MDGs. Available information shows that the proportion of the Bangladeshi population with access to improved water sources increased from 94 percent in 1994 to 98 percent in 2006 (Government of Bangladesh 2009). However, arsenic contamination of 22 percent of the tube wells in the country has lowered the access to safe drinking water to an estimated 78 percent during the early 1990s. The most recent MICS (Bangladesh Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey) of 2009 found that access to improved sources of water, adjusted for arsenic contamination of 50 microgram per litre, has increased to 86 percent (Haq 2009). However, if the WHO’s standard of 10 microgram of arsenic per litre is to be applied, only 75 percent of the population in 2009 used safe water. But the MDG target for safe drinking water for 2015 is 89 percent of the population having access to safe drinking water. Thus, it is highly unlikely that the safe drinking water-related MDG target will be achieved, if we are to use the more stringent WHO standard.

The prospect of achieving the sanitation-related MDG target appears to be even more unlikely. According to the latest MICS, access to improved sanitation facilities has increased from 39 percent in 1990 to 54 percent in 2009. UNDP points out that the MDG for 2015 of reaching 70 percent ‘needs attention’ (UNDP 2010). Universal coverage would obviously take a much longer time.
2. **Limits to the Traditional Approach**

The Hunger Project’s field experience (described below) is consistent with the findings of others (Kar 2003) that large expenditures on subsidised tube wells and sanitary latrines has not produced sustainable results, and has not convinced rural communities to practice safe sanitation. We have seen latrines installed, but not used, or used but not coupled with safe hygiene.

In fact, one can see with one’s own eyes an innumerable number of tube well pipes sticking out of the ground, with missing heads, around the country. It is our assessment that this is because of a lack of (often minor) repair of tube wells. When tube wells remain inoperative, their heads typically disappear, usually because of theft. Such lack of repair, we feel, is a natural consequence when tube wells are installed by “outsiders” with no ownership by the local people. The non governmental organisations did not make the repairs because the duration of their projects had expired.

3. **The Patnitala Experiment**

Based on these experiences, we have come to realise that in order to make the water and sanitation coverage effective and sustainable, a markedly different approach is needed – an approach where people themselves will have ownership in the solution of the problem. The Hunger Project-Bangladesh has been experimenting with an innovative social mobilisation approach in one Upazila of Bangladesh. We have reasons to believe that the social mobilisation approach is more cost effective and it will help us go the extra distance needed to achieve the MDGs within the shortest possible time.

We have been experimenting with this approach in the Patnitala Upazila of the Noagaon district consisting of 11 Unions and a population of about a quarter million. The experiment involved first mobilising the Union Parishads (UPs) and then with their help, a large number of volunteers. The volunteers then mobilise the people to address not only water and sanitation problems, but also good hygienic practices. They also address ways to improve the overall quality of life, as demonstrated through the formation of self-help groups, increased income-
earning opportunities and so on. The important assumption behind this volunteer-based approach is that since poverty is a multi-dimensional problem, its solution also requires multi-sectoral interventions focusing on as many problems as possible, for isolated and piecemeal interventions are unlikely to be sustainable. Another important assumption is that those who are in poverty must be the primary ‘actors’ ending their poverty. That is, those who lack water and sanitation facilities must be the principal stakeholders and initiators for solving the problem, and they must not be given tube wells and sanitary latrines as handouts and treated as helpless ‘clients’.¹

The experiment began in August 2008 and is being carried out in partnership with the HYSAWA (Hygiene, Sanitation and Water Supply) Fund, a statutory company formed with the support of the Government of Bangladesh and the Government of Denmark to address the water and sanitation related issues employing a decentralised approach.² The approach basically calls for using the democratically elected Union Parishad (UP), the lowest tier of the rural local government bodies of Bangladesh for solving water and sanitation related problems.³

4. Key Elements of Social Mobilisation: Vision, Commitment and Action

Social mobilisation has been used extensively in Bangladesh for a broad range of awareness-building activities and to increase people's participation in development. The Hunger Project, however, goes a step further, and recognises that people must never be considered ‘objects’ of development – they must be empowered as the key authors and actors in development.

¹ It has been demonstrated by Dr. Akhter Hameed Khan and his associates through Orangi Pilot Project (OPP) in Karachi, Pakistan, involving 1.4 million slum dwellers that at the neighbourhood level people can at low cost build, finance and manage facilities like sewerage, water supply, solid waste disposals, clinics and provide security. At OPP, government roles have been to work with larger facilities like trunk sewers and treatment plants, water mains and water supply, main solid waste disposal, build college/universities, hospitals and provide land fills. The OPP experiment has also clearly demonstrated that when government partners with the people, sustainable development can be achieved and managed with local resources. For more details see: <www.oppinstitutions.org>

² For details, see <www.hysawa.org>

³ It may be pointed out that although HYSAWA paid for some of the training costs, there was no fund transfer between HYSAWA and The Hunger Project.
In a society such as Bangladesh, where centuries of feudalism have been followed by decades of donor dependency and corruption, empowering people to be the authors of development requires a profound change in mindset – in both the people and the government. People must generate and be inspired by a vision of a self-reliant future for themselves and their community.

This is the starting point for The Hunger Project, and it begins with a one-day workshop known as the Vision, Commitment and Action Workshop (VCAW), led by trained volunteers known as ‘animators’. The initial inspiration people experience in the VCAW, however, will quickly go sour and will actually reinforce a sense of powerlessness and resignation if it is not quickly translated into concrete, meaningful progress. In the VCAW, participants take a stand to translate their vision into reality, and then identify a priority action process – consistent with their vision – that they will take immediate action to achieve. The animators help them select actions that can be achieved in a short time, with people’s own resources. Once people achieve this initial victory, they gain confidence. Leadership begins to emerge, and many participants step forward to be trained as animators.

The VCAW also introduces participants to the issues of gender. As they analyse the situation in their village, they come to see that women are key to progress in all development issues, yet by tradition they have been devalued and denied access to the information, skills and freedom of movement that they need to be full and equal partners in development.4

The animator training is an intensive, four-day workshop that empowers participants to fully understand – own – and be able to apply the principles of bottom-up, gender-focused development. They discover their ability to provide a new model of leadership – not the top-down, patriarchal form of leadership so endemic to feudal societies – but a transformative mode of leadership based on co-equal partnership and co-learning. Animators discover how to ‘animate’ the process of development such that others discover and express their own leadership.

---

4 The Hunger Project mobilises based on a goal of full gender equality, and has achieved 40 percent of all animators being women.
The animator training has proven to be life-altering for many of its participants. Hunger Project animators display a strong identification with their animator 'batch' and with the programme as a whole, sustaining their volunteerism year-after-year. The Hunger Project supports their activism through regular meetings, additional training inputs, and annual 'reunions' which attract as many as 15,000 animators who travel to Dhaka at their own expense to participate.

5. Building People's Organisations / Social Units

In addition to animators, The Hunger Project provides specialised training and empowerment to mobilise key sectors of the society and enable them to build sustainable organisations for mutual support and empowerment. This includes:

- **Youth Ending Hunger**: A programme to unleash leadership and creativity, and foster a sense of social responsibility among 100,000+ students across the country.

- **National Girl Child Advocacy Forum (NGCAF)**: An alliance of all organisations in the community committed to the rights of girls, that coordinates the celebration of National Girl Child Day with rallies, essay and art competitions, debates and media events. The NGCAF carries out a year-long campaign of actions for the rights of girls and for gender equality more broadly.

- **Women's Leaders**: The Hunger Project works to provide intensive training in gender issues and women's rights to at least two women in each Ward, who in turn reach out to all the women of their villages.

- **Barefoot Researchers**: Volunteers from the poorest areas, the vast majority of whom are women, who are empowered, using the Participatory Action Research (Rahman 2007) methodology, to analyse the obstacles they face, devise strategies and carry out campaigns of action to build lives of self-reliance.
6. The Critical Role of Local Democracy

The Hunger Project began applying a bottom-up approach to development in 1994, yet quickly discovered that changes were only society-wide and sustainable when implemented in partnership with the level of government closest to the people – namely, the Union Parishads. We discovered that the animator training itself was transformational for elected UP representatives and chairs, and when integrated with additional information on good governance and democratic values, it served as the basis for a strong, specialised training for UP chairs and members.

The institutions of local governance are currently weak in Bangladesh, and have never been fully implemented as called for in its Constitution. UPs in particular are starved of resources and powers of autonomous decision making. In this climate, UPs have welcomed the power provided to them through the ‘social capital’ achieved through social mobilisation.

Stronger local governance, of course, must be coupled with stronger mechanisms of social accountability. The Hunger Project has been a staunch proponent and strongly supports the recently enacted reforms calling for Ward Sabha, and has – in the meantime – been organising them in many of the Unions where we work. In addition to Ward Sabhas, The Hunger Project builds and works with bottom-up civil society (as cited above) through the formation of social units among all sectors of society, and also provides pathways for citizen advocacy at upward levels through coordinated actions at Upazila, District and national level. These include:

- **Shujan**, Citizens for Good Governance, which organises respected members of society to provide a non-partisan forum pressing for reforms and accountability;
- **Self-governing UP Advocacy Group**, a forum for elected UP representatives to make their voice known at higher levels of government;
- **Unleashed Women’s Network**, the network of our trained Women’s Leaders, which advocates for women’s rights and gender equality at every level of society.
7. Applying Social Mobilisation to HYSAWA

The ultimate goal of the above methodology is to empower rural communities to achieve all the Millennium Development Goals on a sustainable basis. What the Hunger Project has learned in Bangladesh (and 12 other countries including India and countries in Africa and Latin America) is that this process occurs in roughly five stages or steps, which are described below in the context of the HYSAWA example.

While the Hunger Project’s approach has produced results in all sectors, it has proven to be particularly effective in sectors where attitudinal and behaviour change is a big component, and where the consequences of inaction are readily understandable. Halting water-borne disease is perhaps the best example of this, and Hunger Project mass-action campaigns for installing sanitary latrines, testing wells and training in oral rehydration have been held in hundreds of Unions over the past 15 years. The concrete steps encompassing this methodology include:

7.1 Step One: Initial Mobilisation

The Hunger Project-Bangladesh conducted two five-day residential trainings for the Chairs, Members and Secretaries of the 11 Unions at Rural Development Academy in Bogra at the end of 2008. Participants undertook a rigorous process of self-questioning. The process was intended to create awareness among the participants that (1) they were the elected leaders of their communities, (2) they were elected to help solve the problems faced by the people of their Union, and (3) they must work in partnership with their constituents to build a better future for all.

The training focused on the goals of Community Led Total Sanitation (CLTS). At the end of the training, all participants made a public declaration of their commitment to ending hunger and poverty – by creating better (1) livelihood opportunities for their constituents, addressing important (2) social problems, achieving (3) transparency and accountability in their UPs, and creating better (4) infrastructure. UP representatives would start by implementing a community wide sanitation campaign using the CLTS methodology.
Following the five-day residential training in Bogra, UP representatives organised four-day trainings of ‘animators’ – volunteers who are the main ‘sparkplugs’ for social mobilisation. Animator trainings were held for 18-20 volunteers from each Ward (a Ward is a cluster of around 3 villages, and there are 9 Wards in a Union), creating approximately 180 volunteer-animators in each Union. Volunteer-animators included teachers, imams (religious leaders), social workers, political activists, students and conscious citizens. Nearly 40 percent were women. Across the 11 Unions, a total of 22 animator training sessions were conducted, empowering 1,953 volunteer-animators to take concrete steps towards improving the quality of life of their area – starting by improving sanitation, good hygiene practices and ensuring access to clean water in their communities.

After the animator trainings, day-long workshops were conducted in each Union where 27 Ward Catalysts (three volunteers from each Ward selected by the animators) were trained. The training focused on the formation of Community Development Forums (CDFs), Social Mapping and how to assess sanitation and safe water needs. A total of 297 Ward Catalysts were trained across the 11 Unions.

7.2 Step Two: Organising People (Creating Social Units)

As the Unions were mobilised through animators training and VCAWs, women and men began to receive specialised skills training, especially to conduct agro-based group enterprises. Particularly dynamic women received intensive training to be Women Leaders and to be part of the Unleashed Women’s Network. Women from the poorest communities were trained as People’s Researchers, and were empowered to constructively analyse and identify solutions to end their own poverty.

7.3 Step Three: Bottom-up Planning and Transparency

Communities mobilised by volunteer-animators were trained to prepare short and long-term plans for taking action in their Unions. In addition, Ward Sabhas
were organised in some UPs to set priorities, develop action plans and report progress to the communities. It may be noted that Ward Sabhas – a Ward level assembly of voters twice a year – are mandated by the new *Union Parishad Act 2009*, and are yet to be fully implemented.

### 7.4 Step Four: Establishing Sufficient Infrastructure

Once the communities were mobilised, the goal is to ensure that the communities have sufficient infrastructure to achieve their development goals, including latrines, tested water taps and points, etc. With this goal in mind, the volunteer-animators worked with their communities to assess their needs and plan actions. Based on community inputs, they prepared and submitted 526 sub-projects to HYSAWA for investment for building water points or sinking tube wells and installing sanitary latrines for use of the entire community. The users paid 10 to 20 percent cost of building these community level common facilities. In addition, the individual households made their own plans of installing tube wells and sanitary latrines. The animators also mobilised Para Unnayan Forums, consisting of few households to pursue overall development of the community.

### 7.5 Step Five: Mass Action to Achieve Development Goals

From the beginning of the intervention, CDFs, led by volunteer-animators, have been holding rallies and carrying out mass action campaigns to promote CLTS. Campaigns were carried out to give information about the necessities of using safe water and hygienic latrines as well inspiring the local people to install those facilities. Campaigns were also carried out to promote good sanitation practices such as hand washing.

Campaigns are continuing to achieve all locally set priorities. These include mass awareness campaigns not only on water and sanitation related issues, but also on an array of other local priorities, such as birth registration, immunisation drives, school enrollment, halting of dowry and early marriage, reducing school dropouts, mobilising for self-reliant actions and so on.
8. **Challenge: Delayed Local Elections and Lack of Coordination**

The greatest challenge facing our experiment is that local elections have been delayed and the terms of the current Union Parishads expired in early 2008 and the energy and responsiveness of these bodies has undoubtedly waned to some extent. UP elections are expected to be held sometime in the next few months, at which time the Hunger Project plans to provide extensive training to newly-elected UP representatives and office-holders in the principles and advantages of bottom-up, gender-focused development.

Successful implementation of the HYSAWA goals also require effective coordination between HYSAWA as a fund management entity, local government support unit (LGSU) and the functionaries of the Public Health and Engineering Department of the Government of Bangladesh. The present structure is quite complicated, which makes coordination at times difficult to achieve.

9. **Monitoring and Evaluation**

At the start of 2010, the Hunger Project implemented a web-based programme planning and result tracking database, which records priorities and results on a monthly basis for every Union mobilised in its programmes. This frequency of reporting may seem excessive compared to ‘professionalised’ development projects. However, it appears to be essential to maintaining a high degree of mobilisation in a volunteer-based development movement.

The tracking system provides gender disaggregated information on participation. For example, 38 percent of the 1,961 animators trained were women, compared to only 20 percent of the 11,947 who participated in the formation of Community Development Forums. The system also tracks outcomes, such as the number of tubewells proposed (1,283), approved (874) and installed (673). It tracks improvements in access over time. For example, the percentage with access to safe sanitation improved from 36 percent to 71 percent from October 2008 to October 2010.
10. Other Achievements of the Programme

In addition to sanitation and clean water campaigns, literacy campaigns were initiated in South Haripur and Shomvopur village in Patnitala UP and Singhondi village in Matindor UP; and social action campaigns were conducted on such issues as drug abuse, child marriage, and the mistreatment of women. Approximately 400 farmers received training in how to utilise vermin compost, organic fertiliser and herbal pesticides to ensure sustainable agricultural practices.

A total of 38 Participatory Action Research (PAR) organisations were formed by the poorest of the poor, catalyzing about 1.4 million taka as savings. As “Barefoot Researchers” they analyse their own poverty to find creative ways of transforming the condition in which they live. The achievements of these groups include establishment of tree plantations, halting early marriage, formation of savings and credit groups and establishment of handicraft businesses. Animators formed another eight self-help groups. Students organised science clubs, community information centres, English learning centres and adult literacy centres.

11. Technical Evaluation

In May 2009, Ausaid and Danida commissioned a Joint Review Team of external consultants to evaluate various aspects of HYSAWA including four different implementation modalities – three based on paid implementers, and the volunteer-based social mobilisation approach described in this paper. The report stated:

The success of the social movement approach depends to some degree on the organisation and personalities that instigate the activities. The Hunger Project appears to have performed well. Given such organisations to instigate, organise training and guide, the social movement approach has many advantages in terms of spread of effect. It is also clear that at the community level separating hygiene, water and sanitation from other development issues does not make sense. Sustainability considerations with regard to intended impacts on health
through hygiene practices; sanitation and water would also point to the social movement approach as a better option than hired NGOs. Internalisation of hygienic behaviour takes a long time, and the continuous presence of local change agents is more likely to sustain this.

The report also recommended that the social mobilisation approach be extended to additional areas.

12. Conclusion

Achieving MDG targets, such as those for access to water and sanitation, requires not only infrastructural improvements but also behaviour change. Social mobilisation offers significant advantages over direct implementation by NGOs in that it establishes deep ownership by the people and by their elected local governments.

Acknowledgements

The data collection for this experiment was carried out by the volunteer-animators themselves and coordinated by the Hunger Project staff member Manjurul Hoque and Asir Uddin.
References


Urban Storm Water Management – Capital and Community Considerations for Municipal Pakistan
Faisal Haq Shaheen*

Abstract

Urban policy contexts in ‘meta cities’ across the Global South illustrate the contrast between national development policies and the reality that exists at the street level. A range of external and internal factors constrain the access to municipal programmes and services by all segments of urban society. Recent studies emphasise the challenges that urban rehabilitation and service delivery governance face in providing basic services, such as water and waste-water (sanitation). While rights based approaches have dominated water and sanitation research discussions, aspects of environmental responsibility and stewardship have been neglected. In urban contexts, utility management has been increasingly challenged with severe weather events resulting in storm/flood water pressure on fragile infrastructure. In light of the conflicting strategic and operational challenges facing utilities in South Asia, a comparative examination of the policy environments of urban storm water management is conducted between North and South.

Storm water management initiatives across the Global North take into account environmental objectives, infrastructure realities and leverage participatory engagement, driven by rising energy costs, infrastructure funding gaps and water scarcity. In the Global South, initiatives are the result of storm water management awareness, developed to buttress water resource management and flood mitigation strategies. Policy findings across both contexts reveal the stress under which capital intensive infrastructure and large scale engineered drainage systems are operating. The trend towards participatory engagement and citizen-based initiatives to mitigate the effects of storm water are outlined with evidence drawn from South Asia’s larger cities. The conclusions suggest that stakeholders in urban Pakistan should allocate more resources to mobilizing individuals and communities through initiatives such as rain water harvesting and storm water management, where municipal authorities and communities participate in canal maintenance and aquifer recharge. The increased frequency of severe weather events (stemming from ongoing climate change), pressure on infrastructure and the lack of municipal financial capacities to keep pace with levels of deterioration reinforces the case for municipal-community collaboration on storm water management.

* Mr. Faisal Haq Shaheen is a Ph.D candidate in Policy Studies at Ryerson University, Canada. He is also a civil servant with the Municipality of Toronto and a Visiting Research Associate at the Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad, Pakistan.
1. **Introduction**

Solutions to the challenges of urban poverty and development across the Global South are increasingly intertwined with the economic reforms of trade liberalisation, aid and globalisation. The ability of a municipality to engage the urban poor hinges increasingly on its economic vitality\(^1\) as well as its institutional and interest based linkages with provincial and federal agencies. If adequate resources and support (political or bureaucratic) are not forthcoming from higher tiers of the state, service-delivery machinery can be undermined by a range of exogenous, economic, social and political forces.\(^2\) The resulting polarisation of service delivery results in exclusion of the marginalised poor from urban services, force them to coalesce into a socio-economic and physical space known as the Informal Sector (IS). While this ‘unobserved economy’ is not recognised in financial indicators or economic statistics, the urban IS contributes\(^3\) in many ways to the vitality of society. While civil society experiences reveal success at grassroots level, sustainable interaction between IS and state actors is required for sustainable development. From a public administration perspective, where the state is the ultimate owner of social and physical service, public sector machinery must extend to the informal sector, as the formal economy is subsidised by the IS through the provision of low-cost and flexible labour. The urban IS also underlines the social capital that exists within municipalities and holds potential if only they were subjects of policy engagement. The IS provides a range of services to the formal sector and its workers.\(^4\) The resilience of urban economies is buttressed by the presence of the IS, which unfortunately, receives little recognition or sustained rehabilitation from the state. As the study

\(^1\) Economic vitality is a by-product of neo-liberal growth, where the market is the centre of development efforts, rather than state initiated spending. ‘Trickle-down economic growth’ in this sense, is experimented within the urban economic landscape, where it is expected that with enough wealth, the poor will find jobs. Most of the growth, through neo-liberalism, has encouraged developing countries to move away from agrarian based activities into ones with high industrial activity. This, of course, has been centred on urban development and sprawl, which has resulted in the migration of large segments of rural Pakistan to urban centres. The point of emphasis here is the dependency of municipal development plans, budgets and systems on higher tier political and economic actors.

\(^2\) Without adequate support, as stated earlier, municipalities are vulnerable to political and market-based shocks that are common to the economic landscape. For instance, a range of provincial programmes as well as federal ones overlap, duplicate and threaten the role and functionality of urban-based agencies and departments. If municipal stakeholders fail to appease the party will and align with administrative authorities through client-based relationships, their authority and legitimacy is likely to be undermined.

\(^3\) Interestingly, while political change has become routine in many developing countries, the IS continues to be neglected, in spite of its growth and support to the formal economy.

\(^4\) Services include food services, clothing supply, transportation, essentials provision, cloth washing, courier services, manual labour and a host of tasks that reduces the overall operational costs of urban activities of the formal sector.
develops further, this engagement need not be one way, and mutual benefits may be realised through outreach and relationship development.

A range of complex external (colonial legacy5, neo colonialism6 and urban sprawl) and internal (administrative culture, policy, capacity and capability) factors constrain the equitable provision of basic services7 by municipalities to all segments of urban society. Four broad challenges hinder the development of the relationship between the state and the IS. Firstly, at the market level, the unleashing of the neoliberal agenda (a combination of structural adjustment, aid dependency and free market ideology-based policy making) is gradually overwhelming municipal services and institutional structures by polarising the accessibility and needs of the wealthy with those of the impoverished (Brockeroff and Brennan 1998). Secondly, the rapid expansion of cities in developing countries has complicated socio-economic relations with their rural peripheries. The expansion of ‘meta cities’ (Laquian 2006) and ‘greater urban regions’ continues to erode the efficacy of the state in balancing urban/rural development and the needs of IS segments of the labour market.8 Thirdly, physical insecurity, as a result of environmental and economic deterioration, also continues to threaten communities of the marginalised, urban poor. Finally, the political and administrative culture of municipal agencies is also undergoing significant transformation and polarisation.

Many studies address these challenges with recommendations centred on private sector operation, political/institutional reforms and civil society offloading as a part of service delivery improvement efforts. Donor studies have overlooked the complexity of developing municipalities as much as developing country processes have neglected investing in the public sector (Batley and Larbi 2004). As a result, the misalignment of the organisational culture and mindset of civil

5 Colonialism in the context of developing country’s urban governance refers to the struggle of indigenous civil service staff to adapt and adjust their social and cultural sensibilities in utilising an administrative structure imposed from the outside. In spite of the independence of many developing countries from colonialism, the legacies of these structures persist and result in alienation between the civil service and the population they serve. The colonial mindset of top-down, hierarchical and class-oriented relations within the bureaucracy has also complicated relations within the civil service.

6 Neo colonialism, similarly, refers to the dominating influence of foreign governments and supranational bodies, such as the International Monetary Fund, World Bank and World Trade Organization in shaping the policies of developing country governments which inevitably influences urban regimes.

7 In turn, these colonial structures have a bearing on the internal linkages that connect with neo colonial forces and pressures that also impact municipal structures.

8 Urban cities in the developing world are often closely surrounded by an agro-urban periphery that supplies raw materials for input as well as low wage labour.
servants\(^9\) has continued to alienate the bureaucracy from the public at large (Islam 2004). This has resulted in an artificial and ‘context-less’ structure, splitting state-society interactions and limiting the engagement of the IS (Haque 1996). The equitable functioning of the state is weakened as reforms that pave the way for transparency, accountability and agenda control are transferred from the marginalised to the middle class and the elite (Cheema et al. 2005). Ultimately, challenges facing the IS are left unresolved as programmes and services are focused on catering to higher income groups. Furthermore, their strategic frameworks and financial models are also based on cost recovery rather than on equitable service provision.

Pakistan’s engagement of the urban IS has been challenged by factors common to most developing country municipalities. The ‘context less’ state, plagued by a dependency on foreign ‘aid’ and influence, has ignored the reality that most of the benefits of pro-poor policies are captured by upper class stakeholders. Restructured, polarised, politicised and overwhelmed municipal bureaucracies continue to find themselves incapable to serve all segments of their society.\(^{10}\) As a result, a vast number of marginalised citizens are excluded from urban development and service delivery machinery. On rare occasions where effective policies are implemented, they are foreign-funded, one-off projects and are less sustainable or substantial than indigenous support to marginalised segments of society. In light of these realities, there is an urgent need to examine the context within which Pakistan’s municipalities engage or neglect the IS and to uncover the constraints to more effective urban service delivery mechanisms. Policy recommendations that stem from the experiences of effective engagement between the public sector and the IS thus emerge from the analysis.

\(^9\) Civil servants, having inherited the hierarchical organisational framework from their colonial predecessors, also share similar elitist mindset which polarises the senior levels of the bureaucracy from the lower levels.

\(^{10}\) This study does not focus on assessing the differences between policy development capacity and initiatives during periods of military vs. democratic administrations. This is in part due to the problems that emerge (and lack of research) with respect to conducting rigorous policy implementation and evaluation studies in an institutional environment fraught with overlaps, redundancies and duplication. The implications of poor policy formulation, planning, development and adaptation, particularly in urban contexts are also highlighted that must be shared by all stakeholders. This must receive urgent appreciation by domestic stakeholders in light of the complex external environment.
2. The Storm Water Management Context

Storm water management is an example of how narrow, short-term based approaches to urban planning, often resulting from the dominance of imported solutions, can result in skewed stakeholder involvement and exclude potential beneficiaries from participating in solutions. Given the pace of climate change and the severity with which certain parts of the world are being subject to severe weather, storm water management concerns are attracting more attention in developing countries (Parkinson and Mark 2005). The contrast between northern and southern initiatives to mitigate the impacts of storm water flows is worthy of discussion.

Storm water management initiatives across the Global North are developed by urban planners and ultimately implemented through engineering solutions. Realising the costs of uncontrolled storm water flows, specifically in Queensland, Australia [$6 bn AUD (Uren 2011)] and London, England [£3.2 bn (BBC 2010)], municipalities and water utilities have factored insurance and infrastructure costs of severe weather events into plans to improve storm water management planning (Newkirk 2001). Since then, engineered solutions have given way to ‘green’ urban spaces such as temporary ponds, natural parkland and constructed wetlands (Paul and Meyer 2001). The converging goal of utilities and municipalities in water scarce areas has been to combine the goals of supply demand management between wet weather periods, where infrastructure is overwhelmed with flows and dry weather periods, where demand is high and energy consumption drives up utility operational costs (Brown et al. 2009). Taken in tandem, water utilities have developed integrated storm water master plans that lay out capital projects for the future that expand on existing storm water pipeline and detention tanks to transmit flows to receiving waters (lakes and rivers). These projects also aim to develop and establish retention ponds and flood areas which will decrease the water flow before it surges through collection piping, thereby overwhelming wastewater treatment facilities and of course, receiving bodies. Watersheds are protected by provincial and municipal legislation while many creeks, streams and estuaries, which are in need of revitalisation, involve the participation of community groups and non-government organisations (Mangus and Stefanski 2004). Storm water imperatives of receiving bodies are monitored, but their upkeep is often in the
hands of provincial conservation authorities and civil society conservation organisations. A trend that emerges in the urban water management commentary is that the previous focus on engineered solutions has given way to an increased reliance on participatory approaches to storm water management (Brown et al. 2009).

In the Global South, storm water management reflects the context of urban planning and multi-stakeholder development. The pathways of monsoon rains are influenced by ad-hoc urban planning and increasingly impervious development. Furthermore, the conflicting interests of urban actors with little incentives for protection and stewardship of the public good, results in drainage system neglect. This is problematic for increasingly crowded Asian cities that are experiencing higher rates of formal and informal development (UNESCAP 2009). The continuing downloading of legislative and fiscal pressure on municipalities from higher orders of government\(^{11}\) also complicates the scenario for storm water management (for example, the Indian water portal). Most of the issues stem from the imbalance between weak planning regimes and strong development interests, which leads to the bypassing of laws and procedures where roads are encroached upon, utility services are pillaged\(^{12}\) and the overall public infrastructure is eroded. Natural storm water drainage systems are plugged with garbage, drainage channels are silted and constructed detention ponds are non-existent. The culture of neglect is perpetuated by seasonality and the fact that most of the precipitation tends to hit hardest in a few months of the year. When it does rain, health, education, demographic and social issues emerge (Burby et al. 1988). Hence, where planning and resources may be available and the costs of flooding are noticeably high e.g. Mumbai, India (£260 mn), (BBC 2005), there is a little momentum to expand upon deteriorating infrastructure to manage storm water flow, as the surge is experienced during a few months only.

Across both North and South, overwhelmed municipal agencies struggle in silos to achieve service delivery mandates. While the ratio of demand to resource

\(^{11}\) There is a need for municipal and urban communities to resume ownership of urban challenges, in particular storm water management opportunity, in the inevitable scenario that municipal planning imperatives continue to fall behind surging growth and development momentum.

\(^{12}\) Illegal connections to utility services may be tolerated by the state, as a means of ‘subsidising’ the poor who are seen as unable to pay for services. The problem with such an approach is that funds required to sustain infrastructure are not collected and over use leads to service and infrastructure deterioration over time.
Supplies within municipalities is fractured in the North, capacities are overwhelmed in the South. There is an opportunity in the challenge of storm water management, for the barriers created between organisational entities to be removed, which could buttress more integrated approaches to municipal service delivery. This is a relatively new initiative being adopted across the Global North to keep pace with development (if not sustainability) could be mirrored across an already multi-stakeholder oriented Global Urban South to ensure at least some capacity to absorb or at least mitigate shocks from severe weather events.

3. Methodology and Institutional Review

In developing relevant and sustainable options for storm water management across urban South Asia, we employ an institutional lens in the examination of context, programmes, practices and initiatives across the operating contexts of municipal North and South. An institutional review of Best Management Practices (BMPs) from northern contexts will focus specifically on what instruments are being incorporated into storm water management initiatives. Lessons learned from larger municipalities in the North will be assessed for feasible applications and pilots in the South. The issues that are viable in densely populated cities and highly developed urban settlements are focused on, as they are likely more applicable for the unplanned, encroached and highly developed urban South Asia. The hypothesis is that the complexity of urban storm water challenges faced by the Global North validates the need for decentralised and citizen engaging approaches, rather than solely infrastructure based solutions, which are well positioned for scaling up across urban South Asia.

4. Storm Water Management in the North

Water utility management in the North is often found at arm’s length, as autonomous entities, from the city, whose activities are separated and based largely on revenue from water billing. Utilities have traditionally been segregated into water treatment/supply and wastewater collection/treatment. Storm water has historically been dealt with through waste water management programmes, but has increasingly found focused infrastructure attention in the
development of systems that are relied upon during wet weather and severe storm events.

Water utilities across North America are increasingly exploring methods and mechanisms by which to fund storm water management expenditures as concerns with meeting environmental legislation increase and the costs of managing urban runoff rise. Many municipalities have managed the capital investment and operating maintenance expenditures of storm water management (i.e. source control, detention, retention, absorption and end of pipe solutions) by drawing on the water rate, although fiscal pressure is now requiring the adoption of alternatives (Poertner 1981). At present, there is an agreement across a range of climate change vulnerable municipalities on the need to move forward in developing separate Storm Water Management Fee or Utility Surcharge to be used exclusively to fund the future development and maintenance of Storm Water Management Infrastructure.

The experience and management of storm water runoff differs in the same way that water usage differs from client to client. The separation of a Storm Water Utility surcharge from the Water Rate highlights the need for discussion on the equitable distribution\textsuperscript{13} of fees across client groups as well as the feasibility of managing the investment in time and labour to support various aspects of the billing, review and appeal mechanisms. To that end, several models have been explored and implemented by Canadian and US utilities. The following section briefly outlines the benefits and costs of the models\textsuperscript{14} that are being considered and/or implemented across North America:

1. Storm water Utility Fee
   a. Per area of permeable land (m\textsuperscript{2}) – Similar to the ‘polluter pays principle’
      i. Flexible and allows for tailored pricing per site – depending on mitigation measures and incentives applicable for measures to reduce storm water. Effort intensive.

\textsuperscript{13} For example, as part of storm water management policies and programmes, new development must include the planting of trees and property landscaping.

\textsuperscript{14} Specific attention to be paid to the first group – Storm Water Utility Fee, where the line item is separated from the water bill. Transparency in communicating future capital funding requirements (as per the Wet Weather Flow Master Plan) and linked rate increase require the utilisation of a Storm Water Utility Fee.
b. Equivalent Residential Building Units (ERBUs) – land use type derivation  
   i. Tiered land use based fee. Less flexibility. 

c. Flat Fee – the same cost across all water rate payers  
   i. Treat storm water as an 'overhead charge', as it is small relative to the overall consumption. 

d. Total Runoff Measurement  
   i. Requires accurate measurement of runoff from all properties and potentially, an average rate for common land uses. 

2. Storm water Utility Fee  
   a. By property value bracket (multiple blocks)  
   b. By property value bracket (harmonised blocks)  

3. Water Rate Embedded  
   a. Retain current funding structure (status quo) and measure out true costs on an ongoing basis.  
   b. Apportion to Water Consumption based on Classification of Property  

Storm water management efforts can be segregated into two streams – centralised and decentralised systems. In the centralised, utility managed stream, large construction projects and planning result in the erection of detention tanks, storm water ponds and constructed wetlands which service to slow down storm water before it makes way to the storm water/sanitary sewer system. These capital projects are vulnerable to capital budget flows, project reprioritization and development factors; and are likely to experience cuts and reduced allocations as funding pressure on municipalities' results from reduced tax bases. Of course, they may benefit from stimulus funding, depending upon local council resolutions and of course the financial (and engineering) composition of the storm water solution. However, the assumptions are largely that municipal funding for storm water management is premised on a developed water utility and integrated relations with parks and recreation divisions that manage large natural spaces, which can serve as retention ponds. The complexity of managing storm water programmes and initiatives across a range of U.S. municipalities has been shown to be costly and inefficient (Scholl 2007). A number of western municipalities have outlined storm water management plans...
in their master planning documents.\textsuperscript{15} Returns on investment are not as great as would be liked, and horizontal communications and participatory decision-making is lacking (Brown 2005). As a result of this and other constraints, much effort has now been put in incentives to engage the public.

On the decentralised side of the management equation, property owners are engaged through state incentives to reduce, reuse and recycle elements of their water footprint. Utility managed programmes and tactics include the disconnection of downspouts, encouraging the building of pervious and semi-pervious surfaces to absorb water purchase of rain barrels and routing eaves troughs towards plants and gardens.\textsuperscript{16} A number of municipalities have elevated the profile of such programmes as a means of shifting responsibility to the private property owner to mitigate the impact and force of storm water flow at the point of incidence. NGOs and community based organisations (CBOs) collaborate to clean up estuaries and streams, which are often inundated with garbage which restricts storm water flows. These groups also lobby for the protection of lands against development projects.

The results of such efforts have been substantiated by current findings from the storm water management sector. In particular, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA 2011) has compiled the following list of best practices, based on municipal experiences from across the United States, which mirror experiences across other OECD municipalities:

- **Public education**
  - Outreach programmes
  - Education for homeowners
  - Education for businesses

- **Public involvement**
  - Environmental monitoring and rehabilitation
  - Surveying and community mobilisation

- **Illicit discharge detection and elimination**
  - Programme development
  - Trash and illegal discharges


\textsuperscript{16} The city of Toronto is an example of green efforts at storm water management, which at least in recent years, has been a priority of the political administration.
Decentralised wastewater
- Public reporting
- Construction
  - Municipal programme oversight
  - Construction site planning and management
  - Erosion control
  - Runoff control
  - Sediment control
  - Materials management
- Post construction
  - Programme elements
  - Site plans
  - Infiltration
  - Filtration
  - Retention/Detention
- Pollution prevention
  - Education
  - Municipal activities
  - Municipal facilities

Using the EPA clearinghouse of best practices as an exemplary of success across the municipal United States, the composition of education and outreach versus infrastructure and technology facilitated programmes is noteworthy. While technology is continuing to facilitate the use of financial instruments as a means of encouraging homeowner oriented storm water management, the ‘soft’ options of community engagement and outreach still yield significant results, particularly in smaller municipalities, which experience tighter operating and management budgets. The experience of the latter may be the most relevant to South Asian municipalities, whose financial situation and challenging context for the foreseeable future, is comparable.

In conclusion, storm water management in the North can be seen as having largely planning and engineering oriented roots. However, policy makers are increasingly engaging community and environmentally based initiatives to buttress the limited impact of engineered solutions. In reality, the diminishing returns on centralised projects, structures and canals require up front
engineering expertise and capacity that fits in with the municipal budgets and spending contexts of their municipalities, all of which are being found to be costly and increasingly unaffordable across urban contexts (Belanger 2009). The largely fund driven and dependent process does experience some lobbying from NGOs and CBOs for funds to support the maintenance of watersheds and estuaries, but this is still a small proportion of the total spending that goes into storm water management master plans.

5. Storm Water Management in South Asia

Storm water management in the urban South is quite different in nature. As per International Water Association research (Brown et al. 2009) there are a number of planning concerns and governance/development issues that emerge as a by-product of an ad-hoc planning and surging development. While the concerns are valid, the perspectives of many commentators are dependent upon northern development mandates and assume a level of state or private funding/investment (and capital returns) in engineered and capital intensive measures to developing municipality challenges. The development psychology that municipal agencies have thus adopted, vis-a-vis donor dependency and imported top-down solutions has resulted in the maintenance of a stronger development emphasis that is based on capital investment and engineered structures. Such a philosophy may not be as sustainable as presumed, due to a seasonal context, ongoing operational and maintenance costs and public spending investment returns. A number of South Asian municipalities are surveyed, which speak to this conclusion.

5.1 Mumbai, India

In Mumbai, planning and engineering efforts are commercially linked and have impacted the state's ability to address storm water flows. As with the rest of South Asia, most of Mumbai receives its seasonal rainfall in the four months from June to September. 75 of the 2,500 mm that falls within these months drains into the Arabian Sea via a series of three creeks, four rivers and a complex drainage system. In the wake of devastating floods in 1995, the city has made efforts to
improve river flows by widening and deepening their canal and river capacities (Bhagat et al. 2008). Expansion of the canal system capacity reduces flooding of the adjacent areas and in particular, the encroachment of residential and industrial areas (which discharge waste directly into the river) along the river banks. The storm water drainage system (SWD) consists of over 3,000 km of roadside, below ground and lateral drains along with channels and outfalls (MCGM 2011). Several efforts have been made by the Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai to upgrade the century old storm water system to keep pace with population growth. Unfortunately, despite subsequent storms and flooding they remain unimplemented. As a result of water shortages and seasonal flooding, rain water harvesting has been actively promoted by the province and municipalities in partnership with civil society to mitigate the impact of flood waters and buttress pressure on below ground aquifers with some commercial, industrial, institutional and household harvesting of rain water.\footnote{The most celebrated and widely promoted rain water harvesting initiatives across Indian cities are managed by the Centre for Science and Environment and their Rainwater Harvesting Initiative, <http://www.rainwaterharvesting.org/>}

5.2 Chennai, India

The flat terrain of Chennai requires an effective Storm Water Drainage System that can efficiently re-route water through natural drainage channels. Severe flooding has over-whelmed the municipalities’ ability to manage storm water flows and the burden has been borne largely by the urban poor (Bharat 2003). In response, the Corporation of Chennai has developed and continues to maintain a Storm Water Drain network of 334 kilometres within the city. The system is composed of 16 canals stretching 27.92 km across the city, forming a grid pattern through urban communities. Rainwater runoff flows through the network of canals and towards the sea via four waterways (CC 2011). Challenges in ensuring the rapid flow of water have been met through de-silting canals (semi-annually) and rainwater harvesting. The management and operation of infrastructure has been motivated through benchmarking with other municipalities in India. In order to reduce standing water, unaccounted for water, recharge ground water levels and counter sea-water intrusions; rain water harvesting has been actively promoted by Chennai Corporation. The result has
been noticeable reductions in surface flows, water loss and the overall burden on the infrastructure.

During the rainy season, the Corporation of Chennai identified heavy water stagnating areas and installed water harvesting structures in 242 of the city's most low lying areas, road margins (945), streets with stagnant water (1,698) and along flyovers and bridges (29) (Ibid.). The building department has also incorporated this initiative into its policies. The department will only approve building plans if engineer approved drawings clearly outline the incorporation of rain water harvesting provisions into the master plans. Enforcement of the building department's code is carried out by revenue. Homeowners are also encouraged to install rainwater harvesting structures in their homes. In leading by example, from 2001 to 2002, city owned buildings and facilities have installed a total of 1,344 rainwater harvesting structures. Aside from the roof top structures, a number of aquifer recharge structures are also installed and take the form of percolation pits, shallow bore holes and percolation wells (Savic 2005). While efforts are still new and require third party assessment and validation, the civil society momentum behind Chennai on rain water harvesting initiatives has been tremendous.

5.3 Kolkata, India

The city of Kolkata is the centre of Kolkata Metropolitan Area (KMA), and home to 14.5 million people. Located on the east bank of the river Hooghly, the city is located 146 km from the estuary at the Bay of Bengal (KMC 2011). The river (along with ground water) is the main source of water for the Kolkata Municipal Corporation, but also the source of flooding and scarcity. Drainage to Hooghly is facilitated by a series of tributaries and canals that flow through the area. Siltation requires maintenance by the city corporation. As with Delhi, the majority of the 1,500 mm of rain falls between July and October (KMC 2011). In order to meet domestic, industrial and agricultural demand, water is drawn from the drainage system as well as water bodies. Most of the storm water that falls during the monsoon season is discharged to the sea. Despite central and state government action, urbanisation is an undermining result. Citizen engagement and awareness regarding environment, pollution, health hazards and
sustainability has generated integrated initiatives for improved drainage, with coordination led by the municipality and local government (Bose 2008).

5.4 Delhi, India

The SWD system of India’s capital is made up of five drainage basins; natural drains, roadside storm water drains, and combined sewer cum storm water drains. As with most combined sewers, they serve as a bypass for blocked sewer lines. Most of the water collected through different drainage systems is discharged into the river Yamuna (MCD 2011). The problems of the cities drains include a lack of lining, damage, construction debris reducing water flow rate and capacity and the use of drains as a repository for street sweeping debris and garbage (illegal dumping). Lack of rapid repair of the storm water drains leaves openings for garbage and debris. This issue requires addressing prior to drainage resolution, for which massive education campaigns and awareness through CBOs are being developed and implemented.

5.5 Dhaka, Bangladesh

Heavy monsoon downpours occur regularly in Dhaka, as it is situated along the extensive floodplains of the Ganges and the Brahmaputra. The construction of natural wetlands to absorb overflows has failed to keep pace with the growing population. While a network of 24 canals and natural wetlands was able to minimize flood damage decades ago, the growth of urban form has resulted in increased surface flows. Management of drainage system of Dhaka City is presently a challenge for the urban authorities because of rapid growth of population and unplanned development activities (Kreimer et al. 2003). Unplanned development activities and the spontaneous growth of habitation due to rapid population surges are causing encroachment on retention areas and natural drainage paths. The lack of care and consideration for natural drainage systems creates obstacles to the effective and unrestricted flow of water during periods of intense rainfall and urban runoff. As a result, water logging is taking place in different parts of the city, which remain inundated for several days.
Mitigating the effects of chronic flooding has been addressed through capital investment by a range of engineered solutions. However, many of the built solutions continue to be inadequate in addressing drainage challenges. Challenges such as inadequately drained sections, conventional drainage systems with low capacity and gravity, natural siltation, absence of inlets and outlets, indefinite drainage outlets, lack of proper maintenance of existing drainage system, and disposal of solid waste into the drains and drainage paths, are contributing to blockages in the natural drainage system. In addition, the seasonal tidal effect and the topography of the city contribute to water logging. Stagnant water contributes to adverse social, physical, economic and environmental impacts. Costs include the disruption of vehicle and pedestrian movement, damage to property and infrastructure, destruction of vegetation and aquatic habitats, and loss of income potentials. The storm water becomes polluted as it mixes with solid waste, clinical waste, silt, contaminants, domestic wastes and other human activities that increase the prevalence of water born diseases (Tawhid 2004).

A master plan for flood mitigation and drainage has resolved the issue for the western half of the city, but the eastern portion is without any protection in the face of deteriorating infrastructure. Encroachments, unplanned use, lack of maintenance, inefficient pumping and a lack of coordination among developer activities results in flooding. According to analysis, more public awareness and political will is required to develop and implement efficient plans (Ibid.). In the absence of any state action and public awareness, commentators warn that a collective detriment to public health will continue to be experienced.

6. Analysis and Discussion

Storm water management challenges across urban South Asia can be linked with the inability of urban planners\(^{10}\) to ‘get it right’ and municipal managers to maintain the drainage estuaries, creeks and streams free of debris, so that they should serve as the conduits of storm water flow. Firstly, across the urban South, these streams are blocked with solid waste and refuse not collected through solid

\(^{10}\) By way of mentioning urban planning, we are not singling out urban planners, but rather the urban planning process or set of interests as a whole. The lack of participation and inclusion of several relevant stakeholders and the pursuit of development within a narrow set of interests has sustained a state of inequitable, ad-hoc, urban development.
waste collection services. The result is often over flows, standing water and contaminated ponds that complicate public health and transportation. Secondly, sanitation flows also complicate the drainage picture during storm events, as many public toilets, open sewers and septic ponds find their flows entering the drainage canals, contaminating the creeks and of course, the canals into which the estuaries empty (Gupta and Nair 2009). The result again, is an impact of contaminated water on public health.

Coping with continued urbanisation will require sustainable local solutions at municipal levels, which consider the regular operations and maintenance of such natural drainage systems. Capital intensive solutions will not suffice, rather the mobilisation of social capital and ‘operations focused labour’ to free up drainage systems is necessary.

A number of broad trends are worth noting, which are shared with the management of water resources across South Asia. Firstly, there is a need to identify constraints, particularly those involving the politicisation of services. Secondly, policy makers must show the utilisation of current resources with built-in sustainability and taxation mechanisms wherever appropriate. Thirdly, there is a basic need to ensure transparency between institutions on both the sides of state-community dynamic. The review of state programmes reveals limited disclosure of project documentation or regular status updates of the programmes’ success in diverting storm water away from drainage pathways. This is particularly important with regard to projects that are being developed and that can be managed by the institutional resources that are assigned, particularly within civil society. The Centre for Science and Environment (CSE) among others, within the rainwater harvesting initiative have disseminated such information to member organisations, but increased linkages with the state are required to encourage wider harvesting practices. Fourthly, there is a link between health, education, water, sanitation and the environment, which needs to be addressed through a shared conscience of state and non-state actors. Finally, resource management must be structured to deal with geographic differences in aquifer recharge and depletion rates. Technology and focused management may facilitate decentralised approaches to these challenges, but a common vision and will for addressing long term needs must be maintained by the state.
Despite the brief attention given to each of the municipal storm water contexts surveyed, an appreciation of the costs and benefits of infrastructure (requiring continuous capital investment and operational support), complexities and limitations is appreciable. As per discussions and recommendations in the literature (Parkinson and Mark 2005), the underlying nuance is one that seeks to mobilise increased resources to develop capital programmes and allocate resources for funding. However, an observation of northern practices also demonstrates a parallel shift towards community engagement in mitigating the impacts of storm water through natural means, which ultimately increases soil absorption capacities and when redirected through shallow boreholes, can contribute to aquifer recharge (Paul and Meyer 2001). The fiscal environment in more vulnerable southern municipalities may not likely allow for such capital intensive approaches, beyond the wealthier enclaves that may be able to subsidise adjacent neighbourhoods and watershed segments. However, the dense urban form and concentrations of household demand, reveals substantial potential in yields from awareness generation and decentralised approaches to harvesting and aquifer recharge.

With regard to storm water management in the Global South, there is more of a trend and emphasis on the inability of the state to manage existing storm water management flows due to the challenges of urbanisation and the need to develop participatory storm water management practices (Parkinson 2003). There are increasingly, as in the case of Indian cities as well as in Kenya (Henry et al. 2006), strong policy push towards and evidence of the benefits of collaboration with CBOs and the public to harvest rainwater. Methods such as rooftop rainwater collection, drainage to property, low-cost sanitation, community-based planning, and shallow bore hole engineering and construction are in many case books and context specific literatures (Otterpohl et al. 1997). Such approaches bypass the heavy spending and investment required through municipal planning. Not to say that the latter is not without merit, but that the returns on investment from the community based monitored and measured sites build more ownership over the areas of storm water concern (Rauch et al. 2005). Focused constructed solutions and engineered diversions, both temporary (seasonal monsoons) and permanent (chronic flooding) are perhaps more worthy of pursuit.
Across the Urban South, a collaborative approach has been shown to work that recognises the issues and actors and employs the state to facilitate collaboration to achieve shared goals. On the public side, increased collaboration between solid waste, water and sanitation authorities, transportation and public health is required. Within the various levels of government, flood plain management that is beyond the purview of the municipal administrations must be managed by the province, in order to see returns from the drainage system benefit canal health. On the community engagement side, increased resources during extreme wet weather events cannot fall solely to the water and sanitation authorities. Increasing collaboration with community groups to harvest rainwater, managing streams and water courses, developing and sustaining retention ponds and natural landscapes that can hold water to allow for downstream demand management will likely yield higher returns.

A more proactive role for state and community actors is required that allows for the advocacy and education of communities to collect rain water, divert sewage/sanitation flows appropriately to owned solutions and reduces stress on road ways. The mobilisation of the informal sector and vast pools of labour to ensure that drainage systems are clean should be considered. The operations and maintenance costs of maintaining such drainage departments in local water and sanitation authorities should be budgeted for, made transparent, and monitored through mapping technology as means of tracking development. While the interests of ad-hoc development may continue to trump public management concerns, the costs and benefits of preserved drainage systems must be emphasised. Namely, the reduced flow through cities should at the least, lead to reduced erosion of infrastructure, already badly damaged and in need of repair.

7. Conclusion

While the survey of cities in North and South is far from exhaustive, the examples serve to show the enormous challenges of storm water management. Policy experimentation from the Global North reveals the limitations of engineered solutions and built infrastructure (Wanielista et al. 1993). There is clearly a limitation that infrastructure investment brings in the management of water
scarcity, particularly with respect to decentralised systems (Villarreal et al. 2004). While large scale projects such as constructed wetlands and water reuse are taking place across developed municipalities in Canada as well as Australia, public engagement is being recognised as an increasingly significant component of success (McCann 2010). Furthermore, there are increasingly significant outreach and education programmes through which the engagement of households and communities can generate more immediate and localised returns. The momentum of new sustainable urban development initiatives are, at the least, educating the masses that the current trajectory is unsustainable and storm water management can serve as a tool for reducing urban footprints (Novotny 2010).

In the urban South, improper infrastructural and environmental management along with large socio-economic inequality must be dealt with in order to align storm water management with environmental protection. Firstly, more research on the benefits of rain water harvesting across sectors is required. Small households and enterprises must serve as pilots for larger developments both residential as well as industrial. In the case of the latter, improved storm water management may reduce toxic runoff and health concerns during urban storm events. Strong civil society and state advocacy is required to maintain institutional participation and storm water community activity. It is hoped that improved communication between storm water advocates across the region’s mega cities would result, as this resource becomes increasingly scarce. Influencing institutions is crucial, as is conscious government resource management policies that look to the broader impacts of storm water flows in urban contexts.

In order to ensure effective storm water management capacity, key considerations should be incorporated into plans as reflected from the analysis. Firstly, service delivery compatibility must be established between water and sanitation authorities and storm water management divisions at the municipal level. To this end, the shared management of wastewater and solid waste must include the necessary resources to maintain drainage systems. Secondly, advocacy and research capacities of rainwater harvesting familiar NGOs and CBOs must interface with water and sanitation authorities municipal capacities in formal arrangements to recognise alternative storm water management solutions
during severe weather events. It will be difficult, to say the least, for water and sanitation authorities and storm water management staff to monitor all drainage paths and depressed areas within expanding cities. The engagement of the public and civil society, which contributes to a shared protection of infrastructure and drainage systems, will generate more potential returns. Finally, monitoring and evaluation procedures must be assumed by provincial authorities and ensure that municipal operations are in sync with storm water demands and that best practices are being initiated across storm water drainage basins and zones. Monitoring and guidelines are in short supply from higher tiers of the state, which as far as official plans and departmental orientations are concerned, appear to be more engaged in operational issues and ‘rowing’ as opposed to ‘steering’. Civil society feedback into provincial mechanisms should serve as a means of ensuring that municipalities are sufficiently funded to encourage storm water management and that higher tiers of the state are held accountable for guiding the participatory response to meeting the region’s storm water management challenges.
References


Section V
Food Security

- Livelihood and Food Security for Socially Backward Communities: Constraints in Improving the Himalayan Mountain Ecosystem—Prakash Tiwari and Bhagwati Joshi
Livelihood and Food Security for Socially Backward Communities: Constraints in Improvement in Himalayan Mountain Ecosystem
Prakash C. Tiwari* and Bhagwati Joshi**

Abstract

In Himalaya, nearly 15 percent of the total population falls in the category of socially backward communities. A considerably large proportion of these communities is landless, and traditionally engaged in agricultural labour, collection of minor forest products etc. for their subsistence, and therefore is highly vulnerable to food and livelihood insecurity. In order to bring these communities into the mainstream of social and economic development, the Constitution of India designated them as Scheduled Castes (SCs), and made specific provisions for providing them reservation in educational institutions, government employment and political institutions. Besides, both central and state governments have been implementing a series of programmes for their social, economic and political mainstreaming from time to time. Nevertheless, these communities still comprise the poorest and socio-economically marginalised segment of society and constitute 75 percent of livelihood and food insecure population in Indian Himalaya and 69 percent in the Upper Kosi Catchment of the study area.

This paper analysed the socio-economic constraints to improving livelihood and food security of socially marginalised communities through the interpretation of factors determining community access to critical natural resources with a case study of Upper Kosi Catchment in the newly carved Himalayan state of Uttarakhand in India. Data and information was generated through conducting detailed social surveys using exclusively designed schedules and questionnaires and from various secondary sources. The study concluded that economic justice requires equitable access to natural and economic resources which are traditionally the stronghold of higher-class communities and are becoming scarce in mountains. This deprives backward communities their legitimate right to make use of even primary resources, such as land and water which constitutes the main basis of attaining food and livelihood security, as well as achieving social sustainability, and thus prevents them in getting out of the poverty trap in remote mountains. It was observed that institutionalising critical natural resources for equitable access at grass-root level, and bringing awareness through educational empowerment of backward communities could sensitise and help backward communities in attaining economic growth, as well as ensure the security of livelihood and food in the region.

* Dr. Prakash C. Tiwari is a Professor of Geography at the Kumaun University, Nainital, Uttarakhand, India.
** Dr. Bhagwati Joshi is Assistant Professor of Geography at the Government Post Graduate College, Kumaun University, Rudrapur, Uttarakhand, India.
1. Introduction

Food and Agricultural Organization (2003, p.21) defines food security as “Food security is a situation that exists when all people, at all times, have physical, social and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life.” The access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food is determined by various natural as well as socio-economic factors that vary from country to country and one part of the country to other (Ibid. p.21).

Since 2003, the overall global food security situation has been continuously deteriorating mainly because of increasing world population and resultant increasing gap in supply and demand of food, encroachment of productive agricultural land by rapid urbanisation and industrialisation and declining per capita agricultural land (Tiwari 2010). Cline (2008) as quoted in Aase et al. (2009) has estimated that the global food production is likely to decrease between 3 percent and 16 percent by 2080 due to global warming and its adverse impact on agricultural productivity across the world. It has been estimated that more than one billion people in the world have no access to sufficient dietary energy, and nearly two billion people are suffering from micronutrient deficiencies (Barrett 2010). Moreover, food and agricultural systems across the world have been facing stern challenges from the continued depletion of the natural resource base and resultant loss of ecosystem services. Furthermore, the impacts of climate change are already stressing the world agricultural system (Roberts 2009; World Commission on Environment and Development 1987). The economic recession which started in 2008 increased the price of food in the global market leading to more hunger and malnutrition in many developing and underdeveloped countries. The situation particularly worsened in countries like India where society is stratified based on income, caste and religion (Jenkins et al. 2006; Dev 2003). Food prices have been increasing sharply since 2008 (FAO 2008; Bakhshooodeh 2010; Hauenstein et al. 2010). Furthermore, developing and underdeveloped countries, and marginalised regions in the south owing to their large population and subsistence agricultural economy are likely to face severe food crisis, particularly in the era of climate change than the developed countries of the north (Aase et al. 2009, p.1). India is expected to face decline in agricultural
output up to the extent of 30 percent by 2080 (Cline 2008 as quoted in Aase et al. 2009, p.1).

The marginalised regions, such as, high mountains which encompass nearly 24 percent of the total land surface of the earth and are home to approximately 12 percent of the world’s population are highly critical from the view point of food security mainly because of constraints of terrain and climate, geographical inaccessibility, less infrastructural development, socio-economic stratification etc. It has been estimated that a large proportion of food insecure population now live in mountain regions of the world (FAO 2008). During recent years, a variety of changes have emerged in the traditional resource use structure in high mountain areas, particularly in developing and underdeveloped regions of the world mainly in response to the globalizing economy, increased population dynamics and resultant increased demand of natural resources as well as socio-economic marginalisation (Tiwari 1995).

As a result, mountain regions of the world have been passing through a process of rapid land use changes and depletion of natural resources leading to ecological imbalances and economic un-sustainability both in upland and lowland areas (Tiwari 2000, 2010). Consequently, the agricultural productivity in mountain ecosystems has been declining, increasing the proportion food insecure population in mountains (Huddleston et al. 2003; FAO 2008). Mountain ecosystems and communities are not only threatened by global environment changes, but also by the emerging new international economic and political orders and the resultant problems of food and livelihood insecurity (Adhikari and Bohle 1999). Huddleston et al (2003. p.iii) are of the view “Environmental constraints limit the prospects for agricultural development in many mountain areas, yet about 70 percent of the world’s mountain population remain rural and depend on the natural resource base of land, water and forests for their livelihood.” Moreover, the changing climatic conditions have already stressed traditional food and agricultural systems through higher mean annual temperatures and melting of glaciers and snow, altered precipitation patterns and hydrological disruptions, and more frequent and extreme weather events.

These changing climatic conditions are expected to increase the severity and frequency of natural disasters in Himalaya (IPCC 2007; ICIMOD 2008), 30 percent
decrease in agricultural productivity (Cline 2008; IPCC 2007; UNDP 2006), and massive decline in human health in large parts of South and East Asia including India, Pakistan, Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh, Thailand, Myanmar and China mainly dependent on subsistence agriculture, and lessen the adaptive capacity of both natural and human systems to long-term impacts of climate change in the entire region (Rodo et al. 2002; Holland and Bitz 2003).

Besides, the recent food crisis followed by global economic recession has adversely affected the food and livelihood security of mountain communities because of their subsistence economies, constraints of terrain and climate and resultant physical isolation and low productivity, vulnerability to natural risks, poor infrastructure, limited access to markets, higher cost of production and social marginalisation.

In Himalaya, nearly 15 percent of the total population falls in the category of socially backward communities, and a considerably large proportion of these communities is landless, and traditionally engaged in agricultural labour, collection of minor forest products etc. for their livelihood, and therefore is highly vulnerable to livelihood & food insecurity (Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment 2004). In order to bring these communities in the mainstream of social and economic development, the Constitution of India designated them as Scheduled Castes (SCs), and made specific provisions for providing them reservation in educational institutions, government employment and political institutions. Besides, both central and state governments have been implementing a series of programmes for their social, economic and political mainstreaming from time to time (Planning Commission of India 2006a & 2006b; World Bank 2006). Nevertheless, these communities still comprise the poorest and socio-economically marginalised segment of society and are deprived of the benefits of development and excluded from socio-economic safety nets (Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment 2004; Rao et al. 2000; Sen 2000; Shah et al. 2006; Singh 2009).
2. **The Study Area**

The study has been carried out in Upper Kosi Catchment which encompasses a geographical land surface of 107.94 km$^2$ (10794 ha) between 1425-2650 m from the mean sea level (msl), in the Lesser Himalayan ranges of district Almora which (put together with 12 other districts) constitutes the newly carved Himalayan state of Uttarakhand in India (Figure 1). The total population of the region is 16080 persons which are distributed in 5157 households and inhabit 65 villages.\(^1\)

According to the field study, out of the total population of the catchment 14 percent fall in the category of socially backward communities. Nearly, 55 percent settlements are situated within 5 km from the road. The watershed is one of the densely populated and agriculturally colonised tracts of Kumaon Himalaya. The authors calculated the density of population to be 149 persons/km$^2$ for the watershed as a whole and as high as 469 persons/km$^2$ for the village area that excludes reserved forest (reserved forests are state property forests) of the region. The major land use categories include forests, cultivated land and barren land.

More than 75 percent population depends on subsistence agriculture although the availability of arable land is severely limited. Nearly 72 percent of the socially backward households are landless and marginal farmers. Nearly 90 percent operational land holdings are less than one hectare and the availability of per capita cultivated land is merely 0.17 ha which results in low food productivity, as well as low economic viability of agriculture in the region. Owing to the constraints of subsistence agricultural economy a large proportion of adult males migrate out of the region in search of livelihood and employment (Tiwari 2010).

---

\(^1\) Based on the authors’ field survey and mapping.
Source: Authors’ compilation.
3. Methodology

In Himalaya, due to constraints of terrain and climate, agricultural productivity is considerably low leading to approximately 65 percent food deficit which is balanced by import of food from other parts of the country (Tiwari 2010). The food security of rural population including the socially backward communities, therefore, mainly depends on local agricultural productivity, and community food purchasing power. In view of this, food security of socially backward communities has been measured in terms of (i) availability of food from local agricultural production, and (ii) purchasing power of local people to buy food from the market which put together determine the availability of and access to food and therefore constitutes the critical parameters of food security in the region.

Data and information required for catering the research components were collected from various secondary sources, and generated through conducting detailed social surveys in 65 villages (with more than 25 percent population of socially backward communities\(^2\)) from 10 mountainous districts of Uttarakhand, India using exclusively designed schedules and questionnaires. The purpose of conducting village surveys was to obtain general information about the status of food and livelihood security of backward communities in the village and the related constraints, and for this purpose only the Garm Pradhan (the head of the village level constitutional democratic institution) was interviewed in each of the 65 selected villages. Whereas, the detailed information about the food and livelihood conditions at family level was generated through household questionnaire.

The information derived through primary sources include (i) number of family members and their age, (ii) food demand and consumption pattern, (iii) size of agricultural land holding and its physical characteristics, (iv) access to water for irrigation, (v) agricultural production, (vi) other sources of employments and income. In order to analyse the current trend of increase in prices of essential food commodities, detailed information was collected from 5 percent of the grocery shops located in the nearby markets. Besides, comprehensive discussions were also held with the officials of local government departments, NGOs, local

---

\(^2\) 1157 backward community-households.
people etc. that also strengthen the research database developed through primary investigations. The secondary data used in the present work has been derived mainly from Survey of India Maps, government land records, State Forest Department and from other local government agencies.

The requirement and availability of food have been estimated both at household and village levels and finally for the Kosi Headwater as a whole. At the first stage, food availability has been determined by developing the estimates of agricultural production and food demand employing standard techniques (Tiwari 1995). In order to analyse food surplus, sufficiency and deficit situations, household level food demand was worked out using the norm of 15 kilogram/adult/month and 8 kilogram/child/month requirement of food-grains (which include wheat, rice and pulses), and compared with household level production of food (Tiwari 1995). Secondly, the other sources of livelihood and employment were analysed, and household level income was determined which constitutes the main source of food purchasing power and is a precondition for balancing the food availability gap.

4. Results and Discussion

An assessment of overall food demand and local production of food revealed that the Kosi Headwater faced overall food deficit of 65 percent in 2010. The interpretation of village-wise food deficit situations indicated that all the 65 villages of the headwater are currently facing food deficit ranging from just below 30 percent to as high as 70 percent.

In order to meet the food deficit situations, food-grains are made available to the local people through (i) government controlled system, and (ii) open market system. The government system is known as Public Distribution System (PDS) through which essential food commodities, such as, wheat, wheat-flour, rice, sugar are made available to poor families (i.e. families whose per capita income is less than Indian Rupees 478.02 or approximately US Dollars 10 per month as per the criteria of the state) by the government controlled Fair Price Shops (FPS) in prescribed quantity at reasonable price. Families whose per capita income is more than this are expected to buy food commodities from the open market as
per their requirement. But, socially backward communities are entitled to get food commodities under PDS irrespective of their income level. Further, the procurements of food either from Public Distribution System (PDS) or from open market depends on the level of cash income and purchasing power of the people. A large proportion of rural population, particularly socially backward and marginalised households mostly depend on agricultural labour, construction activities, village based processing of agricultural and livestock products, making agricultural tools and traditional handicraft items, collection of medicinal plants etc. for their income that contribute to their food purchasing power. This situation is quite comparable to food security factors in many less developed regions of the world (Hauenstein et al. 2010). All these activities are completely based on the availability of and community access to local resources, such as, land, water, forests and biodiversity, and traditionally provide livelihood and employment to a large section of rural society, specifically the socially marginalised communities. As in other parts of Himalaya, the remittances sent by the migrated population constitutes the principal source of income and food purchasing power of rural communities, both from Public Distribution System (PDS) and open market in the region (ICIMOD 2008).

In view of this, in the present study food security situation of Scheduled Castes has been examined in terms of availability of food from local production and purchasing capacity of households to buy food from the market to balance the food deficit. A Scheduled Caste family was considered food secure if it is able to fulfill it's requirement of food either from its own agricultural land or able to balance the food deficit by purchasing food from market.³ Whereas, in case, a household which is neither able to meet its food demand from its own agricultural production, nor has enough purchasing power to buy the required quantity of food from the market was considered as food insecure.

The analysis of food availability based on the interpretation of above mentioned parameters revealed that nearly 27 percent households in all 65 villages of Kosi Headwater are vulnerable to food insecurity. In 13 villages of the headwater, more than 50 percent families were categorised as food insecure, whereas, only in two villages the proportion of food insecure households was less than 10

³ The authors developed this criteria based on analysis of the determinants of food security as discussed in the methodology.
percent. In two villages of the Kosi Headwater, 40 to 50 percent families have been facing food insecurity, in six villages 30 to 40 percent, in 19 villages 20 to 30 percent, and in as many as 23 rural settlements of the region the percentage of households threatened by food insecurity ranged from 10 to 20 percent (Table 1). Out of the total 27 percent food insecure households identified in the watershed as many as 39 to 81 percent in different villages with average 69 percent households were Scheduled Caste.

Table 1: Vulnerability to Food Insecurity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percent Households</th>
<th>Number of Villages</th>
<th>Percent of Total Villages</th>
<th>Salient Feature of Food Insecure Households in Order of Importance</th>
<th>SC Households (Percent)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Below 10</td>
<td>02</td>
<td>03.08</td>
<td>Landless households, poor households, SC</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 – 20</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>35.38</td>
<td>SC, marginal farmers, households with no source of regular income</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 – 30</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>29.23</td>
<td>SC, households with no regular source of additional income, landless households</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 – 40</td>
<td>06</td>
<td>09.23</td>
<td>SC, landless households</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40 – 50</td>
<td>02</td>
<td>03.08</td>
<td>SC, landless households, marginal farmers</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Above 50</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>20.00</td>
<td>SC, families with no regular source of income, marginal &amp; landless households</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Out of the total food insecure Scheduled Caste households as many as 45 percent were mainly landless and 31 percent had less than 1 ha of cultivated land. One of the most critical factors for the increasing food insecurity among the Scheduled Caste families is that these communities do not have access to land resources. This is clearly evident from the fact that as many as 35 percent SC families in the region are landless and 37 percent SC households have land holding size of less than 1 ha (Table 2).
LIVELIHOOD AND FOOD SECURITY FOR SOCIALLY BACKWARD COMMUNITIES

Table 2: Access to Land Resources

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Size of Land Holdings</th>
<th>Other Communities (Percent Households)</th>
<th>Backward Communities (Percent Households)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Above 3 ha</td>
<td>00</td>
<td>00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 – 3 ha</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 – 2 ha</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Below 1 ha</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landless</td>
<td>00</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Further, the maximum proportion of agricultural land owned by SCs is rain-fed, mainly located in up-slopes characterised by poor soils and high surface gradient. It was observed that only 2 percent agricultural land of SC was irrigated, whereas remaining 98 percent of their arable land was not due to non-availability of water. Only 25 percent of SC families had 2 to 8 percent agricultural land under irrigation (Table 3).

Table 3: Access to Water Resources for Irrigation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage of Irrigated Cultivated Land (%)</th>
<th>Percent Higher Castes (Percent Households)</th>
<th>Scheduled Castes (Percent Households)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Below 2</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 – 4</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 – 6</td>
<td>05</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 – 8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 – 10</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Above 10</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Besides, the majority of Scheduled Caste households had very little income from off-farm sources that reduced their food purchasing power. Out of the total working population of SC, 16 percent had government jobs and employment in organised private sector despite reservation for these communities in government sector jobs. Approximately 25 percent SCs were engaged in unorganised private sectors on purely temporary basis. Whereas, remaining 59
percent SC working population completely depend on local seasonal employment in agricultural, forest, construction etc. (Table 4).

Table 4: Access to Off-Farm Employment Opportunities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Employment</th>
<th>Other Communities (Percent of Total Workers)</th>
<th>Scheduled Castes (Percent of Total Workers)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Government Sector</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private Organised Sectors</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private Unorganised Sector</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural Sectors</td>
<td>02</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forests Sector</td>
<td>03</td>
<td>05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction Sector</td>
<td>00</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Small Business</td>
<td>03</td>
<td>00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tailoring</td>
<td>00</td>
<td>07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carpenter etc.</td>
<td>00</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Nearly 15 percent SC households had no regular source of income, and 9 percent had annual income below US$ 110. This was brought out by the fact that the educational level of SC families was considerably low as only 17 percent SC population falls in the category of literates compared to 42 percent literates in other communities in the region. The majority of SC families were poor as 57 percent SC households had annual income less than US$ 110, 22 percent had between US$ 110 and US$ 220, 9 percent had US$ 220 and 330, 10 percent had US$ 330 and US$ 440, and only 2 percent SC families had annual income of more than US$ 440 (Table 5).

This clearly shows that the majority of socially backward communities in the region do not have enough purchasing power to buy food from the market in
required quantity and quality, and therefore they are highly vulnerable to food insecurity.  

Table 5: Level of Off-farm Income

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Off-Farm Income Level (Family/US$/Year)</th>
<th>Other Communities (Percent Households)</th>
<th>Scheduled Castes (Percent Households)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Above 440</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>330 – 440</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>220 – 330</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>110 – 220</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Below 110</td>
<td>09</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Besides the lack of access to land and water resources, the low educational level of SCs is one of the main reasons of their remaining underdeveloped and becoming more vulnerable to food insecurity in the area (Jenkins et al. 2006; Singh 2000; Shah et al. 2006). Moreover, studies revealed that due to depletion of land, water and forest resources and consequent decline in forest, agricultural and livestock productivity, the availability of livelihood in these traditional rural sectors has decreased considerably during the recent years. In different villages, rural employment in forest based activities decreased by 38 percent, while employment opportunities in agriculture reduced by 15 percent. Further, off-farm income generating opportunities such as collection of medicinal plants and traditional rural handicraft and agricultural tool making decreased by 24 and 28 percent respectively (Tiwari 2010).

As in other parts of Himalaya, the remittances sent by the migrated population constituted the principal source of income and food purchasing power of rural communities both from Public Distribution System (PDS) and open market in the region. But, the recent economic recession and the resultant decline in income and hike in food prices particularly rendered the socially backward communities highly vulnerable to food insecurity as both the local income level and purchasing

---

4 Based on the analysis of current food prices and current food requirement (2010) at household level, the food purchasing power is the proportion of the total income that SC families can afford to fulfill their annual food demand.
power declined due to loss of employment opportunities outside the region. It was investigated that on an average, the level of remittances decreased by nearly 30 percent in SC families in the watershed.

5. Conclusion

The outcomes of the investigations indicate the region is currently facing huge deficit of food mainly due to poor agricultural productivity. The food security in the area, therefore, primarily depends on local agricultural production and community food purchasing capacity. As many as 27 percent households belonging to all communities have been identified as highly food insecure taking into account their production of food and food-purchasing power. But, the socially backward communities are particularly vulnerable to food insecurity as 69 percent of the SCs households fall in the category of food insecure in the region. The main reason for the increased food insecurity among the socially backward communities is that they do not have access to primary agricultural resources, such as land and water. Besides, they do not have access to education and skill development opportunities in the region which deprive them of better livelihood and employment opportunities and viable means of additional income generation, locally as well as outside the region. Moreover, the restricted access to land and water resources and social and educational exclusion of backward communities are some of the important reasons for the failure of various governments’ programmes and schemes implemented for socio-economic up-liftment and mainstreaming of these communities. It was observed that institutionalising land and water resources at grass-root level, and educational empowerment of backward communities could sensitise and help them in attaining food and livelihood security, as well as claiming social justice with economic equity.
References


Dev, S. M. 2003, 'Right to food in India', Working Paper No. 50, Centre for Economic and Social Studies, Hyderabad, India.


Holland, M. M. and Bitz, C. M. 2003, 'Polar amplification of climate change in the coupled model intercomparison project', *Climate Dynamics*, vol.21, pp. 221-232.


Tiwari, P. C. 2010, 'Natural and socio-economic factors of food security in Kumaon Himalaya, Uttarakhand, India', presented at Mountain Research Initiative (MRI) Workshop on 'Key drivers of food security in mountain regions', 21-26 March 2010, Centre for Development & Environment (CDE), University of Bern, Switzerland.

Tiwari, P. C. 1995, Natural resources and sustainable development in Himalaya, Shree Almora Book Depot, Almora, India.


Annexure

Peace and Sustainable Development in South Asia: The Way Forward
SDPI’s Thirteenth Sustainable Development Conference

21 – 23 December 2010
Islamabad

Organised by the
Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI)
Islamabad, Pakistan
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9:00 am – 11:00 am</td>
<td><strong>Opening Plenary</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Introduction to the Conference:</strong></td>
<td>Dr. Abid Qaiyum Suleri, Executive Director, SDPI, Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Welcome Address:</strong></td>
<td>Dr. Saeed Shafqat, Chairperson, Board of Governors, SDPI, Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Remarks by the Chief Guest:</strong></td>
<td>Mr. Javed Malik, Federal Secretary for Environment, Government of Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Launch of the SDC Anthology and Annual Report:</strong></td>
<td>Title of the SDC Anthology: <em>Fostering Sustainable Development in South Asia: Responding to Challenges</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Keynote Speaker:</strong></td>
<td>Ms Urvashi Butalia, Director, Zubaan Books, India</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **Plenary Title:** | Confronting the Past: Imagining the Future  
Is there Hope for a New South Asia? |
| 11:00 am – 11:30 am | **Tea / Coffee** |
### Tuesday, 21 December 2010

**Concurrent Panel A-1**

**Title:** Sustainable Development and Peace: Respecting Religious Diversity  
**Chair:** Dr. Lubna Chaudhry, State University of New York, Binghamton, USA  
**Discussant:** Ms Marvi Memon, MNA PML-Q, Islamabad, Pakistan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Speakers</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Masood Raja, University of North Texas, USA</td>
<td>Neoliberal Globalization and the Rise of Fundamentalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ms Ayesha Salman, Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
<td>Respecting Religious Minorities: A Case Study</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Ahmad Salim, Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
<td>Print Media and Pakistan’s Minority Communities: Challenges and Prospects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ms Urvashi Butalia, Zubaan, New Delhi, India</td>
<td>The Marginal Voice in South Asian Literature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ms Humaira Ashfaq, International Islamic University, Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
<td>The Role of Minorities in the Development of Pakistani Literature</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Discussion**

**Lunch**

1:30 pm – 2:30 pm
## Tuesday, 21 December 2010

**Concurrent Panel A-2**  
11:30 am – 1:30 pm

### Title: Advancing Sound Chemical Management for Sustainable Development and a Toxic Free Asia – Session I

**Chair:** Prof. Uzaira Rafique, Fatimah Jinnah Women University, Rawalpindi, Pakistan  
**Discussant:** Prof. Dr. Rashid Karim, Professor, International Islamic University, Islamabad, Pakistan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Speakers</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Mahmood A. Khwaja, Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
<td>The Role of Civil Society in Advancing Sound Chemical Management for Sustainable Development and a Toxic Free Asia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Khuda Bakhsh, Department of Environmental and Resource Economics, University of Agriculture, Faisalabad, Pakistan</td>
<td>Early Plantation of Crops (BT Cotton): The Impact on Chemical Use, Profitability and Sustainability – A Case Study</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prof. Ms Kalkash Abubakirova, Kazakhstan, University of International Business, Almaty, Kazakhstan</td>
<td>Environmental Pollution: Hazardous Chemical Waste Management in Kazakhstan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Discussion
1:30 pm – 2:30 pm

**Lunch**
Tuesday, 21 December 2010

Concurrent Panel A-3 11:30 am – 1:30 pm

Title: Floods and Disaster Preparedness in Pakistan: Regional Solution to National Problems

Chair: Mr. Naseer Memon, Strengthening Participatory Organization (SPO), Islamabad, Pakistan
Discussant: Mr. Navid Ahmad, Media Analyst, Islamabad, Pakistan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Speakers</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Edward Gonzalez, USAID, Lahore, Pakistan</td>
<td>Pakistan at a Critical Juncture: How an Integrated Community-led Reconstruction Model can help Promote Democratic Culture and Institutions in Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ms Huda Sarfraz, University of Engineering and Technology, Lahore, Pakistan</td>
<td>Technology Preparedness for Disseminating Flood Relief and Rehabilitation Information to Local Stakeholders Online</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Sanaullah Rustamani, Qasimabad, Hyderabad, Pakistan</td>
<td>Floods in Sindh: Analysis of Missing Links in the Pre and Post-Flood Scenario</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Arshad Abbasi and Ms Javeriya Hasan, Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
<td>Sustainable Flood Management Strategy for Pakistan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Discussion

Lunch 1:30 pm – 2:30 pm
**Concurrent Panel A-4**  
**11:30 am – 1:30 pm**

**Title: The Water and Sanitation Challenge in South Asia**  
**Session I**  
**Chair:** Mr. Arif Hassan, Chairman, Urban Resources Centre, Karachi, Pakistan  
**Discussants:** Mr. Nazeer Ahmed, Sindh Irrigation and Drainage Authority, Pakistan; and, Ms Rizwana Kausar, UN Habitat, Islamabad, Pakistan.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Speakers</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Ahmed Nawaz Hakro, University of Nizwa, Sultanate of Oman</td>
<td>Water and Sanitation in Pakistan: Understanding the Poverty Link</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Dibalok Singha, Dushtha Shasthya Kendra (DSK), Dhaka, Bangladesh</td>
<td>Bringing Water Supply to Dhaka Urban Slums</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Faisal Shaheen, Municipality of Toronto, Toronto, Canada</td>
<td>Comparative Approaches to Efficient Storm Water Management</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Discussion**
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tuesday, 21 December 2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Concurrent Panel A-5</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Peace and Sustainable Development: The Role of Think Tanks</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>(Brainstorming Session)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Moderator:</strong> Dr. Adil Najam, The Frederick S. Pardee Center for the Study of the Longer-Range Future, Professor, Department of International Relations; and Department of Geography and Environment, Boston University, USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Discussion</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Concurrent Panel A-6</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Title:</strong> Advancing Sound Chemical Management for Sustainable Development and a Toxic Free Asia – Session II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chair:</strong> Dr. Qasim Jan, Professor, University of Peshawar, and, Member Board of Governors, Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Discussant:</strong> Prof. Imdad Ullah Mohammadzai, Institute of Chemical Sciences, Peshawar University, Peshawar, Pakistan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Speakers</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ms Anjum Rasheed, Department of Environmental Sciences, Fatima Jinnah Women University, Rawalpindi, Pakistan</td>
<td>Toxicity Evaluation of Personnel Care Products - Moving Towards Sound Chemical Management in Cosmetic Industry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ms Asma Younas, Environmental Science Department (ESD), Peshawar University, Peshawar, Pakistan</td>
<td>Evaluation of Activated Carbon Amendment for Reclamation of a DDT Contaminated Site in Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ms Fozia T. Minhas, Pakistan National Centre of Excellence in Analytical Chemistry, University of Sindh, Jamshoro, Pakistan</td>
<td>Removal of Residual Toxic Metals for Cleaner Environment: through Liquid Membrane, using Calixarene Derivatives - A Case Study</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Discussion</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Tuesday, 21 December 2010**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Concurrent Panel A-7</th>
<th>2:30 pm – 4:30 pm</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Title:** Climate Change, a Security Risk? The Case of South Asia

**Chair:** Mr. Shafqat Kakakhel, Member Board of Governors, SDPI, Islamabad, Pakistan

**Discussant:** Dr. Aurengzeb, Planning Commission of Pakistan, Islamabad, Pakistan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Speakers</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Aneel Salman, Ghulam Ishaq Khan (GIK) Institute of Science and Technology, Topi, Pakistan (paper presented in absenstia)</td>
<td>Environmental Governance and the Role of Institutions in Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Kiran Maharjan, Swiss National Centre of Competence in Research, South Asia Regional Coordination Office, Kathmandu, Nepal</td>
<td>From Heaven to Hell: The Impact of Climate Change</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Discussion**
Concurrent Panel A-8

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title: Federalism: A Challenge to Conflict Management in Less Developed Countries/South Asia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Guest of Honour:</strong> Dr. Kaiser Bengali, Adviser to CM Sindh, Karachi, Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chair:</strong> Ms Anjum Ibrahim, Business Recorder, Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Discussants:</strong> Mr. Mukhtar Ahmad Ali, Center for Peace and Development Initiatives, Islamabad, Pakistan; and Mr. Zubair Faisal Abbasi, Institute for Development Initiatives, Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Speakers</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Arshad Khan, National Commission for Human Development, Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
<td>The Baloch Conflict: Nationalism, Natural (Gas) Resource and the State’s Reaction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Yunas Samad, University of Bradford, Bradford, UK</td>
<td>Managing Diversity in Pakistan: Going Beyond Federalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Bishnu Upreti, NCCR North-South, Kathmandu, Nepal</td>
<td>Federalism and Potential Conflicts: A Reflection from Nepal</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Discussion**
### Concurrent Panel B-1

**9:00 am – 11:00 am**

**Title:** Neo-liberalising South Asia—Impacts of Structural Adjustment: IMF and World Bank Programmes

**Guest of Honour:** Dr. Pervez Tahir, Former Chief Economist, Planning Commission of Pakistan, Islamabad

**Chair:** Ms Anjum Ibrahim, Business Recorder, Islamabad, Pakistan

**Discussant:** Dr. S. Akbar Zaidi, Karachi, Pakistan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Speakers</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Muzna Fatima, The Energy Resources Institute (TERI), New Delhi, India</td>
<td>Structural Adjustment Programmes and the Feminisation of Poverty in South Asia: Exploring Linkages and Challenges</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ms Antonia Settle, RMIT University, Melbourne, Australia</td>
<td>Structural Adjustment: The Development Project and Privatisation of State Land in Pakistan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Discussion**

**Tea**

**11:00 am—11:30 am**

### Concurrent Panel B-2

**9:00 am – 11:00 am**

**Title:** Imagine a New South Asia: 25 years of SAARC

**Chair:** Senator Haji Mohammad Adil, Senior Vice President ANP

**Discussant:** Mr. Rashed Titumir, Unnayan Onneshan, Dhaka, Bangladesh

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Speakers</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Rashid Ahmad Khan, University of Sargodha, Sargodha, Pakistan</td>
<td>Intra-regional and Inter-regional Connectivity in South Asia: Imperatives and Responses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Faisal Shaheen, Municipality of Toronto, Canada</td>
<td>Need to Re-focus SAARC on an Urban South Asia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Avanish Kumar, Management Development Institute, Gurgaon, India</td>
<td>South Asia: A Model for Social Integration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Tahir M. Azad, National Defence University, Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
<td>Political and Social Challenges in South Asia: Focus on Pakistan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Discussion**

**Tea**

**11:00 am—11:30 am**
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Speakers</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ms Anusha Sherazi, Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad Pakistan</td>
<td>Climate Change Induced Floods in Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ms Javeriya Hasan, Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
<td>Encouraging Green Housing in Pakistan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Discussion**

| Tea | 11:00 am – 11:30 am |
**Concurrent Panel B-4**  
11:30 am – 1:30 pm

**Title:** Peace through Development?  
**Chair:** Dr. Saba Gul Khattak, Planning Commission of Pakistan, Islamabad, Pakistan  
**Discussant:** Mr. Talimand Khan, Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad, Pakistan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Speakers</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Lubna Chaudhry, State University of New York, Binghamton, USA</td>
<td>Post-conflict Voices from the Swat Valley: On Reconstruction and Development from the “Bottom-up”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Anita Ghimire, Swiss National Centre of Competence in Research (North-South), Kathmandu, Nepal</td>
<td>Internal Displacement and Sustainable Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Shaukat Sharar, Swat, Pakistan</td>
<td>Peace through Development in the Post Conflict and Post Flooding Situation: The Case of Malakand Region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Fahim Razaq, College of Youth Activism and Development (CYAAD), Quetta, Pakistan</td>
<td>Youths in Praxis: Engaging the Youth of Tribal Societies in Peace and Development</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Discussion**

**Lunch**  
1:30 pm – 2:30 pm
**Wednesday, 22 December 2010**

**Concurrent Panel B-5 11:30 am – 1:30 pm**

**Title:** Poverty Reduction: Social Exclusion and Safety Nets in South Asia  
**Chair:** Mr. Sakib Sherani, Adviser, Ministry of Finance, Islamabad, Pakistan  
**Discussant:** Dr. Bishnu R. Upreti, NCCR (North-South) South Asia, Kathmandu, Nepal

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Speakers</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Prakash Tiwari, Kumaun University, Nainital, India</td>
<td>Livelihood and Food Security for Socially Backward Communities: Constraints in Improving the Himalayan Mountain Ecosystem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Faisal Shaheen, Municipality of Toronto, Toronto, Canada</td>
<td>Comparative Urban IS Engagement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ms Priyanthi Fernando, Centre for Poverty Analysis (CEPA), Colombo, Sri Lanka</td>
<td>Addressing the Issues of Older People in Sri Lanka: A Framework for Action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Babar Shahbaz, University of Agriculture, Faisalabad, Pakistan</td>
<td>Access to Livelihood Assets and Social Exclusion: Some Insights from Northwest Pakistan and Challenges for Further Research</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Discussion**

**Lunch 1:30 pm – 2:30 pm**
Concurrent Panel B-6

11:30 am – 1:30 pm

Title: Ending Violence against Women: The Unconventional Role of Men

Chair: Ms Nasreen Azhar, Member National Commission on the Status of Women, Islamabad, Pakistan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Speakers</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ms Mome Salim, Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
<td>Community Ownership to end Violence against Women: Role of Men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Safi Ullah Khan, Rozan, Pakistan</td>
<td>Understanding Masculinities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Veer Ji Koli, Tharparkar, Pakistan</td>
<td>Case Study 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Mukhtar Javed, Sungi, Pakistan</td>
<td>Community Group Model</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ms Sameena Nazir, Potohar Organization for Development Advocacy, Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
<td>Violence and Women in Pakistan: A Cycle of Perpetual Pain</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Discussion

Lunch

1:30 pm – 2:30 pm
**Wednesday, 22 December 2010**

**Concurrent Panel B-6a**  
11:30 am – 1:30 pm

**Title: Financing Climate Change**

**Chair:** Mr. Malik Amin Aslam, Ex-Minister of State, Environment, Islamabad, Pakistan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Speakers</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Shafqat Kakakhel, Member, Board of Governors, SDPI, Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
<td>Politics of Climate Change Financing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Shakeel Ahmad Ramay, SDPI, Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
<td>Opportunities for Pakistan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Discussion**  
1:30 pm – 2:30 pm

**Concurrent Panel B-7**  
2:30 pm – 4:30 pm

**Title: The Water and Sanitation Challenge in South Asia - Session II**

**Chair:** Mr. Ayub Qutub, Pakistan Institute of Environment and Development Research, Islamabad, Pakistan

**Discussants:** Mr. Abdul Hafeez, WaterAid, Islamabad, Pakistan; Mr. Irfan Tariq, Director Ministry of Environment Pakistan; and, Dr. Dibalok Singha, DSK, Bangladesh

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Speakers</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Badiul Alam Majumdar, The Hunger Project, Bangladesh</td>
<td>Social Mobilisation in Bangladesh: An Innovative Approach to Meeting Water-Sanitation Related MDGs Towards Poverty Eradication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Shamim Ahmed, WaterAid, Bangladesh (presented in absentia)</td>
<td>Overcoming Deprivations in Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WaSH) Sector: An Emphatic Analysis from Bangladesh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Munawar Hasan, WaterAid, Pakistan</td>
<td>Securing Poor People's Right to Safe Drinking Water: 'Rain Water Harvesting' (RWH) – A Tool to Reach Out to the Most Marginalised Communities in Thar</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Discussion**
**Wednesday, 22 December 2010**

**Concurrent Panel B-8**

2:30 pm – 4:30 pm

**Title: Revisiting the Indus Water Treaty for Peace and Sustainable Development**

**Chair:** Mr. Shafqat Kakakhel, Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad, Pakistan  
**Discussant:** Mr. Shams ul Mulk, Former Caretaker Minister, KPK, Pakistan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Speakers</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Shaheen Akhtar, Institute of Regional Studies, Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
<td>Climate Change and IWT: Issues in Transboundary Watershed Management and Co-operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Shakeel Ramay, Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
<td>Revisiting the Indus Water Treaty in view of Climate Change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Arshad Abbasi, Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
<td>Indus Water Treaty and its Interpretation after Baglihar Dam</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Discussion**

**Concurrent Panel B-9**

2:30 pm – 4:30 pm

**Title: Regional Trade: The Way Forward**

**Chair:** Dr. Safdar Sohail, Ministry of Trade, Islamabad, Pakistan  
**Discussant:** Dr. S. Akbar Zaidi, Karachi, Pakistan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Speakers</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Faisal Shaheen, Municipality of Toronto, Toronto, Canada</td>
<td>Sector Based Examinations of Trade Activity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Khondaker Golam Moazzem, Centre for Policy Dialogue, Dhaka, Bangladesh</td>
<td>An Approach to Prune Sensitive lists of Bangladesh: Preliminary Findings from a Cross-country Study</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Shafiq Shehzad, Director, Pakistan Institute of Trade and Development, Pakistan</td>
<td>Pakistan's Perspective</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Discussion**
### Thursday, 23 December 2010

#### Concurrent Panel C-1 9:00 am – 11:00 am

**Title: Promoting Decent Work for Vulnerable Groups in the Post Flood Situation**  
**Chair:** Mr. Saifullah Chaudhry, International Labour Organisation, Islamabad, Pakistan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Speakers</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Saba Khattak, Planning Commission of Pakistan, Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
<td>Mainstreaming Child Labour Prevention in Crisis and Disaster Response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ms Shyama Salgado, ILO, Colombo, Sri Lanka (presented in absentia by Mr. Haroon Qureshi, International Labour Organization, Islamabad, Pakistan)</td>
<td>Tsunami and Responses to Address Needs of Vulnerable Groups in Sri Lanka</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Discussion**  
Tea 11:00 am-11:30 am

#### Concurrent Panel C-2 9:00 am – 11:00 am

**Title: Energy Governance in South Asia**  
**Chair:** Mr. Nazim Haji, Islamabad, Pakistan  
**Discussant:** Mr. Mohammad Yasin, Senior Advisor SDPI, Islamabad, Pakistan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Speakers</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ms Javeriya Hasan and Mr. Arshad Abbasi, Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
<td>Renewable Energy Sources in Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Arshad Abbasi and Ms Javeriya Hasan, Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
<td>Electricity Governance in Pakistan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Discussion**  
Tea 11:00 am-11:30 am
Concurrent Panel C-3  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 9:00 am – 11:00 am | Title: The Role of Parliamentarians in Peace and Sustainable Development  
Panel by UNDP’s Strengthening Democracy through Parliamentary Development (SDPD)  
Moderator: Dr. Farzana Bari, Quaid-e-Azam University, Islamabad  
Panelists:  
Ms Shiralla Mallick, Chair, Standing Committee on Women Development  
Ms Nazish Brohi, Independent Researcher, Karachi, Islamabad  
Discussion  
Tea 11:00am-11:30 am |
### Thursday, 23 December 2010

**Concurrent Panel C-4**  
*11:30 am – 1:30 pm*

**Title:** Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD): Impacts on South Asia  
**Chair:** Mr. Sarwat Naz Mirza, University of Arid Agriculture, Rawalpindi, Pakistan  
**Discussants:** Dr. Muhammad Khurshid Swati, Economic Affairs Division, GoP, Pakistan, and Mr. Kanwar Muhammad Javed Iqbal, SDPI, Islamabad, Pakistan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Speakers</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Syed Mahmood Nasir, Ministry of Environment, Islamabad, Pakistan and Mr. Javed Ahmed, Pakistan</td>
<td>Discerning Facts from Fiction in Hazara and Malakand Northern Pakistan: Can REDD+ Reverse the Growing Deforestation and Degradation of Forests?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Nadeem Bukhari, Integrated Natural Resource Management Project, Pakistan and Syed Mahmood Nasir, Ministry of Environment, Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
<td>An Assessment of Institutional Framework and Legal Challenges for Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD) in Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Syed Moazzam Nizami, Arid Agriculture University, Rawalpindi, Pakistan</td>
<td>Estimation of Carbon Stocks in Subtropical Managed and Unmanaged Forests of Pakistan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Discussion**

**Lunch**  
*1:30 pm – 2:30 pm*
Concurrent Panel C-5  11:30 am – 1:30 pm

**Title: The Relationship between Food Insecurity, Poverty, Militancy and Conflict**

**Chair:** Syed Kamal Shah, former Federal Secretary Interior, Islamabad, Pakistan

**Discussant:** Mr. Ejaz Haider, Consulting Editor, The Friday Times, Pakistan; and, Dr. Ayesha Siddiqa, Defence and Security Analyst, Islamabad, Pakistan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Speakers</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Abid Q. Suleri, Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
<td>Food Insecurity in Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Bishnu Upreti, NCCR North-South, Kathmandu, Nepal</td>
<td>Food Insecurity in Unstable and Conflict-Ridden Countries: Reflections from Nepal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Sahib Haq, World Food Programme (WFP), Islamabad Pakistan</td>
<td>Food Security in View of Disaster</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Lunch**  1:30 pm – 2:30 pm

Thursday, 23 December 2010

Concurrent Panel C-6  12:00 pm – 2:00 pm

**Title: Water Resource Management: Sharing Perspectives**

**Chair:** Mr. Munawar Saeed Bhatti, Additional Secretary, Foreign Office, Islamabad, Pakistan

**Speakers:**
- Mr. Shakeel Ramay, Head Climate Change Study Centre, SDPI, Islamabad, Pakistan
- Mr. Arshad Abbasi, Adviser Water and Energy, SDPI, Islamabad, Pakistan
- Ms Kalpana Murphy, Economic Officer, Embassy of the United States of America
- Mr. Faisal Haq Shaheen, Business Management Analyst, Canada
**H. U. Beg Memorial Lecture**  
2:30 pm – 4:30 pm

**Chair:** Mr. Shamsul Mulk, Former Chief Minister, KPK, Pakistan

**Recap of the Thirteenth SDC:**
Dr. Avanish Kumar, Management Development Institute, Gurgaon, India  
Dr. Bishnu Upreti, NCCR North-South, Kathmandu, Nepal  
Ms Priyanthi Fernando, Centre for Poverty Analysis (CEPA), Columbo, Sri Lanka  
Mr. Rashed Titumir, Unnayan Onneshan, Dhaka, Bangladesh

**Keynote Speaker:**
Dr. Tariq Banuri  
Director, Division for Sustainable Development  
Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA)  
United Nations, New York, USA; and, former Executive Director, SDPI

**Theme:** Energy as Key to Peace and Sustainable Development

**Remarks by the Guest of Honour:** Syed Naveed Qamar, Federal Minister for Petroleum and Natural Resources, Government of Pakistan

**Vote of Thanks**
Dr. Abid Qaiyum Suleri, Executive Director, SDPI, Islamabad, Pakistan

**High Tea / Coffee**