Sustainable Development in South Asia: SHAPING THE FUTURE

Sustainable Development Policy Institute
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
IN SOUTH ASIA:
SHAPING THE FUTURE

SDPI
Sustainable Development Policy Institute

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## Sustainable Development in South Asia:
Shaping the Future

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**Preface**

According to the Bruntland report, development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs is ‘sustainable development’. Thus by this very definition, sustainable development shapes the future. However, what shapes the future of sustainable development is simultaneously an extremely simple as well as an extremely complicated question.

SDPI’s Fifteenth Sustainable Development Conference titled ‘Sustainable Development in South Asia: Shaping the Future’ explored exactly the above and how things will look in 20, 30 or even 50 years from a global and South-centric perspective and threw light on issues that will be looming large for the planet and proposed innovative solutions to overcome them. This flagship international Conference of the Institute showcased 24 panels and 3 plenary sessions highlighting the work of some 145 delegates from 18 countries including Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Belgium, Canada, China, Germany, India, Nepal, New Zealand, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Switzerland, Thailand, the Netherlands, UK, and the USA. Over 1,600 people took part in the three-day deliberations from all walks of life.

This anthology is based on compilation of selected peer reviewed papers presented in that Conference. In order to cover the three dimensions of sustainable development, the book is divided into eight sections and an epilogue. First three sections discuss economic sustainability; the next three cover social sustainability, whereas the last two sections address environmental sustainability. In the epilogue, I have touched upon mega trends and drivers of change that may shape the future of sustainable development in South Asia.

Critical perspectives on the future of sustainable development, democracy in South Asia and the importance of global governance are provided in the first section. The second section deals with sustainable economic development through examples of railways, India-Pakistan trade, and corporate social responsibility from Pakistan, India, and Nepal. Economic development sans peace and increased opportunities of livelihoods,
especially for the excluded and marginalised segments of society cannot lead to a sustainable future; this is the central theme of two papers presented in section three of this volume.

Food security, nutrition and human security are indicators as well as outcomes of sustained livelihoods. How sustainable development could lead to resilient and secure societies is the common thread of papers grouped under section four. Secure societies would provide religious freedom to its citizens. An anatomy of issues, challenges, and prospects of religious freedom is presented in section five. Section six of this volume deals with another vital game changer for shaping the future, i.e., female and feminist identities. Whereas issues of environmental sustainability and climate change are discussed in sections seven and eight.

In the end, the Anthology aims to enrich academic research and cross fertilization of experiences from related fields, especially from and about the South Asian region. I hope that this book of 24 peer approved papers and an epilogue add to your knowledge and open up new avenues and connections that can help us in collectively working towards a greener, brighter and more sustainable future.

Last but not least, I should thank the dedicated efforts of the Sustainable Development Conference unit and its editorial team at SDPI, especially Ms Uzma T. Haroon, Ms Imrana Niazi and Ms Sarah S. Aneel. Without their commitment and support, compilation of this volume could never have been possible.

Dr. Abid Qaiyum Suleri
Executive Director
About the Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI)

Who we are
SDPI is one of Pakistan and South Asia’s leading sustainable development and environment policy research organisations providing the global development community representation from Pakistan and South Asia as a whole with the mission ‘to catalyse the transition towards sustainable development, defined as the enhancement of peace, social justice and well-being, within and across generations.’

Where we come from
The Institute’s genesis lies in the Pakistan National Conservation Strategy, (also known as Pakistan’s Agenda 21), which approved by the Federal Cabinet in March 1992, outlined the need for an independent non-profit organisation in the country to serve as a source of expertise for policy analysis and development; policy intervention; and policy and programme advisory services. The Institute, therefore, started its humble beginnings in August 1992.

What we do
We function in an advisory capacity by carrying out robust research, policy advice and advocacy; and in an enabling capacity by strengthening other individuals and organisations with resource materials and training. Specifically our broad-based yet holistic mandate is to:

- conduct policy advice, policy oriented research and advocacy from a broad multi-disciplinary perspective
- promote the implementation of policies, programmes, laws and regulations based on sustainable development
- strengthen civil society and facilitate civil society-government interaction through collaboration with other organisations and activist networks
- disseminate research findings and public education through the media, conferences, seminars, lectures, publications and curricula development
• contribute to building national research capacity and infrastructure.

**How we do it**

The diverse array of socio-economic and environmental projects and programmes that SDPI has been involved in over the past 21 years outline the following core activities:

• Providing policy advice to the government
• Facilitating and organizing forums for policy dialogue
• Supporting in-house, local, regional and international academics, students and researchers
• Publishing critical research for public and private sector use
• Acting as a conduit for North South dialogue
• Creating an environment for information dissemination and training
• Campaigning for regional advocacy and networking.

**Why we do it**

Despite the political, economic and even environmental turmoils which Pakistan has endured over two decades, the Institute’s efforts remain unwavering in its vision to become a centre of excellence on sustainable development policy research, capacity development and advocacy in the country and South Asia by producing knowledge that not only enhances the capacity of the state to make informed policy decisions, but also engages the civil society and academia on issues of public interest for the betterment of current and future generations.
Acknowledgements

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SDPI’s Fifteenth Sustainable Development Conference was held in major collaboration with Aawaz, a Department for International Development (DFID) funded programme, implemented by Development Alternatives, Inc Europe (DAI Europe) and Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI).

Other partners in this Conference included the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA); Heinrich Boll Stiftung (HBS); Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) of the United Nations; United Nations for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UNWomen); Minorities Rights Group International (MRGI); Oxfam International; GIZ; Commission on Science and Technology for Sustainable Development in the South (COMSATS); National Centres of Competence in Research (NCCR); OXFAM; Partnership for Economic Policy (PEP), Canada; Prakruthi India; ActionAid Pakistan; and Secure Livelihoods Research Consortium (SLRC).

Review Panel
This anthology was peer reviewed by experts having diverse academic and technical expertise. The independent reviews provided critical and honest comments that assisted the authors, as well as anthology editors, in making this publication as reliable and thorough as possible. The Institute and editors wish to thank the following individuals for their peer review:

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Section 1
Critical Perspectives

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The Future of Sustainable Development

Ishrat Husain

Human nature is ‘driven by the desire for clarity, certainty and control even in the situations that are intrinsically doubtful, ambiguous and volatile’ (Kirkpatrick 1989). To sketch out the future of sustainable development is very difficult because the world ahead is going to be complex, uncertain and riveted by unknown and imponderables. On the other hand, one can narrate (if not in finely drawn lines), vague contours a picture of what the future holds out for us and our generations.

In order to present an informed view about the future we have to look at the past. My starting point would be to show how much gap existed between economists and environmentalists even three decades ago and how much it has been narrowed in the last few years. The extreme position of the environmentalists was best articulated by scholars like Paul Ehrlich, Lester R. Brown and Club of Rome.

The battle to feed all humanity is over. In the 1970s, the world will undergo famines – hundreds of millions of people are going to starve to death (Ehrlich 1968, p. xi).

Brown (1995, p.71) pointed out that soil erosion, water logging and salinity which will reduce 15% of China’s irrigated land, air pollution and acid rain by burning of coal and reduction in rice yields by a rise of 3 degrees F in average summer temperatures will lead to a ‘fall in China’s grain production by at least 20% between 1990 and 2030’ (Ibid.). China’s demand would increase from 335m tonnes in 1990 to 479m in 2030. The short fall of 216m tonnes – a level that exceeds the world’s entire 1993 grain exports of 200m tonnes (World Bank 2012). Both these extreme predictions have not proved to be true. World population almost doubled from 3.7 billion in 1970 to 7 billion in 2010, but food production has remained ahead of population growth. Food price index declined from 100 in 1970 to 40 in 1991 and per capita calorie supply in developing countries including China rose to 2540 from 1930. In China, food production index has almost doubled between 1990 and 2010 and cereal yield per hectare has risen from 3.6 tonnes to 6.8 tonnes. In Emerging and Developing Economies (EDEs) as a group, food production has gone up by 88% in the same period (Ibid.).

On the other hand, economists believed that human ingenuity will always be equal to the consequences of its actions and scientific and technological advances will rise to the occasion and overcome issues like global warming, resource depletion, and overconsumption in the world. Myers and Simon (1994) argue that..

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1 This chapter has been approved as a speech by the referee.
2 Dr. Ishrat Husain, a banker and economist, is the Dean and Director of the Institute of Business Administration, Karachi, Pakistan.
...abandoning the appropriately human centred goal of managing nature to provide people with a better life, the environment movement has adopted a utopian ideology which idealises a mythical nature and demonises humankind. Traditional Conservationists like Ted Roosevelt recognised man’s responsibility to make the World a better place, while today’s environmentalists typified by Al Gore regard human beings as interlopers whose freedom to pursue their own interests must be restricted to prevent them from destroying nature.

Bhagwati (2004, p.135) postulated that…

...economists generally belong to the philosophical tradition that sees nature as handmaiden to mankind. This humanity-centric view of nature is deeply rooted in the tradition that originated among the Hebrews and the Christians and spread to the Western World.

Accordingly, environmentalists tend to value environment over income, whereas trade and other economists conventionally tend to value income over the environment. This difference was at the heart of their conflicts. Economists consider markets efficient in utilisation of resources and see government interventions as disruptive. Environmentalists typically deal with situations where markets do not exist – as when pollutants are dumped into lakes, rivers and oceans, the pollutant does not buy a permit to do so. Trade flourishes in absence of regulations, whereas, environmentalism suggests its necessity. Bhagwati (2004, p. 141) writes that ‘growth that devastates the environment is surely not being correctly measured if no downside adjustment for environmental damage is made’. Nordhaus and Tobin (1972) proposed a new measure of income and growth in environmental degradation. ‘Reduced estimates of growth rate’ were made by Herman Daly (1996) (Ibid. p. 141).

An examination of the widely held belief by environmentalists that growing incomes will always be associated with deteriorating environmental outcomes could not stand the test of scrutiny. Evidence showed that this was not necessarily the case.

As income rises, activities that cause more pollution may contract and those that cause less pollution may expand... In fact, as development occurs, economies typically shift from primary production, which is often pollution-intensive to manufacturing which is less so, and then to traded services, which are currently even less pollution intensive. This natural evolution itself could reduce the pollution-intensity of income as development proceeds. Available technology used and newly invented technology may become more environmental friendly over time (Bhagwati 2004, p. 144).

Both these phenomena are being observed (Ibid.). Therefore, the assumed trade-off between growing income and environmental protection is not borne out by evidence. Of
course, quality and pattern of growth do matter. Fossil fuels used indiscriminately for generating growth create problems.

The Brundtland Commission’s (1987, p.7) definition of sustainable development where ‘the environment is where we live and development is what we all do in attempting to improve our lot within that abode--the two are inseparable’ was a turning point in this debate. According to the Commission, economic growth would facilitate the ‘needs of the present without compromising the ability of the future generations to meet their own needs’. The conclusion that ‘no other region more tragically suffers the vicious cycle of poverty leading to environmental degradation, which leads in turn to even greater poverty’ (Ibid. p.31) established the nexus between poverty and environmental degradation. Thus, addressing poverty became an important element in protecting environment. The Report strongly influenced the Rio Summit in 1992 and the Johannesburg Conference in 2002.

At the same time, empirical studies supported the environmental transition hypothesis i.e. environmental amenities are negatively related to income in countries with less than $1200-$2200 income per capita and in higher income countries environmental amenities are positively related to income with an income elasticity of >1 (Antle and Heidebrink 1995). Institutional or technological innovations can significantly lower the threshold. For example, Costa Rica achieved the transition at relatively low income level (Ibid.).

In recent years, most environmental organisations have begun to embrace market-based solutions to environmental issues recognising that markets and growth are not generally inconsistent with environmental protection. There remains, however, a group of hardcore activists who view command and control regulation as the only legitimate environmental policy and who also view economic growth as an enemy of environment...a sensible balance between economic development and job creation/trade-expansion on the one hand and environmental protection on the other hand (Yeutter 1994)....[is possible].

A consensus has been reached in recent years that ‘sustainable development’ extends beyond raising per capita incomes or protecting environment at all costs and needs to be concerned with issues such as equity, inclusive growth, gender and social justice. We also know that growth does not automatically trickle down and public policy interventions are necessary to tackle basic human needs. Macroeconomic stability is an essential pre-requisite for sustained growth and institutions do matter for ensuring access and distributing benefits of growth. Global climate change is no longer an issue dear to the environmentalists’ lobby, it is a real threat to the living standards and ‘survival of 11-12 billion people who will likely inhabit the earth by the end of this century’ (Bogardi and Szollosi-Nagi 2004, p.34 citing the Johannesburg Declaration).
The concept of a ‘green economy’ that encompasses concerns of climate, food and economy now symbolises this new emerging consensus. Green economy is driven by considerations of energy, green buildings, clean transportation, waste and land management. It reflects a realisation that economic growth and development must be environmentally friendly, conserve natural resources and minimise pollution. At the same time, eradication of poverty and creation of jobs are not possible without robust economic growth that distributes benefits in an equitable manner.

For the future, we must recognize that past experience is an unreliable guide to forecast future outcomes. What is clear, however, is the overarching and all-encompassing role of technology, its advancement and impact on our lives.

Demographic changes, shift in economic power balance and urbanisation are likely to give rise to new challenges.

Unlike the past, the law of diminishing returns that affected resource allocation is no longer valid. ‘Knowledge is not scarce’ – ‘the more you’ use it and ‘pass it on, the more it proliferates. It is “infinitely expansible” or “non-rival in consumption”’ (Vikas 2005, p. 162). What is scarce is the ability to understand and use knowledge. Therefore, the use of ideas, knowledge and technology will be the main drivers of global economy in the future.

Information and Communications Technology has made it possible to have abundant information, lower transaction costs and lower barriers to entry. Inexpensive electronic or voice communication, video conferencing, technology-enabled workflows and social-networking technologies have transformed connectivity and knowledge sharing (Gibbs et al. 2012). These characteristics all add up to a more efficient and competitive market with benefit to consumers.
Besides information technologies, container revolution, hub airports, low-cost cargoes, high performance materials, bio-technology, and low-cost vaccines have brought about flexible business processes, just-in-time inventory, hyper competitive purchasing worldwide, remote services, lower overheads, shorter turnaround time and affordable health care solutions.

Contrary to the popular belief that technology has by and large been labour displacing and job destroying, technology has advanced rapidly over the past couple of centuries but unemployment has not risen with it (Ibid.). On the contrary, productivity, employment and output have all risen together. How does this work in actual practice?

New technology brings about product innovation or process innovation i.e. the same unit of output is produced with less labour or raw material inputs (The Economist 2006). ‘Higher productivity reduces costs and lower costs, in turn, lead to lower prices, higher wages or fatter profits’ (Ibid. p. 258). Higher wages or lower prices raise consumer purchasing power and boost demand for higher output for other goods and services in the economy. Higher profits finance expanded investment in these industries where output and jobs are rising due to demand (The Economist 2006).

The net effect on employment depends upon how much prices respond to lower costs and how sensitive demand is to lower prices... The demand generating effects of new technology have always outweighed the labour displacing effect (The Economist 2006, p.258)

Technology has, in the end, created more jobs than it has destroyed.

Agriculture in Pakistan at the time of independence was unable to feed 30 million people and was dependent on PL-480 imports from the United States (Husain 2010). Today, the agriculture sector of Pakistan not only provides higher calories per capita per day for 180 million people but it is surplus in wheat; third largest exporter of rice in the world; one of the largest producers of milk and self-sufficient except some cyclical fluctuations, in sugar cane. However, Pakistan does face food insecurity problem but that is not due to technology, rather human failure – failure of governance and adequate public policies. Technology has facilitated us to produce more out of the same acre of land with high yielding seeds, fertilizers and modern harvesting techniques.

In 1950, more than half of the national output originated from agriculture sector which employed three-fourth of the working labour force. By 2010, the share of agriculture in the national output had fallen to about 20%, while those employed in the sector are close to 40% of the labour force. Higher labour productivity and increased labour demand resulting from the Green Revolution led to considerable expansion in employment and considerable wage increases in other sectors of the economy. Non-agricultural employment in the rural areas exceeds agricultural employment. Consumers have also
gained through lower prices of agriculture produce. ‘Since the Green Revolution generates an economic surplus by more efficient utilisation of resources and reduced unit costs, consumer gain need not imply producer losses’ (Hazell and Ramasamay 1991, p.3).

Four million tonnes of wheat and rice were produced by eight million labour force employed in 1950 i.e. 0.5 tonnes per worker. In 2010, 20 million labour force in agriculture produced 30 million tonnes of wheat and rice or 1.5 million tonnes per worker (State Bank of Pakistan 2010). The surplus labour released from agriculture has been absorbed in non-farm activities – input distribution and sales depots, agricultural equipment and tools rentals, storage, transport, marketing and credit industry and services that are relatively more productive. Our irrigation water losses are still substantially large because of inequitable distribution by officials entrusted with the task. We can preserve this scarce commodity by substituting flood irrigation by sprinkler and drip irrigation, by laser levelling of land and greater reliance upon Water Users’ Association and communities. The challenge faced is no longer maximisation of yield per acre but per cubic meter of water. There are many other tested eco-friendly methods of farming that can be piloted, promoted and propagated on large scale. Research and development on varieties that can resist pests and survive upon lower input of water per acre would also contribute positively to the current scenario.

Scanning the megatrends for the future and taking technological advancement and innovation as the backdrop, five issues have bearing upon the future of sustainable development. These issues are: governance at international, national and local levels; climate change; shift in economic power balance from advanced to emerging and developing economies; inequality in incomes and opportunities; and jobs and employment.

**Governance**

As the world is shrinking, interdependence is growing, the room for manoeuvrability by nation states is becoming narrow. The institutions of global governance are either fragmented, weak, missing or ineffective. The Bretton-Woods institutions played their critical role in the 20th century when reconstruction and assisting emerging new nations was the pressing need of the time. The United Nations also carried out its mandate, particularly in peace-keeping and humanitarian assistance reasonably well. But in the current and future situation of ‘divergent interests, conflicting incentives and differing norms and values’ (WEF 2011, p. 6), these institutions have either to be reformed, revamped or new institutions are to be set up in their place. The G-20 mechanism is a good interim solution and so are the Development Rounds, the Millennium Development Goals and World Summits and conferences at Rio and Copenhagen but a more permanent architecture would have to be put in place that could be allowed to evolve over time.
'Climate change, financial instability, nuclear proliferation', health pandemics and terrorism are global challenges that cannot be solved 'by even the most powerful nations' who are the ones 'most reluctant to cede national sovereignty' (Stephens 2010) and the existing international institutional mechanisms to tackle these challenges are quite ineffective.

Same is the case with 'illegal trade in drugs, arms, intellectual property, people and money' (Naim 2002, p. 2) amounting to US$2 trillion (Naim 2002). These issues have precipitated violence and conflicts in many parts of the world and governments are pitted against agile, stateless and resourceful networks empowered by technology, stronger political and economic linkages (Ibid.). Shrinking importance of geographic distance has made the issues of governance at international, national and local level highly intractable.

At the national level, ‘a regime’s capacity to govern is measured by how it performs three key tasks: mobilising political support (legitimisation); providing public goods (performance); and, managing internal tensions (conflict resolution)’ (Minxin 2002). 'State incapacitation (is) exemplified by a government’s increasing inability to provide essential services such as education, health care, public safety, law enforcement, and environmental protection' (Ibid.).

Expanding urbanisation of middle class in Asia exerts new demands for greater voice and participation, greater accountability for results and better public services (WE Forum 2009). This requires effective institutions of governance at the national and local levels. These institutions will have to be ‘retooled with an emphasis on transparency, accountability, and enforceability’ (Kohli et al. 2011, p.5).

'Private grievances are more likely to find violent expression when institutional mechanisms for resolving them are inaccessible, unresponsive and inadequate’ (Minxin 2002). In Pakistan, many observers attribute the growing menace of lawlessness and disorder to the gradual disappearance of the writ of the state arising from the weakening of institutions at the national and local level.

**Climate Change**

Economic growth is the surest foundation for more positive adaptation to climate change. China has demonstrated the benefits of economy doubling every seven to eight years – an unprecedented 16 fold increase in income during a single generation and 10 fold increase in share in the world trade (Arora and Vamvakidis 2010).

The Stern Report has raised awareness of economists about the costs and benefits of climate agenda (Stern 2007). Many policy makers were convinced in light of the evidence presented in the Report that due to increased concentration of carbon dioxide since 2000, fossil fuels should be substituted by alternative renewable energy sources. China is making impressive strides in clean technology and renewable energy. It is...
vigorously investing in clean-energy and its share in world’s solar panels had risen to 32% by 2008. As compared to the US, investment made by China in clean-energy is twice as much (World Bank 2012). The adoption in 2009 of the target to keep the temperature rise 2-degree Celsius (°C) below is a welcome step, but a World Bank (2012a) report reveals that the world is on track towards 4-degree Celsius (°C) warming which would entail ‘extreme heat waves, declining food stocks, loss of ecosystem and biodiversity and life-threatening sea-level rise’. This necessitates a more urgent response by the international community for adaptation and mitigation. The Green Climate Fund should be financed fully even before the deadline of 2020 so that developing nations are able to protect their people’s health, agriculture and economies by converting to cleaner energy sources and in adapting to a shifting climate.

At the international level, Copenhagen 2009 proved to be quite disappointing, but recent reports suggests that the United States is becoming more receptive to the climate change agenda and to the risks arising from the rise in global temperature. Prospects for a global climate deal in 2015 will improve if the US plays a constructive leadership role. Capping of United States carbon emissions through legislative action can change the dynamic of the talks. Hurricane Sandy 2012 that hit the East Coast of the United States has alerted the public to the growing risks of climate change.

In Pakistan, the World Bank Environmental Assessment Report (2006, p.i) estimates that health costs of pollution and degradation of natural resources are 6% of GDP per year. The major issues in Pakistan relate to waste management, natural hazards and climate change (Gowdy and Salman 2008). It has been quoted in many papers that ‘Pakistan is vulnerable to climate change because it generally has a warm climate; it lies in a region where the temperature increases are expected to be higher than the global averages; its land area is mostly arid and semi-arid and its rivers are predominantly fed by the Hindukush, Karakoram, and Himalayan glaciers that are reported to be receding rapidly due to global warming’ (Rasul et al. 2012; Hanif et al. 2010). The negative effects of climate change will be experienced in water resources, energy, health, biodiversity with a major impact on agriculture productivity due to change in temperature.

As a result of climate change, the Indus River system is likely to be affected by gradual glacial recession in the Himalayas. It is projected that flooding will increase within the next five decades followed by a decrease in water flow upto 30 to 40% over a hundred years (Briscoe and Qamar 2006, p.xvii.) This will dramatically cause fluctuations in irrigation water supply with increased temperature and decreased precipitation impacting water availability for crops. The decline in irrigated wheat yield would accentuate problems of food security.

**Shift in Economic Power**
The shift in economic power equilibrium is taking place with immense speed. Emerging and Developing Economies (EDEs) which were epitome of sympathy and pity and a
source of worry until the end of the 20th century have now become the ‘engine of global economic growth’ (IMF 2012). Over the past five years, they have accounted for around two-thirds of global growth. United States, Europe and Japan – the traditional economic power houses of global economy – are in deep recession. For the developing countries of Asia, growth rate in 1990 was around 7%. By 2010, it had increased to around 8.5%, while actual growth was above this trend line. It is not only growth in which EDEs are leading the world, but as a World Bank former President, Bob Zoellick (2012) puts it…

...in trade, commodities, currencies and exchange rates, finance, investment, knowledge development, the environment and security too is a tectonic shift that has happened roughly over the past ten years, a microsecond in historic terms.

The share of United States which was almost half of the global output in 1950 has fallen to 20% while that of China which was only 10% in 1980 is set to move up to 17% by 2015. EDEs now account for almost half of the world GDP (Asia accounts for 28%). In the decade 2000-10, Brazil, Russia, India and China (BRICs) added US$8 trillion to global GDP, which is equivalent to about 80% of the G-7 economies. These countries will add around US$12 trillion over the next decade; double the US and Eurozone combined. It was estimated that in the five year period (2007-12), China will expand its output by close to 60%; Emerging Asia 50% but advanced economies only 3%.

Should the current differential in the growth rates (almost 4 percentage points annually) between the Advanced Economies (AEs) and EDEs persist, the latter will soon overtake Advanced Economies. In the decade to come, the United States, Japan and Europe are likely to grow slowly but some observers believe that ‘their sluggishness will look less worrisome compared with the even bigger story in the global economy, which will be the three to four percent slowdown in China’ (Sharma 2012, p.5). The challenge for countries such as China and BRICs is how to sustain rapid increase in productivity and manage huge structural shifts as their economies become more sophisticated and therefore more vulnerable to exogenous shocks both anticipated and unanticipated. In the words of the Chinese leader Wen Jiabao, how to avoid the economy becoming ‘unstable, unbalanced, uncoordinated and ultimately unsustainable will be the main challenge for them.’

It is estimated that by 2030, the size of the middle class will rise from 2 billion in 2012 (28% of the total population) to 4.9 billion in 2030 (61% of the total population) (The Economist 2011c). For the first time in human history, more people will belong to the middle class than poor. The demand for access to education, jobs, social security, and health care will place stress on public finances and the capacity of these new economic powers. This, in turn, depends on the governance structures that have to be evolved to address these issues.

2 Calculated from various IMF, World Bank and OECD publications.
Income Inequality
The Global Risks Survey carried out by the World Economic Forum every year identified ‘economic disparity as one of the most important risks in the coming decade....Economic disparity is tightly interconnected with corruption, demographic challenges, fragile states, global imbalances and asset-price collapse’ (World Economic Forum 2011, p.10).
‘Countries with greater disparities of income also fare worse in all manner of social indicators from higher murder rates to lower life expectancy’ (The Economist 2011a).

Income of the top 20% wealthiest Americans was 14% in 1970s and had risen to 27% by 1990s, while that of the bottom 20% rose from 9% to 10% only. Top 0.1% of the earners in America, Britain and France in 1913-2008 received 8% of total income (80 times more than the lower 90% ) compared to 2% in 1960s. Top 1% Americans earned 20 times more than the rest in 2006, while the ratio was 10 times in 1980s (The Economist 2011b). Income of top 1% of United States population, after adjusting for inflation, rose by 25% between 1979 and 2006, but middle class rose only 21% and the poor class 11% (Saez 2007). Alesina and Perotti (2011) argue that high levels of income inequality are associated with increased social instability; unrest often erupts when a wealthy middle class is weakened.

In Pakistan, despite some robust average growth and modest reduction in the incidence of poverty, lack of access to basic social services such as good education, healthcare and sanitation have created serious implications for survival of the state. In a multi-ethnic society, if the benefits of prosperity mainly accrue to one province or a major ethnic group the other feels deprived, neglected and discriminated. These groups voice their resentment in the form of violence against other ethnic groups or join criminal gangs or mafias to destabilise order in society or become part of religious and sectarian extremist groups hitting at the roots of the state. In either case, the resulting social and economic fragmentation undermines the sense of broader national cohesion and solidarity.

In countries such as Pakistan, laws, courts, institutions and enforcement machinery governing economic activities do not afford a level playing field to the poor and disadvantaged segments of society. Tax evasion widely practiced in Pakistan is in fact a transfer of income from the poor to the rich. Land disputes are seldom settled in favour of the weak and unconnected. Property rights and contact enforcement are tilted towards the rich and influential. These tendencies perpetuate and accentuate inequality.

Jobs and Employment
One of the major issues that is causing enormous concerns not only in EDEs, but also in advanced economies is high unemployment. Technology, trade and globalisation are all blamed by different analysts as the cause for this. Jobs not only provide income, but also a learning opportunity, self-esteem, and respect in the family and community. A fully employed economy is more politically stable than the one in which idle labour, particularly the youth, is hanging around. According to the Asian Development Bank
(2007), employment elasticity estimates suggest that developing Asia should be able to create sufficient jobs for new workers provided that growth does not stall and that growth continues to create jobs as it has in the past. If Pakistan grows between 6 and 7% annually, it can create enough jobs to absorb new entrants to the labour force. Growth is strongly and inversely conflated with agriculture output and employment shares in developing Asia. But countries that have increased their industry shares have, on an average grown more quickly. Likewise, those countries where employment share in industry has risen have enjoyed faster GDP growth (Ibid.).

For Pakistan, the largest employment elasticity coefficients are in the small and medium manufacturing and construction industry. Services sector has also figured prominently in the creation of jobs (Husain 2005). A wide range of services grow rapidly as industry and manufacturing expand. These include banking, finance, transportation, wholesale and retail trade. Unbundling and outsourcing of non-core activities like market research and accounting services that used to be carried out in-house has allowed firms to focus on core competencies, increasing productivity. As industry advances, it creates demand for knowledge services and requires scientific, technical and managerial workers.

According to the GoP’s Economic Survey (2011-12), informal employment constitutes almost three-fourths of total employment. Jobs and livelihoods earned by those in this sector are highly insecure. It is not only ill-health of the household head which deprives them of their earnings, but frequent closures caused by strikes, processions, religious and sectarian rallies and disturbances in urban areas. Some of the daily wage earners are forced to fall back upon charity for sustenance when the city is shut down for several days. The link between poor governance and corruption, failure of institutions for delivery of essential public services, unemployment and income inequality is quite strong. The vicious cycle can be broken only if governance and institutions are set right.
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Varied Manifestations of Democracy Contending with Violence and Terrorism\(^1\)
Nihal Rodrigo\(^*\)

**Abstract**
Change is the only constant factor in history. Forms of governance adjust to evolving situations. Some theorists see a Fourth Wave splashing the Middle East: others see it is part of the Third Wave’s flow. British colonialism ebbed after the Second Wave, usefully bequeathing English language as a means for South Asian connectivity. All South Asian governments had declared versions of democracy as their chosen form of governance before the Third Wave.

The essence of democracy is in its process of decision-making, implementation and governance by regimes, acceptable to the majority of their people who have expressed, through free exercise of the vote, their political, economic and other preferences. However, feelings of exclusion due to class, caste, gender, religious and ethnic disparities sully democratic systems in South Asia. These have led to riot, revolt and rebellion: even terrorism and secessionist tendencies as in Sri Lanka until 2009.

There can be no single-fit governance model applicable throughout South Asia. The monarchical system in Bhutan has evolved to function democratically under ‘Gross National Happiness’ criteria. In Nepal, royalty has been replaced and a new political system is being evolved. A consensual devolution package between Sri Lanka’s Central Government and provinces, in the post-conflict situation is being worked out.

Democracy remains South Asia’s best option. A single conceptual construction applicable to all states need not be forced, nor measured against the Third Wave. This was clear in statements of Heads of States at the SAARC Summit in November 2011 (SAARC 2011).

The Third Wave is a reality. The US, as its central mover, is however aware of other major developments shaping global relationships. The United States National Intelligence Council (USNIC) in its last 4-yearly Report (2008) sensed the world moving in major systemic change, including transfer of ‘global wealth and economic power...from West to East’. A US-Asian axis for sustained global development and governance helpful for South Asia and ‘the Rest’ is likely.

\(^1\) This chapter has been approved as a perspective essay by the referee.

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Theories on Democracy

Samuel Huntington’s book, ‘The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late 20th Century’ in 1991 was followed, soon after, by Francis Fukuyama’s book with the rather morbid title ‘The End of History and the Last Man’ in 1992. Following on the dissolution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in December 1991, Fukuyama (1992) in the introductory chapter indicated that the origins of his theory of international relations lay in an article he had provided to the journal *The National Interest*, in the summer of 1989. In this, he had piously argued that Western ‘liberal democracy’ would constitute ‘the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution’ and ‘the final form of human governance’ (Fukuyama 1992, p. xi). However, we have not yet reached, and may even never reach, what he then, in all seriousness, claimed and described as the ‘end point of mankind’s ideological evolution.’

Varying forms of governance have evolved over the centuries in different continents, each having had to adjust in response to changing situations. In Greece, its brand of democracy (*demokratia*) of around 4th century BC is, more often than other forms, considered as its earliest example. It was projected as a classic relationship between *demos* (the people) and *kratos* (power) anticipating the current ‘people-power’. Varied manifestations of the process have evolved, beyond Greece, over the centuries with its waves, or high tides, surging and receding. No exclusive ‘copyright’ can be established on the methodology of democracy. In today’s context of globalization, given all its diverse forms of national manifestation, democracy is being linked with varying types of home-bred governance methodologies to meet the specific needs of national political situations. The need to adhere to democratic governance, despite variations in its application, is very much a reality from the perspective of South Asian countries. The so-called Third Wave is just one aspect of a more complicated situation in the region.

In the South Asian context, at a workshop in New Delhi, India held by the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), Shiv Shankar Menon, Security Advisor to the Indian Prime Minister, and a former Foreign Secretary, spoke on Kautilya’s *Arthashashtra* of the 3rd century BC. Menon described the manner, or science, within which Kautilya had dealt with varied situations that had arisen in past centuries. They also included concepts and issues of democratic governance and economics such as ‘of multipolarity, of asymmetries in distribution of power, of debate on purposes of power, of utility of force and of several issues of current resonance’ (Menon 2012).

All of these concepts have kept evolving and changing over time, in their respective manifestations in various entities, in order to contend with both the domestic, as well as the important inter-related neighbourhood nexus. Given the current flowing waves of globalization, both negative and positive, there is a need for all states, whether big or small, to interact with the larger global community of states of which they are a part. The means and methods of internal national governance within individual states, therefore, can no longer remain isolated and free from mutually helpful foreign engagement; nor
indeed unwarranted involvement, intervention or interference. Democracy or any other related forms of governance cannot thrive nor languish in complete isolation. The impact and interests of neighbours, the United Nations, regional and multilateral agencies and the assorted human rights organisations are all very much aspects which impact national democratic governance.

In the current context, some theorists have seen a ‘Fourth Wave of Democracy’ splashing over the Middle East: others see it as part of the Third Wave’s continuing flow impelled by the strategic and economic interests of outside powers as well as failures of local regimes to fulfil their own people’s aspirations and demands.

**Democracy in South Asia**

British colonialism ebbed away after the Second Wave of democracy, usefully bequeathing the legacy of the English language as a practical means for South Asian connectivity in the face of the region’s multilingual culture. Before the so-called Third Wave welled up, each of the original seven South Asian Governments in the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) established in 1985, had by then, declared their individual national perceptions/versions of democracy as their chosen form of governance.

The essence of democracy is deeply embedded in its actual essential domestic working processes in different national contexts, much more than in the many externally implanted, sometimes abstract descriptions of its theory. In each of the present eight South Asian countries, democratic procedures and governance practices have had to adjust to the realities of changing circumstances, both local and external. Democracy involves varying internal processes of consultations, decision-making, implementation and governance by the respective regimes. Any democratic regime needs to win and maintain acceptance from the majority of its people. It is essential that the people themselves should have had the opportunity, through the free exercise of the vote, or by other means of expressing and securing their political, economic, social and other preferences.

Cooperation and close coordination among the three main traditional constituent arms of democracy, the Legislature, the Executive and the Judiciary, are essential requirements for effective governance. Sri Lanka’s present Senior Minister of Governance and Infrastructure (who was formerly Prime Minister), Ratnasiri Wickremesinghe, commenting on a current controversial situation relating to the position of the Chief Justice in the country stated, ‘the Legislature, the Executive, and the Judiciary should work in close coordination. Any institution subject to public opinion should not attempt to consider itself superior to the other’ (Daily Mirror 2013).
Voice of the People: Exclusion from Governance Processes

Beyond the above triaxial essentials of democracy, the vehement views and voices of the people expressed on certain critical, but sometimes neglected, issues need also to be taken into account as a form of democratic expression. Regrettably, violence can sometimes become part of such popular expression, even leading to mob rule as well. The views of a Pakistani Deputy Inspector General of Police, Zulfiqar Cheema, following some extremist incidents in 2010 was that mob rule would need to be controlled by reinforcing the writ of the State, restoring Government credibility and rebuilding community institutions that would create space for dialogue and negotiations. He felt that all political parties in a country need ‘to realize the risks of giving in to mobs and will have to come together on this issue to reduce social, political and economic polarization’ (Jamal 2012).

The late United States President Abraham Lincoln’s well known description of democracy as being a process of governance ‘of the people, by the people, and for the people’ continues to remain valid. When there are differences, indeed sometimes even conflict, among the Executive, the Legislature and the Judiciary, as they have in South Asia, including Sri Lanka and Pakistan, people may need to step onto platforms of protest.

At the level of the people, notwithstanding the strong assertions and projections relating to South Asia’s common cultural heritage and connectivity, there are also deep feelings of exclusion perceived by some communities or groups within the region. These have arisen from firm assertions, as well as violent expressions of separate identities, which have been stereotyped on the basis of gender, class, caste, religions and ethnic disparities. These issues do not always respect national boundaries and can also often spill out of their country of origin and can also affect bilateral relations among neighbouring states as well (as they do in South Asia).

Terrorism: Subversion of Democracy

Such assertions have engendered even terrorism and secessionist tendencies across borders as they had, for example, in Sri Lanka. Constitutional disputes and tensions between the Tamil and the Sinhalese communities had existed even during the British colonial period which ended in 1948. In the late 1970s, such ethnic and communal assertions led to the formation of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). The group based its campaign chiefly on the use of violence and terrorism to force the establishment of a mono-ethnic separatist Tamil state in areas of the country where they were concentrated. However, the majority of people, even among the Tamil community itself, totally rejected terrorism and preferred to pursue democratic constitutional means, however slow they may be, in order to secure their demands. Due to bilateral concerns between India and Sri Lanka, involving Tamilnadu state in India in particular, the latter did provide early training to some of the Sri Lankan terrorists. Eventually, India had to send its own troops to fight the LTTE in Sri Lanka. Tragically, it was eventually an
LTTE suicide bomber who assassinated Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, in situ, in India.

At a Strategic Studies Summit in November 2010 sponsored by the US Near East South Asia Centre for Strategic Studies (NESA), I described an extensive international democratic ‘society of States’ which had been brokered by Norway to help work for the goal of a peace process in Sri Lanka with the participation of the LTTE as well. This was based on an optimistic election manifesto of Sri Lanka’s former Prime Minister Ranil Wickremasinghe who spelt out the following ambitious goal: ‘We will end the war and build national unity. We will bring about a political solution, acceptable to all those who are party to the crisis, within the framework of an undivided Sri Lanka…We will involve the LTTE in the process’ (Keethaponcalan and Jayawardana 2009, p.11). Several democratic states, including Norway, Japan, the United States, and the European Union assisted the efforts for a peaceful resolution of the issues involved. Many negotiating encounters in which this ‘society of democratic states’ was engaged were held in different world capitals, to reach a peaceful democratic settlement with the LTTE. They all eventually ended in frustration. The LTTE continued with its devious terrorist activities. Following a democratic change of Government in Sri Lanka led by current President Mahinda Rajapaksa, the LTTE in 2008 blocked essential water supplies from an irrigation scheme from reaching thousands of innocent civilians in Mavil Aru. This left the Government of the President Mahinda Rajapaksa with no alternative but to resolutely take decisive military action against the LTTE to defend the safety and livelihood security of all communities in the country. All communities in Sri Lanka were victims of the LTTE’s terrorist campaign for its goal of a mono-ethnic racist apartheid state which no community in Sri Lanka supported. The LTTE was eventually, militarily, defeated by May 2009.

Pronouncements of the United Nations on Sri Lanka’s Battle against Terrorism
Paradoxically, the essential military and other action taken by successive Governments in Sri Lanka to ensure the continued success of democratic processes and the security and safety of its people against terrorism have also been subject to critical comments by some global human rights organisations and foreign television channels. The United Nations, nevertheless issued three major consensual documents which comprehensively assessed the evil impact of terrorism on the democratic processes of Sri Lanka, the Government’s essential military campaign against terrorism, and its eventual conclusion.

The first was the consensual Statement issued on the 13 May 2009 by the United Nations Security Council, during the final stages of the conflict against terrorism (UN Document SC 9659). The Statement strongly condemned the LTTE for ‘its acts of terrorism over many years and for its continued use of civilians as human shields.’ The Statement also clearly acknowledged ‘the legitimate right of the Government of Sri Lanka to combat terrorism’ with the members of the Security Council demanding that the LTTE ‘lay down
its arms and allow tens of thousands of civilians still in the conflict zone to leave.' The Security Council accordingly requested the Government to 'take further necessary steps to facilitate the evacuation of the trapped civilians' (UN Security Council 2009).

The second document was issued on the occasion of the visit of the UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon to Sri Lanka in order to assess, in situ, the true prevailing situation in the country. During his visit, he had talks with the Sri Lanka President and officials and also had several close encounters of the open kind with members of civil society as well. A consensual Joint Statement was issued by the Secretary General and the Government of Sri Lanka on 23 May 2009 (Document SG/2151). It noted, inter alia, discussions the Secretary General had with the Government and also 'other relevant stake-holders, members of the international humanitarian agencies and civil society.' This clearly indicated the open democratic consultative structures and processes in the country as well as its international reach. The concluding paragraph of the Joint Statement was of particular significance as the Secretary General underlined the importance of 'an accountability process for addressing violations of international humanitarian and human rights law.' The SG clearly stated that it would be the Government of Sri Lanka itself that would assess and 'take measures to address those grievances' (UN Secretary General 2009). Here too, confidence was expressed about democratic aspects of the governance process in Sri Lanka.

The third multilateral consensus on Sri Lanka was reached at the Special Session of the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) in Geneva, four days later, on 27 May 2009. This document also reaffirmed its 'respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of Sri Lanka and its sovereign rights to protect its civilians and to combat terrorism.' It further condemned 'all attacks that the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) launched on the civilian population and its practice of using civilians as human shields' (UNHRC 2012).

Sri Lanka’s basic democratic framework and decisive military action were eventually successful in eliminating the vicious terrorism of the LTTE in the country despite all obstacles. However, some members of remaining residual rump groups supportive of the LTTE’s mono-ethnic separatism, for their own reasons, have infiltrated particular elements in the Sri Lanka diaspora. These groups are active in foreign countries, including Canada, Britain and Australia, all three governments committed to democratic forms of governance.

Yielding perhaps to some external pressures, the UN Secretary General subsequently took a decision to undertake yet another assessment of the situation in Sri Lanka. He appointed a UN panel of three experts to ‘advice him on the implementation’ of the Joint Statement which he had issued on 23 May 2009 in agreement with the Government of Sri Lanka (UN 2011). However, none of the three members of the Panel visited Sri Lanka to directly gather and assess the actual prevailing situation, in situ, for the report. Moreover,
the Panel was surprisingly content to merely ‘analyse information’ from what they themselves reported ambiguously as ‘a variety of sources’, (Ibid. p.i), none of which were however specified. Members of the Panel were also quite content to complacently determine ‘an allegation to be credible if there was a reasonable basis to believe that the underlying act or event occurred’ (Ibid. p.i). The Panel was, moreover, concentrating, without balance, largely on the ‘final stages of the conflict’, virtually ignoring all other atrocities of the LTTE over three preceding decades which have been condemned globally by democratic states. The atrocities include the cold-blooded assassination of the Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, the Sri Lankan President Ranasinghe Premadasa, the Sri Lankan Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar (himself an independent member of the Tamil community) and many other ministers as well as thousands of defenceless civilians, including those at worship in temples, mosques and churches. An open invitation to the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Navaneethan Pillay to visit Sri Lanka to view, first hand, the results of the rehabilitation efforts, has been extended to her by the Sri Lanka Government.

India’s Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, who is clearly dedicated to democratic governance, had occasion to comment, in a formal statement at the United Nations General Assembly about the ‘growing assertions of separate identities and ethnic, cultural and religious intolerance (which) threaten development efforts and cooperation to combat terrorism’ (Singh 2011). It was, as indicated earlier, such assertions in India which had in the past, even pressured its Government into training terrorist cadres of the LTTE to attack targets in neighbouring Sri Lanka. However, learning lessons and moving away from that approach, India subsequently dispatched Indian troops into Sri Lanka to fight against the LTTE. Yet once more in 2012, avoiding armed entanglement, India nevertheless yielded to what its media described as ‘coalition compulsions’ i.e. the strong electoral pressures on the democratic federal Central Government of India exerted by ethno-centric elements in the southern State of Tamilnadu which is a close neighbour of Sri Lanka. Such compulsions eventually influenced India to vote against Sri Lanka on a resolution, initiated by the United States at the United Nations Human Rights Council (No. L 2 of 22 March). However, at the same time, India’s delegation at the Council, perhaps in understanding of other possible subsequent consequences, also took a moderating step to propose, and eventually succeed in securing an amendment moderating the thrust against Sri Lanka in the resolution. The amendment seeks to ensure that any future action that may be taken under the mandate of the resolution against the interests of Sri Lanka, should be pursued only after full discussion with, and with the concurrence of Sri Lanka. India, of course, continues to assist in Sri Lanka’s post-conflict socio-economic recovery.

An informal dialogue process between the Manipal Global Education group of India and the Pathfinder Foundation of Sri Lanka has examined the status of Indo-Sri Lankan relations in various areas. The dialogue has generated some practical recommendations to strengthen bilateral relations between the two countries and to deal with varied irritants
that may sometimes hinder stronger mutually beneficial cooperation in a number of economic, political, cultural and social aspects. A report with recommendations has been submitted to the respective Governments for their consideration.

**Variants of Democratic Governance in South Asia**

Given intra-state and inter-state complexities, there can be no single-fit governance model nor rigid democratic structures from the so-called Third Wave that could be applicable to all eight states in South Asia. The monarchical system of governance in Bhutan, for example, has gone through many evolutionary stages to function democratically under the country’s ‘Gross National Happiness’ criteria. The United Nations has even held consultative meetings to explore aspects of this criteria. In Nepal, royalty has been replaced and a new multi-party political system is being gradually evolved for implementation of democratic governance in the country. In Sri Lanka, a consensual devolution package, in the post-conflict situation, between the country’s Central Government and its Provinces is being worked out with the involvement of all political parties.

Despite varied complexities, democracy remains yet, and is accepted as South Asia’s best option. A single conceptual construct applicable to all states need not therefore be internationally forced on the region, by other Governments or by human rights organisations, nor be measured in terms of its perceived success in relation to the Third Wave. This was evident in the individual statements made by Heads of States at the 17th SAARC Summit held in Addu City, Maldives in November 2011. The statements focused on diverse national concerns about dangers and threats that needed to be faced by the individual South Asian countries which are committed to democratic systems of governance despite their national variations in application and implementation (SAARC 2011). Nepal’s Prime Minister Baburam Bhattarai said that ‘the increasing gap between rich and poor had given way to enormous stress on social harmony...peace and security.’ His point was that the challenge demands that poverty alleviation strategies be comprehensive, and that socio-economic processes need to be more democratic in their reach as well as be ‘genuinely people-centred and justice-based’ (SAARC 2011a). Bhutan’s Prime Minister Jigmy Thinly spoke disparagingly at the Summit about the complex adverse impact of globalization on the planet caused by insensitively ‘employing our genius and technology to extract more, and faster; sell and consume more; waste and pollute more; all in our singular aim for material gain in the pursuit of mistaken symbols of success’ (SAARC 2011b). These were particular aspects that Bhutan was most concerned about, although they were global in impact and extent. Sri Lanka’s President Mahinda Rajapaksa spoke of the concerns of the restless, dissatisfied youth. He said that what was evident now is ‘a mood of urgency, even of impatience... a large and influential part of our societies consist of young people, inspired by new ideas, looking forward with enthusiasm to a promising future. Patience is not infinite’ (SAARC 2011c).
Sustainable development within countries clearly requires protecting the interests of all communities, including those in neglected rural areas who may lack the numbers or organisational abilities and means to stage effective mass demonstrations to propagate their causes. Democratic governments need to protect rural communities from the perils of greedy corporate exploitation as the Prime Minister of Bhutan indicated at the SAARC Summit. In the larger national interest, state agencies also need to avoid parasitic damage and destruction of dwindling forest reserves and water resources which sustain rural communities as well as a country’s environment.

**Mass Public Demonstrations**

The mass demonstrations held on Wall Street in 2011, the corporate centre of New York, are also part of the rising, unfulfilled aspirations of frustrated youth. The Wall Street demonstrations are, however, not what influences South Asia. Mass public demonstrations in South Asia have agitated for practical action due to social and gender issues on which some Governments of the region concerned may have been ignorant, negligent, powerless or reluctant to take effective action. Such demonstrations amount to much more than a mere dribble of democracy inspired by external developments. For example, the public demonstrations and mass protests that followed the ruthless, cruel gang rape in New Delhi on 12 December 2012, which took the life of the innocent female undergraduate, were frankly described in a headline of a major newspaper as ‘a battle for equality, not just a fight against rape’ (The Hindu 2012). Many thousands protested against the initially slow State action taken against the rapists in this particularly horrific incident as well as against many other molesters guilty of hounding, sexually harassing and raping women. India’s Prime Minister Mannohan Singh was quoted as having said,

> *We have seen the emotions and energies this incident has generated...It would be a true homage to her memory if we were able to channelize these emotions and energies into constructive action... (the Government is examining) the penal provisions that exist for such crimes and measures to enhance the safety and security of women* (Timmons, Mandhana and Gottipati 2012).

The role of the general public beyond voting time at elections in democratic processes requires further comment. Governments need to make provisions to engage, outside of the State sector, responsible citizens in the corporate sectors, economic research groups, the legal profession, retired public servants who have made significant contributions to the national interest locally, or in assignments abroad, and truly independent members of civil society who have no obligations to foreign funding sources. Such engagements with capable persons outside the state sectors as well as careful consideration of their frank, focused views are vital. However, their views and advice need to move out of a purely theoretical ‘parallel’ framework. Parallel lines never meet. Such practical interactive engagements would be a vital factor in helping those in power who may otherwise sometimes remain insulated from realities confronting them and the people whose support they need. Blunt frank independent advice in the larger national interest would
benefit the State more than being comforted and appeased by those providing docile passive support for its policies.

Already, the SAARC Summit held in Thimphu (April 2010) has expressed the need of an open process to ‘reach out to different sections of the South Asian community, particularly its youth and students, private media, private sector, think tanks, civil society and institutions of economic development’ It was at this Summit that Heads of State/Governments agreed to set up the South Asia Forum (SAF) for ‘the generation of debate, discussion and the exchange of ideas on South Asia and its future development’ (SAARC 2010). The South Asia Forum had its initial meeting in New Delhi in September 2011 where all delegations were led at Ministerial level and also included members of the diverse non-governmental sectors identified at the Thimpu Summit. Following the meeting of the South Asia Forum, two preparatory meetings for the next Summit at Addu City in the Maldives were held in Male and in Kathmandu, both of which engaged members of the non-state sectors involved in economic and social issues. At the meeting in Male, the President of Maldives and the SAARC Secretary General also participated, together with a range of experts beyond SAARC. They included a former Secretary General of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), experienced officers of the European Union, the Asian Development Bank, four former Secretary Generals of SAARC and others. Their inputs and engagement provided a wider international dimension to SAARC activities which were also reflected in the Declaration adopted eventually in the Addu City Declaration.

**Restoration of Peace through Reconciliation, Rehabilitation and Strengthened Democracy**

At the national level, in Sri Lanka, following the defeat of LTTE terrorism, the Government selected a group inclusive of independent former members of the judiciary, the Government sector, civil society, former diplomats and others representing different ethnic groups in the country, to report on lessons to be learned from the ethnic conflict now ended. They were able to interact directly with the widest range of citizens of all communities and hear their frank views, including in areas worst affected about security, economic, social, and humanitarian factors which needed attention. Views were sought, and frankly expressed on how best to achieve the restoration of peace, reconciliation among citizens of all communities, rehabilitation of insurgents, and revitalization of the county’s economy which had been one of the region’s most successful in terms of the United Nations’ Human Development Index. South Africa’s own reconciliation experiences following the end of white racism and apartheid in the country provided useful guidelines. The Lessons Learned and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC) thus set up provided opportunities for all citizens in the country to express their views on the reconciliation process. Among those who openly expressed their views and concerns in the process were victims and offenders, members of the Government and opposition, the military, human rights groups, civil society and other concerned citizens from all areas of Sri Lanka, including the writer.
Taking account of all views expressed, including those that were critical, amounted, in a sense, to a democratic nationwide referendum. The LLRC submitted its Report and Recommendations to the Sri Lanka President in November 2011 which was made public a month later. The Report is under consideration. A National Action Plan Committee is currently working on the implementation of recommendations made in the Report.

Beyond South Asia, varying manifestations of the waves of democracy continue to flow as well as to ebb away in a trickle. Beyond South Asia, the United States, as a primary advocate of the wave, is impacting South Asia as well. Varied waves flow, not merely within states, but also between states even extending beyond the regional equation. Lack of more open extensive inter-state democratic interactions have had an impact on South Asia’s future as well. It has been heightened given the increasing threats which are now affecting all countries in the region brought about by current globalised economic, political, environmental and non-traditional security threats that respect no national boundaries. These trends are also impacting democratic governance structures in the global power equations, including economic, military and strategic balances.

**US Approaches to Global Trends**

The United States National Intelligence Council (USNIC), a state agency, seeks to predict, ponder and project trends in global developments every four years. Its latest report *Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds* was released at the end of December 2012. There is an implicit recognition in the thematic sub-title accorded to the USNIC report that the various Waves of Democracy do not serve as sole and exclusive models nor as a common mode applicable to all nations for engaging people and sustaining development. In the present shifting global context, alternatives to democratic means and hybrids do exist. Blog posts in the US, in anticipation of the USNIC assessments, had prophesized and projected, inter alia, global scenarios and prospects, some of which clearly impact South Asia’s sustainable development as well. For example, among the blogs were those on ‘China’s challenge to the liberal order and India’s attraction to it and the possibilities for Western revitalization in light of the global embrace of democratic norms’; ‘Liberal democracy is here to stay, Thank you - but it needs to be tended and adapted’ (Friends of Human Rights 2012).

An earlier USNIC’s report, released in 2008, *Global Trends to 2025: A Transformed World* correctly anticipated the world moving through a period of major systemic change, including the irrefutable transfer of ‘relative wealth and economic power roughly from West to East’ (USNIC 2008, p.vi). The report further conceded frankly that ‘for the most part, China, India and Russia are not following the Western liberal model for self-development’ (Ibid. p. vii) which for the US signified democracy. It further anticipated, with a sense of realism, that alternatives and hybrids to Western forms of democracy were emerging as governance models. The US nevertheless remained ‘optimistic about the long term prospects for greater democratization, even though advances were seen as
likely to be slow…(and that) globalization is subjecting many recently democratized countries to increasing social and economic pressures’ (USNIC 2008, p. vii).

China, India and ‘the Asian Century’

In the same year 2008, China and India signed their own significant bilateral Shared Vision for the 21st Century. Democracy, a la the Third Wave, is not upheld as the central binding criteria in the Vision document. The two countries, one declared the largest Democracy in the world, and the other the largest Communist country in the world, each function within different systems of governance. However, in practical terms they recognized their ‘historical responsibility to ensure comprehensive, balanced and sustainable social development’ (MoEA GoI 2008). Both significantly also acknowledged ‘the right of each country to choose its own path of social, economic and political development’. The Sino-Indian ‘Shared Vision’ also viewed that ‘drawing lines on the grounds of ideologies and values, or on geographical criteria, is not conducive to peaceful and harmonious co-existence’ (MoEA GoI 2008).

Whatever the reports and media assessments of the United States pre-election Obama-Romney debates had seemed to portend, China’s relations with the US are also developing on pragmatic lines, despite conceptual and ideological complexities, as well as some mutual suspicions about each other’s policies.

USNIC (2012) also indicated the following developments as being among what were described as ‘Relative Certainties’: a) despite a global multipolar system emerging, the relative power of non-state actors, businesses, tribes, religious groups and evil criminal cartels will increase; b) the potential for conflict will increase; c) terrorism is unlikely to disappear by 2025.

Implicit in all this is that forms of governance and ideological approaches could vary in diverse waves and flows, and that no single universally acceptable democratic system is likely to emerge. The reference to the corporate sector as ‘businesses’ is also an indication of the realistic approach to methods of economic development.

All these have had a significant impact on South Asia’s own development, not only within each individual state, but also in respect of inter-state relations as they have had on the Indo-Sri Lankan equation (the Indian support for the US resolution on Sri Lanka at the United Nations Human Rights Commission) not withstanding other sound bilateral relations.

Security aspects in the Indian Ocean Region will be affected in the wake of the US declaration that it was moving away from the Middle East to focus now on its ‘Pivot to the Indo-Pacific’ (i.e the Indian Ocean region, the South China Seas with links to the Pacific Ocean). The ‘Pivot’ has complexities that will be impact international democratic norms. China’s role in the South Asian region, including particularly across the Indian
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Ocean region, is subject to sensationalized security speculation, including the much publicized ‘String of Pearls’2 theory (MacDonald et al. 2004). This theory links the South Asian ports of Gwadar in Pakistan, Hambantota in Sri Lanka, and Chittagong in Bangladesh, all developed with China’s technology and funds, as being an integral part of the latter’s central strategy to contain India. In fact, the development of these South Asian ports has been motivated fundamentally (not by security issues against India), rather by corporate economic considerations that have been the primary concern behind China’s development of naval connectivity eastwards across the Indian Ocean.

The Indian Ocean, in which the island of Sri Lanka is located, has over 30 other states which border it. Well over 50% of world container transport, annually, utilizes the IOR for its movements. Around 70% of all global oil supplies also move across the Indian Ocean. The IOR also provides easier, more convenient connectivity with the provision of transit ports, storage warehouses, ‘break bulk’ facilities and re-fuelling points in Sitwe (Myanmar), Chittagong, Colombo and Hambantota and Gwadar en route across East Asia, South East Asia, South Asia, the Middle East and Europe.

The US ‘Pivot to the Indo-Pacific’

With the United States eventually moving away from the Middle East and its subsequent strategic orientation to, and focus on ‘the Pivot to the Indo-Pacific’, China would now be assessing rising security factors in the Indian Ocean region as well as in its neighbouring South China Seas. These would also include security aspects and some conflicting marine territorial claims already involving a number of other states, in particular, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Philippines and as well as Australia where a US military contingent has been recently based.

Sustainable development and democratic norms in South Asia, across the IOR and beyond are also being imperilled by growing extremist activities of globalised criminal cartels in which residual rump groups of Sri Lanka’s LTTE are also now reported to be corporate collaborators. The activities include non-traditional threats such as extensive people smuggling for illegal migration as well as for prostitution, drug trafficking, illegal arms smuggling, piracy and credit card and other cyber crimes. Each of these threats poses major bilateral, regional and even multilateral concerns to the countries involved. Consensual strategies, following democratic consultations are needed among all affected countries to work together to effectively deal with these common threats, notwithstanding some clear disparities in their respective national strategic powers.

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2 Phrase coined by Booz Allen Hamilton, Consultants for the US Defence Department, in their report ‘Energy Futures in Asia’.
Strategic Cooperation

Sri Lanka, centred in the Indian Ocean region in this context, hosted the 3rd session of its Galle Dialogue in December 2012 in which 27 concerned countries freely participated. The Sri Lanka Defence Secretary, Gotabaya Rajapaksa has emphasized the vital need for 'partnerships and cooperation to face our future challenges by harmonizing our resources and capabilities.' This, well beyond abstract theory, acquires the nature of a practical global inter-state democratic wave which could engage participants from all regions including those with varying diverse governance systems, unrelated to the Third Wave. Countries participating in the Galle Dialogue, in addition to host country Sri Lanka, were, alphabetically (to avoid unintended ‘precedence’ to anyone on the basis of their relative commitments to democratic values), Australia, Bangladesh, Canada, China, France, Germany, Indonesia, India, Iran, Israel, Japan, Kenya, Maldives, Netherlands, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Russia, Seychelles, South Africa, Thailand, the United Kingdom, the United States, Vietnam and Zambia.

Despite the diversity in forms of governance among the 27 participating countries, free consultations among them focused, as the Sri Lanka Defence Secretary described it, on 'the need for nations to look beyond their own immediate security threats and operational considerations to forge cooperation and partnership at the strategic level' (MoDaUD 2012). This free, frank and open democratic inter-state wave of cooperation is currently essential in order to deal with piracy, terrorism, human smuggling, gun running, drug trafficking, illegal and unregulated fishing, and other non-traditional security issues. Threats shared and feared in common affect a variety of countries in their bilateral equations as well. In an international cooperative democratic fashion they all, whatever their respective forms of governance, could mutually benefit by working together on security and non-traditional threats. This is a vital democratic wave that needs encouragement to deal effectively with non-state, non-traditional security threats. Sri Lanka and Australia, as one example, have cooperated and coordinated on the sensitive issue of people smuggling which is part of the illegal corporate activities of the rump residue of LTTE cadres still in action. Sri Lanka also continues its close cooperation with the world’s largest communist country, China on a number of issues, bilaterally as well as internationally.

Making the World Safe for Diversity and Cooperation

Current relations between the United States, the largest economy in the world and China, the second largest economy are also thriving despite a number of issues relating to, among others, exchange rates for the Chinese currency the Yuan, tariff issues, limitations on rare earth exports, intellectual property rights questions and blocks on Chinese investments in US companies. Neither country wishes a violent confrontation that could affect their mutually beneficial relations. There is no heady clash of civilizations. Former US President John F. Kennedy’s general comment is still relevant, ‘If we cannot end now our differences, at least we can help make the world safe for diversity.’
Democratic governance has many forms as discussed earlier which basically concentrates on South Asia. Just as much as South Asia’s inter-state cooperation and development should not be tied to ideological perceptions and variations on democracy, so too must United States-China cooperation not break down, nor remain frigid and frozen as in the Cold War era. China’s outgoing President, Hu Jintao at the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) in December 2012 spoke of the Republic’s practice of ‘consultative democracy’. In China, all its citizens do not vote in a single nation-wide election, in their individual capacities. However, the process of ‘consultative democracy’ helps in assessment of the essential needs of the people, and engages them to participate in governance through what is described by the CPC as ‘extensive consultations’ with the varying strata and segments of China’s vast population living scattered across all provinces and regions of the country. These consultations engage political parties, the defence services, social organisations, corporate entities, religious and ethnic groups, academics, strategic think-tanks, writers, artists and others. On returning home after serving as Ambassador to China, I spoke at a meeting organised by the Sri Lanka-China Society in Colombo, in September 2007, to commemorate 50 years of China-Sri Lanka Diplomatic Relations, the Peoples Republic was then the fourth largest economy in the world. It is today the second largest economy and Justin Yifu Lin, an economist at the World Bank, predicts China’s economy could surpass that of the United States by 2016.

The 18th National Congress resolved to combat rampant corruption in China. Hu Jintao sternly described measures being taken, through ‘punishment and prevention, conducted through investigations into major corruption cases’ on those held guilty, whoever they are, and ‘regardless of their positions in the CPC hierarchy and be brought to justice without mercy.’ Bo Xi Lai, one of China’s most brilliant and powerful personalities has been sentenced following the results of enquiries made into some his corporate dealings.

**Conclusion**

Rigid dependence and adherence to a single systemic theory of political governance or economic development cannot sustain a country’s continued stability or progress. Like oceanic waves, systems rise and fall. Economic and political tsunamis could also occur as they once did for rigid Soviet-type politico-economic systems, as well as currently in some economies within the European Union. Mythology affects democracy as well. South Asian development needs to be engineered with the engagement of the general public as well as the application of realistic political and economic development planning which could benefit from practical, pragmatic, professional guidance and cooperation, of course avoiding those who have cunningly, illegally made-off (pun intended) with millions.
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Toward a Typology of Civil-Military Disputes

Sunil Dasgupta

The classical description of the civil-military relations problem is of a society having an army strong enough to defend it but not so strong that it threatens the society itself. While this description captures the core dilemma of civil-military relations, there is a much wider range of civil-military disputes that the fear of a predatory army does not capture. Threat to the society from an army need not be that of a military coup d’état, curtailed civil liberties, or emergency conditions. The army could be grabbing resources from other productive uses, avowing choices that the society finds unacceptable, or forcing unwanted choices about when and how to fight a war. Indeed, in a world that has become more democratic, we should expect the military to be more subtle in asserting its prerogatives.

In Turkey and Egypt, for example, the military has retreated from its previous role as the protector of authoritarian regimes, but both countries appear to have replaced the old model of civil-military relations with implicit civil-military deals that allow the armed forces to secure some of their corporatist goals while sacrificing their strategic roles. In India, which is rare among developing countries for having avoided military rule, severe civil-military relation stresses have disconnected military and political elements of grand strategy at one end of the spectrum and the broken down relationship has led to an unprecedented shortage of officers in the Indian Army at the other end. In most of Latin America (except Venezuela and Colombia), the withdrawal of the military from politics has been completed, but these nations struggle with how to reconfigure their armed forces in a new era. Counter-narcotics operations are seductive because they draw U.S. aid, but can they be the raison d’etre for an army: where is national defence? In Japan and Germany, there is an inability to alter the civil-military relationship between society and the armed forces in line with increased economic power of those countries. Rather than national defence shaping civil-military relations, which is how the problem of civil-military relations is classically understood, civil-military relations determine national defence prerogatives.

The civil-military relations problem in the United States after the Cold War, for example, has been one of a ‘culture gap’ between civilian leaders and military institutions. In particular, where American society has become increasingly liberal in its views on gender and sexuality, the armed forces have remained conservative. The recent changes made by the Obama Administration to allow open gay service and to expand the
occupational roles for women in the armed forces are efforts to impose civilian values on the military.

The larger question here is whether Americans care about the culture gap only because of the ultimate fear of the military disobeying civilian orders. Military insubordination is a distant possibility in the United States. To the contrary, Americans care about open gay service and wider occupational roles for women as issues that stand on their own, whether or not they affect the core dilemma of civil-military relations.

While there is an extraordinary amount of scholarly work done on organizational culture, recruitment, basing, technology development, and other forms of non-core civil-military interactions, the politics of civil-military relations are always defined as a problem of control. This is especially true of the so-called developing world, where the primary conclusion of the study of civil-military relations is to suggest one or another form of civilian control aimed at resolving the core dilemma. Yet non-core civil-military disputes have to be seen as important on their own and must be resolved independently of the type of civilian control in place in a country.

The many and often variegated problems are not reducible to the core dilemma of civil-military relations centred on predation and control. The multifaceted nature of civil-military relations raises the question why certain kinds of disputes become more salient in one state, while others are more critical elsewhere. What drives salience may be an overly obvious question: politics, of course, but what about the politics? While the principle of civilian supremacy may be important to the core civil-military relations dilemma, non-core disputes may not have to meet that high standard. In liberal societies where citizens are supposed to petition their government, the armed forces must be able to lobby for its interests just like any other group. To deny the military this right on grounds of maintaining proper civil-military relations would be illegitimate.

If we want to go beyond the core agency problem underlying civil-military relations, we must think more systematically about different kinds of civil-military disputes. The first step in that direction is to build a typology of civil-military disputes to organise our own thinking. Though military sociologists in particular have made great contributions to the study of non-core civil-military issues, I do not know of a typology of civil-military relations disputes. This essay offers a first-cut at a typology of civil-military relations problems built around the object of disputes. We can think of four types of overlapping, but nevertheless conceptually separable categories of problems in civil-military relations.

1. The first, and the most obvious one, comprises questions about where, when, and how to use force.
2. The second category constitutes questions about public support for use of force decisions. It is here that we include problems of predation: absent political and
public support for national security objectives, the military could simply abrogate to itself the right to set the agenda and forcibly extract necessary resources.

3. Third, there are questions about military preparedness. This category would include issues related to defence spending, weapons procurement, the military-industrial complex, and the development and absorption of military technology.

4. Lastly, there are questions about military welfare such as pay and promotion, veterans’ benefits, and the like. The rest of the paper explores and justifies an object-based typology.

Questions about the Use of Force

Decisions about when, where, and how to use force are central to the core dilemma in civil-military relations. The most common understanding of the problem is the militarization of policy, that is, the unwarranted resort to the use of force. Obviously, what constitutes unwarranted use of force is a judgment call, but this concern revolves around military leaders coming to a different judgment than their political masters and then acting on that judgment either overtly or covertly to steer national policy toward the use of force. Where military and civilian leaders agree there is no civil-military dispute; there may be downstream quarrels about how to use force.

A cultural and organizational belief underpins this possibility: the military is by definition militaristic, that is, it should believe in the use of force as a way of addressing security threats, and military leaders trained within the institution for the greater parts of their lives are expected to choose military solutions over others. The stereotype of this kind of military leader might be the general in the film Dr. Strangelove who advocates a massive bombing campaign in response to enemy threat, believing in some way that it was possible to win a nuclear war.

In a number of cases, military leaders have hesitated to use force even when ordered to do so. General George McClellan, for example, rejected President Abraham Lincoln’s orders to throw the Army of the Potomac into direct battle against the rebel Confederate forces, choosing instead to ‘save’ the army itself from the war. In the developing world, civilian rather than military leaders have led the domestic use of military force. The military usually went along with it under protest.

This is why Feaver (1996), the civil-military relations scholar, has described military obedience as an ‘always/never’ problem: the military must not only refrain from using force when it is not ordered to do so, but also not fail to use force when it is ordered to do so. Ensuring the military always uses force when ordered is as central to the civil-military relations problem as the need to ensure that it never uses force when it is not ordered. In The Soldier and the State, Huntington (1957) was concerned foremost about the United States being able to fight the Cold War. Without a history of long wars, and an ideological aversion toward standing armies, he feared that the US would succumb to the Soviet Union, an authoritarian state with the ability to conscript resources and citizens.
Tackling the always/never problem has required contradictory civil-military arrangements. Ensuring the military always acted when ordered required military autonomy with irreversible standard operating procedures, but the increased autonomy raised the risk of military action when no order was given. Conversely, efforts to ensure that a military unit never took action unless ordered would mean that at times it would refrain from action even when ordered. The resulting confusion is a key source of civil-military tension.

Given the ambiguity, Feaver has written elsewhere that the standard in civil-military relations on the issue of use of force is absolute: civilians decide and they have a right to be wrong. The military must follow even if the civilians are mistaken. In return, military leaders share no responsibility in decisions to go to war; that lies in the hands of the civilian authority alone. Military leaders do have a duty to offer their best advice of course, but the decision itself lies with political leaders alone.

Eliot Cohen (2003) has argued further that political leaders cannot simply decide to go to war and then hand over the conduct of the war to the generals. He believes that political leaders must compel the military—Lincoln sacked four generals before coming up good with Grant—to fight the war in accordance with their wishes. Clemenceau, Ben Gurion, and Churchill became successful war leaders by imposing their will on the military in a vital act of civil-military relations.

Cohen’s four statesmen obviously made the right decisions, but there are plenty of cases where civilian leaders have made the wrong—and sometimes malevolent—choices. The hazard to civil-military relations is nowhere more dramatic than in the domestic use of force. From China to Colombia, armed forces have put down rebellions at home, often administering vast territories in the absence of civilian authority, but usually at the invitation of civilian leaders. When military action has caused human rights violations, however, civilian leaders have quickly distanced themselves from the decision to use the military in the first place. Indeed, this expectation of abandonment motivates military leaders to want to stay away from military operations at home, reiterating the always problem described by Feaver. In response, some armies have taken over the government in an effort to fight the rebels more effectively—this last step pushes us toward the second category.

**Questions about Public Support for Use of Force Decisions**

An army uses force on behalf of the society. This agency role implies that military action must have the support of the people in whose name it is undertaken. Where political leaders hold the power to decide on the use force, they themselves must represent the people. Where this is the case, the people consent to war measures such as higher taxes, conscription, rationing, and the suspension of civil liberties.
In case where a country is attacked but not felled, governments and militaries usually see a high degree of consent as there is a rally round the flag effect, but as they move away from the point of attack, consent becomes harder to gain. A short war that requires limited mobilization seldom raises protest against war measures, but longer wars that need broad mobilization could see an inflexion point where the costs of war exceed the degree of consent. For example, a war that is promised to be limited could break out of acceptable bounds—the use of napalm in Vietnam and torture in the war on terror—leading people to question their leadership. When that happens, the military is as much at the receiving end of criticism as the government. The military-related measures, especially conscription, come under attack.

In the formal structure of civil-military relations, public pique at the military should be redirected toward the political leaders in control of the armed forces, but in reality the military works for two principals: the government to which it is formally responsible and the people in whose name it exists. The fact that public opinion is itself divided compounds the problem. The rise of the modern peace movement has meant there is a wellspring of criticism of the military in every society simply because armed forces exist.

The interaction between the military and both the critical and the supportive public elements is a significant component of modern civil-military relations. Most professional armed forces are highly attuned to public opinion. They maintain public affairs departments mainly to counter negative images and seed positive views of the military. The record of the U.S. armed forces on this during Vietnam was a nightmare of civil-military relations, but the military had learned its lessons by the time of the Afghan and Iraq Wars. Unlike the freewheeling news reporting of the Vietnam War, journalists embedded in military units reported the latest wars. The reporters lived in the warzone with the troops, ensuring a high degree of empathy with the soldiers in the news reporting.

To resolve the two-principal problem, the armed forces will sometimes try to put some distance between themselves and the political leaders in charge, creating yet another layer of the civil-military relations problem. In the United States, the civil-military relations problem extends to further layers: there is a relationship between the military and the executive branch with the president at its head, but the military has another relationship with the United States Congress and a third one with the wider public. The greater the number of power centres there are that can influence the way the military functions, the greater the complexity of its civil-military relations.

In other countries, this pursuit of military autonomy had led to coups d’état. In Latin America, for example, the military coups of the 1960s and 1970s occurred when the generals saw the civilian government as unable to make the hard decisions necessary for putting down the communist guerrillas. The armed forces then acted in the name of the people in removing the government, which they claimed was illegitimate. The logical
endpoint of this usurpation came when the armed forces attacked the people themselves, suspended civil liberties, and imposed even harsher war measures in the name of national good—an even more abstract idea than the will of the people.

Unlike questions about the use of force, there are less absolutist standards for questions about public support. With the exception of the military coup, efforts of armed forces to hold public support separate from the public support for political leaders are hard to criticize. This is especially true in situations where the civilian leaders are themselves predatory. The more visible a public agency is, the more it must serve two masters.

Questions about Military Preparedness
As we move away from the use of force decision itself, another set of civil-military disputes come to the fore—and even though these issues have intimate connection with the use of force, they exist in a separate category. Civil-military disputes over defence spending are framed in the context of threat, but they play out differently. Whereas in use of force decisions, the standard for civilian supremacy is absolutist, most professional militaries in modern states do hold independent and authoritative views on the degree and direction of defence preparedness. To say that the armed forces should not have this independent voice is naïve and counterproductive.

Security policy is not a predetermined standard, but an ambiguous product of competing interests and views. Political and military leaders, policy experts, and public opinion of varied persuasion seek to drive policy outcomes in the direction they believe is right for the nation and sometimes in their own private interest. The armed forces are central to this debate because they are the experts in the use of force and robust corporate entities (designed to withstand grievous shocks, for example, of war). The more effective a military force is in war, the more effective it is going to be in lobbying for its beliefs and interests at home; success in war enhances the ability of armed forces to bargain.

To be meaningful, this bargaining capacity must be real and able to shape budgets and related matters. At times, the military influence can be undue, but rather than see the debate as violation of the absolute standard of civilians having the right to be wrong, most open societies allow space for the military to contest civilian counterpoints. This participation in the debate gives members of the armed forces ownership of the policy outcome and reduces the shadow of the spending debate on the subsequent use of force debate. While civilian control absolutists believe that this is a slippery slope to military takeover, I would argue to the contrary that prohibitions against bargaining would create greater civil-military mistrust and do more harm in the long-run.

Intelligence is another aspect of intense civil-military contest. In particular, there is debate over the prevention of surprise attacks. But unlike the defence spending debates, the contestation over intelligence programmes occurs primarily in the realm of the law and civil liberties. The Patriot Act in the United States, for example, unleashed
widespread resistance to government collection and use of private data, the legality of holding persons without charges, and increasingly about drone kill lists. There is now gathering opposition to the mammoth national security state created in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks. As a civil-military relations dispute, the fight conducted by lawyers and overseen by the courts are qualitatively different from other problems in civil-military relations.

Lastly, there is a third set of tussles over the developing and absorption of new military technology. Here the parameters of debate are even more different—the concerns here do with how research and development can be encouraged (competition or monopoly; public and private sector), how the armed forces interact with suppliers, and what they do to absorb and internalize technology. President Eisenhower’s warning about the military-industrial complex falls into this category. The military sociologist Morris Janowitz (1971) saw a technology-led convergence of civilian and military spheres in the future. As military contractors and air force pilots sit together in Las Vegas to fly drones half the world away, Janowitz is proving to be prescient. The convergence of civil and the military spheres are bringing back to the fore issues of recruitment, training, and veterans’ benefits (for post-traumatic stress disorder), which constitute the last set of civil-military relations dispute.

The debates over spending, intelligence, and technology are highly contested. Military and political leaders routinely resort to tough rhetoric in support of their objectives. In that sense, they are real civil-military relations disputes, but seldom do they rise to the level of the use of force decisions and they should not be subjected to the absolutist standard of civilians having the right to be wrong.

Questions about Military Welfare
The last category of civil-military relations disputes occurs over military welfare issues such as salaries, retirement, veterans benefits, help to wounded, and to widows and children. In most cases, these are least controversial aspects of civil-military relations. In democratic societies, political leaders are generally willing to give soldiers benefits that the country can afford. Of course, there is contestation over how much the country can and should afford for those who serve to protect it and then there is the bargaining over the allocation of funds to different uses. But civil-military dispute over military welfare are not as adversarial as disputes in the other three categories.

There is a belief that military welfare can have a broad uplifting effect as well. In the case of the GI Bill in the United States, for example, the veterans’ benefit is widely acknowledged as having contributed to the post war boom. Nevertheless, we do see civil-military tension over welfare issues as well. The creation of a separate Veterans’ Administration is indicative of the civil-military relations dispute inherent in military welfare. In creating a new agency for veterans, the effort was to remove the Defence Department from cannibalizing resources meant for veterans and prevent veterans from
commandeering the Defence Department’s capital budgets, which would happen when veterans’ organisations became particularly powerful. Therefore, a relatively non-emotive issue of military pay and benefits commands civil-military relations space.

The civil-military relations disputes over benefits that military personnel receive in service and after retirement present their pathologies. In Pakistan, for example, the need to provide postretirement employment to soldiers has now led to the creation of a significant military-owned commercial sector that has itself become a source of civil-military relations tension. According to Ayesha Siddiqa (2007), the military in Pakistan controls 7 per cent share of the GDP, one-third of heavy manufacturing, and as much as 6-7 per cent of private sector assets in the name of soldier welfare. She has said that this level of military intervention prevents the Pakistan Army from returning fully to the barracks, one reason why the Pakistani state is so heavily defined from the security perspective.

Scholars such as Finer (2002) and Stepan (1971) have long identified the problem of the military grabbing a society’s resources undemocratically or by suspending democracy itself in the name of the greater good. Unlike Huntington, Finer (2002) argued that a strong army would not remain within the narrow domain of its military activities, especially in countries where the civilian government was weak and corrupt. Stepan (1971) found that the very military professionalism that had kept the military out of politics in advanced industrial societies led the armies of the so-called developing world to intervene even more in politics simply to meet their professional objectives. Thus, a mismatch between an overdeveloped military and an underdeveloped polity allowed the armed forces to claim broader powers and authority and became the cause of civil-military relations disputes.

While questions of military welfare could themselves become questions about political control over armed forces, especially in countries where the governments are weak and corrupt, there may be some benefit in categorizing these problems separately. Separating security and welfare issues has the benefit of being able to deal with them with different tools. The Chinese PLA, for example, had been a significant part of the country’s economic liberalization, holding control over some large conglomerates, but have slowly divested from commercial activity without any serious repercussions to civilian control over the armed forces. The Chinese example would suggest dealing with different kinds of civil-military relations disputes differently, thereby highlighting the need for typology of civil-military relations.

**Conclusion**

The study of civil-military relations has sought to reduce the many faces of the problem to the question over the degree of civil control—and how this control is imposed, rejected, and returned. This approach sees civil-military relations as a singular problem.
with a singular solution—the return of civil control. There has been no effort to map the many problems of civil-military relations.

I have tried in this essay to offer a first cut typology based on the object of civil-military disputes: use of force, public support, preparedness, and welfare. The categories, as I have pointed out, overlap at times but they do represent reasonably distinct sets of disputes with distinct actors participating in the bargaining. The differentiation gives us the ability to investigate the many kinds of civil-military disputes and get away from absolutist notions of civilian control and where necessary to allow the military greater space in which to contest civilian leaders and become part of contested democratic governance.

There are other ways to categorize civil-military relations: the problem in democratic societies should be different than the problem in hybrid, authoritarian, totalitarian, one-party, and sultanistic regimes, among others. We could think about using the typology of regimes offered by Linz (1996) and Stepan (1971) to create matching categories that allow comparison of civil-military relations. We could further consider categorizing civil-military relations by actors involved: in the United States, for example, the civil-military relations of the special forces are likely to different from the civil-military relations of the National Guard which in turn would be different from the civil-military relations of the regular Army. There is a growing body of ‘third generation’ civil-military relations which looks at the relationship between military forces and politicians and public outside their own in the context of UN or multinational operations.

This essay is merely an early step in the direction of seeing civil-military relations as more than a problem of civilian control to be fixed with measures aimed at bringing back true political supremacy over the armed forces.
References


Development Post-2015: Why Global Governance Matters
Johannes Blankenbach

Abstract
This paper tries to assess whether and why global governance matters for sustainable human development on the ground. In theory, the link between global governance and local development is quite clear: global governance can be considered a pre-condition for cooperation on global public goods as it changes risk perceptions and bridges knowledge and compliance gaps that would normally prevent stakeholders from collaborative action. In turn, the global public goods that state and non-state parties commit to in forums of global governance are instrumental for development on the ground.

In practice, however, several multilateral processes relating to global public goods are stagnating, such as the WTO Doha round and the Kyoto process. Among other factors, a lack of adaptation to the changing world order, resulting in unrepresentative institutions, as well as insufficient linkages between the different fields and mechanism of global governance may account for poor performance of the current system. Suggestions on how to improve it follow straight from what has been identified as core shortcomings, with the post-2015 development agenda receiving special attention as it may provide a future vision for coherent global governance as a whole.

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Introduction

The notion of ‘global governance’ figures prominently in discussions about possible frameworks for global development beyond the year 2015, when the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) will have expired. Although in many cases there is an implicit assumption that global governance can be instrumental for development (e.g. Brandi 2012; Sachs 2012), only a few analytical pieces specify this link and assess what it means for people on the ground. This paper seeks to contribute to the debate by identifying ways and causal mechanisms through which global governance may promote development processes on the ground in theory and practice.

The first part of this paper assesses the potential relevance of global governance for future local development, referring to theoretical frameworks such as the global public goods concept and game theory. Three working hypotheses will be discussed in different sub-sections, framing global governance as *a sine qua non* for promoting cooperation on a range of global public goods. These global public goods, in turn, are closely interlinked with development at the regional and local level, e.g. in South Asian countries.

The second part will focus on the ‘real life’ performance of current global governance structures, considering that there is a strong contradiction between the theoretical potential of global governance structures and their actual contributions to development. Major shortcomings of the existing system will be identified as they may account for some of the current impasses in important global governance processes such as the WTO Doha round and talks on climate change mitigation. A section on ways ahead precedes the conclusion, suggesting strategies to overcome current global governance shortcomings.

‘Global governance’ is one of the main concepts used in this paper. Although the practice of global governance may in fact reach back much further in history (Chase-Dunn & Lawrence 2011, p. 142), the term as it is understood today was coined in the 1990s by James Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel (Weiss & Thakur 2010, p. 30). The concept has remained remarkably vague as there is not even consensus on whether it is merely a description of already existing phenomena, a (normative) political programme, or an analytical tool (Dingwerth & Pattberg 2006, p. 186). Based on Boughton and Bradford (2007), ‘global governance’ is used in this paper to capture both the existing as well as potential trans-border processes, norms and institutions that connect national governments, multilateral agencies, civil society and the market to bring about collaborative action for global public goods.

‘Development’, the second concept that this paper focuses on, happens at various levels (e.g. state, society, individual) and in various ways (e.g. economic, social, and political development). What should not be lost sight of, however, is that human beings are supposed to be the end beneficiaries of development processes. In this light, development at the global or state level is not a final goal in itself, but rather an instrument (Loewe 2012, p. 3) to improve human development in various ways. Human development, in turn, has many components; the Human Development Index (HDI) combines just a few
of them, i.e. life expectancy, education and income. At the same time, strategies for human development need to respect environmental concerns as human well-being cannot thrive in a destroyed ecosystem. Therefore, ‘development’ may be defined as all processes that ultimately enhance human well-being by improving people’s access to adequate income, food, education, health care, infrastructure and political participation while (and through) safeguarding a healthy environment. In other words, the concept of development as it is used here refers to sustainable human development.

**Global Governance, Global Public Goods, and How they Relate to People’s Lives**

The remainder of this section will be informed by the three working hypotheses:

(a) Without the provision of key global public goods as intermediaries, there is no progress towards development on the ground, i.e. sustainable human development improving the well-being of all people.

(b) Without global and cross-sectoral cooperation, this instrumental set of global public goods cannot be provided.

(c) Without sound mechanisms of global governance, there is no such collaborative action.

These hypotheses will be detailed in the following sub-sections. First of all, it is necessary to specify what type of global public goods matter for development at different levels, and how they link to people’s lives on the ground. A subsequent sub-section will underline that public goods require collective action, followed by theoretical considerations on why a system of global governance is needed to facilitate such cooperation.

**Global Public Goods for Human Development on the Ground**

The notion of global public goods extends the economic public good concept to the global level (Kaul 2010, p. 22). A classic example for a national or actually local public good is a street sign as it fulfils the two defining criteria of being non-excludable and non-rival: everyone can see it, and it does not get used up even if hundreds and thousands of people look at it (Ibid.). However, someone needs to make the effort of installing the sign and repairing it from time to time, serving the public interest without getting immediate (e.g. financial) benefit from it. The example of a public pavement on a popular street illustrates even more clearly that public goods need continued effort to remain non-excludable and non-rival: without maintenance, the pavement would collapse after many countless people have walked on it, which means that it would become impassable for the next pedestrians (and thus a rival good).

Global public goods are not just the sum of national or local public goods (street signs do not amount to a global public good although they exist in every country across the world): they are truly global and systemic. However, the debate is to a large extent a normative one as many goods that are framed as global public goods do in fact not fulfil the two qualification criteria. Clean air and a healthy global environment, for instance, have the potential to become global public goods, but until now they are rival in
consumption as some actors use them as ‘dumping ground for pollution’ (Kaul 2010, p. 22), preventing others from fully enjoying them. Most global public goods presented in this section have aspirational character as further effort would be needed to make them non-excludable and non-rival on a global scale.

There are also different hierarchies of global public goods: financial stability ranks certainly higher than an international treaty on banking rules, which merely is a contribution to the first good (Kaul 2010, p. 29). However, both have the potential to qualify as global public goods. As all public goods discussed here are highly interdependent, this paper will not draw a systematic distinction between global public goods of different causal hierarchy. What will be established based on non-exhaustive examples, however, is their relation to development processes on the ground, substantiating Loewe’s (2012, p.3) argument that global public goods are ‘enablers’ or ‘instrumental goals’ for human development. The following set of (potential) public goods on a global level is deemed vital for development that ultimately improves and secures human wellbeing on the local level.

**A healthy global ecosystem**

The global ecosystem has already been severely damaged, but there may still be the possibility of containing ecological degradation to keep the system at a relatively healthy level. This implies a stable climate with only a moderate rise in average temperature 2 degrees Celsius is the current target, which may not be reached though, (World Economic Forum 2013, p. 18) as well as oceans that partly recover from acidification, well-preserved sub-ecosystems such as forests and estuaries, and a high level of biodiversity. The global ecosystem as described above is linked to the local level in manifold ways: global weather conditions, for instance, can cause drought, floods or heat waves, which in turn have an impact on local food supply and health. Natural disasters, which have already (and probably irreversibly) become more frequent due to present levels of climate change, may increase inequalities among different provinces within a country as some areas may be more prone to disasters than others. Loewe and Rippin (2012, p. 4) show that even today inequality between sub-state provinces in a region such as Asia is much higher than between entire states in the same region, which has an impact on social cohesion, political stability and poverty reduction inside of a country (Ibid.). Protracted inner-state conflicts may arise from horizontal inequalities between geographic or social groups (Stewart 2010), triggering cycles of violence and poverty (Collier 2007) that affect various aspects of human development. South Asia is particularly affected as India, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh are among the top 20 countries worldwide most at risk of extreme weather (Melamed 2012, p. 19).

Rising temperatures on a global scale let lakes run dry and glaciers melt, with severe consequences for regional and local water supply. The causal chain can be continued and diversified infinitely until it reaches the individual level: e.g., people who have to travel long distances to collect water may not be able to attend school or participate in political processes anymore. This is likely to affect mostly women and girls, and it already happens – providing the global public good of a healthy ecosystem as such is therefore
not so much about boosting development, but simply about limiting further and very severe damage to development processes. Maintaining a high level of biodiversity, for instance, increases the probability that even in the event of extreme weather conditions some crops survive.

**Global financial and resource market stability**
The global public good of financial and resource market stability implies a set of subordinate goods (e.g. international regulations and institutional mechanisms) that reduce price volatility across financial assets and resource classes, one of the main components of the current financial crisis (Melamed 2012, p. 30). Developing countries suffer from the recent turmoil in various ways: foreign bank lending has sharply dropped; investors have fled from stocks in developing countries’ equity markets; foreign direct investment is decreasing; and the cost of raising money through bond issues is much higher for poor countries than for industrialised countries as lenders strive to minimise risks (ActionAid 2009, p. 5). All this has tremendous impact on the local level as, for instance, governments increasingly lack the funds to provide for public services and infrastructure. Private companies may increasingly face difficulties in retrieving bank loans, which negatively affects private sector growth and employment. Providing the global public good of market stability, in turn, would make economic development and public spending in developing countries more predictable. Moreover, regulating food and energy prices effectively improves food security on the ground: for instance, the price of oil may have significant impact on the demand for biofuels (Timilsina et al. 2011), which in turn changes patterns of agricultural production and adds to price volatility in grain crops (UN Right to Food Rapporteur 2011, p. 2).

**A just global trade system**
Ascribing global public good character to the global trading system is not about promoting total trade liberalisation, although the public good criterion of non-excludability (see above) could be interpreted as an imperative to remove all tariffs and trade barriers. Instead, a trade system that all countries in the world can benefit from in an equitable manner implies that poorer countries with vulnerable local economies can maintain some of their protective tariffs and trade subsidies. At the same time, promoting global trade rules as global public good would entail that richer countries curb their protective tariffs and subsidies. The fact that least developed countries (LDCs) are currently subject to around 141 protectionist measures by G20 and developing countries (Berensmann and Brandi 2011, p. 3) suggests that trading conditions are far from fair even among ‘southern’ countries. A reduction of agricultural subsidies in industrialised and emerging countries, for instance, could boost economic and rural development in poorer countries with huge agricultural sectors, such as those in South Asia (Naseem 2003, p. 1). Pakistan is already a net food exporter (FAO 2013). Although apparently there is no automatism, rural development may have a positive impact on female employment and empowerment at the local level, considering that there are more female than male workers in agriculture across many world regions (World Bank 2009, p. 315).
A global human rights regime
While a fair trade system implies the inclusion of all countries and entities that have something to trade, framing the international human rights regime as a global public good aims at an even higher level of inclusion: it means that the system has to be accessible to all human beings to qualify as a non-excludable good. Human rights treaties with global coverage are certainly one component of it. However, as conventions alone do not guarantee human rights implementation on the ground, global institutions with an increased capability to process individual complaints and to monitor and sanction human rights abuses would also be part of this global public good. Currently, four human rights treaty bodies consider complaints from individual people against states if the latter are party to the corresponding: the Human Rights Committee, monitoring the implementation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Right; the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination; the Committee against Torture; the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women; the Committee on Enforced Disappearances; and the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (OHCHR 2013a). Access to such mechanisms apparently also depends on people’s knowledge about their rights, their capabilities to file complaints, and many other factors that go beyond the scope of this section and paper.

A global human rights regime with increasing coverage and outreach would in any case have considerable impacts on development on the ground. For instance, vulnerable countries and groups can use powerful human rights language to forward their developmental claims. Also, universal ratification and global monitoring of strict labour rights conventions across all countries in the world could prevent corporate actors from relocating to a new country if regulations are too strict in another. Decent work conditions, in turn, have a positive impact on health and income levels as well as other aspects of human development.

Given their potential leverage on corporate reputation, human rights campaigns backed by a global human rights regime may raise consumer and producer awareness, thus facilitating voluntary agreements on responsible business behaviour. The non-binding UN Global Compact is one such example, but there is also a need for binding human rights treaties that require corporate actors to respect and if possible promote human dignity and development on the ground.

A fair intellectual property regime
Similarly to the trade system, the current regime of global intellectual property has not yet acquired global public good status as many developing countries are excluded from the use of overly expensive patents, e.g. in the area of pharmacy. Flexible solutions such as patent pools reconcile the need to protect intellectual property as a precondition for innovation with the demands of manufacturers in developing countries: the latter can access the right to use a pooled licence by paying a fair amount of money, while the companies that have placed their licences at the disposal of the pooling agency still hold the patent and receive royalties for each licence (WIPO Magazine 2011). An intellectual property regime that qualifies as global public good for being non-exclusive would...
clearly have a positive impact on people’s health in developing and emerging countries. Moreover, it may also trigger income- and employment-generating effects by fostering local innovation and business development.

A global regime of development cooperation
The global development cooperation regime, encompassing principles such as aid effectiveness, ownership and transparency as well as a broad range of global institutions, is in many ways linked to development on the ground. What makes framing it as a global public good particularly interesting, however, is again the central requirement of non-excludability that applies to such goods. Core institutions of the current system, such as the World Bank and the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC), are highly exclusive due to unequal voting powers or limited membership. The OECD DAC is the main body for monitoring aid flows from government sources, the so-called Official Development Assistance (ODA). Against this backdrop, it is not surprising that all 24 DAC members except for South Korea are traditional western donor countries. The group of non-western donors that has emerged over the past ten years is not represented, although these countries are heavily involved in South-South cooperation while at the same time still receiving ODA to a limited extent. Pure recipient countries are excluded from membership as well, even if they are the ones that are mostly affected by decisions taken within such a forum.

The OECD DAC has been the main proponent of the aid effectiveness agenda and other principles for aid quality assurance, but these concepts have remained western-driven due to the long-standing exclusion of a majority of countries. This has implications locally as important criteria fostering more coherent and demand-driven development cooperation on the ground do not currently systematically apply to ‘non-traditional’ modes of development cooperation between countries of the Global South (e.g. Cabral and Weinstock 2010). Framing the whole system of development cooperation as a global public good implies the ultimate goal of making institutions and principles valid and accessible for all countries (and populations) involved.

Cooperation for Global Public Goods
The second hypothesis this paper builds upon claims that the provision of global public goods requires global cooperation. This is for a simple reason: global public goods cannot be provided by one party alone as no single country, or group of countries, has the leverage to drive a global agenda or solve a global problem unilaterally. Take, for instance, the global public good of a healthy ecosystem. One single nuclear power could destroy it forever, thus producing a global public ‘bad’ unilaterally, but safeguarding and promoting a sound ecosystem is not manageable for one single state. Even if a large industrial country would reduce its CO₂ emissions to zero, there are enough other countries polluting the environment in a way that threatens the global ecological balance. In the same way as global public goods are non-excludable by definition, the global public ‘bad’ of a destroyed global ecosystem would be inescapable as it transgresses all borders, harming even inhabitants of a hypothetical ‘zero emission’ country as much as it harms other populations.
Providing global public goods is about managing some of the trans-border processes and global interdependencies that spread the impact of crises across countries and sectors. The current economic and financial crisis, for instance, mainly originated in the industrialised world as a foreign debt and banking crisis (Melamed 2012, p. 30), but it has harmed other economies as well due to the interconnectedness of global trade and financial flows. Similarly, price distortions in one sector may affect others, as the link between food and energy prices underlines. Managing such interdependencies requires cooperation not only among a ‘critical mass’ of countries, but even across different sets of stakeholders: banking rules agreed between states may be an important step towards a global public good of financial market stability, but compliance of banks as corporate actors is as much needed for their success as is the advocacy work of NGOs. Hence, global governance goes beyond the government level as it incorporates private sector and civil society actors as well.

Global Governance as a *sine qua non* for Cooperation

The third and last working hypothesis suggests that global governance is a *sine qua non* for transnational cooperation on global public goods: it is not the only requirement for successful cooperation, but one that is indispensable. The main reason for this lies in the fact that cooperation does not happen automatically. There are important disincentives for cooperation, which will be discussed in the following with reference to game-theory.

One of the classic concepts in game theory is the Prisoner’s Dilemma, formalised by Poundstone (1992, p. 118): two criminals in solitary confinement testify against each other although cooperation (i.e. mutual non-betrayal) would reduce their prison sentence. However, as there are no means of communication and accountability, both players fear the risk of unilateral action, which would even extend the prison sentence of the one opting for non-betrayal.

Some of the insights from the Prisoner’s Dilemma game may be transferred to the level of transnational cooperation on global public goods, e.g. a healthy global ecosystem. Apparently, some variables are different. In the classic version, for instance, there is a police officer who defines the rules of the game, whereas no such authority exists on the global level. It seems realistic, however, to have a game situation in which governments believe that there is a trade-off between curbing environmental pollution and national economic growth: they are firmly convinced that stricter environmental regulation and taxation will slow down economic growth immediately as industries have to lower production levels and invest some of their revenue in clean technologies to keep up with new standards. Decreasing economic growth in governments’ perception would severely affect their economic power and even political influence on a global scale relative to other countries. In contrast to this, policy-makers see global environmental degradation as a far away threat, therefore believing that a sound global ecosystem is a desirable but not very urgent goal. Governments are also aware of the fact that their endeavours to curb pollution might be in vain as the global ecosystem cannot be saved without a critical mass of other countries also reducing their emissions. The other side of the coin is that
even a country that does not collaborate in reducing pollution levels may benefit from other countries efforts as they will be felt globally across all borders.

Not knowing what other countries will opt for, individual governments would decide to not curb pollution as rational players in this cooperation game. Based on the assumptions described above, policy-makers calculate that by not cooperating they exclude the risk of curbing pollution and putting brakes on economic growth in vain. In the best case, i.e. if a critical mass of other countries collaborates, the non-cooperating state may benefit as a ‘free-rider’ from other countries efforts while at the same time keeping up its economic growth. In the worst case the ecosystem will not be saved as no country collaborates, but at least there are no limits to economic growth. This is the most probable outcome of the game, given the above-mentioned set of assumptions that governments believe in. The best solution for the common good, when the ecosystem is saved and no country loses economic and political weight vis-à-vis another, cannot be achieved.

Table 1 depicts this game, matching the decisions of a single state A with the independent decisions of a critical mass of other countries B:

**Table 1: Global Cooperation Game about Saving the Ecosystem**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries B: non-cooperation</th>
<th>Countries B: cooperation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Country A: cooperation</strong></td>
<td>Country A invests in pollution control in vain, its economy slows down; the global ecosystem cannot be saved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Country A: non-cooperation</strong></td>
<td>No cuts on economic growth for any country; the global ecosystem cannot be saved (most probable decision).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s own compilation.

What prevents governments from cooperation and fostering the common good is (1) a lack of information on what other countries may opt for; (2) a lack of instruments to make other countries stick to their initial decisions; and (3) a set of assumptions about risks and opportunities that makes short-term economic growth appear more preferable than measures to save the global ecosystem in the long run.

Norms and institutions of global governance have the potential to step in at all three levels: (1) they can bring stakeholders together to facilitate an exchange of information.

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2 Governments’ rational decisions based on the assumption that there is a trade-off between economic growth and limiting pollution.
and joint decision making; (2) they may increase the compliance of all parties to an agreement by monitoring its implementation and by ‘naming and shaming’ or even sanctioning deviators through mechanisms previously arranged for; and they (3) can disseminate knowledge on global trends and interdependent dynamics, influencing policy-makers’ perceptions of risks and opportunities.

Joint decision making on global public goods is what many international treaties are already about, e.g. the Kyoto Protocol on combating climate change. ‘Soft law’ in the form of non-binding political declarations such as the Rio+20 outcome document “The Future We Want” may also reflect joint decision making on a global level. Treaty bodies and general forums such as the Development Cooperation Forum (DCF) ensure that stakeholders come together on a regular basis to share information and views.

Credible sanctioning in an international system of anarchy without any central authority depends on global governance again: one single state announcing sanctions against another for non-compliance to a treaty may not lead to anything, but the aggregated sanctioning power of a large group of states, channelled and coordinated by an institution of global governance, may be effective. Trade sanctions are already imposed bilaterally as a deterring policy for polluting activities (Tsakiris et al. 2010, p. 2), but taking them to the global level would make such action more coherent, transparent, fair and effective.

Monitoring the progress of implementation and publishing results regularly is also an instrument that global institutions may provide in order to bridge compliance gaps. It increases peer pressure as most states are not keen on appearing in bad light in front of others, and it may foster domestic pressure for compliance as well. Civil society organisations play a vital role in such global monitoring processes; for instance, the Universal Periodic Review of the human rights situation in all 193 UN member states by the Human Rights Council also takes into account information submitted by non-state stakeholders such as NGOs and national human rights institutions (OHCHR 2013b).

Similarly, considering that global governance institutions have the potential to connect civil society organisations from production and consumption countries effectively to raise consumer awareness, reputational damage may be the sort of sanction that forces multinational companies into compliance with norms of responsible business conduct.

Providing positive incentives for compliance to an agreement may be even more promising than sanctions. For instance, participation in a system of rules to regulate financial volatility may make both state and corporate parties to such treaty eligible to an emergency fund that compensates them for losses (e.g. food shortages) suffered through external shocks. Again, such mechanism would require an administrative body at the global level.

Also, lacking cooperation in the provision of global public goods by one party may not necessarily be the result of unwillingness, but of lacking technical or financial capacities to do so. Global forums are the best place to discuss and address such issues, e.g. by coordinating technical assistance through the institutions of a global development cooperation regime (which itself may be framed as a global public good).
Channelling sanctions (e.g. trade sanctions against environmental pollution) or incentives (e.g. technology transfers for environmental-friendly development) may be one important function that global governance institutions can assume in order to facilitate the provision of global public goods. In addition to this, they may also influence through their research and information work how the good as such is perceived, i.e. to what extent it seems desirable for stakeholders to contribute to its provision independent from sanctions and technical incentives: if a healthy global environment is considered an inherent value by all stakeholders, sanctions may not even be necessary to ensure compliance to environmental regulation. Or, in other words: if the global public ‘bad’ of a destroyed ecosystem seems to be an unbearable risk to all parties involved, efforts to reduce pollution will come more easily.

Take, for instance, the set of assumptions that influences player A’s and B’s decisions in the cooperation game on a healthy global ecosystem. The belief that efforts to reduce emission and pollution levels are incompatible with economic growth still exists among policy-makers (ODI 2009). Moreover, climate change is sometimes denied or considered a far away threat (Dunlap and McCright 2011). However, institutions of global governance may significantly change risk perceptions by disseminating state-of-the-art research through reports and in global stakeholder forums. In an OECD report, for instance, Marchal (2012, p. 72) states quite clearly that climate change actually hampers economic growth – not investing in mitigation strategies may in fact backfire very soon. Other bodies of the global governance system point to the positive relation between investments in green technology and economic development, as was the case in a Rio+20 side event organised by UNDP in collaboration with the Chinese Ministry of Science and Technology (UNDP 2012a). The Green Growth Knowledge Platform hosted by the Global Green Growth Institute, OECD, UNEP and the World Bank provides another good example as it aims at bridging ‘major knowledge gaps in green growth theory and practice’ (GGKP 2013). Changing perceptions of risks and opportunities is crucial to fostering cooperation, as Santos and Pacheco conclude in their analysis of free-riding in a public good context (the so-called ‘tragedy of the commons’): ‘investments or efforts targeting the mitigation of future losses will depend on how likely such losses seem to be’ (2011, p. 10421).

**Shortcomings of the Current Global Governance System**

Global governance is not just a vision, but a fact – mechanisms of global governance are already in place in many areas, regulating trade (WTO), setting targets for human development (Millennium Development Goals) or promoting universal human rights (the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as well as binding treaties and bodies on specific subsets of rights). However, the provision of global public goods for development as they were specified in the previous section progresses slowly, if at all, and global governance seems to be part of the problem. Two of the most important multilateral processes, the Kyoto Protocol and the WTO Doha round, are close to failure (Melamed 2012, p. 30; see also Brandi et al. 2011, p. 1). The financial crisis, as important and influential it is, currently dominates all other debate, and global institutions such as the G20 do not
manage to move from inward-looking crisis management to a broader agenda that includes other global challenges (Cooper 2010, p. 757).

Recent failures do not, however, change the fact that global governance is the right answer to global challenges, and one of the most important instruments to foster global public goods for sustainable human development on the ground. Rather, what the current impasse shows is that today’s system of global governance is not perfect at all as it suffers from structural shortcomings affecting its performance. Some of these shortcomings are going to be discussed here.

Lacking Adaptation to the New World Order
One structural shortcoming of the current system of global governance is its inability to properly reflect shifting power structures in a multi-polar or even non-polar world. Western dominance has ceased and new global players have emerged, such as the BRICS countries. However, these and other rising powers are still underrepresented in many global forums, especially in the international financial institutions: the World Bank is always headed by a director from the United States, the IMF by a European (Chase-Dunn & Lawrence 2011, p. 144). OECD and WTO (Shaffer 2005, p. 130) are dominated by western countries, and apart from China, no country from the Global South is represented in the UN Security Council.

Unequal representation in general has, arguably, a negative impact on cooperation between groups of countries in specific cases of global governance. Both the WTO Doha round and the Kyoto process have been stagnating as developing and emerging countries claim special treatment (i.e. exemption from specific regulations) whereas industrialised countries are reluctant to accept such asymmetry. The Doha round is stuck between the Special and Differential Treatment claims of the developing world and demands for greater market access by western powers, especially the US (Ismail 2012, p. 11). With regard to the Kyoto Protocol, the fact that none of emerging powers from the Global South was subject to binding reduction targets was one reason why the US have never ratified the treaty. President Bush stated in 2001: ‘As you know, I oppose the Kyoto Protocol because it exempts 80 percent of the world, including major population centres such as China and India, from compliance, and would cause serious harm to the U.S. economy’ (Office of the Press Secretary 2001). These fault lines have not changed significantly even after the recent Doha climate conference at the end of 2012. The crucial question is, however, why states that do not have the same rights in global decision making due to underrepresentation should accept the same treaty obligations as industrialised countries. This is not just a matter of perceived injustice, but of political risk: committing to binding rules in a system that they can influence and shape only to a limited extent may not seem politically viable to many developing and emerging economies. Hence, lack of representation in global institutions may feed into scepticism towards processes of global governance in general, and into reduced commitment to specific regulations in particular.

3 This is a real-life example of the kind of assumptions that players base their decision on in the global cooperation game.
Failure to Reflect on Interdependencies

Today's global governance system does not fully follow a cross-sectoral approach. In other words: current institutions do not properly mirror the highly interdependent nature of global challenges as the system is too fragmented and not interconnected enough. This applies to the macro and micro level, i.e. both to institutions representing totally different fields and to institutions within one area of global governance. Take for instance the complex UN institutional structure in the field of development: around 30 largely autonomous agencies are involved in independent activities in countries of the Global South, which makes coordination difficult (Bauer and Weinlich 2012, p. 2). Likewise, the process supposed to lead towards a coherent framework for development post-2015 risks to disintegrate in parallel structures: a High Level Panel on Eminent Persons on the Post 2015 Development Agenda, co-chaired by Liberian president Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, Indonesian president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, and UK Prime Minster David Cameron, has already taken up its work on a draft post-2015 agenda succeeding the Millennium Development Goals (Martens 2013, p. 27). At the same time, an Intergovernmental Open Working Group on Sustainable Development Goals has been formed very recently, focusing on post-2015 Sustainable Development Goals as a follow-up to the Rio+20 conference in 2012 (Loewe 2012, p. 1). The two forums are not the only ones involved in the drafting of future frameworks for development – parallel structures multiply even in such closely related areas, hampering coordination and coherence that would be needed to tackle interdependence effectively.

At a more aggregate level of the global governance system as a whole, the lack of a coherent vision for the provision of interconnected global public goods is even more apparent:

> Like its predecessor, the GATT, the World Trade Organization deals with trade. The World Health Organization (WHO) oversees health issues. The UN Security Council responds to situations that threaten world peace. The World Bank and regional development banks provide official financing to developing countries. The IMF oversees the functioning of the international financial system. Notwithstanding the extensive consultation and cooperation that take place regularly among these and other agencies, each one acts independently within its own sphere. In sum, what we have today is a multiplicity of independent actors, both public and private, each pursuing its own objectives and priorities, with its own clientele and constituency, with its own technical language and organizational culture, with its own mandate and specialized focus. [...] In this setting, agencies become more inward looking, focusing more on how to evaluate and try to improve their own performance than on how to work together with partners to achieve common objectives (Boughton and Bradford 2007, p. 11).

The failure of the current global governance system to counter interdependent global challenges with a similarly interconnected institutional structure affects its potential to facilitate global cooperation: for instance, by motivating information sharing and joint
decision making, global governance can bridge information gaps that prevent players in a Prisoner’s Dilemma-like game from cooperation. However, if such information is not shared across institutions as most of them are inward looking, some degree of uncertainty remains. Similarly, global governance mechanisms lose much of their potential to ensure compliance if it becomes more difficult to establish cross-sectoral sanctions or incentives (e.g. trade sanctions or trade facilitation according to environmental records) due to disconnected bodies of regulation. Finally, the dissemination of state-of-the-art research and knowledge on cross-sectoral global challenges is difficult if the different sector-specific platforms for dissemination are themselves not connected to each other.

**Global Governance and Development: Ways Ahead**

The core argument of this paper is that global governance, by facilitating the provision of instrumental global public goods, is crucial for sustainable human development on the ground. Hence, the system must not fail, and it becomes of utmost importance to overcome current shortcomings of global governance mechanisms. This view is backed by the recent edition of the World Economic Forum’s Global Risks 2013 report, which finds that ‘global governance failure’ is the most interconnected in an impressive landscape of global risks (WEF 2013, p. 53). A big number of them, or better said their prevention, links to the set of development-conducive global public goods specified in a previous part of this paper.

Strategies for improving global governance follow straight from what has been said with regard to its weaknesses: adapting current global governance structures to the new world order by making them more inclusive and representative; and translating the interdependent nature of global challenges and corresponding global public goods into a more coherent and better coordinated global governance system.

**Making Global Governance Fit for the New World Order**

A global governance system that reflects the new multi-polar world order appropriately by being more inclusive could unblock some of its current impasses as long as the trade-off between inclusiveness and effectiveness (Killen and Rogerson 2010, p. 2) is effectively dealt with. This implies reform of the international financial institutions, the WTO, the UN Security Council, and a lot more. It does not seem desirable to create a big number of new organisations as this would further undermine coherence and coordination. However, if organisations that historically have been dominated by the West for a long time want to uphold their right of existence, the inclusion of new players such as emerging economies and transnational civil society must go beyond pure rhetoric.

The G20 provides an interesting example as it has been a level playing field for countries from the Global South and North from the very beginning. However, as many commentators point out (e.g. Brandi 2012), even the G20 lacks legitimacy as it is still an ‘exclusive club’ (Ibid.) that many countries have no access to, notably small and least developed countries. Moreover, the G20 is merely a ‘talk shop’ without any properly negotiated rules for cooperative governance (Husain 2011) – transparent procedures should be established in the near future to increase confidence in G20 decision making.
Moreover, the forum has to formalise its outreach to regional organisations such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the African Union in order to address the concerns of developing countries (Berensmann et al. 2011, p. 1).

Regional organisations may play a vital role in many areas of global governance if what game-theorists Santos/Pacheco conclude for the community level applies to the global level as well: *the joint combination of local agreements within groups that are small compared with the population at risk is prone to significantly raise the probability of success* (2011, p. 10421). In other words, a coherent combination of soft or hard law agreements found in regional settings or ‘coalitions of the willing’ may be more promising than struggling for the one and only global treaty. The so-called ‘building blocks’ as a follow-up to the 2011 High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan work as ‘coalitions of the willing’ among government, civil society and corporate actors, pushing for innovation in fields such as South-South and public-private cooperation (OECD 2011).

Another post-Busan instrument, the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation, also includes stakeholders from all geographic regions and sectors quite systematically: the steering committee is headed by the ministers from Indonesia, UK, and Nigeria (the same countries that co-chair the High Level Panel on Eminent Persons on the Post 2015 Development Agenda) and comprises representatives from low- and middle-income countries as well as delegates from the private sector, parliaments and civil society. The secretariat is staffed by UNDP and OECD in a joint effort (UNDP 2012b). Membership and management that cross-cuts geographical, sectoral and institutional borders is certainly a good answer to today’s interdependent global challenges.

**Reflections on Global Interdependencies**

Apart from reflecting changing global power structures more appropriately, the current system of global governance also has to become more interconnected and coherent. The simplest reason for this, as mentioned above, is that global public goods (and ‘bads’) are highly interdependent as well. In order to ensure that the provision of one good does not harm the provision of another, institutions of global governance need to keep themselves updated on the broader picture through continuous exchange and coordination.

On a more technical level, intensified linkages between different areas and institutions of global governance may provide policy makers with better information on the overall context of their decisions, thus bridging knowledge gaps that may otherwise hamper cooperation. Moreover, sanctions for non-compliance are more effective once they can be implemented across sectors, e.g. if environmental regulations become part of trade agreements and their sanctions mechanisms. It was also mentioned previously that global governance institutions may significantly change risk perceptions and motivate collective action by disseminating state-of-the-art research on trans-border challenges. These activities would run into more open doors if policy-makers were to be exposed to interdependencies in their day to day cross-institutional decision making.
One good way to enhance coherence within the global governance system may be the introduction of joint secretariats or steering committees for all major institutions: the above-mentioned post-Busan Global Partnership is a promising example – why not extend it to bigger institutions, ensuring that staff members (not state delegates) of the G20, UNDP, and the WTO as well as officers from regional institutions are represented, for instance, in the technical bodies of international financial institutions?

However, reflecting global interdependencies through greater coherence is not a purely technical task. What is missing throughout the whole system of global governance is a common and broader vision. Without such global narrative, claims for coherence and coordination float in a vacuum – coherence for what? Arguably, a broader vision that could give meaning to all the different processes and players of global governance is currently in the making: the post-2015 development agenda. Such agenda could go much beyond narrow definitions of aid-driven development if it were to include Sustainable Development Goals. It is not yet clear what set of targets the Open Working Group on Sustainable Development Goals will agree upon. However, the focus will be quite different from that of the Millennium Development Goals, which focus on poverty alleviation in developing countries supported by external aid. As a complement to this, Sustainable Development Goals may envisage the global enabling structure for on-the-ground development, or in other words: Sustainable Development Goals are about the provision of global public goods (Loewe 2012, p. 3). Their inclusion into a post-2015 agenda would create a global vision that does not only apply to countries in the Global South, but to the whole globe:

Sustainable development is eluding the entire planet. The SDGs should therefore pose goals and challenges for all countries—not what the rich should do for the poor, but what all countries together should do for the global wellbeing of this generation and those to come (Sachs 2012, p. 2208).

Conclusion
This paper tried to assess whether and why global governance matters for future development on the ground, based on theoretical considerations as well as practical evidence. In theory the link between global governance and local development is quite clear: global governance can be considered a pre-condition for cooperation on global public goods as it changes risk perceptions and bridges knowledge and compliance gaps that would normally prevent stakeholders from collaborative action. In turn, the global public goods that state and non-state parties commit to in forums of global governance are instrumental for development on the ground. Some of the causal mechanisms connecting the global to the local were specified in this paper.

In practice, however, several multilateral processes relating to global public goods are stagnating, such as the WTO Doha round and the Kyoto process. The remainder of the paper focused on what may account for this gap between theory and practice: a lack of adaptation to the changing world order, resulting in unrepresentative institutions; and
insufficient linkages between the different fields and mechanism of global governance, given that highly interdependent global public goods and ‘bads’ demand coherent and well-coordinated approaches.

The discussion of structural flaws directly fed into suggestions on how to overcome global governance shortcomings, e.g. by membership reform of major global institutions to make them more representative of the new multi-polar world order and the increasing influence of private and civil society actors. Joint bodies covering different sectors of global governance may improve coherence and coordination. The post-2015 development agenda received special attention in the section on policy recommendations as it may provide a broader vision for future global governance. By incorporating Sustainable Development Goals, which overlap to a large extent with global public goods, such agenda would create a truly global narrative relevant to both the Global South and North. Every country can contribute to the provision of global public goods, and every country benefits from a global setting that is conducive for development, considering that every society is continuously developing. Global governance provides the unique opportunity to move from narrow development strategies based on external aid to a broader and more sustainable approach, focusing on global enablers for local ‘home-grown’ development all around the world.

In conclusion, the question is not whether global governance as such matters for development post-2015: the potential clearly exists. The challenge lies in fully unlocking this potential by reforming the current system of global institutions, norms and procedures in the above mentioned ways. The future practice of global governance has to reach out to a wide range of actors as inclusiveness and representation are of key importance. Not just states, but also the private and civil society sectors have to be involved more systematically and equitably. Moreover, there is a need for mechanisms to incorporate direct feedback from people on the ground: at the end of the day, transnational challenges and the global policies designed to tackle them affect individual lives.
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Section 2
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Railways in Pakistan, India and China: Performance and Prospects

Nadia Tahir*

Abstract

Railways in Pakistan, India and China are three publicly owned busiest systems in Asia. Indian and Chinese Railways are growing and generating profits, whereas Pakistan Railways is not only in deficit but also contracting in all standard performance indicators except passengers carried. We use Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) to measure performance in these three systems in a holistic manner. By employing output oriented two stage variable returns to scale DEA, we identify causes of inefficiency. China has the most efficient system with increasing returns. India is using almost 70% of inputs and Pakistan is only using 40% of its inputs. This suggests that Indian and Pakistani systems mostly failed to maximise output and there is a possibility of using input oriented method. The Indian system is financially efficient and Pakistan fails to meet its expenditures. Further, we forecast demand by using Holt-Winter’s Multiplicative for railway services in the three systems. The projections indicate increasing freight and passenger services in Indian and Chinese Railways. For Pakistan, freight service not only shows a declining trend but also zero growth. Pakistan Railways needs drastic rehabilitation through investment in rolling stock with effective changes in management structure. Only then can it become a vibrant link in any regional arrangement involving the three systems to accelerate economic growth.

1 This chapter has been approved as a research report by the referee.

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Introduction
In the development literature of the British Raj, railway was considered an evocative example of technology, breaking speed barriers on land bringing industrial revolution and generating high growth (Kellett 1969). Located between China and India, two great public railway systems in the world which are not only financially viable but also growing, why is Pakistan Railways (PR) not a success? This paper looks at the reasons why the public sector operation of the Railways has failed in Pakistan and succeeded in China and India. Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), the technique used here, neutralises the differences in physical and financial size. It compares inputs used in service delivery as an index of efficiency.

The neglect of PR started with the efforts of restructuring public enterprises in early 1980s (Ghias-ud-Din 2007; World Bank 1998). It was also the time when roads offered convenience, speed to the masses and revenue to policy makers. PR lost its charm as a mode of transportation, trust as a symbol of modernity, culture and determination to excel as an industry (Quddus 1992, 2010; Imran 2009). Policy makers ignored railways and its indirect effects, substituting to roads instead (Looney 1998). This intermodal shift resulted in the deterioration of rail services in Pakistan. The government not only allocated fewer resources to railways, but also failed to collect revenue which it could spend on public sector railways for promoting harmony and integrating socio-economic change and promoting growth. Moreover, parallel roads threw fierce competition and railways lost competitive edge and profit. The result of the fatuity of the policy was closure of railway business, heavy losses and poor public transportation facilities. Abysmally low and declining public investment in infrastructure and rolling stock affected the ability of PR as an effective mode of transportation and worsening financial performance contributed negative receipts in the public exchequer (Tahir 2012). The government left transportation in the hands of market forces, with the net outcome of overall bad condition of roads and a deteriorating Logistics Performance Index (World Bank 2012).

From the very beginning, railways required huge and speedy investment funds. With redundant technology and continued underinvestment, the PR could not but be a loss making public enterprise. Instead of addressing these issues, efforts were directed towards the more general issues of over-employment and corruption (ADB 2011). Allocations to railways are no more than 0.6% of GDP (GOP 2011a). It is argued that the contraction of railways is justified because PR is a financially inefficient organisation. We argue that Pakistan uses redundant inputs which increase unit cost. A government facing persistently high fiscal deficit has not invested enough in modernisation. The reasons are inability to collect taxes and a pro-road bias in infrastructure investment and distorted allocation of public sector freight. Lack of autonomous decision making makes matters worse. Closing loss making branch lines for passenger and freight services as a cost cutting solution can create hindrance for reviving economic activity. Lack of employment opportunities can aggravate regional disparities. Social connectivity,
cultural exchange, scenic beauty of the landscape and social returns make the case for government intervention and investment which can not only generate growth, but also revive manufacturing and engineering skills. Private returns are low because of shrinking business. Social returns make the case for increasing investment in an autonomous railway.

While PR is declining, both the Indian Railways (IR) and the Chinese Railways (CN) are expanding. Contrary to the situation in Pakistan, India and China have set the pace by undertaking huge investments in railways for strengthening infrastructure. China is investing almost US$300 billion annually in its railways. China’s rail network is growing most rapidly since 2001 (Lugar 2008; Hui 2006). It is among the top five operational railways in the world (Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China 2006). The length of the CN has reached 91,000 km. Its share in the world railway is 6% and is responsible for moving 25% of world’s passenger and freight traffic (ESCAP 2009). India is also not shying away from spending on its railways (GOI 2008). IR is one of the largest, profit-making public railways network in the world (GOI 2010a). IR carries 2 million tonnes of freight daily, whereas PR carried 2.5 million tonne freight in the entire 2010-11 (GOI 2010b).

With a view to understanding the decline of PR and the rise of IR and CN, the three railways need to be analysed as systems. Some key aspects of these systems are the amounts invested in railways, investment conditions, product efficiency and financial efficiency. There are also some systemic questions to be answered. Does expansion or contraction work best as a strategy in the case of railways? Should branch lines be closed for earning revenue as the only viable solution and is surplus capacity a burden or could it be translated into a growth option? Exploration along these lines will yield useful insights about the role of railways in the development process of Pakistan, India, and China in the past as well as future.

After this introduction, Section 2 reviews the relevant set of issues raised in the rail literature in general. Section 3 spells out the research design followed and gives the sources of our data. In Section 4, the historical background of railway development in Pakistan, India and China is stated. Their present condition is discussed in Section 5. Section 6 contains the efficiency analysis of the three systems and results. A multistage framework is adopted, besides focusing on competition and public policy. Section 7 forecasts demand for railways services in the region to present a futuristic perspective on
rail infrastructure and economic growth. The last section provides basic findings and conclusions.

**Issues in Literature**

Various economies like Germany, France, Spain, USA, Russia and Korea started investment in the railways as a way to bring the economy out of the recession (OECD 2004). CR witnessed a setback after the Wenzhou (Zhejiang province, China) bullet train accident in July 2011, but it has been growing almost at 8% annually (KPMG 2011; IRJ 2013). Railway performance must be based on economy and affordability on the one hand and efficiency and equity on the other. There are also issues of environmental sustainability and transparent policies (Litman 2011). Intermodal transport policy is important for economic productivity and environmental sustainability. In the European Union, 70% of freight moves by trucks which are a cause of productivity loss due to congestion, besides being a source of environmental degradation (Headicar 2009). Intermodal transport policies are considered opening avenues for removing strain on the environment without compromising economic growth (OECD 2004; CER 2010).

The United States started restructuring her rail industry in early 1980s by reducing employment share and track mileage by 50%. This policy improved efficiency, but increased freight share by only 0.4% during 1993-2002 (AAR 2011). Japan after World War II built railways despite deficiency of investment funds in the economy (Jitsuzumi and Nakamura 2010). The World Bank supported them to build a railway system which not only connected industrial centres, but also revived the economy (ITPS 2004). Successful railways require congenial business environment with the priority to invest for generating a demand of industrial inputs (TERA 2006). Efficient supply line of railway equipment which cost effective and increased demand of transportation with the priority to divert huge investment are a few pre-requisites for a profit making railway system (Collins 2000).

Railway as a medium of transport has changed a lot since the first train completed its journey. Train performance depends upon sophisticated control technologies which need huge investment and skills for maintenance. Train builders are emphasising people, process and tools working in coordination for an efficient system (Candfield 2011). Nowadays railway means safe, energy efficient, environment friendly, reliable, affordable, comfortable, and fast medium of transport (Parkash 2008). Railway appeared as a concept of speedy transport, which could be used to revolutionise industry. It was a source of urbanisation, exploring new markets for industrial revolution, creating employment opportunities, comfort in travelling and opening up distant areas and cultures.

Equally important, railway has to perform a service; customer satisfaction is the key in catering to demand. Efficient railway means not just cost effectiveness but also punctuality, reliability, seats availability, comfort, cleanliness and the ease of getting in
and off. Profitable but unsafe and untidy railway can never be considered as efficient. It is because of this fact that railways are mostly built under the public sector. Railways grow where there is high patronage and efficient management (CER 2010; Cowie 1999; Oum and Yu 1994).

British used railways not only for extracting natural resources from colonies but also to create markets for their industrial products. Moreover, their monopoly in railway equipment enabled them to earn revenue for the value of money allocated to build railways. Railways also played a crucial role in moving army and artillery during WWII and it was a medium for getting settlement rights and influencing cultures. Since the Victorian period (1837-1901), it has been considered a means of generating business and growth. There is a strong correlation between growth of infrastructure and industrial output. Railway is responsible for moving people and output (Simane 2004).

Modernisation in railways is considered a major driver for achieving operational economies. A technology can be beneficial if there is continuous increased investment in replacement and expansion of total capacity. The more intensive use of the technology leads to profitability and its rate of deployment increases. Availability of funds for investment in technology is a major determinant of the rate of diffusion of improvements and all this is true for railways (Terleckyj 1974). Capacity means rolling stock, locomotive power, employees, and operating strategies. Trained professional employees and adding one more locomotive means huge cost, but it is a life cycle of investment. Capacity of railways is important in an era when fuel cost is rising and a larger share of freight is moving through highways (Laird et al. 2005). The disintegration of railways in Europe showed that the ability to regulate decline was important, as the main finding was an increase in the marginal cost of passenger output with the level of infrastructure value (Ivaldi 2005).

In Pakistan, PR has been placed on the list of the Privatization Commission since 1990s. The case is built around improved financial management and enforcement of discipline. The idea of privatisation gained currency in 1979 when the Conservative government of Mrs Thatcher announced the privatisation of peripheral businesses such as hotels, rolling stock manufacture and ferry services of the British Rail (Affuso et al. 2003). Partial privatisation was never successful and the British Rail had to use rolling stock intensively on the basis of good marketing and management skill (Wolmar 2001). There is a view that privatisation may change the financial outlook of the rail as an enterprise, but it never brings a change for the benefit of its passengers or for the labour. It brings tangible change in revenue which may be important for the growth of the industry, but damages the rail industry culture, because fewer people are working on the tracks. There is the question of social railway or a profitable private enterprise. A solution may be to retain the passenger romance of railways and privatise the freight part of the railway output. Another fancy solution may be to privatise ownership but retain assets, with labour as part of the assets. In France, closing down branch lines was considered a risk like killing
trees. On the issue of cost and financing, there is a concept that it should be financed by using private capital, not government subsidies (Meunier 2002).

**Research Design and Data Sources**

We use two stage, output oriented, variable returns to scale for measuring efficiency of the railway systems of Pakistan, India and China. DEA (Data Envelopment Analysis) is used to measure efficiency in a multiple input and output model. Charnes, Cooper, and Rhodes (1978), CCR for short, Banker, Charnes and Cooper (1984) BCC for short, introduced output maximisation DEA models. DEA method is used widely for measuring inefficiencies of DMUs (Decision Making Units) using the linear programming technique. BCC-DEA model allows the estimation of pure technical efficiency (PTE). Efficiency is measured in terms of a proportional change in inputs or outputs. A DEA model can be subdivided into an input-oriented model, which minimises inputs at a given level of output, and an output-oriented model, which maximises outputs without requiring more of any observed inputs. It is widely used in various forms and returns to scale (RTS). Classical economists believed in constant returns to scale: increase in a single input must lead to same proportional increase in output. When there is more than one variable input, proportional increase in all the inputs results in more than proportional increase in the output. Banker and Thrall (1992) extended the RTS concept from the single output to multiple output levels while maximising efficiency in DEA. A further extension of DEA was introduced by Lee (1977), Banker and Natarajan (2008) and Lee, Lee and Kim (2009). They used Tobit Regression Analysis at the second stage for determining efficiency gaps among various DMUs. BCC output-oriented two stage DEA model is specified as follows:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Min} & \quad \theta + \sum_{i=1}^{n} S_{i}^- + \sum_{r=1}^{s} S_{r}^+ \\
\text{st} & \quad \sum_{j=1}^{n} \lambda_j y_{ij} - S_{r}^+ = y_{ir}, \quad r=1, \ldots, s \\
& \quad \sum_{j=1}^{n} \lambda_j x_{ij} + S_{i}^- = \theta x_{ir}, \quad i=1, \ldots, m \\
& \quad \sum_{j=1}^{n} \lambda_j = 1 \\
& \quad \lambda_j \geq 0, \quad j=1, \ldots, n \\
& \quad S_{r}^+, S_{i}^- \geq 0, \quad r=1, \ldots, s, \quad i=1, \ldots, m
\end{align*}
\]
Where \( x, y \) are inputs and output.

In two stage variable return model, we calculate efficiency score for each DMU. These scores measure relative efficiency. At the second stage efficiency scores calculated at stage 1 are used as dependent variables. These extensions have proved that the two-stage DEA produces consistent results.

Inputs: Total number of employees, route length, fixed investment, freight carried in tonnes (volume) and passengers carried (no.)

Outputs: Freight revenue and passenger revenue.

After measuring efficiency, we forecast future demand for railways for all the three systems in terms of passenger km and freight tonne km. Forecasting reduces decision risk by minimising uncertainty. If there is demand for railways, it makes the case for investment and sustainability of the organisation. Single exponential smoothing technique (SES) Linear Regression with Trend (LR) and Holt-Winters Multiplicative Method for Forecasting has been used in this study.

These methods portray three scenarios. If there is no trend and seasonality in the data, SES can be used to forecast demand for freight and passenger services. In this case naïve and average forecasting may also be used. In the second scenario, when there is a trend and no seasonal pattern exists, linear regression with trend to forecast demand for railways services may be used. In the third scenario, when trend and seasonality both exist and seasonal variations proportionally changes with the level of the series, Holt-Winter’s multiplicative method to capture seasonality could be used. This method is based on three forecasting equations and three smoothing equations for measuring level, trend and seasonality (Hyndman and Athanasopoulos 2012) as given below:

\[
\hat{y}_{t+h|t} = (\ell_t + hb_t)s_{t-m+h|t},
\]

\[
\ell_t = \alpha \frac{y_t}{s_{t-m}} + (1 - \alpha)(\ell_{t-1} + b_{t-1})
\]

\[
b_t = \beta^s(\ell_t - \ell_{t-1}) + (1 - \beta^s)b_{t-1}
\]

\[
s_t = \gamma \frac{y_t}{(\ell_{t-1} + b_{t-1})} + (1 - \gamma)s_{t-m}
\]
The error correction representation is:

$$\ell_t = \ell_{t-1} + b_{t-1} + \alpha \frac{e_t}{s_{t-m}}$$

$$b_t = b_{t-1} + \alpha' \beta^* \frac{e_t}{s_{t-m}}$$

$$s_t = s_{t} + \gamma \left( \ell_{t-1} + b_{t-1} \right)$$

Where errors are

$$e_t = y_t - (\ell_{t-1} + b_{t-1}) s_{t-m}$$

Data and Sources

We use the annual data on railway systems of Pakistan, India, and China. Data on PR is taken from its various yearbooks, while financial data is extracted from the yearbooks of the Pakistan Bureau of Statistics (GOP 2011b and c). The CR data is extracted from the statistical yearbooks of railways and International Railway Statistics from 1994-2009 (Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China 2006). IR data was taken from yearbooks from 2001-2010 (GOI 2010a and b). Two observations related to 1980-81, 1990-91 were added from other sources. Data on costs and revenues was converted into US$ based on average market exchange rate, taken from International Financial Statistics 2011. Locomotive kilometre was not included as output indicator due to non-availability of IR data. Similarly, data on fuel, pensions, passengers and freight fares was also not available. Some data for Indian and Chinese railways were also obtained from UIC (2010).

Historical Evolution of Railways in Pakistan, India and China

In India, the first train ran between Mumbai (then Bombay) and Thane during 1849-69. Railways were constructed by British companies under the 5% guaranteed interest on capital and land was provided for free. Companies invested £ 95 million for building railways under East India Company (Andrew 1884). Railways were not profitable in this period, but they brought a cultural revolution by raising the issues of lower caste drivers and higher caste travellers. It proved a most significant dent in the caste system of undivided India. In 1895, India had started building locomotives and other related railway equipment. It had the monopoly of stores and railways equipment. In 1905 after establishing a railway board under the Department of Commerce and Industry, railways began to make profit in India. In 1920, the finance of railways was detached from other government revenue (Thorner 1955). Railways enjoyed a boom during 1920-29 and were responsible of moving over 620 million passengers and approximately 90 million tonnes of goods annually (Thorner 1955). WWII crippled the Indian Railways. In 1946, railways were taken over by the government. At the time of partition, India had 42 rail systems. In 1951, these were nationalised as one unit – IR (Ibid.). Indian Railways after partition maintained its role as a public sector organisation providing transportation facilities to its
masses. It is being run by qualified technocrats accountable for efficient railway management (Ramanathan 2004).

According to Acton\(^2\), the objectives of the British Raj for building railway network in undivided India were military hold, market for trade and as a sentimental symbol of enterprise and power. Another motive was to develop an alternative to American cotton. If the supply of cotton from America diminished, Manchester manufacturers would access Indian cotton. In any case, it would enable the British to keep cotton prices in bound and take their goods into the interior of India. The line from Karachi to Kotri (1861) was purely for accessing cotton. Lord Dalhousie completed the survey of the seaport, Manchester manufacturers provided uninterrupted funds and railways were built under the guaranteed system. On the whole, the railways moved military, commodities and, most importantly, connected cities (Thorner 1955). These motives determined the gauge of lines in India, broad gauge for military purposes, narrow gauge (light line) for passenger and freight. But Railways in Pakistan were broad gauge in general, and narrow and metre gauge at places.

After the first Anglo-Afghan War in 1840 and with the annexation of Punjab in 1849, a new chapter opened in British history. From then onward North West of undivided India became the focal point of British forward policy in India. With this strategic shift, railways in the region, which is now Pakistan, essentially served as the logistics of warfare. State support became its major source of sustenance. Like the military, it developed a culture of self-reliance, maintaining its own educational system, housing, police, accounting system and a policy of life-time employment.

In the second phase during 1869-1880, the state constructed railway lines in undivided India. The third phase of Pakistan Railways started after partition. According to Malik (1962), in 1947 the country won freedom but railways lost it. The management of railways reverted to the position of 1892. The railway board was abolished and a railway division in the central secretariat was established under a director general, who reported to the secretary of Ministry of Communications. Expert opinion did not dispute the role of the state. But making it just another department of the government was seen as a way to compromise the professional management of the railways. In the words of the then Chairman of the railway board, ‘As state railway, undoubtedly government must control the expenditure on major development projects, but the management must be left in the hands of those who have requisite knowledge and experience of railway working and are eventually responsible for running the railways’ (Malik 1962, p.60). In 1956, a World Bank team commented on the unsuitability of these arrangements and urged the establishment of a semi-autonomous body. This debate has remained unresolved.

Railway is used to organise engineering capacity, which is important for promoting

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\(^2\) These are comments made by Acton on the so-called Danver Report. It appears in a document entitled ‘A Very Few Words Respecting the Constitution of the Covenanted and Uncovenanted Services of India, Remarks on Indian Railway Reports: Reason for a Change of Policy in India’, 1840, quoted in Naoroji (1901).
technical knowledge. If it is run by the people who lack relevant knowledge they are unable to influence the decisions in the commercial interest of the organisation. Pakistan had to face very unfavourable conditions at the time of partition. There were heavy arrears, operating units were in Calcutta (now Kolkata, India) and railway personnel transferred en masse to India. Yet the revival of railways was considered as a measure of the firm determination of the new nation to survive.

Pakistan inherited a very large network but not extensively used, as road transportation threw the real challenge and railways lost and failed to compete. A military-controlled trucking organisation, National Logistics Cell, had offered direct competition to railways. In the first five year plan, Pakistan formulated a strategy to rehabilitate the tracks first and rolling stock later. In contrast, India started with rolling stock and left the rehabilitation of the track for future. The latest plans in Pakistan continue to repeat this strategy, while state funding has continuously declined.

For Pakistan Railways, railway management has become an issue. All the powers required to take necessary actions do not rest with the PR authorities. They have to look to various ministries for appointments, expenditure and funds. Management of railways requires requisite knowledge and experience. These restrictions in the execution of responsibilities badly affected services. Since the Constitution Bill of 1956, a view has also existed that railways should be transferred to the provinces. In October 1958, a committee on the issue was set up which declared that railways should remain with the centre and its administration must be given to a railway board. A railway board ordinance was passed in 1959, but its composition precluded autonomous decision making. The railway financial administration continued to be like that of a government department. Railway budget was a part of the general budget. As if the administrative problems were not enough, politicians have lately joined the issue. After the 18th Amendment to the constitution in 2010, there have been demands to transfer railways to the provinces.

The first Chinese railway was constructed by British merchants in 1876 during Qing dynasty but it was torn down within a year. After defeat in the first Sino-Japanese war, several railway lines were built with settlement rights and permission for mining coal (Crush 1999). The second phase of Chinese railways started under the Republic of China (1912-1949). Growth of railways slowed down because of civil wars and Japanese invasion. During this period, Japan was involved in building Far Eastern Railways in China and added almost 2700 km of railway line in China (Lee 1977).

The third phase of Chinese railways started with Mao Zedong’s heavy investment. After China was declared People’s Republic in 1949, she had only 22,000 km of railway line. Since then China is not only expanding its rail network but it also holds a dominant position in rail manufacturing equipment (Garratt 1988). In 2001, China formed CSR (China South Locomotive and Rolling Stock) and CNR (China Northern Locomotive and Rolling Stock), the latter emerging from the former China National Railway Locomotive
and Rolling Stock Industry Corporation (LORIC). CSR leads in the production of electric locomotives, high-speed electrical multiple units (EMUs), and some types of subway vehicles. CNR is strong in the production of diesel locomotives, very-high-speed EMUs, and certain types of subway cars. Both companies are engaged in HSR manufacturing joint ventures with the leading international rail manufacturers via subsidiaries like Changchun, Tangshan, and Sifang (KPMG 2011).

Only a decade ago, Bombardier of Canada, Alstom of France, and Siemens of Germany accounted for more than half of global sales for the production of rail and transit vehicles. Bombardier and Alstom have maintained their leading positions, but two Chinese manufacturers, CSR and CNR, have now moved into third and fourth place. Both these Chinese firms together employ more than 200,000 people directly (Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China 2009). China’s presence in the global market has changed the composition and leading role of manufacturers worldwide. State-owned Chinese companies are becoming increasingly important players in the global market (ESCAP 2009; KPMG 2011).

While Pakistan Railways is failing, other systems in its neighbourhood have been looking ahead with confidence. Recently, India and China set the pace by making huge investments in railways for strengthening infrastructure. In its 11th five-year plan, China planned to invest US$292 billion in a railway building programme (Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China 2006). The share of railways has increased in India during the 10th plan which makes it possible to direct more resources to Indian Railways. 'The actual mobilization of internal resources went up from a meagre Rs 3113 crore or 27% of the total resource mobilization in its first year to a sizeable contribution of more than Rs 12000 crore or nearly 50% of the total resource mobilization in its final year' (GOI 2008). Chinese railways are carrying 4.5 times more freight than Indian Railways (Ibid.). In Pakistan, the share of freight has shrunk to as low as 4-5%. In the future scenario for the region, Pakistan cannot remain the missing link between the two giants, China and India, and in the grand trade facilitation projects connecting Central Asia. Railways can become a major driver of growth in reviving the failing economy of Pakistan.

**Characteristic Features of the Three Railway Systems**

Table 1 outlines the physical extent, financial ratios and operating condition of railways in Pakistan, India and China.

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1 640.4 million USD and 2902.2 million USD respectively.
Table 1: Railway Indicators 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>CR</th>
<th>IR</th>
<th>PR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total employees (0000)</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>1352</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Length of railway in operation (km)</td>
<td>91,000</td>
<td>63,974</td>
<td>7791</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fixed Investment (million US$)</td>
<td>97503.9</td>
<td>44464.04</td>
<td>12.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total locomotives (unit)</td>
<td>17825</td>
<td>8889</td>
<td>520</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Passenger coaches</td>
<td>47436</td>
<td>57535</td>
<td>1776</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freight cars</td>
<td>594388</td>
<td>219,931</td>
<td>16450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freight tonne km</td>
<td>2523917</td>
<td>600548</td>
<td>3925</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railways passenger km</td>
<td>787890</td>
<td>903,465</td>
<td>23522</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revenue from passenger traffic (US$ millions)</td>
<td>14,120</td>
<td>5,121</td>
<td>147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revenue from freight traffic (US$ million)</td>
<td>22,928</td>
<td>12,446</td>
<td>87.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total transportation costs (US$ million)</td>
<td>13,98</td>
<td>1829.72</td>
<td>665</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total transportation revenue (US$ million)</td>
<td>51,640</td>
<td>1951.40</td>
<td>271</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall density of operations (km/000 km²)</td>
<td>36.39</td>
<td>23.51</td>
<td>3.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average length of haul</td>
<td>838</td>
<td>661</td>
<td>1082</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average per trip km</td>
<td>527</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>310</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Statistical yearbooks of respective countries.

Physical extent is measured by input conditions like track length, freight cars, passenger cars, fixed investment and total number of employees. Financial condition of the railways was analysed on the basis of freight and traffic revenue and operating cost. Commercial railways must generate most revenue from freight, not from passenger revenue. Operating conditions were analysed on the basis of traffic density, average haul and trip length. Efficiency of a railway can be measured on the basis of average haul/trip length. Evidence suggests that longer hauls are more economical to operate than shorter hauls (Friedman 1979). Average haul length and trip kilometres indicate the average distance covered by freight and train handling events from shipper’s door to consignee’s door. These are indicators of financial viability. For financially viable railways, it is necessary to carry freight above 500 km in order to meet fixed cost.

PR works as a public sector organisation under the federal government. Currently, it is a loss making institution, working with redundant locomotives. According to the year book 2010, Pakistan railway has railway track of 7791 km which includes 7346 km of broad gauge but truncation and auxiliary services are still old which is the great hindrance in raising the speed limit in Pakistan (GoP 2011c). Maximum speed limit on the main line is almost 120 km/h. Passenger revenue is the main source of revenue for PR, whereas freight tonne km is lowest in the world. It is deficient in some crucial inputs like locomotives, freight cars and passenger coaches. Fuel and administrative cost is rising and the main reason of increasing transportation cost in Pakistan. PR enjoys the second highest rank in freight haul distance in Asia which makes it a financially viable investment. Its average length of haul is 1082 km and average length of trip is 310 with the lowest traffic density i.e. 3.8 km/000 km².
CR has the world’s second largest volume of publicly owned railway network with 91,000 kilometres of railway track and 17825 locomotives (Scales and Amos 2009). For details see Figure 1.

**Figure 1: Busiest Railways in the World**

![Busiest Railways in the World](image)


It has the capacity to move world’s 25% freight which makes it financially viable. Railway is the quickest mode available for moving 75% of coal, 66% of ore, 62% of iron and steel, and 56% of grain and 20 million passengers (BRICS 2011). At 36.4 km/000 km² it has the highest overall density of operations in the world. CR began to modernise in 2003. A four tier reform system was introduced, which replaced old railway bureau and branch system to increase productivity and effectiveness. China allocates 12.5 (1.6USD) per ¥1000 (125 USD) of its GDP for building railways. As a result of this heavy investment, there was rapid and sustained growth in passengers and freight services. During the last decade, China witnessed highest freight tonne growth, hovering around 6%. China’s average haul/trip length is 838 km and 527 respectively. It is the cheapest means of transportation as the energy consumption ratio of transportation by air, road and railways is 11:8:1 (Hui 2006).

IR is the second largest in passenger trains and fourth largest in freight trains. It has not undergone any significant change in its structure. In 2009-10, it earned a profit of IRs7.5 million⁴ that was appropriated to the development fund. IR is responsible for moving coal, iron ore, cement and food grains - almost 75% of the total freight. The capacity to move freight has continuously increased from 112 million tonne km in 1951 to 350 million tonne km in 2010. India had 225000 freight wagons, 45000 passenger coaches and 8300 locomotives (GOI 2010b). There are 110 freight cars available, while the actual demand is 280,000. As freight wagons increased rapidly compared to freight, the load capacity

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⁴ 0.16 million USD.
declined from 70% to 64% in the same year. The annual investment plan for IR for the year 2010-11 was proposed at Rs 414.3 billion\(^5\) (Ibid).

**Analysis and Results**

The analysis is based on the overall data of railway system in Pakistan, India, and China. It has information related to inputs and outputs as a whole. For each year of analysis in all three railway systems, five inputs (employees, route length, investment, locomotives, freight km and total number of passengers) and two outputs (passenger and freight km/tonne) in output-oriented CRS and VRS efficiency model have been used. Results include efficiency score and reference set of each DMU for a pooled data.

**Figure 2: CR’s Efficiency Analysis**

Computing the average efficiency score revealed that CR has the highest and PR the lowest operational efficiency. Years 2007-08, 2008-09, 2009-10 for CR and year 2009-10 for IR are seen as product efficient and all other years, inefficient (Figures 2, 3 and 4). Alarming, all years of PR from 1994 to 2010 proved inefficient and can target to move input oriented DEA calculation (Figure 3).

PR’s minimum efficiency score was 0.28 in year 1994-95 and its maximum efficiency score was 0.48 in 2006-07. After 2006-07, it again started declining. Most of the time the system failed to maximise output, which is freight tonne km and passenger tonne km. In this scenario, Pakistan should emphasise input oriented efficiency analysis, but with most redundant inputs and unutilised capacity, results did not seem to be any different. Closing

\(^5\) 9.1 billion USD.
down operations due to lack of investment in rolling stock ultimately reduces future stream of income, making it difficult to sustain.

Figure 3: PR’s Efficiency Analysis

IR was product efficient in 2009-10. Its system is steadily improving like CR. Since 1991, it is continuously maximising its output. India has intensively used freight services, which heavily contributed to revenue generation.

In 1990-91, it was inefficient as the efficiency score was 0.36 - the lowest value efficiency score in recent years. Since 1991, it is continuously improving and most of the time its scores lie in the middle range of 0.60, which makes it a potential target for input minimising. But in 2009-10, the system reached the highest efficient level with a rank of 4 in all 45 observations.

Figure 4: IR’s Efficiency Analysis
Since 2000 CR has used regional administration autonomy for profitability. The central government provides assets for the operation of railways. These assets become a liability of the regional administration, with responsibility for profit and loss. This asset operation liability system and management restructuring is adapted from the railways built by the British in India under the guarantee system. Profitability is mainly due to growth in freight which is largely industrial output and coal. Against these long run measures taken by CR, IR has introduced a set of short run measures including a marketing strategy of capacity utilisation, reduction in unit costs, and improvement in service quality. As a result, IR has become technically efficient. In Pakistan, route rationalisation, privatisation of passenger trains and increasing unproductive employment have acted to reduce business rather than promote efficiency. Passenger kilometres is the only positive indicator of PR and the major source of revenue. Its privatisation will neither reduce the subsidy burden on the public exchequer nor minimise investment requirement for overhauling railway system.

**Forecasting and Future Prospects**

Global demand for passenger and freight, rail equipment, infrastructure, and related services is projected to grow to US$214 billion by 2016. Western Europe dominates the market, followed by Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP 2009; Parkash 2008). In Asia, India and China emerged as the big players by timely investing and introducing reforms. China is producing rail vehicles almost one-third of the total rail market. With the expansion of Light Rail Transit in the world, there is growing demand for rail equipment and it is worth making investment in railways.

China has emerged as a leader in rail equipment and it is also expanding its railway network to 93,000 miles by 2020 which includes 16,000 miles of high-speed trains (ESCAP 2009; Renner and Gardner 2010). CR is expected to contribute more than half of global rail equipment expenditures in coming years (Parkash 2008). With this huge local demand for rail equipment, railways networking project, long haulage and increasing income and demand for railways, there is huge potential for generating income and trade in China. India followed this path but its presence in rail equipment is far behind China. However, a huge demand for freight and passenger services offers an opportunity which India is trying to translate into the growth of railways industry.

For predicting the demand for freight and passenger services in Pakistan, India, and China, single exponential smoothing technique, linear regression and Holt-Winter’s Multiplicative method have been used. Results for China are shown in Figure 5. The left hand panel shows demand for freight and the right hand panel depicts demand for passenger services in China. All forecasting methods show increasing trend for freight.

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6 The state guaranteed a minimum rate of return on capital to private companies.
and passenger services in China. Holt-Winter method with the multiplicative seasonality explains fluctuation and trend well. SES and LR also show increasing returns.

Economic growth is closely linked with growth in infrastructure. Poor quality infrastructure can create a hindrance in economic development and trade. Since railway has the capacity to quickly move bulk quantities in a cost effective manner, growth in income is usually related with growth in railway especially freight services. World projection for China’s growth is almost 9% and for trade 17%. China has the highest growth in railway freight tonnage in the world. It has the capacity to carry 25% of world’s freight with 6% of freight carrying capacity. Between 1998 and 2007, its railway freight tonnage increased by 1,003 million tonnes (ESCAP 2009). In next few years, somewhat sluggish but increasing trend of freight services can be predicted.

China has almost 0.6% population growth and incomes are increasing almost by 8% annually. With the availability of reliable and safe railways a huge growth in passenger services can be envisaged. All forecasting techniques show increasing trend in passenger services. Without increasing railway fares, just by expanding, China can enjoy all the economies of scale and scope. Holt-Winters Multiplicative Method (HWM) fits the data well. It explains trend and seasonal fluctuations.

India has achieved the most impressive growth in the volume of freight traffic in the region. It has the second largest freight service in this region and the third largest in the world. Its growth rate of 14% is the envy even of China. It has increased its freight tonnage in the last decade by 259 million tonnes (Ibid.). India is also growing at the rate of 7% annually and merchandise trade is increasing at 21% annually. If we take this scenario, it means growth will generate more freight revenue for India.
Figure 5: Forecasting Demand for Freight and Passenger Services in China
All three methods projected high growth for freight services in India. Figure 6 presents forecasts of freight and passenger demand in India. In the left panel, we present results of forecasting freight services and the right panel presents forecasting of passenger services in India. HWM fits the freight and passenger data well. We projected almost 46% increase in freight services for India. Even the most pessimistic scenario project 7% growth in freight services in India.
India’s population is increasing by 1.4% and incomes are projected to increase by 7%. More population and increasing incomes will generate demand for railways. Indian railways is already working at full capacity and sluggishly growing. HWM projects almost 62% growth in railways passenger by 2020. The most pessimistic scenario portrays 24% increase in passengers demand in coming ten years.

Pakistan is the only country in the region where freight services are declining. Interestingly when the economy is growing, freight services are declining. In 2002-09, the economy was growing by 4% and merchandise trade was expanding by 8% (ESCAP 2009), but freight services were declining by 36%. Future prospects are negative or zero growth. Declining freight services is an obvious indicator of wrong priority and hindrance in trade and growth expansion.

Pakistan’s population is projected to grow by 1.9% per annum and incomes are growing at 3%. It is not difficult to imagine that passenger demand for railways is increasing and PR is trying to meet its expenditure by increasing fares. Holt-Winter’s Multiplicative method forecasts constant demand for passenger services but linear trend is forecasting increasing demand.

Economy, employment, travel market, and the capacity of producing equipment plays the most important role in creating structural changes which are important for the revival of the railway and for the value of money allocated. Passenger kilometre increase and load per train increase are indicators to estimate the demand for railways. In case of Pakistan it is very much there. Railway has to perform a service and customer satisfaction is most important in catering to the demand. This is missing. It is difficult to revive railways in a depressing economy, but its revival can generate demand and employment opportunities.

To recapitulate, growth is projected at 7% in this region till 2020. Urbanisation and increased incomes will lead to increased passenger’s elasticity to pay for better transportation services. Trade and industrial growth will generate almost 40% increase in demand for freight by 2020. Population growth and changes in demography will generate 50% more passenger demand by 2020 (ADB 2011).
Figure 7: Forecasting Demand for Freight and Passenger Services in Pakistan
Conclusion

Development of physical infrastructure has strong linkages with economic growth. Within the domain of physical infrastructure, railways occupy a key position. The three countries studied in this paper have witnessed the evolution of their rail systems for over a century and a half. As we show in the paper, while China and India have seen expansion, railway in Pakistan has become laggard.

This paper has examined the performance of these three major railway systems of Asia. They are all publicly owned and managed. Investment in railways is considered socially desirable yet no railway system can survive without a long term prospect of profit. We attempt to find the factors contributing to the revival of Indian Railways and making China a front runner. To understand the decline of PR and the rise of IR and CN, we analysed them as systems. These systems differ in terms of amounts invested, product efficiency and financial efficiency. We used two stage data envelopment analysis technique.

Our results show that the Pakistan Railways is technically inefficient because of redundant inputs. Since 2005, it also became financially inefficient because costs are not minimised and freight service is drastically low. Chinese Railway is not only technically efficient, it has scale efficiency as well. India recently became technically efficient and it has achieved financial discipline by introducing some crucial reforms and simultaneously preserving basic features of the busiest public railways by adopting an appropriate marketing strategy. It has introduced a model of sustaining passenger services on the basis of freight revenue.

To judge future prospects, the demand for passenger and freight traffic in all the three systems is forecast. China is growing by 8% in freight services and 2% annually in passenger services. It has bright prospects as the economy in China is growing at 7% annually. After the global financial shock of 2009, China consolidated its system by investing huge sums in catering to growing local needs. China adopted a business strategy of separating core and noncore (production of railway vehicle) activities to give autonomy and create local competition by establishing independent rail companies. Pakistan railway system is in a fix. After failing to increase freight services, now it has been facing problems in running passenger services. We conclude that demand is not deficient for making a profitable investment in PR.

All three are state run systems, but only Pakistan’s performance is poor. The short term inefficiencies are related to policy confusion about the long run. While Pakistan has not been able to decide whether or not to privatise and keeping long term investment on hold, China and India invested heavily in their railways, which helped to turn them around. They have also built capacity to produce railway equipment. Pakistan has failed even to maintain existing capacity to produce equipment. The pro-road bias continues although the age of motorways ended in the 1980s. With no autonomy to take decisions, the
railway management wastes more than it utilises in terms of the meagre allocation of resources. Unlike China and India and elsewhere in the world, passengers rather than freight is the main source of earning in Pakistan. But customer care is practically non-existent.

Looking towards the future, it should be noted that financial viability is not the only reason for running railways. We forecast rising passenger and freight traffic in China and India. Pakistan is held back by underinvestment in railways. Technical efficiency leads to other efficiencies and railway development requires huge doses of public investment and autonomous and professional management. This will also contribute to the revival of economic growth. With recession in the world and growing capacity to produce railway equipment in China and India, there are opportunities for CR and IR to invest in PR. The resulting connectivity will accelerate trade and growth in the region in a mutually beneficial arrangement.
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Addressing NTBs in Indo-Pak Trade: Implications for South Asia

Bipul Chatterjee,* Joseph George,** and Vinayak Kant Mishra***

Abstract
Over the years, studies have shown that cost of trade within the South Asian sub-region is markedly higher than the average costs incurred in other intra-regional trade cases across the globe. Geographical proximity and huge market sizes with scale economies have hardly benefitted South Asian traders in regional markets because of the different types of trade barriers; non-tariff barriers (NTBs) in particular. As a result, intra-regional trade in South Asia remains very low, despite the application of lower preferential tariff rates on a range of products with high trade potential under the South Asian Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA). Incidence of non-tariff barriers and consequent high costs in trade between India and Pakistan, the two largest economies in South Asia, assumes particular importance in the regional context.

Efforts to reform NTBs face certain inherent difficulties and have remained at a nascent stage in South Asia. Generally, NTBs are categorised into policy induced barriers and others, wherein the former are disciplined using enforceable laws and the latter are addressed through non-enforceable voluntary commitments, international aid, technical assistance and capacity building. With regard to the former category, the debates on NTBs revolve around the legitimacy of the policy in question and the legal requirements which determine legitimacy, while their trade distortive effects are not given adequate attention. In the latter category of non-policy related NTBs, high costs of reforms measures and budgetary constraints often act as deterrents.

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This chapter has been approved as a research report by the referee.

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****Mr. Vinayak Kant Mishra specializes in regional economic integration and WTO topics. Currently working as an Assistant Policy Analyst at CUTS, he is engaged in projects on non-tariff barriers in South Asia and related regional economic issues.
This paper enquires into the nature of NTBs in Indo-Pak trade and explores possible solutions. It builds on quantification of avoidable trade costs owing to NTBs and demonstrates the benefits of NTB reforms in general. The paper also traces the available mechanisms and policy tools for undertaking NTB reforms, especially those at the disposal of India and Pakistan as SAFTA member states. By examining the pros and cons of existing mechanisms, legal tools and institutional arrangements, certain measures for improvements therein for carrying out NTB reforms more effectively, are also derived. Such improvements will not only benefit Indo-Pak trade, but will also help to enhance overall intra-regional trade in South Asia.
**Introduction**

Recent developments in terms of tariff reduction have failed to generate any significant amount of increase in bilateral trade between India and Pakistan. While Indo-Pak trade remains far below its actual potential, the same can be said about intra-regional trade of South Asia in general. As the tariff liberalisation agenda pursued under SAFTA is nearing completion, the member states are grappling with the puzzle of stagnant share of South Asia’s trade with itself in the region’s total trade. This is against the backdrop of deepening regionalism elsewhere in the world, which is increasingly threatening export expansion plans of South Asian countries in their traditional markets.

The fact that tariff liberalisation is not sufficient in itself for generating momentum in intra-regional trade is underlined by the fact that South Asia exhibits one of the highest rates of non-tariff trade costs in the world. Moreover, costs of trade owing to NTBs are highest when South Asian countries trade products among themselves rather than with partner countries outside the region. The issue of NTBs is stark in the case of India and Pakistan. Being the two largest economies in South Asia, resolving NTB issues between them is of utmost importance to South Asia’s overall intra-regional trade prospects.

In the absence of specific legal and institutional arrangements for reforming bilateral trade barriers, the best hopes for India and Pakistan hinge on how they leverage their status as signatories of SAFTA. However, the mechanisms for NTB resolution provided by SAFTA itself suffer from certain shortcomings that are awaiting reforms. Therefore, it would be mutually reinforcing for India and Pakistan to take lead in advancing NTB reforms at the regional level as much as it would be for trade-ties between South Asian countries in general.

**Need to Address NTBs for Trade Normalisation in South Asia**

The policy tools that were developed under the multilateral trade liberalisation under the WTO as well as under numerous plurilateral Preferential/Regional Trade Agreements (PTAs/RTAs) have been fairly successful in tackling the visible set of trade barriers, namely import taxes or tariffs on traded items. But, addressing the next set of trade-distorting barriers, generally grouped together and called NTBs, has proved to be a challenge of colossal proportions for such policy tools.

Unlike tariffs, which are clearly defined and intentionally applied trade barriers, the simplified expression ‘NTBs’ refer to a large variety of trade distorting barriers that sometimes arise unintentionally out of policy measures imposed for legitimate purposes like health safety, product safety, national security etc. Though complying with such trade policy measures – non-tariff measures (NTMs) - often raises the cost of trade and thereby poses a barrier for the suppliers; it is hard to judge NTMs as barriers unless they are proven to be deliberate attempts to discriminate against foreign products and services. The World Trade Report rightly summarises that ‘the basic challenge in dealing with
NTMs is to ensure that these measures meet legitimate policy goals without unduly restricting or distorting trade’ (WTO 2012, p. 36).

Thus, one of the two broad international policy responses towards NTBs has been development of legal tools to set norms for harmonisation of NTMs, determining the legitimacy of NTMs and address them if they are found to be set on faulty grounds. The WTO agreements on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) and Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS) are crowning examples of such legal instruments, which work for disciplining unfair NTMs. However, recent analysis based on WTO monitoring reports and the Global Trade Alert (GTA) database shows that the number of NTMs—including quotas, import-licensing requirements and other discriminatory rules—has risen sharply post 2008 global economic slowdown, indicating an increasing trend of usage of NTMs as a pretext for protectionism (Cadot et al. 2012).

The second broad international policy response is related to another set of NTBs, which has no direct association to trade policy measures. This set of NTBs falls into the category of avoidable trade costs owing to inefficiencies in the trade administration systems, institutions and infrastructure. Lengthy customs clearance procedures, burdensome documentation requirements, inadequate transport infrastructure etc. are also essentially NTBs in a sense that they are ‘non-tariff’ issues creating trade ‘barriers’. Contrasting the case of NTBs originating from NTMs, the discriminatory intent or effect of a trade policy is not the prime concern in these cases, but the sheer lack of policies for improvement of trade formalities and facilities is. Efforts are on-going to develop model codes and conducts, generally put together as trade facilitation measures, as a response by the international trade community, to address such NTBs.

On the one hand, rigorous efforts are being made at the international level, particularly under WTO and the United Nations Council on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) to classify NTBs originating from NTMs and collecting information on their incidence, coverage and magnitude of trade impeding effects. Legal framework for disciplining NTMs is also fairly developed at the multilateral level as there are specific WTO agreements and provisions for streamlining subsidies, standards, licencing, safeguard measures including antidumping and countervailing duties and so on. However, the process of judging and penalising unfair NTMs in the light of these legal provisions has been lengthy and slow, given the sensitivities and multipurpose nature of most of the NTMs.

On the other hand, trade facilitation (TF) reforms move in a different but parallel way. TF measures mostly involve implementation costs (both upfront and recurrent) which poor countries with budget constraints would fail to meet without external assistance. Moreover, such countries would be expected to take up the bulk of TF reform

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2 See Introduction by Mona Haddad in Cadot et al. (2012).
commitments as they have the highest incidence of underdeveloped customs processing procedures and transport infrastructure. Therefore, the course of action for TF reforms necessarily has to recognise and accommodate their inability to comply with legally binding commitments. As a result, reformation of barriers like infrastructural and procedural shortcomings are largely sought through international aid and technical assistance programmes which often accompany unwelcome obligations and conditions for the recipient countries. There are also certain issues of conflict of interests where TF reforms ease imports into the reforming country. Increase in imports is generally viewed with scepticism, especially in the developing countries where export expansion is often the prime motive for engaging in trade negotiations; incentives for undertaking TF reforms are weak.

Many a times, the distinction between reforms of NTMs and TF measures is vague. For instance, requirements of compliance with a NTM may raise the cost of trade administration and documentation which comes under the purview of TF. It is also difficult to segregate trade costs owing to compliance with NTMs and other transactions. A friction in trade flow like delays in inspection and clearance may occur because of inadequate facilities at customs stations or excessive procedures to verify the compliance of a consignment with applied standards. While all kinds of NTBs raise cost of trade like tariffs, fragmented policy responses used to address them because of their diversity and complexity have hitherto proved to be sub-optimal.

Nevertheless, the resolve for addressing NTBs has been strengthening and it has become the principal issue in international trade as tariff walls are gradually succumbing to trade negotiations at both multilateral and regional levels. It was famously stated by Baldwin (1970) that ‘lowering of tariffs has, in effect, been like draining a swamp. The lower water level has revealed all the snags and stumps of non-tariff barriers that still have to be cleared away’ (p. 2). WTO has chosen the topic of NTMs as a focus for the latest World Trade Report is itself a testimony to the currency and urgency of the topic.

RTAs broadly follow the multilateral approach when it comes to legal and institutional arrangements for trade integration and therefore they share many problems encountered by the multilateral system. The system followed under the South Asian Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA), which functions for reducing trade barriers and smoothen trade between eight South Asian member states, also heavily borrows from the WTO laws and practices. Certain inherent difficulties, starting from defining NTBs to designing and implementing proper remedial measures, are experienced in the way of executing SAFTA functions. Moreover, certain specific constraints imposed by the volatile political and economic environment under which SAFTA operates, adds to the woes of South Asia’s trade integration process.

Even after achieving considerable progress in terms of tariff liberalisation under SAFTA (though it remains an unfinished agenda), intra-regional trade in South Asia still
stagnates at a very low level. In a prequel to this paper (Chatterjee and George 2012), the case of trade in products which are subjected to preferential tariff rates was examined revealing that more than 300 such products with very high regional trade potential remain non-traded. These products are currently being imported from rest of the world at a higher price than what South Asian trading partners could have offered to each other if their trading costs were reduced by disciplining NTBs.

**Prevalence of NTBs in Indo-Pak Trade**

Bilateral trade between India and Pakistan quickly receded since the independence period and low levels of trade integration between the two neighbours continue to date despite the adoption of open trade policies and the advantages of geographical proximity and trade complementarities. A historical review shows that at the time of independence, India and Pakistan were heavily dependent on each other. In fact, India’s share in Pakistan’s global exports and imports accounted for 23.6% and 50.6% respectively in 1948-49 which declined to 1.3% and 0.06% respectively in 1975-76 (Ghuman 1986). Pakistan’s share in India’s global exports and imports was 2.2% and 1.1% respectively in 1951-52 which gradually went down to 0.7% and 0.13% in 2005-06 (ITC 2012).

Though their membership in SAFTA and increasing bilateral engagement in matters of commerce and trade in recent times have brought about improvements in terms of tariff liberalisation, bilateral trade still remains far under potential (Chatterjee and George 2012). As tariff liberalisation progressed, a major obstacle over and above tariff walls has become visible by way of NTBs, especially deficiency of transport infrastructure and procedural opacity, which hikes up trade costs in Indo-Pak trade. Such NTBs not only include lack of infrastructure resulting in costly transportation, poor trade facilitation measures like stringent customs and procedural barriers, and strict visa regime, but also contain a number of product standards and testing related issues.

In recent times, while both Pakistan and India managed to maintain high growth rates in trade, their respective shares in each other’s total export volumes plummeted further. Pakistan’s exports to India as percentage of their total trade fell from 2.1 in 2005 to 1.07 in 2011. Likewise, India’s exports to Pakistan declined marginally to 0.5% by 2011, which was 0.7% of its total trade volume in 2005.

In 2001, India’s exports to Pakistan accounted for US$164.6 million, which increased to US$ 2,235.8 million in 2010. The imported value of goods from Pakistan was US$69.9 million in 2001, which increased to US$248.4 million in 2010. India’s trade balance with Pakistan which was US$94.7 million in 2001 has increased to US$948.6 million in 2006 and currently stands at US$1987.4 million as of 2010 (ITC 2012). Furthermore, the share

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3 Some oftentimes cited difficulties faced by traders include cumbersome licensing and certification procedures, improper valuation methodology, undue application of standards and inspection delays. For detailed exposition see ADB (2007) and De (2009).
of Pakistan’s import from India in its global imports has increased from 4% in 2008 to 6% in 2010 (Ibid.). On the other hand, India’s import from Pakistan remains negligible. This trade balance in favour of India often results in political rhetoric, further hindering cross-border trade. Though India’s trade statistics show better access to Pakistani markets than vice-versa, it is clear that both countries have not paid any significant attention to reviving the trade channel connecting them, as they concentrated on expanding trade relations with markets outside South Asia.

It is estimated that informal trade worth is roughly as much the volume of formal trade, between the two countries, which can well be brought into the mainstream economy through better trade facilitation measures. Most of the informal exports from India to Pakistan, constituting of readymade garments (RMG), jewellery and spices, are reportedly routed through major ports like Dubai in the Middle East. The fact that per unit trade cost (including transportation, warehousing, testing and documentation) of longer circuitous trade routes are found cheaper than that of short distance direct routes – one of the reasons of informal trade – indicates strong prevalence of NTBs in the formal channels of trade.4

Though Indian exports to Pakistan has registered more than 10% annual compound growth rate during the past decade, it is well short of growth rate of Indian exports to rest of SAARC region at 15%. One notable feature is lack of diversification in Indian exports to rest of Pakistan export basket. Commodity-wise trade statistics show that the top three Indian exports to Pakistan include sugar and sugar confectionery, cotton and manmade filaments, accounting for US$613.33 million, US$320.04 million and US$300.39 million respectively in 2010-11, accounting for about 65% of total exports. Cotton, manmade filaments and processed food residues have consistently ranked in the top exported products by India (ITC 2012).

Lack of diversification has hampered export growth. One of the reasons often cited is reluctance of Pakistani authorities to permit trade in wider range of products through land routes. Though Pakistan has adopted a negative list containing 1209 non-tradable items, following its decision to grant most-favoured nation (MFN) status to India, import of only 137 items from India are permitted through the land route (Attari-Wagah border). This is cited by industry and government sources in India as the main NTB being faced by the Indian exporters in recent times.5

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4 A research study by Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Pakistan estimated that the value for total informal trade within two countries in 2005 was US$ 545 million. While the total informal exports from Pakistan to India were around US$ 10.4 million and informal imports were US$ 534.5 million (http://www.sdpi.org/research_programme/researchproject-108-12-569.html). Other recent studies have estimated the volume of informal trade as between 2 to 4 billion US$.


6 Information collected as part of a firm level survey on trade impediments in Indo-Pak Trade by CUTS International, India (forthcoming).
Going by trade complementarity index (TCI) between the two countries, which measures the degree to which the export pattern of one country matches the import pattern of another, India enjoys a high TCI with Pakistan, indicating great potential for India to expand export markets in Pakistan. In 2010, India’s TCI with Pakistan was 50% while Pakistan’s TCI with India was only 22%. Inability on India’s part to use this advantage is explained by cost of NTBs to a large extent (Chatterjee and George 2012).

The World Bank’s trade Logistic Performance Index (LPI) score for Pakistan was 2.53 in 2011 which is marginally fairer than the average figure for South Asia (World Bank 2012). A breakdown of the components of LPI throws light on areas of trade facilitation where Pakistan falls short. Customs, infrastructure and logistic competence are the areas where scores for Pakistan are lower than the average regional score for South Asia. It can be noted from further breakdown of domestic LPI for Pakistan that time delays and consequent costs of physical inspection of consignments are of major concern. There is a gap of more than 3 days in clearance of consignments with and without physical inspection. Incidence of multiple inspections is also much higher than the regional average. Though lead time for import is less than the regional average, number of agencies involved in import clearance is 4 compared to the regional benchmark of 2 in Bangladesh.

One of the main problems with analysis of NTBs is accounting of costs due to data deficiency. The UNESCAP Comprehensive Trade Costs Database (version 2) released in December 2011 covering bilateral comprehensive trade costs from 2000 to 2009 of over 107 countries – 48 of which are Asian or South Pacific economies - gives a unique opportunity to compare trade costs due to NTBs in South Asia. This database is based on a measure derived by Chen and Novy (2009), which follows the concept of Anderson and Wincoop (2004) to calculate non-tariff trade costs. A measure termed as the comprehensive trade costs excluding tariff (ntctc_sa) has been developed, which includes all additional costs other than tariff costs involved in trading goods internationally rather than domestically, when two countries engage in trade with each other. Thus, the ntctc_sa figures are given for pairs of countries. The UNESCAP database, hence, calculates the potential savings from NTB reforms. An assessment along these lines has been made with bilateral ntctc_sa figures available for five main South Asian countries viz., Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. The results are given in Table 1.

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7 The international logistics performance index (LPI) is perception based and is calculated according to the responses received from stakeholders on the effectiveness of logistics within a given country which are scored 1 (weakest) – 5 (strongest). LPI is calculated as a weighted average of the following components: efficiency of the customs clearance process; quality of trade and transport-related infrastructure; ease of arranging competitively priced shipments; competence and quality of logistics services; ability to track and trace consignments; and frequency with which shipments reach the consignee within the scheduled or expected time. India and Bangladesh outperformed Pakistan in terms of the overall index score (The World Bank 2012).

8 To calculate the cost of NTBs in South Asian trade, bilateral ntctc_sa figures for 5 main South Asian countries were taken from the UNESCAP Trade Costs Database, Version 2 (UNESCAP 2012). The ntctc_sa figures are
Table 1: Summary of Results on Aggregate Potential Savings from NTB Reforms in South Asian Countries on the basis of Country Specific Ideal Non-tariff Comprehensive Trade Cost

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reporting Country</th>
<th>Average ntctc_sa</th>
<th>Aggregate Import Value in Reporting Country (US$ Million)</th>
<th>Aggregate Domestic Value in Partner Countries (US$ Million)</th>
<th>Average Excess from Ideal ntctc_sa</th>
<th>Aggregate Potential savings from NTB reforms (US$ Million)</th>
<th>Average Potential saving as % of Import Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>2.39</td>
<td>2631.73</td>
<td>1325.36</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>167.42</td>
<td>6.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>2.02</td>
<td>1251.68</td>
<td>636.53</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>315.86</td>
<td>25.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal*</td>
<td>3.30</td>
<td>9.36</td>
<td>2.92</td>
<td>1.57</td>
<td>4.29</td>
<td>45.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>2.58</td>
<td>1213.15</td>
<td>530.33</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td>325.77</td>
<td>26.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>2.51</td>
<td>1910.50</td>
<td>906.64</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>331.68</td>
<td>17.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>2.56</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>7016.42</td>
<td>3401.79</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1145.02</td>
<td>16.32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note:
1. The latest ntctc_sa figures pertaining to Bangladesh are available for 2007 in case of Bangladesh, India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka (See footnote 8).
2. The ideal ntctc_sa figure for 2009 is 1.86 of Bangladesh with Netherlands, 1.47 of India with Germany, 1.74 of Nepal with India, 1.67 of Pakistan with Germany and 1.74 of Sri Lanka with Maldives.
3. Due to non-availability of ITC import data for Bangladesh in 2009, export values of Partner Country have been considered.
4. In case of Nepal, the latest ntctc_sa figure pertaining to Bangladesh is available for 2003.

*In 2009, India was Nepal’s ideal trading partner with the least NTB cost; therefore, we have considered Nepal’s import cost from other South Asian countries excluding India, wherein the potential savings were possible. Thus, as the Nepal-India ntctc_sa is Ideal in this case, India is excluded in calculating total and average figures. It is to be noted that, though Nepal’s potential savings is comparatively less than the other South Asian countries, the share of its potential savings in import value is far higher than any other country.

Source: Authors’ calculations based on UNESCAP Trade Cost Database (2012) and Trade Maps database (2012), International Trade Centre.

The aggregate potential savings from NTB reforms for the whole South Asian region, following the aforementioned methodology, is found to be around US$ 1.14 billion for the year 2009 (Table 1). The average potential savings from reforms for South Asia in given as indices which can easily be interpreted as percentage terms. For instance the ntctc_sa for India-Pakistan bilateral case for the year 2009 was 2.30 ((2.30 - 1)*100) represents the rate of NTB costs when goods are traded between India and Pakistan. Accordingly, when goods worth Rs.100 are exported from India to Pakistan or vice versa, their price owing to costs of trade other than tariffs gets raised by 130 %. For arriving at savings, the ntctc_sa figures maintained by all 5 South Asian countries were sorted and the most ideal and lowest bilateral figures among all their trade relations with other countries were selected. The most ideal figures were accepted as benchmarks and the savings for each country were calculated, once they undertake NTB reforms and achieve the ideal ntctc_sa with other South Asian trading partners. For these calculations, non-tariff saving rates (represented by differences in ideal and other ntctc_sa figures for each country) were applied on actual trade volume of each South Asian country for the year 2009. For the purpose of calculation of trade costs, trade volume data has been taken from ITC (2011). For details of the origin and development of the methodology behind UNESCAP Trade Costs Database, see Anderson and Wincoop (2004), Chen and Novy (2011), and Duval and Utoktham (2011).
terms of percentage to the total import value is around 16%. These figures explain the impact of NTBs on intra-regional trade in the five major South Asian countries and motivates for NTB reforms in the region. As per the country-wise results, Nepal’s potential savings are comparatively less than the other four major South Asian players, but the share of its potential savings in import value is far higher than the other countries and comes to around 45%. Sri Lanka and Pakistan are expected to gain more potential savings from NTB reforms followed by India and Bangladesh.

Figure 2: Country-wise Share in the Aggregate Potential Savings from NTB Reforms in South Asia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Share in Aggregate Potential Savings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>28.97%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>14.62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>28.45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>0.37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>27.59%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Derived from Table 1.

Figure 2 presents the result of the study more clearly and shows that all the four major economies of South Asia have the potential to save largely from the NTB reforms. Figure 2 shows the share of each SAFTA member in the aggregate potential savings. The results highlight that while the figures for savings from NTB reforms are comparable, the effect of NTB is highest for India and Pakistan bilateral trade. This fact is evident from the country-wise summary of results on potential savings from NTB reforms, as presented in Table 2. Due to the stringent political and trade relations with Pakistan, the bilateral ntctc between these two trading partners comes to 2.30, which if reduced to 1.47 (India’s ideal ntctc_sa with Germany) will gain India US$ 98.11 million, which is 36% of its total import value with Pakistan. This is the highest for India among all its bilateral cases with South Asian trading partners.

Likewise, if Pakistan’s bilateral ntctc_sa with India is reduced through reforms to its ideal ntctc_sa i.e. 1.67, it will have a potential to save US$ 0.29 billion for the country. It
can be noted that Pakistan’s potential savings with other countries are negligible compared to what it stands to gain by enhancing trade relations with India. These figures underlie the fact that NTB issues between India and Pakistan, the largest economies in the South Asian region by far, have to be resolved if South Asian trade integration is to progress in the future.

Table 2: Country-wise Summary of Results on Potential Savings from NTB Reforms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Partner Name</th>
<th>ntctc_sa</th>
<th>Import Value in India (US$ million)</th>
<th>Domestic Value in Partner Country (US$ million)</th>
<th>Excess from Ideal ntctc_sa</th>
<th>Potential savings from NTB reforms (US$ million)</th>
<th>Potential saving as % of Import Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>1.93</td>
<td>234.42</td>
<td>121.15</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>56.31</td>
<td>24.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>1.74</td>
<td>416.34</td>
<td>239.70</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>63.94</td>
<td>15.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>2.30</td>
<td>272.12</td>
<td>118.36</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>98.11</td>
<td>36.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>2.09</td>
<td>328.80</td>
<td>157.32</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>97.51</td>
<td>29.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>2.02</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>25.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1251.68</td>
<td>636.53</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>315.86</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Partner Name</th>
<th>ntctc_sa</th>
<th>Import Value in Pakistan (US$ million)</th>
<th>Domestic Value in Partner Country (US$ million)</th>
<th>Excess from Ideal ntctc_sa</th>
<th>Potential savings from NTB reforms (US$ million)</th>
<th>Potential Saving as % of Import Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>2.17</td>
<td>76.12</td>
<td>35.03</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>17.50</td>
<td>23.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>2.30</td>
<td>1080.40</td>
<td>469.93</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>294.11</td>
<td>27.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>3.65</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>1.98</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>54.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>2.22</td>
<td>55.79</td>
<td>25.15</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>13.71</td>
<td>24.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>2.58</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</table>

Note:
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3. Due to non-availability of ITC import data for Bangladesh in 2009, we have considered the export values of Partner Country.
4. In case of Nepal, the latest ntctc figure pertaining to Bangladesh is available for 2003.
5. As the Nepal-India ntctc is ideal in this case, India is excluded in calculating total and average figures.

Treatment of NTBs: Status Quo
The definition of NTBs should encompass all trade distortive conditions other than tariffs. This being the literal meaning of ‘non-tariff’ barriers, in the general discourse, the acronym ‘NTB’ is often used to refer to a wide variety of conditions which affect trade adversely. Some of these barriers, such as shortcomings in trading facilitating infrastructure and inefficiencies in the trading systems, are felt by those who are in the
trading business and are not direct outcomes of a deliberate policy adopted by any state. We may refer to them as incidental NTBs, not directly related to any policy measure, though their occurrence may have been prevented/reduced by policy measures to that effect, say, usage of public funds for the betterment of trade infrastructure.

Elimination of these NTBs depends on governments’ conviction to adopt adequate policy reforms, which has always been sensitive to the huge implementation costs associated with such reforms. In the parlance of international trade governance regimes, multilateral (WTO) and regional, policy reforms needed for dealing with incidental NTBs are grouped and named as Trade Facilitation (TF) measures. It has been observed, at the WTO Doha Development Round (DDR) negotiations on TF, that it is difficult to persuade governments to undertake TF reforms through legally binding obligations because of the lack of incentives or capacity or both (George 2011). Hence, international agreements on TF reforms are heavily based on voluntary non-binding commitments as well as external aid, technical assistance and capacity building, often resulting in slow processes and poor results. 9

It is to be noted that the initiatives for TF reforms at the regional level in South Asia also suffer from shortfalls in incentives and capacity, and are yet to produce significant results. Most of the Agreements involving South Asian countries including SAFTA have only weak provisions for addressing issues of trade related capacity building, standards, conformity and mutual recognition arrangements (MRAs), customs procedures, banking arrangements and trade financing, transit facilities, transport and communication infrastructure, business visa procedures etc. (Weerakoon et al. 2005; Chaturvedi 2007 and George 2011).

While a part of the entire universe of NTBs is subsumed in the discourse on TF, the other part - constituted by NTBs which are direct outcomes of policies - is no longer addressed as NTBs per se, rather primarily as non-tariff measures (NTMs). The basic premise for considering policies influencing trade as measures instead of barriers is that there are many diverse sets of policies which affect trade and all of them need not be trade distortive. A measure cannot be called a barrier until it is proven beyond doubt that it is distortive and discriminatory. Thus, NTBs are a subset of NTMs.

The generally accepted definition of NTMs puts them as ‘policy measures, other than ordinary customs tariffs, that can potentially have an economic effect on international trade in goods, changing quantities traded, or prices or both’ (UNCTAD 2010, p. xvi).

9 The Draft Negotiating text of the Trade Facilitation Agreement under the WTO Doha Round Negotiations heavily relies on non-binding commitments for reforms and provides for longer adjustment period for countries with low capacity. For a detailed analysis, see George (2011). The Third Global Review of Aid for Trade held in mid-2011 provided evidence that budget-constrained poor countries could utilise aid funds for overcoming infrastructural and administrative limitations, but lingering issues of accountability, ownership and management of Aid for Trade were also exposed and finding solutions for these remain a challenge for the WTO membership (WTO and OECD 2011).
The set of policy measures that may have an economic effect on trade are extremely large and diverse in nature and it is very difficult to tell apart the ones that are barriers (NTBs) and the ones that are not. Many a times, such policies are put in place not to discriminate against imported goods or intentionally distort trade but to serve legitimate policy goals like ensuring a minimum quality of imported products, yet they may factually have discriminatory and distortive effects. Therefore, judging whether an NTM is an NTB, the first step towards reforms, fundamentally relies on whether it meets a set of accepted criteria of policy legitimacy more than on its trade distortive effects.

At the WTO, an inter-related but scattered range of principles, legal instruments and practices are used to deal with NTMs. Firstly, there is a system of notifications whereby members are required to report NTMs applied which then are used for analysis and review. Secondly, the cornerstone principle of ‘on-discrimination’ which is applied through the legal requirements of National Treatment and Most Favoured Nation (MFN) clauses, is used to judge NTMs and remedy NTBs through the Dispute Settlement Mechanism (DSM), whenever an NTM is raised as a dispute. Thirdly, through specific multilateral agreements like the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS); Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT); and Agreements on Anti-Dumping, Customs Valuation, Pre-Shipment Inspection, Rules of Origin, Import Licensing, Subsidies, Countervailing Measures and Safeguards, the WTO lays out rules, guidelines, standards and codes for fair and just application of NTMs.10

This multilateral system for dealing with NTMs has been erected through more than 60 years of deliberations, following the formation of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1947. It is still in an evolutionary stage and suffers from several shortcomings. The notification process has only managed to collect information on a small sub-set of the whole population of NTMs applied across the world, only a handful of them were (could be) raised as disputes under the DSM.11 Verdicts take years of deliberations at panels and appellate bodies and the Agreements allow many different exemptions and exceptions, which are sometimes known to be misused to justify unfair NTMs.12

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10 These systems are not mutually exclusive and have several cross-cutting elements. For details see Cadot et al. (2012). Also see WTO legal texts for detailed provisions of various agreements.

11 In the context of participation of African countries in the WTO dispute settlement process, Alavi (2007) notes their marginal role and position because of lack of know-how and capacity. Pointing out similar reasons, Abbott (2007) observes that the vast majority of the developing country cases were launched by just five members and that around 80-90 members have had no dispute participation at all.

In summary, we can observe that the entire universe of what can be called as NTBs are addressed broadly in two streams of approaches to reforms, with distinct features as follows:

- **Trade Facilitation** – Generally non-policy related NTB issues with their trade distortionary effects as basis for reforms and are attempted to be resolved through non-mandatory and voluntary reforms, aid, technical assistance and capacity building.

- **NTMs Review and Reforms** – Policy related NTB issues with their trade distortionary effects as only sufficient conditions and policy legitimacy as necessary conditions as the basis for reforms and are attempted to be resolved through mandatory rules, laws, guidelines, standards and practices.

RTAs across the world basically follow the multilateral system, which is accepted as the most comprehensive one, and are by and large modelled based on the WTO Agreements and procedures. SAFTA is not an exception to this trend. The existing systems for NTB reforms under SAFTA are roughly an adaptation of the multilateral system, albeit at a nascent stage. Thus, many of the problems encountered at the multilateral level have seeped into the regional trade liberalisation system.

The general conceptual and methodological problems in dealing with NTBs in the current systems and practices can be grouped under the following three heads:

**Issues of Definitions and Fragmentation of Remedial Measures**

For collecting information on such measures and to conduct an objective analysis of NTMs, some form of a classification system was found necessary. Certain classification systems group them into hard measures (e.g. price and quantity control measures), threat measures (e.g. antidumping and safeguards), SPS, TBT, and other categories such as export measures (those applied to exports), distribution restrictions, restrictions on post-sales services, subsidies etc.¹³

On the other side, NTBs requiring Trade Facilitation reforms are not confined to any definition. The mandate of the Negotiating Group on Trade Facilitation (NGTF) under the ongoing Doha Round of WTO negotiations is to ‘clarify and improve relevant aspects of Articles V (Freedom of Transit), Article VIII (Fees and Formalities connected with Importation and Exportation) and Article X (Publication and Administration of

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¹³ Definition and classification of NTMs is a long-standing area of research which continues till date. Mostly definitions and classification vary according to purposes for which such exercises are undertaken. Some of the earlier and influential works include Baldwin (1970) and Deardorff and Stern (1998). In one of the most recent such studies, Staiger (2012) classifies NTMs according to whether they are applied at the border, to exports (e.g. export taxes, quotas or bans) and imports (e.g. import quota, import ban), or behind the border.
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Trade Regulations) of the GATT 1994. Though this mandate appears to be covering only soft reforms for procedural ease, cost cutting and transparency, the negotiations overseen by the NGTF also include topics like establishment of one stop border post, control usage of electronic equipment for pre-arrival processing and other infrastructural improvement as should accompany soft reforms.

It is observed that similar certain reform requirements are listed under both streams. For instance, Chapters C (pre-shipment clearance and other formalities) and F (charges, taxes, custom valuation charges etc.) in the UNCTAD classification, refers to trade barriers which are also covered under Article VIII and Article X of GATT. Thus, a conflicting case may arise when a WTO member is found in violation of the provisions of Article 2 (Obligations of User Members) of the Agreement on Pre-shipment inspection if it does not discipline its pre-shipment inspection systems accordingly. While at the same time the member has already taken exemptions to undertake any measures to discipline its pre-shipment inspection system as per its obligations under the soft laws of the Trade Facilitation Agreement. While resolution of these kind of problems (i.e. whether streamlining of pre-shipment inspection systems should be resolved through legally binding commitments or non-binding voluntary obligations) are still left to the complex and fragmented legal texts, the sufferers are the traders who want an easy system of inspection with bare minimum transaction costs.

In most cases, it can be seen that Trade Facilitation and NTM cases are interrelated. An unjustified NTM, like a standard (Chapters A or B in the UNCTAD classification) found in violation of the SPS or the TBT Agreement, usually raises trade cost in multiple ways. It raises compliance costs, testing and documentation costs, inspection requirements and fees and charges associated with these. Strict enforcement of standardisation of standards has thus crossed over implications for trade facilitation measures. There are plenty of examples for such inter-linkages between policy related NTBs and non-policy related NTBs and their distinctions, made for the purpose of remedial mechanisms, and breaks down at margins.

Issues of Data Availability

Availability of information, on both incidence of barriers and their trade distortive impacts, is crucial for triggering reforms. With regard to TF reforms, which are

14 The mandate for TF negotiations was laid out in Annex D of the July Package under the Doha Development Agenda and subsequently the negotiation process officially commenced on 12 October 2004 by establishing the Negotiation Group on TF (NGTF) by the Trade Negotiations Committee on that date. See WTO (2009).
15 Trade Analysis and Information System (TRAINS) developed by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) gives the most comprehensive database on NTMs, based on classification of NTMs according to a customized coding system which distinguished sixteen core categories of NTMs. See UNCTAD (2010).
16 Easing of pre-shipment inspection procedures is covered under both Agreement on Pre-shipment and Draft Consolidated Negotiating Text on Trade Facilitation (yet to become a formal Agreement), wherein the former is a disciplinary agreement and the latter allows non-obligatory and voluntary commitments to be made.
predominantly voluntary and unilateral, information on trade costs owing to inefficient systems essentially comes from the business community. Decisions on reform measures are taken on the basis of a cost benefit analysis of upgrading trading systems including infrastructure. But formal arrangements are not in place to collect data on trade costs due to inefficiencies in the trading system and infrastructural deficiency. Traders operate within a given system and often encounter the need of an official agency at their disposal to report possible reduction in trade costs if reforms were undertaken. Data deficits make an objective analysis of net benefits of a particular reform measure difficult and as a result, credible demands from the business community for TF reforms get overlooked.

Data collection on NTMs also suffers from similar problems. Databases on NTMs basically rely on notifications of policy measures made by countries, which is made mandatory under the WTO, as well as trade policy review (TRP) systems, government publications and surveys by various agencies. The most comprehensive database on NTMs available at present is included in the Trade Analysis and Information System (TRAiNS) developed by the UNCTAD. Most recently, data collection efforts have been accelerated through multi agency cooperation arrangement called Transparency in Trade (TNT), as a joint venture launched in 2011 by the African Development Bank, International Trade Centre (ITC), UNCTAD and the World Bank. However, NTM databases at best, give partial coverage and vague information because of the difficulties in collecting, standardising and formatting NTMs from scattered, complex legal texts.

Collection of data using both reporting and survey methods have their respective fundamental shortcomings. In the former case, there are disincentives for governments to avoid reporting for they may attract punitive action; and in the latter case it is very challenging to cover NTMs through surveys as there is no single repository for all the NTMs applied by a government. In any case, the information collected on NTMs does not give an accurate idea about whether and to what extend individual NTMs act as trade barriers. Quantification of trade costs owing to NTMs is even more difficult and only crude methods have been developed and used till date for calculating *ad valorem* equivalents of NTMs. Thus, in both cases of Trade Facilitation and NTM reviews, lack of quantitative data obscures a clear-cut analysis of net benefits from reforms, without which the incentive for undertaking reforms is hard to come by. This brings us further to the point of incentives and enforcement related to NTB reforms in the current approaches.

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17 WTO (2012) gives details of various sources of information on NTMs and their respective limitations.

18 The database includes NTM information for 86 countries over the period 1992-2010. For some countries/years, in particular after 2001, data was collected only for a sub-set of NTM categories.

19 As in most countries numerous laws and regulations affecting trade are often promulgated by different government agencies and regulatory bodies, assimilation of information on NTMs is found to be highly challenging. Also see WTO (2012) and Cadot et al. (2012).
Issues of Incentives and Enforcement
The problem of incentive deficits runs deeper within the current systems for NTB reforms due to the lack of data on benefits. Analysing the usage pattern of NTMs, WTO (2012) notes two key points. Firstly, very often more than one NTM can be used to pursue the same policy objective. Secondly, NTMs used to pursue legitimate regulatory objectives can also be used for protectionist purposes, implying hidden protectionist motives behind apparently legitimate NTMs in many cases. In the first case, as governments’ primary concern is meeting regulatory objectives, the need for selecting the most cost efficient NTM for that purpose is often overlooked or simply cannot be practiced because of paucity of data, analytical limitations and lack of capacity. It may also be said that, since the cost of NTMs, if any, are to be borne by businesses and often goes unnoticed, governments may lack the motivation to conduct a detailed exercise to check the comparative costs and benefits of alternative NTMs at their disposal. With regard to the second case, if the original intention of governments behind application of an NTM itself is not welfare maximisation but protective tendencies, there will hardly be any incentive for them to undertake reform even if the NTM in question is trade distortive and welfare reducing.

It is to cover for these kinds of incentive failures that legally enforceable systems are developed and depended on for disciplining NTMs under trade agreements. But many a times, the scope of mandatory rules and laws and enforceable commitments fall short as proof of policy legitimacy is enough as per the requirements of laws for a government to sustain a trade distortive NTM. 20 The proof of policy legitimacy is mostly centred on proof of non-discrimination, i.e. the government is not using an NTM to discriminate between foreign goods with different national origin (Most Favoured Nation, GATT Article I) or to discriminate between domestic and foreign goods (National Treatment, GATT Article III). In the history of NTMs disputed under GATT/WTO system, Articles I and III are the most cited legal provisions by far. In many complex and bitterly fought multilateral legal battles on trade policy legitimacy spread over a period of more than half a century, verdicts of WTO panels and appellate bodies running over thousands of pages have examined the discriminatory nature of NTMs under the light of requirements of non-discrimination principle in WTO law. A definitive set of criteria with which we can judge an NTM as discriminatory or non-discriminatory is still elusive.21

20 In the quest for determining policy legitimacy, i.e. whether an NTM conforms to the obligations of member countries under disciplinary agreements, trade distortive effects of NTMs are often downplayed. This prompted NAMA 11 group to propose a new facilitative mechanism under which trade distortion of an NTM will get more emphasis in disputes related to NTMs. See Submission by NAMA-11 Group of Developing Countries, ‘Resolution of NTBs through a Facilitative Mechanism’ (WTO Doc: TN/MA/W/68/Add.1 8 May 2006).

21 A huge body of literature follows various aspects of problems encountered in the application of non-discrimination principle in WTO law and lack of objective standards for determining discriminatory regulatory actions. Some of the most prolific expositions are Hudec (1998); Cottier and Mavroidis (2000); Horn and Mavroidis, (2004) and Horn (2006).
On the contrary, incentive failures have necessitated development of systems with very lenient and weak legal enforceability in the case of Trade Facilitation reforms. As mentioned in the previous sections, this is due to lack of capacity, budget constraints etc. that present themselves as major factors besides and/or behind incentive failures and enforceability cannot cover for it. Thus, both types of experiments, with enforceability and without it, have generated only unsatisfactory responses from governments towards demands for NTB reforms.

Treatment of NTBs: Need for a Participatory Approach at Regional Level

Against the backdrop of systemic failures inherent to current approaches, as explored in the previous sections, an improved approach can be thought of. It is clear that for facilitating reforms, the first and foremost aspect is identification of conditions (policy measures or any other factors) which act as barriers to trade. If we set aside other issues and technical details like modes and methods of reforms for later and consider the point of view of business, a barrier necessarily means additional cost, over and above what should incur if inefficiencies of any kind were non-existent. Thus, if there is an alternate but currently inaccessible route through which a trader can transport a consignment that will reduce cost or if there is an alternate way in which a government can implement a policy which will reduce cost of trading while meeting the regulatory objective, then the current route and the policy can easily be seen as barriers. We may standardise this notion as follows:

If it can be found that there is a cheaper-alternative(s) to a particular condition which influences trade, that condition may be judged as a barrier to trade.

It cannot solely be the job of governments to investigate the existence of cheaper alternatives to existing trading systems. It is in the self-interest of businesses to carry out and maintain (and they habitually do) cost assessments, consider all potential alternatives and explore possible cost saving avenues. One of the elementary shortcomings of the current approaches is that they are predominantly government driven systems, though private businesses do have certain informal channels to influence the process through governments to some extent. When businesses, the primary stakeholder group directly affected by barriers, are allowed to participate in a reform approach based on the dictum of ‘cheaper-alternative’, it can be immediately seen that the three main problems of the current approaches dissipate:

• Issues of definitions – Firstly, there would not be any need to define and treat NTBs differently as NTMs and TF measures. Whether it is a policy induced barrier or others like infrastructural ones, the overarching definition of a barrier as an existing condition with a cheaper alternative is inclusive of all such conditions. Hence this approach offers an ease to treat all barriers that are ‘non-tariff’ together under one monolithic framework, without the confusions created by different terminologies and
legal systems. Secondly, it qualifies the standard definition of NTMs as ‘policy measures other than tariffs’ with an effect on trade, ‘which may have cheaper-alternatives.’ This simple addendum to the standard definition makes a huge difference to the way NTMs are viewed at present. Since ‘cost’ of a trade policy includes not only its ‘implementation costs’ but also foregone benefits due to ‘lost trade’ (a trader may question a policy on the grounds of volume of trade it prevents), its ‘cheaper-alternatives’ must include policies which serve the same regulatory objectives with lesser implementation costs as well as minimum trade distortionary effects. Thus, equal importance will be placed on legitimacy of the stated regulated objective of a policy and its distortionary effects, if any. And when distortionary effects are given an important place, legitimacy of the regulatory objective can no longer be defended simply on the basis that it is non-discriminatory, as is often the case. In effect, regulatory intentions will be subjected to tougher tests under the new approach.

• **Issues of data deficiency** – A formal incentive driven mechanism that facilitates registry of ‘non-tariff’ complaints of businesses, will automatically ensure that all barriers worth raising will get registered. Thus, the approach can lead to creation of a better and more comprehensive repository of trade barriers. More importantly, since the singular pre-condition of a valid complaint which makes a just case for NTB is that it should have cheaper alternative(s), quantitative expressions of the costs of the current condition and the comparative costs of the suggested alternative(s) becomes an elemental requirement. Thus, costs of barriers and possible benefits (difference between the costs of current conditions and suggested alternatives) from reforms in quantitative terms are self-generated by the system, which will help make decision-making a more transparent and fast process.

• **Issues of incentives** - It naturally follows from the above arguments that businesses have incentives to raise complains and once the benefits and viability of alternative options are known, calculation of which is integral part of the approach, governments will have incentives to initiate reforms. In an incentive driven system, enforceability will only have a secondary role to play. It can work with or without strict enforceability and penalisation of non-compliance.

In addition to these advantages, the participatory approach can be observed to have certain positive externalities for the overall governance of trade. This approach promotes transparency and efficiency, permits accessibility of primary complainant or victim (businesses) to the complaint resolution system, and allows more information flow and facilitates cross-fertilisation of ideas. It is integrative and comprehensive as any ‘non-tariff’ complaint may be permitted, after it justifies a criterion – that the questioned trade condition should have a known and demonstrated cheaper alternative. It offers a simple and administratively easier system because the admitted complaint automatically comes with possible solutions, against which reform decisions can be made. It also allows
prioritisation of reform measures as relative costs and benefits of different reform requirements can be compared and inter-linkages between different reform requirements becomes visible under a monolithic framework.

Moreover, a participatory approach would facilitate responsibility sharing and reduce the burden of governments with respect to reform process, as private sector gets involved in it; starting from identification of barriers to implementation of reforms. The biggest advantage is that this approach does not require an overhaul of the existing system, but only a change in focus. Thus, existing institutional and legal resources could be used as and when required to cover up for the shortfalls in the conduct of the new system.

**Scope for Participatory Approach to NTB Reforms in South Asia**

In order to effectively contain and restrict the use NTBs in the South Asian region, a formal and well-defined participatory approach is required by designing and building an effective institutional set-up. A proper mechanism needs to be built-up in order to address the issue of NTBs. The agreement of SAFTA in its article 3 (1.d) contains the objective of ‘creating effective mechanism for the implementation and application of the agreement, for its joint administration and for the resolution of disputes’ (SAARC 2004a). However, the existing mechanism lacks a participatory approach and the role of the governments of the member states is more elaborate (SAARC 2004b).

Dependency of private stakeholders on their respective governments to notify NTB related complaints not only involves a time lag but also lacks the motivational factor to effectively present the case. The private sector, thereby, aspires to change the role of governments from regulators to facilitators (SAARC CCI 2012). An institutional built-up, therefore, needs to be developed with an apt participatory approach including all the stakeholders. A unified body can address and resolve the NTB issue more effectively with a legal enforcement and binding on the member states than the present, loose mechanism that is in existence under the SAFTA agreement provisions.

It is required that the industry stakeholders should be encouraged, informed and facilitated to raise the NTB issues through their own channels of apex business organisation body rather than to depend on the governmental authorities for notifying their NTB related grievances. The approach of stakeholder’s participation will not only help to identify the NTBs but will also contribute in defining their nature and various forms. The individual stakeholders should be provided with an opportunity to approach their own national level chambers/confederations which are presently acting as focal

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22 SAFTA Agreement, Article 3(1.d).

23 Article 8 of SAFTA mentions a range of complementary trade measures including, simplification of customs procedures and harmonisation of product coding system, easing of banking and trade financing, licensing, cross-border investments, development of communication systems and transport infrastructure and simplification of travel visa issuance (SAFTA Legal Text).

24 Press Release, SAARC CCI, Conference on Trade facilitation in South Asia, 16 June 2012.
points on behalf of the SAARC Chamber of Commerce and Industry (SAARC CCI) to notify their NTB related complaints.

As and when the complaints are reported to the national level chambers/ confederations, they need to be referred for proper examination and reviewed by experts. The complaints which are found to have merit and sufficient supportive documents can be referred by the national chambers to the SAARC CCI. The constitution of the SAARC CCI in its article 2 (g) states as an objective ‘to provide for Arbitration in the settlements of disputes arising out of commercial and industrial transactions between parties who are willing to abide by the judgement of the SAARC CCI’ (SAARC CCI 2011a).

The SAARC CCI can thereby again get complaints reviewed at their end and the genuine cases can be duly notified and intended to the Committee of Experts of the SAFTA, who under provisions of article 10 (6) of the SAFTA agreement, can monitor, review and recommend their comments and report the same to the SAFTA Ministerial Council (SMC), which is the highest decision making body of the agreement on SAFTA.

SAFTA itself confers sufficient power for institutional reorganisation under article 10 (10), stating that ‘the SMC and COE will adopt their own rules of procedure’ (SAARC 2004c). The scope of the SAARC Ministerial Council (SMC) and Committee of Experts (COE) is thereby pre-defined; the need however is to sensitise the apex decision making bodies of the agreement on SAFTA to adopt a participatory approach towards the NTB issue. The article 10 (2) of the SAFTA agreement infers that ‘the SAFTA Ministerial Council (SMC) shall be the highest decision-making body of SAFTA and shall be responsible for the administration and implementation of the agreement and all decisions and arrangements made within its legal framework’ (SAARC 2004d). Although the SMC is the ultimate authority but the actual monitoring, reviewing and facilitating powers for implementing the SAFTA provisions lies with the COE which under article 10 (7) is conferred to act as a dispute settlement body under the agreement on SAFTA. However, the COE needs to be more strengthened and its decisions and recommendations should be legally binding and enforceable.

In pursuance with its thrust area, of awareness building on key economic issues i.e. trade facilitation, NTBs, TBTs, Harmonisation of Customs Procedures, intra-regional investment and such others pertaining to economic cooperation at the regional level, it is already a vested responsibility of the SAARC CCI to act as an industry voice on NTB issues. However, an institutional reorganisation is required in order to enable the SAARC CCI to cater its responsibility and to discharge its duties with a legal binding. A

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25 Constitution of the SAARC Chamber of Commerce and Industry (amended and approved by 51st Executive Committee and 16th General Assembly, 19 May 2011, Dhaka, Bangladesh).

26 Nath (2007) highlights that the SAFTA agreement does not provide much guidance to the COE for examining a dispute or rendering its recommendations and it also lacks an operating framework for the COE to streamline the process and lessen ambiguity.
strengthened institutional mechanism will not only help to tackle the complex NTB issue, but will also scrutinise the NTB related complaints at each level.

A participatory approach requires that the national federations of Chamber of Commerce and Industry of member states should get due representation in the institutional mechanism under SAARC to deal with the NTB issues. Being important stakeholders in the overall NTBs issues and representing the private sector views on NTBs, their role cannot be overruled. However, the role and scope of these national federations of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry needs to be duly defined under the existing framework. Under article 3 (b) of the constitution of the SAARC CCI, these national federations have been recognized as the members and national bodies which act as the focal points of SAARC CCI in each of the member states27 (SAARC CCI 2011c). These national federations should be suitably empowered to tackle the NTB issue of their members in their respective countries.

**Conclusion**

As tariff walls are gradually succumbing to multilateral and growing number of regional trade agreements, trade liberalisation increasingly faces the far more difficult challenge of NTBs. The case of South Asia is no different. Ridden with a wide range of barriers, the region’s efforts to enhance intra-regional trade by reducing tariffs are under the threat of subversion by NTBs. The fact that regional trade has failed to rise to the expected levels and stagnated at a very low level for the past two decades, despite actively pursuing trade liberalisation through a formal legal and institutional system, indicates certain systemic shortcomings.

Indicators of cost of trade due to NTBs in South Asia reveal that such costs are highest in the bilateral case of trade between India and Pakistan due to high prevalence of NTBs. Being the largest in terms of economic size and the most influential member states in South Asia, resolving issues of trade barriers between India and Pakistan is very essential for progress of regional trade integration. In the absence of specific bilateral legal and institutional mechanisms to undertake NTB reforms, the best chance for both countries to better trade conditions between them is to leverage such legal and institutional mechanisms offered by their membership under the SAFTA. This will not only help boost Indo-Pak trade but also foster better trade ties amongst all South Asian member states.

This paper proposes a fresh approach based on a comparative principle which subjects current trade conditions that may be barriers, both policy-induced and other, to a comparison with potential cheaper alternatives. Greater level of involvement of private

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27 Article 3 (f) of the Constitution of the SAARC CCI allows broadening of its membership base by admitting various national level chambers/confederations/federations and specialised trade associations as associate members.
sector in the formal system for NTB reforms is necessary for the success of this approach.

It is observed that such a participatory approach has several advantages over the current approaches. It solves issues related to definitions and fragmentation of NTB reforms as all trade distortive conditions can be raised as NTB complaints under one monolithic framework. As the approach is founded on cost calculations and possible remedial measures, it also solves data deficiency and the system may also ensure that all barriers worth rising will get registered as it is in the self-interests of the businesses to do so. Further, since the approach will create an incentive driven system, problems related to lack of incentives and enforceability etc. can also be overcome.

This approach can have additional positive effects on overall trade governance as it is more transparent and permits accessibility of primary complainant (businesses) to the complaint resolution system. It allows more information flow, facilitates cross-fertilisation of ideas, while being a more integrative and administratively easier system. It also facilitates responsibility sharing and reduces the burden of governments with involvement of the private sector.

For the new approach to function, the system has to be made more inclusive, giving adequate representation to business organisations. This requires only minimal institutional reforms. An examination of the present system designed under SAARC and legal provisions of SAFTA reveals that setting up of an inclusive system is already amply provided for. Institution reforms does not require any legal amendments, it only needs more awareness generation and collective action to transform the vision of inclusiveness stated in the documents into reality.
References


Addressing NTBs in Indo-Pak Trade: Implications for South Asia


Corporate Social Responsibility in Nepal: Status and Challenges
Neeraj Nepali* and Mochan Bhattarai**

Abstract
This is a compilation of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) related practices and status in Nepal. It includes a review of current and past activities carried out by businesses, NGOs and other stakeholders using current and past secondary literature, news and reports analysed to provide a thoughtful insight on the subject. Possible recommendations directed at different levels to strengthen CSR activities have been also added.

Nepal still remains one of the poorest (BBC 2012) countries in the South Asian region and the world. More than 60% of the population depend on agriculture and there is an increasing awareness of the importance of industries in relation to economic growth and poverty reduction. Industries and business in Nepal are gradually forming an integral part of the economy as their share in the GDP is increasing. In today’s competitive market, businesses cannot disassociate themselves from social issues, especially from CSR issues. Presently, CSR activities of businesses are limited mainly to donations (cash/kind) to local NGOs, schools, elderly homes etc. Besides these, tree plantation, health camps, clean up programmes are also reported as part of CSR activities. However, internal CSR practices and plans of any businesses are not shared with the general public. As the charities are performed successively between businesses, an unseen competition may be also observed amongst them to portray themselves as responsible businesses.

At present where businesses in developed and developing countries have been taking CSR seriously for sustaining their business development activities, Nepalese businesses have just started recognising the importance of the issue. Inclusion of CSR in business development activities and appointing CSR officers are starting. In addition, a few businesses have started discussing this issue in annual and semi-annual meetings, including few multinationals that have started to include CSR in their business strategy.

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1 This chapter has been approved as a research paper by the referee.
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Introduction
Nepal is a landlocked country with an estimated population of about 26.6 million (CBS 2011) as of September 2011 and 147,181 square kilometres (CBS 2010, p.1) lying in the southern slopes of the Himalayas bordering China in the North and India in other three directions. Nepal falls in line with Cambodia, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Senegal and Uganda in terms of poverty. Her geography places formidable challenges to economic growth and development, however Nepal’s economy and society have seen significant changes and improvements over the last two decades as the share of agriculture declined whilst that of industry increased. Despite all the economic activities, Nepal’s performance has not been very satisfactory compared to the other South Asian countries with regard to economic growth.

Nepal a republic in between China and India is known for its culture and world’s highest mountain peaks. It was a trade link between Tibet and the rest of the world before long. This ‘history of trade between Nepalese businessmen from the Malla Dynasty and Tibet dates back to 5th Century BS’. After centuries, the Nepalese Chamber of Commerce was established in 1952 AD with an objective to assist in the development of the national economy through promotion and protection of commerce and industries (ECCA n.d.). Consequently, in 1965 AD, Federation of Nepalese Chamber of Commerce and Industries (FNCCI) with the aim of promoting business and to ‘protect the rights and interests of business and industrial communities was established’ (FNCCI n.d.).

The development of modern industries is not very old in Nepal though handicrafts and cottage industries have been in operation for decades. Since 1951, Nepal has tried to expand its contacts with other countries and improve its infrastructure. However, significant progress was still unapparent till the early 1990s (Mongabay n.d.).

The effects of being landlocked and of having to transit goods through India continued to be reflected in the early 1990s. As a result of the lapse of trade and transit treaties with India in March 1989, Nepal faced shortages of certain consumer goods, raw materials, and other industrial inputs, a situation that led to a decline in industrial production (Mongabay n.d.).

Nepal experienced a visible increase in the business sector from 1990 onwards. Different industries and multinational companies were established and the expansion in industries (both manufacturing and service) became visible. Though the decade long political war came to an end with the peace process, yet the transition has been getting tough due to strikes, workers’ issues and blockages/protests by various political, armed or civil groups. Thus, industries in Nepal today face internal and external challenges. Internal instability and membership of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) has opened up many opportunities as well as challenges, that require the industrial sector to be on its toes. The country has enormous potential for raising its GDP through maximum utilization of opportunities in the areas of agro-processing industry, tourism, hydropower, high-value
herbs processing industry, education, and health. There is a need to effectively mobilize foreign and internal resources in order to generate employment and alleviate poverty (NRNA n.d.).

Table 1: Economic Growth Rates of Nepal and Neighbouring Countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>8.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bhutan</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maldives</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>3.5</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: IMF 2012.

In the South Asia region, India and Bangladesh have uniform higher growth rate. China (with the exception of 2009) has been achieving growth rate of more than 9 %. Data shows that Nepal has been achieving a moderate growth rate of 3.9 % over six years. Analyzing the same period, each 4.7 % of growth was observed in 2008-09 which is the highest for the 2006-2012 period. However for 2008-09, all the neighbouring and SAARC countries experienced a dip in their growth rate.

Understanding CSR

CSR issues may be interpreted differently at different levels. The social, political and cultural differences that exist between different nations pose a challenge to achieve universal understanding of CSR. Similarly, ideological differences between government, civil society and business community within a nation influence how CSR issues are prioritized and practiced in a society (Visser et al. 2007, p. 149). In the developing countries, philanthropic activities are mostly considered as CSR activities.


**Corporate Social Responsibility is about how businesses align their values and behaviour with the expectations and needs of stakeholders - not just customers and investors, but also employees, suppliers, communities, regulators, special interest groups and society as a whole. CSR describes a company’s commitment to be accountable to its stakeholders. CSR demands that businesses manage the economic, social and environmental impacts of their operations to maximize the benefits and minimize cost.**
According to Baker (2004),

 CSR is about how companies manage the business processes to produce an overall positive impact on society.

The European Commission’s new definition of CSR calls it,

....the responsibility of enterprises for their impacts on society. This wider remit requires businesses to respect applicable legislation and adhere to the UN Global Compact principles (Agenda NI 2012).

According to ECCA (n.d.),

 Social Responsibility is the voluntary investment done by a company upon its people, society and planet beyond legal compliances, which in turn brings positive impact to its stakeholders.

CSR activities are performed within three different components covering the stakeholders of business which are internal, external and the environment. Internal CSR includes the staff and shareholders of the organisation; external CSR includes members of the supply chain covering suppliers, consumers, community and the government; and the life supporting system of the universe or the environment regarded as the broader component (GoC n.d.).

CSR is often mistaken as charity or donation. CSR is an ongoing process, whereas donation or charity is done once after making a profit (Enbridge n.d.). It can be understood as a win-win situation which is developed through a creative and interactive process. Its main role is to ensure that while making profit, the business operation promotes social and environmental welfare too. This would help to internalize ethical principles at the core of the business strategy and help the community and nation in achieving nationally/internationally formulated goals and sustainable development practices.

Many companies as well as its stakeholders have taken philanthropy as CSR. This is especially true in case of developing countries (Gupta 2006, p.22). But…

....CSR at its best is about the corporate sector reaching out from within the company to society outside, in order to benefit both business and the social and physical environment from which it springs and within which it functions. CSR, thus, synergizes social and business interests, and it is this coupling that makes it different from philanthropy (Gupta 2006, p.22).
Sustainability is more important for whatever activities constitute CSR. Focus should be more on making activities sustainable, rather than leaving it to the ‘personal preferences of company executives.’ Most of the times, such activities only relate to philanthropy and not CSR. CSR should be related to the ‘fundamental principles of business ethics which force one to reach out in terms of business interests within. Sustainable CSR is truly stakeholder oriented, not just indiscriminate philanthropy’ (Gupta 2006, p.27).

The word ‘sustainable development’ first evolved in the Stockholm conference in 1983. A commission formed on the conference under then Norwegian Prime Minister J.K Brundtland was called the Brundtland Commission, and it defined ‘sustainable development’ as ‘Development that meets the needs of present generation without comprising the ability of future generation to meet their own needs’ (WCED 1987, p.43).

Later in 1987, the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) [called the Rio Summit], also highlighted ‘sustainable development’ under Section III. The heading of the subsection was ‘Strengthening the Role of Business and Industry’ (UNCED 1987). The United Nations has also called for developing a ‘Global Partnership for Development’ under Goal 8 in its MDG chartered plan (UN 2000). A great deal has been written for and against CSR practices since then.

Arguments for CSR
Those who argue in favour of organisation in socially responsible ways offer many reasons, such as:

• Balancing corporate power with corporate responsibilities;
• Discouraging the creation and imposition of government regulations;
• Focusing on social problems’ (Baxi and Chadha 2006, p.5).
• It creates good-will and better stakeholder relations in order to improve business performance;
• Improves competitiveness through better stakeholder relations, better processes for better products and services (European Communities 2009, p. 114).

Arguments against CSR

• ‘Stakeholders bear the costs of corporate social action (shareholders, employees and consumers) which affect a corporation’s operating efficiency and weaken competitive position and advantage;
• Mismatch of the roles and expectations between the organisation and society;
• The prospects of corporations become even more powerful, as they may already exercise considerable power over society;
• Management is trained in functional areas of management and does not have generic expertise in handling social issues’ (Baxi and Chadha 2006, p.5).
CSR issues became more important in the socio economic context of Nepal following political changes in the 1990s such as formation of democratic government, rise of non-profit organisations, social and economic institutions and the alarming need to address poverty. However, since this is an emerging concept in Nepal and the political environment is still unstable, apart from a few fragmented efforts, nothing substantial has been achieved in this context so far. There has been limited research on the topic within the country.

CSR is an opportunity for businesses to secure an integral part in the global market and to make use of the opportunities that the WTO provides mainly in the form of economic growth, free trade, dispute management and peace promotion. Hence, Nepal can no longer ignore CSR issues, rather she needs to use the construct as an important tool for not only improving work environment and ethics, but also to move towards industrialization and capitalize on market access opportunities. Consumers in today’s globalized world are more aware and demand higher standards at all levels. They are concerned about the commodities they buy, the way they are produced along with the producers’ commitment.

**History of CSR in Nepal**

The Nepalese business sector has always been giving back to society in the form of donations to various sectors like schools, temples, statues and orphanages; but the term ‘Corporate Social Responsibility’ (CSR) is still relatively new to Nepal. The credit of introducing the word CSR among the business sector goes to Lotus Holdings and Action Aid Nepal (AAN) when AAN started funding Lotus Opportunities for CSR awareness in 2004. A network to carry out various activities related to CSR was formed named the Socially Responsible Business Development Network (SRBDN). Formation of the SRBDN was an output of the first ever study on CSR in Nepal, ‘The Status of Corporate Social Responsibility in Nepal’ jointly conducted by Lotus Holdings, Action Aid Nepal and FNCCI in 2003 (SAFoRB n.d.). Major findings of the study showed that some business entrepreneurs were aware about CSR, but had no clear concept about the issue. Most viewed CSR as ‘unwanted cost for their business, but they were still positive about the impact that responsible business practices could have on their business and society’ (SAFoRB n.d.). In Nepal, some…

...businesses make charitable donations in the name of CSR, while others are using it as a marketing strategy. However, with increased awareness among the business community and increased media attention, businesses today in Nepal are more responsible in terms of their action to the employees and the society. Some banks and airlines have started allocating a small percent of their income for conducting different social activities. They are mostly investing on education, health and orphanages. On the other hand, certain companies are more interested in water and sanitation, education and health programmes. But it is mostly multinationals and organisations working in tourism, power and large corporate groups who are
interested in investing in community services. Local businesses and SMEs consider CSR as an activity that only big corporations need to carry out and not small and medium sized business, hence they prefer to use the term Responsible Business (SAFoRB n.d.).

As quoted on the Forum site, CSR is ‘already been included in the three year [2010/11 - 2012/13] interim plan of Nepal, encourage[ing] private sector investment in sustainable employment generating ventures by promoting competitive capacity.’ At the same time, the interim plan ‘subsequently expects private sector to keep their operation transparent, adopt good governance’, bear social responsibility and seek participation from different stakeholders and labour management (SAFoRB n.d.).

Despite CSR being the current ‘Talk of the Town’ in Nepal, majority of businesses are unaware/ neglecting the core theme of Responsible Business Practices. In fact, while the need for CSR has been realized, the concept is still not clear and confused with charity, as it is not linked with core business and profits. In addition they are unaware of the fact that some of the major problems like power crisis, labour problems, working environment etc being faced by the business sector currently could be addressed and minimized through proper integration of the CSR concept.

2010 Study Background

The study on ‘CSR Status of Nepal 2010’ conducted by Environmental Camps for Conservation Awareness (ECCA) and South Asian Watch on Trade Economics and Environment (SAWTEE) in association with South Asian Forum on Responsible Business (SAFoRB) provides insight on the status and practices existing in the country. The South Asian Forum on Responsible Business (SAFoRB) is a civil society forum launched in November 2007 at Dhaka ‘with a vision to enable NGOs in South Asia to coherently and effectively engage with businesses to address common CSR issues’ (SAFoRB n.d.[a]). ‘The Forum has representation from 15 CSO’s from eight SAARC countries along with external observers from Novib (Oxfam Netherlands), MVO Platform (Netherlands) and Red Puentes (Latin America)’ (SAFoRB n.d.[a]).

South Asia Watch on Trade, Economics & Environment (SAWTEE) is ‘a regional network that operates through its secretariat in Kathmandu and member institutions from five South Asian countries namely Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka’ (SAWTEE n.d.) Registered in Kathmandu in 1999, the overall objective of SAWTEE is to ‘build the capacity of concerned stakeholders in South Asia in the context of liberalization and globalization’ (SAWTEE n.d.).

Study Methodology

The study was conducted in two tiers, namely secondary research and primary research. In secondary research, related literature review and Nepalese companies’ action were studied. This helped in general examination of the perception and attitude of businesses
in Nepal regarding CSR. The methods employed for primary research were mainly questionnaire survey and in depth interviews conducted with key informants of the companies conducting programmes aligned with the CSR concept. Apart from the questionnaire survey, published reports and information from their web pages were also recorded.

For the questionnaire survey, the method used for selecting study sites was stratified random sampling. Due to the heterogeneous nature and uneven distribution of businesses across different regions of the country, the study team consented that this method would be best suited amongst other statistical methods. In the process of executing the survey, the samples were divided into different strata within each central point and were chosen randomly within the strata. Depending upon the business densities existing in each development region, 124 sites in total were chosen from all over the country.

During the process, different industrial belts and corridors of the country were identified. As a result, five central points were located in five development regions of the country which were Biratnagar, Birgunj, Pokhara, Kathmandu and Nepalgunj. The central point covered the entire area of each development region. The regions were based upon the number of industries and the business activities being carried out in those areas. Total percentage of samples, taken from eastern, western, central, mid western and far western regions, were 16, 10, 44, 10 and 9% respectively. Also 11% of the study sites were multinational corporations (MNCs) and large corporate houses which were taken separately as they perform their businesses all over the country. Broadly, the study samples were categorized into two major sectors: General (manufacturing; communication; and finance sector); and Specific (agriculture; tourism; and real estates). MNCs and large corporate houses were also taken under general category. The ratio of specific and general were about 45% and 55% respectively.

The initial questionnaire for the study was prepared by Partners in Change, New Delhi for the regional assessment of CSR status in South Asia. The questionnaire consisted of ten major sections and 120 main questions designed to give an overview of organizational activities under CSR and Philanthropy. Other aspects such as stakeholder management, community development, supply chain management, training & recruitment process and awards were also included.

Through this initial survey, it was found that some of the questions were irrelevant in the context of Nepal. Thus, after several rounds of discussions amendments were made and the questionnaires were customized pertaining to the local context. Finally, the questionnaires were divided into four groups: general; sector specific; public sector unit; and MNCs. Effort was made to interview the highest ranking official of companies.

The major sectors in the 2003 ‘Status of CSR in Nepal’ baseline study mainly comprised of construction, transportation, communication, storage, real estate finance, trade,
restaurants and hotels. These businesses were mostly concentrated in the central part (72%) of Nepal followed by Eastern and Western. However, in the 2010 study, special focus was given to different development regions, along with companies performing business activities in different parts of the country. To compare the change that occurred after the CSR study in 2003, some of the respondents of the study in 2010 were the same.

Findings of the Study
It was found that industries were mainly caught in a spiral of problems like labour issues, power cuts and unfavourable political conditions and because of which business houses could not accelerate their attention towards CSR activities. The responding companies were unsatisfied with the governmental initiatives and services provided to them. It was felt that if business companies needed to be involved in CSR activities, initial efforts should come from the government; and companies needed to be encouraged through benefits and rewards.

The study revealed that understanding of the CSR concept amongst businesses is still low in Nepal and it is essential to create awareness on the issue. Confusion exists about the differences between CSR, philanthropy and charity. Lack of accountability and proper reporting were also missing. Those who had relatively responsible practices were conducting them in bits and pieces, thus could not get returns as expected. The awareness level in public sector (legal incentives) was stumpy; and even the media reported charity and philanthropic activities as CSR. Since they are called for press releases by corporations to announce perspective corporate donations in the name of CSR.

On the positive side, CSR practices are given priority by major MNCs, financial institutions and certain tourism, power related businesses and corporate groups. It was found that some of the businesses have started CSR initiatives and their institutionalization, however, other sectors were found to be unaware or neglecting CSR issues. Consumer demand has facilitated the former’s activities since they have started to realize the importance of responsible business practices.

Very negligible knowledge on CSR was found among the respondents outside Kathmandu valley with rare exceptions. Majority were performing philanthropic activities and were not concerned about implementation of CSR in business. Inside Kathmandu valley, it had been a buzzword for businesses and philanthropy and marketing were also promoted as CSR activities, especially to attract media coverage.

Respondents were of the view that the influential role of government was not seen in the CSR sector. Amongst them, 38% said that the government’s facilitation is inadequate; whereas 35% said that it was endorsing the issue in some form. In case of activities undertaken by NGOs and CSOs, 53% of the respondents shared that they were inadequate. The media’s role was not felt to be satisfactory and only one fifth said that it was moderately satisfactory.
The major barriers to perform CSR in companies were lack of financial resources (44%); and not being the part of corporate vision (27%). Autonomous CSR departments to coordinate all aspects of CSR activities were only reported in 39% cases; and the majority was found to be undertaken by marketing, human resources or public relations department. Approximately half of the companies had been addressing the issue at board or management level. Similarly, only one fifth of the businesses had a written CSR policy and companies having annual operating plans were only 19%.

Results from the study showed that the most influential stakeholders pushing for greater CSR from businesses were customers and shareholders comprising (37%). However, only 35% of the respondents had any formal engagement process with their stakeholders and only 8% had a mechanism to identify the most vulnerable stakeholders. Amongst the respondents, operating plans under health were the highest; accounting 60% whereas human rights 39%; recycling 27%, business ethics 15% and product responsibility 17%. In addition, responses stated that only 1% had been using CSR as an indicator for determining their suppliers.

The cause which was supported by highest percentage (36%) was scholarship programmes in the education sector and the lowest percentage of response (less than 1%) was for the wildlife protection. Performing donations as a way of company investment has been found to be popular where direct cash and product donations were practiced by 83% and 63% respectively by the respondents. Similarly, 4% had been performing community development activities that impact their business, while 35% of the study sample worked with communities irrespective of the impact they made on business.

For discharging CSR activities effectively, only 37% of the respondent organisations said that they have the need for skills/trainings and showed interest in learning/managing cross sector partnerships. The support centres in case of need or for specialized training were consultancy support (24%), NGO and Business Schools (18%) and 4% for INGOs and Ministries. Regarding hiring a CSR graduate as an asset for their business, 3% fully agreed that they considered him/her an asset, whereas 52% stated that they partly consider CSR graduates.

In the supply chain aspect, CSR issues were taken care of in forward linkages and neglected in backward linkages. Most companies were not aware of different international codes, but there were few cases where respondents were members of CSR forums and codes. The study found that there were not enough CSR related activities and this limits companies from sharing and upgrading their knowledge.

Examples of CSR Initiatives
Nepalese context CSR activities are led by financial institutions, MNCs and corporate houses. Besides these, certain businesses in tourism and hydropower sector have been in
the stream. Major banks and corporate houses have established CSR departments while in some of the institutions, it is often taken care by HR or marketing department. Activities are carried out by the businesses either in partnership with local NGOs or by the unit within the institution itself.

At the policy level, the Government of Nepal through the FNCCI has developed a ‘Business Code of Conduct’\(^2\) for its members and formed a CSR Forum in 2008. Some initiatives by private Nepalese institutions include the Green Savings Account and Bike Friday (where employees are motivated to come to office on bicycles every Friday) by Laxmi Bank; Plantation of Trees under its Far west Project by Yeti Airlines; Annual Walkathon held by Standard Chartered Bank; Disable Friendly Banking by Sunrise Bank; Gyan Uday Scholarship by Chaudhary Group; N cell’s Adopt a School Programme and use of solar energy for the mobile base transeiver stations (BTS) under its growing green scheme. Insurance companies like Prime Life, National Life are also currently in the list to provide support to various organisations. For managing workplaces, firms have been going through quality assurance certification e.g. fixing of air reverse back system by Heatuada Cement, internal audit conducted by an external auditor for Social Treks and Tours, use of Jatropa oil as bio diesel (research stage) by Tiger Tops Resort.

Apart from these, the authors belong to Environmental Camps for Conservation Awareness (ECCA) which…

\(^3\)ECCA understands that economic development initiatives and facilitations are effective and sustainable only if these initiatives are aligned with business principles; and ECCA Nepal believes in global compact’s three bottom lines of sustainable development viz: planet, people and profit. With a vision of self reliant, socially, ecologically and economically developed and vibrant society through the growth of sustainable entrepreneurial initiatives, Enterprise Initiatives (EI) is an endeavour of ECCA walking-the-talk towards “think like business” (ECCA EI n.d.).

EI/ECCA has been ‘backstopping the Socially Responsible Business Development Network (SRBDN)’ since 2008. However, the network has been sharing information, experience and ideas related to responsible business practices since 2004. SRBDN circulates a weekly posting called ‘Wednesday Posting’ online which consists of national

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and international news and information pertaining to CSR and the forum activities. EI/ECCA also facilitates implementation of responsible business at different levels through workshops and trainings. At the regional level, ECCA is a founding member of the South Asian Network on Sustainability and Responsibility (SANSAR) and has been liaising with the SAARC Secretariat to achieve SANSAR’s vision to enlist CSR as a SAARC agenda. This would greatly help in driving the issue forward within South Asia.

It is also worth pointing out that the only award dedicated to social entrepreneurship in Nepal has been established by Surya Nepal called the ‘Surya Nepal Asha Social Entrepreneurship Award (SNASEA)’ given to five entrepreneurs since 2011.

**CSR Challenges in Nepal**
The hurdles in the CSR sector are both internal and external:

**Political Uncertainty**
Due to the prolonged transition period, the business environment of the country has been deteriorating day by day. After the Constitution Assembly was dissolved untimely, uncertainty has increased. As a result, the production sector has spiralled in problems related to labour and several big companies have been shut down.

**Power Crisis**
One of the biggest challenges the country is facing is in the area of power supply. Despite its rich hydro power potential, the country has been facing power cuts every season. The maximum power cut experiences in the country is 18 hrs/ day. In such conditions, even the government has failed to provide separate power source for the production sector.

**Unskilled Labour**
As the sector has been facing closure and downturns, workers have gone abroad in search of opportunities which has led to shortage of skilled manpower within the country.

**Lack of Proper Legislation**
Developments in the CSR related policies in the country have not been to the mark due to lack of proper legislation and government support. Though CSR has been made part of development plans, supportive bylaws and articles are still not developed.

**Low Priority by Businesses**
Even at the business association level, CSR holds low priority due to lack of understanding of the core concept of responsible business and focus on other issues.

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**Conclusion**

A huge gap between organisations regarding conceptualization and implementation of CSR related activities exists in the country. As businesses are struggling to run smoothly due to various external obstacles, much progress has not been visible. Some companies have been doing regular activities aligned with international guidelines to conduct their business in a responsible manner. In the general scenario, businesses in Nepal have been proactive about philanthropic and charity activities which could be transformed towards CSR.

The government should be promoting responsible business and then implement programmes to create awareness about CSR issues. The government also needs to take care of the needs of the private sector and work towards building a favourable working environment for them. It has a big role in encouraging, promoting and developing partnership programmes with the private sector to undertake CSR activities. The government should also bring up policies and consider tax benefits in order to encourage such activities.

Businesses need to be more far sighted rather than continuing in the conventional manner. In various countries CSR is used as a tool for serving stakeholders which in return raises profitability. Businesses should formalize CSR processes and align them with international codes. Additionally, it is also the responsibility of businesses to maintain responsible practices in both forward and backward aspects of their supply chain. Federation of industries (national, regional and local) can facilitate its members for implementing responsible business practices and act as a platform for knowledge sharing and transformation of perceptions.

Competent NGO/INGOs can facilitate by arranging awareness trainings, organising forums to strengthen understanding and perceptions of business companies with regards to CSR. They can also develop an alliance amongst businesses or act as a partner for attaining CSR vision and maintaining a win-win situation between all stakeholders. Provision of awards or recognition could also be a way for promoting CSR. Additionally, NGOs can educate customers regarding CSR practices.

Media have a greater role in promoting CR issue in the country. They should act responsibly while broadcasting business related information. They should be able to differentiate between philanthropy, marketing and CSR activities and promote actual news without amplification or distortion. Customers can help in promoting CR issues by purchasing products or services which are produced ethically and support responsible initiatives. Business schools can built the capacity of youth by designing modules and courses on responsible business.
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Section 3
Post-Conflict Social and Livelihood Implications

- Livelihoods and Markets in Post-Conflict Settings:
  No Short Cuts, No Quick Fix
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- Future of Livelihoods, Basic Services and Social Protection in Post Conflict Nepal
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Livelihoods and Markets in Post-Conflict Settings: No Short Cuts, No Quick Fix
Stephen Commins

Abstract
Violent conflicts severely disrupt livelihoods, and the markets upon which these livelihoods depend, in affected communities. In conflict settings, governments, international donors and other agencies (such as civil society organisations) are under obligations set out by humanitarian imperatives to provide immediate assistance to those impacted by the conflict. This assistance generally seeks to address needs such as shelter, health care and water provision. These are all basic services, and as such, require both immediate support for humanitarian needs and longer-term support for human development outcomes. There are differences when conflict affected livelihoods are taken into consideration for the design of government programmes and aid instruments, both in terms of time frame and structure of programmes. These differences are important with regards to the roles of governments and donors.

Recent work on conflict affected and fragile states has pointed towards some of the dilemmas facing governments, donors and direct service providers as there are often gaps between the humanitarian response and the support for strengthening services, let alone livelihoods, in the longer term. Research on services has indicated the importance of context, time frame and particular local, indigenous factors. Similar issues, time frame, context and local dynamics, arise with regards to the restoration of livelihoods and re-establishment of functioning markets in communities affected by conflict. In addition, because livelihoods and markets are not ‘services’, there are particular challenges that governments and donors frequently find difficult to address because of the complex factors that prevent quick fixes or short cuts that could contribute to improved and sustained livelihoods opportunities.

One under-explored aspect of the relationship between livelihoods and post-conflict contexts is in the area of accountability and governance. Given the centrality of livelihoods and supporting markets for people’s well-being, particularly for communities emerging from conflict, this is an area that would be served well by greater research and policy interest.

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1 This chapter has been approved as a working paper by the referee.
2 Dr. Stephen Commins is a lecturer at Luskin School of Public Affairs, Los Angeles, USA. He works in areas of regional and international development, with an emphasis on service delivery and governance in fragile states.
**Introduction**

In post-conflict contexts, governments, donors and service providers are under the humanitarian imperative to respond quickly to the lack of basic services, often by-passing weak or collapsed public institutions in order to meet immediate needs or restore livelihoods. The tension between the need to deliver services quickly in fragile and post-conflict contexts, and the need to also support longer term processes for rebuilding livelihoods may create difficulties in timeframes and programmatic priorities. In order to improve short term well-being, build foundations for long-term economic growth and effective services; donors need better political analysis, greater coordination, and increased clarity in their approach towards livelihoods.

The centrality of livelihoods has recently been re-emphasised through work undertaken by the Secure Livelihoods Research Consortium—a six-year project funded by Department for International Development (DFID), UK which aims to bridge the gaps in knowledge about:

1. *When* it is appropriate to build secure livelihoods in conflict-affected situations (CAS) in addition to meeting immediate acute needs;
2. *What* building blocks (e.g. humanitarian assistance, social protection, agriculture and basic services) are required in different contexts;
3. *Who* can best deliver building blocks to secure livelihoods in different contexts; and
4. *How* key investments can be better and more predictably supported by effective financing mechanisms (ODI 2012).

A review of programmes in post-conflict settings by the SLRC indicates that in most instances, economic development, specifically employment and livelihood generation, remains secondary in contrast to security concerns, humanitarian needs, and restoring rule of law in transitions from conflict to post-conflict contexts. The secondary role played by employment generation and livelihoods promotion has resulted in sequencing and implementation gaps in programmes designed to promote economic well-being in post-conflict situations, thus hampering effectiveness, efficiency, and sustainability of rehabilitative efforts in the long-term. However, given growing understanding of their fundamental role within economic recovery and security, by agencies such as the International Labour Organisation (ILO), World Bank, and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), there is the potential for devoting increased attention and resources to employment generation, markets and livelihoods.

When developed within a coherent policy framework designed to support the transition of post-conflict contexts from emergency response to rehabilitation and long-term development, employment and livelihood generation can alleviate the need for continued assistance and provide alternatives for people to improve their livelihoods, and can therefore act as a useful tool in helping to break the conflict cycle. These programmes may also provide leverage for improved governance and state/society relations, but this
aspect of post-conflict and livelihoods programming requires further exploration and elaboration.

A range of instruments within the realm of livelihoods and employment may provide resources for addressing different forms of poverty and contribute to both household well-being and wider economic growth. This paper summarises some of the lessons and issues from different types of programmes, pointing to some of the different contexts within which these programmes occur, and identifies some of the possible links between different instruments. It argues that in order to effectively and consistently support livelihoods and employment programmes, donors and national governments should promote more consistency with long-term development objectives. The paper seeks to provide a wide overview on some approaches that support and sustain local livelihoods. The challenge remains in terms of finding, designing and implementing effective mechanisms for integrative approaches that link livelihoods and employment programmes with other priorities. The specific aspects of livelihoods and employment initiatives for poor people also require improvements in current monitoring and evaluation practices.

In order to accomplish their goals in relation to livelihoods and employment, governments and donors need to eventually address issues such as identifying power holders, accountability and governance, and forms of exclusion. This paper notes that the issues of governance and accountability that are addressed in the growing literature on post-conflict programmes often do not cover issues of livelihoods in post-conflict in relation to governance approaches.

Livelihoods and Well-Being

The ILO has highlighted, as has the World Bank’s recent World Development Report 2013, that productive employment and decent work are the main routes out of poverty (ILO 2011). Opportunities within labour markets and an enabling environment for local production are essential to increase livelihood opportunities for poor people. Policies that recognise impediments and seek to improve working conditions for poor women and men are critical to poverty reduction. Increasing livelihood options of and market opportunities for poor people, especially for women and youth, opens new pathways for them to improve their well-being (World Bank 2012).

Various policies and programmes have been initiated in the past two decades that have sought to improve livelihood and employment opportunities for poor people. This has represented a change in thinking and practice, as many government and donor programmes had their institutional origins in response to short term needs. Over years of organisational learning and programme adaptations, these organisations often move from a sole focus on immediate needs to welfare models and then to various forms of what can be termed community or economic development, or livelihoods models. The shift to a livelihoods and employment emphasis generally has sought to address poverty through
instruments such as skills training, microfinance and support for investment of remittances. This means that in practice, governments and donors shifted from the primary service delivery approach to programmes related to livelihoods and employment.

**Livelihood Programmes in Fragile States**

The application of a livelihoods framework to fragile and post-conflict states, including situations of chronic conflict and political instability, requires that vulnerability is placed more centrally in the analysis of local contexts (Geiser et al. 2011), that some form of political economy assessment is integrated into the livelihoods analysis and that an assessment of the pre-conflict situation is incorporated into the planning of new programmes.

Recent papers from SLRC’s initial work propose that livelihoods programming requires a deeper level of contextual understanding than is usually apparent in the design of humanitarian interventions (ODI 2012). The importance of contextual analysis of livelihoods and conflict has been emphasised in work by various researchers in the Households in Conflict Network, such as Justino (2012), Rockmore (2012) and Justino (2009). While a wide range of assessment tools are available, there are at least two key challenges: first is the decision about which tools to use for specific assessments for livelihood support and second is how to link the assessments with governance and public sector roles. In practice, the different agencies’ modalities and experiences can both restrict and provide opportunities for livelihood approaches in fragile states.

Placing livelihoods into a broader political economy context can allow donor agencies to consider different dimensions of conflict, governance and fragility. By assessing local contexts and diversity, donors can address security issues and governance issues more effectively. In addition, they can determine the best ways to address the infrastructure problems that have disrupted travel and transport, and thus local markets.

In countries recovering from conflict and/or subsequent population displacement, it is necessary to rapidly conduct livelihood assessments and identify sources of household incomes and expenditures. Small teams of enumerators can accomplish this goal with the assistance of prior training which instructs them in interview methods and the use of contextually relevant questionnaires. In combination with training, teams of livelihood analysts may utilise threats to livelihoods checklists, identify resilience mechanisms, and subsequently disseminate this information to policy-makers who can then target assistance efforts. These targets can then be included in larger needs assessment

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2 Based upon available national and historic data, teams can anticipate general threats to livelihoods within specific contexts. However, interviewees should be encouraged to elaborate more specifically on threats during questioning processes.

3 Throughout the data collection period teams must be mindful of particular realities of affected populations. In tandem with securing the poorest populations, it is important to recognise that displaced persons within
frameworks constructed by stakeholders within the immediate aftermath of conflict cessation.

Along with the community level and local information, governments and donors need better political analysis, greater coordination, and increased clarity in their approach to services, livelihoods and governance:

- The dilemma between speed of delivery vs. ‘quality’ of the process is a key challenge in fragile states and needs to be looked at on a case by case basis;
- Service delivery or livelihoods support can serve as a potential entry point and trigger for social and political change in a country;
- Interventions should be piloted first, for demonstration effects and changes should be incremental, balancing both scale and degree.

People’s livelihood strategies depend upon a complex range of factors, including location, security setting, nature of local governance structures, social networks, and access to inputs, roads, markets and water. There is consequently a great deal of variability among areas, groups, and even villages and households within the same locale. This means that in practice, donors and governments work in situations where the on-going adaptations and diversification in people’s livelihoods and coping strategies require equal flexibility as the diversity and adaptability in humanitarian and transition responses. It also requires an understanding of how livelihoods fit into local and regional market structures and market relations.

**Livelihoods and Markets**

The ways in which real markets (IDS 1993) function, as a result of their structure and internal dynamics, are key determinants in the livelihoods of poor people. The functioning of markets is also affected by availability of infrastructure and services, financial resources, regulatory policies and practices, trade policies, and how power holders affect market access. Other factors affecting market functioning in ways that impact livelihoods include types of investments in agriculture; vocational support services and resources; quality of local governance; cooperative action and collaboration by producers; types of public and private investment in infrastructure; and what is meant by an attractive investment climate and business environment (Albu and Griffith 2006).

There is a risk that a focus on ‘livelihoods’, especially at the individual or household level, without attention to market factors, may mean that the impact of livelihood initiatives will be significantly reduced, or even that the benefits are captured by the already better off and more powerful. The practical challenge for governments and donors comes in identifying the major factors and trends that shape specific markets that

government or rebel-held areas or particular ethnic groups may be ‘disproportionately affected’ and singled out as conflict targets, and therefore stand to lose significantly from a conflict.
are most important to poor people’s livelihoods, and determining the connections and the current (and evolving) conditions of the markets. The different factors that affect both markets and livelihoods result from different economic, social, political and cultural dynamics that are beyond the control of local poor people, and tend to be influenced more by the powerful actors in markets -- locally, nationally and internationally -- rather than by poor people or people in the middle class.

Moreover, there are several dimensions to be taken into account, and several complexities in their interactions. For example:

- **Gender:** Women are often major livelihood producers, as well as domestic workers, or are engaged in a range of informal activities in urban economies. Some policy reforms based on supporting women in these roles can have the effect of reinforcing inequitable gendered divisions of labour.

- **Ethnicity:** Some policies may intensify ethnic and regional conflicts through the real or perceived reallocation of resources between different interest groups.

- **Trade-offs between groups:** terms of trade between rural, agricultural producers and urban food consumers may mean that the income of some producers increases even as the purchasing power of other people or groups declines.

Establishing a balance of policies that can be both pro-growth and pro-equity will rely on an analysis of the key dimensions of inequity and exclusion and the main political-economy obstacles to change in a given country, region and community, and accepting trade-offs between different goals. Some of the obstacles that may need to be addressed include resilience of caste systems and drivers of social change; persistence of discrimination against women and affirmative action; inheritance systems and the role of formal and informal rules.

In addition to existing obstacles that reinforce different poverty factors, another major difficulty facing both governments and donors is they frequently lack a wider markets framework and compound programme weaknesses due to short-term funds that are supposed to solve long-term needs. Organisations sometimes find themselves implementing programmes and projects that may have a livelihoods goal, but lack wider foundations due to the ways in which donors have framed the approach.

Thus, too often, at the macro-level, the livelihoods/markets connections may be an afterthought. Although there is now a growing recognition of the need to integrate macroeconomic management and employment/livelihoods, there is still a strong tendency to think this means continuing to set national policies with ‘sound’ macroeconomic policies with a focus on a few criteria, an overriding emphasis on narrowly conceived ‘economic’ policies and then adding-on social policies in order to achieve socially desirable outcomes such as poverty reduction (Elson 2002). This leaves major policy
Livelihoods and Markets in Post-Conflict Settings: No Short Cuts, No Quick Fix

Livelihoods and Urban Contexts

Livelihood approaches were originally generated by work addressing various types of rural natural resource access issues or problems of food security, in the case of sub-Saharan Africa, often linked to drastic food shortages. This has meant that much of the research and programmatic activities have a strong rural focus. However, adapting a livelihoods approach can contribute to understanding the complexities of urban poverty and in connecting poverty reduction with fragile states’ policies.

For example, there are specific urban connections between local programmes and larger scale analysis. A livelihoods approach does not promote specific community level or municipal interventions. Its role is to identify and assess the connections between various dynamics that affect poor urban residents, from the household level around specific livelihoods to the larger policies and programmes that affect opportunities. Urban livelihoods analysis can provide greater insights into the various levels and relations within political and economic institutions, as well as the regulations, which affect poor people’s access to resources. ‘While control over poor people may be legal, for example, by municipalities, they may also be the result of illegal activity, for example, drug gangs that control neighbourhoods’ (Sanderson 2000, p. 97).

Assessments can identify how poor people do or do not have access to resources as a key analytical starting point, including the ability of poor urban dwellers to access finance, food, employment, shelter or political power. In urban contexts, livelihoods work can help focus on the importance of income as a means of accessing many of those resources. Also, the analysis can illustrate the importance of household-level social and physical assets.

Urban contexts and the identification of urban political dynamics, and relationships of power, can help donors, governments and civil society organisations in addressing livelihoods issues in cities and larger towns. Urban contexts are continually shifting and in flux, with continued rural to urban migration, overburdened municipal governance systems, an ill-equipped public sector and various forms of competition for limited resources. The ‘food price shocks’ of 2006-7 highlighted one specific area of vulnerability, as urban consumers were frequently more at risk and food access stressed than were their rural counterparts.

As Hugh Stretton stated over 20 years ago: The life of a modern city is very complicated. The citizens have intricate patterns of common and conflicting interests and tastes and beliefs, and individually and collectively they have very unequal capacities to get what they want for themselves or from one another. From that tangle of powers and purposes comes a social life so complicated and partly
unpredictable that any understanding of it has to be incomplete (Sanderson 2000, p.97).

Livelihoods and Food Security
One main element of humanitarian programming frequently involves providing food resources and nutritional interventions. A review of the approaches to food security in conflict and humanitarian situations can help provide another perspective to the livelihoods question. In assessing the food security (and livelihoods) and fragile states connection, one indication of a growing recognition of the difficulties in adapting the food insecurity approach is found in the summary of an FAO-organised conference (FAO 2003). The summary of the workshop noted that in fragile states, where there are issues of government collapse, violent conflict, the weaknesses of the state have notable impacts on food security and on the well-being of poor people and vulnerable groups. While donors will commit increasing flows of short-term, emergency humanitarian assistance, the ‘transition’ to longer-term development is often not as well supported either financially or programmatically.

The workshop report argued that this may be partly a result of the general absence of core policy frameworks for addressing longer-term food security (and livelihood) issues in fragile states. The widely utilised policy frameworks of humanitarian agencies or humanitarian departments, with a focus on immediate needs, do not have longer term investment in markets as part of their approach. Similarly, development organisations (notably Non-State Providers) that are focused on food insecurity in fragile states often do not produce any livelihoods analysis. The overall disconnect between short-term needs and longer-term livelihood/food security gaps was characterised by workshop participants as a ‘policy gap’: a lack of short and long-term mechanisms and reference points for setting priorities in addressing food insecurity (Flores et al. 2005). They noted that there are both institutional and analytical failures in terms of how donor agencies approach food security issues. One reason given for the ‘policy gap’ was that it is the result of the food supply driven nature of donor food aid systems and domestic politics, as well as the humanitarian imperative to ‘feed hungry people’ (Ibid.). Donor time frames work against more incisive analysis of the food insecurity dynamics, and agency organisational cultures can use immediate needs assessments more easily than political economics or market trend analysis.

As Christopolos (2004) noted:

Current agricultural rehabilitation and development efforts are supply-driven and are poorly anchored in an understanding of what rural people themselves are striving to achieve as they rehabilitate and develop their own livelihoods (cited in Flores et al. 2005, p. 33).
There seems to be a trade-off between food resource provision versus agricultural and livelihoods rehabilitation. This was noted in other studies, which argued that information systems are better at short term needs and less adequate for generating the needed knowledge for long-term issues/factors related to food insecurity, especially the impacts of fragile states/conflict and coping strategies (Ibid.). This leads to programming that is usually guided by needs assessment exercise that takes the nature of the response----food assistance---as a given.

According to Flores et al. (2005), a study funded by Save the Children-UK argued that rather than food resources, it was more appropriate in most cases to utilise ‘cash transfers to boost entitlements and road reconstruction to improve security and market access’ (Levine and Chastre 2004 as cited by Flores et al. 2005, p.33) The study found that…

"…many, if not most, food security interventions failed to address the needs of people affected by crises…agencies used the same narrow range of responses in nearly all circumstances…[which] deal with symptoms not causes…[which] focused narrowly on food production… [and which] were often not cost effective (cited in Flores et al. 2005, p. 32)"

What is notable from the perspective of the connections between food security and livelihoods in post-conflict contexts is that there are common points of concern and analysis between the livelihoods/conflict literature and the recent food security/fragile states work: time frames; market issues; and political economy questions.

**Lessons from Pakistan**

Current and recent research on the impact of conflict and displacement in one of the provinces of Pakistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) provides some specific contexts for understanding the impacts of violent conflict on livelihoods and markets. War led to the ‘physical destruction of markets and transport infrastructure, including shops, storage space, transport vehicles and roads. Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) [on the border of KPK’ undoubtedly suffered the greatest damage’ (WFP 2010, p. 20).

‘Overall, 80% of surveyed markets have been affected by insecurity, 70% by military operations and two thirds by looting. Traders’ access to 43% of markets has been inhibited; and, as in FATA, increased transaction costs are a major problem’ (Ibid. p. 22).

In these areas, traders have adopted ‘coping strategies that are likely to be harmful to consumers; while 32% of interviewed traders increased their prices, the first reaction was to reduce their scale of operation; mainly implemented as a means of minimising losses in the case of looting (reported by 81% of traders). Secondly, three quarters

4 From Shabhaz et al. (2012).
reduced their business costs; by taking advantage, for example, of quick stock rotation opportunities offered by the high demand in Afghanistan, rather than handling costly stocks in FATA. Finally, two third traders offered less credit to customers. As an outcome of these coping strategies, the ability of households to purchase food is further compromised and sales volumes decrease’ (WFP 2010, p. 22).

Bari (2010, p. 40)’s research concludes that the conflict ‘not only destroyed local infrastructure of schools, health facilities, and roads, it destroyed local rural and urban economies.’ She reports that ‘both men and women suffered from loss of resources, livelihoods, jobs, income from agriculture and business due to on-going conflict in their areas. However, women were affected in gender specific ways due to their traditional roles as mothers and caregivers. With the loss of family income, the burden to feed family members with little or no income weighed heavy on them’ (Ibid. p. 40).

In assessing how different markets have an impact on the livelihoods of communities in KPK-FATA, it is necessary to consider the nature of different markets, and market-related factors - including transportation, financial resources, government policies/regulations, and how power holders affect market access – and how they can potentially affect livelihoods. A focus on ‘livelihoods’ without attention to these details may mean that the impact of livelihood initiatives will be significantly reduced. It will also mean that assessing the impacts of conflict or disasters will be less effective (Shahbaz et al. 2012, p.26).

In a review of donor literature and plans for KPK and FATA, there is relatively little attention to either the private sector or the key market linkages in both their pre-disaster/development and emergency settings. There is often little attention to market systems and their roles in the rebuilding of livelihoods. It can be argued that the processes of elaborating market relations, especially if carried out in participatory ways, can also be important interventions in themselves - directly improving linkages and relationships between market linked actors, and preparing local communities for introducing or ‘generating innovation in products, processes and market access’ (Albu and Griffith 2006, p.14).

One example of the importance of market assessment involves the centrality of agriculture shops that support the productivity of agriculture and livestock in conflict affected areas. These shops are the source for such inputs as seeds, fertilizers, pesticides and other necessary agricultural resources for households on a credit basis during the planting season. They, then, receive repayment at the time of harvest and marketing of farm outputs. These shopkeepers have managed and financed their operations based on seasonal credits and thus help farmers to cultivate their lands annually. However, surveys of the conflict affected areas showed that because of the dramatic decline in agricultural outputs, these shops have had to close, leaving farmers with greater debt and the shop owners without resources for re-opening (HOPE87 2010).
These lessons from KPK and FATA indicate the importance of donors and implementing agencies in identifying major factors and trends that are shaping the market-chain environment and operating conditions. They may or may not be easy to change because of pre-existing politics, power relations and market structure. It is vital, though, that there is a clear understanding of these livelihood enabling environment factors which are generated by structures and institutions that are beyond the immediate direct control of poor people. The purpose of charting livelihoods environment is to understand the trends that are affecting the entire market-chain, and examine the powers and interests that have shaped the livelihoods of poor people and which continue to affect livelihoods after conflict and displacement (Abu and Griffith 2005). Along with the programmatic issues there are basic questions about how improved governance links with rebuilding livelihoods and markets.

Another element of identifying linkages involve the broader issues of employment policies and the role of governments in promoting livelihoods, as was recently summarised in the World Development 2012 that focused on ‘jobs’.

**Way Forward**

**Understanding the Political Economy of ‘Jobs’**

Livelihoods and employment as essential elements of improving well-being and addressing chronic poverty were highlighted in the *World Development Report 2013 Jobs*. One area to which the Bank and other donors should give more attention is the political economy of jobs and livelihood policies. The World Bank and DFID, among others, have been increasingly focused on such themes as good governance and strengthening mechanisms for social accountability. But the connections between politics and employment are relatively unexplored in the governance and accountability literature, as compared to basic services.

Yet, as with basic services, clientilism may involve governments designing policies that are structured in ways to benefit specific political allies, or favoured religious and ethnic groups. This divide, rather than a clear ‘rich’ versus ‘poor’ or ‘middle class’ versus ‘poor’, may be an important analytical issue for donors and government reformers in relation to access to employment and livelihood opportunities. The WDR 2004 introduced the ‘accountability triangle’ to explore links between governments, service users and providers, and sought to highlight the political nature of service delivery. But, in retrospect, this element of basic services probably required even more emphasis and analysis, as many of the obstacles to services that have been studied in the past decade are the result of politics not some technical failure.

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5 This section is drawn from Commins (2012).
Greater attention to the relationship between citizens and the state, and how political relations shape ‘jobs policies’ appears to be an area for further research as well as citizen engagement. Two points from the WDR (2012) are particularly relevant for considering the relationship between livelihoods and markets in post-conflict settings:

Labour policies - Because growth alone may not be enough, labour policies need to facilitate livelihood improvements and enhance development payoffs from jobs. Policies can address labour market distortions while not being a drag on efficiency. But they should avoid distortionary interventions that constrain employment in cities and global value chains—and provide voice and protection for the most vulnerable (WB 2012, p. 3).

Priorities. Because some livelihood opportunities contribute more to well-being than others, ‘it is necessary to identify the types of jobs [livelihoods] with the greatest development payoffs given a country’s context, and to remove—or at least offset—the market obstacles and institutional failures that result in too few livelihoods opportunities being created (WB 2012, p. 3).

One priority that has been advanced by the ILO involves Employment-Intensive Investment Programmes, which in the case of conflict settings may have added value of connecting infrastructure with livelihoods as well as with markets.

Employment-Intensive Investment Programmes

In situations of post-conflict displacement and economic insecurity, there are a variety of approaches that could be utilised to rapidly restore economic activities, livelihoods and markets. One approach is the Employment-Intensive Investment Programme (EIIP), which is an approach that has been utilised by the ILO to alleviate poverty by speeding local economic development through investment in both physical infrastructure (transportation, communication, irrigation) and social infrastructure (housing, schools, clinics, clean water). These programmes were originally designed for use within non-conflict scenarios, but have been successfully translated to the post-conflict context, albeit with certain difficulties. In general, the goal behind these poverty alleviation strategies is to create employment and income for conflict-affected people:

The principal advantages of EIIPs are that they provide scope and flexibility to generate both short-term, immediate employment through construction, rehabilitation, and maintenance of the infrastructure, and long-term sustainable employment through the productive use of the same infrastructure (ILO 2001, p. 23).

*Employment-Intensive Investment Programmes are the intellectual property of the ILO. The following sections discussing their design and implementation have been adapted from the guidebook ILO (2001). The summary is derived from the ILO and from thesis produced by Grant (2009).*
In post-conflict scenarios, EIIPs are established immediately after the cessation of conflict and represent an integrated employment approach which ensures that a wide spectrum of conflict-affected persons are included within employment creation efforts. EIIPs offer opportunities to low or unskilled labour who can contribute physical labour to infrastructure rebuilding, semi-skilled labour looking to improve their skills and participate in training efforts toward better vocations, and small entrepreneurs who want to establish or expand businesses within the formal and informal sectors (ILO 2001, p. 17).

Beyond the creation of employment opportunities, EIIPs enjoy ‘spin-off’ effects through the introduction of increased wages and subsequent cash flow within the local economy. They also increase local procurement needs which reinforce the utilisation of locally available resources, rather than more costly imported equipment. In due course, a successfully implemented EIIP will help to foster a market for local goods and services, thus providing the foundation for a more stable local economy (ILO 2001, p.23). Moreover, because priority is placed on the input of labour as opposed to capital equipment, the costs of EIIPs remain relatively low: ‘By maximizing the most abundant and cheapest resource, and minimizing the scarcest and more expensive inputs, the costs of EIIPs are comparatively lower than other approaches’ (Ibid. p. 25-26).

Well-planned and executed EIIPs can help increase socio-economic capacity within post-conflict countries and peoples. Efficiently designed, they can also provide vocational skills training, strengthen social networks, and create a foundation for improved social and economic stability (ILO 2001, p. 26). By encouraging the active participation of conflict-affected people in the planning and implementation of infrastructure programmes, EIIPs engender local ownership in the (re)development process. This ownership, in turn, means that beneficiaries not only become active participants in the (re)development effort, but also have a stake in its stability (Grant 2009). The risk with EIIPs is that they may not have an adequate linkage with how markets have been affected by conflict, and thus may require wider programme connections that establish clear linkages with restoring markets that will promote livelihood opportunities.

Mapping Markets
In a review of donor literature there is relatively little attention given to markets in both development and emergency settings. Some recent work has provided new resources to the functioning of market systems and their roles in the rebuilding of livelihoods (EMMA 2011). Giving attention to an enabling environment for markets is essential when existing markets have been damaged or destroyed. The goal of an enabling environment is a series of adapted policies and programmes that support markets that have been damaged or destroyed, with an assessment of the levels of loss, identification of those who are affected and an analysis of the political economy of the markets and the market power holders.
This commitment to an enabling environment can include market support, provision of livestock, focused or widespread cash transfers and agricultural tools. More broadly, the rebuilding of market systems may involve rebuilding infrastructure, financing the re-opening of shops and different parts of the supply chain, such as transport and fuel. This is likely to involve building on some elements of the previous system, but also using the opportunity for reforms and changes, while being realistic (i.e. forms of exclusion, power, property holding do not disappear because of conflict or a disaster). Planning for an enabling environment would consider the pre-existing conditions and shifts before the negative shock; i.e. subsistence, market sales, non-farm employment, outmigration, remittances, or foraging and fishing.

In the complex contexts of post-conflict settings, front line practitioners or the organisational planners and policy-makers face a range of solutions or policy prescriptions including: trade liberalisation; more productive agriculture; more effective support services and resources; better local governance; collective action and collaboration by producers; greater public investment in infrastructure; and a more attractive investment climate and business environment (Albu and Griffith 2005, p.7-8). In order to secure or improve the livelihoods of people affected by conflict, programmes are best designed ‘through concentrating on the improved overall performance of specific economic channels or market-chains’ (Albu and Griffith 2005, p. 8). One way to engage with local contexts is through the…

...processes of elaborating a Market Map7, which if conducted in a participatory way, can also be important interventions in themselves—directly improving linkages and relationships between market-chain actors, and preparing the ground for introducing or generating innovation in products, processes and market access (Albu and Griffith 2005, p.3).

The central component maps the economic actors who actually own and transact a particular product as it moves through the market-chain from primary producer to final consumer. By better understanding the contribution each actor in the chain brings to the product, the aim is to identify inefficiencies, inequities and losses which could be remedied, or added-value which could be captured by poor producers particularly. While many market-chains are characterised by inequitable relationships between actors, a clear objective of the Market Map approach is to help stakeholders realise mutual benefits by improving the 'systemic efficiency' of the chain. Key to this is helping stakeholders become more aware of functions and processes along the chain that are needed to satisfy more lucrative or reliable markets (Ibid.).

7 Graphical representations of market systems (before and after emergency onset) (EMMA 2011).
In post-conflict planning, one task is to identify major factors and trends that are ‘shaping the market-chain environment and operating conditions’ (Ibid.). They are unlikely to be easy to change, given the nature of politics and power, but they need to be understood in terms of how they shape markets. These ‘enabling business environment factors are generated by structures and institutions that are beyond the immediate direct control of economic actors in the market-chain’ (Ibid.). This mapping helps one ‘understand the trends that are affecting different elements of market relations, and examine the powers and interests that are driving change’ (Ibid.)

The third component of the Market Map framework is concerned with mapping these services that support, or could potentially support, the market-chain’s overall efficiency. The range of services that can potentially add value is huge and include input supplies; market information; financial services; transport services; quality assurance - monitoring and accreditation; technical expertise and business advice; veterinary services; support for product development and diversification (Ibid.).

Mapping “services” involves identifying particular service needs and their locations within the market-chain in order to get an overall picture of the opportunities for using services to improve market-chain efficiency or equity. This mapping is a precursor to subsequently assessing the most appropriate mechanisms for delivery of services, in terms of outreach, sustainability and cost-effectiveness (Ibid.).

With mapping, there is also the opportunity to outline approaches for market strengthening that can provide guidance for government policies that bring together different stakeholders to promote livelihoods within the local development context.

Local Economic Development\textsuperscript{8}

Local economic development (LED) provides local government, the private and not-for-profit sectors, and local communities the opportunity to work together to address livelihoods and markets in post-conflict setting. As an approach in post-conflict contexts, LED encompasses a range of disciplines including economics and marketing, and also incorporates many local government and private sector functions (Swinburn et al. 2006).

The application of ‘local economic development approaches can be undertaken at different geographic scales’ (WB LED website) including rural communities, regions or districts, and urban neighbourhoods.

‘Such approaches are most successful if pursued in partnership with post-conflict and local government strategies. Local communities respond to their LED needs in many ways, and a variety of approaches can be taken that include:

\textsuperscript{8} This section is taken from the World Bank LED home page. The work originated in 2004 but the Bank maintains an updated website for it.
• Supporting small and medium sized enterprises;
• Encouraging the formation of new enterprises;
• Investing in physical (hard) infrastructure;
• Investing in soft infrastructure (educational and workforce development, institutional support systems and regulatory issues);
• Targeting particular areas for regeneration or growth (areas based initiatives);
• Supporting informal and newly emerging businesses;
• Targeting certain disadvantaged groups (WB LED website).

Conclusion
At the intersection of conflict, livelihoods, and governance, there are long term tasks for livelihoods programming, as well as during (which is not as short as donors and governments wish) the transition out of the initial ‘post-conflict’ phase. The challenge is how to address the overall factors, as well as the specific ‘politics of markets’ in livelihoods. How can donors support actions and transitions that strengthen livelihoods and expand livelihood opportunities, increase quality and capacity of governance (slowly), and engage accountability mechanisms? This is where country specific experiences and examples would be most useful. The time frame for addressing livelihoods provides both the challenge and opportunity to bridge the two-track dilemma with greater attention to linkages between livelihoods and governance in fragile states. Donors and governments need to move beyond formulaic humanitarian delivery systems and methods to allow for greater flexibility and differentiation in their response over space and time (Commins 2004).

One possible approach that emerges from assessing various approaches centres on expanding opportunities for the poorest and most vulnerable groups in post-conflict communities. This includes an emphasis on ‘opportunities’—intended broadly; not just incomes—and on the ‘poorest and most vulnerable groups’. Various poverty studies point out a diagnostic frame that focuses on inequality traps, namely various forms of unequal relations (for instance between poorer and elite groups), that can lead to the restriction of opportunities for some groups and to significant costs in terms of overall well-being of poor children and their families. The work could involve several steps:

• Identifying two or three key disadvantaged groups, and the key ‘assets’ they lack such as women and political rights; indigenous groups and control over natural resources; the rural poor and security of tenure; slum residents and personal security; the unemployed and livelihoods.
• Identifying fundamental institutional inequities such as labour market discrimination against certain ethnic or religious groups; justice system too slow and biased against women and the poor; credit market inaccessible except to the more powerful and affluent groups.
• Identifying the main channels through which those inequities are reproduced over time, and possible mechanisms to address them. For instance, resilience of caste
system and drivers of social change; persistence of discrimination against women and affirmative action; inheritance systems and the role of formal and informal rules of markets.

- Developing contextualized programmatic options to get past the poverty traps. These may involve economic/social policy as well as political and institutional reform and cultural change.

In the end, the approach should be about problem solving, not providing pre-packaged solutions that have either worked in other contexts or which seem theoretically feasible. Lessons from Pakistan and other contexts through the work of SLRC and other initiatives can provide assistance in future designs. On-going research can help identify different approaches being pursued by governments, donors and others at the project/grass roots level to strengthen livelihoods of poor and marginalised people.
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Livelihoods and Markets in Post-Conflict Settings: No Short Cuts, No Quick Fix


Livelihoods and Markets in Post-Conflict Settings: No Short Cuts, No Quick Fix


Future of Livelihoods, Basic Services and Social Protection in Post-Conflict Nepal

Bishnu Raj Upreti* and Sony KC**

Abstract

Poor, marginalised and socially excluded people continue to face several challenges when it comes to ensuring secure livelihoods, basic services and social protection because of post-conflict political uncertainties and associated complications in Nepal. This paper examines these challenges and envisions future opportunities/trajectories and argues for a paradigm shift in the current system of providing these services in the country. The 2006 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) is used as the basic framework for this envisioning exercise.

In the first part of the paper, we argue that despite various livelihoods, basic services and social protection related interventions by the Government and international actors in Nepal, there is inadequate empirical verification on their positive impacts on the lives of people (Upreti et al. 2012). We also find that while state-driven policies in the area of livelihoods have helped people to some extent, the state’s capacity in responding to people’s need for livelihood security and basic services has been severely weakened by the decade long insurgency, particularly in the remote areas (Chandran et al. 2008). The paper further discusses the supply side (framing sound policies, commitment from the state and assigning proper institutions); and the demand side (what people actually need – employment, rehabilitation and other forms of livelihood support).

Getting state-people relations right is the best way forward and hence, it is imperative to bring sound policies, regulatory frameworks and institutional arrangements within a strong governance framework for ensuring secure livelihoods, providing effective basic services and sound social protection to the poor and marginalised in Nepal.

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1 This paper is an outcome of ongoing research in Nepal under the Secure Livelihoods Research Consortium. The information for the paper is derived from qualitative data and existing literature. The chapter has been approved as a working paper by the referee.

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Setting the Context

The livelihoods pattern of Nepal following the long conflict (1996-2006) is directly proportional to the political stance of this country. Conflict aroused due to rampant poverty; traditionally practiced gender, class, caste, ethnicity, religion and geography based inequality; and discrimination. It exacerbated due to policies driven by external forces (Deraniyagala 2005) such as development aid agencies and interests of neighbours. It was fuelled because poor people’s use of natural resources such as land (Bhattarai 2003; Upreti et al. 2009 and 2010; Upreti and Müller-Böker 2010) and forests were controlled by elites and other groups. Also, high exploitation and misuse of power by the elites excluded massive numbers of Nepalese of their rights to economic and political inclusion (ICG 2007; Upreti 2006; 2010). In six years, five different governments led the country with their own vision and ways towards progress. Nepal progressed in terms of addressing inequality and exclusion which in reality was never thought of for a country with severe economic, social and political disparities (Upreti et al. 2012). Addressing inequality and exclusion gave the poor and marginalised opportunities to raise their concerns with regards to demanding better livelihoods options. However, failure to sign the Constitution and political disputes worsened the political scenario of Nepal which is still running without proper mandate and rule of law. Those with access to politically powerful leaders have better lives as opposed to those with no access. People once again mistrust the state and have started questioning its legitimacy – from service delivery mechanisms to creating employment opportunities and livelihoods.

Nepal is still engulfed in high poverty rates, lack of employment opportunities and distorted allocation of resources (Mahat 2005; Upreti 2008 and 2009). With the end of insurgency, people had hoped for the best options and held their heads high, but their hopes failed. Condemning failure and accusing leaders is prominent whilst inflation rates, unemployed youths, nepotism in vacant posts and lack of other opportunities that secures Nepalese basic needs has provoked discontentment. People wish to advance their living standards by getting involved in decision making processes (Upreti 2010) and coming together to support inclusion rather than discrimination based on caste, class, religion and gender.

The desires of post-conflict Nepalese people have been oscillating like a pendulum as they now wish for monarchy which ended years ago. Though much remains to be done at the implementation level, there have been a few noticeable changes in post-conflict Nepal. For example, it was the war that introduced rights and inclusion of disadvantaged and marginalised people like women and Dalits in every agenda of the country.

Data suggests that the national poverty line has reduced to 25.4% (UNDP and NPC 2010). However, there has been debate on this issue since the method/s used to calculate poverty rates by the World Bank differs from that of the National Planning Commission and the United Nations (Bhusal 2012). A precise methodology is required to calculate the
actual poverty rate which should meet the standards of Nepal. Also, the geographical
built of the country creates more challenges in terms of addressing problems and needs as
poverty is more severe in remote places than in the urban areas (Joshi et al. 2010). The
Global Hunger Index places Nepal at 20.6 which represents severity (WFP 2009) and this
severity is scattered region wise.

There will be no future for Nepal in terms of enhancing livelihoods if sound plans and
policies with long term vision are not formed. So far, there have only been short term
projects such as providing sewing machines to women or goats to households for
enhancing their livelihoods. Such programmes have been successful in some parts, but
are not continued due to problems of monitoring, understanding people’s perception
about the programme and its effectiveness. With such short term plans and policies,
people will not benefit from any long term benefits.

Finding who the poor are, their income ranges and assessing their needs for livelihoods,
basic services and social protection support are must for Nepal. This way the poorest of
the poor can be identified without exclusion of their rights to better livelihood options.

Understanding Livelihoods in the Nepalese Context
The understanding of livelihoods varies. For the poor, it is about finding bread and living
hand to mouth on a daily basis. For institutions working on enhancing livelihood options
of people, it is about frameworks/approaches such as the Sustainable Livelihoods
Approach initiated by DFID which focuses on human, natural, financial, physical and
social capital; the Rural Livelihoods System (RLS) by Baumgartner and Hogger (2006);
CARE’s livelihood framework that looks at production, consumption, stress and shock;
and OXFAM’s framework which looks into capacity development and changes in
policies (Upreti et al. 2012). These frameworks are widely used by donor agencies as
well as researchers. However, they fail to address people’s needs based on their aims and
perceptions (Ibid.).

Upreti et al. (2012) see two fold understanding of livelihoods through literature reviews.
One understanding is the ‘materialist’ which scrutinizes the concerns related to poverty,
risk, vulnerability and coping strategies. The other is what is termed as ‘group-centred’
which includes examining inclusion in relation to caste, ethnicity, religion and gender.

The magnitude of conflict on livelihoods was intense for the Nepalese. It had both
negative and the positive effects which led to a paradigm shift in the livelihoods of
people. While conflict violently destroyed human and physical capital (the basis of
livelihoods), it also undermined better living at an individual level; and induced
migration not due to choice but force (Sharma and Donini 2010). There has been
movement of thousands of youth, women and men to Gulf countries seeking employment
and livelihood opportunities. MoF (2009) data reveals that the Government has chosen
107 countries as destinations for foreign employment after being aware of the migration
rate that brings remittances. These remittances have been used in supporting livelihoods in rural areas. Apart from migration, approximately 200,000 people (data varies among organisations) across the country were displaced due to conflict induced displacement (IDMC 2012). Due to migration, while men went abroad, women’s employment rate rose (Menon and Rodgers 2011). As men migrated women started taking the roles of men resulting in a massive paradigm shift in relation to livelihood options. However, women who had better jobs were discontent and depressed due to the monotonous routine and dual roles in rural areas. Also less pay and income was one factor for them being discontent with the change (Mammen et al. 2009). Whether this shift is good or bad needs more research on perceptions of these women who took over men’s roles. In broader terms though, the shift could empower women and give them the status of head of the household as well as set them as the decision makers.

Nepal’s livelihoods are primarily agrarian. About 74% of the population depends on agriculture for their living with 36% contribution in GDP (World Bank 2012). Despite agriculture being the mainstay, it only accounts for 3% of the public expenditure as opposed to education (15%), police (7%), electricity (6%) and others (Dillon et al. 2011, p. 252). The Government formulated plans such as Agriculture Perspective Plan (APP) with an aim to increase production, promote food security and reduce poverty in the rural areas. Providing marketing information about agriculture, promoting and enhancing marketing skills and addressing the need for transportation networks are also efforts by the Government.

Upreti and Müller-Böker (2010) state that conflict interrupted the means of livelihoods of Nepal. Furthermore, it restrained the emergence of new livelihood options. The darkened conflict period affected people by restricting livelihoods through agriculture. It even interfered with the Government’s programme on employment opportunities (Upreti et al. 2012). Seddon and Hussein (2002) report that the impact of conflict on livelihoods came in the form of obstruction in road networks which hindered trade (transport of goods) and economic activities; devastated infrastructures such as schools, health posts and food insecurity was at its zenith.

Conflict also affected children as many were recruited by both the Maoists and the state (Shakya 2009) to support the war by handling guns. Children (aged 14-18) were shoved out of school and forced to join the war (Hart 2001). Some parents sent their children to the capital for their safe future, but many were orphaned and girls were trafficked. Whether such children will get rehabilitated and have safe livelihood options in the near future is a question that seeks attention. People who joined the insurgency did not have definite livelihood options after the war. Even if there were options available, their first need was rehabilitation and rescue from mental and emotional distress.

On the other side, Gilligan et al. (2011) and Voors et al. (2012) reveal that conflict did not necessarily induce negative impacts on the lives of people. From the social capital
perspective, it was found that people adopted new norms and became altruistic. Thus, they brought a new dimension to the existing paradigm, against the thought that conflict distorts feelings and generates hatred among people.

Post-Conflict Livelihood Practices and Implications in Nepal
The conflict ended in 2006 with movement towards negotiation and peace building in the country. There was also rise in people’s expectations from the state for better livelihood options. They had complete faith in the Maoist government, yet till now, their expectations have been unmet. It is important, therefore, to look into livelihood practices and implications from the supply and demand side to have an understanding of where Nepal stands today.

Supply Side
The government, private sectors, donors, international and non-government organisations and youth forces have been involved in creating or promoting better livelihood options for the people of Nepal. For example, the prominently used DFID (2002) sustainable livelihoods framework provides a multidimensional picture that people’s livelihoods will shape up when they have better and equal access to quality education, health, information, technologies, marketing facilities; their environment is supportive; they have the right to use natural resources with proper management; and have sound policies and institutional support (cited in Upreti et al. 2012). Other existing frameworks such as OXFAM, RLS etc have their set aims and differ from each other. Yet they tend not to integrate aspects of social exclusion or inclusion in their structures. Moreover, people’s perceptions and their individual needs are not addressed in any of these frameworks.

The Government of Nepal has provided programmes for improving the livelihoods of people with special focus on community-managed programmes under the Local Governance Act (1999). These include schemes such as provision of fertilisers, agricultural production with subsidy rate, and employment generation for women. With support from the World Food Programme (WFP), the Government has also succeeded in providing support to the needy for poverty alleviation. Moreover, other forms of support such as improving roads and access and keeping women’s rights in focus has been part of the terms of reference of the Government of Nepal.

Likewise, the private sector in Nepal has also been very proactive. On one hand, there are massive private investments on roads, hospitals, hotels and infrastructure building and the likes, while on the other, there are important stakeholders in small and medium sized enterprises as such garments and cottage industries. The latter has been more of an option of livelihoods for majority of people in Nepal based on their affordability and capability (education, aptitude and interest). The World Bank (2007, p. 2) stated that Nepal falls in 100th position of 175 countries on the Ease of Doing Business Index. However, less has
been said about the direct influence of private sector on people’s livelihoods and the impact of conflict on the private sector.

From international actors and donors, Nepal has been gaining all forms of support starting from post-conflict reconstruction to providing new bases for sustainable livelihood options and growth (Upreti et al. 2012). Various aid agencies came together during the conflict with an aim to reduce or prevent their programmes from being impacted. In this vein, the Nepal Peace and Development Strategy 2010-2015 was created and submitted to the Government by 13 agencies recommending inclusive parameters of livelihoods and growth, plans and policies, reconstruction and restructuring of the state. There have been various attempts made to enhance the livelihoods arena in Nepal through various projects (see Table 1).

<table>
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<tr>
<th>SN</th>
<th>Livelihoods Projects</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Decentralised Rural Infrastructure and Livelihoods Project (DRILP)</td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Capacity Building for Poor Farmers and Disadvantaged Groups in the Eastern Development Region (EDR)</td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Improving the Livelihood of Poor Farmers and Disadvantaged Groups in the EDR</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>High Mountain Agribusiness and Livelihood Improvement Project, Economic and Social Inclusion of the Disadvantaged Poor through Micro-Irrigation</td>
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<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Reducing Child Malnutrition through Social Protection</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>Supporting the Development of a Social Protection Framework for Nepal</td>
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<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Rural Community Infrastructure Works Programme (RCIW)</td>
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<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>District Road Support Programme (DRSP)</td>
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<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Rural Access Programme (RAP)</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>The Karnali Employment Programme (KEP)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled from Upreti et al. (2012).

The above livelihoods projects are designed to provide livelihoods options, capacity building and improvement, providing employment guarantee to people in various parts of Nepal. For example, the DRILP focuses on creating roads and assets in rural areas by providing cash for work programme to people in search of employment. Likewise, the KEP is a 100 days employment guarantee scheme to those in the Karnali region (one of the most underprivileged region of Nepal consisting of 5 districts). Assets such as irrigation canals and roads are created in rural areas providing livelihood options to the people. These livelihoods enhancement and improvement options exist in Nepal, though some of these programmes tend to have similar mechanisms and thus chances of duplication occur. For example, DRILP, RCIW and KEP are all employment guarantee programmes with similar objectives. Consolidation of such programmes to reduce duplication would be the best fit to improve livelihoods options created in Nepal by
various organisations. Consolidation would also reduce the risk of the same person getting involved in all the programmes that run in certain villages (Ibid.).

On the supply side, there also exist programmes such as Rural-Urban Partnership Programme (RUPP) established in 1997 with an aim to generate market channels for agriculture production. It has been able to link rural and urban relationships by constructing roads, market centres and providing credits to entrepreneurs. Another is the Women’s Empowerment Programme (WEP) established in 1999 which has been able to provide women with livelihoods and other forms of interventions. Ashe and Parrot (2001) reveal that through this programme there has been improvement in literacy of women, increase in leadership abilities, better decision making skills and livelihoods generation as well.

It is also evident that Nepal is highly dependent on foreign aid in which livelihoods improvement is one of the areas for which aid is earmarked. The World Bank and Asian Development Bank are viewed as the major contributors of various programmes. For example, ADB has been providing methodological support to the Government in forming a National Protection Framework. It has also been technically supporting the Government in improving its capacity and decision making skills to produce a sound social protection system in Nepal (ADB 2011a). Many donor funded projects revised their agenda and activities by putting recovery after conflict as their first priority. The Rural Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Sector Development Programme (RRRSDP) was introduced to support the livelihoods of those affected by conflict. It covered activities like income generation, water, health and sanitation, reinstating infrastructures and developing communities (UNDP 2010). There are many such foreign aid based projects/programmes in Nepal, yet their actual cost-benefit analysis is rare.

Demand Side

Holistically, improving and securing livelihoods has been the demand of majority of Nepalese. Increased labour migration, both from rural to urban areas and to international boundaries; displacement due to conflict; unemployment due to lack of qualification indicate that demand for secure livelihoods is high. Although people’s survival depends on improved livelihoods status, the kind of livelihood options available and demanded vary according to the circumstances, gender and background of people, for example, those in vulnerable situations want the state to protect them from risk, while those who already make a living demand job security. There is very little evidence that collates what people in certain areas and situations want/need; and even less about understanding which livelihood options have worked for Nepal and which have not. Lack of coordination, dissemination and uptake from organisations involved is one major factor. In most cases, livelihood generation patterns are mostly related to the interests of organisations and their respective frameworks. This has actually led to the focus being shifted from people’s actual demands (who have become inclined towards what organisations have to offer to them) due to lack of other options.
Gaps
Research on people’s aspirations about livelihoods is uncommon in fragile and conflict affected states (FCAS) which leaves a gap in understanding the demand side. Practically, existing organisations devoted towards livelihoods enhancement of people work according to their frameworks. But failure to address what those who demand actually wish for, including the psychological, creates a fissure. Though conflict changed the structure of traditional practices of Nepal with regards to caste and creed, certain norms have not been eradicated totally (Askvik et al. 2011). These century old practices (social structures) have had strong impact on the livelihoods of people.

The lack of evidence about what was effective as an intervention and what became ineffective is one major fissure in understanding the dimensions of supply and demand based livelihoods study. Various donors, international organisations and others study the conflict affected situation by formulating and implementing various livelihood options and programmes. However, there is lack of study about peoples’ wants versus needs. For example, in case of the ex-combatants in the Maoists, the whole rehabilitation concept proved to be a failure as they were burdened with basic needs (food, water, shelter and jobs in some cases), despite the psychological interventions for those who lost their family members or were profoundly affected by conflict.

Whether the Government acted to respond to immediate needs or just fulfilled its duty, Nepal is a fine case of mismatch between public expectations and service delivery, e.g. Upreti et al. (2012) point out the UNDP Rural-Urban Partnership Programme which ran during and after the conflict. Its exact implication and effectiveness could never be identified. Such cases are typical in Nepal because monitoring and programme assessments are rare.

People have been justifiably accusing and rebuking the Government’s service delivery, but it needs to be acknowledged that despite lack of capacity in implementing livelihood programmes, the Government itself was helpless to make great changes given the ongoing conflict. Many officials working in the Government sector withdrew from their jobs (Seddon and Hussein 2002). Additionally, inadequate finances as well as weak risk budgeting to address the vulnerability and livelihoods of people affected the Government (Upreti et al. 2012). Besides, geographical remoteness is also a factor which constraints working agencies and the Government from reaching out to the poor when in need. Only major entry points of regions (for example headquarters) are reached when distributing services (Chandran et al. 2008). It is then up to the Government to decide whether infrastructure such as roads should be the first priority of investment, while putting hunger on the other side of the scale. Nevertheless, livelihoods programmes such as DRILP, RCIW and others are good examples of providing employment along with creating assets.
In the area of foreign aid, it is evident that Nepal faces massive corruption and misuse of funds. The flow of foreign aid could actually reduce poverty if unexploited. However, funds have not been utilised well enough by the Government in poverty reduction (Sharma 2008) leading to leakages, corruption and lack of transparency. In this instance, the Nepal Peace Trust Fund (NPTF) then becomes a strong means of monitoring the use of funds in respective areas. It should be noted that different researchers have their own views about the use of foreign aid in the country. While Pyakuryal et al. (2008) positively state the gains from foreign aid addressing the Foreign Aid Policy of 2002, Geiser (2005) questions the ability of foreign aid in making people attain their needs. The former emphasises the formation of Foreign Aid Policy which created programmes such as Poverty Alleviation Fund to support the poor.

Nepal is a clear example of how livelihood options have failed despite massive flow of foreign currency and donor interest. The relationship of people-state or the state-donor or people-donor has become arbitrary. There is mistrust between the people, state and donors which often leads to chaos in coordination, as well as development of ‘interest-based’ rather than needs based programmes. The blame-rebuke game persists. The gaps can only be filled when there is a paradigm shift in understanding livelihoods properly. This can be done by identifying the various categories of people and their wants. The wants that are common can then be framed into one category guided by a framework, while the uncommon could be then analysed on the basis of importance and effectiveness. Though difficult, an attempt to combine and address these issues and derive a better livelihood approach is a long term need. There has to be an alternative which can be discovered if strenuous effort is put up.

**Envisioning the Future**

Where we Stand?
The GDP of Nepal declined in Fiscal Year 2011 because of political instability, slow progress in remittances and problems in the economy (Upreti et al. 2012). Vastly, political instances have a lot to do with Nepal’s economy. While insurgency hindered much of the country’s economy, reaching the peace process is one best option for Nepal. ADB (2012) states that Nepal’s economic status solely depends on fulfilment of the peace process which will allow the leaders to have mutual understanding and common vision that will in return help promote participation of private entities in development, enhance business capacity and advance labour relations.

Therefore, for a country like Nepal, looking back to the past is as important as planning for a sustainable future. Sustainable livelihoods can be attained only when the existing frameworks used in Nepal (DFID, OXFAM etc) are merged with people’s aspirations and behavioural responses. Frameworks that only mention capacity building, empowerment, marketing and production or training opportunities etc. cannot suffice
actual livelihood needs. For example, Chambers and Conway (1992 cited in Upreti et al 2012, p. 14) refer to sustainable livelihood as an element that is a combination of…..

...the capabilities, assets (including both material and social resources) and activities required for a means of living. A livelihood is sustainable when it can cope with and recover from stresses and shocks and maintain or enhance its capabilities and assets both now and in the future, while not undermining the natural resource base.

Taking Nepal’s context into consideration, Chamber and Conway’s definition can be modified by adding to it the psychological and physical well being of people and their level of satisfaction to adapt to changes (in living) when at risk. For that to happen there needs to be a strong institutional force which will then enact polices and regulations to support people in providing them livelihood options. Also, securing livelihoods becomes tricky when a country’s political stances are weak and when politics rule the livelihoods of people. For example, in Nepal the elites and powerful people have easy access to services as opposed to the poor and marginalised. Nepal still faces what we can term as ‘groupism’ where the rich stand on one side, the poorest of the poor on the other and the disabled who do not even know what livelihood is, stand as if they do not exist. Though there are organisations that have been training deaf people who could make their living as waiters in restaurants, the practice has not flourished nationwide. Somewhere, an imbalance exists which restricts a large group of people from attaining better living as opposed to the smaller group that earns everything.

Poverty, vulnerability of people who have limited access to resources, lack of guidance about existing jobs and opportunities, existing organisations’ own interest and area of work etc are some factors that exclude the needy. For a country whose major livelihoods option relies on agriculture, land automatically becomes a major possession. However, it is ironic that people without land rely on farming for their living. Landlessness, therefore, is one major problem of Nepal (UNDP 2009). Landlords with rich land entitlements are considered well off as opposed to those who work on their land as kamaiyas2 or bonded labourers. The Nepal Living Standard Survey (NLSS) 2003-04 states that poverty is defined by people’s ownership of land, as those with land have better living options. Freeing bonded labourers and introducing women’s rights to assets took much of the Government’s attention after the conflict. However, the debate has not been taken at any other level. The bonded labourers became free, but they had no alternative livelihoods. Allendorf (2007), on the other hand, reveals that the introduction of land rights to women empowered them in terms of decision making. Also, women with land ownerships had children with better health as opposed to those who had no access to land or were not involved in decision making.

2 Kamaiya is a practice of bonded labour in western Nepal especially prominent among the Tharu ethnicity and the Dalits. It is a system where those without land or property would take loans from rich landowners and when they cannot pay it, their family members have to live with the landowners and work on their lands as slaves.
Livelihood options are in one way or the other interlinked and hence extensive research especially in the area of programme and policy implementation is needed. From what exists, there has only been a give and take mechanism. A proper sustainable approach is still lagging in Nepal and without it the future of livelihoods look rather bleak.

What will Work for Years Ahead?
There are three interlinked elements that can create a paradigm shift in the livelihoods approach in Nepal. First, the existing frameworks be reviewed and evaluated on the basis of what has worked and what has not. The discernible patterns can then help bring about changes where needed. Also, the inclusion of human behaviour and aspirations is a must while planning livelihoods strategies. Second, the political changes Nepal has been experiencing need to stabilise at some point. For this to happen, disputed parties need to come together in an understanding to maintain secure political stances and collective vision and direction for the country. With this, donors and massive aid flows can then be monitored no matter who is at the helm of affairs. Third, livelihoods and growth will happen if there is an approach to sustainable economic growth. This will happen when political barriers do not hinder the country’s economy. Also, livelihoods are interconnected with various factors such as education, assets and possession such as land and property, the age of people seeking livelihoods and others.

Thinking small but sustainably would be the best approach for Nepal. If majority people rely on agriculture, it should be supported by introducing technologies for irrigation and other farming activities, followed by marketing information and approaches which then would help them build sustainable livelihoods.

Also, providing awareness about education can also be a long term livelihoods support. For example, there have been evidences of youth dropping out of school to work or go abroad. Though school drop out rates are high in rural areas of Nepal, the blame has been aimed solely at the institutions and the resources of the institution. However, little is known about youth and their perception about education which is the demand side. While on one hand, the Government and concerned institutions create possible options to reach out to the remotest area in facilitating education, on the other hand clarity about who is interested is a concern. Compulsory education till a certain age can prevent dropout rates. Also, those not interested in continuing further studies could then be guided towards trainings and technical support which will then make them independent.

From the land rights issue aforementioned, it is clear that freedom from vulnerability without any alternative is not an option for Nepal. Freedom from risk should be defined not only through a rescue process, but also with a long term vision for that individual. UNDP (1997) reveals vulnerability can be reduced when people have access to resources or if they have the right to possession. This could be true for those who can work in the field as farmers. However, it might not be feasible for a student who, for example, lost
his family and property in a landslide and does not know how to make a living. Helping this child overcome his distress and then supporting him or her to continue his education could help him find his own way. These sensitive issues are at the core of creating sustainable livelihoods.

With regards to private sector actors (profit making organisations working in the livelihood sector), ADB (2011b) suggests that those held responsible in promoting and progressing livelihoods should put arduous effort in formulating clear plans and policies so that the partnership between public and private entities would grow. The private sector in Nepal has its own ways which sometimes tend to intervene with the public sector. Due to this, there remains a clash among these two, thus restraining partnership and collaboration. Interestingly and unfortunately, there are private and public institutions with similar vision, but lack of coordination and mutual understandings have led to failure in joint ventures. The Government has recently started a rule for NGOs/INGOs working in Nepal to acquire approval from the respected ministries before they can start their work. This could be used as a means to track the various livelihood projects and programmes ongoing in Nepal. Proper monitoring and evaluation can also then be carried out about the registered projects. Holistically, livelihoods should not only be viewed from the lens of income generation, but should also be linked to social protection mechanisms.

It is, thus, important for Nepal to consider a rigorous examination of its past schemes and practices on livelihoods and enhancement. Analysing new ideas of the local, national and international entities before impulsively conceptualising would save time and resources. In Nepal, the practice of jumping into a project without understanding the intended and better outcomes has been a major problem.

**Conclusion**

The Government, development agencies and the likes have been actively engaged in maintaining the livelihoods of people of Nepal though much needs to be done. Various programmes have been successfully implemented. However, in the context of Nepal, policies and programmes need an intense review. International donor’s link to the state and its people are also prominent in planning and implementing any programmes. This is because foreign aid has contributed to ‘*more than one third of the development expenditure*’ (Upreti et al. 2012, p. 21) and have shown their interest in peace building by helping in the reconstruction process. While much has been written about the supply side, research needs to be done from the demand side perspective as well.

Also, little is known about the impact of international donors and their engagement in enhancing the capacity of the Government. Hence, a thorough understanding in this area is a must to understand the state-people relationship and peoples’ perception of the state in terms of its service delivery. There is a need to re-think the existing parameters in the livelihoods arena of Nepal so that more ways can be paved to improve the economic
opportunities of people. Those in the highly remote areas are deprived of proper facilities such as education, water, and health. Livelihoods with protection and sustainability will help fight hunger and poverty as people then will have long term security. In the years ahead, livelihoods must not be taken in the form of income to make a living, but also in the form of earning by sustainable work and securing one’s own future.
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Section 4
Food Security, Safety and Economic Resilience

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Food Security Situation among Rural Households of District Faisalabad, Pakistan

Muhammad Ashfaq*, Shamsheer ul Haq** and Amar Razzaq***

Abstract

In most developing countries, including Pakistan, it is frequently observed that rural households particularly those headed by small farmers, females and workers are more vulnerable to food insecurity. However, factors influencing chances of being food secure or insecure may vary from one region to the other. The present study has investigated the incidence of food insecurity of vulnerable rural groups, i.e. small farmers, females and workers, in Faisalabad district of Pakistan, using data from 80 households collected through a questionnaire survey.

Using the logistic regression model, the study analysed gender, age and education of household head, medical expenditures, number of family members and amount of loan, influencing the probability of household food security. Findings revealed that nearly four-fifth of female-headed households were food insecure. Likewise, 75% and nearly 70% households respectively headed by workers and small holders were food insecure. Results of logistic regression showed that there is higher probability of being food secure for those households who are better in education and there is a lower probability of being food secure for those households who spend more on medical purposes. However, factors such as gender, age, number of family members and amount of loans taken showed statistically non-significant influence on households’ likelihood of being food secure. Based on the findings, it can be stated that education is the most important factor that may increase the chances of food security by inducing direct effects on income opportunities and households’ awareness about food security. Spending on medical purposes may also be linked with the level of education. Thus, local and provincial governments should take solid steps to improve the education of rural households, particularly the vulnerable groups, to strengthen food security.

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1 This chapter has been approved as a research paper by the referee.

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Introduction

‘A total of 925 million people are still estimated to be undernourished in 2010, representing almost 16% of the population of developing countries.’ About two-third of all undernourished people in the world live in China, India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Indonesia, Ethiopia, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (FAO 2010). More than 70% people live in rural areas in the developing countries and depend directly or indirectly on agriculture for their livelihood (Bashir et al. 2012, p. 1). Food security of rural areas is severely affected due to the availability of food, less diversity and limited number of markets (Morris et al. 1992 as quoted by Bashir et al. 2012).

The definition of food security is given differently by different authors in their respective studies. The most comprehensive definition of food security is by FAO (2010): ‘food security exists when all people have physical, social and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meet their dietary need for their active and healthy life’ (p.8). Contrarily, food insecurity is defined as not having the adequate physical, social and economic access to food according to the above definition. Undernourishment is also a very important concept in the context of food insecurity. According to FAO (2010), ‘Undernourishment exists when caloric intake is below the minimum dietary energy requirement (MDER)’. On the basis of these definitions, there are three main pillars that affect the food security situation of any country, province, region or individual. First is Availability; second is Accessibility; and the third is Absorption of Food (Eneyew and Bekele 2012).

Pakistan is a developing country with low per capita income. As the availability of food is mainly determined by the level of agricultural production in a country, therefore the Government of Pakistan has made significant progress in increasing food supply, especially cereals. The supply of pulses and cereals has increased more than 3.5-folds since the early 1960s (Ahmad and Farooq, 2010, p. 907). But due to various factors including population growth and inequality, food access and nutritional status of the country’s population remain severely damaged. Despite securing the position of the largest grower of many agricultural commodities in the world and having food self-sufficiency, about 26% population of the country was undernourished in 2005-07 (FAO 2010).

The SDC-SDPI-WPF (2009) finds that Punjab is the largest province of Pakistan in terms of agricultural production. Almost 14 out of 34 districts of Punjab are producing surplus food (p.33). Among all 131 districts of Pakistan, Faisalabad ranks at 87 (with 1 being the lowest rank) based on availability of food (p. 35). About 50% of Pakistan’s population has inadequate access to food (p.56). Due to inflation in recent years, access of people to food has decreased. In Punjab, extremely low access to food has increased from 35 to 53% (p. 60). On the national level, about 59% of the districts have extremely and very low level of food absorption and in Punjab about 21% of the districts suffer from extremely low food absorption (p. 81). Faisalabad district is ranked at 122 with 0.85
Food security is a complex as well as multi-dimensional phenomenon. The 1996 World Food Summit highlighted the issue of food insecurity and hunger. At that time, both poverty and slow growth were believed to be the cause and effect of hunger and food insecurity. Consequently, reducing food insecurity and hunger were put as one of the important Millennium Development Goals. Over time, the priority of the food security issue has varied from its focus. For example, in 1970s, improving nutrition was considered an important strategy by international agencies, governments and policy makers, which was replaced by food security in the next decade and then in 1990s the emphasis was shifted toward poverty reduction (Maxwell 1998). During all this time, literature continued to evolve both on food security and poverty; sometimes paralleling each other and sometimes food security preceding poverty.

Maxwell and Smith (1992, p.4) extensively reviewed literature on household food security and considered it as the cause of developments in other parallel fields as well. First of all, household is itself a problematic concept where different members of the same household are vulnerable to varying degree of food security risks and they will seek different food security strategies. Secondly, ensuring food security only cannot guarantee nutrition; therefore it is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition. Health and care are the other two important conditions in this regard. A third consideration is that food security cannot be studied without taking into account livelihood security because people may change their food security status from being food secure to food insecure in preserving assets or meeting other objectives. Moreover, people’s own perceptions about food security largely define food security strategies which are even more complex to understand (Ibid.).

There is growing evidence in the literature of food security that the rural households are likely to be more food insecure as compared to urban households which is ironic since the very rural households are the main producers of food in most developing countries. Therefore, it is imperative to study the state of food security and its determinants for rural households. There are several studies with a special focus on rural households’ food security; for example, Olson et al. (1996) studied factors contributing to household food insecurity in a rural upstate New York county and found that being a single parent, lack of savings, large family size, unexpected expenses etc. were the variables significantly affecting food insecurity. Bashir et al. (2012, p.1) found that 27% of sample rural households from 12 districts of Punjab, Pakistan were food insecure. They concluded that the household’s monthly income and education of the household head were positively affecting food security, while household head’s age and family size were the negative
contributors to food security situation of rural households. In Nigeria, Asogwa and Umeh (2012) found that the number of working household members had a positive significant impact on rural households’ food security, while the number of children in school and large family size had a negative impact on food security. Kyaw (2009, p.70) reported that landless and small households in Myanmar constituted 74% of the total food insecure households. There is also evidence in literature that food security situation may also depend on the gender of the household head and the female headed households are more likely to be food insecure (Kassie et al. 2012).

The present paper aims to assess the level of food security in selected rural households of district Faisalabad in Punjab. The respondents were categorised as Farmers, Females, and Workers, respectively to make a comparison of food security prevailing in the different classes of population. The category of Workers include households with household head working in factories, mills, farms, kilns and other small scale industries and earning nominal wages. Many food security assessment studies also determine various factors such as gender, monthly income, family size, distance from the market and food prices etc., which may have an effect on food security situation of the households. The additional objective of this paper is to determine the effect of such different variables on food security situation of the rural households. And therefore, contribution of different factors like age of household head, family size, education of household head, medical expenditures, the amount of loan, food prices, income instability etc. to food security of rural households has been explored.

**Methodology**

The study was conducted in district Faisalabad which was selected randomly. The district has eight administrative units and considering the small scale of this study, Samundri Tehsil was randomly selected as the study area. From this Tehsil, a random selection of five villages was made. The proportionate allocation method was used to select the sample of respondents. Proportionate allocation is one in which the total sample size is distributed among the different strata in such a way that number of respondents in each strata are proportional to the size of the strata (Chaudhry and Kamal 1997).

\[ n_i = n \times \frac{N_i}{N} \]  

for \( i = A, B, C, D, \text{ and } E \).

Where,
- \( n_i \) = the size of sample in \( i^{th} \) stratum,
- \( N_i \) = total households in \( i^{th} \) stratum (in this case village)
- \( N \) = sum of households in all 5 strata.
- And A, B, C, D, E represent the five villages.

Proceeding with this method, the final sample included 15, 17, 13, 19 and 16 households from each of the five villages, thus making the total sample size equal to 80 (Table 1). A
Food Security Situation among Rural Households of District Faisalabad, Pakistan

A well-structured questionnaire was developed to interview the selected households which was modified and standardised after pre-testing in the field. The questionnaire consisted of three parts; first part was devoted to elicit information on various socio-economic characteristics of the selected households, the second part contained several questions to record perceptions of the households related to food security and third part of the questionnaire contained questions which helped in obtaining data on various quantitative variables which were used in logistic regression analysis. The data was collected by the researchers themselves in March 2012.

Table 1: Total Number of Households in Sample Villages and Sample Size

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Village</th>
<th>No. of Households</th>
<th>Sample Size</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chak No. 213</td>
<td>355</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chak No. 473</td>
<td>387</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chak No. 480</td>
<td>305</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chak No. 485</td>
<td>445</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chak No. 626/15</td>
<td>380</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1872</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Simple percentage formula was used to draw the results for ‘people’s judgment’ about different factors with the assumption that people have better perceptions (Ahmad, Khan and Anjum 2011). After that, to see the effect of different factors on food security, the binary logistic model was applied.

\[
\text{Percentage} = \frac{f}{n} \times 100
\]

\(f = \) Total frequencies and \(n = \) No. of observations

The statistical software SPSS version 17 was used for data analysis. Following form of the logistic model was used (Eneyew and Bekele 2012).

\[
P_i = E \left( Y = \frac{1}{X_i} \right) = \frac{1}{1 + e^{-(\beta_c + \beta_i X_i)}}
\]

For ease of exposition, the probability that a given household is food secure is expressed as

\[
P_i = \frac{1}{1 + e^{-(\hat{\beta}_i)}}
\]

Probability for food insecure is \(1 - P_i\) thus

\[
\frac{P_i}{1 - P_i} = \frac{1 + e^{Z_i}}{1 + e^{-Z_i}}
\]
is the ratio of the probability that a household was food secure to the probability that it was food insecure.

\[ L_i = \ln \left| \frac{P_i}{1 - P_i} \right| = Z_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X_1 + \beta_2 X_2 + \beta_3 X_3 + \cdots + \beta_n X_n \]

Where \( P_i \) = is the probability of food secure which ranges from 0 to 1.

Dependent variable:
\( L_i = 1 \) for food secure household and 0 otherwise

Independent variables:
- \( X_1 \) = Gender (1 for male head otherwise 0)
- \( X_2 \) = Education of the household head (No. of schooling years)
- \( X_3 \) = Age of the household head (Years)
- \( X_4 \) = Family size (Numbers)
- \( X_5 \) = Medical expenditure (Pakistani Rupees\(^2\))
- \( X_6 \) = Amount of loan (Pakistani Rupees)

**Results and Discussion**

**Socioeconomic Characteristics**

**Age, Education and Family Size**

Table 2 shows various socio-economic characteristics of the selected respondents such as age, education and the family size. Age of the household head could be an important factor affecting the income of the family and thus its food security status. The table shows the average age of household heads for three categories of respondents. The average age of farmers was slightly higher than the females and workers’ household heads.

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\(^2\) 1 US$ = 96.88 PKR as of January 2013.
Table 2: Socio-economic Characteristics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Particulars</th>
<th>Farmers</th>
<th>Females</th>
<th>Workers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age (Years)</td>
<td>48.21</td>
<td>44.04</td>
<td>45.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Size (No.)</td>
<td>6.38</td>
<td>4.89</td>
<td>5.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education (% of total)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illiterate</td>
<td>27.60</td>
<td>74.10</td>
<td>41.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under Matric</td>
<td>41.40</td>
<td>7.40</td>
<td>29.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matriculation</td>
<td>24.10</td>
<td>11.10</td>
<td>16.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FA and more</td>
<td>6.90</td>
<td>7.40</td>
<td>12.50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Education of the household head can significantly affect the income of the family which ultimately defines the food security status of the family. Four categories of education were chosen and termed as illiterate (0 years of education), under matric (education under 10 years of schooling), matriculation (10 years of schooling), and FA & more (12 years of schooling and higher). It is evident from Table 2 that the farmers had higher education spread followed by the workers. The females had the lowest spread of education. This low literacy rate among the females leads to more food insecurity among the households headed by women that we will see later in results. Haile et al. (2005) also found that education had a very important role to play towards the food security situation of a household. But unfortunately, the literacy rate in rural areas of Pakistan remains continuously lower owing to number of factors and policy failures.

Table 2 also shows the number of family members. The farmers had the highest family size with an average of 6.38 family members followed by the Workers having 5.88 family members. The households headed by females had the lowest average family size. The family size of a household also plays an important role towards its food security status. The greater the family size, the greater is the likelihood for a household to be food insecure as Eneyew and Bekele (2012) found that majority of the food insecure households had a family size more than half dozen and also had large number of dependents when compared to food secure households. In our sample, the average family size of all the respondents was 5.73.

**Housing Conditions**

Housing condition is a very important economic indicator toward assessing the income of a household which in turns defines its food security status to a greater extent. Houses were categorised according to building quality, and were *Kacha*¹, *Semi-pakka*² and *Pakka*³ houses respectively indicating the bad to good housing conditions. It was observed that majority of the respondents were living in *semi-pakka* houses. And within

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¹ Houses made of mud and wooden roofs.
² Houses built of bricks and having wood or iron rods as the roof material.
³ House made of bricks, cement and concrete.
the three categories, most of the farmers were living in relatively good housing conditions followed by the workers, whereas the female headed households were living under relatively poor housing conditions implying poverty (food insecurity) is likely to be more among the households headed by females having fewer opportunities to earn.

Overall, about 21% of all respondents were living in kacha houses, 53% of respondents were living in semi-kacha houses and the remaining 26% of respondents were living in pakka houses.

### Table 3: Housing Conditions of the Respondents (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>Kacha House</th>
<th>Semi Pakka House</th>
<th>Pakka House</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Farmers</td>
<td>6.90</td>
<td>62.10</td>
<td>31.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Females</td>
<td>33.30</td>
<td>44.40</td>
<td>22.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workers</td>
<td>25.00</td>
<td>50.00</td>
<td>25.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>21.30</td>
<td>52.50</td>
<td>26.30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Debt Burden

Payable household debts\(^6\) have much to do with the expenditures on food items because it involves a tradeoff. The households under debt are more likely to spend relatively lower amount on food items along with other expenditures because much of their income is consumed for repaying debts. Table 4 presents the frequency and percentage of respondents under debt. Overall, 50% respondents were found under debt. The highest proportion of the Farmers was found under debt because they needed it more often to buy inputs used in farming, and to finance food expenditures because they have irregular income. The debt burden was relatively low on the female headed households probably because they could not easily get the loans, partly because of social constraints and partly because of not having sufficient collateral required. The workers who had a relatively regular stream of income had the lowest debt burden. This may also be because of insufficient assets possessed by them to serve as collateral to get loans.

### Table 4: Debt Burden of Respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>Responses</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Frequency</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>Frequency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmers</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>62.07</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Females</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>48.15</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workers</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>37.50</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>50.00</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^6\) The debt includes loans acquired through both formal and informal sources.
Food Security Situation

Table 5 depicts the overall food security status of the sample households based on their own judgement. The respondents were given a good understanding of food security and then the questions about food security were asked. Based on the results, it was found that 75% of households were food insecure, while female headed households had the highest food insecurity followed by workers and farmers. Kassie et al. (2012) also found that female headed households were more food insecure as compared to male headed households since female heads are offered fewer opportunities to earn livelihood than the male counterparts.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Frequency</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmers</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>31.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Females</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>18.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workers</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>25.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>25.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Food Availability

The availability of food is a main factor contributing to the food security status of a household. Nutrition comes later. Table 6 shows the responses of respondents when asked if the food (mainly wheat) was available to them in sufficient quantities. Majority of the sample households showed a positive response which means they had sufficient quantities of food available. But again the female headed households suffered from lowest food availability followed by the workers. As most of the farmers were producing their own food, therefore, they had the lowest food insufficiency among all groups. Overall, about 64% of respondent stated that they had sufficient food available to them. Although the availability of enough food is a necessary condition for food security, it is not a sufficient condition by any means.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Frequency</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmers</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>82.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Females</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>48.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workers</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>58.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>63.75</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Effect of Food Insufficiency on Adults

Extreme food insufficiency can lead to skipping meals for adults even if they were hungry. To complement the assessment of food security situation in the study area, respondents were asked if they ever skipped meals due to the shortage of food. Table 7 shows the effect of insufficient food availability on the adult food intake level showing chances of an adult skipping meals due to less food. Only females gave high response, which means adults remain hungry in the female headed households due to lack of affordability of food. Workers were more secure in this case as compared to the farmers and females. Females not only had insufficient food available (Table 6) but they also had the highest food insecurity in terms of skipping meals altogether.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>Responses</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Frequency</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>Frequency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmers</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>27.59</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Females</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>70.37</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workers</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>25.00</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>41.25</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Income Stability

Households with stable incomes are more likely to be food secure, but the inverse of this is not necessarily true and food security definition encompasses many different aspects. Table 8 shows the responses about income stability. Female headed households suffered from the highest income instability, whereas it was almost identical for the farmers and workers. On the whole, about 58% of all respondents suffered from income instability.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>Responses</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Frequency</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>Frequency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmers</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>51.72</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Females</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>22.22</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workers</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>54.17</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>42.50</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Relationship between Income Decline and Food Consumption

There is very strong relationship between income and food consumption and the decline of income usually has a negative impact on consumption. The same question was asked from the respondents to assess its validity. Table 9 shows the responses of sample households about the effect of income decline on consumption of food commodities. On the whole, almost 84% respondents replied that decline in their incomes decreased their
food consumption. While comparing the farmers, females, and workers, it was found that the effect of income decline on food consumption was strongly perceived as negative by female respondents, followed by workers and farmers, although the difference between the two was not that high. So, again female headed households were more severely affected by income decline probably because their income already hovered around the threshold level to make ends meet. Rahim et al. (2011) found similar results that income had inverse relationship with food insecurity implying that decline in income increases food insecurity among households.

Table 9: Decline in Income lowers Consumption of Food Commodities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Frequency</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmers</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>79.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Females</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>88.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workers</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>83.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>83.75</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Relationship between Income Decline and Food Quality

Good quality food is an important concept in food security definition as it is linked to a widespread phenomenon in Pakistan called ‘undernourishment’ or not meeting the minimum dietary energy requirement (MDEAR) per day. As the quality of food along with its availability is an important factor in determining the food security of a household, therefore the questions related to this were also asked to explore the effect of income decline on the quality of food consumed. The results (Table 10) show that highest proportion of farmers among all three categories found a severe negative effect of income decline on the quality of food they consumed followed by female headed households. Comparatively, this effect of income decline was less severe on workers. The reason for this is probably because the workers have relatively streamlined income as compared to farmers and females. Overall, about 71% of all respondents were of the view that income decline negatively affected their quality of food.

Table 10: Effect of Income Decline on Food Quality

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Frequency</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmers</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>79.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Females</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>77.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workers</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>54.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>71.25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Relationship between Rising Food Prices and Food Consumption
In the context of Pakistan, prices of food commodities are increasing day by day. Global food inflation also caused food inflation in Pakistan, and within the food group there is an evidence of persistence of food inflation (Hanif 2012). As in most cases, food items are highly price elastic, so there is a strong relationship between food prices and consumption. To explore this relationship, respondents were asked if they experienced lower food consumption due to price hike over the years. Table 11 describes the effect of the increase in food prices on food consumption of respondents. The results showed that the rise in prices of food commodities especially affected the workers because they depend on daily wages for their labour work and price fluctuations are likely to adversely affect their consumption. Overall, almost 78% of all the respondents said that the price hikes affected their food consumption negatively.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>Responses</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Frequency</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>Frequency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmers</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>72.41</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Females</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>74.07</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workers</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>87.50</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>77.50</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Factors Affecting Food Security Situation of Faisalabad’s Rural Households
The binary logistic model was applied to study the factors affecting the food security situation in Faisalabad’s rural households. The factors included in the model were gender of household head, age of household head, education of household head, medical expenditures of a family, the family size, and amount of loan acquired by a family. The selection of factors was based on earlier literature about food security. The results presented in Table 12 depict a very interesting relationship between the socio-economic profile of the respondent households and probability of getting food secure or insecure. The education of the household head and medical expenditure both significantly affect the state of food security of a household but in opposite directions. The results show that an extra year of schooling may result in increased likelihood of household to be food secure by a factor of 1.45. This is because the educated household head is likely to have relatively more opportunities to earn and manage his/her income than an uneducated one. Similar result was observed by Sultana and Kiani (2011) that is, education acts positively in ensuring the food security status for a household. On the other hand, medical expenditure has a negative impact on food security of households. The results show that an increase of 100 rupees (approx. $1) on medical purposes may decrease the chances of food security by 26%. The results are in line with Nielsen et al. (2010). This is logical because the part of income going towards medical expenditures decreases the income left
for purchasing food items, and this has severe implications in Pakistan’s case where health facilities are not free of cost rather these could be very costly. Furthermore, the results also indicate that the gender of the household head being male is likely to increase food security of the household by a factor of 1.58, however this probability is statistically non-significant. Similar results were found in case of gender by Kassie et al. (2012) that female headed households had higher food insecurity.

Other factors such as age of household head, family size, and amount of loans taken all have a negative impact on the likelihood of being food secure for the household, however these results are statistically non-significant. This is because all these factors have an impact on income. For example, the older household heads especially those involved in labor earn less than the younger ones. The larger the family size, the more likely that it will have low per capita income and ultimately low per capita availability of food. Eneyew and Bekele (2012) and Olson et al. (1996) also observed similar negative relationship between family size and food security. Finally, the amount of loans taken is also expected to negatively impact the expenditure on food.

Table 12: Factors affecting the Food Security Situation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>S.E.</th>
<th>Wald</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
<th>Exp(B)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>0.457</td>
<td>0.868</td>
<td>0.277</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.598</td>
<td>1.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age of Household Head</td>
<td>-0.017</td>
<td>0.039</td>
<td>0.202</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.653</td>
<td>0.983</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education of Household Head</td>
<td>0.369</td>
<td>0.095</td>
<td>14.978</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.446**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical Expenditures</td>
<td>-1.338</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>4.234</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.262**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Family Members</td>
<td>-0.045</td>
<td>0.177</td>
<td>0.064</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>0.956</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amount of Loans</td>
<td>-0.053</td>
<td>0.261</td>
<td>0.041</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.839</td>
<td>0.948</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.265</td>
<td>1.856</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.887</td>
<td>1.303</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

***Significant at P < 0.01, ** significant at P < 0.05  
N = 80, -2 log likelihood ratio = 56.902, Cox and Snell $R^2 = 0.356$, Nagelkerke $R^2 = 0.521$

Conclusion and Recommendations

The food security problem is multidimensional and it depends on number of different factors. The results of this study indicate that the rural households of Tehsil Samundri are mostly food insecure and suffer from various problems. Respondents were having sufficient food i.e. mainly wheat but were not food secure.

The results of the logistic regression show that education is a very important factor which can reduce food insecurity, therefore, due importance must be given to increase literacy rate in rural areas, especially among the females. Unfortunately, the literacy rate is still very low in rural areas of Pakistan. There is an indirect relationship between population (family size) and food security. Higher the population, lower will be the likelihood of being food secure. Therefore, the government should take measures to control population
to ensure a more food secure citizenry in future. Population control is a controversial issue in Pakistan, therefore, religious leaders should be taken on board. The aggressive use of electronic media to create awareness in this regard might also prove helpful.

There exists a vicious cycle between poor food and health. Poor food leads to poor health that reduces work efficiency as a result of which income declines, which ultimately leads to poor consumption of food in terms of quantity and quality. Furthermore, an increase in medical expenditures also reduces the likelihood of being food secure according to the results of this study. Therefore, adequate medical facilities should be provided in rural areas.

Farmers had relatively higher food security. However, they suffered more from debt burden because of input purchase at the time of sowing and irregular stream of income. Financial institutions should pay more attention to soft loans schemes along with creation of awareness programmes for rural poor to use loans for productive purposes only. Households headed by females were found to be more food insecure. Therefore, the government should also start targeted safety-net programmes for female headed households and ensure transparency to increase the food security status of such families.

A final caveat is in order. The results of this study should be interpreted carefully and apply to Faisalabad district only in the given context rather than to the whole Punjab province. This is because it is a kind of study limited in scale and level of generalization.
References


Calorie and Macro-Nutrient Income Elasticity of Pakistan: An Analysis
Zahid Asghar* and Abdul Rauf**

Abstract
This study aims to measure the impact of income on food demand by using Pakistan Social and Living Standard Measurement (PSLM) 2007-08 survey data (see FBS 2008). Besides calorie income relationship, macronutrient (protein and fat) income relationship (which plays an important role in food security) is also assessed. Income-expenditure elasticities for calorie demand range from 0.38 to 0.42, for protein 0.29 to 0.32 and for fat 0.62 to 0.64. Robust regression has been used for possible protection against outliers. The results show that income has a positive and significant relationship with both calorie and macronutrient intake. The role of income remains significant when socio-economic variables such as head of household’s education, households headed by females, and access to safe drinking are included that also directly affect food consumption. Livestock availability in a household showed a positive impact on intake of macronutrients. As income elasticity is significant for calorie and macro-nutrient intake, proportionate increase in income can lead to a relatively proportionate increase in food consumption. The paper advocates that policies should be focused on attaining high economic growth to reduce poverty in the long run, and targeted policy interventions like Benazir Income Support Programme (BISP), wheat subsidy etc., for food insecure people both in urban and rural areas, are required to make food accessible to the poor in the short run.

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1 This chapter has been approved as a research paper by the referee.
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3 Mr. Abdul Rauf is a Lecturer at the University of Wah, Wah Cantt, Pakistan.
4 BISP was initiated in October 2008 in Pakistan; a non-conditional cash transfer to poor people to enable them to meet their basic needs like food, shelter, clothing etc.
Introduction

Food security is a national issue because it is necessary for the development of the country, since ‘food insecurity anywhere, threatens peace everywhere’ (SDPI 2009, p.2). Food insecurity may cause unrest or even political instability. Persistent food insecurity leads to rise of conflicts, civil wars and can also threaten the overall peace of a country. Food security, on the other hand, may help reduce poverty since both are strongly correlated if not causing each other. According to the Hunger Map 2012, Pakistan has 25-34% population whose minimum dietary energy requirements are not met and thus ranking Pakistan among high hunger countries (WFP 2012).

Only sub-Saharan Africa and a few other countries have undernourishment higher than Pakistan. Child malnourishment is even more severe not only in Pakistan but also in South Asia. Article 38(d) of the Constitution of Pakistan explicitly guarantees the right of food to the people of Pakistan (Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973) but it has attracted little attention of policy makers since its promulgation.

Studies reveal that the state of food insecurity is not uniform in the country, as some of the provinces are affected more severely than others. SDPI (2009) evaluated the severity of food insecurity in Pakistan by dividing the country into four categories: extremely insecure, insecure, at the borderline and reasonably secure. According to their report, results show that Pakistan at the household, district, province and country levels has become more food insecure as compared to the scenario of 2003. The number of food insecure districts increased significantly between 2003 and 2009. The widening gap between income and market prices has compelled many households to reduce their food intake or opt for cheaper food sources.

The increase in extremely food insecure districts depicts an alarming situation, where people are unable to meet their requirements adequately. Punjab, being the bread basket of Pakistan and host to many industrial units, suffered a severe setback in the past few years. The industrial crisis due to power shortages, increases in production costs and insignificant growth in income of households are some of the reasons for increasing vulnerability to food insecurity. In Sindh, the number of extremely food insecure districts increased in comparison to 2003. Similarly, law and order situation in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) caused the worst price hike. A sharp decline in the level of food security created many problems in the area like disease and malnourishment. Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA) has the highest level of food insecurity as compared to other regions of the country. Educated people of FATA migrate to urban areas for livelihoods, while many migrated because of war. Likewise, Baluchistan is among the extremely food insecure groups. No district in Baluchistan qualifies as a food secure group (Kabeer and Asghar 2012).

The intensity of food insecurity in Pakistan has increased over time in the past 10 years. Many households have become insecure due to deteriorating socio-economic conditions.
During 2007-2008 and 2010-2011, food price shocks have pushed many people below the food security line. Across the country, 48.6% of the population is in various degrees of food insecurity out of which 22.4% are extremely food insecure (Ibid.).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>% Food insecure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Punjab</td>
<td>38.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sindh</td>
<td>44.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khyber Pakhtunkhwa</td>
<td>56.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baluchistan</td>
<td>61.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FATA</td>
<td>67.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pak Administered Kashmir</td>
<td>46.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gilgit Baltistan</td>
<td>52.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamabad</td>
<td>23.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Sustainable Development Policy Institute 2009.

Hunger and malnutrition are the main problems in developing countries. Several governments and aid agencies have aimed to remove the menace of hunger and malnutrition by adopting programmes and policies. One of the main ongoing debates relates to the fact that if income of poor is increased, will it have a positive influence on food intake. The World Bank (1981) expressed the view that

Malnutrition is largely a reflection of poverty: people do not have income for food. Given the slow income growth that is likely for poorest people in foreseeable future, large numbers will remain malnourished for decades to come. The most efficient long term policies are those that raise the income of poor (p.59).

There is no consensus so far on the issue whether increase in income improves food demand or not. There are two opinions about the calorie income relationship. On the one hand, there are studies which state positive and significant relationship between income and calorie intake (Subramanian and Deaton 1996). They advocate that the calorie-income elasticity is significantly different from zero and calorie consumption increases with increase in income. This implies that income increase of an individual level has positive influence in terms of food intake and nutrient consumption, which will result in improving living status. To achieve this target, billions of dollars in the form of aid have been spent in developing countries to improve the lives of the poor for possible reduction of malnutrition and hunger.

On the contrary, researchers (Behrman and Deolalikar 1987; Bouis and Haddad 1992), argue that the calorie income relationship is weak and calorie income elasticity is not significantly different from zero. In this case, any increase in income will not automatically improve food accessibility. To resolve this puzzle, there is a need of empirical research to analyse the relationship between income and calorie relationship.
A randomised controlled experiment by providing cash to one group, while the other group with no cash provision is a control group. But this requires resources and time, therefore, we, following suit of other studies, calculate income elasticity for food demand using Household Integrated Economic Survey (HIES) data.

The objective of this study is to calculate income elasticity for total calorie demand, income elasticity for protein and fat consumption, and to suggest possible remedies to overcome the issue of food insecurity, particularly accessibility at the household level of Pakistan. This study contributes to food security issue in three ways: firstly income elasticity for food demand/calorie was calculated by using the latest data. Previously, Grimard (1996) calculated income effect on food demand using household survey data. Our study’s results are in coherence with what he had proved. Secondly, macro-nutrient elasticities were calculated which have not been tested before. Besides having the latest survey data for income-calorie relationship, the study presents itself to be a useful contribution in assessing how income affects macronutrient consumption among households at different income levels. Moreover, a nonparametric analysis of calorie income relationship is also provided. Finally, results saw various policy implications different from those of Behrman and Deolalikar (1987); Bouis and Haddad (1992), but in agreement with Subramanian and Deaton (1996). Alderman (1993) also did not find a tight link between income and demand for calories. Mittal and Sethi (2009) review programmes for achieving food security by South Asian countries, unfortunately Pakistan has no programme so far to ensure food security other than increase in production of food.

### Data and Summary Statistics

Pakistan Social and Living Standard Measurement (PSLM) survey 2007-08 data has been used for this study. A two-stage stratified sample design was adopted. Keeping in view the objectives of the survey, the sample size for the four provinces (Baluchistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Punjab and Sindh) has been fixed at 15512 households having provincial representation as Punjab 6636, Sindh 3765, KPK 2937 and Baluchistan 2174. We have calculated quantities of each food item for each household and converted these quantities into calories using Ministry of Planning and Development, Government of Pakistan’s approved nutrition conversion table. Calories from each food item are grouped together for main food groups which are cereals, pulses, edible oil, milk / milk products, meat, sugar, vegetables and other food groups. More details are available in PSLM Survey report (2007-08) published by Pakistan Bureau of Statistics formerly known as Federal Bureau of Statistics. A brief description of variables used in our study is given in Table 2:

---

3 This is the Food Composition Table for Pakistan (Revised 2011) and it includes analysis of about 200 food commodities. This table provides information about macro and micro-nutrient content in each food item.
Table 2: Variable Definitions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Log of nutrient per capita</td>
<td>Logarithm of per capita household total calories/protein/fats consumed per month</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log of PCE</td>
<td>Logarithm of per capita household total expenditure per month</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log of PCE square</td>
<td>Square of the logarithm of per capita household total expenditure per month</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HH size (log)</td>
<td>Logarithm of total number of household members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HH education</td>
<td>Logarithm of the education of household head in years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women schooling</td>
<td>Logarithm of the schooling of household women in years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female head</td>
<td>1 if household headed by female otherwise 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infant proportion</td>
<td>Proportion of household member’s age less than three years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children proportion</td>
<td>Proportion of household member’s age less than fifteen years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aged proportion</td>
<td>Proportion of household member’s age greater than 60 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female proportion</td>
<td>Proportion of household members who are female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Livestock</td>
<td>1 if household having livestock otherwise 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmer</td>
<td>1 if household engaged in farm activity otherwise 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>1 if household in urban area otherwise 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sindh</td>
<td>1 if household from Sindh otherwise 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPK</td>
<td>1 if household from KPK otherwise 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baluchistan</td>
<td>1 if household from Baluchistan otherwise 0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Punjab as a base category.

The descriptive analysis includes calorie share from each food group for rural/urban, provinces, various deciles, along with a calculation of Rupees per 1000 calorie cost for different income deciles. Mean and standard deviation for calorie share from each food group and calorie consumption data across various expenditure deciles has been reported. In order to avoid extreme values, limit of 8000 calories per capita per day following other studies was set (e.g. Grimard 1996) for Pakistan.

Mean and standard deviation for calorie consumption for income deciles both for urban and rural households of Pakistan are given in Table 3. Table 4 provides calorie share from each food group. It is important to note that cereals contribute almost 50% to total calorie share whether lower income deciles upper, rural or urban. Nevertheless, poor get maximum calories from wheat flour, while upper income groups consume a diversity of cereals i.e. wheat, biscuits, semolina, plain flour, noodles, macaroni, etc.
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics of Daily Consumption Per Capita by Expenditure Deciles

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Expenditure deciles</th>
<th>Urban HH</th>
<th>Rural HH</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>Standard deviation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2436</td>
<td>1021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>2577</td>
<td>1055</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>2547</td>
<td>1004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>2586</td>
<td>1090</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>2685</td>
<td>1138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>2739</td>
<td>1174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>2730</td>
<td>1123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>2938</td>
<td>1250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>3176</td>
<td>1271</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>3405</td>
<td>1394</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: After implementing condition ( > 8000) of daily calories per capita as well as removing missing observation means along with their standard deviations are shown as above, having a systematic pattern as expenditure deciles increase average calories per capita also increase.

Table 4: Calorie Shares

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Food Groups</th>
<th>Urban areas</th>
<th>Rural areas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>First 4 deciles</td>
<td>Last 6 deciles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cereals</td>
<td>0.5459</td>
<td>0.5440</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pulses</td>
<td>0.0195</td>
<td>0.0181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edible oil</td>
<td>0.1139</td>
<td>0.1074</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milk &amp; milk products</td>
<td>0.1617</td>
<td>0.1764</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meat</td>
<td>0.0161</td>
<td>0.0201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sugar</td>
<td>0.1066</td>
<td>0.0922</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vegetables</td>
<td>0.0281</td>
<td>0.0252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>0.0142</td>
<td>0.0166</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Estimating Elasticity

There are two main approaches to estimate elasticity: indirect approach and direct approach. Indirect approach or expenditure approach is based on estimating food demand/expenditure system for a relatively small number of food groups and then converting the elasticities obtained from them to nutrient elasticities with respect to expenditure at the same level of aggregation (Behrman and Deolalikar 1987). Commenting on both the methods of estimation, they argued that due to wrong procedure adopted for food groups, indirect approach provides an upward bias in elasticity results. According to their argument:
The expenditure system approach at the level of aggregation at which it is typically applied tends to result in higher estimates of nutrient elasticities with respect to expenditure than the direct estimates, and that the direct estimates probably lead to better, though still possibly upwardly biased, estimates (p.496).

Their argument is mainly related to quality of food, since most of the food groups’ expenditure may not be homogeneous. Taking the example of ‘meat group’, all categories of meat such as poultry, different quality of beef, mutton, etc., should not be kept in one category because price of all these food items varies on the basis of their quality. When the household becomes rich, she moves towards varieties of foods based on quality. This quality issue may give biased estimates for calorie-expenditure elasticity. To prove their argument, Behrman and Deolalikar (1987) used the International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics Village Level Studies (ICRISAT VLS) data set and estimated the elasticity for calorie demand by using both methods. The results obtained by using the indirect approach for elasticity estimation in the range of (0.77 to 1.18) which is close to one. On the other hand, by using the direct approach, elasticites will be smaller and may not be significantly different from zero, within range of 0.17 to 0.37. They concluded that ‘the World Bank (1981)-type optimism about the nutrient improvements to be expected with income gains in communities such as the ones under examination seems fundamentally misleading’ (p.505). Some details of the indirect method are given as follows:

If the consumed total calories intake should be defined as

$$n = \sum k_i f_i \quad \ldots \ldots \quad (3.1)$$

Where $n$ is the quantity of calories consumed, $k_i$ is the average calories content of unit of food group $i$, and $f_i$ is the number of units consumed of food group $i$. The total expenditure elasticity for calories can be found by differentiating the above:

$$\eta_{nE} = \sum \theta_i \eta_{f_iE} + \sum \theta_i \eta_{k_iE} \quad \ldots \ldots \quad (3.2)$$

Where $\eta_{XE}$ is the elasticity of $X$ with respect to $E$, total expenditure, and $\theta_i$ is the share of total calories consumed obtained from group $i$. It is to be noted that the expenditure on the $ith$ food group is $E_i = p_i f_i$. Consequently, the expenditure elasticity of food demand for $ith$ food group is:

---

4 For more details please see Grimard (1996).
Where \( p_i \) is the unit price of the \( ith \) food group. The equation 3.3 is then substituted into equation 3.2 in order to have an expression in terms of calories:

\[
\eta_{f,E} = \eta_{E,E} - \eta_{p,E} \quad \text{(3.3)}
\]

\[
\eta_{aE} = \sum \theta_{i} \eta_{E,E} - \sum \theta_{j} \eta_{p,E} + \sum \theta_{i} \eta_{q,E} \quad \text{(3.4)}
\]

While collecting data, households seldom provided the unit price \( p_i \) of the \( ith \) food groups they chose. However, expenditure and quantities were available for different food groups from the surveyed data, which could be used to calculate the ratio \( p_i/k_i = q_i \), where \( q_i \) is the average cost of the calories obtained from food group I; consequently, equation 3.4 can be rewritten as:

\[
\eta_{aE} = \sum \theta_{i} \eta_{E,E} - \sum \theta_{j} \eta_{q,E} \quad \text{(3.5)}
\]

Equation 3.5 states that the calories elasticity is a weighted sum of elasticity of food expenditure of the \( ith \) group with respect to the total expenditure minus the weight sum of an average cost of calories for each group and how it varies from total expenditure.

It was noted that as income grows, people become more inclined towards quality instead of quantity. They spend more income to purchase better quality products for their daily use. As they tend towards quality, elasticity \( \eta_{q,E} \) becomes large because better quality products at high prices affect elasticity. This reduces the overall elasticity results of equation 3.5. For this, second term of equation 3.5 is considered to be zero. It implies that elasticity of an average cost nutrient with respect to income/expenditure is zero.

The other is to directly estimate the reduced demand for nutrients by having some specified functional form. Both these methods have some pros and cons and both approaches have been used in the analysis of this study. The main findings revealed that income elasticity for food demand is significantly different from zero. For macro-nutrients elasticities, only direct approach was used.

One of the difficulties while carrying out analysis was to find the exact relationship between income and calories. Though both income and expenditures are not measured accurately, yet expenditure is being considered the better approximation for income, therefore, we have used expenditure instead of income.
Calorie-Expenditure Elasticity Calculations using the Indirect Method

Using indirect approach, quantities expenditure elasticities are calculated for distinct food groups. These elasticities and, for the first four deciles and the last six deciles are given in Table 5 and 6 respectively.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Food Groups</th>
<th>Urban areas</th>
<th>Rural areas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>First 4 deciles</td>
<td>Last 6 deciles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cereals</td>
<td>0.6343</td>
<td>0.2427</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pulses</td>
<td>0.7141</td>
<td>0.4148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edible oil</td>
<td>0.6499</td>
<td>0.4732</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milk</td>
<td>1.1967</td>
<td>0.9123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meat</td>
<td>1.0350</td>
<td>0.8736</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sugar</td>
<td>0.6681</td>
<td>0.3785</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vegetables</td>
<td>0.4807</td>
<td>0.4415</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>0.8381</td>
<td>0.6318</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These results show that income elasticity for calorie demand is different from zero and that with an increase in income, elasticity becomes small which implies that a non-linear relationship exists between calorie consumption and income.

Calorie-Expenditure Elasticity Calculations using the Direct Method

In the direct approach, we have estimated elasticity for calorie demand using a specified functional form and in some cases regional, seasonal and households characteristics are also being used.

\[ \ln N = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \ln PCE + \beta_2 \ln PCE^2 + \omega_r + \xi \]  

Where \( \ln N \) is log of calorie purchased, \( \ln PCE \) is per capita expenditure on food and \( \omega_r \) represents all other variables i.e. socio-economic, regional, seasonal etc. Square terms of \( \ln PCE \) is added to address nonlinearity issue. Results for calorie expenditure elasticities are reported in Table 7.
Table 7: Direct Estimate Calorie Expenditure Elasticities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>First 4 deciles</th>
<th>Last 6 deciles</th>
<th>Full sample</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>0.5797</td>
<td>0.4658</td>
<td>0.4937</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>0.4994</td>
<td>0.3587</td>
<td>0.3687</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Strauss and Thomas (1990) suggested two alternative approaches to estimate calorie-expenditure elasticity. One is linear and the other is non-linear. These (linear and non-linear) approaches are applied step by step with increasing sample size, first estimates the functional form using the poorest five per cent of total expenditure. The same function is performed for first ten percent in the next step and repeated until entire data set is included in the sample. The second option for estimation is to divide the full sample into quintiles and calculate elasticity estimate for each quintile. Table 8 and Table 9 provide both linear and non-linear polynomial elasticities results for cumulative percentile distribution of total expenditure. The models used in Table 8 and Table 9 include the household characteristics with and without cluster dummies. Each column in the tables examines the same model by using robust regression with the help of statistical software STATA.

Results shown in Table 8 and Table 9 indicate that expenditure elasticity varies among income classes. Expenditure elasticities are high for poor income group than those of high income groups both in urban and rural areas. This implies that poor households demand for food will become stronger as compared to rich households in case of income growth.

Table 8: Expenditure Elasticities for Calorie Demand, Urban Areas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cumulative %tiles</th>
<th>Without cluster dummy</th>
<th>With cluster dummy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LnPCE</td>
<td>Quadratic polynomial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(robust)</td>
<td>(robust)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.5109</td>
<td>0.4152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>0.5581</td>
<td>0.4791</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>0.5110</td>
<td>0.4639</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>0.4671</td>
<td>0.4691</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75</td>
<td>0.4005</td>
<td>0.4760</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90</td>
<td>0.3767</td>
<td>0.3947</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>95</td>
<td>0.3574</td>
<td>0.3881</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>0.3098</td>
<td>0.3500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 9: Expenditure Elasticities for Calorie Demand, Rural Areas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cumulative %tiles</th>
<th>Without cluster dummy</th>
<th>With cluster dummy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LnPCE</td>
<td>Quadratic polynomial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(robust)</td>
<td>(robust)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.8052</td>
<td>0.7286</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>0.6498</td>
<td>0.5403</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>0.5863</td>
<td>0.5641</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>0.5622</td>
<td>0.5618</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75</td>
<td>0.5561</td>
<td>0.5646</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90</td>
<td>0.5226</td>
<td>0.5367</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>95</td>
<td>0.5090</td>
<td>0.5215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>0.4559</td>
<td>0.4833</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Non-linear behaviour from Table 8 and Table 9 was also observed, as elasticity decline with per capita income. Robust regression estimates for elasticity are slightly different from simple regression. The calorie-expenditure elasticity shows similar pattern as the full sample parametric estimation: concavity gradually becomes flatter with an increase in income.

Table 8 and Table 9 results could be compared with the same model, but having different estimation procedures such as simple and robust regression. These two estimation procedures show almost similar results at the full sample, but there is significant difference for the 5th and 10th percentiles than other groups.

Since there are various socio-economic variables which also play an important role in determination of calorie demand, in the absence of these variables, income elasticity results may be biased upward. Therefore, various socio-economic factors in the model have been included, but income elasticity estimates for calorie demand remained significantly different from zero.

Table 10: Calorie Equation using Different Household Characteristics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model -I</th>
<th>p-value</th>
<th>Model -II</th>
<th>p-value</th>
<th>Model -III</th>
<th>p-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Log of PCE</td>
<td>0.6763</td>
<td>(0.1271)</td>
<td>0.8392</td>
<td>(0.0355)</td>
<td>0.9084</td>
<td>(0.0343)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log of PCE square</td>
<td>-0.0114</td>
<td>(0.0855)</td>
<td>-0.0187</td>
<td>(0.1064)</td>
<td>-0.0958</td>
<td>(0.0062)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HH size (log)</td>
<td>-0.9566</td>
<td>(0.0222)</td>
<td>-0.9958</td>
<td>(0.0351)</td>
<td>-0.9948</td>
<td>(0.0343)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HH education (log)</td>
<td>-0.0184</td>
<td>(0.0152)</td>
<td>-0.0314</td>
<td>(0.0275)</td>
<td>-0.2540</td>
<td>(0.0268)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female head</td>
<td>0.0136</td>
<td>(0.0196)</td>
<td>0.0114</td>
<td>(0.0195)</td>
<td>0.0192</td>
<td>(0.0192)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infant proportion</td>
<td>-0.2520</td>
<td>(0.0546)</td>
<td>-0.2599</td>
<td>(0.0542)</td>
<td>-0.2899</td>
<td>(0.0529)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children proportion</td>
<td>-0.0954</td>
<td>(0.0294)</td>
<td>-0.0972</td>
<td>(0.0292)</td>
<td>-0.1153</td>
<td>(0.0285)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aged proportion</td>
<td>0.0648</td>
<td>(0.0605)</td>
<td>0.0631</td>
<td>(0.0601)</td>
<td>0.0270</td>
<td>(0.0586)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female proportion</td>
<td>0.0155</td>
<td>(0.0359)</td>
<td>0.0175</td>
<td>(0.0356)</td>
<td>0.0043</td>
<td>(0.0347)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmer</td>
<td>0.1533</td>
<td>(0.0000)</td>
<td>0.1506</td>
<td>(0.0000)</td>
<td>0.1434</td>
<td>(0.0000)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
While describing household characteristics on food consumption it was revealed that household characteristic affects food consumption in a significant way. Socio-economic variables play an important role in demand for calorie determination, however, details are not discussed here as the main purpose of including these variables is to see whether income elasticity for calorie demand remains significantly different from zero after including all other relevant variables in the given model to avoid omitted variable bias.

Nonparametric Analysis of Calorie-Expenditure Relationship
In this section, LOWESS\(^5\) procedure has been used to see the relationship between calorie consumption and expenditure. Rudimentary nonparametric plots between calories consumption and expenditure verify nonlinear relationship between calorie consumption and expenditure. These show that with an increase in income, there is an increase in demand for food at decreasing rate both at country and provincial level. Analysis both for urban and rural area is presented separately.

\(^{5}\) LOWESS is a (Locally Weighted Scatterplot Smoothing) non-parametric regression technique for fitting a smoothing curve to a dataset.
**Rural Area**

**Figure 1: Calorie Expenditure Relationship of Different Provinces**

Figure 1 shows the calorie expenditure relationship, in Punjab calorie intake gradually increase and decline at the end, indicating that income influence on calorie intake is positive, but this influence will be stronger for the poor household. At a particular stage, income cannot influence calorie intake. Sindh and Baluchistan have almost the same pattern and relationship. Calorie intake seems to be decreased in KPK and Punjab at same percentile.
In urban areas, calorie expenditure relationship can be seen in Figure 2. Curvature in rural areas decline is sharper than urban areas. At a particular stage, income seems to not influence calorie intake. Sindh, KPK and Baluchistan gave almost a similar picture; calorie intake increases but does not seem to be decreasing as is the case with Punjab province.

Income Elasticity for Protein and Fat Demand
Malnourishment is not only lack of access to calories, but also the utilisation of food containing macro and micro-nutrients. Human body needs balanced diet-a proper combination of meat, vegetables, fruits, etc. Malnourishment may exist because rich nutrient food is not accessible and/or subjects are unaware of the balanced food concept. The role of socio-economic variables is very important in macro-nutrient consumption, but we find that even after controlling the effect of socio-economic variables, income elasticity for macro-nutrient is significantly different from zero. Of course, micro-nutrients are also very important and cause hidden hunger but the study is restricted to macro-nutrients protein and fat. Following is a brief summary of protein and fat intake patterns among provinces.
Protein intake per capita varies among provinces. In the first quartile, we have 41.27 grams protein intake which is the minimum in Sindh and highest (48.52 grams) in Punjab. Second quartile also shows similar picture, the lowest protein consumption is 51.71 grams from Sindh while the highest 64.03 grams from Punjab. Protein consumption ranges in the third quartile from 66 grams to 102 grams for Sindh and Punjab respectively.

Fat intake per capita also varies among provinces. In the first quartile, 29.24 grams fat intake is the minimum in Baluchistan and highest (37.18 grams) fat consumption is in Punjab. Second quartile gave a similar picture at minimum level, lowest fat consumption 44.94 grams in Baluchistan, while the highest 64.03 grams in Punjab. Fat consumption ranging in the third quartile is 72.25 grams to 97.75 grams in Sindh and Punjab respectively.
Table 11 and Table 12 provide income elasticity estimates for protein and fat demand respectively.

**Table 11: Protein Equation using Different Household Characteristics**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristics</th>
<th>Model I P value</th>
<th>Model II P value</th>
<th>Model III P value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Log of PCE</td>
<td>0.2997 (0.0099)</td>
<td>0.2939 (0.0094)</td>
<td>0.3203 (0.0093)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HH size (log)</td>
<td>-0.7110 (0.0199)</td>
<td>-0.7156 (0.0189)</td>
<td>-0.7539 (0.0186)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HH education (log)</td>
<td>0.0048 (0.0138)</td>
<td>0.0122 (0.0132)</td>
<td>0.0196 (0.0129)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women schooling (log)</td>
<td>-0.0521 (0.0122)</td>
<td>-0.0345 (0.0117)</td>
<td>-0.0169 (0.0115)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female head</td>
<td>0.0482 (0.0179)</td>
<td>0.0591 (0.0170)</td>
<td>0.0407 (0.0166)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infant proportion</td>
<td>-0.3422 (0.0495)</td>
<td>-0.3444 (0.0472)</td>
<td>-0.3927 (0.0462)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child proportion</td>
<td>-0.1679 (0.0263)</td>
<td>-0.1749 (0.0251)</td>
<td>-0.1862 (0.0245)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aged proportion</td>
<td>0.0426 (0.0549)</td>
<td>0.0029 (0.0524)</td>
<td>0.0570 (0.0512)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female proportion</td>
<td>0.0060 (0.0326)</td>
<td>0.0061 (0.0311)</td>
<td>0.0168 (0.0303)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Livestock</td>
<td>0.2588 (0.0179)</td>
<td>0.0000 (0.0184)</td>
<td>0.1834 (0.0164)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>-0.1420 (0.0116)</td>
<td>-0.1420 (0.0116)</td>
<td>0.0000 (0.0000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>_cons</td>
<td>5.2989 (0.0860)</td>
<td>5.3015 (0.0820)</td>
<td>5.1239 (0.0808)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: Standard errors are in parenthesis.*
Table 12: Fat Equation using Different Household Characteristics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model I</th>
<th>P value</th>
<th>Model II</th>
<th>P value</th>
<th>Model III</th>
<th>P value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Log of PCE</td>
<td>0.6246</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>0.6213</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>0.6358</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0173)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0172)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0175)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HH size (log)</td>
<td>-1.2695</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>-1.2750</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>-1.2947</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0348)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0347)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0349)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HH education (log)</td>
<td>0.0615</td>
<td>0.0110</td>
<td>0.0672</td>
<td>0.0050</td>
<td>0.0709</td>
<td>0.0030</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0242)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0242)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0241)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women schooling (log)</td>
<td>0.0709</td>
<td>0.0010</td>
<td>0.0846</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>0.0972</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0214)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0215)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0216)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female head</td>
<td>0.0161</td>
<td>0.6080</td>
<td>0.0138</td>
<td>0.6570</td>
<td>0.0127</td>
<td>0.6830</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0313)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0312)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0311)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infant proportion</td>
<td>0.1498</td>
<td>0.0850</td>
<td>0.1364</td>
<td>0.1150</td>
<td>0.1040</td>
<td>0.2290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0868)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0865)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0865)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child proportion</td>
<td>0.1571</td>
<td>0.0010</td>
<td>0.1561</td>
<td>0.0010</td>
<td>0.1477</td>
<td>0.0010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0462)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0460)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0459)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aged proportion</td>
<td>0.0604</td>
<td>0.5300</td>
<td>0.0451</td>
<td>0.6380</td>
<td>0.0260</td>
<td>0.7860</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0963)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0960)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0958)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female proportion</td>
<td>0.0765</td>
<td>0.1810</td>
<td>0.0740</td>
<td>0.1940</td>
<td>0.0825</td>
<td>0.1460</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0571)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0569)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0568)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Livestock</td>
<td>0.1779</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>0.1739</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>0.1317</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0328)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0328)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0345)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>-0.0885</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.0885</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.0885</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0216)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0216)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0216)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>_cons</td>
<td>2.2420</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>2.2359</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>2.1364</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.1508)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.1502)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.1512)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Standard errors are given in parenthesis.

Results

Calorie income relationship was found to be significantly different from zero for different income groups, and by including various socio-economic variables. These estimates are high whether measured through direct method or indirect method. These results match with those of Alderman (1986) and Deaton and Subramanian (1994), and differ from those of Behrman and Deolalikar (1987); Bouis and Haddad (1992), who suggested that income elasticity was not significantly different from zero.

Income elasticities both for protein and fats are also significantly different from zero. The income elasticity for fat intake per capita is 0.64 which is two times higher than that of protein, i.e. 0.32. This suggests that with proportionate increase in income, consumer prefers to have more percentage of food rich in fat- milk and milk products, red meat etc. This study shows a significant and positive relationship between both overall calories and macronutrient demand with incomes per capita. As household’s income grows, the consumption pattern also changes. They spend more on food to meet their best dietary needs. This shift in income is not only significant in calorie’s case but also meaningful in macronutrient case.
Conclusion and Recommendations

Income affects total calorie and macro-nutrient intake positively. How to have sustainable increase in income of households? This is an important question but difficult to answer. Following Drèze and Sen (1989), two strategies can be adopted to ensure food security. One is to have growth-mediated security and the other is support-led security. In case of the first approach, there should be high and sustainable economic growth for many years and this will result in general affluence, including not only expansion of private income but also an improved basis for public support. New Growth Strategy by the Planning Commission (2011) is based on this concept and it has all the ingredients which can lead Pakistan to have high sustainable growth for future. This will help in creating more jobs and more income which will help reduce food security. Kabeer and Asghar (2012) elaborate in detail how the New Growth Strategy will enhance economic growth and hence ensure food security through job generation. They emphasised the role of Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) in high economic growth and in prosperity of the non-farm poor. There is a strong need to promote SMEs for non-farm activities in agriculture sector because of its capacity to generate employment through agro-based industry. Though agriculture is now declared as private business, it lacks healthy competition as it is still a family business. There is a need to bring more innovations in agriculture farming and livestock sector through social entrepreneurship.

On the macroeconomic front, high economic growth rate is not only the key to food security and poverty reduction, it also contributes indirectly to reduce food insecurity. Pakistan has about 80% population which is living on less than US$2 per day. Total fertility rate for this income bracket is higher than middle and upper income groups. There is estimated to be a high increase in population in this income bracket which means adding millions more to poverty every year. This number is predicted to increase alarmingly in the next three to four decades.

The only viable solution is to take care of this problem by addressing poverty through high sustainable growth. As income per capita goes up people start thinking in terms of welfare of their children rather their own welfare in old age. They will invest more in their children’s education, health and recreation expenditures by shifting focus from quantity of children to quality of children. This will lead to increase in literacy rate, low child mortality rate, increase in life expectancy, better health and nutrition and, all these factors will ultimately lead to more productivity in all sectors of the economy (Leathers and Foster 2005, p.307).

The second one is a targeted approach where programmes like Benazir Income Support Programme (BISP), Bait-ul-Mal, subsidies through utility stores corporations and various other programmes could be initiated, in order to remove destitution without waiting for a transformation in the level of general affluence. The two approaches are connected in the long run. Only policies related to direct food and agriculture are ineffective in sustainable
food security, but policies that have implications for controlling price (particularly fuel), income, and employment will help in reducing poverty; hence improving food security.

Besides having an increase in income, there is a need to plug investment in infrastructure which has direct bearings for providing safe drinking water, education and health. This may help in better food utilisation which is very important for reducing malnutrition after having availability and accessibility to food. Social protection programmes need to be strengthened in order to provide food security to the most vulnerable segments of society. Otherwise achieving food security for the households may have very high cost in terms of time, money, health, etc. Some households try to achieve food security by selling their assets accumulated over their life e.g. land, livestock, jewellery etc. Such households become very vulnerable to any shock or natural disaster such as floods, and lose their main source of earning. Therefore, transfer to the poorest in the form of cash payments or vouchers or direct food transfers are highly recommended particularly in times of rapid food price increases. There is a need to control prices, keeping in mind that incentives to farmers are not reduced.

The impact of providing different subsidy programmes for the welfare of people and need to devise the mechanism which provides maximum returns through minimum resources should also be analysed. Whether food subsidy or cash transfer policy will help in providing food security requires careful analysis. For example, Jensen and Miller (2011) show through a randomised controlled trial (RCT) conducted in extremely food insecure poor people of China, food subsidies led to reduction in nutrition rather an increase in it. They justify that it may be a taste-preference that households getting subsidy reduced rice consumption and used that income for eating shrimps. Other possible reason may be that people think that rice has lower calories than shrimps and hence started consuming fewer calories than before. The results of this experiment are quite interesting and one needs to pay serious attention for having an optimal policy mechanism for providing food security to vulnerable groups.

Furthermore, after the 18th Amendment, there is a dire need to develop inter-sectoral linkages among various government departments both at provincial and federal levels to increase food production and security. In general, Pakistan is facing institutional fragmentation and independent goals for every sector. This has led to change in distribution of resources both horizontally (across sectors) and vertically (across government levels). Moreover, there is high chance of inefficient allocation, and overlapping of actions and customers. A comprehensive and well-designed strategy for food security supported by macroeconomic environment will be sustainable and will not only enhance agricultural productivity, but also solve the problem of food insecurity by augmenting purchasing power of the masses.
References


Hunger Breeds Human Insecurity: Case Study of Far-western Region of Nepal

Nirmal Kumar Bishokarma

Abstract
Recent trends show that food insecurity is a critical dimension of human insecurity. The state and trends of food production, access and consumption in Nepal show that scarcity of food will escalate resource insecurity, individual deprivation, and exploitation. This study carried out a household survey of 370 houses, key informant interviews, focus group discussions with special attention also given to secondary data relevant to far-western region of Nepal. The findings reveal that the current scenario of population growth, food production, land fragmentation, poverty, per-capita income and consumption in the context of social exclusion and climate change will make food security a matter of personal and community security. This trend will significantly increase the number of hungry people by 2030 and 2050. The scenario confirms that marginalised people will particularly face food based human insecurity, which will further increase fear, conflict and other socio-political unrest in resource scarce areas.

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1 This chapter has been approved as a research report by the referee.

2 Mr. Nirmal Kumar Bishokarma is a doctoral student at School of Arts, Kathmandu University in collaboration with the National Centre of Competence in Research (NCCR) North-South.
Introduction

Nepal is one of the most food insecure countries in Asia (WFP 2005; FAO 2008). Global Hunger Index 2011 ranks the country at the 54th position out of 81 countries (IFPRI 2011). Its hunger index is 19.9 which illustrates the severity of hunger in serious situation. In the country, 60.2% of the total households face regular food insufficiencies in a year (Upreti 2010). On average, Nepal’s current trend of hunger reduction reveals that its Millennium Development Goal (MDG) commitment to reduce the proportion of population below malnutrition level of dietary energy consumption to 25% by 2015 seems difficult to achieve. According to UNDP and NPC (2010), 36% people are facing malnutrition. At this pace, 30.9% population would still be facing malnutrition by 2015.

The far-western region of Nepal, the study area, has higher prevalence of food insecurity and severity of hunger in the mountainous region is extremely alarming (WFP and NPC 2010). The region is already established as a resource scarce area in terms of per-capita availability of natural resources, human development and empowerment index. The trends of edible food production balance in the region confirm that it is a historically food deficit region. There was shortage of 51630, 49100 and 2268 metric tonne edible food in 2002, 2007 and 2011 respectively (MOAC 2011). People’s per capita mean dietary energy consumption here is 2250 kcal/per person/day, which is lowest in the country, while it is estimated at 2405 kcal at the national level (WFP and NPC 2010). Also, more than 60 and 50% children are stunted and underweight respectively (FAO and WFP 2007).

After the end of the World Wars I and II (1916-1945) and the Cold War (1945-1991), the concept of security has changed from the state centric traditional approach to non-traditional, human security domain (Spring 2009; Bhattarai 2010). Traditionally external threats and objectives of security were to protect state territory and national sovereignty (Kumar 2012). Insecurity, in this regard was considered a military threat and means of addressing such intimidation was through the use of military and coercive force (Quilop 2007). Over the years, focus has shifted to human security to include food and environmental insecurity, provision of basic needs, human rights and, focusing on protecting economic and social rights of individuals and communities (UNDP 1994). It has become an overarching concept that includes all forms of threats to individual and community well-being (Wahlqvist et al. 2012). Also, these are the situations which are perceived as foundation and justification for terrorism, conflict, and a number of other actions destabilising nations and the world (Pinstrup-Andersen 2001).

The evidence of World Wars demonstrated that lack of basic necessities such as food in one nation became a problem for all nations (Barrett and Maxwell 2005; DEFRA 2006). Devereux (2000) claimed that famines were responsible for 70 million deaths during the twentieth century; the count was more than the World Wars. In addition, the evidence of current civil unrest including protest, marches, and often violent uprising around the world due to rising food prices in 2008, signify the high importance of food security not
only for individual safety but also for national social unrest (Gasper 2005). Nepal’s ten year long (1996 to 2006) armed conflict showed that the main target of the insurgents were the poor and food insecure rural people (Bishokarma 2010). Evidence highlights that in coming years food insecurity will be a major threat to personal and community well-being particularly in developing countries. Chronic hunger will not only threaten individuals and community but also governments, societies, and borders (Naylor 2011). Without significant changes in both developed and developing countries’ policies, over the next two decades hundreds of millions of people will remain food insecure; millions of children will die each year from malnutrition and environmental degradation will continue unchecked (Cohen 2008). With this perspective, achieving food security will be a major objective of livelihoods interventions, which is also a key fundamental right of every individual in poor countries (Boonchai and Sedsirot 2007; Hastings 2010; Upreti 2012). Inability/ability of the government to ensure that its people are well-fed will determine the level of its legitimacy (FAO 2009; Wahlqvist et al. 2012).

Therefore, food security at present and in future, will remain an important dimension of human security. This security concern is directly linked with whether every individual has access to safe, affordable food. However, there is limited evidence on how food insecurity, at present and in future, will breed personal and community risk which may affect national and international peace and stability. The paper looks at how hunger will be a major non-traditional security threat in the future in resource scarce areas of Nepal. It specifically looks at how food insecurity will escalate psychological fear of people being hungry, worry about loss of livelihood assets, pain of dependency, illiteracy, resource and environmental insecurity, personal safety and how it may nurture wider socio-political unrests.

Methodology

Study area
This research was conducted in the far-western region (FWR) of Nepal. It is a highly resource scarce and food insecure region of the country, with around 90% of the households having insufficient access to food (WFP and NDRI 2008) and 76% highly food insecure people (WFP and NPC 2010).

The study area includes mountain, hills and Terai (flat land) physiographic locations of the region. The social composition in the mountainous and hilly area comprises of caste based settlements including upper caste such as Brahmín, Chhetry and Thakuri and Dalits such as kami (blacksmith), damai (tailors), sarki (shoemakers). In Terai, the indigenous ethnic groups called tharu, are the dominant social groups accompanying the hill caste groups.

2 Dalits are untouchable caste groups and one of the most marginalised section of Nepali society.
Data collection
The study was carried out in three Village Development Committees (VDC), namely, Phulbari, Birpath and Brahise of three districts: Kailali, Achham and Bajura. The study used quantitative and qualitative methods of social science research. The quantitative data were collected through secondary sources. Household surveys of 370 households (7% of total research population) using stratified random sampling method was carried out. The data was used for analysis of trends and forecasting of future scenario. Qualitative methods such as 12 in-depth key informant interviews (KII) and 21 focus group discussions with 84 people were primarily used for triangulation and justification of quantitative data. Participatory tools such as ranking, timeline, Venn diagram, and resource mapping were used to collect and analyse the data.

Findings and Discussion
Focus group discussions show that for the past 25 years, people in Kailali, Bajura and Achham have been facing localised hunger.\(^3\) However, the famine of 1997 in the mountain area including these districts caused the death of 1400 people (Adhikari 2010).

Access to food in the region has become costly over the years. Recently, the district headquarters of Achham and Bajura have been connected with the regional transport mechanism. However, villages of the districts have yet to be linked. Therefore, households in the rural parts of this mountainous region face high transportation cost, which is the main reason for food price hike. As a result, major portion of household income is expended on food purchase as the market dominates food distribution. This reduces purchasing power for other livelihood assets such as clothes, houses, equipment etc.

Food insecurity is also considered a major cause of exploitation, deprivation and hunger for most of the marginalised community in the region. In future, the poor will endure further exploitation because they have limited livelihood options, which could increase their dependency on local landlords for food, and they may be forced to receive food on credit from the market due to limited income. Evidence shows that the current state and trends of food availability, access and consumption in the region may escalate the psychological fear of facing hunger. Their concern over resource insecurity, loss of livelihood assets and personal safety could also be accompanied by wider socio-political unrest at local and national level.

Food Availability
Data from the household survey shows that households of Bajura and Achham districts are self-sufficient in food only for six months in an average year. In Kailali, almost 60% households are self-sufficient in food. Food distributed through the Nepal Food Corporation, World Food Programme (WFP) and the market contribute another six

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\(^3\) Localised hunger is considered hunger specific to the far western region of Nepal.
months on an average in a year to fulfil food demands of local people in Achham and Bajura. In Kailali, only the market provides food for six months to the food scarce households. Only 8% of the total households are food self-sufficient, and 5% face hidden hunger for at least one month in a year. Evidence shows that self-sufficiency of food through production is considered an indicator of food security and well-being of households in rural areas (Lang 2002; Adhikari 2010; Prasad et al. 2011). Production capability of a household also determines income and access to food available through market and public distribution as well as better consumption level. Due to scarcity of food, habitants also face the problem of high food prices, income shortfall, food hygiene, etc.

Historically, the region is food deficit and in future the production of food will be a major insecurity concern for people. The trend of food production in the region (Table 1) shows that households in the area will face more food production deficit in the future. The figure indicates that there was a 2268 metric tonnes deficit of food in FWR in 2010-11 right when there was favourable climate and investment.

Table 1: Trends of Edible Food Balance in Far Western Region of Nepal

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Nepal Production (mt.)</th>
<th>Nepal Requirement (mt.)</th>
<th>Balance Production (mt.)</th>
<th>Balance Requirement (mt.)</th>
<th>Balance Production (mt.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2002*</td>
<td>5185824</td>
<td>4630200</td>
<td>555624</td>
<td>430200</td>
<td>-51630</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>6352700</td>
<td>6577400</td>
<td>-224</td>
<td>573200</td>
<td>49100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010/11**</td>
<td>5512875</td>
<td>5069818</td>
<td>443057</td>
<td>483998</td>
<td>2268</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: FAO and WFP 2007*; MOAC 2011**

The region is highly vulnerable to climate change. National Adaptation Plan for Action (NAPA) of Nepal has categorised Bajura and Achham as drought and Kailali as a flood prone district. From focus group discussions, it was found that for the last five years farmers face incidences of drought annually. From 2005 to 2009, there was 50% loss of production of cereal crops due to drought which also has tremendous impact on productivity of land. District profile information shows that the productivity (yield/hectare growth) of paddy and maize in the region is only 0.97 tonne/hectare and decreasing, while productivity is 1.07 tonnes on an average at the national level (FAO and WFP 2007).

Resource Insecurity

In the coming years, scarcity of land is predicted to become a major constraint for food production in the region. The trend of land holding of far western region also proves that food production will reduce since per capita availability of land for agriculture will
reduce because of higher population growth, and use of agricultural land for other purposes such as construction of roads and electricity poles.

Table 2: Trends of Per Capita (Households) Agriculture Land (hectares)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FWR</td>
<td>1.41</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.4*</td>
<td>0.3*</td>
<td>0.3*</td>
<td>0.3*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Author’s forecast from trend analysis.

The trend of land holding in Nepal shows that per capita land holding in the far-western region is lower than other regions. Total land area in the far western region is 1944297 hectares and agriculture land in the region is 256836 hectares (ha) which is only 13% of the total land area. The trend of land fragmentation shows that it is increasing more rapidly than other regions and those of the national average (Table 2). A rough estimate shows that minimum 0.64ha, 0.55ha, and 0.45ha land would be needed for food self-sufficiency in mountain, hills and Terai respectively (IASC 2008). Based on author’s analysis, the trend of land fragmentation in the region shows that there will only be 0.3 hectares land by 2030 and 0.25 hectares by 2050 available for agriculture purposes. In the far-western region, 256836 hectares is cultivated and 12051 hectares is uncultivated land. By 2020, 50% of total uncultivated land (6000 ha) will be under cultivation. Under current rate of population trends, by 2020 total households are estimated to increase by 645 thousand, which is equivalent to 0.4 hectares agriculture land per household. By 2030, the total number of households could increase up to 850,000 enveloping the remaining uncultivated land for cultivation; the per capita land is then estimated to be 0.3 hectares per household.

In this scenario, fragmentation of land will make marginal groups especially socially excluded caste groups fall into a state of landlessness or near-landlessness. In Nepal, land tenure is determined by institutions and set of rules, which allow the high caste groups to own land in the form of Birta, Jagir, and Rakam. Socially marginalised groups do not fall under these privileged groups (Nepali 2010). These institutions exist strictly in the region. In Bajura, there are 7.5% of total households that are landless, of which 86.88% are the Dalit community. The average landholding size of the Dalits is 1.06 kattha (0.03 hectare) against 3.4 kattha (0.12 hectare) of non-dalits. Unequal

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4 *Birta* means an assignment of income from the land in favour of individuals in order to provide them with a livelihood. It was granted in favour of priests, teachers, religious heads, soldiers, and members of nobility and royal family (Regmi 1999).
5 Before 1952, it was a common practice in Nepal to assign the income of Raikar lands as emoluments to government employees and functionaries. Such assignment was known as *Jagir* (Nepali 2010).
6 *Rakam* refers to a particular category of land grants and assignments similar to Raikar, Jagir, and Guthi lands on which cultivators are required to provide unpaid labour on compulsory basis to meet government requirements.
distribution of land has negative impacts on people’s food security (Zia and Gadi 2001; Mancusi-Materi 2000). As they have very small holding of agricultural land, the size of their land is estimated to be very nominal in future; as a result they will be unable to diversify their agricultural production. This could be a major cause of decrease in their food production ability.

The share cropping system of agricultural production is predicted to become an insignificant practice in the region because of land scarcity. Focus group discussions indicated that there were about 50% households cultivating their crops via share cropping ten years ago, and now only 25% of total famers are producing food using this system.

The production trends under climate change and land fragmentation would not be maintained in future. Trend analysis in the context of production scenario, land fragmentation, and climate change shows that the number of self-sufficient households are expected to reduce by 5% and households threatened by hunger will rise to 10% in 2030 and 15% by 2050. This projection is calculated based on participatory trend analysis with local people through focus group discussions. Simultaneously, the duration of chronic food insecurity of socially and economically marginalised groups in the region will increase in future. Marginalised communities in the study sites face more than 9 months of food insecurity. The months of February to March and July to August are agricultural lean seasons that can also be called ‘hunger seasons’. Due to less production, crop loss and late growing season, the period of hunger could be extended in the future.

Simultaneously, the field study finds that scarcity of land and land based marginality not only reduces food self-sufficiency, but it also increases exploitation and social movement in the region. The current trend of land tenure and fragmentation in far-western region of Nepal shows that there are now 22% marginal cultivators and landless people. From author’s analysis, this number of landless and marginal cultivators will reach 30% by 2030 and 40% by 2050. Also, the prevailing caste based patron client institutions like Bista and Haliya of Bajura and Achham district and Kamaiya of Kailali district are breaking now because of increasing level of awareness among them and Government’s policy to free bonded labour. In such institutions, the lower caste and indigenous people worked for higher caste people, in turn receiving grains at harvest time. Sometimes, they are also paid nominal cash. These types of institutions may completely disappear by 2030 because of Government’s current legal provisions and ongoing social movements against them. However, this will create new groups of landless households in the region.

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7 Chronic food insecurity describes the inability to meet minimum nutrition and consumption needs over a sustained period of time (WFP and NPC 2010).
8 In this institution, the low caste people make tools, sew clothes, make shoes as the high caste require, in turn they are paid with grain at harvest time (Caplan 1970).
9 It is ploughman and master relationships between low and high caste households. It is one kind of slavery (Caplan 1970).
10 System of bonded labour where one group of indigenous people called Tharu worked for their masters to pay off debt.
Recently, the Government declared that these institutions are illegal and bonded labourers are freed. However, they have not been provided alternative livelihoods. As a result, Dalit in hills and indigenous Tharu in Terai are organising themselves, conducting many social movements at local and national level. They are also getting involved in deforestation and illegal settlements inside the forests. Hunger and food insecurity based deprivation will be linked with these movements which may be a major cause of strikes, road blockades, and conflict in the future.

The incidence of climate change is proving to be a major cause of food based insecurity in the region. Key informant interviews revealed that drought, hail storms, land-slides and floods are regular incidences which cause loss of land, production, human disability and in some cases even death of people. In Bajura, hailstorms in 1981, 1995 and 2009 caused heavy losses to agricultural production. People resigned to eating forest products, selling almost all of their jewellery and requested people of other districts for grain support as coping strategies.

In Kailali, floods and land slides destroyed 600 hectares of agricultural land and displaced 150 houses in 2007 (MOAC 2011). When displaced people resettled in the nearby forest, a huge conflict occurred between local residents and the displaced people. Resource scarcity in combination with population increase gave rise to tremendous competition and conflict regarding the use of water for production of food in the context of climate change. Marginal cultivators in the field said that there was water scarcity for them when there was drought and it was during that time that the local elite capture irrigation channels, making the situation worse. Also, there were conflicts pertaining to drinking water.

**Individual Well-being and Access to Food**
Lack of access to food is a long-term food insecurity problem in far-western regions because of inaccessibility due to poor road conditions and commutation constraints. As stated earlier, this region is historically food deficient in terms of self-sufficiency, which has led to people’s dependency on external means such as aid and public food distribution.

Government’s public food distribution through Nepal Food Corporation (NFC) and aid through World Food Programme (WFP) have been major sources of food provision in the region during critical times for the last 40 years. Access to food available through aid and public distribution, however depends upon access to social safety-nets, politics, information about quantity and price of food, social services, and education. It is also determined by how well people can convert their various financial, political, and other assets into food, whether distributed or purchased.
WFP has been distributing free rice to individuals who work for Planned Infrastructure Development Programme such as road construction, trail improvement, school building construction, and channel preparation. In the Cash for Work Intervention of the programme, daily wage is provided to individuals who work for the abovementioned construction activities. Similarly, Food for Education Programme is directed at improving the nutritional status, school enrollment and attendance of children, particularly girls, by providing a mid-day meal. Major limitation of this programme is that it provides seasonal work, which is only sufficient up to three months. Also, availability of this kind of food and work is highly influenced by political processes in the area. How people engage in the voting process, pressure groups and different wings of political parties, all determine allocation of food aid and whether the settlement area is eligible for allocation of aid or not.

NFC has been distributing food to the hilly and mountain area of the region, for which the government provides transport subsidies. The distribution of food through NFC is expensive because of the high cost of transport. It is estimated that the cost of transporting rice by air, for example, is almost four times the price of rice in the Terai (FAO and WFP 2007). The budget for subsidies severely limits the amount of food that NFC can supply. It is found from focus group discussion that NFC’s distribution of food to these areas amount to only 5-6% of the total deficit (Ibid.). Also, there is no system of fair distribution of food and heavy misuse of food has been witnessed over the years. The findings reveal that at least 25% of the NFC subsidised rice is misused for wine production and another 25% has been sold to influential people with the recommendations of political party leaders. In addition, NFC has failed to reach target groups like, women and Dalit in the region, as these groups have not been properly identified for support through the supply system.

Recently, the market has been supplying food because of construction of seasonal roads in some places. Access to market food depends upon economic infrastructure (wage and employment, household income and expenditure, food price) and physical infrastructure (road, transportation, house) (Mancusi-Materi 2000; Sahley et al. 2005). Economic accessibility to food is predicted to be a major issue in the region. Roads are predicted to be constructed by 2030 which may lead to people’s reliance on markets for purchase of food rather than the existing food distribution systems. The NFC is city focused and unable to fulfil the demands of local people. While aid is a short term mechanism, it is focusing on cash for work to support the construction of physical infrastructure.

However, the current trend of poverty reduction in the region shows that the number of poor people will increase dramatically in the future. Poverty causes food insecurity (Maxwell 1998; WFP and NPC 2010). The current rate of poverty reduction in far-western region shows that there will be 30% to 25% poor (1.25 million and 1.50 million people) by 2030 and 2050 respectively.
Table 3: Trends of Poverty and Income

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SN</th>
<th>Year/region</th>
<th>Household percentage below poverty line (head count index)</th>
<th>Per capita income (US$ dollar)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>FWR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>1994/95</td>
<td>41.8</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>2003/04</td>
<td>30.8</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>2010/11</td>
<td>25.16</td>
<td>45.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>2030/31</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>2050/51</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source:CBS (2005 and 2011) and author’s prediction based on trend analysis.

In this region, per capita income of the people is estimated to be 650 to 1225 US$ dollars by 2030 and 2050 respectively. The current trend of annual increase of per capita income in the region is 0.8%.

According to CBS (2011) poverty rate in the far-western region is more severe than that of the other regions of Nepal. The report shows that 45% of the total number of people living in the region are poor. The average poverty rate in the region is twice as much as the national average. More critically, percentage of poor people in the region is increasing with time. There were 41% of total poor living in the region in 2003-04, but the number has now increased to 45.61%. This trend shows that the poverty rate would increase in future with the purchasing power of the poor decreasing.

Access to food is also linked to income and wealth (Collier 1999; Lang 2002; FAO 2008). However, the trend of income in the region shows that there will be reduced income opportunities in future. Recent data shows that per capita income of people of far western region is US$ 201 per annum which is lower than other regions of Nepal (Table 3). The current scenario of employment opportunities shows that there will be no additional jobs that will increase per-capita income. Household survey shows that remittances from India contribute more than 90% of total income of households. It is currently a major source of income. Construction work such as roads, buildings and bridges also contribute 8% of total income of the households. Around 2% households generate income through cash crops such as vegetables and fruits. The study did not find any major investment setup in the area that could create employment opportunities for local people. However, some individuals from wealthier households may migrate to Gulf countries or Malaysia for work. Going to these countries for work is a major income opportunity for people in the region. However, this may widen the gap between rich and poor households because the poor are unable to invest to go to these countries, thus resigning to work in India.

Drèze and Sen (1989) have argued that the victims of food insecurity come from the class of agricultural labourers who are often primarily engaged in growing food. Similarly,
marginal groups in the study sites are also found to be engaged in wage labour. At present, 85% of the total households of Dalits in the hilly region and 70% of women members of Tharu community (indigenous people of flat-land area) in Fulbari VDC (Village Development Committee) are agricultural labourers. The informal wage system in the hilly and mountain area limits the choice of earning options due to scarcity of money. Nevertheless, in the study areas 90% of labour is forced to work unpaid due to scarcity of cash. In turn there are practices of labour exchange system called ‘Parma’\(^\text{11}\) which limits their income earning opportunities. In Terai, they are low paid workers and their wage rate has remained unchanged since the last five years. Also, there is a disparity between men and women in payment. Men earn up to twice as much as women for unskilled labour.

Higher price of food is and will be the major cause of food based vulnerability for the poor people in the region. Nepal Rastra Bank (NRB) (2008) shows that the poorest spend 60.7% of total expenditure on food, while the richest expend only 30%. Based on one estimate, people living in the mountain parts spend (on an average) more than 65% of their income on food, compared with the national average of 36.9% (FAO and WFP 2007). Focus group discussions revealed that in these parts there is 150% food price increase than an average price increase in far-western region. The current scenario of food price hike will sustain in the region because of low level of food production and purchasing power. The study reveals that the possibility of food being supplied to this region from Terai, which is a food surplus region of the country, is highly unlikely because the traders of the latter will get more benefit from doing business in other regions. In the case of far western region of Nepal, traders will get more price for their food if they sell it into other cities of Nepal, areas such as in Kathmandu and Pokhara. There are also some issues that high quality commodities from Terai region move to India and low quality rice and wheat remains. When food price is high, it absorbs a substantial part of the total income, making it difficult to access other required components such as housing, health care, and education.

Household survey data shows that people in the region expend their income on food, health, education and housing on priority basis. When the price of food will rise, they need to compromise their expenditure on these sectors. Ensuring higher education for the next generation is the single most important strategy for securing future entitlements. Evidence shows that many children of the poor households left their school because they could not afford food in the time of crisis. As a result, Central region of Nepal shows completion of higher secondary rates three times higher than the far western region. It is a regularised pattern among Dalits and the poor that most boys, just after reaching working age, accompany their fathers and go to India to find work. This may widen the

\(^{11}\) Parma is the labour exchange system during agricultural work in far-western region of Nepal. In this system, agricultural workers are hired for certain days in agricultural activities by some farmer. In turn, the farmer returns his/her labour later.
Educational gap between the poor and the rich because the latter get the opportunity to educate their children in private schools.

Consumption Patterns and Personal Safety

The far-western development regions of the country have the highest percentage of people with very poor food consumption patterns. Household survey data shows that 40% of total households have very poor food consumption patterns. Generally, they consume maize and wheat on a daily basis, complemented by rice, barley and tubers. However, the poor have access and can afford maize only for their everyday consumption. The high caste people who rear livestock have opportunity to drink milk. The study finds that consumption of milk among low caste groups is very low because there is a cultural practice that the high caste people do not give milk to the lower caste. Moreover, very few households from the low caste groups rear buffalos and cows.

Unequal consumption pattern among different caste/economic groups is predicted to become a major consumption issue in the future. Because of construction of roads and establishment of markets, number of meat shops will increase near the roads. Also, the promotion of fruit farming would be promoted. So, the consumption of meat and fruits could increase. However, actual consumption will depend upon affordability.

Per capita mean dietary energy requirements will remain under fulfilled due to less production and dependency on the market on the condition of lower purchasing power and the quality food availability will be very difficult for the people living in the region. Food consumption based personal safety is also expected to become a major security issue. Consumption is a better proxy for well-being as the actual consumption measures a person’s well-being in terms of meeting current basic needs (CBS 2011). Quality of food is an essential part of food security (Maxwell 1988) and availability of necessary nutrients is fundamental for stable and enduring social order (Hopkins 1986, p. 4). Per capita mean dietary energy consumption in the region is 2250 kcal which is lowest consumption in comparison with the other regions of Nepal, while the number stands at an estimated 2405 kcal/per person/day at the national level.

Women in the region consume less nutrient-rich foods (MOHP 2011). 24% of Nepalese women who have low body mass index are from the far western region which indicates a serious public health problem (WFP and NPC 2010). Approximately 70% of the women of child bearing age are anaemic. Because of poor maternal health and nutrition, 27% of new-borns have low birth weights. There is a high level of malnutrition in the far-western regions, where generally more than 60% of children are stunted and 50% are underweight (FAO and WFP 2007). Household practices such as women eating left over and in the end (Harriss 1993; Shively et al. 2011) are still ongoing in the study sites particularly in resource poor households. In the area, the youngest daughter in-law is responsible to serve food at home, while she herself is the last one to eat. Her portion is decided by the rest of the household’s appetite and arrival of unannounced guests.
Food discrimination is related to resource scarcity; there are two types of foods prepared during food scarcity period. One type is made from fine grains which are for parents and sons and other type is made with coarse grains which are for daughter-in-laws and daughters. During the agricultural season, landlords give *chapatti*\(^{12}\) of wheat if the wage labourer is male, while he gives *chapatti* of millet if the worker is female. In general, staple foods, such as rice, lentils, and bread are fairly evenly distributed across gender lines, but prestigious foods rich in micronutrients, such as vegetables, yogurt, ghee, and meat, are allocated preferentially for adult males only (Shively et al. 2011). The study also revealed that women were discriminated against during menstruation, pregnancy and breast feeding, essentially at the time when they need nutritious food. They are treated as an untouchable individual during menstruation and not allowed to consume milk, curd, or even cooked food. Birthing mothers also face discrimination, besides being deprived of meat, fish, milk, and curd (in Hindu caste groups) after 12 days of delivery. The sex of the child also dictates a female’s treatment, if the woman gives birth to a son then her husband and father in-law perform a ceremony by slaughtering a goat and providing enough food for the mother, but if she gives birth to a daughter, they neglect her and give her *chapatti* of millet. Moreover, male babies are breast-fed for longer duration (10 months) than female babies. The study based on analysis of increasing trends of awareness among mothers, however, forecasts that these practices are expected to diminish completely by 2030.

This discriminatory attitude towards women during pregnancy is not found in *Tharu* community. There is also an equal distribution of food during menstruation. The study reveals that in more than 50% of houses particularly in *Dalit* and poor groups there is a practice of eating food residue left by the husband. As most of the *Dalit* women work in agriculture sector as wage labour, for them there is no designated time to eat which also obliges them to eat last. On the other hand, high caste *thakuri* women who work in government and non-government offices, have to eat food on time just so they can show up at work on time.

Study further sheds light on food poisoning due to contamination in drinking water, which is a major health issue in the region. People lack safe drinking water, as 90% of households use public water sources such as stone well, and pipe taps as the main source of water. They use direct water without any purification. Access to health services is not readily available. The nearest health post in the area is one hour away on foot. The health conditions are affected by a lack of access to proper toilets and sanitation facilities in the region as 70% of households do not have any toilet facility.

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\(^{12}\) Pin role wheat bread.
Conclusion and Recommendations

The study shows that the current state and trends of food availability, access and consumption in the far-western region of Nepal will escalate fear of being hungry, resource insecurity, individual well-being and personal safety. It may also nurture wider socio-political unrest at local and national level.

The paper recommends effective inter-regional food distribution, a climate change adaptive agriculture system, market ration system, and alternative livelihoods opportunities for the marginal groups to increase their food purchasing power to counter the predicted situation in the far-western region of Nepal.

Inter-regional food distribution is important for far-western region of Nepal. It is a general assumption that food will move from surplus areas to deficient areas. But that does not seem to be the case in the region. Government needs to structure policies that can provide incentives, particularly to the market, so food supply can be provided to such areas.

To deal with the climate change incidences, it is necessary to deliver direct interventions applicable to the marginal / small cultivators because their food security becomes more vulnerable due to climate change.

The role of the public sector appears to be shrinking in the region, while the private sectors have gained importance over time. On the other hand, the role of government also needs to increase by which the access of insecure people to food markets can improve. In this situation, food ration schemes can provide better access to low income groups.

Poor people need non-farm and non-land based alternative livelihood opportunities through which they can increase their income in a sustainable way. Government needs to invest more in peoples’ skills, which could be beneficial to them in the long-run. There is a potential of increasing income of marginal people through tourism, micro-hydro and non-timber forest based enterprise establishment.
Hunger Breeds Human Insecurity: Case Study of Far-western Region of Nepal

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## Section 5
Religious Freedom: Issues, Challenges and Prospects

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Religious Freedom in Pakistan: Alternative Futures

Yunas Samad

Abstract
Charles Taylor (1994) argues that the failure to recognise difference causes harm, and recognition of difference is necessary to create a just society. John Rawls (1991) concept of justice premises Kymlicka’s (1995) theoretical formulation on multiculturalism. While his focus is primarily language groups, the principle of recognition and how they are accommodated within multicultural federations is something that resonates with issues of religious accommodation in pluralistic societies. Irna Young (1997), however, suggests that that there is an imbrication of culture and economy and this point is repeated by Amartya Sen (2006) arguing that class accentuates cultural differences. In recent debates, multiculturalism has been critiqued that the celebration of difference has resulted in creating segregated societies where communications and interactions between different groups are minimal. To counter these negative affects alternative theorization based on cultural capital theory emphasise intergroup engagement to foster inter-community harmony (Samad 2013).

Religious minorities in Pakistan suffer from inter-religious and intra-religious discrimination, disadvantage and violence. When the drivers of discrimination and disadvantage of religious minorities in Pakistan are considered, besides inequality which has a wide impact on all demotic groups, religious minorities are subject to inequalities and restraints that flow overtly and implicitly from legislation and state policies as well as discriminatory practises and behaviours from civil society (Samad 2011). As said earlier, debates around the management of difference in multicultural and multi-ethnic society raises issues of justice at the level of principle and social cohesion on the pragmatic level. Injustices to religious minorities in Pakistan are also indicative of injustices to other forms of minorities and women and violence is a common corollary. Reforms can be minimalist legislation and policies are tinkered with to remove the obvious excesses. Tinkering with Islamic legislation and state policies, an important driver of religious injustice, may deal with some of the overt forms of discrimination resulting in some arrangement equivalent to a modern millat (nation) system where religious minorities are unequal, autonomous, self-regulated communities, but the authority to regulate lies in the hand of the religious leadership (Modood 2007) paralleling a similar arrangement within the majority community.

However, it raises the question whether it is desirable for communities to be only constituted on religious terms and exclusively regulated by religious leadership. It does nothing for dissenterers within communities or sectarianism and fails to engage with other forms of difference based on language for instance, which has been so problematic in Pakistan’s history. A maximalist approach would be more radical in repealing discriminatory legislation and policies, adopt a stance of equality to all religions and adopt legislation that proscribes discrimination on the grounds of religion and foster inter-community dialogue in the pursuit of religious harmony. The maximalist approach would easily accommodate ethnic and gender discrimination and move Pakistan towards building a just society and developing inter-cultural harmony. It should not be confused with secularism as there are examples of multicultural societies, such as the UK, that formally privilege a particular faith but proscribe religious discrimination.

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1 This chapter has been approved as a perspective essay by the referee.
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**Introduction**

Pakistan appears to be in a state of religious discord with cases of bigotry, discrimination and violence erupting with regularity. Discrimination of religious minorities, Shias, Christians, Hindus, and Ahmadiyyas occur with such predictability that it quite often does not even get mentioned in the media. Religious violence of all forms has also become more frequent and ranges from inter-religious to sectarianism and quite often is linked to militancy and events in Afghanistan. How can Pakistan become a society where there is justice and fairness for religious minorities and what future scenarios of reforms would achieve this? This paper reflects first on the principles of a just society and how multiculturalism, social policy that is based on the recognition of group rights for cultural minorities, can address issues of fairness and justice. It then reflects on the drivers of discrimination and disadvantages for religious minorities with particular focus on legislation and its impact. The paper then considers two scenarios: one of reform of the existing legislative framework and the implication for this process. It then reflects on a more radical approach, which combines repeal of legislation considered to be discriminatory along with new legislation to tackle prejudice and discrimination.

**Principles of a Just Society**

Rawls stated in *A Theory of Justice* (1991) and reaffirmed in *Justice as Fairness: A Restatement* (2001) his conception of justice, which was a principled reconciliation of liberty and equality. These principles are a single inclusive package, *justice as fairness* and don’t function individually and are applied to maximise the prospects of the least well off. For Rawls the first principle of ‘justice’ is that *‘each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others’* (Rawls 1991, p.53). The second principle, which introduces the idea of distributive justice, states that socio-economic inequalities should be organised so that they are to the maximum benefit of the least advantaged and *‘offices and positions’ are accessible to all under conditions of ‘fair equality of opportunity’* (Rawls 1991, p.206). This first principle may not be violated for the sake of the second principle but there may be trade-offs to obtain the largest possible system of rights. For Rawls, the *‘fair equality of opportunity’* principle has precedence over the *‘difference principle’*: society cannot organise inequalities to enlarge the share of the marginalised and disadvantaged without allowing entry to offices of power and position. This principle upholds that the individual should not only have rights and opportunities to *‘offices and positions’*, equality of access to educational and employment opportunities, but should have equal chances with those of similar abilities. Hence *‘offices and positions’* should be open to individuals regardless of difference whether in terms of class, gender ethnicity or religion (Freeman 2012; Arneson 2008). The *‘difference principle’* governs inequalities permitting only disparities and disadvantage that benefits the marginalised. This is an inversion of the trickle down economic theory as here society is organised such that wealth ‘diffuses up’ allowing the most beleaguered in society a fair deal compensating for naturally occurring inequalities (Freeman 2012).
Communitarians’ critique Rawls’ liberal political theory for giving priority to individual entitlements and freedoms over group rights and collective goods and refute that the individual is prior to the community. By embracing ontological holism, where social goods are ‘irreducibly social’, Charles Taylor argues for a normative case for a multicultural ‘politics of recognition’ based on collective identities and cultures (Taylor 1992, 1995) and where cultural and linguistic difference are irreducibly social goods of apparent equal value. Consequently, the recognition of equal worth of cultural difference necessitates supplanting the established liberal convention of ‘identical liberties and opportunities for all citizens’ with an arrangement of group rights for cultural minorities.

The politics of identity is about codifying the procedural and substantive principles for organising multicultural societies (Taylor 1994, p.7). Identity politics is shaped by its recognition, its absence or misrecognition. Absence of recognition or misrecognition of difference fuels oppression and harm and thus sets the stage for identity politics to redress the position (Taylor 1994). Taylor argues that the failure to recognise difference or its misrecognition causes harm and recognition of difference is necessary to create a just society.

Multicultural Citizenship

Both of these philosophical premises, the concept of ‘justice and fairness’ and the recognition of difference, underpins Will Kymlicka’s Multicultural Citizenship (1995) which formulates a multicultural society that benefits the worst-off rather than the best-off (Modood 2007; Young 2006). His formulations on multiculturalism engage with liberal values of ‘autonomy and equality’ but link it with communitarian concepts of group rights and cultural difference (Kymlicka 1995, 2001). Culture is essential for enabling individual autonomy; provide contexts for choice, and make meaningful the social discourses and narratives from which people fashion their lives (Appiah 2005). Second, culture is instrumentally valuable for individual self-respect and there is connection between a person’s self-worth and the respect accorded to the cultural group to which one belongs to that must be protected because of the difficulty in surrendering group identity. Thus, inequalities and disadvantage in accessing their own culture, in contrast to the members of the dominant culture, cultural minorities can make demands on society for the accommodation of difference. Kymlicka argues that rectifying for ‘unchosen’ inequalities through minority-group rights is defensible within liberal egalitarian theory (1995). This makes Kymlicka’s argument very relevant to countries like Pakistan, where communities are more important than individuals, because of his emphasis on group rights and cultural differences and how to address inequalities between dominant groups and cultural minorities.

While Kymlicka’s focus is primarily language groups, the principle of recognition and how they are accommodated within multicultural societies is something that resonates with issues of religious accommodation and also applies to gender difference. He suggests that group-rights is consistent with liberalism and identifies three group-specific rights: self-governance rights for indigenous people and national minorities, group
representation rights such as affirmative action policies and poly-ethnic rights for immigrants, which include temporary measures to facilitate integration and the last two may apply to religious minorities (Kymlicka 1995). There is an imbrication of culture, economy and class that accentuates cultural differences (Sen 2006) and cultural and linguistic minorities may be disadvantaged in economic and political terms in relation to the dominant cultural community. Hence, anti-discrimination legislation for cultural minorities on its own is inadequate and falls short in treating cultural minorities as equal as the states cannot be neutral in relation to culture. In pluralist societies, some cultural groups are recipients of state support over others, which has a normalizing effect valuing the language and culture of those groups over others. Thus, multicultural theorists contend that positive adjustments must accompany any discrimination laws (Kymlicka 1995).

These concepts are not alien to the sub-continent as group rights were afforded to Muslims, Sikhs, non-Brahmins and Marathas through the Communal Award. It gave Muslims separate electorates and weightage in the federal government and was embodied in India Act of 1935, which forms the basis of Pakistan’s various constitutions (Samad 1995, p.17). Group rights for linguistic minorities are imperfectly reflected, in that language groups and provinces do not coincide, in the federal quota policies that establish provincial/regional quotas for recruitment into the civil service (Kennedy 1991). Reserved seats were first introduced for women in the 1962 Constitution promulgated by Ayub Khan and were a feature of the national assemblies until the 1980s. They were reintroduced in 2002 for the local government. At present, there are 60 seats in the National Assembly and 17 in the Senate reserved for women and furthermore there are 10 seats for religious minorities (Krook 2009; UNDP n.d.). However, while there are examples of positive discrimination policies, there are no anti-discrimination policies in Pakistan and both are required when framing a multicultural strategy.

Social Cohesion
In recent debates, multiculturalism has been critiqued, politically, that the celebration of difference has resulted in creating segregated societies where communications and interactions between different groups are minimal. Multiculturalism primarily has been heavily critiqued in Europe, while in Canada and Australia it is still hailed as a major success. Among Muslims, the largest religious minority in the European Union, the European debate is heavily marked by rising insecurities from globalization, anti-immigration rhetoric, rising Islamophobia and the concern with riots and terrorism. Thus, here, multiculturalism becomes the whipping boy; too much diversity is considered to be dangerous and a threat to national solidarity, the social fabric, and prosperity of the country. There is a need to hold onto core national values, norms and common perceptions. It seems that the concern with too much diversity is irrespective of whether cultural difference and group rights were recognised or not. In France, there is no recognition of ethnic diversity and cultural difference and equality and anti-discriminatory legislation is an anathema to Republican universalism; while in Germany
citizenship is difficult to acquire, no religious statistics are collated and cultural minorities do not have self-representation.

Discussions around community cohesion are associated, and also overlap, with ideas of cultural capital, common identity and values, social order and social control and conflict reduction. These ideas are condensed and fed into processes which if, exploited positively or harnessed will foster the development of a harmonious society where all groups have a sense of belonging, participation, inclusion, recognition and legitimacy (Jenson 1998; Samad and Sen 2007). This alternative theorization based on cultural capital theory emphasises intergroup engagement to foster inter-community harmony which has been incorporated into multicultural strategies. Thus, policies that encourage inter-community dialogues have been amalgamated into existing legislation and procedures designed to engage discrimination and disadvantage. The shift in policy is placing greater emphasis on social cohesion but retain policies recognising difference and equality of opportunity (Samad 2013).

**Religious Minorities and Islamisation**

Religious minorities in Pakistan suffer from inter-religious and intra-religious discrimination, disadvantage and violence. When the drivers of discrimination and disadvantages for religious minorities in Pakistan are considered, besides inequality which has a wide impact on all demotic groups, religious minorities are subject to inequalities and discrimination that flow overtly and implicitly from legislation and state policies amplifying prejudice, practises and behaviours from civil society. Islamisation marked a major turn in Pakistan history designed to generate support for the military regime, prevent the Pakistan Peoples’ Party (PPP) from returning to power and provided vital manpower for the intervention against the Soviets in Afghanistan. However, Islamisation process was driven by pragmatism and the ‘secular elite’ remained in control and the ulema (religious scholars) provided legitimacy without real authority. Islamisation was partial and applied in a highly instrumental and pragmatic manner to areas of society where it would have minimal disruptive impact on General Zia’s military and political objectives. Religious leaders, particularly those of the Deobandi persuasion, were incorporated to give legitimacy to the regime and widen support but important levers of power remained exclusively with the military-bureaucratic oligarchy. The process was only partial and was never considered even by its supporters to be a complete introduction of the shariat (Islamic law), but the religious groups saw this as moving in the right direction as they supported both his internal and external objectives. The Islamic parties’ influence in electoral terms was marginal as they lacked concentration of supporters in specific constituencies, however, Islamisation and jihad gave their supporters a greater sense of legitimacy and self-appointed authority to regulate society and impose their understanding and norms. It also gave them access to resources, local, national and international, particularly from Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States, resulting in an enormous proliferation of Islamic institutions and the emergence of a transnational Islamic network linking groups primarily in Pakistan, Afghanistan and
Kashmir but also in Central Asia, the Middle East, South East Asia and further afield. Islamic social justice proved to be ineffective in dealing with poverty, and several sections of society, women, Shias, Ahmadiyyas, Christians and Hindus considered these processes to be discriminatory and prejudicial. Top-down Islamisation in Pakistan interacted with grassroots activism invigorated by their deployment in proxy wars, first in Afghanistan and then later in Kashmir, and combined with transnational processes to produce a plethora of religious organisations, which were relatively independent of the authorities. With their coffers full of Saudi and Gulf donations, and links originally established during the Afghan jihad (holy war), they expanded vigorously into the social sphere, an area neglected by the government, winning new recruits. Their influence among demotic groups increased because of the lack of social opportunity, particularly in education, and the expansion of the madrassa (religious schools) networks and various charitable activities (Samad 2011).

The Islamisation process raised a very fundamental question around legitimacy and who is a Muslim and what position Muslims and non-Muslims have in the state. The process brought into sharp relief differences between the Sunni claims of a universal Islam that was rejected by Shias who saw it as a threat to their religious beliefs. Zia’s Islamisation was heavily influenced by the Jamat-i-Islami interpretation of an Islamic state and when he made Hanafi jurisprudence obligatory for members of all sects, it was rejected by Shias and their representative resigned from the Council of Islamic Ideology in protest and launched a political party to campaign for their rights. It exposed a contradiction of the Islamisation process as Shias based their opposition on the constitutional guarantees for sectarian interpretation (Zaman 2002, p.155-7).

Shias called on the government to let each sect be governed by its own interpretation of the Quran and Sunnah (teaching of Prophet Muhammad PBUH), and demanded religious freedom and unhindered observance of Muharram. While normally concessions were made to Shias, the security Establishment saw them as a threat promoting the interest of Iran. Sunni madrassas (religious schools), organisations and groups were encouraged particularly along the Pak-Afghan border and in localities such as Gilgit and Baltistan where Shias were numerically predominant. The consequence was an escalation of sectarian violence, which during the 1990s threatened to spiral out of control. Thus, there are clear links between Islamisation, proxy wars in Afghanistan and Kashmir, and sectarianism in Pakistan. State policy accentuated violence had a damaging impact on the fabric of society with a rapid increase in sectarian violence (Samad 2011).

The original question, who is a Muslim, was implicit in the anti-Ahmadiyya agitation of 1953 and the movement of 1974 which led to the Ahmadiyya being declared non-Muslims. The question became explicit during the Munir Inquiry into the anti-Ahmadiyya agitation of the 1950s when the Chief Justice Munir asked the ulema (religious scholars), who were united in that Ahmadiyyas were not Muslims, to define who is a Muslim and their inability to reach a consensus undermined their demands
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(Munir and Kiyani 1954). However, under Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s direction Parliament introduced Articles 260(3)(a) and (b), which defined the term ‘Muslim’ in the Pakistani context and listed groups that were, legally speaking, non-Muslim, which effectively declared Ahmadiyyas to be non-Muslims.

General Zia-ul-Haq’s Islamisation policy exacerbated the situation, in particular the laws pertaining to Ahmadiyyas, the blasphemy laws and separate electorates. In 1984, Zia-ul-Haq’s military regime issued an anti-Ahmadiyya Ordinance (Ordinance XX), which added S.298–B and S.298–C to the Pakistan Penal Code. Section 298–B and 298–C of the Penal Code, which prohibited Ahmadiyyas from calling themselves Muslims and banned Ahmadiyyas from using Islamic terminology, such as Islamic greetings and praying, and prohibited them from propagating their faith at the cost of a three-year prison sentence and a fine (Samad 2011).

Other groups that were adversely affected were Christians and Hindus. There is strong evidence to suggest that institutional discrimination against religious minorities by state bodies, in particularly the police, is quite common. Minority complaints are not taken seriously or are ignored because of prejudice and fear of sectarian groups who vigorously retaliate against those they perceive to be against them. Courts routinely fail to protect the rights of religious minorities. Judges are pressured to take strong action against any perceived offence to Sunni orthodoxy. The judiciary rarely hears discrimination cases dealing with religious minorities. This situation was exacerbated when in 1986 General Zia’s government inserted Section 295(c) into the Penal Code, which stipulates the death penalty for blaspheming the Prophet Muhammad (Peace Be Upon Him). In 1990, Nawaz Sharif’s government introduced the Blasphemy Law, whereby insults to the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) were a criminal offence for which the death sentence was mandatory. The Blasphemy Law was used by sectarian Muslims to turn personal rivalries into religious disputes. Christians, Hindus and Ahmadiyyas are particularly victimized by this particular law as lower courts often do not require adequate evidence in such cases, leading to some accused and convicted persons spending years in jail before higher courts eventually overturned their convictions or ordered them free. Trial courts usually deny bail in blasphemy cases, claiming that since defendants face the death penalty, they were likely to flee. Many defendants appeal against the denial of bail, but bail is often not granted in advance of the trial. Lower courts frequently delay decisions, are intimidated, and refuse bail for fear of reprisal from extremist elements. Under the rule of General Musharraf, attempts were again made to repeal the Blasphemy Laws, however, the military government backed down on repealing or substantially modifying the anti-blasphemy laws, demonstrating its unwillingness or inability to secure minority protection. But it did bring about minor procedural changes to the anti-blasphemy laws whereby only senior police officers could investigate such complaints (Samad 2011).

Two other issues also concerned religious minorities -- one was the abduction of women from religious minorities and separate electorates. Women of religious minorities who
were kidnapped and raped received little legal protection or redress because the courts often accepted that if an abducted woman converted to Islam, her marriage in her previous faith was void and therefore she could not be returned to her non-Muslim family. This became a license for abductors and rapists to argue that the woman had converted and therefore should not be returned. The other issue was separate electorates, which meant that they could only vote for candidates from their religion and Muslim candidates could ignore the significant presence of a minority in their constituencies, but after much lobbying by religious minorities joint electorates were reintroduced in 2002. Notwithstanding the promise of reintroducing joint electorates, the system of separate electorates was used in the local elections held in August/September 2005 and also in the national elections of 2008 (Samad 2011).

Reforms

Minimalist Approach

Debates around the management of difference in a plural society, raises issues of justice and fairness for cultural minorities on the basis of principle and social cohesion at the pragmatic level. Injustices to religious minorities in Pakistan are also indicative of injustices to other forms of minorities, such as language groups, women and violence is a common corollary. Reforms can be minimalist in nature with the present legislation and policies tinkered with to remove the obvious excesses.

Amending Islamic legislation and state policies, an important driver of religious injustice, may deal with some of the overt forms of discrimination. For example, the Blasphemy Law could be applied to all religions equally and could be used to prosecute Muslims, as well, if they blaspheme non-Muslims. It may then make Muslims reflect on whether blasphemy should have a mandatory death sentence. At present, Islamic personal law is applied to all communities but religious minorities could be regulated by their own personal law and it could be complemented by an arrangement of separate electorates, thus, ensuring religious minority representation at the local, provincial and national level. This would result in some arrangement equivalent to a modern millat (nation) system (Modood 2007) where religious minorities are unequal, autonomous, self-regulated communities with the authority to regulate in the hand of religious leadership. However, this would reinforce the idea that religious minorities are unequal citizens with less rights than Muslims, a concept incompatible with a just society, regulated by their religious leadership and generate demand for a similar arrangement within the majority community that they should also be regulated by their religious leadership. This raises the question whether it is desirable for communities to be only constituted on religious terms and exclusively regulated by their religious leadership. Conceding such entitlements to religious communities reinforces the authority and interest of conservative elites at the expense of dissenters in the group. It raises the question of minorities within minorities by building biases and predispositions that favour those elites wanting to maintain the traditional status quo, hierarchy of domination and subordination and integrity of the
community through intolerance to dissension, nonconformity and demands for reform (Kymlicka 1995). Furthermore, this approach does nothing for sectarianism, discrimination, the security establishment proclivity for promoting militancy and prejudice and fails to engage with other forms of difference based on language for instance, which has been so problematic in Pakistan’s history.

Maximalist Approach
Simply recognising difference is not enough for a just society, as it needs to engage with discrimination and disadvantage through equality legislation and positive discrimination. A maximalist approach, grounded on the assumption that all citizens are equal irrespective of their cultural diversity, adopts a stance of equality for all religions, is the only way forward for a just society. Radically it would repeal discriminatory legislation and policies such as, Islamic legislation that promotes a particular version of the faith, the Blasphemy Laws and would allow religious minorities to define themselves and not have their faith and identity ascribed by the state. The removal of legislation on its own would not be enough to disconnect militancy from the security Establishment. This would require a change in policy, which perhaps could develop if supporting sectarian activity was proscribed. Repeal and reform would remove the sense of legitimacy that has been used to justify the action of Islamic militants against religious minorities. To combat prejudice and discrimination, a multicultural approach would adopt legislation that proscribes discrimination and hatred on the grounds of religion or for that matter on ethnicity or gender and foster and introduce positive discrimination policies in education and employment for disadvantaged groups as well as develop inter-community dialogue in the pursuit of religious harmony. It assumes religious minorities can fully participate in the political process on the basis of joint electorates and are equal citizens in all respects. Multiculturalism would accommodate religious differences and also ethnic and gender differences and move Pakistan towards building a just and fair society and develop inter-cultural harmony.

This should not be confused with secularism, as there are examples of multicultural societies, such as the UK, that formally privilege a particular faith but proscribe religious and ethnic discrimination and explicitly secular society such as France where cultural difference and in particular religious difference is not recognised and it is proscribed to collect data on cultural difference. Without such data it is impossible for society to introduce anti-discriminatory legislation for cultural minorities.

Conclusion
This paper investigates the principles of a just and fair society and why cultural groups should be recognised in a multicultural society. It demonstrates that group rights is a relevant concept for Pakistan and is grounded in its history and applied in relation to language and gender. It then reflects on the drivers of discrimination within the Pakistan contexts and highlights particular issues that have vexed and caused grievances for religious minorities. It then evaluates two different scenarios by which justice and
fairness for religious minorities may be achieved. It considers a minimalist approach, which basically reforms the present legislative framework by introducing parity between different religious groups. Thus, for example, the notorious Blasphemy Laws would apply to all religions and the defilement, desecration and sacrilege of religious minorities by Muslims would be a punishable offence. However, this approach would enshrine unequal rights for non-Muslim citizens, constitute them as religious minorities regulated by tradition minded religious elites that are implacably opposed to dissent and reform. On the level of principle, this approach is not compatible with ‘justice as fairness’ by failing to address equality for cultural groups and treats them as unequal citizens. On the pragmatic level, it does nothing to address the issue of sectarianism as a driver for this development originates with the privileging of one sect over another.

To build a just society where cultural groups are not only treated equally but disadvantage and discrimination is addressed requires a much bolder approach. It first requires the dismantling of discriminatory legislation, the Islamic legislation that privileges a particular sect and provides the framework of legitimacy for some Islamic militants. Failure to recognise cultural difference and misrecognition cause harm; thus, religious minorities need to have the freedom to constitute their identity as they please and legislation that implicitly ascribes non-Muslim status to groups would also be incompatible with this approach. Furthermore, by allowing cultural groups to constitute themselves as they please would allow for dissension and reform within cultural groups. To recognise group identity on its own is not enough in dealing with issues of equality and fairness. To do this, equality legislation needs to be implemented premised on the principle that all citizens are equal, which needs to provide a legislative framework that addresses discrimination and disadvantage of religious minorities with positive discrimination in education and employment. Hence, a multicultural approach that addresses issues of equality combined with inter-community dialogue would address issues of discrimination and disadvantage for religious minorities. While the focus of this paper is rights for religious minorities, the multicultural approach for group rights for cultural minorities is applicable to linguistic minorities and women and therefore would open up the equality debate to a much wider audience than simply religious minorities and make justice and fairness agenda for all.
References


Despite Differences: Narratives of Interfaith Cordiality in Pakistan
Imdad Hussain

Abstract
In Pakistan, the discursive space on interfaith coexistence is dominated by accounts of violence and enmity. As a result, the non-violent acts of members of all faiths and sects remain under-represented. I call this despair scholarship. We know a great deal about religious and sectarian violence, but little about the cordiality: peace, friendships, warmth, and respect between followers of various religions, sects and faiths living in Pakistan from ancient to modern times.

The poetic works of Sufi poets such as Baba Fareed (1173-1266), Lal Shahbaz Qalandar (1177–1274), Guru Nanak (1469-1539), Shah Hussain (1538–1599), Mian Mir (1550-1635), Bulleh Shah (1680-1757), and Sachal Sarmast (1739–1829), still act as promoters of cordiality, i.e. peace, friendship, warmth, and respect between various inhabitants of Pakistan irrespective of sect, faith and religion. A visit to the shrine of these saints illustrates this assertion.

No doubt, Pakistan is not violence free, yet practices of cordiality remain strong here, which needs to be showcased. Just as focus on violence helps us understand violence, a focus on peace helps us comprehend peace. This paper focuses on peace by sharing incidents of cordiality among people belonging to various faiths and sects in Pakistan. The purpose is to strengthen ordinary people’s initiatives of peace. Based on findings from this research, it is suggested that the federal and provincial governments, academicians, interfaith activists and religious scholars should highlight and celebrate practices of peace besides highlighting and condemning violence.

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1 This chapter has been approved as a research report by the referee.
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History says, Don’t hope on this side of the grave.
But then, once in a lifetime
the longed for tidal wave
of justice can rise up,
and hope and history rhyme.

---Seamus Heaney (from *The Cure at Troy*, 1990, p. 53)

**My Inspiration**
Three stories, among many, I collected in 2011 during my research on interfaith harmony across Pakistan, inspired me to write this paper.

*My first story comes from Rajanpur, Punjab:* In 2010, a city-wide campaign was launched by some Deobandi *ulema* (religious scholar), falsely declaring District Officer (DO), Excise and Taxation, Rajanpur, an Ahmadi and demanding his removal from the service. According to local narratives, Rajanpur city had not witnessed anti-Ahmadi violence. The very act of demanding DO’s removal on a baseless charge could have served as an entry point for a city-wide anti-Ahmadi campaign. Arshad Gilani, a self-motivated activist, looked into the matter along with his friends and found that DO’s subordinates, in connivance with *ulema*, manufactured a campaign against their boss to seek revenge. Gilani and his friends simultaneously talked to their other friends, senior Deobandi *ulema*, and district administration, exposing the anti-Ahmadi plan designed not only to remove DO from his job, but to promote enmity between Muslims and Ahmadis of Rajanpur city. As a result of Gilani’s mediation, the campaign stopped, the enmity promoters were reprimanded by the district administration, and the bigoted plan failed. A future strategy was designed to prevent bigoted campaigns.

*My second story comes from Khanewal, Punjab:* While picking cotton, female Muslim cotton-pickers found pages of the Holy Quran lying on the ground of the fields of Allah Rakha Chaudhary, a Christian landlord of Chak No. 33, Tehsil Mian Channu in Khanewal. Chak 33 is a settlement of Christians. Before this news could spread, Allah Rakha briefed a local activist, Naeem, who contacted his friend Masood Chohan and their other friends. Chohan immediately talked to the District Police Officer and apprised him about the situation. Chohan, his friends, and the police jointly investigated the matter and found that the act of putting pages of Holy Quran in the cotton field was done on purpose by some Muslims. Based on their findings, Chohan and his friends assured the safety of Chak No. 33. They also made arrangements to expose the perpetrators. The police played a very constructive role by denying registering a false case against Allah Rakha. With timely mediation, a whole village was saved from getting torched.
My third story also comes from Khanewal, Punjab: Imtiaz Asad, a journalist, was informed of the presence of some pages of the Holy Quran in a street dump in Shalimar town. The people of the area immediately accused an illiterate, female Christian sanitary worker of blasphemy. Within half an hour, Asad was in Shalimar town. By then, no journalists were informed of the incident and the news had not reached the thousands of people in Khanewal. Asad investigated the matter and found that the Christian woman was not at fault. In fact, the household she worked with had mistakenly put the pages from the Holy Quran in the garbage. Later, some pages were found in the garbage, which were still lying in the household. Asad briefed the District Coordination Officer immediately who dispatched police. In the meantime, local Muslims started gathering and some of them were very angry. The police told the gatherers about the innocence of the Christian woman. Meanwhile, the Muslim family, who had mistakenly put the holy pages in their garbage, fled their home. However, the police registered a case against them. In a few days, the family was arrested. Highly remorseful of their negligence, they sought forgiveness and mercy. Again, Asad brought local ulema together to find mercy for the family. The ulema gave a fatwa (religious declaration) demanding they seek Allah’s forgiveness and give charity. The fatwa was instrumental in withdrawing the case against them.

These ordinary events could have had extraordinary consequences had the self-motivated individuals not mediated for peace. Three activists, Arshad Gilani, Masood Chohan, and Imtiaz Asad, proactively played critical roles to support non-Muslims against Muslims. All three stories indicate that the enmity producing and bigoted campaigns were either fabricated or a result of human negligence. These and other similar stories tell that the causes of many acts of violence against non-Muslims may not be religious. Religion may be used to settle secular disputes. This means that it is primarily the misuse of religion for revenge seeking, which is increasing in Pakistani society and it should not be confused with religious bigotry. Religious bigotry should be studied on its own.

Downplaying of Hope

If we only study despair, we tend to deny possibilities of hope. Sometimes we do not see objects, rather our own habits. American-French writer, Nin rightly observed that ‘We don’t see things as they are; we see them as we are’ (1969, p. 220). Nin stated this about human beings in general. But trained researchers may also choose to see the real world in the light of their ideologies. A number of scholars may consume their lives presenting their beliefs as empirical realities. Some of the self-fulfilling tendencies of scholarly myopia have been highlighted in the social science literature. Nils Gilman (2003), for example, has rigorously identified the errors committed by modernization thinkers in developing countries according to their beliefs. Gilman is not alone: there are many others who have deconstructed habits of the human mind which create myopia (Berger and Luckmann 1966; Boswell 2009; Bouwmeester 2010).
West (2001, p.120) suggests that our perspective influences not only our understanding, but our actions. If we believe that belonging to a minority religion is equal to being oppressed and belonging to a majority religion is equal to being the oppressor, we will end up seeing minorities as oppressed. If we believe that religious politics is always fundamental and violent, we will unquestioningly label all violence expressed in religious terms as religious violence even when the violent acts are motivated by purely non-religious causes. Our perspective imprisons us in its boundaries.

I was also myopic till I spent a lot of time with Muslims and non-Muslims. In these interactions, I found possibilities of hope—material and discursive—and non-violence in Pakistan. Inspired by this hope, I decided to highlight the narratives of friendships, intimacies, and connections of the ordinary Muslims and non-Muslims. I believe we can extend this cordiality among the people of all faiths in Pakistan by supporting peoples’ ways of nurturing peace. A large part of my decision to highlight narratives of cordiality was determined by the fact that the discursive space on interfaith harmony is dominated by the narratives of violence. As a result, we know a lot about violence against people of minority religions but know little about interfaith cordiality: love, peace, friendship, warmth, and respect which Muslims and non-Muslims reciprocate in their daily lives. Ordinary people—Muslims and non-Muslims—offer possibilities of a discursive shift towards peace. The narratives of cordiality can help us create hope amidst despair, support inclusion amidst exclusion, promote love amidst distrust, and seek co-existence amidst divisiveness. Writing hope narratives is necessary to create the possibilities of discursive shifts towards peace. Quoting Cornell (1991) and Lyotard (1988), Ebert (1996) believes that oppression can be ended ‘through the subversion of existing regimes of discourse and hierarchies of representation,’ (p.206) and by ‘writing a different version of the story’ (p.208).

Based on my research, I stress the need to develop a framework which highlights and celebrates practices of peace and coexistence besides highlighting and condemning violence. In this paper, I try to present a perspective, which endeavours to heal besides describing the wounds. I want to clarify that I do not deny violence against minorities in Pakistan. I am looking at cordiality without overlooking violence. But I believe that all incidents of violence between people of different religions are not motivated by religion or religious differences. In many cases, religions and their teachings contribute to bring peoples of various faiths closer. Explorations into religion’s role in peace also support this observation (Haar and Busuttil 2005).

**Faith, Interfaith and Despair in Pakistan**

Most of the works on alleged religious violence commit the mistake of making binary division of violent and non-violent religious communities in Pakistan. If violence ‘implies a relation of force,...[and] a relation of harm,’ (Ahmed 2004, p.198) it can be exacted through non-physical means because ‘[t]exts and words...can inflict injury on subjectivity’ (Kuntsman 2009, p. 23). I, therefore, characterise scholarship on Pakistani
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religious minorities and their relations with Muslim majority as despair scholarship. The main feature of despair scholarship is its silence about non-violent people and non-violent acts among groups of people. Engaging with Matsuda (1993), Marcus (1996) and Delgado and Stefancic (2004), who stress on the violent role of words in hate speech and racist discourse, I stress that hiding of non-violence in discourses of violence is also an act of violence. By hiding non-violence and non-violent people, the language of violence scholarship may become ‘[s]violent language...[which] is both performative in the sense of discursive constitution, and injurious in the sense that its violence is felt and lived’ (Kuntsman 2009, p.24). In my view, violence through words is usually not the monopoly of the ostensibly violent groups. The ostensibly oppressed people also exercise violence against their perceived oppressors using words. It is this two-dimensionality of discursive violence, which, according to Shepherd & Weldes (2008, p. 535) may produce ‘the conditions of possibility for physical violence’.

The second characteristic of despair scholarship is its discursive closure on victimization. Using Kapur’s words, this scholarship overly contributes to construct a ‘victim object’ or ‘victimized object’ (Kapur 2005, pp. 95-96). But despair scholarship stigmatizes the majority and minority, the oppressor and oppressed, and the victimizer and victimized. The main purpose of such scholarship is to perform a ‘sordid game’ of declaring some groups as morally superior victims (Novick 1999, pp. 9-10). Despair scholarship shares a tendency of according moral superiority to the people of minority religions over the people of majority religion. As a result, the process of healing or coexistence, which is politically a two-way process, may not progress.

The third characteristic of despair literature is its construction of binary-of oppressor and oppressed people-without acknowledging that both of these constructions do not exist in reality. Muslims and non-Muslim groups are internally differentiated and sometimes divisive. In the despair binary, however, the majority, i.e. Muslims are oppressors and violent while the minority, the religious minorities, Christians, Hindus, Ahmadis, and Sikhs, are oppressed people. Violence, in these constructions, flow from one community to other communities. These formulations make violence a property not of the violent individuals but a community constructed by it as violent. Save a few cases in the 20th century, a group of people never turned against another group of people on a large scale. The cases of Nazis, Fascists and partition migration in Punjab provide closer examples. Despair scholarship’s belief in simple moral binarism, in which majority—equal oppressors and violent and minorities—equal oppressed and peaceful is naive and misrepresenting. This binary not only essentialises religious differences, but also majority-minority relations. Such scholarship has little empowering and emancipatory possibilities because of its reliance on intransient religious majority-minority binaries. This over-simplification reduces the possibilities of appreciating complexity—the conditions which produce prejudice and violence. Despair scholarship’s dependence on fixed religious categories, as well as its downplaying of questions of citizenship, class, gender, culture, politics to more abstract ideas of interfaith harmony and peace feeds
status quo politics. Owing to the hegemony of oppressor-oppressed binarism, the activists from minority religious groups fail to recognise the oppression fostered within their own communities, makes it difficult for the minority people at large to democratize their own interpersonal relationships. Thus, despair scholarship contributes to undermine efforts for social justice, which require strong commitments to struggle with the violence that exist within human beings—majority and minority.

The fourth characteristic of despair scholarship is that it views human societies in religious terms. The lineage of this kind of scholarship on religion can be found in Enlightenment ideas, which portrayed religion as a villain in the story of social progress. In general, Enlightenment ideas dismissed all religious expression as inimical to progress and growth of reason (Casanova 2008, pp. 118-19). Borrowing from the Enlightenment ideas, British colonialists encouraged a kind of scholarship, which viewed colonised people in India in religious terms:

As Western observers struggled to grapple with the complexities of Indian social organisation, it became a major subject of their academic pursuits and ethnological stereotyping. The early missionaries and the Orientalists believed that religion was the primary basis of social organisation in the subcontinent, a stereotype that was later officially recognised and legitimated by the colonial empirical inquiries of the late nineteenth–early twentieth centuries. This ‘colonial sociology’ rather simplistically argued that Indian society was primarily divided into two religious categories, the Hindus and the Muslims, while the former were further subdivided into mutually exclusive castes (Bandyopadhyay 2004, p.11).

Appropriating the colonial categories of knowledge, despair scholarship implies Islamisation and its stated objectives, Islamic state, as the sole cause of violence. This conclusion is a kind of one-dimensional scholarship. The colonial scholarship on Indian religions did not treat all religions as equal and did not consider religious differences as diversity. Framed in colonial categories of religious identification, despair scholarship does not appreciate religious difference as a source of diversity. It always finds comfort in finding faults with the ideologies and interpretations of Islam just like secular scholars across the world regard other religions as the major problem for civilisation. As a result of this ideological fixation, despair scholarship hardly questions the potential of bigotry and violence among the people of religious minorities. If the existing scholarship on religion considers religious ideology and politics violent, and if it considers religious beliefs as antithesis of reason, then, all or at least, most religious ideologies of majority and minority religious groups should be suspected without approving use of religion in minority politics. Scholars need to resist efforts of making religious politics equal to violence. Cavanaugh (2009) has rigorously shown that violence is not the sole monopoly of religious people.
Examples of Despair Scholarship

The following section provides concrete examples of despair scholarship found in literature on Pakistani religious minorities. Reproduction of few brief passages from a book by Bhatti (2008) illustrates this point:

*It is fact that Islam was a religion of invaders who entered India from north-western borders and poor convert Muslims provided them with a base in Punjab. These Muslims in Punjab joined the Muslim invader armies to conquer Hindu states, but Christians in Punjab refused to support, which was beginning point of fall for Christians in Punjab* (Bhatti 2008, p.14).

*The incidents of conversion by force of women to Islam, rape and abduction by the influential Muslim majority is worst part of genocide of Christians in Pakistan* (Ibid. p. 186).

*In spite of all negotiations with Muslim leaders, I decided to demand “Separate Christian Province” within Pakistan. I called a press conference in Hotel Jabees Karachi in 1992, and pressed for demand of our separate province. I argued that hate among Christians and Muslims on religion is at worst...Muslim majority is creating continuous hardships [for Christians]. When we discuss the future of this demand it is a fact that this is the voice of every Christian and Muslim majority is forcing them to press for this demand seriously* (Ibid. p. 229).

Qaiser (2007) writes:

*Poor non-Muslim girls and women have been deprived of their honor and dignity because of becoming victim of religious hate and prejudice, and they are still in search of justice* (Qaiser 2007, p.37).

*Civil marriages do not exist in Pakistan. [One] has to convert to the official and majority religion in order to marry. Most of the marriages are held among Muslim men and non-Muslim women. And non-Muslim women have to convert due to marriage...besides this, uncountable women have been married to Muslim men after being kidnapped forcefully* (Ibid. p.49).

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2 Translated from his Urdu book.
Theodore’s (2007) book explains:

But to many Pakistani Muslims, they [Christians] are persona non grata, to be looked down upon and to be treated differently from themselves [Muslims]. At best they are to be assimilated by religious conversion and at worst expelled from the nation (p.42).

Apparently the testimony of non-Muslims, like those of women, has been made secondary to that of Muslims (Ibid. p.51).

A tendency to dominate is already existent among the Muslims of Pakistan due to the preponderance of their majority situation....Blasphemy laws and the like are only likely to exacerbate this feeling and use the laws as tools for domination (p.71).

Minorities are often under pressure. If a particular group can identify themselves as a majority whether it be on the basis of race, ethnicity or religion they are likely to have feelings of superiority and to see the minorities as a distraction, as alien and as troublemakers who are liable to undermine the state and their own welfare (pp. 41-42).

Governmental commissions and Ministries might not be successful when the general attitude of the majority to minorities remains hostile and unsympathetic (p.91).

The language used by the authors cited above implies that Pakistani religious minorities, particularly the Christians, face harshest oppression. The authors of these works use apocalyptic language by even claiming that the Muslims of Pakistan were performing genocide of the minorities. Though fear of the enemy, imagined or real, plays an important role in promoting unity amongst identity holders, such fear and scholarship based on it reduces the possibilities of peace. The rhetoric of such scholarship is easy to appropriate for purposes other than peace. Such constructions of violence actually use suffering by insisting on victimhood status for particular victims. There is a possibility of using victimization as a means of intellectual and professional power, which helps interfaith professionals more than the people, the so-called beneficiaries of their advocacy. Kurtz (2002, p.29) observed that ‘[a]lthough identity politics have fuelled so many important movement mobilizations, there is an underside. Social movements themselves have often become yet another site of injustice.’ An unintended consequence of such scholarship is that it locks minority groups into habits of victimization. Apocalyptic narratives of victimhood also stigmatize victims and therefore, they are disempowering. This kind of scholarship needs to be questioned. Only the violent people should be declared violent, wherever they are: in majority or minority communities. Non-violent people should be highlighted as non-violent people irrespective of their location: in majority or minority communities. The wholesale characterisation of groups of people...
as violent or as victims has negative possibilities for hope, which is important to make
the world a better place.

**Expressions of Hope**
The following section presents a summary of thematic narratives collected through face-
to-face interviews and the internet, from Muslim and non-Muslim people. These
narratives are about ordinary peoples’ friendships across religions. One of the themes of
these narratives is that the narrators were motivated by their religious beliefs to reach
people of different religions. Since it was difficult to conduct this study with squarely
defined methods available in social sciences, the method of narrative collection was
flexible and informed by a number of scholarly insights on methods. Since 1975, when
Paul Feyerabend published, *Against Method: Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of
Knowledge*, methodology does not stand on stable ground (Feyerabend 1975). Taking
lead from Feyerabend, a number of scholars have offered a critique of mainstream
methodologies. The range of scholarship produced cannot be summarised here; however,
one element is common. This literature has established methodological pluralism as one
of the credible means of knowledge production (Chilisa 2012; Shah 2010; Abrams et al.
2007; Liamputtong 2007; Brown and Strega 2005; Yow 2005; Mutua and Swadener
2004; Smith 1999). Brown and Strega (2005) assert that scholarship’s purpose should be
empowerment.

**Tradition and Hope**
The first source of cordiality and hope comes from Muslim and non-Muslim friends and
their narratives. Oral history is an important source of information and it can be used for
revitalization of societies (Hurley 2010). Most narrated oral histories of cordiality
between Muslims and non-Muslims are from the areas which constitute Pakistan. The
narrators also used oral history as a resource to revive friendships among Muslims and
non-Muslims. A number of the narrators shared details of friendships between various
religious communities in Pakistan in the 1960s. Their narrations are similar to scholarly
narrations of friendships beyond religions. A number of academic and spatial writings
point to this (Sheikh 2008; Laal n.d.). In one of his speeches in Ceylon, in 1963, the then
President General Ayub Khan addressed Pakistan’s small Buddhist population and called
Gautum Budhha as the Lord Buddha. In another speech, he praised Parsis and prayed
they become better Parsis (Government of Pakistan 1964). However, despite losing the
war of 1965 when the resultant Praetorian *jihad* (exertion) acted against Pakistani
Hindus (besides acting against Indian Hindus), Pakistani society did not become militant
against religious minorities. This, despite Jamaat-e-Islami’s (JI’s) efforts to construct a
theory of saving Islam by eliminating missionary education, which according to them
was anti-Islam. On occasions, Syed Abu al Ala Maudoodi lamented of not being acted
upon when he asked the government to check what he termed as ‘Hindu conspiracies’
against Islamic people of East Bengal. A number of other scholars also joined Maudoodi
in his Hindu bashing. One of the leading scholars was Mufti Muhammad Taqi Usmani,
who said that missionary educational institutions were the Christian proselytizing
missions (Usmani 1994). In two decades of Pakistan’s independence, he claimed, the missionaries converted more Muslims to Christians than the Muslim conversions to Christianity during a century of British rule. If the missionaries were allowed to work in Pakistan, he argued, they would create an influential Christian minority. For him, the only way to stop the growth of Christianity was to nationalize all missionary schools and ban enrolment of Muslim students in them (Interview with Mufti Muhammad Taqi Usmani, Tokyo, 14 September 2008). In 1966, JI’s campaign became stronger: missionary education had to get undermined. Following these suggestions, Air Marshal Noor Khan, as Chairman of Committee on National Education, approved the idea of nationalizing missionary schools in Pakistan (Government of Pakistan 1969). The anti-missionary policy, however, could not stop Muslim families from enrolling their children in missionary schools. The Christian teachers continued to be respected by their students like before. This behaviour of the people was a kind of subversion of the official agenda and many narrators shared this subversion.

What has been missed in the explication of the opposition politics of Muslims and non-Muslim in Pakistan is that interests other than religion sometimes implicate religion for their politics. Some of the narrators reported that JI’s anti-missionary agenda actually helped some Muslim businessmen to start private education as business. Without competition from missionary schools, they could make higher profits. Roots of the rise of private education during 1980s are linked with the anti-missionary school campaign of 1960s. Despite this, Muslims and non-Muslims continued their lives as they were: cordial and interdependent. A number of narrators’ recalled their memories of war of 1965 and its effects. The theme of being old inhabitants of Pakistan appeared repeatedly. They reported their distance from ideological wars of Pakistani state. They recalled how their grandparents smoked _huqqah_ (water pipe) and talked about community matters and recited mystic poetry. Gilmartin and Lawrence (2000) also discuss that there was a time when religious identities and differences did not matter in public sphere in the Indian subcontinent. In Khanewal, for example, Maulana Abbas Akhtar converted from a strong associate of a sectarian group to a friend of minorities in 2007. Once he read Obaidullah Sindhi’s _Wahdat-i-Insaniyat_ (Unity of Mankind) and decided to work for the welfare of Christians.

Three films, _Pinjar_ (skeleton/cage) [2003], _Earth-1947_ [2003], and _Khuda Key Liyee_ (In the Name of God) [2000] highlight violence and non-violence, friendship and enmity between different religions of the subcontinent. These films present the stories of hope through strong characters contributing to coexistence and trivializing difference. Novels like _Aag Ka Darya_ (River of Fire) by Qurat ul Ain Hyder published in 1959 and _This is Not That Dawn_ by Yashpal in 2010 also provide accounts of friendships between Muslims and non-Muslims.
A number of narrators were friends since two generations. Narrators in this study from Sheikhupura, Nankana Sahib, Khanewal, Hyderabad, Khairpur and Mithi reported that they had good relations with people of other religions.

**Everyday Life and Hope**

The second source of cordiality and hope comes from the concerns of everyday lives and their imperatives. This source of hope is more visible in some of the educational institutions of the country. I listened to the narratives of a number of young cross-religious friends at Forman Christian College University (FCCU), Lahore. A number of Muslim narrators told me they were not concerned with the religion of their friends. Both Muslim and non-Muslim narrators told me they were keen to have friends of different religious and ethnic backgrounds. Ten Muslim narrators told me that they wanted to learn about the culture of their non-Muslim friends. In my view, the young students—most of them who shared their stories with me are migrants to Lahore—do not carry the burden of religious prejudices against the people belonging to religions other than their own. At the same time, I do not deny the existence of religious prejudices among young people. However, their prejudices are qualitatively different and their expressions are becoming accommodating. I found that prejudices related to dressing, fashion, cultural tastes, eateries, music, leisure and entertainment were stronger than religious prejudices at FCCU.

Four of my Hindu narrators from Islamia University of Bahawalpur told me they enjoyed the company of their Muslim friends more than the company of their coreligionists. They explained to me that conforming pressures from Hindu elders was the main reason for preference of Muslim friends. With Muslim friends, they could feel liberated and could also get help in solving day-to-day problems including finding jobs. Their Muslim friends explained acts of connecting their Hindu friends to the wider society in Bahawalpur city. When a Hindu female student wanted to marry her Muslim classmate in 2009, the girl’s family threatened to kill her. However, with the help of her boyfriend’s Muslim friends, they were able to marry and find jobs. The young Hindu students told me stories of repression within their community. I remember one tragic story: A Christian couple in South Punjab married of their own choice in October 2012. They converted to Islam but their families killed both of them (The Express Tribune 2012). Incidents such as these are a major source of motivation for non-Muslim youth to find friends among Muslims. Friendship with Muslims helps young people from religious minorities secure social support and protection, especially, in cases, when they want to subvert collectivism imposed on them by their communities. While resisting collectivism, some of the young people of religious minorities proactively establish friendships with Muslims. These acts can be termed as conversions, not in religious sense but in social sense.

Parallels of these acts of social conversion can be observed in British India during the early 20th century. Scholarly work, on conversions in British India, demonstrates that
local people of various confessions would establish relationships with Christian missionaries for social benefits (Harding 2008).

Some cross-religious friendships happen without reasons. The variables of personal attraction and sports such as cricket, bring Muslims and non-Muslims together, especially younger ones between the ages of 15 and 30. When Gulab Singh was appointed traffic warden in Lahore, he was cheered and welcomed by many people (Bangash 2007). In a television interview, he thanked all those people who greeted him by giving smiles and waving hands. Similarly, Taranjit Singh, a Sikh television anchor at Pakistan Television, Lahore has many fans among Muslims.

What gives rise to hope from the imperatives of everyday life is the high level of understanding of Islam by non-Muslims. Most of the narrators had a good amount of knowledge about Islam. All of them could read the Holy Quran due to studying Islamic studies at schools. School textbooks in Pakistan are blamed for promoting religious divisions. Certainly, textbooks do not educate Muslim students about other religions. They just refute other religions. Few entries in some of the textbooks, however, celebrate teachings of other religions. For example, four student narrators at FCCU said their ethics textbooks helped them learn harmony and tolerance. Three Sikh narrators said since Guru Nanak included Ashloks of Baba Farid in Granth Sahib, they felt themselves closer to Muslims. I met ten Ahmadis and their Muslim friends. Only one of them talked about their differences. They shared their intimacies and friendships, about playing and eating together. Ten Christian professors at FCCU told me that Muslim students invite them to their homes regularly. A number of Muslim students told me they even invited their Christian teachers to Milad and Giyarween celebrations. In Khanewal, Muslims visit churches to celebrate Christmas. In Rajanpur, Tehrik-e-Minhajul Quran (TMQ) and Shia commemorate Muharram and Milad together. TMQ leadership has established cordial ties with Christians and Hindus in Bahawalpur, Rajanpur and Khanewal.

In order to understand whether possibilities for virtual friendships among people of different religions existed in Pakistan, I sent friendship requests to fifty Sikhs and Hindus from my Facebook account between August-November 2012. All of them accepted my requests. As a result, I could follow Facebook discussions between Muslims and non-Muslims during 2012. Once I noticed a slur on non-Muslims by a Muslim user. Within few hours, thirty-three Muslims asked the slur-sender to remove his slur and apologize. The slur-sender apologized. Perhaps, this is due to the fact that Pakistani Muslim youths have non-Muslim foreign friends on Facebook. A total of 37 young and regular Facebook users selected reported that their non-Muslim friends far exceeded the number of Muslim

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3 The celebration of the birth of Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) on the 12th day of Rabi ul Awwal, the third month of Islamic calendar.
4 Literally means the 11th day. It is a devotional festival held in the memory of famous spiritual master of Baghdad, Sheikh Abdul Qadir Jilani (1077-1166) on the 11th day of every month of the Islamic lunar calendar.
5 Commemoration and mourning of the martyrdom of Imam Hussain (626-680 AD).
friends in their Facebook list. Majority of my narrators from all faiths reported they met people of other religions on Facebook. A total of 35 Muslim narrators reported they came to know of Pakistani Sikhs and Hindus on Facebook. They never knew if the Hindus and Sikhs lived in Pakistan. Facebook friendships between Muslims and non-Muslims are transforming into physical space friendships, which is encouraging.

**Beyond Hindu and Muslim**

The practices of religious hybridity are a third source of cordiality and hope. The mystic social philosophers in the subcontinent established traditions of coexistence either by trivializing religious differences or denying them. The culture established then continues till now. There are some shrines in Punjab and Sindh where non-Muslims can also visit to seek blessings. Despite the enactment of The Music in Muslim Shrines Act 1942, which banned dancing and playing music at Muslim shrines, and despite the nationalization of shrines, non-Muslims have been visiting Muslim shrines to seek blessings. The example of a 2010 YouTube video of Noori Bori Wali Sarkar, a saint buried in Kot Abdul Malik in Sheikhupura, illustrates this point well. In this qawwali performance video, the saint asks all attendees—men and women—to dance. The video became so popular that it was watched by hundreds of thousands of people. It means that the official efforts to segregate genders at shrines and banning dance have been subverted.

In 1998, my grandmother told me that she has been seeking the blessings of a Christian holy man for the well-being of our family. The same year, a relative asked her why she would seek blessings from a Christian. She replied, 'Because he heals.' If someone pressurised her to end this ritual, she would refuse and say, 'Allah has given him [that Christian] power [to heal].' After the 1965 war with India, Islam was being allocated roles of nation-building (Qasmi 2011; Iqbal 1959) and anti-Indianism, which constructed Pakistani non-Muslims as ‘Others’, the shrines provided spaces for Muslim and non-Muslim cordiality. As the shrines have been bureaucratized, the expression of worship has also been more reformed. Despite this, however, my Sikh, Christian and Hindu narrators and their families visit many shrines such as Data Sahib, Mian Mir, Shehbaz Qalandar, Abdullah Shah Ghazi, Pakpattan, and Shah Abdul Latif Bhittai, to seek blessings. Shah Hussain and Shah Jamal’s shrines in Lahore are particularly famous for the coming together of people of all faiths. On any Thursday, one can find Hindus, Sikhs, Christians, and transgender people at many shrines in Sindh and Punjab. It is interesting that some Muslims also visit churches, temples and Gurdwaras. On 31 December 2012, I met a Sikh family from Amrisar visiting Mia Mir mausoleum in Lahore. The man, Hardayal Singh, told me, 'Mian Mir Sahib laid the foundation stone of Darbar Sahib Amritsar. Mian Mir is our saint. We worship him. All Sikhs respect him so much. Whenever we come to Lahore, we come to worship Mian Mir Sahib' (Hardayal Singh, Interview 31 December 2012). A number of scholars have highlighted hybrid religious practice and dissolution of difference in the subcontinent (Dimitrova 2010; Pauwels
2007; Hawley 2006; and Hansen 1992). Most of my narrators recalled these traditions of hybridity and expressed faith in them.

**Future of Cordiality**

Is the future of cordiality in Pakistan all bright? No simple answers, definitely. Based on my talks, observations and study of literature, however, I am optimistic about the strengthening of cordiality among people of various faiths in Pakistan. There are voices, assertive ones, to de-link education and minorities from the security apparatus of the state, which is encouraging. Multi-identity cultural forums are emerging but the question is of their sustainability. Young and educated Hindus, Sikhs, and Christians want to form organisations to help their communities. They also invite Muslims to join their associations. Anjum James Paul, Chairman of All Pakistan Minorities Association stresses: ‘A maulvi cannot transform another maulvi. A maulvi cannot transform a priest. Both are the same.’ Paul disapproves of using the phrase inter-faith harmony. He rather uses the word ‘harmony’ to develop cordiality among people of various faiths. His organisation, SHADOW, has included three Muslims on its board of directors. SHADOW links initiatives and promotes them at local level. Local and joint initiatives by people are more important. In Samundari and Khanewal, two organisations of non-Muslims have developed a joint programme of social development with the participation of Muslims.

The future of cordiality is being charted in talks, exchanges, trials and errors by a number of people. The enthusiasm and the commitment I have seen among Muslims and non-Muslim friends reveal that cordiality has a bright future in the country. The other reason which makes me hopeful about the future is the assertiveness among minorities. On 24 December 2012, the Lahore Museum started an exhibition of Christian handicrafts, which was a positive gesture for making minorities’ cultural lives visible. In Sindh, Manzur Mirani organised gypsies and linked them to Hindus, Sikhs and Christians. Mirani’s work is helping people assert their professions and making their culture visible. It is encouraging to note that these activists have focused both on physical and discursive violence—the violence of speech, literature and language. Non-Muslims’ assertiveness can be observed in culture and arts: a number of Christian students are forming music bands. A number of Hindu youths also formed bands in Bahawalpur. They offer guitar classes and people listen to them. This assertiveness has come after the increasing confidence in non-Muslims and opening of Pakistani society.

**Key Challenges: Political, Cultural and Social**

There are a few challenges which must be overcome to strengthen cordiality. The first challenge is how to convince the Pakistani state and its agencies to support people’s initiatives of cordiality. There are also some serious challenges in the fields of scholarship and activism. The most important of them, at scholarly level, is to revisit

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6 Religious leader.
identity politics, in particular, the religiously-informed minority identity politics which needs to avoid its proclivity of imposing collectivism on minority people. An assertive and democratic minority community has more prospects for democracy and national integration than an assertive but closed minority. Minorities have to take some responsibility of their own uplift and to assert their agency. They need to contribute to changing power relations which work against them. They need to become less dependent on external funding, support, and selfish altruism. The other challenge is epistemological. Academic scholars need to rethink their methods of studying Muslim and non-Muslim relations. They need to refine theories and methods of investigating majority-minority relationships. Rigorous debate is needed to engage with methodological developments mentioned in this paper. The point of curriculum and textbooks pose a distinctive challenge. The subject of ethics is presently an optional subject for students belonging to religious minorities. However, in the longer run, ethics textbooks should be made inclusive of ethical teachings of all major religions and taught to Muslims and non-Muslims alike to help them celebrate commonalities. Inclusion of Hindus, Christians, and Sikhs in cultural production also remains a major challenge. Various actors in civil society need to ensure greater visibility of minority people in the media.

**Policy Recommendations**

Why should public policy be concerned with minorities? Foucault says it is important to know which politics brings some issues in the purview of government action and exclude others (Cochrane 2007, p.3). In Pakistan, policy-making is a reactive process. Public policy deals with social problems in a limited way. In the matter of people of minorities, public policy has been disconnected from the actual everyday problems of both the majorities and minorities, no matter how they are defined. Public policy focuses more on the bureaucratic dispensation of things. Though it has sometimes attended to the issues of inter-faith harmony, peace and tolerance, it has not done more than just holding seminars. If we look at the budget of the Ministry of Minorities, it is limited. In the name of quotas, public policy is content with taking a few people from the minorities on its various boards and commissions. This practice ensures numerical representation, not issue-based or thematic representation.

Renowned urban planner, Arif Hasan stresses the need to orient policies to trends of change in society (Personal Interview, Lahore 2012). Lahore based development thinker, Raza Ali, asserts understanding is more important than reform. Sound understanding, according to him, is reform in itself (Personal Interview, Lahore 2012). Taking clue from Hasan and Ali, the first challenge of public policy is to understand peoples’ initiatives of friendships. Once we embark on understanding, we might realise we do not need new policies. In fact, we need to support what people themselves are doing. Government should show determination to support people’s own initiatives.

National and provincial governments and all other sites of knowledge production should promote hope scholarship, a scholarship which engages, encourages and empowers
people of minorities and majorities. An integrated effort at the national level among the Ministry of Religious Affairs, Ministry of Minorities, Ministry of Human Rights, Ministry of Culture and Sports, and Standing Committee on Minorities needs to be undertaken. The Government of Pakistan and provincial governments need to continue their support to change curricula. They also need to increase the visibility of minorities on television, radio and other media.

The second task of policy is to make these initiatives visible in the realm of cultural production. The cultural realm is the best site to resist discursive violence. While Indian films have a strong tradition of including non-Muslims in movies and dramas, Pakistani films and other means of cultural production have done the opposite. In popular literature, Sikhs and Hindus are shown as enemies of Pakistan. We hardly see the inclusion of Christians in films and television. Public policy also needs to respond to the violence through discursive means. Violence is as much physical as discursive and rhetorical. Medhurst’s (1997, p.xiv) observation, ‘A Cold War is, by definition, a rhetorical war, a war fought with words, speeches, pamphlets, public information (or disinformation) campaigns, slogans, gestures, symbolic actions, and the like,’ aptly fits the problems of cordiality in Pakistan where a lot of hate and violence is actually spread through textual means. Therefore, violence should be engaged with alternative textual means. Creating alternative discursive means would definitely promote hope. We need a lot of narratives of hope to reduce despair and to promote cordiality.
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Overcoming the Challenges of Ethno-Buddhist Identity in Sri Lanka

Amjad Mohamed-Saleem

Abstract

On 18 May 2009, the prolonged conflict in Sri Lanka between the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and the Government of Sri Lanka (GOSL) came to an end. It triggered a massive humanitarian crisis and Sri Lanka came under international condemnation for its handling of the crisis. In addition since the end of the conflict, there has been sustained international pressure to address key issues concerning minorities through a constitutional framework that will satisfy the aspirations of all citizens. In particular, reconciliation between increasingly suspicious and polarised communities is the need of the hour to ensure an environment of peace, justice and equity through the medium of good governance. A country which in the past prided itself on its religious diversity and freedom for the practice of religion is facing an unexpected post conflict future.

Identity insecurity has been felt on all sides, but the Sinhala Buddhist, who form a majority of the population, exhibit the most extreme of strains and currently in the absence of conflict, are beginning to exert their religious based ethnic identity; thereby posing the greatest threat to religious freedom in Sri Lanka. This particular strand of Buddhism has undergone a massive change and reinterpretation of its doctrines as a result of the conflict, becoming more militant, violent and ultimately intolerant largely led by the clergy. In particular, there seems to be an emerging clash with Islam as shown by recent incidents in Sri Lanka, with the destruction of mosques which could also have regional implications for South Asia.

Sri Lankan Buddhism has historically been very strongly linked with Buddhism in Myanmar with both countries sharing similar ideologies. Whilst there is no tangible evidence linking Sri Lankan Buddhism to the recent clashes between Buddhists and Muslims in Myanmar, it is clear that monks in Myanmar are heavily influenced by the clergy of Sri Lanka. Thus, any change of ideological thinking amongst the former will relate to thinking amongst the latter.

While not all monks and Buddhists are guilty of this intolerance, it is up to the Government, regional bodies and organisations to have an honest dialogue with each other and identify root causes of the fractures. This paper will explore some of the challenges faced and identify some key recommendations.

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1 This chapter has been approved as a perspective essay by the referee.

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Introduction

On 18 May 2009, the prolonged separatist conflict in Sri Lanka between the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and the Government of Sri Lanka (GOSL) came to an end with the death of the LTTE Leader Vellupillai Prabhakaran (VP).  

The demise of the LTTE, one of the most ruthless terrorist groups in the world (SATP 2001), signalled the conclusion of one of the most turbulent periods of Sri Lanka’s history. The LTTE had been a powerful military force, and had controlled territory running a civil administration in the north and east of Sri Lanka for many years (Peiris 2009). People directly and indirectly affected by the conflict number in their hundreds of thousands (Centre for Poverty Analysis 2002), whilst the conflict has succeeded in polarizing different communities that make up Sri Lankan society.

Although the Tamils themselves were critical of the LTTE for their human rights abuses (International Crisis Group 2012), many Tamils in Sri Lanka and beyond saw the LTTE as their buffer and protection against a ‘Sinhala nationalist’ government (Feith 2010). The end of the 28-year-old conflict extenuated already fragile cracks between different ethnic groups, along faith lines, such that identity was strengthened not only by an insecurity of religious affiliation, but a religious affiliation that is borne from a sense of the ‘other’ who is not only someone of a different ethnicity but someone of a different religion. This insecurity of identity has been felt on all sides, but the Sinhala Buddhist, who form the majority of the population, exhibit the most extreme of strains and currently in the absence of conflict, are beginning to exert this religious based ethnic identity thereby posing the greatest threat to religious freedoms in Sri Lanka. In particular the ideological strand of Theravada Buddhism in Sri Lanka has undergone a massive change and reinterpretation of its doctrines as a result of the conflict (Deegalle 2007), becoming more militant, violent and ultimately intolerant towards other ethnicities and religions largely led by the clergy (Noble 2013). The past three-and-a-half years have seen a rise of violence against religious sites and members of religious communities, with a number of incidents including mob attacks on places of worship; robberies and vandalism; the killing of clergy; protests against communities and the proliferation of hate speech on social media, the internet and via the audio – visual media (Centre for Policy Alternatives 2013). The inability (or reluctance) of the Government (especially its law enforcement agencies) to deal with perpetrators of the violence and hate speech have prompted international organisations like the International Crisis Group to call for stronger international action from the Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group (CMAG) and the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) calling for time-bound actions to restore

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2 He and two of his commanders reportedly died trying to flee the last rebel-held patch of jungle in the north-east (Haviland 2009.). Revered with almost God like status, the death of Prabhakaran put an end to the conventional leadership of the LTTE, its ideology and any military will to oppose the Sri Lankan Government.

3 With the death of senior commanders and later the arrest of its international spokesman by the GOSL (Jeyaraj 2009), the LTTE had no viable leadership that could allow it to continue (Peiris 2009).
the rule of law, investigate rights abuses and protection of religious freedoms (International Crisis Group 2013).

Unfortunately despite some high profile cases such as the attack on a mosque in Dambulla in the east of Sri Lanka in 2012 (BBC News Asia 2012), there have been many more incidents that have received little or no attention, either locally or internationally (Centre for Policy Alternatives 2013). Of the accounted reports, there have been 65 cases of attacks on places of religious worship with all the minority religious communities bearing the brunt of the violence. However, the majority of cases have been from the Christian community (mostly against the non-traditional churches accused of forced conversion); Buddhist temples from the non-Theravada sect; Hindu places of worship and now increasingly from the Muslim community (Ibid.) who, in particular, with the defeat of the LTTE, seem to be the main target from a commercial, social and religious perspective (BBC News 2013b). Coupled with these recent incidents in Sri Lanka, is rising anti-Muslim rhetoric (Farook 2012) as part of a coordinated hate campaign developed by an extreme Sinhalese Buddhist organisation called Bodhu Bala Sena (BBS), which has been responsible for inciting hatred over the last year, especially recently with attacks on Muslim businesses (BBC News Asia 2013a).

While human rights organisations have been quick to label the current increasing anti-Muslim rhetoric and violence (and existing anti-Christian feelings) a ‘decrease in religious freedoms’ (Sri Lanka Campaign 2012), this paper will dispute the fact that this is a direct violation per se of religious freedoms based on an intolerance of religion or faith, but instead it is a manifestation of ethno-religious identities which have blurred ethnic and religious differences causing a ‘repression-reaction pathway’ (Henne, Shah and Hudgens 2012, p.59.). In other words, the decline in religious freedom is not a direct result of an intolerance for religion as such (and as we will see later on, all religions play a vital role in Sri Lanka), but is perpetuated from deeply delusive and divisive assumptions of single exclusive identities by sectarian activists (Puniyani 2008). Such exclusive identities are negative, stressing difference rather than belonging and ‘opposition to’ rather than ‘support for’ something and faith becomes the arena in which this conflict is played out (Commonwealth Foundation 2007). In particular these exclusive identities over recent years are a result of the steady growth of political activism on the part of a new generation of Buddhist monks not only aggravated by the conflict but also by the political and social climate in Sri Lanka (Deegalle 2007).

Thus, in order to understand the current scenario in Sri Lanka, it is important to start from the beginning with regards the development of differences between minority and majority communities in the arena of identity politics and how these have been manipulated and abused for political and personal gain contributing not only to the conflict (Bush 2003), but also to the current relationships between faith communities. The shift in the political axes of identity that is reflected in a corresponding shift in the axes of conflict has been shown from studies where the present dynamics of conflict in
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Sri Lanka and the ethnic identities upon which it is based are radically different from earlier conflicts and identities (Nissan and Stirrat 1990). Like many post-colonial societies, Sri Lanka drew on pre-colonial culture, including religion, to form a national identity after gaining independence. This paper will argue that the identity chosen based on the supposedly close ties among the country’s majority Sinhalese population and their Buddhist religious beliefs, planted seeds for the latter conflict and proved problematic for minorities as it blurred religious-ethnic lines. It is these seeds that pose a challenge for religious freedom in the country. This religio-ethno-political identity that has come to define all ethnic communities of Sri Lanka has to be understood as part of the root cause of the conflict and a decline in religious freedom; and thus has to be factored in while developing any mechanism to move forward. In doing so, this paper also realises that there is a growing trend of anti-Islamic sentiments that are also influencing the rhetoric being used in Sri Lanka and elsewhere (Sri Lanka Brief 2013). Lastly, the paper also realises that Sri Lanka’s reconciliation is a complex cocktail of political, social, economic, religious and grass roots initiatives which all have to be worked on simultaneously in order to achieve true results. In particular, the current ‘persecution’ of Muslims puts strains on the local reconciliation process with rights groups strengthening their calls for greater international scrutiny and action (Sri Lanka Campaign 2013). This paper is about putting forward an argument based on historical anecdotes that will explore how this identity construct is also being exported to other countries in South Asia with dangerous precedents being set. It will then conclude with some recommendations for regional action to address the problem and to deal with the decrease in religious freedom that it causes.

Some Initial Disclaimers

It would be false to depict whole of the South Asian region as a homogeneous entity. South Asia is as heterogeneous as you can get. Each country has different religious, ethnic and cultural compositions which means any discussion while appearing region generic has to be also country specific. Hence there can be no ‘one size fits all’ solution applied to issues in this region.

Also, there is something to be said about what language is used to define the problem and the potential signals that it sends as it could distract from solutions. In my opinion, it is a bit disingenuous to talk about the concept of the decline of religious freedom in Sri Lanka since

*Sri Lanka has long been designated ‘multi religious’. The adjective is descriptive: Sri Lanka is home to four ‘world religions’ (Buddhism, Hinduism, Islam and Christianity) that share the space in urban as well as rural settings (Walters 1995, p.37).*

Thus, it is fair to say that faith plays a big role in people’s lives with some basic religious freedom being exercised such as the practising of one’s faith with the presence of
mosques, churches and temples, and the multitude of religious holidays existing in the country.

Hence, the current attacks on religious minorities is not necessarily about a decline of religious freedom due to a misunderstanding or intolerance of religion per se in Sri Lanka. The current climate we are seeing of anti Muslim protests (and increasing anti Christian sentiments) is largely about the history and legacy of colonialism (particularly in the case of Christianity, intolerance towards it is largely based on its close relationship with colonial masters and the favoured status that Christians had under the colonial rule (Deegalle 2007) and the concept of identity and the intolerance of another ethnicity (considered to be ‘foreign’ to Buddhism) in Sri Lanka. Thus, the issue becomes more political which we will need to unpack a little bit more especially as we discuss ‘religiously clothed national identity’ in Sri Lanka in the light of the increasing involvement of Buddhist monks in political activism (Deegalle 2007).

This is important to consider in particular because despite faith being rarely the issue or the root cause, the differing ethnicities of the two main protagonists of the conflict, the Tamil and the Sinhalese, ended up polarising faith. It is a conflict that cannot be dubbed a religious war, but ‘it is a war in which religion is not innocent, a war in which religious people on both sides have supported violence as politically necessary and expedient’ (Harris 2007, p.153), for example Buddhist priests would bless government soldiers going off to war, while Tamil Christians were deemed to be supportive of the LTTE and Muslims on the whole were the ‘third party’, often suffering as collateral damage.4

Lastly and perhaps the most salient point in the discussion is that with the end of internal conflict in Sri Lanka, while there is an opportunity for reconciliation, there is also a stalemate, which is both political and social, comprising of ethnicity, faith and class. The roots of the conflict go back to marked disparities between urban and rural areas (Bandarage 2009); limited income generation opportunities especially for those from the north and east of the country, particularly the Tamil community but also including the Sinhalese; lack of adequate infrastructure outside the Western province; lack of a political space and opportunity to address concerns of minorities and other indicators of an elusive quality called national identity in a post colonial era. It is this lack of a

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4 About 100,000 Muslims were given 24 hours by the LTTE (without warning or reason) to leave the northern province. They eventually settled around the capital Colombo or in an area called Pattalum (3 hours north of Colombo) where they have been in refugee camps till today (International Crisis Group 2007).

5 Between 1987 and 1990, the Sri Lankan Government was effectively fighting uprisings on two fronts: one in the north with the Tamils and one in the south with Sinhala youth influenced by leftist communist tendencies. Ethnic issues aside, many of the causes of Tamil and Sinhala militancy were strikingly similar – the frustrations of unemployed youth with a failing economy and a class ridden political system that offered no channel for their aspirations. In the south, the uprising was dealt with bloodily setting aside almost all pretence of legality with death squads, mass human rights abuses and disappearances. This similar heavy handed approach was carried out in the north as well and has been largely part and parcel of the State mechanism (regardless of which party is in power) since then as an excuse to tackling insurgency and opposition to its rule (See Bandarage 2009; Bush 2003).
cohesive and comprehensive national identity that is one of the key contributing factors to the conflict (Jeganathan and Ismail 1995). It not only allows differing interpretations of past and present grievances to be perpetuated, but the narrowness and animosity with which social identity keeps being defined and defended impairs efforts to imagine new possibilities. Thus, insecurity about identity becomes manifested and projected onto others (Deegalle 2006) thereby justifying actions against the latter. The Sinhalese in particular suffer from a ‘majority with a minority’ complex that is to say that despite being the majority ethnic community, they suffer from a minority complex (Grant 2009). Centuries and waves of colonisation have given them the insecurity that they as a nation and race supporting the faith of Buddhism, are under threat. This insecurity given the heritage with which the Sinhalese associate their race has been broadly defined within the concept of Buddhism.

In a post independent scenario, with rising demands of the Tamil community for semi autonomy in the face of discriminatory practices from the central Government, this insecurity has been transferred to the Tamils especially due to the latter’s close relationship with South India (Gunawardana 2006). As the end of the conflict has somewhat neutralised that threat, the transnational representation of the Muslim community (with its concept of the Ummah (one nation)) has now signalled red flags for the insecure Sinhalese (McGilvray 2011) who feel under threat by the links that Muslims have internationally and the ‘perception’ of a new form of religious colonisation.

The Bodhu Bala Sena (BBS)
The BBS is a militant Buddhist organisation that has been responsible for an upsurge in attacks on the Muslim community, enjoying tacit support from the Government (BBC News Asia 2013 b). The apparent reluctance of the Government to discourage BBS has ‘resulted in a limited understanding of the scale and nature of these incidents, and also made it easier for the authorities and others to deny the scale of the problem’ (Centre for Policy Alternatives 2013, p.5). In addition Muslim politicians within the Government and Muslim civil society leaders have also come under attack to take a more pragmatic stand against the rhetoric and action6 (Lanka Standard 2012).

On the basis of protecting ‘Sinhalese’ businessmen from rising prices allegedly caused by Muslim businesses, BBS called for the ban of all halal products, since according to the organisation, halal certification caused a higher cost to manufacturers which were passed on to the consumers (Colombage 2013). Whilst this has been disputed and subsequently the halal certification withdrawn, the issue has not been solved with the organisation now targeting the attire of Muslim women and the presence of mosques. What BBS are trying to do is to decrease the ‘visibility’ of the Muslims and thereby the ‘threat’ to Sinhala identity and ultimately Sri Lanka, in the eyes of the protagonists (Ibid.).

6 In this sense, it is noteworthy that so far there has been a measured response from the Muslim community to the antagonism put forward by the BBS (International Crisis Group 2013).
What the BBS experience shows is that Sri Lanka is heading towards a very bleak future having just emerged from a dark past. However, it has to be stated that BBS represent a minority (albeit a very loud and vocal minority) amongst the Sinhala Buddhist community, many of whom have come together to protest the targeting of the Muslim community (Groundviews 2013).

The Mahavansa
We have to understand that the psyche of the Sinhalese comes from a holy land myth (Harris 2007) conditioned by an ancient chronicle called the Mahavansa (written roughly around 5th century but tracing back all the way to 534 BCE) which outlines the origin of the Sinhala civilisation from the mythical figure of King Vijaya who was said to come from North India. By outlining a clear connection to North India, the Mahavansa defines the distinct Aryan nature of the Sinhala race as opposed to the Dravidian heritage of the Tamil population related to South India. In doing so, it very quickly defines the ‘other’ in terms of the Tamil community, although it glosses over what is being said about Vijaya and his men marrying the southern Indian women. It also develops the account of the arrival of Buddhism in Sri Lanka and its subsequent protection by its monarchs. ‘The narrative thus claims the whole of Sri Lanka as the dhammadipa, the island of the dhamma, a holy island dedicated to the Buddha and his teachings’ (Harris 2007, p.152)

It, therefore, consolidates a relationship between the monarchy and the Buddhist religious establishment or the Sangha and by extension a duty upon the ruling elite to offer and maintain protection not only for the Sangha but for the concepts it represents. This restoration of the Buddhism concept is important because it lays the foundation that Sri Lanka as a nation cannot be united unless the monarch is Buddhist (Gunawardana 1990). Hence in a way it offers the justification from Buddhism for violence to bring about and maintain political unity and a Buddhist state and the corollary being that any threat for autonomy and separation (as demanded by the LTTE) is ‘no less a threat to the dhamma, a threat to the continuation of ‘pure’ Buddhism in the world’ (Harris 2007, p.152). It, however, did not achieve the significance that it holds today until the early 20th century, when it was used by anti colonialists such as Anagarika Dharmapala, to develop support for his cause.

What Dharmapala did was to re-emphasise the fact that ‘Sinhalas are specially chosen by the Buddha and their political unity guarantees the survival of Buddhism in Sri Lanka, just as their political identity is guaranteed by their espousal of Buddhism’ (Grant 2009, p.51). In so doing, Dharmapala, once again linked modern Sinhala identity to religion and ancient chronicle tradition, claiming that the colonial period had corrupted the Sinhalese and diluted Buddhism by bringing in foreign elements (such as Christianity) and foreign people (a reference to Muslims). By the early 20th century, Dharmapala was using racial characteristics to define the Sinhalese by explaining the ‘others’. In so doing, Dharmapala (and subsequently other influential Sinhala Buddhists) annexed Buddhism to
colonial nationalism combining theories of race, language and religion to describe a Sinhala identity empowered by a sense of special destiny.

However, the Mahavansa is a court document that addresses the relationships between the ruling elite and the Sangha (Grant 2009). It does not deal with group identity nor does it map directly onto late 19th and 20th century Sri Lanka with the current context -- social mobility, power dynamics, class status as well as the hybridity of the population. By re-reading the ancient chronicle with a specific ethno nationalist agenda and projecting it onto modern Sinhala identity, the context of unemployment amongst youth, rural and urban disparities, political corruption and so on was missed, and when the LTTE attacked Buddhist monks (and subsequently Buddhist places of worship), the Sinhalese were provoked into a response that drew ethnic and later religious lines in order to protect not only Buddhism but also the very unity of the country.

The Colonial Period

The colonial period, especially under the British, is often blamed by most analysts for sowing the seed of ethnic divisions that thrived in the post 1948 Sri Lanka, as it fostered and emphasised a new concept of colonial identity (Rajasingham-Senanayake 1999). Other scholars emphasise the pre-colonial roots citing Tamil and Sinhalese kingdoms in Ancient Sri Lanka that existed in a perpetual state of conflict before the Portuguese captured the island in 1505 (Imtiyaz and Stavris 2008). However, there has been a tendency to misread the past (especially the pre-colonial era) to talk about ‘two opposed nations’ projecting the Tamil-Sinhalese interaction within the current conflict, as a continuity from the past rather than a recent upsurge (Bush 2003). These ‘identities’ are very much the product of a 19th century (later evolving in the 20th century) mind frame and to see them as conflicts between the ‘invading’ Tamils and the ‘resisting’ Sinhalese does not necessarily help in understanding the reality of earlier centuries (Feith 2010).

Since the interpretation of Sri Lankan history is mainly written from a partisan Sinhala or Tamil point of view with selective use of literature and archaeological evidence, presenting a narrative of opposition through warfare that seems to gloss over the past centuries arguments (especially over events which allegedly occurred between the fourth century BC and the 10th century AD), it is ‘often difficult to disentangle the historical evidence from the nationalist framework imposed upon it’ (Nissan and Stirrat 1990, p.22). This colonial and partisan interpretation of the past has, thus, not only conditioned analysis of the conflict in Sri Lanka but cast it as a ‘bipolar interaction of relatively homogenous groups’ (Bush 2003, p.34). This has also been made difficult by the colonial period which put forward certain assumptions based on many influences, including the

7 The British period had further emphasised Sri Lanka’s three main ethnicities: Sinhala, Tamil and Muslim. Muslims are classed separately because of a slight difference in culture, food and dress, whilst holding different religious traditions, rituals and practices. Within the Sinhala and Tamil ethnicities, there is a further division based on religion as there are Sinhalese Buddhists, Christians and Muslims and within the Tamil community there are Hindus, Christians and Muslims (International Crisis Group 2007a).
types of sources available, the broader trends in European historical writing, and the ideological and social positions of the authors and their intended audiences, which were subsequently never challenged (Rogers 1990).

Despite the fact that Sri Lankan history is written by two different sets of communities, each stressing the claim of their own constituency, the pre-colonial history of Sri Lanka in fact does not conform to this model of two opposing nations (Nissan and Stirrat 1990). There is Tamil ancestry amongst Sinhalese8 with the Sinhalese language showing an influence of Tamil language, and the Sinhalese caste system being similar to that of south India, so much so that ‘… during these centuries the people living in this period would not have necessarily identified themselves as Tamil or Sinhalese... ’ (Feith 2010, p. 347).

Not only did Tamils and Sinhalese live together peaceably for most of the two millennia, but there was considerable social, political and economic commonality between them (Bush 2003, p.34).

The early 16th and 17th centuries saw writings from early Europeans in Sri Lanka who discovered people in the north and east who spoke Tamil (and were called Tamil because these people recognised the similarity to the Tamil people of south India) and were ruled by kings who had rivalries with other rulers on the island yet also commonly spoke Sinhalese (Hellman-Rajanayagam 1990). While this explains the dynastic wars that were fought and the differences existing between diverse groups of people on the island, it does not explain the unique channelled Sinhala-Tamil communal violence that dated from after Independence (Bush 2003), and so ‘...the point is simply that differences of languages, custom and religion were made into something new by the devices of the modern state... ’ (Nissan and Stirrat 1990, p.24). This is emphasised by Bush (2003) who further illustrates that even at the height of severe violence in the country, there existed pockets and process of inter-group cooperation and peaceful coexistence; thereby implying that the violence (and group boundaries) were not continuous, undifferentiated and impenetrable.

Thus, prior to the 19th century the ideal congruence of race, language, religion and political territory assumed in current nationalist discourse was not clear-cut and in the pre-modern states of Sri Lanka, there could not have been signs of the incipient Sinhala-Tamil conflict as understood today because these categories did not bear the nationalist connotations that they now bear (Nissan and Stirrat 1990). There were no political claims to the existence of different identities and up to the 1870s...

...we thus find an awareness of being Tamil, even an awareness of a historical tradition that differs slightly from that of the Sinhala, yet attached to one political

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8 The fact that King Vijaya had married South Indian (and therefore Tamil) women.
As theorists contend, the contemporary pattern of ethnic relations and tensions in countries like Sri Lanka is largely due to its colonial history, whose process created borders that included or divided ethnic groups and defined the demographic mixture of colonies that eventually became countries (Imtiyaz and Stavris 2008), while Sri Lanka being an island differs slightly.

British interest in Sri Lanka had first been aroused by its strategic significance in the Indian Ocean, but it also later became an important arena for commercial interests with the British introducing an independent capitalist sector, improving infrastructure like roads and enhancing the coffee and tea estates which resulted in large numbers of South Indian Tamil labourers being brought in to tend the estates (Nissan and Stirrat 1990), a phenomenon that would prove to be catalytic as well for the conflict (International Crisis Group 2006).

However, when they took control of Sri Lanka in 1796, the British had little understanding of the history and customs of the island which was further compounded by the heterogeneous situation, faced with people speaking a variety of languages, wearing a number of costumes, and following different religions. The colonial response to this was simplistic ‘...different groups in Sri Lanka were, it was argued, different races and different races had different customs’ (Nissan and Stirrat 1990, p.27) and hence the colonial powers began to create a body of knowledge that would provide information for both the practical needs of government and a general assessment of indigenous civilization on a universal scale of progress (Rogers 1990). Language, religion, custom and clothes were taken in various combinations as markers of racial variation, and by the end of the 19th century, a large number of distinct ‘races’ were recognised by the authorities in colonial Sri Lanka to include ‘Up Country’ and ‘Low Country’ Sinhala, ‘Ceylon’ and ‘Indian’ Tamils, ‘Moors’ (i.e. Muslims, again divided into Ceylon Moors and Coast Moors), Veddas, Burghers (divided into Dutch and Portuguese Burghers), Malays, Eurasians and Europeans. Furthermore, other groups were also considered ‘races’ at times: the Mukkuvars, the Vagga, the Rodiya and so on (Ibid.).

The British colonial ideology in particular served to influence perceptions of the past whereby the images that were developed during this period were produced by the use of 19th century Western historical ideas and methods. These ideas were essentially based on the assumption of the decline of a great ancient civilization and the presence of different antagonistic groups threatening the sanctity of the nation-state (Rogers 1990). This central idea of a rise and decline of an ancient civilization, was almost universally accepted and developed after 1840 by the anti-colonial revival movements both because it was plausible—it was confirmed by the Mahavansa (in the case of the Sinhalese) and the ruined irrigation tanks and cities around Sri Lanka—and because ‘it was consistent
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with the pattern of European historiography, which looked to the classical civilization of Greece and Rome’ (Rogers 1990, p.102). It was also promoted by people who were not professional historians but ‘activists’ from other disciplines such as law, who were not only influenced by the circumstances but in some cases were rebelling against it’ (Ibid.).

By developing this idea, the anti-colonials from the Sinhala community, succeeded in articulating a ‘Sinhalese’ ideology (which has existed to its contemporary form) as an essential part of contemporary Sri Lankan culture. Being a majority community and with its associations with language, race and religion, this ideology succeeded in thoroughly permeating such areas of intellectual activity as creative writing, the arts and historical writing and radically transforming and refashioning the normative view of Sri Lanka’s past. It is important to remember that these anti-colonial revival movements were not just concentrated with the Sinhalese (Nissan and Stirrat 1990). The Tamil community in their own way set about rediscovering ancient Tamil literature and heritage, while the Muslim community also used this opportunity to develop a link to their unique heritage as well as develop their own distinct identity (Rogers 1990). In developing this group consciousness, the social classes created by colonial rule and influence drew as much on European thought as on their own past traditions.

The British colonial rulers ‘believed themselves to be involved in a civilizing process’ (Nissan and Stirrat 1990, p.27) and introduced ideological capitalist imperatives, committed to the liberal values of 19th century Britain. Thus, introduction of ideas about the individual, rights in private property, ‘and about the various aspects of modern society which Weber referred to as bureaucratization and rationalization were all parts of this process’ (Ibid. p.27). From the viewpoint of the British, ancient Sri Lanka might be one of the wonders of the world, and its achievements celebrated, but further progress depended on the ‘successful introduction of European ways’ (Rogers 1990). Thus, from mid 19th century, the island’s history was judged according to Victorian standards in the context of human progress and imposing ‘modern social categories, such as nationality, on the Sri Lankan sources’ (Ibid. p. 90). This was contested by those anti-colonial parties, who maintained that a great civilization had existed in Sri Lanka, that had weakened as a product of specific historical circumstances, namely the imposition of modern notions of nationality under the influence of western thought. Consequently, the evidence that in ancient Sri Lanka, religious, linguistic, and ethnic identities were often fluid and not always congruent (and therefore there was commonality between mainly the Tamils and Sinhalese) was either denied or portrayed as an indication of decay (Ibid.) leading to a ‘particular colonial interpretation of the past which has conditioned the analysis of conflict dynamics and the definition of the groups in conflict, casting the conflict as the bipolar interaction of relatively homogeneous groups’ (Bush 2003, p.34).

Unfortunately, rather than seek to unify a Sri Lankan identity and history in opposition to a British colonial status that could be attributed to specific historical circumstances, the obsession with defining the origin and heritage of different social categories in 19th
In the years preceding and following independence, the prominent movement within the anti-colonial parties for this identity were led by Sinhalese elites, who promoted the notion that equated race, religion, culture, and language as unchanging components of the Sinhala nation throughout the ages (Rogers 1990), but recognised the advantages that capitalism and modern technology had brought them. Hence Buddhism, which was considered the weakest link in the colonial chain, became the channel for the Sinhalese elite to voice their opposition not only towards the colonial power but also as a way of mobilizing popular support in search of an ‘idyllic’ past (Ibid.). Thus, the concept of ‘Sinhala-Buddhist’ came into use to denote a group of people who are distinguished from the Sinhala of the other faiths and also from the Buddhists of other ethnic groups (Ibid.).

Eventually with the emergence of mass politics in a post independent era, portrayal of the ‘Sinhala Buddhist’ as a victim of the colonial era and an underprivileged group, mainly by people such as Anagarika Dharmapala (who was probably the first person to use the term ‘Sinhala Buddhist’), gained traction (especially after universal suffrage was introduced to the island in 1931), and the need to struggle for the ‘legitimate rights of the Sinhala Buddhists’ (Gunawardana 1990, p.76) became an essential part of the Sinhalese-Buddhist ideology. Consequently, the Sinhala Buddhist construct entered the consciousness of the masses, tying together an appreciation of a common culture that underlined Sinhala as a linguistic entity and overarched local, regional and cast identities. Whilst this construct was predominantly Buddhist in definition, it glossed over the Sinhala Christian sections of the community, preferring a ‘...nationalist movement with certain anti-imperialist potentialities’ (Ibid.). In other words, this nationalist movement emphasised the achievements of an ancient past thereby offering an anti-colonial channel for the Sinhala people to strive to achieve ‘progress’ (in a colonial sense) while maintaining their cultural pride. By developing the Mahavansa ideology, it also allowed the elite to once again set themselves above ‘the mass of poor people’ who ‘needed the

9 These Sinhalese elites were adequately supported by other minority elites such as the Muslims who were keen on retaining their political independence, legitimacy and religious privileges (Ismail 1995).

10 The portrayal of ‘the Sinhalese Buddhists’ as an underprivileged group had a certain basis in fact in that, under British rule, governmental patronage had favoured Christians, particularly those converted to the Anglican faith.

11 It is interesting that this narrative was changed according to circumstances. In some cases, it was necessary for the concept of Sinhala nationalism to consider both Buddhists and Christians. But in other circumstances, the more traditional Sinhalese elites, many of whom were Christian, were portrayed as being too conservative and subservient to the British to provide the leadership the island needed. Thus, narratives by the middle class were used to justify historical images to set itself apart from the British, the poor, and the traditional elites, and to assign itself the role of leading Sri Lanka into the new age of progress (Rogers 1990).
elite to help them rediscover indigenous culture and meet the challenges of the modern world’ (Rogers 1990, p.103).

By the end of the 19th century, this Buddhist revival vis-à-vis nationalist identity succeeded in placing religion at the forefront of most social debates and public activities (Ibid.). In particular, it also became another indirect anti-colonial tool especially in the face of Christianity, by many of the ‘upwardly mobile’ Buddhist elites to challenge the authority of the British and the power and influence of more traditional elite families, many of whom were Christian (and often ethnically Tamil).

Helped by the British ‘divide-and-rule colonial practices’, conditions were inevitably created for these revival movements to flourish into nationalist movements by the turn of the 20th century and in the lead up to independence. The concept of Sinhala nationalism in particular gained strength and the symbolic anti-colonial rhetoric that promoted one ‘nation’ above the ‘other’ gained momentum, developing prominent polarising positions for both the communities which hardened in a post-independence and conflict era and with the articulation of a Muslim ethnic identity in the late 19th and early 20th century, posing a challenge for the future (see Ali 1997; Ameerdeen 2006; International Crisis Group 2007; Imtiyaz 2012; McGilvray and Raheem 2007; McGilvray 2011).

In Sri Lanka today there are then three communities, all three asserting their own integrity, but based on three entirely different notions of selfhood. One can only speculate as to what this augurs for a future settlement to the country’s conflict (Haniffa 2008, p.372).

The International Community
As has been stated above, since the end of its conflict in 2009, Sri Lanka has been under international scrutiny for its ‘deteriorating’ human rights (International Crisis Group 2013). In early March 2013, the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) passed a US-backed resolution on Sri Lanka’s human rights ‘violations’ during the end of the war in 2009 (Ratnayake 2013). The Government of Sri Lanka has rejected this latest resolution, like it has done so in previous circumstances (Daily Mirror 2013a), citing international interference and conspiracy for internal affairs. This scrutiny by the international community has not really gone down well in Sri Lanka who routinely dismisses the latter as being ‘agents of the LTTE’ (Daily Mirror 2013 b).

While, there is an important geo-political context to understand vis-à-vis Sri Lanka’s relationships with India and China which should not be underestimated, it is nonetheless clear that Sri Lanka’s attitude towards the international community (especially the West) is seen from the lens of geo-politics (that is also coloured by a colonial heritage and a perception of the West’s bias in favour of the LTTE). Thus, any attempt by the international community (or organisations) to address or highlight issues will fall on deaf
ears of the authorities whose foreign policy has been reserved to tackling international criticisms of the end of the war (Silva 2013).

Therefore, any attempt to influence the current domestic scenario and perhaps provide ‘advice’ to Sri Lanka to address rising hate speech which is detrimental to its post conflict reconciliation has to be approached in a different manner. It has to be an organic process that takes into account Sri Lanka’s culture and thinking. It is something that allows Sri Lanka the space, time and opportunity to undertake this process itself. One way to provide influence is for the international community to engage with Sri Lanka on its own term and with its own mechanism. Another, is to encourage and support the Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC) set up by the Sri Lankan Government ‘to look back at the conflict Sri Lanka suffered as well as to look ahead for an era of healing and peace building in the country’ (The Government of Sri Lanka 2011, p.1).

It is telling that in one of its recommendations, the Commission recommended that laws should be developed and enforced to prevent ‘hate speech’ that could contribute to communal disharmony (The Government of Sri Lanka 2011, Section 9.283, 387). In addition to this, Chapter 8 of the Commission report goes into a lot of detail of interfaith activities especially the role of religion in reconciliation. In this chapter, the Commission recommends that the ‘culture of suspicion, fear, mistrust and violence needs to be removed and opportunities and space open up in which people can hear each other and be heard’ (The Government of Sri Lanka 2011, Point 9.177, p.368). Emphasising the constructive role that interfaith groups could play in promoting ethnic and religious harmony, the report suggests peace education and admits that the state has to do more to reach out to minorities.

What the LLRC report shows is that the thinking to support post conflict reconciliation is there, however the current circumstances in Sri Lanka show that the recommendations are from being realised nor is there a will (at least publicly) from the Government to enforce it. This is something that the Commission Report also concludes in that ‘One of the dominant factors obstructing reconciliation in Sri Lanka is the lack of political consensus and a multi-party approach on critical national issues’ (The Government of Sri Lanka 2011, Point 9.282, p.386). Undoubtedly, the Government has to do a lot more to ensure confidence of the international community by implementing core recommendations of the LLRC (International Crisis Group 2013).

**Moving Forward**

Given the country’s history of violent resistance to state power perceived as unjust, the current tensions in the country can only increase the risk of an eventual outbreak of political violence which could have regional implications. It should not be underestimated that the current trend in Sri Lanka of the ethno-religious national politics is not in isolation. We see similar scenarios in India and more related to Sri Lanka,
identical rhetoric and justifications being used in Myanmar, by Buddhist clergy who share the same ideology of Theravada Buddhism (Deegalle 2006). Thus, any change of ideological thinking amongst Buddhist clergy and people will relate to thinking and dialogue amongst governments and regional organisations. The foundational myth of ethnic separation and integration developed from Anagarika Dharmapala that provided political legitimacy to Buddhist nationalism has to be challenged and the narrative changed. The first part of changing this narrative is tackling the hate speech that is being propagated by Buddhist monks and groups to dehumanise the other faith (and ethnic) groups thereby justifying violence against the Muslims and Christians. This requires interfaith dialogue and multi faith action not only at the higher echelons of religious leadership, but also started at the grass roots involving all stakeholders including civil society, private and public sector. There needs to be parallel efforts to build trust between people and communities through multi faith interactions and crossing ethnic divides (Saleem 2013). This is the role that the civil society and in particular the religious leaders should be playing in order to bring about reconciliation that rebuilds trust, reducing suspicion and infusing human values with an understanding of the need to move away from apportioning blame for deceit and destruction. Trust can only be rebuilt when a space is created for effective dialogue and understanding. This space is one that starts at community levels with community organisations, leaders and intellectuals. Rebuilding trust is about honouring unity and celebrating diversity, working towards equity and justice and ensuring the eradication of social prejudices in building a collective identity.

In order to protect the rights of all religious communities and to ameliorate tensions in Sri Lanka as a part of the larger post war reconciliation, there has to be a greater engagement between the Government, political and civil society actors and society at large to ensure that incidents are recorded and the culture of violence and intolerance addressed. The Government has a role to ensure that the rule of law is maintained and that those responsible for inciting and perpetrating violence are dealt with. In addition, it is important to take note of the LLRC report which recognised that the country is enriched by its religions and that religious leaders must be united in providing leadership encouraging people of all faiths to act by emphasising religious commonalities and focusing on factors that contribute to a shared vision and promoting ethnic and religious harmony (The Government of Sri Lanka 2011). In particular, formation of ‘Committees of Conscience’ could work at the grass roots level and act as a mechanism to serve as an early warning system which could be a useful preventive measure to ensure communal tension is reduced (Ibid.).

Changing the narrative perhaps is also about discussing the concept of citizenship, the role of governance, the idea of multiculturalism and the concept of social contract. This is perhaps the first step in order to overcome the narrow definitions of national identity so far developed in Sri Lanka. Sen (2006) talks about the key to good citizenship and social cohesion (which are components in a cosmopolitan society) as being the encouragement and retention of multiple identities, where people have several enriching identities:
nationality, gender, age and parental background, religious or professional affiliation. Understanding the role of religion within this complex public sphere, will then challenge people to accept this diversity and create equal opportunities for diverse communities, ethnicities, traditions, cultures and faiths, which add a richness and variety to diversity and pluralism as part of a commonwealth that needs to be celebrated in the global civil society and integrated into life as a positive force for development.

In the case of Sri Lanka, there will also be a need to redefine the functions that religion or religious identity perform in the public sphere. Negotiating this can be complex and is compounded by what Asad (2003, p. 180) explains as ‘...the difficulty of allowing multiple ways of life to flourish in ever complex space and time.’ Harmonious pluralism requires rethinking on a number of levels and an honest dialogue among all parties involved in each particular context.

Sri Lanka needs to understand religious pluralism. It needs to articulate the values and principles which in the past have been defined often (Vellani 2001) by common values which espouse the notion of a shared humanity; social responsibility which is about working against social injustice and articulating social justice and ethics. The key to the issue of respect, understanding and acceptance of religious pluralism is the question of how individuals and groups relate to each other.

From a regional level, either through (SAARC\textsuperscript{12} and/or ASEAN\textsuperscript{13}), there needs to be honest conversation about the concept of identity, citizenship and social contracts so that governments (and ultimately people) can understand their roles, responsibilities and what is expected of them. It should be enhanced through a comprehensive education strategy and peace building policy, both formal and informal, that breaks down the seemingly insurmountable divide of us and them. Regional organisations such as ASEAN or SAARC can also provide support in terms of capacity to countries like Sri Lanka and Myanmar in their transition from post conflict or authoritarian rule, respectively. Sri Lanka and Myanmar are due to take leadership of the Commonwealth and ASEAN (respectively) which means upholding certain values of democracy, equality and rule of law. Given what is happening in the countries currently, there will be scepticism and international pressure that they can actually take the leadership of such organisations. There needs to be support provided to these organisations to help them through these periods.

The key is to react, change, evolve and redefine in response to a new context. The management of religious and cultural differences and the treatment of minorities are key elements of successful governance. The spread of ideas and movements has been accelerated by globalisation and thus communities become more global and issues such as human rights, democracy and social development become globally entrenched norms.

\textsuperscript{12} South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation.

\textsuperscript{13} Association of South East Asian Nations.
Religious pluralism can lead to an absence of violence mainly due to better understandings and interaction but more importantly it opens a space for discussion, dialogue and engagement. Simply put: We need to have this dialogue and we also need to learn to listen closely to one another as a first step to working with each other, because it is possible that we might learn something important about ourselves and become better human beings, building a better global village in the process.

Faith identities will continue to be part of the picture (Clarke 2010) not only of Sri Lanka but of many parts of South Asia. The key is to harness these identities in a way that brings benefit to the community for as Martin Luther King said ‘an individual has not started living until he can rise above the narrow confines of his individualistic concerns to the broader concerns of all humanity’ (King 2001, p.17).
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Section 6
Conflicting Female and Feminist Identities post 9/11

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Caught between an Onslaught of Imperialisms:
Constructing Feminist Identities in Contemporary Pakistan¹
Shama Dossa*, Saliha Ramay** and Tabinda Sarosh***

Abstract
The paper articulates findings of an autoethnographic research study by three Pakistani self-identified feminist activists who were born in the Zia-ul-Haq era (1980s). All three have spent the last ten years working as feminist activists in Pakistan. The focus of their inquiry is on feminist identity construction in the contemporary context of Pakistan amongst their own generation. Using a transnational feminist analytical lens, the authors draw on their experiences, observations and discourse, exploring multifaceted identities and choices as Pakistanis and as feminists analysed through narratives. Challenging the boundaries of research and researcher, the study involves overt critical subjectivity as their narratives are deconstructed. Exploring emerging feminist perspectives as well as the social transformation of thought, ideology and practices, collective analysis suggests that the last decade’s complex social and geo-political circumstances and the multitude of actors projecting their mutated versions of feminism and empowerment are key contributing factors to the current conservatism they encounter.

The study also asserts that although 9/11 left an indelible mark on the course of events in Pakistan it cannot be seen, nor must it be built up as the only defining moment of the decade. 9/11 was only one such manifestation which re-fuelled the perennial debate between the orient and the occident; the subject and other. The authors’ analysis demonstrates that forces of imperialism morph and reappear in different guises making the path for activism murky and fraught with challenges very different from what feminists in the generation before them had to encounter. In Pakistan today, feminist ideological analysis and debates seem to have fewer spaces for discussions and visibility. Feminists today stand cautious and threatened by increasing intolerance amid fears of accusations of being pro-West. The study concludes that a paradigmatic shift is required by feminists of their generation if they are to assume leadership positions in the movement. This shift requires being self-critical and conscious of the choices they make, both at a theoretical and at a pragmatic level.

¹ This chapter has been approved as a research paper by the referee.
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Introduction

The focus of this inquiry is on feminist identity construction in the contemporary context of Pakistan. As Pakistani researchers and activists born in the era of the military dictator General Zia-ul-Haq, we critically explore our understanding of feminist identity construction through an autoethnographic study drawing on a transnational feminist framework to situate our contemporary analysis.

Through this paper we demonstrate that for us, collaborative praxis is a pragmatic and paradigmatic shift needed for negotiating the challenging terrain of imperialism and identity politics in Pakistan. We believe, based on findings of this study, that such a strategy can support movement building and feminist leadership given the need at this moment for solidarity across generations, class, borders and ideologies to address the growing social injustice we witness every day.

We begin this paper stating our theoretical underpinnings, followed by a description of our methodology outlining the choices and rationale for the study. We then present a discussion of our findings and concluding statements written as a three-way narrative.

Theoretical Framework

According to Swarr and Nagar (2010), a transnational framework requires tools and practices that address the logic and practices of imperialism and capitalism and ways in which they structure neo-colonial patriarchal relations. This requires dealing with complex and contradictory ways in which such processes are shaped. Additionally it requires integrating critiques, action and self-reflection so as to 'resist a priori predictions of what might constitute feminist politics in a given time and space' (p. 5).

We also take inspiration from Reason’s (1998) concept of a ‘participatory world view’ who proposes that the purpose of inquiry is to find ways to live our values and purposes in practice and to develop practical skills to change the world (Ibid.). The purpose for us is to move towards a vision which will create a more direct link between intellectual knowledge and personal action (Ibid.).

We see this interrogation and its publication as an opening point for feminist theorizing and our attempt at collaborative praxis – one through which we create knowledge interweaving theory and practice – a collaborative dialogue and safe space for us to reflect critically situating our theorizing in our own historical political and geographic locations. Feminists for many years have been engaged in a process of deconstructing identity politics and highlighting intersecting modes of discrimination across gender, nationality and class which continue to be used as a tool of oppression and inequality (Chenoy 2010). We seek to challenge negative politics through collaborative praxis by our act of feminist identity articulation situated in context.

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2 Famed for pushing women’s rights in Pakistan into the dark ages with his promulgation of the Hudood Ordinances and other repressive policies that blocked free speech.
For us, this is a process of untangling positionality and rejecting universal categorization despite being subject to competing forms of imperialism. By imperialism we refer to international and home grown dominating and subordinating forces that aim towards absolute regional economic and cultural hegemony (Chomsky 2008). In the context of Pakistan, US imperialism and the pivotal position of Saudi Arabia in this exercise of power are of significant concern. The United States has had a long history of intervention in Pakistan through its military and economic policies pre- and post-Cold War. ‘Saudi Arabia and its oil exporting prowess is one of the chief weapons in the arsenal of US imperialism’ (The New Wave 2012). These forces manifest themselves in the form of policy, practice, or advocacy to further their ambitions in the control of economic and political resources supported by various moralizing and civilizing discourses. The Saudis exert political pressure through financial channels to spread the most conservative form of Sunni Islam, Wahabbism and funding madrassa education. They use their big Islamic brother role to mould Pakistani foreign policy in line with their own and by extension conforming with the interests of the United States (The New Wave 2012).

We argue that the choices for us as feminists are not so simple nor are they choices we wish to make. What appears on the surface to be a simple binary position of “You are either with us or against us” – a choice of warped religious beliefs on one hand and secular values and rationality on the other are interconnected strategies of taking forward the imperialist agenda. Additionally, there are also new analytic mutations in the form of academics who draw on their South Asian background and present themselves as authorities—making gross assumptions about our positionality and politics trying to define who we are and what we stand for. They claim that feminists like us ‘preserve secular liberalism’ by often resorting to ‘illiberal means’, and that we ‘...show a marked partiality for authoritarianism and for the military, as long as these are of ’secular’ variety’ (Toor 2012, p. 155).

Hence, the debate is even more complex as it is ridden not only with local and global politics, multiple interpretations of Islam, but also competing manifestations of feminisms and masculinities, academic power plays and colonial and post-colonial analysis. Therefore, praxis for us in this context is theorizing on our identity as feminists based on pragmatic necessity and a need for clarity while facing pressures to be ‘civilized’ and ‘morally corrected’.

**Methodology**

This is a feminist co-constructed autoethnographic study produced through an iterative process of data making and analysis. Our choice of this methodology was based on the study focus. We needed a methodology and analytical framework that would support collaborative feminist research ethics and epistemology. Autoethnography is an emergent approach which seeks to describe and systematically analyse personal experience in order to understand cultural experience. Autoethnographers believe research can be rigorous, theoretical, analytical, emotional, therapeutic, and inclusive of personal and social
phenomena (Ellis, Adams & Bochner 2011). Influenced by feminist methodology and work of many feminist ethnographers, it places the self within a social context, therefore, making it appropriate to study identity (Holt 2003).

Autoethnographers use aspects of autobiography and ethnography to do and write research as a method. As a result it is both a methodological process and product which 'treats research as a political, socially just conscious act' (Ellis, Adams & Bochner 2011) and attempts to challenge power relations of the researcher and researched in the presentation of findings (Holt 2003). This approach acknowledges and 'accommodates subjectivity, emotionality, and researcher's influence on research' through the genre of critical analytical reflexive writing (Ibid.). Autoethnography is not simply story telling. It requires researchers to look at experience analytically, 'comparing and contrasting personal experience against existing research', drawing on peer review in order to produce 'thick descriptions' of personal and interpersonal experience (Ellis, Adams & Bochner 2011):

Co-constructed autoethnographic narratives illustrate the meanings of relational experiences, particularly how people collaboratively cope with ambiguities, uncertainties, and contradictions... (they) view relationships as jointly-authored, incomplete, and historically situated affairs. ...Often told about or around an epiphany, each person first writes her or his experience, and then shares and reacts to the story the other wrote at the same time (Ellis, Adams & Bochner 2011).

This form of exploratory research was new to all three of us. However, it also felt intuitive once we began. With Saliha in Islamabad, Tabinda in Karachi and Shama constantly travelling across the region, we decided to draw on the free technology of Skype and a process of journaling to collect our data. Over a period of three months in 2012 we were able to schedule five thematic discussions two to three hours each which were digitally recorded and transcribed. We would prepare for the discussion by journaling and reading literature that all three of us had collected based on an extensive literature review.
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Box 1: Emerging questions for interrogation during our discussions:

- What does it mean to identify ourselves as a feminist in the context of Pakistan?
- When and how did awareness of feminist identity take place?
- What influences our ideology and activism?
- What strategies do we take to operationalize this identity in practice?
- Does the secular strategy taken still apply in the context of feminist activism in Pakistan?
- What does it mean to be a secular feminist when the language has been co-opted by imperial feminism?
- Do we dare to ask - is there still a cohesive women’s movement in Pakistan?
- Can we say that we truly belong to an indigenous movement?
- Am I a secular feminist if I identify myself as a Muslim?
- Was 9/11 a turning point?
- What are the politics of knowledge, places and spaces we occupy to make feminist solidarity work possible?

The process was challenging with at times weak internet connections, family and work travel commitments. Despite tough work and life schedules, the importance this research held for us was motivation enough to continue with the dialogue and conversations.

Analysis and Representation

Once all three of us felt we had reached saturation point with the themes, each of us began to document our analysis of the data we had produced and followed it up with Skype discussions. We worked by grounding the local in relation to the global – moving from theory to action and back, theorizing from within - through critical self-reflection situating our analysis in context.

Autoethnography has been critiqued for being too self-indulgent and not rigorous enough as a methodology. However, it has also been argued that traditional criteria used to judge qualitative research may not be appropriate for autoethnography given its specific nature and objectives. Ellis, Adams & Bochner (2011) argue that research quality parameters of ‘truth’, ‘reliability’, ‘validity’ and ‘generalizability’ need to be understood and defined in context, meaning and utility of the methodology. For example ‘truth’ must be valued in terms of ‘what a story of experience does—how it is used, understood, and responded to for and by us and others as writers, participants, audiences...’ They also suggest that what is understood and referred to as truth changes depending on the writing or representational experience (Ibid.).

Consequently, reliability for autoethnographers refers to the ‘narrator’s credibility’ (Ibid.). Questions like could the narrator have experienced what she has described based
on presented evidence or her beliefs need to be asked. In addition according to Ellis, Adams & Bochner (2011) asking questions such as ‘how useful is the story?’ and ‘what use can the story be put?’ are also as important. For autoethnographers, validity means that a work seeks a ‘lifelike, believable’ (Ibid.) experience – ‘a feeling that what is represented could be true’. What is of significance is how the reader is supported in engaging with the story and entering the world of the narrator (Ibid.).

‘The focus of generalizability in autoethnography moves from respondents to readers, and is always being tested’ by readers through their engagement (Ellis, Adams & Bochner 2011). For example as you read this account ‘you are the one who will determine if the story speaks to you about [your] own experience or about the lives of others [you] they know’ (Ibid.). Readers ‘provide validation by comparing their lives to ours’ (Ibid.).

We were aware of the critiques of this methodology; so, we used a process of peer review of field texts and dialoguing process to counter this. Additionally as required by qualitative research, we drew on critical subjectivity in our documentation, data making and analysis processes to ensure validity. In order to address emotions, we used the process reflexive journaling and peer support, therefore allowing for managing of emotions. Peer review and journaling contributed to the ‘trustworthiness,’ credibility, or rigour of the study to manage our own subjectivity. We saw our data as narratives – narratives as meaning/sense making tools, as an identity construction process, as a means of solidarity, as a therapeutic process, as a means of documentation, as a critical feminist project. We began to see our very ‘selves’ as ‘storied’ and these stories were the locus of our identity as individuals and as feminists.

Richardson (2004) gives an inspirational notion of ‘writing as a way of knowing’ and as a method of discovery and analysis during this process. We found that the mode of representation – text as a conversation to be the most appropriate to the way we wanted to structure our analysis. We also found that creative writing and poetry gave us the liminal imaginative space to talk about and understand our data and writing in a way that almost became intuitive. The twists and turns in this liminal space were not controllable; they were intense and demanding. Some transcripts provided poetic occasions that moved us to fuse poetic and performative writing.

**Interrogating Feminist Identity – A Three-way Dialogue**

Saliha: One of my earliest memories that I associate with the word ‘feminism’ is a scene with my parents seated in front of the Chairperson of my Department at University. They sit uneasily facing her as she spoke…

“Take care of your daughter - she is copying a feminist” (she was referring to my supervisor in the Anthropology Department)
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“...and she is becoming one, a feminist!”

I had read feminist theory extensively by then, but somehow this is how it came to life as a concept for me. That was the moment that I actually realised that women are not a homogenous group, not in ideology, not in beliefs, nor in struggle. Our class, caste, religion and ethnic identity not only shape our perceptions of reality but also in most cases determine our struggles in life.

Feminism is a word sometimes used as an insult and as a mechanism for control and setting limits and boundaries in our context. You often hear comments like “zyada feminist banney kikoshish mat karo (don’t try to be a feminist)” or “keep your feminist ideas to yourself”. In many cases people making these comments do not even know what being a feminist means. It was difficult for me to understand what was so ‘dangerous’ about feminism. I was clueless about why my parents were cautioned. It seemed that theories and ideals look good from a distance but are not supposed to be followed in real life. I was faced by this dilemma again as I began my professional life I understood that being a woman and following one’s ideals is like walking against the direction of the wind, something I had been doing as a child. However, the full extent of the challenge of taking on the added identity of being a feminist had not sunk in. This entailed embracing my intrinsic rights and the urge to access them, which to date is an on-going struggle.

I recall something I read by Hogeland (1994) who talks of this fear of being associated with feminism:

> Women have real reasons to fear feminism, and we do young women no service if we suggest to them that feminism itself is safe. It is not. To stand opposed to your culture, to be critical of institutions, behaviours, discourses--when it is so clearly not in your immediate interest to do so--asks a lot of a young person, of any person. At its best, the feminist challenging of individualism, of narrow notions of freedom, is transformative, exhilarating, empowering.

Shama: For me, the realisation and formation of my feminist identity has been a conscious pursuit fraught with emotion and challenges. It was not that I had an ‘aha!’ moment the way Saliha described it. In addition, my identity as a feminist has also been tied to my identity as researcher-activist-academic living, working and teaching in Pakistan. As I reflect on my field experiences as a feminist and the literature I have encountered I experience a multitude of conflicting emotions, possessiveness, as well as pain and frustration at the manipulation, control and power struggle that my stories are entangled in. I ponder on the ideals of social change and praxis embodied in the concept feminist activism as movement building in Pakistan, moving from jaded pessimism, to ambiguity, to despair and then to hope.
Tabinda: My identity eluded me, playing hide and seek for a long time. I am often teased that I ‘inherited feminism’ and this sometimes makes me feel defensive and at times less credible. It raises questions about my processes of independent thinking, exploring and investigating as a researcher, as if my thoughts are not my own but inbred due to my ‘pedigree’ – a term Shama had once used.

Shama: It is true though –your mom is a feminist and a member of the Women’s Action Forum (WAF). Having parents as activists and having to leave the country for your beliefs says something about you as their child. It is not something to reject, I think it is something to be proud of.

Tabinda: I agree and yet such an inheritance comes with its burden and an internal resistance. Hoff (2012) in her paper talks about various implications of inheriting a word that is so powerfully meaningful already and the challenges of facing a future in a new and uncertain reality. There follows an urge to run away from identity categorization, from being boxed into ‘feminism’. To keep one’s wits on the ‘identity trail’ (Raab 2009) is a difficult task and this is further confounded when one is faced with multiple identities. A moment of revelation comes as a major life changing experience or a subtle learning process that employs and challenges faculties of mind left unexplored for long. This conscious embracing of identity after the ensuing of a learning process in a society where the word ‘feminist’ is a rebuke, a condemnation of sorts for me began after I joined Shirkat Gah. As a student in Dow Medical College, I felt caught between the stereotypical western and eastern images of womanhood. Girls like me strived between roles of dutiful daughters and ever-forgiving girlfriends, cautiously ambitious students and feminine yet modern women.

A collective female student voice was missing and the only female students active in any kind of politics or ideology were those associated with Jamiat, student wing of the right wing religious party, Jamaat-e-Islami. Jamaat had been instrumental in radical Islamization of the country as a part of Zia’s tactical strategy to strengthen his hold. They mobilized other students, constantly preached and motivated them to pray and cover themselves. Encouraged by their male counterparts they gave sermons in the girls common room which was not a popular hangout for my friends and I due to the air of indoctrination and non-inclusiveness it emanated. Thus, the only socio-political space available for women and approved by male students on the campuses was through the medium of religion. A similar phenomenon happened years later in the Parliament in 2000 when Pervez Musharraf increased the quota for women’s seats which women of politico-religious parties like the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) filled. This, despite their strong stance against women heading a state or contesting for any public office as part of the party’s state Islamization strategy (Jamal 2006). Amid these conflicting ideologies, girls on campus preferred to stay away from political and ideological labels. Feminism or even the concept of women empowerment was not popular and academic excellence was the only area which was pursued rather competitively.
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Saliha: Taking a secular stance to me is important and strategic, however, I feel that the struggle for change has been bounded by binaries, of being labelled western allies if one supports modernist and secular feminist stands or being fundamentalist right wing moralizing entities. My disagreement with both the binaries is the limited space to explore and understand the meaning of feminism and to take a feminist stand. The reaction from ‘progressive voices’ such as the lawyers movement after the assassination of Governor Punjab Salman Taseer in 2011 was a case in point. Many actually supported his assassin for his action in response to proposed amendments to the infamous Blasphemy Law.

Such betrayals have always kept me on the edge and led to additional confusion on how to position myself. I am suffocated by the realisation that the spaces for self-criticism, reflection and collective struggle are shrinking. I feel immense pressure to conform to certain typologies which qualify as a feminist. I believe this is a journey of struggle, of not only seeking justice in society but also justice within. The most difficult struggle for me has always been with myself, where I constantly question the meaning of ‘personal is political’. My dilemma has been to take a secular stand with other layers of identity that make me who I am.

Tabinda: But don’t you think it also has to do with the fact that we grew up under a military regime? I still remember an intense feeling of claustrophobia and a deep sense of tragedy around me as a child. Due to my parents’ involvement in the Karachi Union of Journalists, I was strangely aware of the magnitude of the setback the country had suffered. Journalists lost their jobs, were lashed in public and a heavy censorship policy was enforced. In circles around me, the sense of indignation surpassed all others and discourses at Karachi Press Club and women’s meetings (I, a toddler participant) centred around the ever decreasing space for expression, anti-women laws and policies, restrictive dress codes, the bigger global picture and imperialist designs of the US of A. The change in society gradually became visible and children like me only came to know, love and hate Pakistan in the 1980s. I think this strangulation of intellectual growth and imagination is connected with my identity construction.

Shama: For me the awareness of a military dictatorship did not come directly from my parent’s activism – in fact I did not know what the word meant nor had I heard of feminism. Cultural resistance in my house was witnessed by myself through my mother’s choice of not wearing a dupatta (large scarf) when she was going outside the house and my father’s constant reminders of ‘dupatta ley liya? (Have you taken your dupatta?) How many times do I have to tell you to take your dupatta when leaving the house.’ Wearing the dupatta for me became a symbol of the military dictatorship, Islamization and the exercise of power over my mother’s body.
Saliha: Unlike Tabinda’s experience of witnessing these changes up close, my experiences were rather insular. My father was an air-force officer and we lived at various airforce bases until I entered university. However, being exposed to a snapshot of the pre-9/11 events with you and Shama has helped me take on a new journey of analysis.

I remember segregated sports for girls in school when I was studying in P.A.F. Degree College Peshawar (1993), which I found absurd. I was not so familiar with these divisions. I remember the strict check on covering one’s head with a scarf, the PT master roaming around with his stick and the principal’s shrieking voice ordering girls to cover their heads. I remember attending a Nazia-Zohaib concert and Nazia carefully moving to the beat and the crowd going crazy. Next day the media noted how un-Islamic the girls in the crowd were. I recently read an article on pop music in the 80s where the author claims that,

*In the conservative Islamic culture of Zia-ul-Haq’s Pakistan in the 80s, Pakistani TV was at first reluctant to air the pop videos on PTV, but slowly, as the youth of the country went wild for the melodic tunes, the pop duo got airtime and recognition and are considered the true pioneers of pop culture in Pakistan, raising the spirits of the country* (Jamil, n.d).

Shama: The mandatory covering of heads, arabicized Urdu -- these were indications of how insidious Saudi cultural imperialism was to get. With each successive government, the Saudi hold has gotten stronger. It is funny how everyone at dinner tables and *dhabas* (cafeterias) talks about American imperialism and drones, yet very few want to discuss the spread of the Saudi influence in our country.

Tabinda: I agree that everything transformed in a sinister way, Saudi cultural imperialism infiltrated the local vernacular. Khuda Hafiz which was our routine goodbye, was scarcely replaced by Allah Hafiz, and Ramzan by Ramadan. People started correcting me in public and I being the person I am, resisted and still do to this day. In retrospect, a slow quiet Wahabi/Saudi imperialism had set its foot in the country, invading our social and professional interactions, our conversations and in many cases our very thoughts.

I remember the excitement in my mother’s circles when Mahtab Rashdi refused Zia’s decree to wear a *dupatta* on her head during news telecasts and had said, ‘I have nothing against wearing a dupatta on my head but not on the orders of a military dictator.’ Despite the oppressive environment the voice of dissent was significant and focused against the rightwing forces that were pushing the country back into the stone age. I consider myself fortunate that as a child I was able to observe the women’s movement in the 1980s by default. WAF became the symbol of women’s movement and speaking retrospectively the women around me were different from many others in the country. Instead of accepting and internalizing the newly introduced draconian policies, they
stood up publicly and the children who were around them still remember those vibrant days. They were ready for guerrilla activism, a rare commodity nowadays.

Shama: WAF was an important formation despite its primary composition being upper class formally educated women. It was the beginning of what has been termed the ‘contemporary women’s movement’ in Pakistan. Its presence was a symbol of resistance for Pakistani women against military rule and political Islam.

Tabinda: At a certain level, the class struggles transcended all movements including the left wing and women’s movement. Even as a child I could feel the difference when many women drove to the meetings or were chauffeur driven and others had to change two or three buses to get to the venue. But in those days, there was no concept of an NGO paying for your meeting and demonstration petrol. The modern NGO culture is very much a post 9/11 phenomenon.

Shama: But is it a post 9/11 phenomenon? I think the NGO culture began almost thirty years ago with the first women’s NGOs being formed. Not all of them have led to the corporatization and commoditization of activism. After Zia, I have to say the era of Benazir Bhutto and then Nawaz Sharif was a blur of ineffective policy decisions. Benazir had come to power bringing hopes and dreams of the masses and the elite…perhaps things could have changed had she not been assassinated but that is wishful thinking. However, I would argue that after Zia- ul-Haq was blown up, the coming of Benazir Bhutto provided spaces for NGOs and CBOs in all sectors of social development to mushroom.

Tabinda: I still assert that the “NGOization” culture is a post-9/11 phenomenon because of the aid that followed the commencement of ‘war on terror’ where Pakistan was deemed to be a key ally. Part of this funding was granted under various development and humanitarian heads and thus passed on to NGOs. In addition, in the wake of the two major humanitarian/disaster crisis (earthquake 2005 and floods 2010), funding agencies introduced the ‘gender marker’ requisition in 2009 (GTF 2010), in their proposal formats and every NGO working for disaster was suddenly a feminist rights based NGO working for women empowerment. This was also the beginning of the ‘sophisticated’ reporting era.

Saliha: Constant changing scenarios of funding also made things difficult for organisations trying to resist donor frameworks and working on their learning and direction. Many feminist organisations still do not work with United States Agency for International Development (USAID), but we have also seen leading feminist organisations bow down to it. The price of taking their money is that survivors of violence cannot be entertained in NGO offices due to security risks accentuated by USAID logos plastered on everything in their office from furniture to curtains. For me,
both USAID and Saudi funding are equivalent, as both fail to serve the very purpose of development. To quote writing in the context of education:

The agendas of Saudi Arabia and the US may be markedly different, but their strategies and their sly co-option of the good, the eye-opening, the liberating into mere packaging for warfare, make education the empty morsel that fills the stomach but provides no sustenance (Zakaria 2012).

Shama: I agree, the terms of these encounters with pre- and post-9/11 narratives of disasters and the war on terror revolve around the discourse of ‘development’. Development has also been termed a form of neo-colonialism with policies such as ‘tied aid’ and ‘structural adjustment’ resulting in governments being forced to cut down public spending budgets. National governments too have been identified as colluding with these international organisations and benefitting from the increased poverty of their own people. Escobar (1997) believes that development discourse shapes ‘Who can speak, from what points of view with what authority, and according to what criteria of expertise; it sets the rules that must be followed’ (p. 87); thereby shaping expressions of dissent and potentially limiting critical, challenging and emancipatory approaches (Ibid.).

Within the context of Pakistan, of particular concern is the rise of what Ali (2003) terms ‘US-based imperial neo-liberal globality’. He maps the intervention of the US government in Pakistan noting its role in the creation of the Taliban through CIA funding and Pakistani military collusion, and continuing with the contemporary so called ‘War on Terror’ which has killed hundreds of thousands of innocent civilians. This is imperialism; ‘an economic–military–ideological order that subordinates regions, peoples and economies worldwide’ (Escobar n.d., p. 1). ‘This feature has become central to the neoliberal approach of the American empire (even more so after the US-led invasion of Iraq)’ (Escobar n.d. p.3).

What is at stake is a type of regulation that operates through the creation of a new horizon of global violence (Ibid. p. 7).

Feminist critiques of the so called ‘War on Terror’ reveal how the rationale of intervention and invasion builds on, is fuelled by and embedded in the gendered politics of colonialism, nationalism, and liberalism (Abu-Lughod 2002). Transnational feminists also argue that much ‘liberal feminist discourse now universalizes a notion of global sisterhood under attack by Islamic fundamentalism, female genital mutilation, and so called ‘honour’ killings’ (Maira 2009, p. 643) without nuanced context-specific understandings.

Spivak (2004) observes that ‘Something called terror is needed in order to declare a war on it – a war that extends from the curtailment of civil liberties to indefinite augmentation of military self-permission’ (p. 91). According to Abu-Lughod (2002) with
the initiation the War on Terror public obsession with ‘the veiled oppressed Muslim woman’ and her need to be ‘saved, liberated and empowered’ has gained momentum and has acquired an interesting instrumentalist twist. Feminist discourse has now been brought into the service of Western governments where the ‘the fight against terrorism’ has slid into the ‘fight for the rights and dignity of women’ ‘horrifying’ ‘civilized people’ (Bush 2001). As a result, the War on Terror is packaged as rational, moral and legitimate where ‘certain lives are valued over others’ supported by narratives of empowerment. This discourse of ‘Colonial Feminism’ presents the War on Terror as a matter of survival and therefore a rationale for legitimating other acts of violence in the name of safety, self-defence and women’s empowerment (Abu-Lughod 2002).

As I write, the war talk and development nexus has now been extended to justify demand and allocation of funds for flood relief and reconstruction to Pakistan where the US government has rationalized the provision of funds to Pakistan to counter any gains ‘terrorists’ will make in supporting the relief effort.

9/11 was a frenzy that was created by media hype. One cannot discount the role of the media in constructing it as a turning point. Nor can one discount the impact this frenzy had on the minds of people who were forced to repeatedly witness the event and its aftermath. I don’t think anyone can deny the tragedy of the event or the loss of lives. However, you also need to keep in mind how incidents like these are used in the service of imperialism. The oppressed Muslim woman is a requirement for maintaining the binary of the savage Muslim and civilized, responsible western arguments such as the ‘clash of civilizations’ fit very well into such narratives. It further legitimated all brown bodies to be identified as objects of suspicion. Maintaining the existence of the ‘other’ provides an extremely productive function: that of maintaining a specific hegemonic identity and all that this implies in material terms for the human subject (Yegenoglu 1998, p. 82). After sitting in an interrogation detainment facility twice I can vouch for this. I was on my way to give a guest lecture at the University of Iowa on the discourse of empowerment. As I sat waiting to be interrogated at an American airport all I could feel was this intense sense of vulnerability, disempowerment and anger. One could almost laugh at the irony of the situation. That feeling does something to you. It is not that you begin to hate Americans… but there is a sense of unease and mistrust for the system and a heightened awareness of how forces of imperialism are supported almost by my presence in this situation.

Tabinda: 9/11 was crucial but certainly not the beginning or the end. Back in 1979, when a democratic government was toppled by a general, right wing parties supported the coup. Ironically, the same right wing parties are now seen criticising the US policies. USA supported the coup as they saw an opportunity to manipulate the political scenario

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3 ‘Colonial Feminism’ according to Abu-Lughod (2002) is the instrumental use of feminism which presents the ‘War on Terror’ as a matter of survival and therefore a rationale for legitimating other acts of violence in the name of safety and self-defence.
in Pakistan to gain access to Afghanistan and counter communist forces. Later, we saw the regime’s attempt to legitimise its rule by using religion and collaborating with the right wing forces and hence I disagree with analyses (Toor 2012) that imply that coalitions and movements such as Women Living Under Muslim Laws (WLUML) and the secular Pakistani feminist movements are a phenomenon that are connected to the post 9/11 global political shift and the ensuing war on terror.

Saliha: I guess 9/11 did contribute but definitely is not the only reason. During my MSc field work, I encountered the audio cassettes of Dr. Farhat Hashmi (Al Huda) which are predominantly part of many women’s lives and became an important data for analysis. I examined the teaching methodologies of the ‘Al Huda syndrome’, the creation of good vs bad, the obsession with the West conspiracy theories and East being victimised by the West and West the hand of devil. In my experience, Pakistan’s environment has grown more intolerant and immersed in religiosity than before and 9/11 accelerated the divide between the ‘good’ and ‘bad’ and the salvation it proposed lies in the extreme form of moral regulation. 9/11 gave a platform to politico-religious parties to base their politics around salvation in religion.

Zia (2009) points out that ‘It would be an academic inaccuracy to suggest that the events of 9/11 created ‘new’ religious identities for women’ (p. 31). She further adds that ‘the debates within the movement show that the spectrum of diverse feminist strands is really continuous from the past’ (p. 31) and I agree. My findings from the field were more an outcome of a peer pressure towards following Farhat Hashmi, and the divide was invisible between those who were following the radical stance of her teachings and between those who I would call moderates. Today the abayas (long gowns) and head scarves seen in universities and in villages are not an outcome of empowerment and choice, but stem from a pressure to conform. Acceptance of difference is now an illusion.

Tabinda: Pervez Musharraf’s government was at the heart of war on terror that ensued. Despite the introduction of some pro-women laws and a stronger female presence in the Parliament, we saw numerous women adopting restrictive dress and moral codes with a rise of female preachers and televangelists and religious schools where girls specifically those from privileged classes found a social refuge (Mushtaq 2006). Yet in an interview, four interns from the Women’s Studies Department of Karachi University, shared that most girls in the university covered themselves heavily, but the main reasons were protection from harassment, sunlight and pollution.

Saliha: Despite the claims of moderation and enlightenment, it seemed Musharraf’s measures were cosmetic. In fact, it was felt that religious extremism grew stronger in his time. I remember an experience from a workshop in Abbottabad with participants from Batagram where I was categorically told by a participant to stop discussing patriarchy as I was stepping ‘outside the circle of Islam’. That was the first time I felt threatened while working in this sector. I had goose bumps, I asked myself should I continue? I did. In the
same workshop as we distributed handouts on domestic violence, the same participant was handing out religious texts regarding women’s role.

Shama: You know I was thinking – we all at present work for NGOs and we do this as an active choice despite the challenges we face and the threats we encounter.

Saliha: It took me four years to convince my parents that I am serious about my work and this is what I really want to do. In family gatherings and weddings, I would be asked meaningful questions about my job. Some of the often repeated queries were, “Whose agenda are these NGOs working on?” “Who funds you and why?” “Bahirkay trips pay tumhey bhejty hoangay (they must be sending you on foreign trips)”. The questions infuriated me to no end.

Shama: I have to say that the contemporary context of NGOization is important to consider in our analysis of feminist identity politics. It may have started in the 1980s and gathered momentum in the 1990s, but in 2012 they replaced the role of the state to compensate for socioeconomic inequalities and social problems. Role of NGOs has both been lauded and criticised in international and local community development. NGOs are perceived as dynamic and privatised alternatives for development, democracy and empowerment. Expansion of NGOs over the last two decades as ‘value driven facilitators of change’ has mainly been based on the need for reducing the social costs of economic liberalization, such as growing social problems and also to fill the vacuum left by the state (Grewal 2005). It is assumed they are more aware and able to articulate and cater to the needs of vulnerable groups (Cornwall and Edwards 2010). NGOs are therefore presented as ‘saviours’ and above or beyond the neo-colonial differences in power (Grewal 2005, p. 138).

Saliha: You are right this notion of NGOs as saviours is problematic.

Shama: Additionally NGOs play a significant role in the production of professionalised empowerment. However according to Kamat (2002), it is a fallacy to assume that NGOs are autonomous from the dominant political economy, as this assumption obscures the interests of powerful states, national elites and private capital within development discourse. Crewe and Harrison (1998) highlight the switch from critical pedagogy to training which is now very popular in NGO circles. They claim what ‘technical knowledge’ is now of more value than structural analysis of oppression. Emergence of ‘experts’ is also linked to this training phenomenon, as trainings require expert trainers.

Saliha: So true, increased professionalisation distances us from communities and grassroots women’s groups, it also distances feminists in the movement who might have all the intellectual capacities, they might have lived every struggle of the movement... but might be marginalised due to our complete co-option of the English language in our correspondence and work places. This further weakens the movement and fails to include
women from the grassroots in the movement. Nagar (in Nagar and Raju 2003) shares the feelings of some grassroots women in her article…..

... workers feel terribly marginalised in a context in which generating sophisticated computer generated reports for the funders has become the most revered activity---- in which salaries, privileges and importance of the workers have shifted in favour of those who can really connect with the people in the "project areas" in terms of their languages, struggles and issues and who can help achieve concrete social goals (p.10).

The increased emphasis on professionalism makes me question if I am playing the role of a service provider or a change agent. This scenario seriously hinders the involvement of local community agendas as well.

Shama: The more political term feminist has largely been replaced in development speak by a more acceptable terminology gender. Cornwall (2000) highlights the phenomenon of gender=women. She sees men to be missing from the gender equation and only making occasional appearances as ‘Oppressor’, as figures women struggle with, fear, resist or resent withdrawing the option of multiple masculinities which are supportive of women.

Saliha: True. I think Rozan is one of the very few organisations that is working on masculinities4 in the context of Pakistan. Not many others take this perspective.

Shama: Writers and Nagar (2006) also reflect on the manner in which elitism and hierarchies reproduce hierarchies they are trying to dismantle. Empowerment in such cases gets ‘visualized as a concrete thing that can be measured, quantified, and replicated and that each piece of “empowerment” can be reduced to its component parts’ (p. 144) in a way depoliticising the activist agenda.

A critique of NGOization also comes from the platform of the World Social Forum, Hulme and Edwards (1997) suggest that donor-driven NGOs may have been socialised into the development industry to the extent that they may now be incapable of challenging the system. They fear that this will lead to ignoring issues of class, caste, gender and environmental justice in their own work, but even more dangerously, they will effectively marginalise and de-legitimise those people’s movements in this context the feminist movements for whom these issues form the core of their struggles.

4Rozan’s research carried out with five men from different parts of Pakistan who had taken action against various forms of sexual violence points to the complexity and instability of masculine identities (Rashid, Khan and Dossa 2012).
Conclusion

Shama: We began this study as a way to figure out where we are going and what we need to do as self-proclaimed feminists. We did not set out to define a prescriptive solution – one that is relevant to all Pakistani women. Instead we set out to analyse where we stand theoretically and ideologically in terms of what we have been a witness to and what we have experienced as feminists of a particular generation working and living in a particular context. We need to now consider what the implications of this discussion is for praxis.

Saliha: I believe by attempting this paper we attempt to bring forth the linkages that can be built on between three different persons with three different experiences, yet we were able to agree on many of the opinions. In our disagreements, there was always something that I would take with me as a learning or new perspective or vision to analyse things, which I feel is the need of the day to ensure that women’s movement builds on its strengths. We have to move away from the saviour syndrome so as to be clear about what we want to achieve as a movement.

Tabinda: Despite our differences and distinct experiences we were able to acknowledge each other as belonging to and evolving within a collective ideological identity which is essential to take the discourse and the struggle a step further. Shaheed (2007) also talks about the construction of collective identities and their mutability leading to a 'constant state of negotiation’ within and without, which for an activist is an act of continuous engagement with the state as well as society, peers and self. She reflects more on this in an interview with AWID (2008): ‘We must firstly re-appropriate for ourselves, individually and collectively, the right to design our personal and collective identities. We cannot let others do this on our behalf.’ So this is a first step, a beginning towards resisting point blank generalisation and a gradual construction of our identities on our own terms.

Shama: I think for us this taking a step back to analyse was a form of collective praxis – to begin to document and make sense in a very tangible way the forces of imperialism which tend to corner us and attempt to define us. It is our means of resistance – a denial of definition - through our own articulation and deconstruction. One cannot say that what is happening ‘makes no sense’ – it is very comprehensible and we can trace its roots. We are now armed with an analysis that is powerful and emerging. It is an on-going conversation not one that ends here. It is more a beginning.

I would say that what we have done may not be radical for some, but it is definitely radical for us. It provides us with a lens and language to respond. This collective voice gives us courage if not hope. We can say that we are not disempowered. We can resist being defined, stereotyped, civilized and morally reformed.
References


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Caught between an Onslaught of Imperialisms: Constructing Feminist Identities in Contemporary Pakistan


Political Instrumentalisation of the ‘Burqa’ in France
Nathalène Reynolds

Abstract
In November 2009, to the surprise of most observers, 57% of Swiss voters approved the initiative proposed by the populist Right to make the construction of minarets illegal. Arguing for the need to respect the principle of secularism, the following year France adopted legislation effective 11 April 2011 outlawing wearing of the burqa in public. Was this over-sensitivity consequent to western propaganda accompanying the American response to the events of 11 September 2001 that had instrumentalised rhetoric about women? I would like to focus on the French case and the problematic ‘integration’ (a leitmotif of Right – and far right-wing parties) of French citizens of Muslim origin. Drawing in particular on the concept of ‘murderous identities’ that Amin Maalouf defined, I will look briefly at the recent caricatures of the satirical weekly Charlie Hebdo after the appearance of the troubling film, The Innocence of Muslims, and then at the political instrumentalisation of the veil.

1 This chapter has been approved as a research paper by the referee.

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2 In France, the ban concerned the ‘voile integral’ – i.e. ‘full veil’ covering face (except the eyes), head and body.
Introduction
The crystallisation of identities is a phenomenon that invariably accompanies economic crises. I will be looking at such a process in Europe and more particularly France in this paper. I will examine a French nation that, having henceforth to acknowledge that it has lost its status of world power, takes a dim view of immigration to its territory, especially that which occurred some time after decolonisation. Suffering from an economic crisis that has hit employment in particular (just as European promises of prosperity that the adoption of the euro would bring have not materialised), France continues to preach ‘integration’, a concept that is but partially defined. Meanwhile, the radio and television mass media and right-wing press still today make frequent recourse to an odd oversimplification that mixes up religion (in this case Islam), social issues (immigration and delinquency) and what I would dare to describe as a political, economic and social problem – that of terrorism – onto which a still difficult to evaluate religious dimension has been grafted. Right-wing elements have for their part implicitly accused ‘foreigners’ (whose parents or even grandparents had lived in France) of ingratitude. Employing legislation that allowed French nationality to be acquired easily, they had never – in this reading – recognised the benefits that the country offered thanks to adoption of republican values.

It is especially the ‘integration’ of persons of Muslim descent which is sensitive. One can mention the struggle to climb the social ladder of those small numbers of them who, having managed to complete further education, in theory putting them in a better position than their parents, are somehow stigmatised by their very name. Rather than trying to open up the ‘ghettoes’ of the ‘cités’ (as the concentrations of low-rent urban dwellings are called) which families with higher than average income have left, France adopted in October 2010 a law that took effect on 11 April 2011 which made covering of the face and body with a ‘burqa’ in public places illegal. Parroting the slogan of an ‘invasion’ – of its territory – by an Islamism that predated or followed the attacks of 11 September 2001, to this day the country seems to be avoiding any analysis of a failure that is the outcome of successive urban policies – both of the Right and the Left.

It is, therefore, relevant to ask whether, and I borrow the expression of the author Amin Maalouf, ‘murderous identities’ exist in France, and to do so I will begin by looking back at the recent caricatures published by the non-mainstream weekly Charlie Hebdo, just after the depressing appearance on the web of the film The Innocence of Muslims. Later on, I will look at the issue of the veil and its political ramifications in urban France. In conclusion, I will come back again to the French model of integration, focusing on problems that the country can no longer continue to ignore, as concern mounts over terrorism growing on its soil. This will also offer me the opportunity to look at perspectives for a future, over which the economic crisis casts a heavy cloud.
On the Birth of ‘Murderous Identities’ in France

*Charlie Hebdo* breaks with the Libertarian Tradition

Muslims rose up once again when the Prophet of Islam, Mohamed (Peace Be Upon Him), became the target of another defamatory campaign, so soon after the appearance of an Islamophobic film – *The Innocence of Muslims*. The West, dubiously claiming it was acting in good faith despite the record of the past decade, argued for freedom of expression in the face of those calling for banning of the film. It pretended to forget that the international context had been profoundly changed in the aftermath of the 11 September 2001 attacks, as well as the role that the United States, seconded by its principally European allies, had assumed. In short, the Muslim world was seething with resentment, ignored by a West boasting of being the sole real defender of universal values. Those analysing the situation in France relative to national and international events cannot but hear the alarm bell ringing.

Continuing to put geopolitical realities to one side, French anti-clericals of various political allegiances have perhaps appreciated the recent caustic caricatures published in *Charlie Hebdo* after uploading onto the web of *The Innocence of Muslims*. Following the publication of its edition of 19 September 2002, the French satirical weekly stated that it treated all religious communities equally and that only the Muslim community took offence. Sensitive souls should steer clear. The often crude caricatures of *Charlie Hebdo* are by no means universally popular, even within the Far Left with which it identifies itself. As for the faithful from Christian and Jewish communities, they tend to pay no attention to the anticlericalism cultivated by the magazine. Riculing different religions, their beliefs and practices, and their adherents is, it is true, part of the republican tradition of a France that has tried to put into practice the 1905 legislation separating Church and State. This criticism in leftist circles has strengthened after the events of May 1968; in parallel, part of society – it is difficult to gauge its strength – maintained their faith, but tended to reduce their observation of religious rites, with the exception of the most significant annual celebrations.

1Note the impact of events that continue in the Middle East: French Muslims have not failed to question, especially since the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, the first Gulf War (August 1990 to February 1991) and 11 September 2001, what they implicitly consider to be impunity enjoyed by the state of Israel with regard to its policy towards the Gaza strip and the Occupied Territories. At the time of writing, the matter was once again in the headlines.

2Anticlericism is opposed to the interference of religious authorities in temporal affairs. Over time, the concept has come to no longer refer only to Christianity, and to apply to other religious interference in secular matters. Note that French secularism (‘laïcité’) has been sharply criticised, as we shall see.

3Parts of the latter community themselves mocked faith, suggesting religious practices are often a deliberate cover for financial and social considerations.

4However, the weekly is no stranger to libel cases.

5To simplify, a crisis (in universities, and social and political circles) shook French society, putting in question traditional values. *Charlie Hebdo* was born of this movement in November 1970, a week after the banning of *Hara Kiri Hebdo*. 
In the absence of official statistics, it is, however, difficult to gauge the strength of religious communities that evolved considerably since the legal separation of Church and State. If Catholicism remains the religion of the majority, Islam, in its various forms, has become the second faith of France. It is estimated that there are currently about four million persons of Muslim origin; about 6% of the population (but 14% of those in the age range of 18-24). Many have links with North Africa, but there are others from Sub-Saharan Africa and Turkey.

*Charlie Hebdo*, claiming to be acting purely for the defence of freedom of expression, was silent about the financial dividends that it drew from its ‘operation’ in September 2012; its ordinary print run was 75,000, and like the rest of the French press, it was confronted by significant financial difficulties. Moreover, this was not a first for it. Following the publication in the Danish newspaper *Jyllands-Posten* in September 2005 of caricatures that infuriated Muslims all over the world, *Charlie Hebdo* had decided, in February of the following year, to reprint them in a special edition, sales of which rocketed. This step took place after the Muslim world had been the scene of demonstrations concerning which, as usual, the Western media had covered only the violent incidents.

Like the rest of Europe, France struggled to comprehend that in Islam, the person of the Prophet (Peace Be Upon Him) was not to be represented, let alone caricatured. What had become fashionable amongst a range of caricaturists was taking place in a particular environment: the same countries of Western Europe, crudely mixing socio-economic and religious categories, deplored the incapacity of their Muslim citizens to integrate. In short, they tended to make Islam the scapegoat for a range of policy failures. They, thus, avoided scrutiny of social fabrics with roots in a Christianity that displayed great resistance to welcoming Muslim citizens, a large number of whom, having detached themselves from the all-encompassing belief of their forebears, had, in search of an identity, returned to religion. This phenomenon had, incidentally, become more common following the events of 11 September 2001, and the propaganda that the West had adopted.

The reply of the French government was ambivalent; while the President of the Republic, Jacques Chirac* (1995-2007), condemned this ‘clear provocation’, Henri Paul, chief of staff of the Minister of Culture, asserted the caricaturists’ role as ‘actors for freedom’. A few days earlier, *Charlie Hebdo* had published ‘The Manifesto of the Twelve: Together Against the New Totalitarianism’. This called for a struggle against an Islamism that it qualified as a new religious totalitarianism which was endangering democracy as Fascism, Nazism and Stalinism had. French civil society was publicly disassociating itself from national foreign policy without seeking to sanction the designers of this policy. In parallel, it remained attached to the ‘projection’ of the country’s influence

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*Even as he sought the lofty heights of the presidency, Chirac was not above stooping to xenophobic language.*
overseas. It chose to ‘forget’ France’s less than glorious colonial history, even though the country had striven to conserve what it still refers to as its zones of influence (especially in Africa⁹). With the aim of providing a necessary rampart against communism, it had long supported dictators¹⁰ who worked to keep the population attached to rigorous traditional values, in order to nip in the bud any blossoming of civil society. In these circumstances, the West could hardly expect its pious homilies to be appreciated by peoples who had suffered at the hand of regimes that the West itself had qualified as ‘strong leaders’ during the Cold War, only to dismiss them as ‘obscurantist’ afterwards. Internally in France, moreover, the situation demanded a prudent approach.

The fire in the premises of Charlie Hebdo, following the publication in November 2011 of an edition titled ‘Charia Hebdo’, of which the Prophet of Islam (Peace Be Upon Him) was declared editor-in-chief, provoked condemnation. Its website was also hacked and a photograph of Mecca and verses from the Holy Koran displayed. The weekly, employing derisory tone, as usual of questionable taste, attacked the election of the Islamist party Ennahdha, after the first, seemingly promising, Arab spring, and the introduction of Sharia Law in a Libya cleansed of Colonel Muammar Kadafi.

The Adoption of a Pragmatic Approach?
President Nicolas Sarkozy (2007-2012)¹¹ and his government, hoping to stem the rise in popularity of the Far Right, had made deliberate use of xenophobic discourse. It is against this backdrop that one can look at the indignation expressed by Assia, a young student, French and Muslim, after the publication of the caricatures in the weekly satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo. She declared:

“As a practising and believing Muslim, but first of all as a French citizen, I am shocked by the publication of the caricatures of Mohamed [Peace Be Upon Him]. I am for the freedom of expression and the freedom of the press. Yes, one can criticise Islam and fundamentalists, but which message was conveyed by the caricatures of the Prophet [Peace Be Upon Him]... for millions of Muslims? How can one not feel humiliated by an attack on this sacred symbol of Islam? Through the Prophet, all Muslims can feel humiliated. We are constantly embroiled in polemics: terrorism, halal meat, the veil, ‘street prayers’¹²... It is not a matter of portraying ourselves as

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⁹This is demonstrated by the existence of ‘Francafrique’, a pejorative term that describes France’s desire to conserve, through a network of contacts, as well as political, economic and military means, its influence in its former colonies in Sub-Saharan Africa.

¹⁰By way of illustration, see Paris’s very late reaction to the Tunisian spring; France had hoped that President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali would manage to remain in power. The French government denied that its Minister of Foreign Affairs, Michèle Alliot-Marie, had offered French ‘know-how’ in the field of ‘resolving security situations’ to the Tunisian authorities.

¹¹Following a referendum held on 24 September 2000, the term of office of the president was reduced from seven years to five.

¹²The Sarkozy administration and the Far Right had deliberately played on popular emotions in arguing that schools, the army and prisons were not required, when serving meals, to respect Muslim dietary customs.
victims, but simply the reality of the racism that we have suffered over the years that is getting worse. We are forced to pay a heavy price for the minority of fundamentalist Muslims (Le Monde 2012b).

The Sarkozy government made reference to the theme of a national identity that drew on the Christian roots of the country. It had even argued that it was in favour of delinquents and criminals who had recently acquired French nationality having their citizenship revoked. As the country went to vote in the second round of presidential election, a group of personalities wrote an article, significantly published under the headline, ‘French of foreign origin, we refuse to be the decisive factor in the presidential election’. They wrote:

The ‘debate’ on national identity in reality only questioned the identity of some French men and women too tanned to be honest, the interminable discussions on secularism put those in the firing line who had the misfortune to be Muslim, Nicolas Sarkozy’s speech in Grenoble delivered with the aim of taking away the citizenship of certain Frenchmen – as if that were an option, the difficulties and humiliations that we have met in renewing a simple identity card if one of our ancestors happened to have been from another country... these repeated attacks have put us in a position of great insecurity regarding our identity (Diallo et al. 2012).

The Right and the Far Right were not the only ones under attack. The Socialist Party, that had been stuck in opposition for ten years, had adopted a term that had become widespread without achieving universal approval, ‘diversity’, which tended to mean not only persons with origins in Muslim countries and in Sub-Saharan Africa, but also those residing in French territories overseas, for the most part of Christian origin. It was apparently an effort to replace politically incorrect terms like ‘beur’ and ‘beurette’ that had acquired a strongly pejorative connotation. However, the term ‘diversity’ also attracted criticism. While it may well have stressed the diverse character of the country’s population, it also tended to draw unwarranted attention to the skin colour and religion of people who were fully-fledged French citizens.

Meanwhile, street prayers in which many of the faithful take part on Fridays reflect the inadequate space offered by the majority of mosques in France.

\(^{13}\)Note that this paper, in dealing with contemporary events, relies in large part on articles taken from Le Monde, a French daily newspaper of justified good repute.

\(^{14}\)Ironically enough, Sarkozy is a Frenchman of foreign origin.

\(^{15}\)The word ‘tanned’ [‘basané’ in the original French] doubtless refers to a sketch by the late French comic, Coluche, in which he mimics a police officer who tended to regard all such persons as suspect.

\(^{16}\)‘Beur’ from the word ‘Arabe’ (Arab) by reversing its syllables. The feminine is ‘beurette’. The term is also inspired from the biscuit ‘petit beurre’, brown in colour. This sense is pejorative since it denotes persons ‘insufficiently’ white in skin colour.

\(^{17}\)In 2007, Segolène Royal, presidential candidate, made Najat Vallaud-Belkacem (of Moroccan descent) her spokesperson. She repeated this choice in 2009 for the Socialist Party primaries. Following his election, President Nicolas Sarkozy nominated Rachida Dati, of Moroccan-Algerian descent, to the post of Minister of
Confronted with the new series of caricatures published in *Charlie Hebdo*, the new Socialist administration led by President François Hollande, in power since May 2012, sought to make a measured response (indeed, this was also the position taken up by Hillary Clinton (Secretary of State, USA under Barack Obama 2009-2013); while condemning *The Innocence of Muslims*, she made it clear that the United States, respectful of the freedom of expression, could not ban it). *Charlie Hebdo* sold out its usual print run in a few hours and had a further 200,000 copies on the streets by the following day. It was, nonetheless, on the receiving end of some staunch criticism in France itself.

In an article entitled *'Charlie Hebdo, Caricatures of Mohamed [Peace Be Upon Him]: Not Courageous but Pure Opportunism'*, Pascal Boniface, Director of the Institute of Strategic and International Relations (IRIS, a French think-tank), argued that the weekly had lost its sense of direction, betraying the libertarian tradition in satisfying itself with a commercially successful operation (Boniface 2012). He added that *‘genuine dissidents do not pick on the weak, but strike at the powerful. That’s real courage.’*

Two radio stations with a smallish listenership in France (‘France Culture’ and ‘Radio France Internationale’\(^{18}\)) have given space to French people living abroad. The latter said that it was easy to be provocative in France, protected by the CRS (Compagnie Républicaine de Sécurité, a national police force), without even thinking about the security of one’s fellow citizens living overseas.

Indeed, a development has occurred that France struggles to take into account. For example, this statement of a female blogger reacting to an article in *Le Monde*, the respected centre-left daily newspaper wrote:

> *I am French, republican, left-wing and Muslim. I am comfortable with each of these aspects, neither denying nor apologising for any of them. That some people, for various reasons, each as vile as the other, seek through their speech to question this balance does not change anything. Who do these people think they are? Do they have a monopoly on truth? On the basis of which values and which morality do they try to upset me?* (Diallo et al. 2012).
The Important Contribution of Amin Maalouf

It is time, in the company of Amin Maalouf, to come back to the stereotypical views which we French are scarcely able to do without, notwithstanding the access to knowledge that many of us enjoy.

Evoking briefly the age of Islam’s glory and its tradition of tolerance, the celebrated Lebanese Maronite French language writer, Amin Maalouf, underlines straight away in his essay *Les identités meurtrières* (*Murderous Identities*) that he is in no way seeking to ‘conceal the atrocities that the news throw in our faces every day’, through ‘dispatches from Algiers, Kabul, Tehran, Upper Egypt or elsewhere’ (Maalouf 1998, p. 65). But he is at pains to emphasise that his objective is to oppose the idea that there is ‘on the one hand, a religion, Christianity, that is forever destined to promote modernity, liberty, tolerance and democracy, and one the other, a religion, Islam, bound from its origins to despotism and obscurantism’ (Maalouf 1998, p. 66). He concludes, ‘it is erroneous, dangerous and puts in jeopardy any hope in the future.’

Amin Maalouf, in the first pages of his work, analyses his own background, explaining the atypical career path of a Christian from the East who lived in Lebanon until the age of 27 before fleeing the country in which his family had been established for centuries due to the conflict. He emphasises that his family had ‘always been proud of being both Arab and Christian, probably since the Second or Third Century, that is to say since well before the emergence of Islam and even before the conversion of the West to Christianity’ (Maalouf 1998, p. 23). A central paradox in his thought is that he is Christian but his mother tongue is Arabic, the sacred language of Islam. ‘To speak this language’ builds him ‘links with all those who use it every day in prayer and who, in great majority, know it less well [than him]’ (Maalouf 1998, p. 24). The author lays great weight on these different attachments. He is ‘born in the Greek Catholic community, also called Melkite, which recognises the authority of the Pope, while remaining faithful to certain Byzantine rituals’; it is as a member of this tiny community that he has never taken up arms in a country in which ‘the most powerful communities have long fought for their territory and their share in power’ (Maalouf 1998, p. 25). His family was, however, drawn apart by two rival religious allegiances; his mother, ‘resolutely Catholic’, had him enrolled in the French school run by Jesuit fathers in order to shield him from the Protestant influence that prevailed in his father’s family (Maalouf 1998, p. 26). Maalouf adds that ‘it is due to this conflict’ that he ‘found himself a French speaker, and it is because of this that, during the war in Lebanon, I settled in Paris rather than New York, Vancouver or London, and that I began to write in French.’ He added that his life, in a Lebanon prey to civil war, could have been transformed irrevocably had the life of one of those close to him suddenly changed. He writes:
No religion is without intolerance, but if one were to compare these two ‘rival’
religions [Christian and Muslim], Islam does not come out of it too badly (Maalouf

Maalouf recalls the disappearance of Muslims from Spain or Sicily, ‘massacred, exiled
or forced to convert.’ The author emphasises that:

There is, in the history of Islam, from its beginnings, a remarkable capacity to co-
exist with the Other (Maalouf 1998, p. 67).

Maalouf, well-known for his historical novels set in the Arab-Muslim world, wrote an
essay dealing with identity. He does not shy from employing the language of humanism
that gradually came to prevail following the decolonisation movement. The benefits of
the ‘melting pot’ that would lead us to look at different cultures and religions on an equal
base, and allow us to see ourselves as possessing multiple identities, were lauded.
Lacking the power to express themselves, these identities have today become
‘murderous’ in the phrase of Maalouf, who, already when publishing his book in 1998,
was concerned about the erection of identity-based boundaries.

A Law on the ‘Burqa’

Politics and Xenophobia

‘Trente glorieuses’ had run down the hourglass of French prosperity. Right from the
start of the 1990s, political life took a worrying turn: the Right, concerned by the
assertiveness of the Extreme Right National Front, began deliberately employing populist
slogans. One expression remains notorious, that of the ‘noise and smell of foreigners’. In
a speech made on 19 June 1991, the President of the Rassemblement pour la République
(the mainstream French political party of the Right) and Mayor of Paris, Jacques Chirac,
on the occasion of a dinner-debate attended by 1300 partisans and supporters of his party,
alluded to the need to stem immigration. They may not have been, he said, more
foreigners in France than there had been before the Second World War, but they were not
‘the same’ (National Audiovisual Institute 1991). He declared that:

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19Maalouf’s essay ‘Les identités meurtrières’ – literally ‘murderous identities’, was translated into English as In

20The expression the ‘Trente Glorieuses’ [Thirty Glorious Years] refers to the period between the end of the
Second World War in 1945 and the first oil crisis in 1973. Western industrialised countries enjoyed exceptional
prosperity; economic growth rates were high, and purchasing power increased, promoting mass consumption.
The expression ‘Trente Glorieuses’ came into use following the publication in 1979 by the French economist,
Jean Fourastié (1907-1990) of his book Les Trente Glorieuses, ou la révolution invisible de 1946 à 1975 (Thirty
Glorious Years, or the Invisible Revolution of 1946-1975). The author was inspired by the phrase the ‘Three
Glorious’- that is to say the revolutionary days of 27-29 July 1830.
It is certain that having Spaniards, Poles and Portuguese working in our country created fewer problems than having Muslims and Blacks.

Chirac then took the example of a French worker and his wife, living in the 20th Arrondissement of Paris (an area that was home to a diverse and poor population). The former lived off a modest salary; 'next door' was crowded with a family comprising the father, ‘three or four wives and twenty or so kids’ who took advantage of social services to amass considerable monthly income. The boss of the RPR added:

If you add to that the noise and the smell\(^{21}\), well the French worker next door goes crazy. And you have to understand him, if you were there, you would have the same reaction. And it is not racist to say so.\(^{22}\)

The architect of the family reunion (i.e. enabling the families of immigrant workers to join them in France) as Prime Minister in 1976, stressed that the country no longer had the means to continue the practice. In 1987, he had underlined his support for a pluralist and multicultural society. One year later, Chirac had radically altered his position, instrumentalising the concern felt in a French society confronted by change in its ethnic make-up at a time of significant unemployment. In Marseille, a multiethnic city par excellence, he declared on 10 March 1988, ‘If I cannot condone [the spread of racist and xenophobic reactions], I can understand it’.

'A big part of France’s problem of immigration’ came from North Africa and was the result of ‘a specific historical context'\(^{23}\) that of French decolonisation (Leparmentier 1999). The war in Algeria and the exactions carried out by the French in an effort to retain what at the time was three departments of France\(^{24}\) had not been forgotten.

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\(^{21}\)Was Chirac deliberately playing on words; the French were unfamiliar with the smell of spicy food at the time? 

\(^{22}\)Note a derogatory remark by the Socialist Segolène Royale a day after the nomination to the post of government spokesperson of Najat Vallaud-Belkacem. Royal declared that 'if her name was Claudine Dupont, she might not be there.’ The president of the feminist association Ni Putes Ni Soumises (Neither Whores Nor Submissive), Asma Guenifi, qualified the comment as ‘showing contempt, out of place and discriminatory’ in a press release sent to Agence France Press. ‘According to the former presidential candidate, if one is called Najat, Karima or Abdel, and one is promoted to a senior post, it is not due to competence; but to one’s origin and name’ (The Huffington Post, 29 November 2012).

\(^{23}\)In 2008, it was estimated that there were 1,713,000 Algerian immigrants and their children (counting children with at least one parent born in Algeria) in France. This figure did not include illegal immigration, and did not take into account those of third or fourth generation Algerian descent. It also excluded the Harkis (those who had supported the French presence in Algeria during the war) and their descendents (this community had an ill-defined place in France and numbered between 500,000 and 800,000).

\(^{24}\)The ‘war in Algeria’ was the counter-insurgency conducted by France from 1954 to 1962 against the Algerian independence movement, at a time when, following the defeat at Điện Biên Phủ in May 1954, France had conceded independence to Vietnam. During the same period, the country was confronted by demands for independence from its two North African protectorates (Morocco and Tunisia). Until 1999, it stubbornly referred to the Algerian episode that weighed so heavily on the memory as ‘operations for the maintenance of law and order’.
Similarly, the country still recalled the sad chapter of the Vichy regime\textsuperscript{25} that had accepted collaboration with Germany and whose security forces had shown odious zeal in deporting the Jews of France to the death camps. Indeed, the term ‘smell’ employed by Jacques Chirac had a whiff of anti-semitism recalling that inglorious period, during which the Europe’s Jewish community had been herded into cramped ghettos.

Leaders of the traditional Right, worried for their political future as the perspectives of development of the European Union and globalisation were denying them room for initiative in the economic domain, chose the road of populism. Chirac, whose career path had seen him climb a number of rungs on the ladder of the \textit{cursus honorum}, by then, had only one ambition: to win the presidency, something which seemed to be slipping away from him. Nonetheless, he achieved his goal on 17 May 1995. He would be succeeded, on 16 May 2007 by a young politician, Nicolas Sarkozy, who would instrumentalise populist slogans about immigration even more. With the economic crisis biting deep, Sarkozy deliberately stirred things up through sound bites that jeopardised social harmony even further. Like Jacques Chirac, he was counting on a second mandate as head of state. Come 15 May 2012, it was to be the turn of the former Secretary-general of the Socialist Party, François Hollande. While Sarkozy, at the start of his five-year term had called on Africa to finally ‘enter history’\textsuperscript{26} (this sparked a lively controversy), Hollande sought to leave a more indelible mark on memories. After his victory in the Socialist Party primaries in October 2011, he had laid a wreath on the Clichy Bridge, where French policemen had thrown Algerian demonstrators (who lived and worked in France) into the River Seine. Once he became president, through a press release, he stated:

\textit{On October 17\textsuperscript{th} 1961, Algerians demonstrating for the right to independence were killed in a bloody act of repression. The Republic lucidly recognises these facts. Fifty-one years on from this tragedy, I pay homage to the memory of the victims} (Le Monde 2012a).\textsuperscript{27}

\textbf{European Questions}

The centenary of the French legislation separating Church and State attracted international attention. It coincided with what was called the ‘revolt of the suburbs’. It

\textsuperscript{25}This was the regime, led by Marshall Philippe Pétain, set up following the military debacle in face of the German army’s advance. Until 1943, France was divided into three zones – a ‘free’ one where the town of Vichy was located, an occupied one and an annexed one.

\textsuperscript{26}In July 2007, speaking in front of students, teachers and political leaders at the Cheikh-Anta-Diop University in Dakar (Senegal), the President did express his regret for the colonial period, but he added that ‘Africa’s drama’ was that the ‘African man’ had not ‘entered history enough.’ He went on to say that ‘the problem of Africa is that it lives the present too much in the nostalgia of the lost paradise of childhood. [...] In this imagined world where everything is forever starting over again, there is no space for either human adventure or the idea of progress.’

\textsuperscript{27}François Hollande’s France, facing austerity, had an eye on the Algerian state’s healthy treasury situation. Well informed sources suggested that Algiers had some 200 billion dollars in reserves (Achy 2012).
was a time for thinking about the implementation of the concept of integration à la française, as the country’s political leaders tried to explain to the foreign press posted in Paris why the specificity of the French model had nothing to do with the anger of youths of immigrant origin. The German magazine Der Spiegel, in its review of the year, nonetheless portrayed the situation as of concern, judging that ‘the dogmas of secularism and the policy of integration’ had been ‘pushed to absurd lengths’ (Vernet 2005). It wrote of the dormitory suburbs of French cities that were home to a ‘population that was foreign, dispossessed of its identity, marginalised, disadvantaged, victim to discrimination and without any chance of training’.

The French state looked at its model of integration, organising a number of colloquiums and seminars in neighbouring countries (notably at the Maison Descartes in Amsterdam, the Franco-German Institute at Genshagen near Berlin and at the French Institute in Stuttgart), in order to take a comparative approach. It emerged that French secularism, doubtless with its particularities, was not ‘the only way in which to separate’ political and religious issues (Vernet 2005). Thus, the article quoted the example of Great Britain, which, unlike France, still had a state religion; however the principle of tolerance ensured ‘the freedom of the press and practice of the religion of one’s choice, including the choice of having none.’ More importantly, the centre-left daily emphasised that the concept according to which citizens were free and equal before the law, which implied the absence of differences (whether in terms of religion, race or class) did not apply in a multi-cultural society. As Renate Künast, Co-President of the German Greens, wrote, ‘multi-cultural society’ was not ‘a demand’, it was ‘a fact’. As for the ‘French Republic, united and indivisible’, it had failed ‘to ensure integration, or even the simple peaceful co-habitation of groups of local origins and ‘allochtones’ (non-natives), to use the Dutch terminology’ (Vernet 2005).

Western Europe was looking at how to put in place mechanisms that would allow collective analysis. In the Netherlands, the assassination in 2004 of the Islamophobe film director Theo van Gogh28 had been a wake-up call in relation to what was nonetheless a phenomenon supported by a tiny minority: extremism within a Muslim community that had largely condemned the act. If a jihadi hand in the killing was clear29, there was another question to be answered. If one is to believe the Dutch sociologist Paul Scheffer (whose writings, taken up by a variety of groups, have provoked controversy), the

28Mohammed Bouyeri, a twenty-seven year old citizen of the Netherlands of Moroccan origin, admitted his crime on the second day of his trial (3 February 2006). He was appearing alongside other members of the Hofstad group, the terrorist cell he led, and had chosen to plead his cause himself for more than two hours, advocating the use of violence against ‘infidels’. He declared that ‘those who assert that Mohamed [Peace Be Upon Him] was a pacifist are ignorant liars. He used violence and preached it.’ In addition, for him the Netherlands had breached their ‘contract’ with Islam in sending troops to Iraq, adding that ‘an attack against one Muslim is an attack on all Muslims; an attack on a non-Muslim in the name of Islam is an attack in self-defence of us all’ (Stroobants 2006).

29Bouyeri was in contact with individuals implicated in the attacks in Casablanca (45 killed, 16 May 2003) and Madrid (191 killed, 11 March 2004).
'switch in public opinion’ happened around 1990, ‘with the growth of a more and more critical attitude towards immigration.’ It was at this time that a gap opened up between a timid political class and part of the 'population, from working-class areas but also the middle classes that felt threatened by a globalised world, in which immigration, for it, was the most visible symptom’ (Stroobants 2004).

Confronted with urban violence, more popularly termed riots, that exploded in the Paris suburbs on 27 October 2005, then spread to a large number of other areas, France, in turn, had to decide what to do. Almost unprecedented, a state of emergency was declared on 8 November 2005 and maintained for three weeks. The rioters, in large majority French nationals of immigrant origin, attacked the police and public transport, the industrial and business districts that were supposed to employ on a priority basis young people from disadvantaged areas, before targeting representatives of the national education system. Rioters made ample use of Molotov cocktails, while some fired live rounds on the police. If provincial towns were also affected, Ile-de France (i.e. Paris and the surrounding area) was the main scene of the revolt.

French Women of Muslim Origin or Faith
In 2009, the European Commission Against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI), an organ of the Council of Europe, in its annual report, drew attention to the fact that the economic crisis was provoking ‘development of racist phenomena in Europe’ (Le Monde 2010). While unemployment was rising, public spending in the social domain was decreasing, hitting the more vulnerable in particular. The Commission was also concerned by the growth of ‘xenophobic and intolerant attitudes, accompanied by virulent verbal attacks and violent incidents.’ Lastly, the ECRI regretted that in ‘numerous European countries, the debate on integration focused almost exclusively on the real or perceived failings of minority populations, taking account of neither their economic, social and cultural contribution, nor the minimal effort made by the majority [to aid their integration].’ This committee of experts from the 47 member states underlined a new phenomenon, that of the introduction of ‘restrictions of a judicial character specifically targeting Muslims – which have also been exploited politically.’ No example was given, but one might think of the ban on the construction of new minarets in Switzerland (the ECRI had declared it to contravene human rights), or also of the polemic around the so-called ‘Muslim veil’. Belgium, in April 2010, and then France, in October of the same year, chose to outlaw the ‘burqa’ or ‘niqab’ (in France it was referred to as the ‘full veil’). François Hollande stated during his presidential campaign that he would not seek to overturn this legislation, even though he had not himself voted for it.

When the debate on the wearing of the ‘burqa’ began in September 2009, observers were already worried at the turn that such a process might take; it would offer ‘arms to extremists from all camps, radicalising positions and embarrassing Muslims’, and troubling ‘even those who thought they had a clear position on the issue’ (Le Bars 2009). Moreover, ‘collective emotion’ that was aroused by ‘the sight of these women in France’
allowed ‘some to make a dubious mix, conflating Muslims wearing the ‘classical’ head-scarf with partisans of the full veil’ in a single condemnation. And it is, moreover, this image that Muslim states around the world have retained, even though the initial French concern was, rightly or wrongly, at the concealing of the face in public. The stated aim of the legalisation was to ‘put an end to this communitarian excess’ that was ‘contrary to secular principles’, as well as to French ‘values of freedom, equality and human dignity’. Yet was deploying a legislative weapon in the name of the defence of secularism appropriate? Could one not use the argument of freedom to dress as one chose? As Nicolas Sarkozy, all of a sudden cautious, stated that the ‘burqa’ was not a religious problem, others asserted their belief that it derived from a ‘radical and fundamentalist practice of Islam’, adding that it ‘was not prescribed by the Koran’ (Le Bars 2009) asked the following rhetorical question:

Is it for members of parliament to define religious fundamentalism, to outline Islamic ‘good practices’ in France and to investigate the potential political meaning of wearing such a costume?

Others, presenting themselves as defenders of women’s dignity and gender equality, ridiculed this ‘black sheet’, an assertion that women who wore it themselves contradicted. They could point out other far more serious threats to women’s dignity, but no-one would even consider legislating. Ironically, it was generally agreed that the representation of women in advertising or even pornography tended to freeze female and male roles, while contributing to the perpetuation of clichés that encouraged the violence to which women were subjected. The statistics were alarming: at least 200,000 women were victims of conjugal violence; 400 – more than one woman every day – died each year from beatings by their husband or partner; it was estimated that a woman was raped every two hours.

In France, diverse female identities existed side by side according to social background, cultural roots, profession and age.30 But they were often subjected to what one can describe as the imperatives of a consumer society that tended to bare the female body, on occasion to the extreme. And women rarely asked themselves about the injunctions of fashion that sometimes worked contrary to their dignity, transforming them into objects in which only physical attributes were valued. Some noted the irony of a France authorising its women to bare themselves as much as they wished while preventing them from covering themselves.

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30 Celebrating its fortieth anniversary, the feminist movement, coming together at a congress at the beginning of December 2010, had raised two issues worthy of mention here: was the emancipation of women in the North happening at the expense of their sisters from the South? What should one make of the tendency of international institutions to pay great attention to the question of women? Was this progress protected from instrumentalisation? (Perucca 2010).
Dress code was in any case a divisive factor. French women should rather have looked more positively on the idea of accepting in their midst fellow citizens (incidentally few in number, estimated at around 2,000) who had made the ‘burqa’ into an important component of their identity as their community felt itself the target of widespread prejudice flavoured with more than a whiff of neo-colonialism. The ‘burqa’ or ‘niqab’ was also the sign of the penetration of extremism into impoverished suburbs. However, exclusion would only lead the female sex to division by community, blocking the necessary reflection.

Returning to the issue of the law, one had to wonder whether the police could not, during identity checks (whose methods, incidentally, were very questionable in tending to single out persons of ‘dark’ complexion), simply have asked women wearing the ‘full veil’ to uncover their faces.

As emotion moved French public opinion, preoccupied by a phenomenon that was probably associated with the images of Afghanistan – frequently present in the media, the Muslim community, for the most part moderate, found itself pushed into a corner. Opposed to prohibition, it was embarrassed by these new religious practices that were linked to groups marginal to Islam in France. Indeed, it was as if it was called upon by two opponents making use of over-simplifications to choose its camp: were it to oppose the law it would fail to show solidarity with its co-religionists who wore the ‘burqa’, while in the event of supporting the law, it would run the risk of backing a group that challenged Muslims to no longer practice the articles of faith to which they were attached, denying themselves, without, however, escaping their status of second-class citizens.

Moreover, the Muslim community had already felt targeted by a 2004 law that banned the wearing of religious symbols in schools. It was, therefore, not wrong in feeling stigmatised, all the more since the discussions tended to conflate the ‘burqa’ and the Muslim head-scarf: the only difference, some voices suggested, was the length of material used. Leaders of the different religions in France, for their part, signalled – in vain – their opposition to any ban.

Conclusion

As the law came into effect, the Open Society Institute published the conclusions of a study conducted of 32 women in France who wore the ‘burqa’ (Le Bars 2011). Twenty-nine of them were French nationals born in France. Eight of these twenty-nine had

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1 Meanwhile, the French Council of Islam (le Conseil français du culte musulman) tried to convince women to abandon a practice drawing on foreign theological traditions.

2 Until the appearance of the so-called Islamic head-scarf, Christians had been free to wear a cross around their necks and male Jews a ‘kippa’. Ironically, young girls or adolescents who refused to uncover their hair risked exclusion, even though school was mandatory until the age of sixteen. The state had thus taken the risk of further marginalising a section of its population.
adopted this dress following the publicity surrounding the debate. Religious feeling had inspired their move, without any pressure having been exerted. It was for the police to take on the difficult task of arresting women who, refusing to give in to the requirements of the law makers, continued to wear the ‘burqa’. Interviewed by the International Herald Tribune, several police officers said that the law was not just impossible to implement, but dangerous (Frachon 2011). They added:

*In some areas where immigrants are numerous, we cannot apply the letter of the law without setting off riots.*

Dedicating an editorial to the new legislation, the New York Times (2011), for its part, wrote that

*There’s no question about the real purpose of this giant step backward — or of an earlier law banning Muslim veils in schools, or the ‘debates’ organised by President Nicolas Sarkozy’s party, Union for a Popular Movement, on ‘French identity’ and secularism. They are all cynical attacks on Islam, the religion of about a tenth of France’s population, to curry favour with France’s increasingly anti-immigrant right wing.*

In any case, the debate around the ‘burqa’ disturbed the difficult normalisation of the presence of Islam in France. Was the French model of integration, coupled with events shaking the world, the reason for the country’s failings? And would France be incapable of defining a problem that seemed to be glaringly obvious? Consulting Amin Maalouf is once again called for. The author emphasises that the term ‘murderous identities’ that he chose is no exaggeration: he wishes to denounce a train of thought that ‘reduces identity to a single belonging, pushing men into a partial, sectarian, intolerant, dominating, sometimes suicidal attitude, and all too often transforms them into killers, or into supporters of killers’ (Maalouf, 1998, p. 39-41). Maalouf adds that because of this approach, we have to show solidarity with ‘our own’, who are often ‘the most militant of the community’; moderates, dismissed as traitors, risk threats or even reprisals. As for the opposing camp, ‘one never seeks to put oneself in their place or to allow oneself to soften towards their complaints. The writer reminds us that:

*When Muslims of the Third World violently attack the West, it is not simply because they are Muslims and the West is Christian, it is also because they are poor, dominated, ridiculed, and the West is rich... in observing militant Islamist movements of today, I can clearly see the influence of 1960s Third World movements, both in their discourse and in their methods.*

It is clear that the police had difficulty moving into such areas to arrest delinquents. If officers tried to question women wearing a ‘burqa’, one can imagine that a strong reaction would be likely from communities that considered themselves to have been abandoned by the state.
These movements, added Maalouf, grew out of "our era, its tensions, its distortions, its practices, and its lack of hope." This is a remark that one can easily apply to the French suburbs and the rise of what is nonetheless a tiny minority: French of Muslim origin who may be tempted by the way of terrorism.

Gilles Kepel, for his part, chooses to place the issue of French integration in a global framework. In a work significantly entitled *Fitna: War at the Heart of Islam* (2004, pp. 7-9), the French sociologist criticises the policy pursued by the United States in response to 11 September 2001. In his introduction he writes that "the war on terror opened once and for all a Pandora’s box in occupied Iraq." According to him, the 'abuse inflicted on Iraqi prisoners, the executions of western hostages by jihadis' illustrate the 'impasse' in which both American policy and the Muslim world find themselves. Borrowing the term 'fitna' from *ulema* worried by the turn of world events, Kepel is of the opinion that 'the battle for the evolution of Islam, in which ranged 'communal regression' against 'fusion with modernity' was being fought in Europe. He concludes:

*Europe is today the avant-garde of this combat, the model on which are fixed the eyes of Muslims around the world who aspire to live free from authoritarian regimes as well as the bloody fanaticism of the jihadis.*
References


Section 7
Top Down or Bottom Up: Environmental Challenges, Communities and the State

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Gender and Environmentally-induced Migration in Gilgit-Baltistan, Pakistan

Giovanna Gioli*, Talimand Khan**, Jürgen Scheffran***

Abstract
The fragile socio-ecological systems of the Hindu-Kush-Himalaya (HKH) mountains are one of the recognised hot spots of climate change and are expected to particularly suffer from its adverse impacts. Local communities are adapting to climatic and environmental change, and labour migration is one of the most resorted adaptive strategies. Migration as part of a livelihood diversification strategy is a highly gendered phenomenon in the HKH region. Due to gendered power relations, cultural norms and values, mobility for employment is generally restricted to men. Women are left behind, to take care of the agricultural work, of the household, and to deal with in situ adaptation. In this paper, we discuss key results of a study conducted in Yasin and Hunza Valleys of Gilgit-Baltistan, exploring the gendered dimensions of migration-as-adaptation to climatic and environmental change. The study aims to assess whether migration conditions can be a positive adaptation strategy or not, followed by policy recommendations.

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1 This chapter has been approved as a research paper by the referee.

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Introduction

Gilgit-Baltistan (GB) is the northernmost province of Pakistan and lies in the heart of the Hindu-Kush-Himalaya (HKH). The HKH is recognised as one of the global hot spots of climate change both in terms of large climate variations (IPCC 2007) and impacts on food security (Ericksen et al. 2011). Although climate models do not allow for precise projection in this region (Boos and Hurley 2012; Hasson et al. 2013), and downscaling at the level of the basin is still a challenge, climate change is and shall continue to affect the temporal and spatial availability of water resources, with serious implications for mountain communities and livelihoods, as well as for downstream users (Hasson et al. 2013). In particular, upstream snow and ice reserves of the Indus basin, which are crucial in sustaining seasonal water availability, are likely to be affected substantially by climate change in the near future (Archer et al. 2010; Immerzeel et al. 2010; Bolch et al. 2012). Comprehensive actions need to be planned at several scales (local, national and regional) in order to build the resilience of these vulnerable areas.

Vulnerability to climate change is multi-layered and multi-faceted, and both biophysical and socio-economic factors determine it. The remote communities of GB inhabit a sensitive environment where most of the sectors are highly dependent on ecological goods and services. Their capacity to resist perturbations and hazards is low, as they lack adaptive capacity, which is crucially shaped by the financial, human, social, and political assets enjoyed by given community, as well as by social and institutional factors operating on different scales (Adger 2006; Alcamo et al. 2001; Smit and Wandel 2006; Mañez Costa et al. 2011). GB is a poverty-stricken area, characterised by political instability and lack of governance. Despite being part of the Kashmir stalemate and of the Indian claims over the region (Kreutzmann 2005), since August 2009, GB has gained self-rule and obtained a self-elected ‘Gilgit-Baltistan Legislative Assembly’. Yet it does not yet enjoy full constitutional status within Pakistan and has a peripheral role in the country’s economic and political life (Settle 2011). This hampers setting up a conducive institutional environment needed to build a sustainable and climate-resilient society.

GB presents an incredibly large ethnic and linguistic variety (see Fig. 1). Several sects such as Sunnis, Shias, Ismailis, and Noor Bakhshis have coexisted in the area for centuries, but regrettably, politically-driven sectarian violence on the rise (Bansal 2008; Singh 2013), further amplifies the socio-political instability of the area.

This study aims at shedding light on the complex nexus between climatic and environmental change and migration. Despite increased attention from both scholars and practitioners, our knowledge about this nexus is still limited and no shared definition of the phenomenon has been officially agreed upon. Several definitions coexist in the literature (climate-induced migration, environmentally-induced migration, migration as an adaptation strategy to climate change) and a certain level of ‘conceptual fuzziness’ (Castles 2002) is still to be addressed. The first and paramount conceptual issue pertains to understanding the relationship between adaptation to climatic and environmental
change and migration. Initially, most of the attention has been drawn to migration as a failure to adapt, as a reactive \textit{ex post} form of adaptation to be adopted when any other possibility of \textit{in situ} adaptation has failed. In this case, migration is a forced outcome caused by a clearly defined environmental or climatic driver and has significant overlapping with the notion of \textit{displacement}.

Increasing evidence has contributed to the introduction of a more encompassing understanding of the mobility outcome of climatic and environmental change. Many case studies have shown that migration as an adaptation strategy, especially in the global South, is and can be a proactive \textit{ex ante} livelihood diversification strategy that improves resilience of affected communities at several levels. Hence, the migration and climate nexus has been increasingly re-conceptualised within an ‘adaptation continuum’ (Warner 2010; Bardsley and Hugo 2010) spanning from forced migration and displacement to the complex outcomes and interactions of several forms and scales of mobility in response to environmental and climatic change, that are a less clear-cut, yet prevailing form of adaptation and present a largely untapped potential in terms of policy making. Migration as a core livelihood strategy is part of an ‘adaptation portfolio’ (Tacoli and Mabala 2010; Foresight 2011) adopted at the household level. Gathered knowledge has shown that this migration occurs often at intra-national and intra-regional scales (Tacoli 2009; Banerjee et al. 2011; Adamo and Irazola 2010; Massy et al. 2007; Gemene 2011; McLeman 2012), are predominantly short in distance (Massey et al. 2007; Tacoli 2009; Gill 2010), and often temporary (Raleigh et al. 2008; Gill 2010).
The decision-making process about whether to migrate or not is a complex one, and to date no single definition (be it bureaucratic or academic) of the various migrant types has succeeded in establishing a clear causal link between the stream of migration and the root causes originating it. The reasons for the failure of the early economic push-and-pull models within the wider migration scholarship apply to the reductionist approach that attempts to isolate one single driver for migration. As every human decision, migration is the product of social, economic, political, environmental and cultural interactions. Such complexity is further aggravated by the current lack of effective data and methods to model the complex and changing interactions of environmental drivers with other socioeconomic forces (Kniveton et al. 2009; McLeman 2012; Gibb and Ford 2012).

Both the New Economic of Labour Migration (Stark and Bloom 1985) and the Sustainable Livelihoods Approach (Ellis 2000) consider the household — rather than the single individual- as the appropriate decision making unit and migration as a strategy to diversify the household’s resources, in order to minimise income risks. Such approaches make it possible to evaluate which factors have played a role in adopting a given livelihood strategy, and to which extent such strategy is a result of, and could result in, a process of positive adaptation to environmental and climatic stressors. Following the SLA approach, this paper’s objectives can be stated as follows:

1. To assess the role of migration in the life of GB’s communities and both its shortcomings and potential as an adaptation strategy to climatic and environmental change;
2. To analyse the gendered impacts of male outmigration;
3. To relate the migration-as-adaptation portfolio to emerging climate change agendas and policies.

Methodology and Study Areas
This section presents the study area, methods of data collection and analysis and a descriptive summary of the study sample.

Study area
This paper is based on primary data collected in May and June 2012 in the Karakoram region of Pakistan as part of the project ‘Gender and Environmental Migration (GEM)’, jointly conducted by the Research group Climate Change and Security (CLISEC) of the University of Hamburg and the Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI, Pakistan). Six villages were selected through purposive methods, two in the Yasin Valley (Hundur and Darkut) and four in lower, central, and upper Hunza (Hussainabad, Altit, Shishkat, and Gulmit). The selection had been done through consultative meetings with native key informants and the main criteria for purposive identification and selection were the recent occurrence of environmental hazards and the high incidence of labour migration.
Both Yasin and Hunza present a high rate of labour migration, combined with partial reliance on subsistence agriculture. The Yasin Valley was severely impacted by the 2010 flood, while the Hunza Valley, less affected by the flood, suffered from recurrent landslides. In particular, in 2010, a massive landslide occurred on the Hunza River in the Gojal area, originating the clogged lake known as Attabad Lake. The lake submerged houses, agricultural land and infrastructure, including part of the vital Karakoram Highway.

The altitude of the selected villages ranges between 1800 to 2700 metres. Hunza and Yasin share unique agro-ecological features characterised by an extreme environment and an arid climate, where agricultural production is possible thanks to the climate conditions, the high orography and the high intensity of the direct solar radiation reaching the surface in the Upper Indus River Basin (Cradock-Henry 2002), and by a complex indigenous system of irrigation relying on glacier water that has to be channelled to the limited available flat slopes at the bottom of the valleys, forming the characteristic ‘irrigation oases’ that covers less than 1% of the Karakoram mountains (Kreutzmann 1998, 2000; Stöber 2000).

Wheat is the main crop, and has been heavily subsidised by the Government of Pakistan since the official annexation of the princely state of Hunza and of Yasin to Pakistan in the late 1970s. Since the 1980s, cash crops such as potatoes and orchards (mostly almonds, apricots, grapes and cherries) have become a major source of income for the local people.

Data description
A triangulation of quantitative and qualitative methods for data collection was employed. The quantitative sample had a size of 210 households (69 households in Yasin, 70 in lower-central Hunza, and 71 in upper Hunza; see Table 1). The sample has been stratified by gender, in order to reach a gender-balanced representation. The six villages were randomly selected from the two valleys and the number of sampled households per village was proportionate to the estimated number of households in each village. Representing about 13% of the estimated number of households per village, 24 to 46 households were selected (see Table 1).

The selected team comprised of six enumerators (4 males and 2 females), all local graduates from Gilgit-Baltistan, Burushaski and Wakhi (the two most widely used local languages) native speakers. The enumerators received one-day training on the questionnaire. The questionnaires were administered through one-on-one interviews with respondents.

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2 On 4 January 2010, tens of million of cubic metres rock slide occurred in the Hunza gorge, at the village of Attabad (ca. 550 inhabitants). As a consequence of the Attabad event, a huge debris deposit in the valley blocked and dammed the Hunza River and impounded a lake within the blockage drainage (see Schneider et al. 2011).
Table 1: Summary of the Qualitative and Quantitative Samples

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yasin Valley (Ghizer District)</th>
<th>Lower-Central Hunza</th>
<th>Upper Hunza</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hundur:</td>
<td>Hussainabad:</td>
<td>Gulmit:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40 questionnaires</td>
<td>46 questionnaires</td>
<td>35 questionnaires</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 FGDs</td>
<td>2 FGDs</td>
<td>7 qualitative interviews</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 qualitative interviews</td>
<td>7 qualitative interviews</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Darkut:</td>
<td>Altit:</td>
<td>Shishkat:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 questionnaires</td>
<td>24 questionnaires</td>
<td>36 questionnaires</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 qualitative interviews</td>
<td>2 qualitative interviews</td>
<td>2 FGDs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 group discussion</td>
<td>5 qualitative interviews</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As for the qualitative methods, 31 interviews with key informants and stakeholders from the communities (10 in Yasin and 21 in Hunza), and 6 gender disaggregated Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) comprising of 8 to 10 people in 3 different villages (Hundur, Hussainabad, and Shiskat) were conducted to countercheck the information collected in the quantitative questionnaires. Data obtained from the questionnaires and FGDs was analysed using descriptive statistics and content analysis, respectively. The Sustainable Livelihood Approach (Kollmair and Gamper 2002) was adopted in discussing the results.

The sampled households represent smallholders with an average farm size of 0.6 hectares, comprising of about 9 people per household. The population is essentially Muslim and belonging to the Ismaili sect of Shia Islam.

**Gendered Livelihoods: Hunza and Yasin Households**

Hunza Valley is situated in the North-West Karakoram, along the Hunza River at an altitude of 2500 metres, and is inhabited by an estimated population of 65,000 (Population Census Organisation 2000). Hunza has undergone a massive transformation in the last three decades and is often quoted as a virtuous example of good developmental practices in Pakistan. Hunza went from being a subsistence farming-dependent and isolated princely state, suffering from persistent hunger due to chronic food shortages, to being the best-off region of GB, featuring the highest rates of non-farm businesses of GB and some of the highest education scores in the entire country (SDPI 2013).

Migration as a livelihood strategy is certainly not a new phenomenon, yet it has massively entered the region due to enhanced infrastructures (such as building of the Karakoram Highway in 1978), growing population, increased environmental pressure and higher rates of literacy, within and even outside the country. Labour migration is a highly gendered phenomenon in GB: while men migrate for work, women are left behind to take care of the household and to perform agricultural labour. Overall, besides their role in household chores, family care, collection of fuel wood and potable water and rearing of livestock, women have been traditionally involved in agriculture. Male outmigration has increased their share of participation in the agricultural workforce and
the subsistence sector as a whole is increasingly being ‘feminised’. Such work is largely perceived as an extension of household duties and falls under the rubric of the informal economy. Despite their crucial involvement in agriculture, women are not entitled to inherit land and, hence, are kept in a situation of structural dependence by their male relatives. The Civil Laws of Pakistan do not formally discriminate against women, yet succession and inheritance issues are dealt with customary laws, resulting mostly in the overall exclusion of women from land rights. Khattak and Brohi (2008) deliberate that even those women willing to claim their rights may find impediments, as they are not enrolled in the revenue records as tenants, and there are no legal mechanisms to acknowledge their contribution as agricultural labourers. Patriarchal norms still hamper women’s participation in the workforce: in Hunza, only 7.5% of the total female workforce was found to be engaged in non-farm employment, compared to the corresponding figure of 66% for men (Malik and Piracha 2006). Yet, this is by far the highest share of GB.

Yasin Valley of the Ghizer District is situated in the transitional zone between the Hindukush and the Karakoram mountain range, stretching for 54 kilometres (between 2160 to 2760 metres) along the Yasin river, tributary of the Indus river system. Yasin Tehsil population comprises of about 40,000 people and is lagging behind Hunza in terms of economic improvement and development. Considered more peripheral and marginal in GB, Yasin was reported as having the highest incidence of malnutrition in the whole region, with females much more affected than men (Herbers 1998). Health and educational rates are lower as compared to Hunza, and the overall reliance on agriculture is slightly higher, even if the diversification of income and the livelihood patterns have followed a comparable and parallel evolution.

Similar to Hunza, the typical Yasin household survival strategy has changed over the last decades and other jobs, especially male labour migration, wage labour in the locality, tourism and government jobs (in particular enrolment in the Pakistani army) have entered the economy of the valley. The share of male workforce that adopted non-farm sectors as their primary occupation is 44% for Ghizer (this refers to the data for the Yasin valley aggregated with the nearby and socially analogous Gupis valley) versus 66% in Hunza (Malik and Piracha 2006). As of 2003, 11% of the male workforce were engaged in business activities in Hunza (mostly, retailing), in Ghizer such share was only 4%.

The system of ‘combined mountain agriculture’ (Ehlers and Kreutzmann 2000), based on irrigated agriculture and animal husbandry in high pastures that was paramount in both the valleys, has steadily decreased over the years. The villagers of the Karakoram region have increasingly turned to what has been labelled as ‘combined subsistence-labourer-economy’ (Herbers 1998). The households have integrated the highly risk-prone mountain agriculture with external income generating opportunities, such as labour migration, wage labour, and trade. Increased education rates have also brought many people to own businesses and to work in government jobs. Yet, the majority of
households still rear cattle, sheep, goats and poultry on small scale (traditionally women’s responsibility).

Hence, an average Hunza/Yasin household management can be divided into two quite separate realms of actions (Figure 2):

1. The subsistence sector, includes agricultural labour, that is overwhelmingly carried out by women, and increasingly so, due to the high rates of male outmigration;
2. The male-dominated exogenous realm, which includes all non-farming sectors and development institutions (mostly Ismaili).

Figure 2: The ‘Combined Subsistence-Labour Economy’ of the Hunza and Yasin Households

Despite the above outlined differences, the development lines followed in the two valleys are very similar, the difference is quantitative, but not qualitative: the strategies, as well as the problems and the challenges faced by these two mountain communities, are analogous. Such parallel patterns were caught in the sample and this is the reason why the data is disaggregated only in few cases when the divergence between the valleys was significant. Such convergence is largely due to the fact that both valleys have benefitted
from the participatory development model implemented by the Aga Khan Rural Support Programme (AKRSP). AKRSP was founded in the early 1980s in Gilgit-Baltistan by the Aga Khan Development Network (AKDN). His Highness the Aga Khan is both the spiritual leader of the Ismaili sect of Shia Islam and the Chairman of the organisation. AKRSP’s fundamental goal was to increase agricultural productivity and raise income of poor and remote communities by improving agricultural techniques and by introducing cash crops such as potatoes and orchards. AKRSP also aimed at raising social awareness regarding the key role of education: it has established several community-based schools (the Diamond Jubilee Schools), and has started to push through the agenda of women’s empowerment by setting up several women’s organisations (WO) at the village level (Fazlur-Rahman 2007; Hunzai 2008).

Despite the undeniable achievements and the widespread popularity of the AKRSP model of participatory development in the development sector (World Bank 2002; Fazlur-Rahman 2007; Khan 2009), some caveats have been raised on how effective it has been in terms of overcoming gender, class, and ethnic divides, as well as whether it is replicable in the longer term sustainability of its model. Settle (2011) investigated how disparities shaped by religious affiliation and class are reflected in the work of the AKRSP: despite the non-sectarian representation which the organisation has decided to embrace, empirical evidence show that participation in Shia and Sunni villages has not been sustained or has sometimes been rejected outright (Settle 2011). In Hunza, the Hunza River acts as virtual border between the predominately Ismaili Hunza and the Shia dominated Nagar region. Community leaders claim that in the Shia and Sunni areas of Nagar, where some 200 village organisations had run in the early years of the AKRSP, 100% are now dormant (Ibid).

All of the surveyed villages covered in the study comprise of Ismaili communities, hence, despite their differences, they represent some of the most successful implementation of the AKRSP model of development in GB.

Results

Migration as a livelihood strategy

The vast majority of the population in GB owns small pieces of land passed from generation to generation along patriarchal lines, and most of the grazing areas are communal and assigned to different villages according to the customary laws of GB.³ Compatibly, in the surveyed villages of the Hindu-Kush/Karakoram region, 95% of the households reported to own land was found to have decreased by an astonishing 50% in the last ten years (see Table 2 for a profile of the study area).

Growing population and environmental hazards have also led to a significant reduction of the grazing pastures *per capita*. The increasing demands for housing and livelihood resources, coupled with the loss of pastures due to environmental degradation and deforestation, have tremendously reduced what has been for centuries one of the key income sources of this area. Additionally, the lack of employment opportunities *in situ* has been further aggravated by the decline of international tourism due to the post 9/11 scenario and rising sectarian violence (Khan 2012).

Table 2: Study Area Profile

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Study Area</th>
<th>Hindu-Kush/Karakoram (Yasin and Hunza Valleys)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Survey Overview</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population (inhabitants)</td>
<td>Ca. 105.000 (65.000 Hunza/45.000 Yasin)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Altitude</td>
<td>1800-2700m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Households in survey</td>
<td>210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average HH’s size</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependency Ratio</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion</td>
<td>Islam (mostly Ismaili sect)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural Hazards</td>
<td>2010 flood/landslide causing the Attabad Lake</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Own land (%)</td>
<td>95%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irrigated land</td>
<td>99%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average HH income per capita</td>
<td>16,000 PKR (158$) Yasin/ 34,000 PKR (337$) Hunza</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Property Size</td>
<td>0.6 Ha (-50% in 10 years) in both Yasin and Hunza</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Gender-Age-Literacy**

| Average Age (respondent) | 50 |
| Female illiteracy (respondent) | 58% |
| Male illiteracy | 39% |
| Female respondents (%) | 57% |

**Migration**

| Migrant Sending Households | 76% |
| Sex of the migrant | 99% M |
| Migrant Destination | 97% intra-national; 50% intra-provincial; 2.6% international |


The above-sketched conditions have favoured the emergence and proliferation of labour migration as a prominent livelihood strategy adopted at the level of the household to increase and diversify income. In the survey, migrant-sending households account for 76% of the total sample. The study revealed a positive correlation between level of income and the probability of having a migrant in the household.
Such correlation is even stronger in the Yasin valley of Ghizer District, where the average income per capita is less than half as compared to the Hunza valley [16,000 PKR (158$) Vs. 34,000 PKR (337$)]. These findings are in harmony with recent literature on developing countries (Dercon 2004; Massey et al. 2007; de Haas 2008; Klasen 2012) and with previous research in Pakistan (Gazdar 2003; Banerjee et al. 2011), showing that it is not the poorest income group or the most deprived who migrate. The sample shows that ¼ of the total migrants are not from the lower income quartile, but rather those who dispose of enough financial and social capital to afford a diversification of their income-earning opportunities as adaptation strategy to a changing socio-ecological environment. The poorest are unable to cope with climate shocks and hazards by migrating, or through saving and social networks, as they lack the initial capital to meet the costs of migration.

Overwhelmingly, the mobility of mountain people involves only parts of the family (i.e. adult males) migrating, with the result that people’s livelihoods take on a multi-local and multi-sectoral dimension. In our sample, migration occurs predominantly at intra-provincial (50%) and intra-national scales (97%), from rural to urban areas, and typically to places where relatives or friends could provide indications on jobs and other forms of assistance.

Is migration a form of adaptation to climatic and environmental change?

According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), adaptive capacity is the ability of a system to adjust to climate change (including climate variability and extremes), to moderate potential damage, to take advantage of opportunities, or to cope with the consequences (IPCC 2007). Whereas coping strategies can be defined as ‘short-term actions to ward off immediate risk’ (Macchi et al. 2011, p. 7) with a shorter-term vision (e.g., one season), adaptation is the process of adjusting to change, both experienced and expected, in the longer run. Following these definitions, the present study considers adaptation measures as actions having a proactive element and a longer horizon as opposed to short-term immediate coping mechanisms. Adaptation measures can be ex post or ex ante, according to the degree of planning involved: measures can be taken after experienced change or can proactively anticipate future problems.

Migration in Hunza and Yasin was certainly adopted as a form of ex post adaptation in the wake of environmental shocks: After the 2010 flood and the formation of the Attabad Lake, for instance, more and more people in the area adopted temporary labour migration to cope with the damages and the loss of agricultural land. In order to meet the initial costs of migration people coped with the situation by selling livestock, cutting on health and education expenditures or by borrowing money from friends and relatives.

Such strategies may help alleviate the immediate pressure and help the household to cope; yet, they are detrimental in the longer run, as people are depleting their asset base, thus becoming more vulnerable and prone to future shocks and risks. Moreover, they are usually adopted by the poorest segment of society, with the result of further augmenting
the divide between those who are unable to cope by diversifying their income and the better-off households. It should be pointed out that migration is not an effective adaptation strategy for the most marginalised sectors of society, as it is not the poorest segment of society who migrates. Those who do not have enough social and financial capital to migrate are hence more likely to be caught into the poverty trap, which might become even more difficult to escape, as climate change will probably diminish the range of adjustments available for the already vulnerable groups (Klasen 2012).

Despite the fact that many interviewees resorted to migration after environmental shocks, the ‘environmental driver’ is not perceived as being the main determinant for migration. In our survey, the vast majority of the migrant households in both valleys singled out ‘unemployment’, ‘not enough income’, and ‘decreased income over the years’ as major determinants for the decision to migrate. Also demographical issues, such as ‘too many people of working age in my locality’, and ‘not enough land for farming grazing/land fragmentation’ have been listed as the most significant direct drivers for migration. Interestingly, environmental hazards, such as floods and landslide, are mentioned as drivers for migration by almost the same percentage of respondents (ca. 40%) in Ghizer (affected by flood) and Hunza (affected by landslides, and subsequent formation of the Attabad Lake).

Yet further evidence seems to indicate that climatic and environmental change plays a significant role in the decision of increasingly resorting to migration during the last decade. Environmental drivers have been indicated as the major cause of the decline of income over the years: For over 93% of the migrant households, environmental change and disruption (‘Low temperatures’, ‘Erratic rainfall’, ‘Flood’, and ‘Landslide’) are considered to be affecting their income, and they are also the most popular answer to the question, ‘which are the major causes of change in the productivity of your household (income)?’

Climatic and environmental change, coupled with a burgeoning population, are the main reasons behind the decline in agricultural productivity, and they can be considered as a pivotal indirect driver for migration in the last decade. These findings are in agreement with those collected by previous studies in comparable communities in the bordering Chitral District (Banerjee et al. 2011). Migration is not directly linked to environmental disruption, yet this is considered to be the root cause of the decline in agricultural productivity, and hence in the household income.

Rather than a failure to adapt, i.e. a last resort option involving displacement or the voluntarily abandonment (permanent or temporary) of the affected community, migration is embedded in the livelihoods of the rural communities of GB and can be seen as ‘ex ante risk mitigation strategies’ (Klasen 2012), i.e. they are diversifying their income earning opportunities as a form of household self-insurance to buffer losses and shocks affecting subsistence agriculture, which is entirely dependent on climatic vagaries.
Migration: Gendered Impacts

Remittances

In the case of Hunza and Yasin Valleys, migration often involves low return activities, such as wage labour in nearby towns and only 2.6% of the cases involved international remittances. Migration was found to allow the households to meet basic requirements and also to spare some money to invest for better health and education. Both Hunza and Yasin Valleys rely almost entirely (94%) on fuel wood to meet their energy needs for heating and cooking, and widespread deforestation has forced people to buy fuel wood on the market. Migration has helped to cope with this situation, and fuel wood tops the list of remittance usages in both valleys. Villagers in Yasin Valley shared that three months of energy expenditures are equivalent to nine months of overall other expenditures for the household.

Expenditures on health and education are reported as the most common usage of remittances after spending on fuel wood. Our findings show that in the last ten years remittances have been used to improve the schooling of children, with percentage increase of 10% for both girls and boys (from 80% to 90% for boys and from 74% to 84% for girls). In the surveyed areas, there was a significant level of awareness on the crucial role of education for economic growth and development. This is certainly also a result of three decades of work of AKDN. During the FGDs, education was recognised, by both men and women, as a factor enabling women to have an enhanced decision making power within the household and, to a more limited extent, also at the community level.

Given the limited magnitude of remittances, the inflow is usually confined to the recipient households, with no direct investments at the community level, despite the strong cohesion and organisation of mountain villages, and in particular of Ismaili communities. Whereas remittances are certainly improving the household living standards, their scale is too small to allow for longer-term investments in business and infrastructures, and their development potential is inherently limited.

Figure 3 shows a trade-off between agriculture/livestock and remittances/pension before and after migration. The high decline of livestock highlights two main issues. The respondents have indicated the sale of livestock as one of the key strategies adopted to cover the initial costs of migration and to cope with environmental shocks. Secondly, the decline in the male workforce due to outmigration has led to the decrease or the abandonment of high pastures grazing and transhumance.

In the Valleys of Yasin and Hunza, 70% of female and 87% of male respondents expressed that they were happy with the decision to resort to migration, because of the households’ enhanced food security, better access to basic amenities and the possibility
of saving for their children’s education. The lower degree of satisfaction recorded from women may correlate with the fact that they are suffering from drudgery due to the absence of male workforce. Besides, despite their crucial role in agriculture and natural resource management, women are mostly not allowed to directly control economic capital sent via remittances in both Yasin and Hunza. Prevailing gender norms prescribe that male relatives shall handle the money, and this was mirrored in the study sample. Only in case of nuclear families, and in the absence of any other male relatives, the eldest woman of the house is entitled to directly manage remittances. Under this respect, male outmigration has not brought any change in women’s access to financial capital. During the FGDs, women in all the surveyed villages reported that they were not entitled to handle money and to take financial decisions for the household (aside from small purchases for the children and basic necessities of the house). The same narrative was given during the FGDs with men.

Figure 3: Important Sources of Livelihoods Before and After Migration

Note: Light Gray: Before Migration; Dark Gray: After Migration
Feminisation of agriculture

The average household size in the survey was composed of nine persons, with a dependency ratio of 0.4. Migrants amount to \( \frac{1}{4} \) of the total workforce, which correlates with the finding that the total workforce engaging in agriculture and livestock is 50% less in the category ‘Males 15-64’ in the last ten years. The study reveals that over the last ten years, female share in the household workforce went from 55% to 60% (Agriculture: from 50% to 57%; Livestock: from 60% to 65%). Also, children’s share in the workforce has increased as a consequence of male outmigration, and their participation in household chores was found to have increased by 15% for boys and 10% for girls.

Most of the female interviewees and participants of the FGDs lamented the extreme drudgery they have been forced to undergo in order to allow men to migrate. Despite lamenting their increased work in agriculture, they stated their occupation as ‘housewives’, unless being employed in professions generally accepted for females (at least before marriage), such as teachers and health care providers. Hence, women have internalised the idea that their work ought to be located within the context of the household environment or belong to the few ‘proper’ sectors of the highly gender-segmented Pakistani labour market. They also reported that tasks traditionally carried out by men, such as land preparation and wood-cutting, are now increasingly being performed by women (see Table 3).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3: Percentage of Female Respondents who perceive an Increase in Workload in Various Activities after Migration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Occupations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural work</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land preparation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water fetching</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seed bed preparation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wood fetching</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housekeeping</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Disaggregating by gender, perceptions about the workload has underscored a significant difference of perception across gender. Although men were ready to recognise the increase of women’s workload related to activities performed inside the household, they were underestimating their bigger involvement in farmland activities, as compared to what was perceived by women themselves. This can be linked to the ideal of gender segregation (purdah) and to the related unwillingness of men to declare too much involvement of females outside the household, fearing a possible damage to their honour and social respectability. Women’s greater involvement and exposure does not necessarily rhyme with enhanced mobility. At all study sites, women reported that the absence of men hinders their mobility and significantly reduces their access to health facilities that are mostly located at a significant distance. In the surveyed villages, only dispensaries with no qualified personnel are available and in circumstances requiring
more serious healthcare services, a trip either to Gilgit (from Yasin) or to Hunza city (from Hunza) is necessary. Due to purdah and other limitations (such as not being able to drive a car or unfamiliar with the urban environment), women cannot travel long distances to access healthcare services unless accompanied by a male relative.

The increased inaccessibility of the surveyed villages caused by the recent natural disasters has also led to a decrease in Lady Health Visitors (LHVs) operating in the facilities active at the village level. In the Attabad Lake, cases have been reported of women delivering their babies on the boat on their way to hospital, and related fatalities have been registered. These findings are in harmony with those collected in other mountainous areas of North Pakistan, such as in Chitral (Banerjee et al. 2011). Moreover, increased drudgery caused by male outmigration may also lead to increased health risks.

Despite their crucial involvement in agriculture and their contribution as natural resource managers, the women of Hunza and Yasin reported no significant changes in their decision-making power or in their access to information and assets, including money, as entrenched gender inequalities still prevail over economic needs. Rather than a feminisation of agriculture, this can be considered as an ‘externalisation of the cost of migration’ at the expense of women.

Women are supposed to cover for the absence of men within the household, and, in order to cope, they are undergoing increased labour, are more exposed to social pressure, more vulnerable to environmental disruption and to the adverse impacts of climatic and environmental change. Moreover, due to the system of purdah and to other gender norms and values, their work is barely recognised as proper work, both informally, at the household/community level, and formally, with severe consequences for development, economic growth, and capability to cope with environmental change.

Despite women’s role in agriculture, very scant attention has been paid to the improvement of their agricultural techniques or to enabling them to use more sophisticated agricultural technology. Because of gender norms, agricultural labour is carried out by women in a traditional conservative fashion, such as resorting to low risk/low return crops and production strategies (Elbers et al. 2007; Klasen 2012), and with extremely backward technology, thus causing an inevitable race to the bottom of standards. The lack of investment in women’s work is a luxury that, in the wake of climate change, these communities can no longer afford. Merely diversifying the income portfolio while preserving the status quo might actually lead to further impoverishment, and evidences of the impacts of environmental hazards such as the formation of Attabad Lake, have shown how insecure combined livelihood strategy can be, if not coupled with policies and investments allowing for the socioeconomic empowerment of women and,

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Lady Health Visitors (LHVs) are a cadre of women healthcare providers who have existed in Pakistan since 1951. They provide a variety of reproductive and maternal services to urban and rural communities, including basic nursing care, maternal child health services, and training of community workers.
therefore of community at large.

**Conclusion**

There is little doubt that the mountain communities of Yasin and Hunza are particularly exposed to the adverse impacts of climate change as they are dependent on natural resources accompanied with a lack of socio-political, financial and institutional capacity. Lying at the core of the mountain system providing a bulk of water resources for the whole Indus Basin, development and quality of the socio-ecological systems of these areas should be among the top priorities of Pakistan.

The mountain people of GB are increasingly relying on internal, rural-to-urban migration (often temporary and seasonal) for enhancing their livelihoods. This study shows that environmental change is one of the pivotal indirect drivers for migration. Hence, migration-as-adaptation here is not resulting from a failure to adapt or cope with the changing environment, that leaves people with no options but to migrate. Migration could be understood as an *ex ante* adaptive strategy: by diversifying their income portfolio, mountain people are (or might be) enhancing their ability to cope with climatic and environmental change.

Unfortunately, partial improvement of household standards does not necessarily lead to macro development and increased community resilience (de Haas 2008). In order to achieve such goals, migration, development and climate change policies need to be planned in synergy, in order to address the many shortcomings, where gender is a crosscutting issue.

Despite having entered the policy agenda, migration and mobility in the context of climate change are still predominantly conceived as a problem for vulnerable countries, as a threat to be avoided and managed. A scant understanding of the migration-as-adaptation portfolio has been highlighted by recent research (Tacoli 2009; Tacoli and Mabala 2010), showing how all 45 National Adaptation Programmes of Action (NAPAs) currently submitted to UNFCCC\(^5\) understand migration merely as displacement and as a negative consequence of climate change, sometimes as a barrier to successful adaptation (Sward and Codjoe 2012). Pakistan has not developed a NAPA as yet, but a National Climate Change Policy (GoP 2011) has been recently approved. There is no mention of migration-as-adaptation in the document. Migration is mentioned only once among the vulnerabilities of Pakistan to climate change, that might link to ‘increased health risks and climate change induced migration’ (Ibid. p.6). Yet, the document acknowledges the need to ‘combine efforts towards poverty alleviation along with management of climate change impacts and environmental degradation effects (...), and to integrate the poverty-climate change nexus into economic policies and plans’ focusing specifically on ‘poor gender sensitive adaptation’ (Ibid. pp.21, 5).

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\(^5\) United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.
Considering the above described ‘combined subsistence-labour economy’, it is clear that the impact of migration cannot be evaluated (and policy cannot be planned) outside its relationship with other livelihood strategies, so that the entire portfolio of multi-local and multi-sectoral household activities has to be taken into consideration. Addressing migration-as-adaptation should address and recognise the role of women in the mountain economy. Policies on the subject should play their part in order to bring women’s labour into the formal economy, so that their roles can specifically be strengthened as farmers and agents of adaptation.
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Innovation and Regeneration in Agriculture for Building Climate Resilient Communities and Sustainable Livelihoods in Bangladesh

A. Z. M. Saleh

Abstract

Climatic events in Bangladesh have a life-threatening spectrum affecting agriculture, food security, water resources, health and various other livelihood options. Different geographical regions experience diverse climate change effects due to their biophysical and demographic conditions. Located on the bank of the Bay of Bengal, the southern part of Bangladesh is frequently exposed to cyclones, sea-level rise which has increased salinity intrusion over the years and become a major concern. On the other hand, drought is a threat to the northern part of Bangladesh, predominantly a water scarce area. The intensity and frequency of floods has increased manifold in the central and north-western region decreasing agricultural production substantially every year.

This paper highlights innovative and regenerative agricultural practices of right holders of the ‘Regenerative Agriculture and Sustainable Livelihoods for Vulnerable Ecosystems (RESOLVE)’ programme which is making communities resilient to the adverse impacts of climate change and ensuring sustainable livelihoods.
Introduction

Extreme climate events regularly affect agriculture, food security, water resources and health as well as different livelihood options in Bangladesh. For example, various climate change impacts such as recurring floods, cyclones, salinity intrusion, altered rainfall patterns and drought have negative impact on agriculture production. Moreover, different geographical regions experience different climate change impacts due to their biophysical and demographic conditions. The southern part of Bangladesh, situated on the bank of the Bay of Bengal, is frequently exposed to cyclones. Sea level rise and consequently salinity intrusion have also become major concerns in recent years, potentially decreasing total productive area for this region. On the other hand, drought has become a major threat to the northern part of Bangladesh, which is predominantly a water scarce area. Even though flood is not a new phenomenon, the intensity and frequency of floods have increased manifold in the central and north-western region reducing agricultural production every year.

Geographically, the northern and central region of Bangladesh are flood plains formed through siltation carried by three mighty rivers namely Padma, Jamuna, Brahmaputra from upstream. Historically, the regions experience annual floods and local ecosystems are also influenced by periodic flooding. In spite of people’s sufferings, flood makes the agriculture land fertile through siltation, and thereby shapes the life and economy of the areas. However, climate change has modified the scenario. Different climate change impacts such as recurring floods, river bank erosion, drought in dry season, salinity intrusion as a result of back water effects, and downing of ground water level have been contributing to augment vulnerability of the regions. Nevertheless, the regions remain outside the ambit of climate change related actions. Contextual analysis suggests that unless urgent action is taken, climate change will undermine efforts to ensure food security of the region (Baten 2010, p.1).

Thus, employing innovative approaches for climate change adaptation and community resilience are of utmost importance to simultaneously ensure food security and livelihood stability (Baten 2010, p.1).

The Unnayan Onneshan (UO), Gono Unnayan Kendra (GUK), Gono Kalyan Sangstha (GKS) and Shariatpur Development Society (SDS) with financial assistance from Oxfam Novib are implementing a programme titled ‘Regenerative Agriculture and Sustainable Livelihoods for Vulnerable Ecosystems’ (RESOLVE) with the goal of making communities more resilient to the adverse impacts of climate change as well as to ensure food security in three districts, Gaibandha, Sirajganj and Shariatpur.

This paper is a reflection of the RESOLVE programme, particularly the successful climate adaptive agricultural models and how these models are bringing change in the life and livelihoods of the poor in the hard to reach areas, more specifically the climatic
hot spots in Bangladesh. Moreover, this study is also an attempt to bring forward measurable impacts generated by such models, so that these can be replicated elsewhere with required modifications.

**Issues, Area and People**

‘In Bangladesh, climatic hot spots were identified by country level research, assessing the extent to which communities would be geographically exposed to specific change (using agro-ecological zoning mapping) and their capacity to adapt to the impacts (using poverty map analysis). Since most of the people living in climatic hot spots are dependent on agriculture’ (Basak 2011, p.9), it was therefore obvious to set programme objectives giving priority to adaptation in agriculture to ensure food security.

**Issues**

Climate change and agriculture possess an inverse relationship; where climate impacts hamper agri-production, unsustainable agriculture contributes to greenhouse gas emissions. Rainfall and temperature are two climatic variables that shape the structure of socio-ecological systems. Any alternation of rainfall and temperature cycle, as a result of climate change, eventually hampers agriculture production. Changes in soil moisture and temperature, evapo-transpiration, rainfall and possible increases in heat stress affect the growth of some subsistence root crops and vegetables. Being a climate sensitive sector, agriculture in Bangladesh is totally dependent on seasonal weather variability (Basak 2011, p. 9).

Depending on rainfall pattern and temperature, agriculture season in Bangladesh is divided into two parts such as Kharif and Rabi. The Kharif season is characterised by high temperature, rainfall and humidity. Usually, Kharif crops grow during the season that starts from April and extends up to November, when the soil moisture from rainfall is enough to support rain-fed crops. From seasonal point of view, Kharif crops grow in the spring or summer season and are harvested in early winter. Rabi season is characterised by dry sunny weather with warmth at the beginning and end, but cold in December-February. From seasonal point of view, Rabi crops are grown in winter and harvested in early rainy season. It is, therefore, clearly evident that both Rabi and Kharif crops require certain types of seasonal arrangement to sustain productivity (Basak 2011, p. 20).

Any changes in seasonal weather events will eventually slump agriculture production and thereby food security.

Depending on weather, soil structure and crop availability, the agriculture of Bangladesh has been divided into 31 Agro-Ecological Zones (AEZs). Generally, the whole agriculture production system is affected by climate change, but AEZs 2, 4, 7, 10, 11 and 12 are subject to multiple impacts such as floods and associated sediment influx and river bank erosion, drought, moisture stress, and salinity intrusion. These effects have different
modes of intervention during different seasons. For instance, floods affect *Kharif* season; whereas moisture stress, salinity intrusion, drought and irregular rainfall are major threats for *Rabi* season.

**Areas**

Even though rural areas supply major portion of the country’s food requirement, there are large disparities in the food security situation at the household level within rural communities. There are considerable regional variations in topographical, climatic and agro-ecological conditions and socio-economic development. The northern part of Bangladesh, for example, is geographically different from southern part, and eastern regions have experienced sharper poverty falls than western regions. The RESOLVE programme, therefore, deliberately selected Gaibandha, Sirajganj and Shariatpur to demonstrate climate adaptive agriculture and community resilience with the ultimate objective of up-scaling the best practices, where AEZs 2, 4, 7, 10, 11 and 12 correspond to the aforementioned districts.

**Gaibandha**

Gaibandha district, located in the north-west of Bangladesh, is one of the poorest and most food insecure regions in Bangladesh. The district consists of 7 sub-districts, among which the targeted Sundargonj sub-district is one of the most vulnerable *char*² areas. Natural disasters like floods, river erosion, storms, cold spells, drought and *Monga* (seasonal food insecurity) appear in these areas with devastating impact which cause massive loss of lives and property every year. Agricultural production is also hampered due to the adverse impact of climate change.

**Sirajganj**

Sirajganj district, with an area of 2497.92 km², is situated in the north-western part of Bangladesh and exposed to floods and river bank erosion from the Jamuna River.

**Shariatpur**

Shariatpur district is located at the estuary of the Brahmaputra and Padma. Geographically, Shariatpur district is surrounded by the Padma, the Meghna, the Krittinasha and the Ariyalkha.

**People**

Climate change exerts huge pressure on the normal growth of an economy. Moreover, overwhelming poverty and higher dependency on climate sensitive sectors such as agriculture and livestock rearing make the above regions more vulnerable. Consequently,

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² ‘Morphologically, chars are sand islands which are formed and reformed through silt deposition and erosion on a temporary basis’ (Anik 2012, p.2 quoting from Conroy et al. 2010).
Innovation and Regeneration in Agriculture for Building Climate Resilient Communities and Sustainable Livelihoods in Bangladesh

the people of these areas are also threatened due to food insecurity. Every year, floods also damage assets and create seasonal unemployment. The livelihood strategies of rural households, in and within these three areas, and the vulnerability context that affects their access and control over assets differs greatly. However, despite these differences, the livelihood outcomes shared by the households targeted is the same: their capacity to cover household food needs is low – and their vulnerability to climate change related challenges risks eroding their livelihoods even further.

The hardest hit households of rural communities in Bangladesh include the landless (either engaged in sharecrop farming, fishery, agricultural wage labour or non-farm casual labour) and small-holder agricultural households. Need based action research confirms that women and girls tend to be more vulnerable to food insecurity (even in households that are food secure) due to persistent gender bias. In terms of livelihood groups, food insecure households engaged in both agricultural activities – farming, kitchen gardening, livestock herding, agro-forestry and fishing – and non-agricultural activities, including wage labour and self-employment, were also considered. This study, therefore, purposively targeted the poorest of the areas such as small-holder farmers, landless and women headed households as target groups since they are the most vulnerable due to their low capacity to withstand climatic shocks.

**Climate Hazards**

Geographically, Gaibandha is a flood stricken area. It is estimated that about 1,600 families are displaced each year due to floods and river bank erosion. The frequency and intensity of floods have increased manifold in recent years due to the impacts of climate change. Moreover, recurrent flash floods, as a consequence of heavy rains upstream, devastate lives and livelihood of the people in this area with no early warning in place. Sirajganj is located around Jamuna River and Chalan Beel (wetland) ecosystem. Land elevation of this area is not very high and hence its flat terrain is prone to extended monsoon flooding and river bank erosion, mainly during the rainy season. According to the Bangladesh Climate Change Strategy and Action Plan (BCCSAP) these areas are critical environmental regions.

Flood damages crops and vegetables and other livelihood options like poultry and livestock. Moreover, flood induced sediment influx damages productive agri-land. Simultaneously, river bank erosion affects Sirajganj district destroying standing crops, homestead and houses, trees and plants putting severe stress on local livelihoods and food security leading to more households falling into debt and poverty (Basak 2011). Drought is another major climatic disaster that has been hampering ‘different livelihood options like agriculture, on farm and off farm labourers (rickshaw/van pulling, earth

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1 Those owning less than one hectare of land depending on rain-fed production methods or those cultivating on ecologically fragile lands.
work), poultry and livestock, and fishing/aquaculture, small business etc. In winter, cold wave and dense fog negatively affect agriculture, fisheries and livestock, and at different levels. It decreases production of winter crops and vegetables due to the increase of fungal diseases’ (Basak 2011, p. 27).

Shariatpur is dominated by monsoon climate with temperatures recorded at a maximum of 30.54°C and minimum 26.30°C. ‘Having close proximity to river systems and dominance of monsoon climate, the area is subject to multiple climate change impacts as a consequence of back water effects, tidal surges and cyclones’ (Seal and Baten 2012).

River dominated area makes Shariatpur one of the suitable places for artisanal fishing besides agriculture as people’s main occupation. Every year, the surrounding rivers carry sediment and deposit in the agriculture field which makes the area fertile. However, climate change has changed this scenario. Climate induced sea level rise is causing back water to the rivers and consequently salinity hits the rivers and agriculture land in Shariatpur. Such salinity intrusion is not only hampering agriculture production, but also affecting distribution and availability of native fish species. Usually, farmers in the district produce majority of their food grain in Rabi season. Unfortunately, this season is mostly affected by salinity intrusion, cold wave, and fresh water scarcity. On the other hand, Kharif season is dominated by rain-fed agriculture (Basak 2011, p. 32).

Moreover, fish availability makes this season important to fishermen. However, climate induced floods and river bank erosion is contributing negatively to both farmers and fishermen by destroying agriculture crops and overflowing water bodies.

Interventions

Sandbar Cropping

In Bangladesh, floods not only ‘destroy homes, villages and livelihoods, but also leave a crippling legacy when the water subsides’ (Practical Action n.d.). Silted sand plains (sandbars) appear from mid-November to mid-April (dry season in Bangladesh) mainly due to the decrease of water flow. ‘Most of the sandbars remain unutilised since sand is the main component’ (Rahman and Reza 2012, p. 14). However, sandbars contain a thin layer of silt which can be used for cultivation (Ibid.). In this type of sandbar, main cultivable crops are potatoes, chilli, onion, garlic, millet, tobacco and maize.

Sandbars with coarse sand as a main component remained unused previously due to infertility and lack of water retaining capability. In this type of sandbar, pit cultivation technology is being practiced by simply digging holes in these sandy residues and filling them with manure and compost. In this agricultural practice, farmers make several pits of 1 m² size in their sandy land after flood waters recede from river basin making it dry from mid-October to November. 10-15 kg
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compost/cow dung is mixed with the pit soil and left for 15 days. Next 4-6 seeds are planted in each pit and the pit is filled with water. After germination, 2-3 healthy seedlings are kept in each pit and the rest uprooted. The pits are then covered with straw mulch to conserve moisture. Farmers soak the pits 2-3 times a week with water carried in pitchers or buckets. When the seedlings are 25-30 days old, quick compost is applied at a rate of 1 kg/pit and by 60-65 days, it is reapplied at the same rate. After that, the compost is mixed well with the soil and irrigated immediately (Anik 2012, p. 5-6).

Vertical Agriculture (Integrated Fish-Duck-Vegetable Cultivation)

Considering the observed and potential impacts of climate change on agriculture and resultant food insecurity along with unemployment, poverty and malnutrition issues, RESOLVE has been promoting Integrated Fish-Duck-Vegetable Cultivation (or vertical agriculture model) at Gaibandha district (Agro-Ecological Zones 2 and 7). Vertical agriculture has introduced three innovative agriculture components in one single model: fish culture, duck rearing and vegetable cultivation in a small homestead area of Sundarganj at Gaibandha. Integrated Fish-Duck-Vegetable Cultivation is practiced in a 15-feet long and 7-feet wide pond. The whole pond is covered with a net to protect small fish from the ducks. At the dyke of the pond, seasonal vegetables are grown. Water for the pond is hand pumped from a tube-well every day after every half an hour during dry season. In rainy season, the pond receives water from rain (Unnayan Onneshan n.d).

Year Round Agriculture

‘Year Round Agriculture’ is being practiced at Goshairhat of Shariatpur district (Agro-Ecological Zones 10 and 12). ‘This practice has created a new window in agriculture where farmers without having’ (or owning) ‘a single piece of land can grow vegetables in their yard or even on the roadside. The concept of year round agriculture is mainly a combination of hanging vegetable cultivation, floating bed cultivation (hydroponics) and year round vegetable cultivation in homesteads’ (Anik n.d).

Hanging Vegetable Cultivation

Hanging garden is one of the innovations developed by the communities of south western Bangladesh as an aid to cultivate vegetables in water logging situation. In this practice, an earthen platform is set over a triangular bamboo frame which is filled with fertile surface soil, cow dung and fertilisers. ‘The platform is placed in areas where water inundation takes place and endured for 3-6 months and where most of the places go

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under 4-5 feet water daily. Usually, the platform is raised 5-6 feet (1.52m - 1.83 m) above the ground. Main cultivable crops are hyacinth bean, sweet gourd, bottle gourd, wax gourd, ribbed gourd, cucumber and Indian spinach’ (Anik n.d).

Floating Garden

Floating garden, locally known as ‘baira’, is an age-old practice of the southern floodplains of Bangladesh especially in Barisal, Gopalganj and Pirojpur. In this cultivation system, aquatic plants are used to construct a reasonable-sized floating platform or raft on which vegetables and other crops are cultivated, and seedlings are raised in the rainy season. Water hyacinth (Eichhornia crassipes) is used as a main component for constructing floating platforms which is very common in Bangladesh. The plants grown on ‘baira’ get nutrition and food either from composted organics or from the water. During periods of flood and water logging, field crops often perish, but crops on ‘baira’ can survive. More than 20 varieties of vegetables like red amaranth, Indian spinach, coriander leaves, cauliflower, cabbage, tomato, lady finger, cucumber, bitter gourd, bottle gourd, snake gourd, ash gourd, sweet pumpkin, bean, radish, eggplant, potato and spices including chilli, onion, garlic, turmeric and mustard can be cultivated in the floating beds. This floating vegetable garden can provide multiple benefits in terms of food, nutrition and employment. It is an efficient adaptation strategy which reduces vulnerability of people living in low lying areas (Anik n.d).

Year Round Homestead Gardening

Year round home gardening is another initiative which makes vulnerable communities more resilient to the changing climate. Home gardens are a source of food that have no negative impact on the resource base and are necessary for rural households. Capital input in home gardens is relatively low because of using simple techniques and family members themselves participate as labour. When there is surplus production, the cultivated vegetables can also give an economic return. The nutrient gain from home gardens differs from season to season. Home gardens improve the resources of poor farmers and also meet several socio-economic and ecological conditions which contribute to their better living and sustainability. Home gardening activities are centred around women and can also increase their income, which may result in better use of household resources and improved caring practices and empowerment (Anik n.d).

Economic Feasibility of Interventions

Sandbar Cropping

Cultivation of watermelon, millet and pumpkin in sandy infertile islands contributes to household income during the lean period. During the field survey, it was found that watermelon cultivators benefitted the most with average incomes approx. US$ 108 (BDT
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8856) in three months. On the other hand, millet cultivators were the least profitable with their average earnings of US$ 17 (BDT 1390) in a season. RESOLVE’s local partner Gana Kalyan Shangstha (GKS) provided seeds, initial fertilisers and necessary insecticides for ensuring quality. Table 1 provides a cost benefit analysis of the crops cultivated using Sandbar Cropping:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Crop/Vegetable</th>
<th>Average Income in US$</th>
<th>Average Expenditure in US$ (without seed cost)</th>
<th>Net Profit in US$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Watermelon</td>
<td>303.35</td>
<td>195.85</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pumpkin</td>
<td>181.65</td>
<td>75.45</td>
<td>106.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Millet</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: RESOLVE Field Survey 2012.

**Vertical Agriculture**

During the one-year pilot phase of Vertical Agriculture practice, it was found that the model is economically feasible both in terms of accounting and present value. Total costing of the model was US$ 50, while the profit in account value was US$ 41 and US$ 35 in the present value. In monetary value, the model is extremely profitable. Although as initial and pilot phase cost range is high, it will be more profitable if the practice continues in future as initial establishment cost (e.g. digging pond, buying duckling and preparation cost) will not be required.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Average Income in US$</th>
<th>Average Expenditure in US$</th>
<th>Net Profit in US$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vertical Agriculture</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: RESOLVE Field Survey 2012.

**Year Round Agriculture**

Table 3 reveals the profitability of home gardening with improved techniques. The analysis was made over three months and has been found that the households benefited by US$ 27.40 approximately. Though family members contribute their labour for establishment and management of the home gardens, the labour cost is calculated on a shadow basis. Hanging vegetable cultivars also benefitted in terms of money and average income of US$ 23.53 approximately. For analysis purposes, four raised platform was considered as standard. The farmers’ logbooks were used to validate information. It has also been found that right holders practicing floating bed benefitted most among others and their average income from floating beds’ (Anik n.d.) was approximately US$ 34.98. However, the benefit depends upon beds’ size and number of beds. Since the right
holders used the floating bed as seedling preparation of seasonal vegetables so they could draw a good figure. The analysis is made based on two beds’ (Anik n.d.).

Table 3: Cost Benefit Analysis for Different Models of Year Round Agriculture

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Crop/Vegetable</th>
<th>Average Income in US$</th>
<th>Average Expenditure in US$</th>
<th>Net Profit in US$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hanging Vegetable Cultivation</td>
<td>36.59</td>
<td>13.06</td>
<td>23.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Floating Garden</td>
<td>60.98</td>
<td>26.00</td>
<td>34.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homestead Gardening</td>
<td>50.00</td>
<td>22.60</td>
<td>27.40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: RESOLVE Field Survey 2012.

Comparative Analysis of Earlier Non-Resilient Agricultural Practices

In Gaibandha and Sirajganj, farmers can only cultivate during the winter because the land remains submerged for the rest of the year. The land of Shariatpur remains inundated due to backwater effect. Before the intervention of RESOLVE by plinth raising, farmers were compelled to migrate to urban areas in search of jobs during monsoon. Moreover, since most of the people in these areas are poor and landless, they had to adopt share cropping. Those who had liquid cash in hand could lend one acre of char lands for agricultural use at $25 per year.

The farmers of the programme areas had traditional knowledge. However, there was no initiative either by the government or by any development organisation to merge their traditional knowledge with science. Therefore, they usually cultivated only local variety of rice for self consumption. They did not practice homestead vegetable cultivation. The crops that they cultivated previously included chillies, sweet gourd, bottle gourd, jute and Ganjia, a local variety of rice (Rabi crop).

Table 4: Cost Benefit Analysis of Ganjia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Crop</th>
<th>Average Income in US$</th>
<th>Average Expenditure in US$ (without seed cost)</th>
<th>Net Profit in US$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ganjia (local variety Rabi crop)</td>
<td>222.03</td>
<td>170.89</td>
<td>51.14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: RESOLVE Field Survey 2011.

Post RESOLVE Resilient Agricultural Practices

The RESOLVE not only built models for upscaling but also introduced flood, drought and saline tolerant rice varieties to the farmers. Initiatives were also taken to acquaint them with other crops that have the potential to grow in specific climatic conditions with more productivity, profitability and sustainability. The programme provided farmers of Gaibandha and Sirajganj flood tolerant rice varieties of BR-51 and 52, drought tolerant rice variety of BR-33 and 39, and cold wave tolerant rice variety of BR-36. The farmers
of Shariatpur are now cultivating rice variety of BR-41, 42 and 47, i.e. crops that can tolerate salinity up to 14 DS/m.

Besides cultivating rice, farmers are encouraged to grow wheat, maize, millet, sesame, watermelon, sweet pumpkin, mustard, snake gourd, bottle gourd, tube gourd, bitter gourd, red amaranth, eggplant, etc. The RESOLVE programme intends to make the food insecure poor farmers food secure through innovative and regenerative agricultural practices. The farmers are also now gradually introducing organic compost fertiliser in their fields instead of using chemical fertilisers.

**Findings from Food and Livelihoods Survey**

There exists no unique livelihood approach to ensure food security. Sustainable livelihood approaches are needed to ensure food security. Many risks in livelihood approaches are located in the selected rural areas of this survey because of high geographical and natural vulnerability. For natural drawbacks such as flood, drought, riverbank erosion, salinity problem and tidal inundation, food security is not ensured in these areas through the year. The respondents of the survey need some supporting interventions to ensure food security through the year like food aid in times of disaster or innovative income generating activities which can increase their purchasing power of food (Islam and Saleh 2012).

Ability of people to acquire food depends upon their ‘exchange entitlement’. The poor achieve their ‘exchange entitlement’ mainly from ‘production (crops and livestock)’ and ‘own-labour (wages labour and professions)’ based entitlements (Young et al. 2001, p.3). They cannot ensure their food security when they lose these entitlements especially in times of shock (Islam and Saleh 2012). Shocks are of two types: external and internal. External shocks are ‘drought, market failure, riverbank erosion, conflict and forced migration’ (Young et al. 2001, p.4 as quoted in Islam and Saleh 2012).

Capacity of people to cope with these external shocks is related to the internal shocks. In times of external shocks, ability of people to cope can be increased by some direct and indirect financial or non-financial aids from outside. This support can improve livelihood approaches so that the poor state of people and food security can improve (Islam and Saleh 2012 citing Young et al. 2001).

**Consumption of Food**

Food basket of the respondents mainly consists of rice and other cereals compared to other food items like pulses, fish, meat, eggs, milk, edible oil, fruits and vegetables. The concerning fact is that only the intake of carbohydrate cannot ensure food security for

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1 Editor’s Note: The findings below and the subsequent content are from Islam and Saleh 2012.
2 Editor’s Note: Amartya Sen’s 1981 Entitlement Theory of Famine.
them as intake of protein, fat and vitamins is comparatively lower than that of the national rural average. As the respondents of the surveyed areas are not getting a balanced diet, malnutrition is high in these areas which is reducing the capability of work and damaging long-term livelihood (Islam and Saleh 2012).

Table 5: Food Intake Status in Survey Areas (quarter-wise)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Months</th>
<th>Carbohydrates (Rice and other Cereal) in gm.</th>
<th>Protein (Pulse, Fish, Meat, Eggs and Milk) in gm.</th>
<th>Fat (Edible Oil) in gm.</th>
<th>Vitamins (Fruits and Vegetables) in gm.</th>
<th>Calorie Intake (kcal Per capita per day)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First Quarter</td>
<td>452.7</td>
<td>48.00</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>2137</td>
<td>2084.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Quarter</td>
<td>440.00</td>
<td>48.00</td>
<td>13.67</td>
<td>1853</td>
<td>2112.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third Quarter</td>
<td>426.55</td>
<td>62.56</td>
<td>14.20</td>
<td>14.20</td>
<td>241.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fourth Quarter</td>
<td>53.67</td>
<td>12.33</td>
<td>173.11</td>
<td>211.33</td>
<td>2112</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: RESOLVE Field Survey and Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics 2011-12.

Rice and vegetables are the main food items for the poor people in rural areas of Bangladesh (Banglapedia 2006). The consumption of other essential food items like pulses, fish, meat, milk, edible oil, and fruits are very low in all the surveyed areas. The survey grouped different food items into four classes like carbohydrates, proteins, fats and vitamins. According to the HIES\(^7\), \(\leq 2122\) kcal, \(\leq 1805\) kcal and \(\leq 1600\) kcal per capita per day are considered for absolute, hardcore and ultra-poverty respectively (BBS 2011).

\(^7\) Household Income and Expenditure Survey.
As rice is the main food of the respondents, the amount of carbohydrates is higher than other food elements. Carbohydrates taken by the respondents per day on average were 452.78 gm., 440 gm., 448.22 gm. and 446.67 gm. respectively for first, second, third and fourth quarters. In all four quarters, this amount is higher than that of the national rural average of 426.55 gm.

Pulses, fish, meat, eggs and milk are the main protein based food items. The respondents of the surveyed areas have been taking very low amounts of protein (45.56 gm., 48 gm., 62.58 gm. and 53.67 gm. per person per day respectively for first, second, third and fourth quarters) and this amount is lower than that of the national rural average (62.66 gm. per person per day).

In the surveyed areas, edible oil is the only one fat-based food item. Average amount of taking fat has been found at 16 gm., 13.67 gm., 13.17 gm. and 12.33 gm. per person per day respectively for first, second, third and fourth quarters. National rural average is 14.20 gm. per person per day.

Fruits and vegetables are sources of vitamins. Collecting vegetables from homestead gardening has increased intake of vitamins in the surveyed areas from first to fourth quarter (185.33 gm., 211.33 gm., 173.11 gm. and 235.83 gm. per person per day respectively for first, second, third and fourth quarters), but it is the lowest in third quarter. National rural average of vitamin intake is 241.39 gm. per person per day which is higher than that of the surveyed areas (Islam and Saleh 2012).

Food Poverty

In terms of food, a person who takes less than 2084.64 kcal per day is referred as poor and who takes more than or equal to 2344.6 kcal per day is referred as non-poor. In the survey starting April 2011, poverty level was measured by calorie intake per person per day. The respondents at the surveyed areas were above the food poverty line (average calorie intake was 2137 kcal per person per day) in comparison with the national boundary of food poverty (2084.64 kcal per person per day) during April-June (first quarter). However, in the second quarter, the respondents of the surveyed areas were slightly below the food poverty line (average calorie intake was 2075 kcal per person per day). In addition, during third and fourth quarters, respondents were above the food poverty line (average calorie intake were 2126 kcal and 2112.33 kcal respectively per person per day) compared to the national findings (BBS 2011; Islam and Saleh 2012). According to national findings, none of the respondents of these hard-to-reach areas are non-poor in terms of food consumption.

On the other hand, according to the Household Income and Expenditure Survey (HIES), ≤ 2122 kcal, ≤ 1805 kcal and ≤ 1600 kcal per capita per day are considered for absolute,
hardcore and ultra-poverty respectively (BBS 2011). On average, in the second quarter, the respondents of the surveyed areas were found to be extremely poor.

**Income Level**
A significant change has been found in the level of income of the respondents during these four quarters. In the first quarter, 60.89% of the respondents’ incomes were less than US$ 24, which means that most of the people in the survey areas had income below US$ 1 per person per day, income poverty line suggested by the World Bank (Islam and Saleh 2012). However, with gradual reduction in fourth quarter, it became only 35.89% (53.33% and 47 % respectively in second and third quarters). In addition, in the first quarter 21.78% of the respondents’ incomes were between US$ 24-36, which means that their incomes were below US$ 1.25 per person per day, whereas with gradual increase in the fourth quarter it became 37.72 % (26.22 % and 35.89 % respectively in second and third quarter). The percentage of respondents with the level of income US$ 36-48 was 17.33% in the first quarter and it increased in the second quarter to 20.45 % and again reduced in third quarter to 12.33%. Moreover, it increased in the fourth quarter to 19.17%. In the first quarter, none of respondents had income above US$ 48, but in the fourth quarter, on average 7.28% of respondents had income above US$ 48 followed by 4.56 % in the third quarter (Islam and Saleh 2012).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First Quarter</td>
<td>60.89</td>
<td>21.78</td>
<td>17.33</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Quarter</td>
<td>53.33</td>
<td>26.22</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third Quarter</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>35.89</td>
<td>12.33</td>
<td>4.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fourth Quarter</td>
<td>35.89</td>
<td>37.72</td>
<td>19.17</td>
<td>7.28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: RESOLVE Field Survey 2011-12.*

On average, a rising level of income of the respondents has been observed. An increase in other off-farm economic activities by reducing disguised unemployment in agriculture is also responsible for the increase in income level. In the third quarter (winter season), availability of winter vegetables and their good selling generated a higher income in the surveyed areas. On the other hand, business investment of the respondents is higher in the third quarter than the second quarter and its impacts on overall income are investigated as a supportive mechanism to increase the gross income level in the surveyed areas (Islam and Saleh 2012).

**Social Status**
Based on the income situation, the survey reveals that the respondent whose income is US$ 1 per person per day belongs to the lower poverty and the respondent whose income is US$ 1.25 per person per day belongs to the upper poverty line (Islam 2012). Quarter-wise comparison of the percentage of the respondents living below the poverty line is shown here (Table 7).
It has been found from the survey that the percentage of respondents who belong to lower poverty line has reduced through first to fourth quarter (60.89%, 53.33%, 47 % and 35.89 % respectively). According to HIES, the percentage of rural people who belong to lower poverty line is only 21.1 %. The number of people belonging to lower poverty line is reducing, however, the rate is higher in selected areas than that of HIES findings.

The percentage of respondents who belong to upper poverty line reduced from first (82.67 %) to fourth (73.66 %) quarter. In second quarter, the upper poverty rate reduced from first quarter at 79.55 %, but increased in the third quarter to 82.89 %. The upper poverty rate was the lowest in the fourth quarter, but in all quarters the upper poverty rate of these selected areas was much higher than that of HIES findings.

Overall, in the surveyed areas, percentage of ultra-poor is decreasing (Islam and Saleh 2012). This is because the respondents are becoming more conscious and want to improve their standard of living. Consequently, they are trying to save a small portion of their income and using this saving for regenerative business investment.

**Conclusion**

The poor in hard to reach areas are most vulnerable to climatic shocks as they live in the climatic hot spots of the country. They have to deal with regular climatic hazards that exert pressure on their life and livelihoods. Sometimes they become victims of climate induced displacement. This study found that RESOLVE which is being initiated in three districts of Bangladesh with the ultimate goal to make community food secure and climate resilient by practicing climate adaptive agricultural practices, has had noteworthy outcomes. The level of income of the programme beneficiaries is increasing as well as their food, especially calorie intake which is improving their overall poverty situation.

Providing diversified livelihood options besides regenerative agricultural assistance can make them climate resilient which would increase their chances of survival in their battle against climate change impacts.

All three models (sandbar cropping, integrated fish-duck-vegetable cultivation and year round agriculture) were found to be economically viable in terms of cost benefit analysis. The main challenge that the right holders practicing sandbar cropping in barren sand plains face is irrigation as sand has the least capacity to retain moisture. The government and other non-governmental organisations can provide shallow pumps for irrigation which would reduce migration of locals during the lean period in search of jobs.
Fish-duck-vegetable cultivation is easy to set up on small pieces of land; and year round agriculture, particularly the hanging vegetable gardens, can be grown even during flood season.

The government, non-governmental organisations and civil society should come forward in mitigating the challenges the people of climatic hot spots face. Moreover, proper market channels should be developed in light of profit maximisation of those marginal farmers.

**Acknowledgements**

The author acknowledges Ms Nahida Sultana, Lecturer at the Department of Economics, Asian University of Bangladesh for her assistance in coming up with the theme. The author is also indebted to Swadhin Roy, Sawon Istiak Anik and Munmun Islam, researchers of Unnayan Onneshan, Bangladesh for providing valuable comments throughout the study.
References


Dynamics of Social Movements and Poverty Reduction: Empirical Evidence from the Tharu Movement of Western Nepal¹

Mahendra Sapkota*

Abstract

Globally, research on poverty reveals relatively little about social movements, and vice versa. There is a research gap regarding whether and how emerging social movements can contribute to poverty reduction and equality. In this context, the paper analyses the Tharu movement which represents one of the largest indigenous groups in Nepal. Despite having a long historical background, critics suggest that the agenda of the Tharu movement is primarily based on identity issues and less on pro-poor issues in terms of mainstreaming people in development. Sharing part of this critique, the paper argues that the Tharu movement has merely ‘strategically’ led the poverty agenda (though some outcomes have been achieved); but beyond the rhetoric of the movement, there has been no significant uplift in the local villages of Western Nepal to justify their well-being and sustainability of livelihoods.

¹ This chapter has been approved as a research paper by the referee.

* Mr. Mahendra Sapkota is a Ph.D. fellow of a collaborative research project between Kathmandu University, NCCR North-South and University of Zurich, Switzerland. This paper is one of the outcomes of his field study on social movements and rural development in Nepal.
Introduction

Research Context
Social movement is group mobilisation and campaigning to re-make the world through individual or group voices claiming their rights, welfare and well-being. Some scholars suggest social movement means an organised group of people involved in a conflict with clearly identified opponents, sharing a common identity, a unifying belief or a common programme acting collectively to promote or resist social change in their society (Bebbington 2010). Such movements are perceived as a basic feature of modern societies, though they may have different ideological and strategic orientations such as identity and autonomy. In the context of developing countries, the issues of reducing poverty and inequality posit a key motivational factor of social movements. However, the relationship between poverty and social movements is highly contested (Ballard et al. 2005) and a limited number of studies have revealed the impacts of social movements on poverty reduction since both fields are placed under different analytical frameworks.

Despite the plethoric history of planned development2 that span more than six decades, Nepal remains at the lower ebb of development indices. The core problems of widespread poverty, inequality and exclusion all find their roots in the stagnation of economic and social life in rural areas. Poverty has transformed from being a physical, material phenomenon to something that has seeped into the moral and socio-psychological realms with a loss of people’s self-esteem (Panday 2009, p.10). Though the government and donors in the reduction of poverty are claiming considerable success, this has exacerbated more inequality among various groups and regions, benefitting the interests of people of upper castes and class (UNDP 2009). Consequently, different forms of social movements and non-state actors have geared-up to challenge state-led development strategies representing poor people’s aspirations and expectations.

Scholars argue that one of the distinctive features of Nepal’s post-conflict transition is the plethora of identity-based movements and the recourse by these identity-groups to so-called agitation movements (Sharma, Khadka and Shreesh 2011).3 Agitation as a method for demanding change in society received legitimacy through the success of the Jana Andolan II or the April movement 2006.4 However, while this movement was not based

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2 The history of planned development in Nepal started with the First Five Year Plan in 1963. Since then, the country has developed thirteen subsequent plans including the present Three Year Interim Plan (2011-13).

3 According to the Home Ministry, 109 militant/criminal groups are reported to be active in 26 districts of Nepal, out of which only 12 groups have been classified as ‘political’ organisations (Lawoti 2011).

4 The first ‘People’s Movement’ or Jana Andolan I took place in 1990 when the king-controlled party-less Panchayat system was overthrown and multi-party democracy was established with constitutional monarchy. The second people’s movement or Jana Andolan II took place over 19 days in April 2006 that brought the Maoists into mainstream politics and abolished the monarchy.
on identity politics, subsequent movements, particularly ethnic (adhibasi/janajati) movements have been. They claim to be representative of people and advocate people’s grievances. In practice, do such movements represent the poor people and contribute to reducing poverty?

This paper advances the dynamics of poverty from the viewpoint of the Tharu movement, a movement of one of the largest indigenous ethnic groups of Nepal. However, impact of the movement’s strategies on poverty reduction have not been sufficiently reviewed. This paper, therefore, tries to answer the following questions:

- Has poverty reduction been a strategy of Tharu movement?
- How has this movement contributed to the well-being and livelihood of the Tharu community?

Scholarly Review of the Tharu Movement

The Tharus (Nepali: Tharu) are the oldest as well as the largest ethnic minority group in Terai region and are estimated to constitute around 13.5% of Nepal’s 29.4 million population as of July 2010 (CBS 2011). They have a distinct culture with animalistic beliefs characterised by worship of the forest spirits. Historically, they are forest cultivators of the region, and claim to be direct descendents of Lord Gautam Buddha. However, the Hindu culture has come to be more and more integrated in their lives in the last decades. The Tharus mainly live in the southern plains of Terai by the border with India, but a small number can also be found in the Champaran district of Bihar and Naini Tal district of Uttar Pradesh in India. They practice different languages and cultural rituals within a heterogeneous regional-cultural setting. It is also noteworthy that the Government of Nepal has kept the Tharu ethnic group under the category of ‘marginalised’ indigenous group.

The earliest ethnographies that include details of the Tharu life and culture in Nepal did not appear until more than two decades after the establishment of democracy in 1951. Up until 1990s there was no detailed study carried out that essentially focused on the Tharu

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5 The words ‘adivasi, janajati, mulvasi and bhumiputra’ are interchangeably used to mean the indigenous groups and nationalities of Nepal; defined as ‘those ethnic groups or communities who have their own mother tongue and traditional customs, distinct cultural identity, distinct social structure and written or oral history of their own’ (National Foundation for Indigenous Nationalities Act 2002).

6 Nepal is ecologically divided into three regions from north to the south: Mountains, Hills and the Terai. The Terai is a southern plain region, where there is rapid migration from the hills, urbanisation and industrialisation. The region bears 50.2% of the total population and 23% of the total land area of the country within its 22 districts (CBS 2011).

7 Kathariya, Rana, Dangaur, Chitauriya and Kochi/purhiya are major cultural and regional identities of Tharu community, taken from the far-West to the far-East of Terai-Nepal.

8 On the basis of various indicators, Government of Nepal has classified 59 indigenous nationalities (groups) into five major categories: Endangered, Highly Marginalised, Marginalised, Disadvantaged, and Advantaged (advanced) groups (UNDP 2011).

More recent concerns about ethnicity and ethnic movement, resistance and state, state and society, social exclusion and inclusion, activism and contentious politics, and identity and autonomy have been addressed by various foreign, Nepali and Tharu scholars, notably, Chaudhary (2012), Bhattachan (2010), Lawoti (2010), Guneratne (2002), Stokke and Manandhar (2010), Gellner (2008), Baral (2012), and Hachhethu (2007). All these works are primarily focused on the application of research to identity issues. However, the issue of identity has been conceptualised within a narrow domain of culture or ethnicity, not including the issues of development or under-development. In particular, there seems a research gap in viewing the impact and effectiveness of movements in poverty reduction and sustainable livelihood. Moreover, this list of publications is quite short when compared to the similar reviews for the high castes or for other ethnic groups in Nepal.

On the other hand, even though some of these studies are heavily influenced by the Marxist ideologies and structural changes, scholars are rarely engaged with the theoretical inception that could better explain the cause and context of Nepalese social movements. Though the aim of this paper is not the theoretical deduction of social movements, it attempts to link poverty reduction strategies and the dynamics of the Tharu movement. For this, the Tharu movement has been perceived in a holistic way, which has been led by the Tharu ethnic group and some Tharu community-based social/political organisations.

Analytical Framework

The concept of livelihoods has gained prominence and traction in recent years through debates about rural development, poverty reduction and social movements. Defining livelihoods and capturing multi-dimensionality in the Nepalese context is not straightforward. The term means different things to different people. From a programmatic perspective, there are different frameworks of livelihoods widely used in Nepal, e.g. Sustainable Livelihood Approach of DFID, Rural Livelihood Systems (RLS), Care International’s model and Oxfam’s frameworks. Although different in some respects, these frameworks tend to incorporate analysis of social exclusion and inclusion that ‘open up important questions about power relations and structures’ (Upreti et al. 2012, p. 14). However, the frameworks mentioned lack the socio-psychological values
and aspirations of people. Another gap seems to be epistemological and methodological bias towards income-based poverty and material-dimension of well-being. Moreover, people’s mobilisation and collective actions or practices are missing dynamics as part of their livelihoods, which could relate social movements with livelihood issues. This is what Geiser et al. (2011) call a ‘methodological shift’- a shift from more quantitative to more qualitative research approaches, from the quantification of assets towards more in-depth analysis of certain aspects of livelihoods, such as intra-household power relations, the social significance of certain assets, or the importance of institutions and policies.

There are two popular traditions in literature to analyse the relationship between social movements and poverty: capital-based livelihood framework and state-market-civil society. While the former focuses on poverty in a broader conception, the latter helps focus attention on the institutional domains through which poverty is muted (Bebbington 2010). This paper purposively follows the livelihood framework. The discourse came in the 1990s as a critique of income-based poverty focusing on improvements on human agents and knowledge (Zoomers 1999). Critics suggest that conventional livelihood approach pays greater attention to what poor people think and do, while in recent years it lays more emphasis on what people ‘possess and control’, or what they have (Moser 1998, p. 1). However, the modern approach follows different livelihood strategies such as the ways through which people gain access to assets, combine them and transform them into livelihood outcomes. In this context, five types of capitals tend to be emphasised including human, social, produced, natural and cultural capital (Bebbington 2010).

Figure 1 shows the notion of a livelihoods framework from the context of social movement strategies. The livelihood components and movements are hypothesised as mutually inclusive events with a cause-effect relationship. Therefore, the framework has two obvious implications: first, the power dynamics, which refers to social relationships regarding people’s access and control over productive resources. The second institutional domain refers to dynamic interplay among the productivity, sustainability and reproducibility of those resources. The institutional domain in this framework range from household level to the local contexts and from civil society and market to the state institutions as well. In a cyclical manner, this process proceeds from the household level, promotes accessibility and control over the different kinds of capitals and finally produces well-being of people and their socio-political capabilities. All these processes are rooted in social institutions and structures, on which the nature and dynamics of social movements depend. Social movement, in turn, can promote right-based use, transformation and reproduction of the assets through different kinds of pro-poor

9 The term ‘capital’ here is perceived as a more dynamic, interdisciplinary, comprehensive and value-loaded concept than the term ‘asset’.

10 The term ‘well-being’ is conceptualised in both material as well as non-material terms. Income or kind of material gain is not necessarily a sufficient condition for poverty reduction. Non-material assets are transformed into ‘subjective well-being’ (e.g. dignity, identity, inclusiveness and self-esteem), which also matter significantly to enhance the capability of people. Among others, the agenda of ‘identity’ is becoming crucial in contemporary ethnic movements in Nepal.
strategies and programmes. But is this happening in the Nepalese context? This was the key analytical question in this study.

**Figure 1: Livelihood Framework and Social Movements**

Source: Adapted from Bebbington 2010.

**Historical Overview of the Movement**

**Agendas of the Tharu Movement**

Ethnic movements in Nepal started to emerge when the country was exposed to the external world in 1951. The establishment of Tharu Welfare Society (TWS) in 1949 by some Tharu elites was itself a crucial step in this regard, for bringing forward the voice of the Tharus (Gellner 2008). The TWS was established as a pressure group with the strategies of socio-cultural mobilisation, land-right movement and cultural and lingual awareness. However, the pace of the movement during the *Panchayat* era (1960-1990) was inclined to the monarchy, and its protest activities were prohibited. With the establishment of multiparty democracy in 1990, the hidden voices of Tharu movement were raised and strategically used by the Maoists to mobilise people for their decade long people’s war (1996-2006). Today, ethno-politics is one of the crucial features of the contemporary Tharu movement, through which a rapid polarization has been manifested in local as well as national context. Specifically, the movement has raised Tharu ethnic identity and autonomy as the two basic agendas (Tharu Indigenous NGO Federation 2012).
The issue of ethnic federalism has, however, been contested within different ethnic groups and their movements. Such antagonism is particularly seen in between the Tharu movement and Madheshi movement. In February 2009, the central government of Nepal classified the Tharu community within the domain of Madheshi group, a dominant ethnic group particularly found in eastern Terai region of Nepal. The construction of a pan-national supra ‘Madheshi’ identity was premised on the assumption that all the various castes and ethnic communities inhabiting the Terai, who were not from the hills, could be identified as ‘Madheshi’. This kind of nomenclature was strongly protested by the ‘Tharuhat Joint Struggle Committee’ which organised different strikes throughout the country. The movement compelled the government to change the classification terminology in legal documents from ‘madhesh’ to ‘terai-madhesh’. Since then, the binary term ‘Terai-madhesh’ is now used in the Nepalese literature of development and politics.

In contemporary Nepalese politics, Madheshi has been developed as a strong ‘regional group’ to claim the whole Terai region (i.e. madhesh) as their own province. This doctrine popularly known as ‘one madhesh, one pradesh’ was the main agenda of Madheshi movement, and contemporary Madhesh-based regional parties claim to advocate it (Sheppard 2009; Baral 2012). The agenda strongly claimed that there should be only one federal state within the Terai region of Nepal that would guarantee the rights of Madheshis. The Tharu movement strongly opposed this claim and organised repeated strikes in the country, though the issue has not been settled yet. In recent years, contestation is that some fractions of Tharu movement and Madheshi movement have formed an alliance and registered as a political party. However, specific studies are needed to reconceptualise the boundary between party politics and social movements (Manandhar 2011, p. 68).

Contesting the nature of social movements and organisations in Nepal is that they have different viewpoints about their issues and solutions. They are divided according to the political ideologies forming different sister/brother organisations. The Tharu movement itself is divided into different political, ideological, cultural and regional coverage. It is heterogeneous in nature and therefore this paper looks at the movement not from an organisational view, but through the perceptions of local people and their identities. While this paper refers to the Tharu movement throughout in a general sense, the Tharuhat Joint Struggle Committee (TJSC) is an umbrella organisation that consists of 14 different organisations including the Tharu Welfare Society (TWS) and Backward

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11The major political parties (and actors) in Nepal are divided on the founding principles for establishing provinces in federalism: identity-based (e.g. ethnic and cultural ties) and capability-based (e.g. administrative and financial ability). By and large, the fact that Maoists and most of the ethnic groups are focusing on single-identity based federalism, has coined the mode of federalism as "ethnic federalism. Although the notion of ethnic federalism is a popular one, some of the military and far right political parties have openly opposed it and argued for a referendum to let the people decide.
The TJSC is also a member of the Federal Democratic National Forum (FDNF) along with other state councils of different ethnic groups in the country. This alliance constitutes a specific vision of a new federal Nepal in which ILO 169 is consistently mentioned. However, after the collapse of Constituent Assembly in May 2012 without drafting a new constitution of Nepal, Tharu movement has again been disorganised and TJSC seems to be passive.

Contextualising Tharu Movement and Poverty

Many scholars agree that poverty is a product of prevailing relations of power, and social movements emerge as part of and in response to these power relations (Bebbington 2010). This relationship is complex as explained by Ballard et al. (2005, p. 617) as ‘politically and/or socially directed collectives’. This seems to be true in Nepal, where contemporary social movements are emerging as a response to the structural crisis and instability of political economy. Plus, there are diverse issues and concerns, and hence it is problematic to develop a causal relationship between these movements and poverty reduction of the target community. The relationship gets even more complicated because of the involvement of multiple variables, actors and networks. In this context, Manandhar (2011) argues that the nature of non-state actors and movements in Nepal very much depends upon the changing nature of governance and political regime of the country coupled with class, caste and gender relations of the people. He further argues that while rural people, particularly women, dalits and small farmers, participated in such movements; their access to leadership and benefit sharing has been minimal.

According to the latest statistics, the proportion of Nepal’s population living below the national poverty line has reduced to 25.4%, though there is poor ranking (0.458) in Human Development Index (UNDP 2011). There are views that this reduction in poverty has occurred mainly because of huge outflow of labour migration and the influx of greater remittances (Bhusal 2012). The reduction in poverty incidence, however, has been contradictory with the increase in the inequality measures incorporated in specific geographical areas and skewed along particular lines of identity. As Joshi, Maharjan, and Piya (2010, p. 8) point out, ‘poverty incidence, gap, and severity analysis of the country suggests that poverty is more rampant, deeper and severe in rural areas, and much
worse in the hills and mountains.’ There is also a visible division between rural and urban areas, which is particularly troubling given that the vast majority of Nepal’s population (83%) are still living outside towns and cities (UNDESA 2012).

The correlation between indigenous peoples and high poverty levels is a well-known feature of the world today and despite the disparities among different indigenous groups, Nepal is generally no exception (World Bank 2010). The correlation between indigenousness and poverty is not straightforward due to complexity of Nepalese society in terms of ethnic, caste, linguistic, religious, geographical and cultural diversity. Some recent statistics show that indigenous groups (along with occupational castes, women and some regional groups), are particularly vulnerable to poverty (NLSS 2010/11). Moreover, the UNDP’s Human Development Reports make explicit links between social exclusion and unequal access of certain groups to economic assets, income or employment opportunities, social services and political opportunities (UNDP 2004, 2009, 2011).

Tharu has been categorised as a marginalised indigenous group of Nepal. The incidence of poverty of this group is about 44%, nearly double the national average of 25% (CBS 2011). Though the mainstream development discourse consistently focuses on the empowerment of such disadvantaged groups as a pre-requisite for poverty reduction, the state programmes are less effective in the local context. On the other hand, the issues of empowerment and poverty reduction are elite-driven project networked with the different organisations and associations in local areas. Critics suggest that these organisations collectively constitute the movement, but are more involved with the instrumentalisation of poor people rather than with the sustainability of livelihood.

**Methodology**

The methodology of this study was designed as a qualitative and in-depth case study of the Tharu movement. Empirically, the entry point was Dang, a district of mid-western Terai region of Nepal. According to the National Census (2001), total population of Dang district is 4,62,380. There is abundance of Tharu community, being 31.8% of the total population in the district; followed by other castes like Chettri (22.7%), Magar (12%), and so on. This region witnessed a strong historical foundation of the Tharu movement since the establishment of Tharu Welfare Society in 1949. Regmi (2011) argues that Dang District was at the peak of peasant’s protest in the 1960s and 1970s. In recent years, this district has been known as one of the powerful epicentres of Tharu movement of Nepal with a wide network of ethnic associations and movement activism. 

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15 According to the World Bank, indigenous peoples represent about 5% of the world’s population, but over 15% of the world’s poor.
16 The Tharus of Dang are popularly known as ‘Dangaura’.
17 The peasant movement against the Land Reform Act 1964 in western Nepal was a class-based movement. The poor peasants’ groups actively participated in the movement due to the provision of high taxation, insecurity of tenancy rights, and perpetuation of bonded labor systems. The movement continued for a long time and two Tharus were killed in Dang in the movement in 1971.
Following Flick (2009), a Village Development Committee (VDC)\textsuperscript{18}, Chailahi was selected from the district using purposive sampling. Total population of the VDC is estimated to be 10,135, where the Tharus constitute 63\%, i.e. 5,966 (DDC 2011). Research participants from the four categories of movement activists, participants, opponents, and non-participants were part of Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) and semi-structured interviews. The collected information and narratives were analysed.

\textbf{Discussion and Analysis}

\textbf{Enhancing Capital and Livelihoods: A Local Perspective}

Due to strong intensity of the Tharu movement in Chailahi, this VDC has been categorised as the most prioritised VDC in the Dang district in terms of demonstration (TWS 2012). It may be due to the strategic location of the VDC, growing influence of the Tharu leaders and a strong network of movement organisations, political parties and donors. Lamahi \textit{bazaar} (market) of this VDC has been developed as the thundering place for Tharu movement and demonstration. This study has found different movement strategies along with various welfare programmes and networking organisations, which were directly or indirectly related to the issues of poverty and livelihood of local Tharu people.

The possibility of finding a permanent job in the village is hard and thus no employment opportunities were reported as the outcome of the movement strategies. District and area committees of Tharu Welfare Society are more active in Chailahi VDC and it has launched vocational training programmes for self-employment of the Tharu women in collaboration with a Japanese volunteer organisation. However, these training programmes were accessible to literate women only. On the other hand, in spite of having great income opportunity from Tharu cultural tourism, the movement organisations did not have any policies to promote it. Moreover, there was a common problem of debt, particularly in the case of farmers, who had to borrow money from local moneylenders for expenditures.

Many villagers were working both as agricultural wage labourers and as construction workers, due to low wages. Some of them were still struggling to pay back what they had taken from local moneylenders. The access to high wage labour and micro-credit had not been incorporated as an immediate concern of movement strategies, though it matters in local livelihood and poverty reduction. There were three co-operatives, two of them headed by females, in the VDC. These co-operatives were initially established by the Tharu local people as monthly saving groups, collecting a half USS from each household.

\textsuperscript{18}The VDCs are the smallest administrative units in Nepal, having below 20,000-population size on an average and each VDC consists of nine wards. The VDCs are locally responsible to the District Development Committees (DDCs) and centrally to the Ministry of Local Development.
(1S is equivalent to Nepalese Rs 87). As a strategy of local Tharu leaders and with the initiation of Tharu Welfare Society (TWS) and Freed Kamalari Development Forum (FKDF)\textsuperscript{19}, these saving groups were registered under the co-operative code of the DDC, Dang. Some of the people had access to micro-credit schemes with minimum interest rates. The co-operative officials reported that the banking policies focused more on commercial activities rather than on agricultural production. Thus, the issue of ultra-poor people and landless farmers remains unresolved because there is no special provision to disburse credit to such groups.

Though the movement organisations promoted social awareness about the importance of education, the local reality was different. The story of Sunji Chaudhary is more contextual in this regard. She is 35 years old with four children. Unfortunately, she could only put her son in an expensive private school and the remaining three daughters had to be enrolled in the inexpensive government school. In turn, the daughters could give more time to various domestic and agricultural chores. Though there is access to inexpensive government schools in Nepal; their curriculums are rather traditionally structured as compared to that of the private ones. Some research participants remarked that their accessibility to private schools was very limited because of poverty and unaffordability. On the other hand, the children of local elites and the founders of the school frequently reserved admission quotas for their own children. Hence, Sunji represents a case of gender and class discrimination in education system of the rural areas. Many daughters have become a victim of this system. However, Tharu movement organisations had less engagement to minimise this discrimination.

The story behind the health system is the same. The ability to afford health care services in village was poor. Some research participants argued that though there was a health post in the VDC, it lacked doctors, nurses, and equipment. A 32-year-old Tharu woman expressed her dissatisfaction at the health services and revealed that it was difficult to reach the governmental hospital due to its remote location. The nearest health clinic is a private one, which is comparatively more expensive too. Some movement organisations often help the needy groups, by promoting vaccination programmes and launching health camps at the local level. However, these activities only took place strategically at the peak hours of the movement.

Land is one of the key assets that can influence other assets of livelihood. Historically, Tharu movement has incorporated the agenda of land reform as a high priority (Regmi 2011), though the present context is somehow misleading. Some respondents in the village stated that they did not own enough land that could be sufficient to increase their food access and income. Nevertheless, this could be seen as the modern form of the

\textsuperscript{19}The Freed Kamalari Development Forum (FKDF) is a civil group established in 1999 in Dang by some ex-kamalaria (the Tharu bonded girls), and now extended to the other six western districts of Nepal.
*Kamaiya* system, where the poor people previously working freely on rich farmers’ land have now been further obliged to provide non-farm services. On the other hand, the failure to implement tenancy rights has caused many tensions in Chailahi VDC. Since land reform has been a less prioritised agenda of the Tharu movement in recent years, tenancy right issues were also not focused (TWS 2012).

The distribution of land in the villages is uneven and some Tharu elites as well as upper caste migrants occupy most of the land. Thus, many poor farmers work on public land, locally called *Swaragadhvari Guthi* land. Some farmers have also been engaged as tenants on their landlord’s own land. Many people in the village demand 50% ownership of the land they work on as stipulated in the tenancy rights; but are conveniently denied. Interestingly, one of the tenants remarked that, ‘our issue of land would not be solved permanently until and unless the leadership of movement occupied by landlords and upper class elites does not step down...they have deceived us many times.’

The problem of disbelief against the politicians was immense in the village with many Tharus expressing their dissatisfaction. Though there were some local Tharu politicians, influence of poor people upon them was very limited and elite-driven. People were experiencing an extreme marginalisation as politicians were not listening to them. Regarding their expectations and felt-needs, most of the research participants argued that there should be increased opportunities in education and employment. Unfortunately, these agendas had not been the primer of Tharu movement. Regarding the impacts of Tharu movement, they participated in the movement just as instrument of mass mobilisation, but their representation in the decision-making and agenda setting process was very limited. Though the movement changed some old institutions of participation, some people were also worried about the politicisation and polarisation of the movement. Political participation in the village was very limited except voting. People said that sometimes, especially on elections, great leaders came from headquarters (Ghorahi and Tulsipur) or Kathmandu and committed to various projects such as reducing poverty and promoting development. However, people accused that the leaders did not really care about people’s livelihood situation. They asserted that Tharu leaders initially were a bit different from the leaders of political parties, because the movement leadership was locally developed and structured. Due to such leadership, access and control over village council increased, and the local decision making systems came in favour of Tharus. The same optimistic strand was expressed when some Tharu leaders were interviewed. They cited different claims and achievements of the movement in poverty reduction including the increase in local market (*haat bazaar*), membership in the community forest user committees, and proportion of female representation in local community forests and cooperatives.

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20*Kamaiya* is a kind of bonded labour system practiced in mid-western and far-western regions of Nepal. Though the Government of Nepal released 18,291 *kamaiyas* from their bondage on 17 July 2002, the issue of rehabilitation is still unresolved (TWS 2012).
In the meantime, when this issue was triangulated to other participants, the questions remained unanswered; sources of the basis were questioned. The gathered data was loaded with quantitative visibility, but there were some values and subjective issues as well. The question was, was it necessarily correlative that increase in welfare organisations, co-operatives, community forests, user group membership, local market, etc. were just because of the Tharu movement? Could these achievements be also interpreted in terms of other social and political changes in Nepalese society? Could the movement be analysed as a middle-class elitist propaganda? In turn, what was the sole role of Tharu movement in changing the political economy of poverty? These were some of the questions in the movement dynamics, as reflected in the lamentation of a landless farmer of the village; 'Sir, what can I get from the movement? Do not ask me about my home, land, credit... I do not know what Tharu movement is!'

Preliminary Findings and Observations

Social movements have often helped to place issues on the political agenda. In the areas of poverty and economic policy, however, movements are likely to be more reactive (CPRC 2008). This is also true in Nepalese context of the Tharu movement, which has failed to address the dynamics of poverty in the local context just as the Nepalese state given weak strategies and elitist agendas. This argument is build up with the following preliminary findings of the study:

Structural crisis
In Nepal, elected local bodies are vacant since 2002 and the present state-restructuring process has prolonged. The service delivery system of government is becoming weak and passive. Moreover, there is a huge ideological and political gap among the major political parties to address the present crisis. Due to gradual erosion in self-esteem, dignity and freedom of common Nepalese people, a certain kind of political alienation has developed with despair, dissatisfaction and frustration. On the other hand, contemporary rural life has been more victimised with a significant increase in urban-rural gap, poverty and inequality (UNDP 2011). In this context, the expansion of social movements in the rural areas is inevitable. All these factors also ring true for the structuring of non-state activism of the Tharu movement. Particularly in Chailahi VDC of the Dang district where this study was conducted, the movement was more critical and massive due to some structural issues, including growing awareness, livelihood insecurity, weak representation and in-effective state-led development strategies.

Institutional set-up
With the spaces mentioned above, different kinds of Tharu civil society organisations are emerging rapidly and adopting welfare programmes to enhance livelihoods. However, most of these organisations are politically divided and there is strategic difference among them, thus making it difficult to define the Tharu movement in a holistic way. Use of the livelihood framework reveals that the most significant way in which movements affect
poverty are more institutional-organisational in nature, which influences access and control of assets and capability development through the assets. In this set-up, as explained before, the role of movement organisations is crucial. Table 1 portrays different activities, networks and key issues of some major organisations collaborating with the Tharu movement in Chailahi VDC.

Table 1: Major Organisations of the Tharu Movement and their Activities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Movement Organisations</th>
<th>Networking in Society</th>
<th>Thematic Orientation</th>
<th>Key Issues</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tharuhat Joint Struggle Committee (TJSC)</td>
<td>Strong; but more strategic and politically structured</td>
<td>Political affairs; promoting the voices of ethnic identity and regional autonomy</td>
<td>Focus on the different capitals of people, but the overall impact is pro-elite and pro-ethnic identity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tharu Welfare Society (TWS)</td>
<td>Strong, historically rooted; but the network is gradually eroding</td>
<td>Promoting social welfare, awareness, cultural rights, vocational trainings and co-operative services</td>
<td>Oldest legacy of the movement; more actively engaged in the social, cultural and human capital of local people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Backward Education Society (BASE)</td>
<td>Popular, strong, but donor-driven agenda setting</td>
<td>Rehabilitation of ex-kamaiya, formal/informal education, social security and primary health care programmes</td>
<td>More engaged in the promotion of social and human capital; frequently blamed for the NGOisation of the movement</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: From the author’s field visit in 2012.

Some researchers (e.g. Chaudhary 2012) argue that there is a widening ideological gap and weak co-ordination among these organisations. Initially, TWS was not supportive of the political orientation of TJSC and thus did not participate in the movement. Along with this, there was an obvious blame that such organisations were working as puppets of major political parties. Some of the participants in this research also shared that they were tired of politics of the Tharu movement; for example, the TJSC was guided by ultra-leftist ideology (affiliated with United Communist Party of Nepal–Maoist), the TWS oriented with soft-leftist ideology (inclined to Communist Party of Nepal–United Marxist Leninist) and the BASE was more influenced by democratic ideology (influence by Nepali Congress).

Table 2 shows how different kinds of loose networks were also developed during the movement, and how they are manifesting the agenda of poverty reduction and capability development. These organisations, with the exception of the Land Right Forum (LRF), were not established from movement perspective. Many of them existed before the
movement began, and continuously engaged in welfare affairs and collective production strategies. However, in recent years, they were subordinated to the Tharu movement along with their welfare activities. These groups were strategically used to create ‘critical mass’ for the demonstrations and strikes called by the Tharuhat Joint Struggle Committee (TJSC). The members of these organisations were asked (somehow compelled) to participate in the programme and give collective voice.

Table 2: Loose Networks of the Tharu Movement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisations</th>
<th>Social Networking</th>
<th>Thematic Orientation</th>
<th>Key Issues</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mother groups</td>
<td>Strong, working as self-help group</td>
<td>Social awareness and welfare</td>
<td>Development of all capitals; esp. the social capital of women, but difficult to link up with feminist movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth clubs</td>
<td>Strong, working both as ‘self-help’ and ‘pressure group’</td>
<td>Socio-political awareness and advocacy</td>
<td>Working as power house of the Tharu movement, but no progress in their employment and education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural groups</td>
<td>Historically rooted and structures in villages</td>
<td>Socio-cultural welfare and celebration</td>
<td>More focus on traditional institutions and practices; feudal in nature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freed Kamalari Development Forum (FKDF)</td>
<td>Active in some villages</td>
<td>Social welfare</td>
<td>Rescue and rehabilitation of kamalaries; problem with other liberation movements of bonded labourers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land Right Forum (LRF)</td>
<td>Strong at the VDC level</td>
<td>Political and economic affairs</td>
<td>Advocacy of land reform and issues of landless peasants and tenants; but less influential in Tharu movement and not linked with other land-based movements</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: From the author’s field visit in 2012.

Though there was very weak coordination, these organisations collectively worked in some social welfare programmes. In 2011, they rescued 42 kamalaries\(^{21}\) from the Dang district and among them seven were from the Chailahi VDC. But, can this rescue process be generalised as a sole outcome of the Tharu movement? So far, the literature reveals that the emancipation of bonded labourers and conduction of welfare programmes were

\(^{21}\) Kamalari is a female bondage system, practiced in the mid-western and far-western Terai region of Nepal, particularly in Tharu community. Kamalari movement was started from Dang district and then expanded to other districts. The system has been outlawed by the Government of Nepal, though there are some hidden practices in some places.
not set as the prioritised agenda of the Tharu movement. More shamelessly, as argued by some research participants, the contemporary Tharu movement which claims to be a true representative of the poor people has been less worried about the agendas such as their communal development, land reform and agricultural modernisation.

Overall, the key findings observed in the study can be conceptualised within the livelihood framework as follows:

1) **At household level:** increased social awareness, expanded membership in co-operatives and forests user groups, helping the rescue of bonded labourers.

2) **Access and control of resources:** increased ‘access’ over resources and institutions of the community, but ‘control’ is still limited; e.g. in education sector, health and market.

3) **Capitals and assets:** ranges and choices of livelihood strategies increased, but less focus on the ownership and reproduction of sustainability assets, e.g. land and tenancy rights.

4) **Well-being and capability:** focusing more on material and physical dimension of poverty; some donor-driven, elitist assumption that giving money to the poor will solve the poverty issue.

**Emerging Power Dynamics of Tharu Movement**

Political life in Nepal is characterised by continually changing constellation of struggles over power, resources and identity. Aside from rhetoric and slogans, it is crucial to acknowledge agendas of the movement with day-to-day lives of people. For this, an unanswered question is how successfully movement strategies will break the inverted power dynamics, which has created a huge residue of marginalisation in society. Despite some pre-existing patterns of authority being challenged with the rise of new political movements over the last decade, the shifting of power in favour of poor people is still undetermined. In this context, Sugden (2011) argues that the political change and social movement in Nepal appear to represent renegotiation rather than a transformation of unequal power relations.

The power dynamics in society is more challenging because of the difference in ideological foundations and networking institutions that govern the domains of access, transformation and sustainability of the livelihood outcomes achieved in terms of the movement. Given the historical link between leadership within the Tharu movement, landlords (jimindar) and bureaucrats (chaudhary) continues to remain well represented in the leadership (Chaudhary 2012), which prevents the possibility of mass mobilisation of people to address the genuine issues of their day-to-day lives. Some research participants in the field perceived that most of the leaders of Tharu movement were from the main political parties, who would recycle the process of elitism in the movement. In fact, ownership of movement was often used to reproduce patron-clients relation, whereby tenants and poor people would be offered jobs or reduced poverty in return for electoral
support. An activist of the Tharu movement in Kathmandu, when asked about the prospect of movement in poverty reduction, stated:

*Both [movement and poverty] are very sensitive issues... They are directly linked with the power structure of important families and power interests.... Along with the donors and political parties, we are also biased towards the poverty issue ... But, no one dares to raise the issue as the main agenda of the movement.*

Therefore, in the local context, it was evident that the Tharu has movement failed to address the underlying causes of poverty at the grassroots level of power structure. However, the contribution towards welfare activities performed by the movement organisations can not be denied. The break of this power pyramid dominated by the elites of Tharus and other groups is vital for poverty reduction. In this outset, the critical dynamics of the Tharu movement can be summarised as below:

i. *Dynamics of the movement has been changing* from local (rural) to regional (Terai) and national (state-restructuring) politics. However, the intensity of the movement has been over shadowed by ideological division, elite-driven leadership and lack of alliance with other ethnic movements for livelihood issues of people.

ii. *Less priority given to the transformation and reproduction of capitals* to promote livelihood sustainability. In the meantime, there is no immediate possibility for revolution through the Tharu movement because of weak mobilisation and participation of people and less focus on collective production strategies.

iii. *Poverty remains*, but has been less addressed with structural change. Though some outcomes have been achieved, they are more political rather than developmental in nature, i.e. poverty reduction still remains only a ‘strategic’ tool of the movement. As stated in earlier discussion, this strategic orientation of the Tharu movement can be due to the following causes:

- Short-term welfare programmes only during the peak of the movement;
- Less inclusion of small farmers and poor people in leadership;
- Lack of long-term vision of leadership;
- Weak organisational structure, and;
- Less engagement with poor people’s agendas (including their livelihood security, land reform, incentives, etc.)

**Regional Implications and Sustainable Development**

Social movement researches are more crucial in ‘movement societies’ of the present world (Amin 2010). The impact of these movements in social relationships, power dynamics, poverty reduction and people’s well-being in developing countries, particularly in South Asian countries is inevitable. Therefore, the following are some of the implications in the context of sustainable development:
1) **Nepalese context:** Ethnic movements in Nepal have produced contesting discourses exploring new interpretation of politics and economy (Panday 2009). The movements have tended to alter the dynamics of power relationship between society and the state, people and the state in particular, though there is not a focused agenda of poverty reduction. In this context, the provoking question is still how the movement can become pro-poor and pro-people.

2) **Regional context:** The Nepalese context and perspective of social movement can also be shared with various currents of social movements, today, across the South Asian region, which have become strengthened and highly vocal over last three decades. Particularly, the dynamics of Tharu and other ethnic movements in Nepal have created a kind of no-state activism to challenge the state-led development process. Along with this, some issues and agendas like social inclusion, empowerment and rights of indigenous group have been nationalized. This experience and reality can have South Asian regional implications because of historical as well as contemporary interdependencies with similar social environments, cultural grounds and political development across constituent countries.

3) **A gap of collective structure for social movement studies:** Until now, the social movements in Nepal have been sharing their experiences with each other in a highly confined narrative. Today, however, we have some enabling elements to make collective intelligence through prolonged transition and polarization in constitution writing and state-restructuring process in the country. There is a rapidly changing dynamic of strategies, conflict and alliance among the different kinds of social movements, the Tharu movement and Madheshi movement, for instance. Thus, this is in fact high time when an initiative needs to be taken at national level structuring a Collective for Nepalese social movements with special focus on: a) academic and expert understanding; b) activism analysis and, c) interconnecting discourse and initiatives. This kind of collective colloquium will become a niche to devise a comprehensive outlook of social movements and sustainable development in the country.

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Mainstreaming Disaster Risk Reduction into Development and Building Resilient Communities in Pakistan¹
Atia Ali Kazmi*  

Abstract  
The disaster risk reduction (DRR) concept evolved in the late 1970s and became the basis of global action by the United Nations, governments, International Non-Governmental Organisations (INGOs) and Non-Government Organisations (NGOs) by the 1990s. This global realisation led to the ten-year plan called Hyogo Framework for Action in 2005 urging states to build resilience against natural disasters.

The concept of mainstreaming DRR into development is a proactive way of managing natural calamities. It calls for all developmental activities and proactive DRR measures to be completely synchronised. Mainstreaming through a top-down approach of policy-making and implementation can reduce vulnerability. Likewise, a bottom-up approach to mainstreaming would be to build the capacity of communities vulnerable to natural disasters. Synergy between the two approaches would ideally offer maximum mitigation and reduce vulnerabilities.

This paper examines the linkages between mainstreaming, the present institutional set up and political will to establish it, and making vulnerable communities resilient in Pakistan. The paper features a self-reliant community in Basti Lashkarpur- a remote village near Muzaffargarh, Southern Punjab, Pakistan. Basti Lashkarpur is a flood prone area and can only be accessed through boats. The villagers, with the help of a local NGO have proactively mainstreamed DRR into their indigenous practices. Since then, the community has successfully mitigated the disastrous effects of recurrent floods.

¹ This chapter has been approved as a research paper by the referee.  
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Introduction
Pakistan’s geography makes the country vulnerable to natural disasters. During the 2010-11 floods, 29 million people were affected with 1985 deaths and US$ 10 billion in losses (NDMA 2010a). Unless Pakistan mainstreams DRR into development, it would be unable to achieve milestones set by the UN’s Millennium Development Goals. However, if Pakistan is able to mainstream disaster risk reduction into its development plans and builds resilient communities, future natural calamities may be less disastrous and pose lesser financial burden on its fledgling economy.

Mainstreaming Disaster Risk Reduction
Mainstreaming means ‘to consider and address risks emanating from natural hazards in medium-term strategic development frameworks, in legislation and institutional structures, in sectoral strategies and policies, in budgetary processes, in the design and implementation of individual projects and in monitoring and evaluating all the above’ (Benson et al. 2007, p.6).

There is a Yin-Yang relationship between sustainable development, disaster management and mainstreaming DRR into development. Developing states usually have a reactive approach to disaster management (Arnold 2008, p. 1) focusing merely on recovery and rehabilitation. Conversely, mainstreaming DRR into development could lead to proactive management of disasters (NDMA 2007b, p.v) which is a triangulation ‘between three elements of governance: economic, political and administrative’ (UNDP 2004). Economic envisages decisions affecting ‘economic activities and interaction of a country’s economy with other states’; political relates to policy formulation for disaster reduction and planning, while administrative governance is directed at policy implementation in compliance with organisations at local and central levels (UNDP 2004). In DRR domain,

...it requires enforcement of building codes, land-use planning, environmental risk and human vulnerability monitoring and safety standards (UNDP 2004).

It also includes activities such as safe construction, building dykes and dams, rainwater harvesting, relocation, community building, safe livelihoods, and awareness programmes. Preparedness activities call for educated and trained officials, teams and communities, effective education plans, early warning systems in working conditions and plans for precautionary measures to be carried out in the alert period for disaster (NDMA 2007b, p. 36).

The World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction held in 2005 at Kobe, Japan presented the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA) 2005-2015, whose prioritized actions suggest that governments should exhibit *strong political determination* to promote mainstreaming (UN/ISDR 2005, p. 7). Channelling finances, technological assistance, materials and training human resource for mainstreaming proactive DRR strategies
requires strong political will. Only such mainstreamed DRR leads to improved co-
ordination among various Disaster Management (DM) institutions (Collins 2009).

**Building Resilient Communities through Mainstreaming**

Building the capacity of communities strengthens social capital by ‘creating strong
bonds among members i.e., making them resilient and safe from disasters’ (Kuhlicke and
Steinführer 2010). This approach also plays a major role in enabling civil societies to
face complex emergencies. Mainstreaming can, therefore, be achieved by promoting
social assimilation and political involvement (Ibid.).

Improper development activities such as not following building codes and inhabiting
disaster prone areas, add to disaster risk. Ill-conceived urbanisation and habitats in
hazardous areas increase risk as well as poverty level, thus affecting the ability to cope
with disasters such as floods and earthquakes (UNDP 2004). On the other hand, while
mitigation measures may enhance construction costs by a few per cent, they pay in the
longer run and returns are higher (Benson et al. 2007, p. 6). The HFA sets the tone for
building capacities of communities:

...Disasters can be substantially reduced if people are well informed and motivated
towards a culture of disaster prevention and resilience, which in turn requires the
collection, compilation and dissemination of relevant knowledge and information on
hazards, vulnerabilities and capacities (UN/ISDR 2005, p. 9).

A community development strategy can play a crucial role in assessing the impact of
disasters, thus being helpful in ‘vulnerability analyses’ for disaster management
(Yodmani 2003, p. 481). All members of the community, from children to elderly can
contribute effectively in minimising the disaster and its impact. This is because their
local knowledge of the area and the problems arising from the aftermath play a vital role.
Hence, it is imperative to ensure community involvement in ongoing DRR policies and
practices. A long-term commitment towards community based DRR should focus more
on vulnerable groups rather than elites and privileged.

DRR programmes should, hence be ‘bottom-up’, steered by a national policy developed
from ‘top down’ (Ritchie 2003). ‘A top-down approach led by governing elites involves
co-opting grassroots; alternatively a bottom-up led process, working closely with
community organisations, involves co-opting governments’ (Mitchell 2003, p.9 quoting
Warner 2003). A community capacity building strategy aimed to ‘mitigate, prepare and
respond’ to a disaster can lead to sustainable development and poverty reduction (Oxfam
GB 2008).

**Pakistan’s DRR Institutional and Policy Set-Up**

The 8 October 2005 earthquake highlighted that Pakistan’s disaster management policies,
laws, organisational infrastructure, and financial capacity, were inadequate in creating a
system that could withstand the consequences of a massive earthquake. Need for an
overarching organisation to coordinate the national DM effort and deal with domestic
and external agencies was felt. This also meant that policies and laws governing
development and DM needed an overhaul.

The Earthquake Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Authority (ERRA) appeared
immediately after the earthquake, while the National Disaster Management Commission
and Authority (NDMC and NDMA) were set up in 2007, and the Ministry of Disaster
Management in October 2011. A few pre-2005 organisations such as the Federal Flood
Commission, Pakistan Directorate General Civil Defence, and Provincial Irrigation and
Drainage Authorities already existed.

This section reviews domestic laws, policies, and organisations for DRM with a focus on
mainstreaming. All disaster management organisations have not been assessed; only the
ones with existing or prospective mainstreaming role have been taken as a sample. This
approach helps in identifying gaps.

Though ERRA was institutionalized earlier, NDMA is the ‘focal point’ (NDMA 2007b,
p. xii) for managing disasters in Pakistan. An overall view of these organisations’ legal
arrangement and initiatives for mainstreaming is given below in sequence of their
establishment.

**Earthquake Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Authority (ERRA)**

ERRA was established on 24 October 2005 to ‘(rebuild the affected area) spread over
30,000 square kilometres of nine districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) and Azad
Jammu and Kashmir (AJ&K)’. Its work is earthquake-specific only and limited to these
nine districts of KPK and AJ&K. The ERRA Act was issued on 14 March 2011 and
entered into force on 1 July 2007 ex-post facto (GoP 2011, p.34-42). While there is no
specific clause that deals with mainstreaming DRR into development, ERRA is in fact
working on mainstreaming DRR into development and capacity building of local
communities and district administrations.

2005 onwards, ERRA has strengthened the capacities of communities in 300 Union
Councils in its nine target districts. Teams of volunteers comprising 50 persons each
have been trained in practices such as search and evacuation. While drawing lessons
from the 2005 earthquake and later small scale disasters, ERRA and local communities
have identified vulnerable areas and pre-stocked districts with supplies and machinery as
a proactive measure to manage earthquakes. A few union-councils in Balakot District

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2 Now called the Ministry of Climate Change.
3 Muzaffarabad, Neelum, Bagh, Rawalakot, Abbottabad, Mansehra, Battagram, Shangla and Kohistan districts are ERRA’s responsibility.
4 Brigadier Amir Muhammad Mumtaz, Project Director DRM Programme, ERRA, person comm., Islamabad, 19 January 2012.
have also compiled data about the impacts of disasters at the local level and presented it to ERRA for disaster planning.\(^5\)

In 2011, ERRA arranged workshops in collaboration with the Planning Commission, U.S.A and India to educate people and help them prepare a checklist of construction codes to mitigate disasters. These lists have been translated into Urdu and the provincial government has made it a part of PC-1 for all future projects in the districts. Once this procedure comes in vogue it will be easier to monitor the progress of mainstreaming DRR into development.\(^6\)

**National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA)**

Under the provisions of Article 144 of the 1973 Constitution of Pakistan, the Parliament enacted/promulgated the National Disaster Management Act 2010 (NDMA 2010b). This Act provides the basis for mainstreaming DRR into the country’s development plans. It empowers the NDMA as ‘an implementation, coordination and monitoring body for disaster management’ (NDMA 2010 p.b) and calls for the establishment of permanent legal bodies from the federal down to the district level.

The National Disaster Management Commission (NDMC) was established under ex officio Chairmanship of the Prime Minister of Pakistan. It is an all-inclusive body that lays down the plans, policies, and guidelines for disaster management in Pakistan besides supervising the funding of disaster mitigation, preparedness and response (NDMA 2010b, pp. 733-734)

NDMA develops the national disaster management plan; draws guidelines for ministries or departments and the Provincial Authorities; provides required technical assistance; and promotes awareness and education with reference to managing disasters (NDMA 2010b, p. 763). However, it needs to be pointed out that NDMA does not evaluate all PC-1s; and as shared by an interviewee it should not do so either as that would ‘make it a slow and heavy bureaucratic organisation and would be stepping into the Planning Commission’s domain.’\(^7\)

NDMA works in collaboration with the National Planning Commission and the Ministry of Finance to ensure that the National Development Plan and the National Poverty Alleviation Strategy amalgamate DRR with development plans and a section on this issue has been added to NDMA’s policy papers (NDMA 2007b, p. 42). The Authority’s developmental projects envisage a procedure to check them for risk assessment and reduction. For this purpose, NDMA has delineated ‘sectoral guidelines’ on mainstreaming and a risk reduction based assessment criteria for projects for development ministries, especially the Ministry of Planning and Development (Ibid. p.

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\(^{5}\) Ibid.

\(^{6}\) Ibid.

\(^{7}\) Ibid.
Regional and Provincial Disaster Management Authorities (RDMAs and PDMAs) and Commissions assist local institutions in towns and villages in risk management. The PDMAs also focus on enhancing the technical capacity of organisations and dwellers in a community, mitigating, improving livelihoods, and thus improving strategies for preparing and reducing risk (Ibid. pp. 38-39).

The National Disaster Risk Management Framework for Pakistan (NDRMFP) seeks ‘to achieve sustainable social, economic and environmental development in Pakistan through reducing risks and vulnerabilities, particularly those of poor and marginalised groups, and by effectively responding to and recovering from disaster impact’ (NDMA 2007b, xii). The Framework’s vision of the culture of DRR was intended to be established through enhanced training, education, awareness, early warning systems, legal and institutional settings, vulnerability and threat assessment, community capacity building, DRM planning and integration of DRR with development in all projects. Moreover, emergency response and recovery was also part of the framework (Ibid.). The more recent National Disaster Risk Reduction Policy (NDRRP) 2013 is a holistic document which seeks to ‘advocate an approach to disaster management that focuses on reducing risks’ (NDMA 2013, p.6).

Ministry of Disaster Management (now called the Ministry of Climate Change)

The Government established the Ministry of Disaster Management on 26 October 2011 claiming that the measure was for ‘good governance’ (Paper PK News 2011). Subsequent to the implementation of the 18th Constitutional Amendment, Ministry of Disaster Management and three other administrative units were created under the provisions of Rule 3(2) of the Rules of Business, 1973 (The Nation 2011). The creation of the Ministry was viewed as a step ‘to accommodate the ruling party’s (Pakistan People’s Party) and coalition parliamentarians (Pakistan Muslim League (Q) and Muttahida Qaumi Movement) on ministerial berths’ (Bukhari 2011). Though a minister was appointed to lead the Ministry, commentators observed that it was literally ‘functioning under bureaucrats...because the Prime Minister had failed to appoint federal ministers and state ministers due to differences between coalition partners over securing ministerial berths’ (Bukhari 2011). The present government which was elected in May 2013 has not appointed the Federal Minister and Parliamentary Secretary Climate Change, despite appointments in almost all other ministries. This speaks of the obliviousness in setting priorities and poor political will.

NDMA’s Achievements in Mainstreaming

The NDMA’s most noteworthy achievement is the National Disaster Risk Management Framework Pakistan (NDRMFP). This Framework offers a proactive and a ‘risk sensitive’ approach of dealing with natural disasters and not merely as consequence management (NDMA 2007b, p. 41). In 2008, the NDRMFP focused on incorporating
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DRR by planning, designing and implementing development programmes in a manner that they ensure sustainable economic and social development.

The Authority has also engaged with five federal ministries, professional and technical bodies and international donors in this regard and provided consultancy services. By December 2009, five more ministries were added to this plan. It has also assisted in training Urban Search and Rescue (USAR) Teams for Capital Development Authority (CDA), Islamabad and for Karachi and Mardan administration (NDMA 2009, p.7). However, unlike ERRA, NDMA has no direct role in capacity building of communities. This function is performed by the PDMAs through external funding.

Challenges in NDMA’s Mainstreaming

The Authority’s vision and designed policies for DRR set impressive goals. However, the output and achievements do not meet desired standards. The plan of preparing a Vulnerability Atlas and an open source database (NDMA 2007b, p.34) has not materialized. Unless disaster vulnerability is mapped and a database on disasters created, planning assumptions and decisions would lead to skewed results in face of disasters.

In most cases, NDMA exercises little financial control over the PDMAs. Donor agencies directly fund the PDMAs. The practice has pros and cons. Though funding the PDMAs precludes diversion of resources elsewhere, it takes concerted policy-making and controlling powers away from the apex body NDMA. It also gives donor countries an opportunity to push their political agendas. For instance, the KPK province had $227 million in direct donor investment in 2010; whereas the federal government had a paltry $50 million aid available for disaster management. Routing all foreign aid through the NDMA and Economic Affairs Division will guard national interests and prioritise the national disaster management effort. This way, some money can also be set aside for the creation of a central fund for release/use in emergencies.

Which of the two institutions (ERRA/NDMA) should be above the other is another critical issue. One view is that putting ERRA under NDMA would strengthen the former (Ghumman 2011). The other, more logical, perspective is that since ERRA already has a fully functional system, placing it under NDMA may result in re-evaluation of all reconstruction and mainstreaming effort – thus slowing down the process. ERRA has

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1 Mubashar Hussain, DRR Mainstreaming Expert/Director NIDM, One UN Disaster Risk Management Programme/NDMA-Islamabad, person. commun. Rawalpindi, 1 January 2012.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid. pers. commun, 14 December 2012.
5 Brigadier Amir Muhammad Mamtaz, Project Director DRM Programme, ERRA, person. Comm.. Islamabad, 19 January 2012.
13,000 projects\textsuperscript{13} – worth over $ 5 billion\textsuperscript{14} – and its performance would be seriously affected if brought under NDMA’s control. Once ERRA has completed its current mandate, it could be ultimately placed under NDMA’s aegis. This, however, requires political will in terms of repealing the legislation. However, the Government may be less inclined to change the status quo to avoid political fallout.

NDMA, like ERRA,\textsuperscript{15} has also prepared a generic checklist for PC-1 of developmental projects.\textsuperscript{16} This is a good step towards mainstreaming. However, its implementation is difficult for three reasons. One, NDMA has no implementation mechanism and the provinces do not take action against the trend of only up to 25 per cent developmental project managers sending the completed checklists with the PC-1s. A penalty and legal cover may be required to implement the norm. Two, the NDMA check list is in English and incomprehensible for people responsible for filling the PC-1. Three, specific checklists for all sorts of developmental works, such as construction of buildings, bridges etc., do not exist and this would take substantial time to develop.\textsuperscript{17}

**Basti Lashkarpur - A Self-Reliant Community**

This section establishes how small communities can successfully mainstream and reduce their vulnerability with a little help from non-government actors. The observations made in this section are from a field visit in July 2011 during which the author surveyed the community’s work and interacted with the NGO that helped the inhabitants of Basti Lashkarpur in mainstreaming and community building practices. The main sources for this data are interviews with the NGO’s staff and villagers, documents provided by the foundation, and a comprehensive booklet published by Oxfam GB.

During the field trip to Basti Lashkarpur – a remote village in Southern Punjab – a first-hand account was taken to observe how a self-reliant community can proactively reduce its vulnerability to disasters. Basti Lashkarpur lies close to Muzaffargarh in a flood prone area. It is sandwiched between two offshoots of River Chenab and can only be accessed by boats. The villagers, with the help of an NGO\textsuperscript{18}, proactively mainstreamed DRR into their meagre and indigenous development programmes. Since then, Basti Lashkarpur has quite successfully mitigated the disastrous effects of recurrent floods.

\textsuperscript{13} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{14} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{15} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{16} PC 1 is the basic form filled once projects and schemes are drawn up.
\textsuperscript{17} Mubashar Hussain, DRR Mainstreaming Expert/Director NIDM, One UN Disaster Risk Management Programme/NDMA-Islamabad, person.commun. Rawalpindi, 1 January 2012.
\textsuperscript{18} The people of Basti Lashkarpur received assistance from the Doaba Foundation which is operating in that area since 1987 to help build the local communities capacity to handle the threat and devastation caused by floods.
The Community Building Strategy

The local NGO, Doaba Foundation works in coordination with several INGOs in a project called ‘Community Based Flood Risk Reduction in Southern Punjab’ that spans 50 riverine villages in District Muzaffargarh and Jhang in order to reduce their vulnerability to floods. All residents of the village were taken on board. The goal was to proactively plan for managing disasters (Oxfam GB 2008). During the survey, it was learnt that the Doaba Foundation in collaboration with Oxfam GB, helped people of these areas in forming Community Based Organisations (CBOs) with equal gender representation. The members were trained to manage livestock, first aid, and increase agricultural productivity. The early flood warning system was strengthened by forming fifty Early Warning Committees in Muzaffargarh area that were linked to the CBO arrangement. Community members also organised mock drills. The early warning training sessions included orientation to maps, village flood plans, communication and networking between the locals and district administration, and awareness about flood wave time lags.

It was also learnt that developing and maintaining strong infrastructure was a top priority. Almost 522 drains were constructed along with rehabilitation of 245 km unpaved tracks in all 50 villages. Concurrent effort was also made to share mainstreaming best practices with other communities and relevant departments at the district level. Two District Forums in Jhang and Muzaffargarh were created to provide a chance to the communities to seek representation and elevate their voice in the corridors of decision-making. The district forums were formed in stages. Initially, CBOs were set up at the village level followed by cluster level CBOs. Finally, Action Committees were formed within the District Forum that had equal representation of women, marginalised and minorities. The most noteworthy contribution of this organisational planning was that the community itself could speak for its requirements and demands. It was learned from the NGO staff that these Forums proactively engage with District Governments and also have dialogues on various issues to seek solutions. Another major accomplishment has been the translation of the District Flood Management Plan in Urdu which is now widely accessible and is easy to comprehend.

Basti Lashkarpur Project

Basti Lashkarpur is one of the fifty target riverine villages in Muzaffargarh. It is part of Union Council Rangpur, District Muzaffargarh and is situated on the left bank of River Chenab. Its total population is 293 and most of them are small farmers, whose livelihoods are dependent on agriculture and livestock. During interaction with the residents in July 2011, it was learnt that wheat is the major crop and sometimes cotton is also cultivated.

The training sessions rendered by Doaba Foundation have enhanced this community’s resilience against floods. It was observed that the Foundation helped them develop a sense of ownership by using local jargons, knowledge, techniques and wisdom. Two
gender-balanced CBOs evolved indigenous plans for floods and maintaining sustainable livelihoods with the Foundation’s guidance. Other mainstreaming efforts included formulation of records such as the village list, hazard mapping, village vulnerability profile, economic ranking and problem and solution mechanisms. The preparedness plan included devising committees for early warning, livestock management, agriculture, construction and monitoring. The Village Disaster Management Plan was made in a way that involved training the whole community in proactively preparing for floods and mitigating disasters. In doing so, tasks and responsibilities were equitably distributed. For instance, men maintained Peter engines and women learnt to operate fuel efficient stoves.

As a result, the village Flood Committee saved 200 acres of wheat crop and vegetables when 158000 cusecs flood water was released at Trimmu Headwork in 2010. Hence, with the help of trainings, these target communities have improved human and social capital and become more self reliant.

**Major Inferences and Recommendations**

The lesson from Pakistan’s experience with mainstreaming DRR into development thus far is that it is time that the Government delineates a mainstreaming policy and gives it wholehearted political support. Such a policy could be a natural consequence of the five-year NDRMFP that came to an end in 2012. The mainstreaming policy should address all anomalies in laws, policies and organisations and take the lessons after 2005 into account. This section expounds the rationale for such a policy, draws on lessons from the earlier sections to identify policy-imperatives and proffers Mainstreaming Policy implementation timelines.

**Economy and Mainstreaming**

The NDMA cannot perform its quintessential role of DRR without political support from the top echelons. Political will is indirectly related to a sturdy economy that allows the Government to invest in mainstreaming DRR into development. Sans domestic funds, the NDMA has to rely on external donors who sometimes experience donor-fatigue. Besides this, donors and even the Government have similar psyche in releasing funds for mainstreaming and DRM. For example, the Prime Minister released $11 million for disaster management during 2010 floods for political reasons, but earlier requests for funds before the 2009-10 budget for DRR were turned down.

To conserve resources, maximum use of domestic sources and expertise must be made. For instance, an official of NDMA narrated that though Pakistan Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Commission (SUPARCO) and National Engineering and

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19 Peter engine is a motor regulated water pump.
20 Anon. person. commun. 12 December 2012.
21 Ibid.
Scientific Commission (NESCOM) have the capability to prepare GIS software for vulnerability mapping, the contract was awarded to a French firm because France made it conditional to release aid for DRM. Unfortunately, a major chunk of donor money goes into such expensive projects and travelling due to the strings attached to the loan.22 Mainstreaming DRR into development is a slow and tedious process whose results are not immediately visible. Owing to this, dynamic mainstreaming is less attractive to politicians and fewer resources are diverted in this sector. Poor economic outlay adds to this tendency of relegating mainstreaming to more urgent rehabilitation and disaster mitigation work.23

Hence, it can be concluded that poor economic profile of Pakistan is the key hurdle in DRM and especially in long-term mainstreaming of DRR into development. ERRA and NDMA cannot make quick progress because they are largely dependent on foreign funding. According to ERRA’s estimate, due to paucity of funds only 6,000 projects have been completed so far out of a total of 13,000.24 Sound economic base would make communities and the Government self-reliant and politically less susceptible to external players.

Education, Capacity and Systems Development
Another pre-requisite to efficiently mainstream DRR into development and build capacity of the community is education for all. The challenge of education is great because out of 5,800 schools destroyed in the 2005 earthquake, only 100 schools could be re-constructed.25 A decade of DRM experience teaches that systems and organisations should be built instead of personality-oriented organisations.26 The entire developmental process must be meticulously documented so that the future administrations can learn from these benchmarks. Likewise, vulnerability mapping is the key to future planning and policymaking.

National Disaster Management Database
According to UNDP (2004):

Local governments, line ministries of central governments, and networks of non-governmental and community based organisations all have roles to play in the developing of shared reporting conventions and methods that will maximise the amount of data that can be used for strategic policy-making.

22 Ibid.
23 Anon. person. commun. 22 November 2011.
25 Ibid.
26 All interviewees unanimously asserted that development of systems and organisations is key to progress and development.
The NDMA’s 2009 future goals included a National Risk Assessment Project to collect data about disasters and make it accessible for risk analysis and accurate decision-making. NDMA is still working on this project and is in the process of building its database. This should be expedited.

Policy Imperatives
Pakistan’s DM system has disconnects and overlaps. Three major observations are:

1. The NDMA and ERRA Act have no co-relational clauses.
2. A clear hierarchy has not been established within federal and between federal and provincial DM organisations.
3. In the event of a disaster, first responders, i.e. police, military, fire services are answerable to multiple players.

A mainstreaming policy would lay a timeline to remove these redundancies and make the entire network efficient. Since there are two major tiers of decision-making, a corollary of national mainstreaming policy would be creating policies for provinces that take their essence from the former.

As discussed earlier, the existing DM at national level is beset with duplication and lacks synergy. The existing legal framework does not establish formal linkages between relevant ministries, departments, or directorates. The legal arrangement does not identify and define relationships between key disaster related institutions. Hence, the mainstreaming policy must initiate a review of all existing policies and laws on disaster management to remove inconsistencies. An independent judicial commission would have to be constituted for completing this review in a year, as it will take even longer to seek parliamentary approval of the suggested amendments and ultimately enforce these.

The mainstreaming policy must facilitate timely completion of ERRA’s projects. Once completed, ERRA is suggested to be absorbed into NDMA. The Federal Government must exercise centralised control in managing foreign donations since disaster management needs coordination at the national level and cannot be done piecemeal once there is resource constraint.

The National Crisis Management Cell (NCMC) in the Ministry of Interior performs functions of disaster management similar to that of NDMA. To avoid this duplication and reduce the chances of confusion during disaster management, all duplications in the role of NCMC and NDMA must be rationalised and the responsibility must shift to the latter. After transferring the natural DM functions, manpower and infrastructure to the NDMA,

27 Mubashar Hussain, DRR Mainstreaming Expert/Director NIDM, One UN Disaster Risk Management Programme/NDMA-Islamabad, person commun. Rawalpindi, 1 January 2012.
NCMC would then be able to focus more on the country’s internal security and law and order related functions.

The mainstreaming policy would work effectively if the idea of Specialised Control Centre is implemented and domestic resources and expertise utilised. SUPARCO and NESCOM could be greatly helpful.

Since DM is a national issue, the Prime Minister should remain the chief executive of the NDMA and the authority’s secretarial and routine functions may be assigned to a deputy. Hence, the Prime Minister would be able to give the necessary impetus to the national mainstreaming policy, as visible in ERRA-model and the early days of the NDMA.

Since the NDMA would become a powerful body and its policies and decisions will have long-lasting effects, it should have self-correcting evaluation and strategic planning mechanism. Hence, a strategic and technical planning wing may be created within NDMA.

Vulnerability mapping of Pakistan has not been done and there are inconsistencies and inadequacies in the literature available with NDMA on natural disasters in Pakistan. In the course of research, it was observed that most of the pre-2005 data is not sourced. Hence, the mainstreaming policy’s success would largely rest on the accuracy of a Vulnerability Atlas and national disaster management database that is constantly updated. A Specialised Control Centre, SUPARCO and NESCOM could provide ideal, indigenous and inexpensive solutions. The expertise and resources of the Survey of Pakistan and Army’s Survey Groups can also be hired for vulnerability mapping of Pakistan. Similarly, NADRA’s technical expertise and experience in database development and management would be greatly helpful. SUPARCO’s existing communication system can be enhanced and synced with that of the military and provincial administration for timely warning of impending disasters and managing the relief effort. The SUPARCO can be the lead-agency in this effort.

The national mainstreaming policy must make PC-1 check list mandatory for the approval of all developmental projects. NDMA and ERRA have made generic lists and these can be amalgamated to make one standard generic list. However, different codes and standards are required for each type of developmental project. These lists must be prepared and standardised for all provinces likewise.

The mainstreaming policy must establish a clear linkage between the first responders and the district, provincial and national DM administrations. This could set off a process of developing detailed standard operating procedures (SOPs) by all first responders and bring synergy and efficiency in the entire DM and response network.
Policy Implementation Timelines
Recurring natural calamities will not wait for DM policies to be evolved and implemented. For a financially weak country like Pakistan, even if a fully operational mainstreaming policy were in place, each natural calamity could retard its DM capacities. Hence two conclusions emerge.

One, a mainstreaming policy must be made and implemented in the shortest possible time. This will mitigate the disastrous effects of natural and even manmade calamities.

Two, an efficient mainstreaming policy can be made but cannot be implemented without financial capacity. Hence, Pakistan must redraw its economic policy and implement it without letting petty political considerations affect it. Synergistic and consistently implemented national policies can only guarantee progress.

NDMA, ERRA and the Planning Commission must institute a national mainstreaming policy and place it before the Parliament to debate within a short time span of six months. While framing the initial draft, the three organisations must invite experts from all related departments and provinces to be part of the process. Consequently, the government and judiciary can constitute a commission to review the entire legal framework of mainstreaming DRR into developmental perspective in light of draft policy. These overarching reviews would lay the foundation for reorganisation and restructuring. The entire DM organisational and developmental organisational infrastructure would then be restructured to implement the mainstreaming policy. This would be a slow tedious process that can be timed with the five to six-year timeline by which ERRA may complete its reconstruction effort.

Hence, it can be fairly inferred that a Mainstreaming DRR into Development Policy may take a decade to bear fruit. That means at least two political governments would govern the country during this critical period. Hence, there is a need for political-will to sustain policies and maintain supremacy of national interests.

Conclusion
The main pillars of the disaster management edifice are political will of the government and resilience of the communities to proactively deal with natural calamities. Without these top-down and bottom-up approaches of mainstreaming DRR into development, natural calamities can attain disastrous proportions. Development projects should ideally be monitored on an annual basis so that the laid down codes on DRR are followed, responsibility of violation is fixed, and penalties awarded. Violation of developmental codes carries minor penalties which must also be reviewed. The DRR policy should be implemented in letter and spirit, with regular records of progress in specified areas.
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Section 8
Climate Change: A Non-traditional Security Threat or Not?

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Climate Change and Security in South Asia and the Himalaya-Region: Challenges of Conflict and Cooperation

Jürgen Scheffran

Abstract

In many parts of the world, climate change is emerging as a threat to natural resources, human security and development, multiplying and combining with other security risks. If global greenhouse gas emissions are not significantly restrained, natural and social systems are vulnerable to climate stress, including water resources, agriculture and forestry, human health and settlements, energy systems and the economy. Potential conflict constellations are water scarcity and food insecurity, biodiversity loss and spread of diseases, weather extremes and environmental migration. While climate change may under certain circumstances contribute to violent conflict, it could also lead to more cooperation in addressing challenges.

South Asia and the Himalayan region are particularly exposed to climate change and very sensitive to potential shifts of monsoon patterns and the melting of glaciers. Environmental changes have a considerable influence on the distribution of and access to water, food and energy supplies. Destabilising the Himalayan ‘water tower’ could pose a threat to millions of people. Extreme weather events (storms, floods, droughts) and sea-level rise affect river systems and coastal regions across borders. The complexity of the geopolitical and socio-economic situation of the region makes it vulnerable to large-scale environmental changes which pose significant risks and conflict potential. Particular attention will be given to human responses that could lead to increasing displacement and tensions over dwindling resources as well as to cooperation among affected communities and countries.

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1 This chapter has been approved as a perspective essay by the referee.

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Vulnerabilities and Risks of Climate Change
In its Fourth Assessment Report (2007), the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) addresses serious risks associated with climate change that could undermine the living conditions of people all over the world. The impacts are specific for each region (IPCC 2007a, b). Vulnerable systems include water resources, agriculture, forestry, human health, human settlements, energy systems, and the economy. The stronger the impact and the larger the affected region the more challenging it becomes for societies to absorb the consequences. Extreme weather events are projected to become more likely (IPCC 2012).

Whether societies are able to cope with the impacts and restrain the risks depends on their vulnerability, which is a function of the ‘character, magnitude, and rate of climate change and variation to which a system is exposed, its sensitivity, and its adaptive capacity’ (IPCC 2007a, p.21). Vulnerable systems are more sensitive and susceptible to changing environmental conditions. Adaptation is understood as the ‘adjustment in natural or human systems in response to actual or expected climatic stimuli or their effects, which moderates harm or exploits beneficial opportunities’ (IPCC 2007a, p.21). Adaptive capacity depends on the economic, human and social capital of a society which in turn is influenced by access to resources, information and technology, and by the stability and effectiveness of institutions.

Most vulnerable are poor communities in high-risk areas and developing countries with low adaptive capacities. Societies which strongly depend on ecosystem services and agriculture tend to be more vulnerable to climate stress (Scheffran and Battaglini 2011, p.29). With the increasing impact of climate change, it becomes more challenging for societies to absorb the consequences. Additional risks may occur as a consequence of tipping elements and cascading events in the climate system, including the potential loss of the Amazon rainforest, a shift in the Asian monsoon, the disintegration of the West- Antarctic ice sheet or the shutdown of the North-Atlantic circulation (for an assessment see Lenton et al. 2008). Moving into unknown domains of the climate system is a high-risk endeavour for future generations.

The Debate on the Securitization of Climate Change
Since the Fourth Assessment Report of the IPCC in 2007, interest in the climate-security nexus has increased and contributed to the ‘securitization’ of the climate discourse (for an overview see Brauch 2009; Scheffran and Battaglini 2011; Scheffran et al. 2012a). While the IPCC has given only minor attention to this issue, a number of think tanks and advisory panels have emphasised the security risks of climate change. For instance, a blue-ribbon panel of retired US admirals and generals published a report that sees climate change as a ‘threat multiplier’ in already fragile regions of the world which could heighten global tensions. A panel of the Center for Strategic and International Studies suggested that climate change ‘has the potential to be one of the greatest national security challenges’ (Campbell et al. 2007, p.105), could ‘destabilise virtually every
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aspect of modern life’, and is likely to breed new conflicts and magnify existing problems (Ibid. p. 9). A comprehensive report by the German Advisory Council on Global Change concludes that the consequences ‘could well trigger national and international distributional conflicts and intensify problems already hard to manage such as state failure, the erosion of social order, and rising violence’ (WGBU 2008, p.1); and ‘Without resolute counteraction, climate change will overstretch many societies’ adaptive capacities within the coming decades.. This could result in destabilisation and violence, jeopardising national and international security to a new degree’ (Ibid. p.1).

Similar statements have been also expressed at government levels. Initiated by Great Britain, in April 2007, the U.N. Security Council (UNSC) for the first time discussed the security risks of climate change. In response to a request from the UN General Assembly, the UN Secretary-General provided a report on the security implications of climate change (UNGA 2009). On 20 July 2011, a statement of the UN Security Council under German presidency raised concerns regarding the threats posed by climate change to international peace and security. While a coalition of OECD countries and Pacific Small Island States stressed the need to deal with the security implications of climate change in the UNSC, Russia, China and many G77 states remained critical. In 2008, the EU High Representative and the European Commission suggested that ‘climate change acts as a threat multiplier, worsening existing tensions in countries and regions which are already fragile and conflict-prone’ (EC 2008, p.5).

Whether climate change will pose a security risk, also depends on the meaning of security which has evolved since the Cold War. In the emerging world (dis-)order, a large number of actors and interconnected factors shape the security discourse. The concept of ecological security transforms environmental problems into security threats, but was criticised as too broad and unspecific, partly because it would allow the military to expand its instruments in environmental policy (Brock 1997). ‘Human security’ is centred on the security and welfare of human beings and focuses on ‘shielding people from critical and pervasive threats and empowering them to take charge of their lives’ (CHS 2003, p. iv). Some of the described climate impacts may force governments to take actions (e.g. for disaster management, in response to massive refugee flows, or in conflicts induced by environmental stress), although responses of national security policies have remained limited yet (Brzoska 2012, p.175).

Societal Instabilities and Conflicts
Researchers are just beginning to understand the complex and causal mechanisms between climate change and society, including linkages between natural hazards, water and food security. Spillover effects (refugee flows, ethnic links, environmental resource flows or arms exports) could expand the geographical extent of a crisis and challenge the stability of regions. Climatic changes can add to and intensify other problems such as state failure, the erosion of social order, and the use of violence (for a deeper analysis of this nexus see Scheffran 2009a; Scheffran and Battaglini 2011; Scheffran et al. 2012a).
The societal implications of climate change crucially depend on how human beings, populations, social systems and political institutions respond. Some responses facilitate adaptation and minimise the risks, others may cause new problems. Whether and under which conditions climate change contributes to conflict is difficult to answer in general because it depends on a wide range of factors and causal pathways between them. There is a range of possible fields of conflict related to climate change (Scheffran et al 2012c, p.113):

1. Conflicts induced or strengthened by the risks of climate change;
2. Struggle on scientific predictions and uncertainties of climate change;
3. Conflicts in selecting effective mitigation strategies;
4. Conflicts on adaptation to and damage limitation of climate change;
5. Conflicts between emitters and victims on the distribution of costs, risks and benefits of climate change (injustice);
6. Conflict on the climate protection strategies, such as nuclear power, bioenergy, or climate engineering.

While the first category of conflicts requires a significant intensity of climate change, the other five may be already imminent at earlier stages. In all conflicts, the actors can apply ‘violence as the most extreme form of action’ (Ibid. p.113). During the 1990s, several research groups have examined how the scarcity of natural resources, such as minerals, water, energy, fish and land, affects violence and armed struggle. Some basic conclusions can be drawn from these studies (for an overview see Scheffran et al. 2012a):

1. Environmental destruction and resource scarcity can contribute to the emergence or aggravation of violent conflicts, but in many cases the environment is not the primary cause, rather a catalyst or multiplier of existing conflicts. The local changes in fishery, forests, water and land have a more direct impact on conflicts than the global and long-term phenomena of climate change and ozone depletion. Environmental destruction only rarely leads to direct violence.

2. Resource scarcity and environmental degradation can lead to social and economic disruptions that may indirectly become a source of conflict. Typical conflict patterns are resource capture (powerful societal groups try to influence the resource distribution to their favour); ecological marginalisation (resource scarcity and unequal distribution contribute to the impoverishment of marginalised social groups and economic decline); and forced migration (environmental problems drive people into ecologically fragile and conflict prone regions).

3. Environmental change may interfere in a complex way with political, economic and social conflict factors, such as population growth, increased demand and unequal distribution, lacking political legitimacy of governments.
4. To which degree environmental risks will actually lead to conflicts strongly depends on the societal conditions which are shaped by the conflict history, group identities, the organisation and capacity of conflict parties, as well as the control of resources for group interests and power structures.

5. Whether environmental problems lead to violent or peaceful responses will be determined by different contextual conditions, including governance structures, institutions and conflict regulation mechanisms. The weakness of political institutions, the limited carrying capacity and the dissolution of established livelihoods increase conflict potentials, while the development of cooperation and management procedures are diminishing them.

6. A simple and direct relationship between resource scarcity and violent conflicts is difficult to verify. More likely than armed conflicts between states are low-level conflicts between societal groups over renewable resources. The contribution of resource scarcity is often hard to understand and indirect.

The review of 73 empirically recorded environmental conflicts between 1980 and 2005, showed that these had a regional scope and did not present a serious threat to international security (Carius et al. 2006). Instead of more environmental conflicts more cooperation was observed, in particular regarding joint water use and water agreements (Wolf 2002). Some researchers point out that in many cases conflict is not driven by the scarcity of natural resources but their abundance, which critically depends on the type of resource, whether it is renewable or non-renewable, proximate or distant, point or diffuse source (Le Billon 2001). Climate change largely affects renewable resources.

A number of statements and studies expressed concerns that climate change could contribute to violent conflict. According to WBGU (2008, pp. 2-3) four conflict constellations are particularly prominent: degradation of freshwater resources, decline in food production, increase in storm and flood disasters, and environmentally-induced migration. Others may, however, be also relevant (e.g. biodiversity loss, sea-level rise).

An assessment of quantitative empirical studies on the relations between climatic variables (temperature, precipitation) and conflict-related variables (number of armed conflicts or casualties) provides mixed results (see for details Gleditsch 2012; Scheffran et al. 2012b). There is not sufficient evidence to support clear causal mechanisms between security, conflict and climate impacts. While historical case studies find significant statistical correlations between a changing average global temperature and the frequency of wars (e.g. during the Little Ice Age), for recent decades there is no clear statistical relationship between temperature change and the number of armed conflicts (Scheffran et al. 2012b, p.870). The number of such conflicts has declined after the end of the Cold War, while temperature has increased. There is need for more comprehensive
data and a better understanding between past and future climate change. The assessment of potential conflict implications of climate change is complicated since it is still not possible to systematically and directly measure the resource distribution or small scale violent events (such as cattle raids). Increasing attention is being paid to low-level conflict data.

Most affected by climate change are weak, poor and fragile states, with weak governance structures and inadequate management capacities, which are unable to cope with climate impacts and therefore are most sensitive to both conflict and climate change (Scheffran 2009a, p. 24). Some regional hot spots (such as Bangladesh, the Middle East and the African Sahel) are more vulnerable due to their geographic and socio-economic conditions, disaster risks and the lack of adaptation capabilities (see Harmeling and Eckstein 2012).

**Security Risks and Conflict Potentials in South Asia and the Himalaya Region**

South Asia and the Himalaya region will be significantly affected by climate change. New assessments highlight increasing pressure on natural resources and the risk of natural disasters as some of the main challenges. This region is shaped by extreme environmental conditions. Major changes in climate, water, biodiversity and agriculture (e.g. during monsoon, river flooding in South Asia or droughts in Central Asia) are supposed to have a considerable influence on human security and environmental conflict. Climate change will significantly affect the region’s development chances, add to health problems and already high levels of poverty. Border regions will be prone to tensions due to dwindling resources and migration trends. Some areas are particularly vulnerable due to their geographic and socioeconomic conditions and the low level of adaptive capacity. Selected cases of regionally-specific conflict risks will be discussed in the following section (for a global perspective on climate hot spots, see WBGU 2008; Scheffran and Battaglini 2011).

**Impact of Climate Change on Glaciers and Rivers**

The Himalaya separates the semi-arid and colder Tibetan Plateau from the southern plains of the Indian subcontinent which are heavily vegetated, humid and more polluted. The precipitation and its seasonal variation are strongly influenced by the monsoon which brings heavy rainfalls. The Himalaya-Karakoram-Hindukush (HKH) mountain ranges holds the largest mass of ice outside the polar regions, due to which they have been called the ‘water towers of Asia’. Glaciers have multiple functions for humans: they provide water storage, transportation, and water production by melting glaciers which supply water to many rivers used for irrigation and as a reliable source of hydropower.

Global warming is projected to accelerate the melting and retreat of the Himalayan glaciers, partly because the flow of a glacier is very sensitive to the existence of water at the bed. In the longer term, these processes could lead to the disappearance of glaciers,
although recent satellite observations show contradictory results for different areas of the HKH region (Bamber 2012).

In the short term, possible consequences could be an increased risk of flooding, erosion, mudslides as well as glacier lake outburst floods (GLOF) during the wet season which are a potential threat to settlements in river valleys. The cascading events are affecting, for example, ‘water availability (amounts, seasonality), biodiversity (endemic species, predator–prey relations), ecosystem boundary shifts (tree-line movements, high-elevation ecosystem changes), and global feedbacks (monsoonal shifts, loss of soil carbon)’ (Xu et al. 2009, p. 520). Some of the glaciers are located in conflict-prone high altitude areas of the Himalaya. The Siachen Glacier, one of the world’s largest glaciers in the border region of India, Pakistan and China, is a battleground between Indian and Pakistani troops which threatens the fragile glacier environment.

The greater HKH region is a source of the 10 largest rivers in Asia. Their combined drainage basin is home to almost half of the world’s population. About 1.4 billion people are dependent on the rivers that flow from the Tibetan plateau and Himalayas (Zhang et al. 2012, p.6449). While water demand is increasing, water supply and hydropower is dependent on and vulnerable to climatic changes in this region. Climate change affects the distribution of water which is essential for food and energy, and will have environmental and social impacts that will likely increase uncertainty in water supplies and agricultural production for human populations across Asia (Xu et al. 2009, p.520).

One of the most direct impacts of climate change is flooding. In recent years, major extreme events demonstrated the vulnerability of the region to floods, whether caused by climate change or not. The Indus River flood in 2010 was the worst flood in over 80 years which swamped a fifth of Pakistan. This extreme event affected 20 million people, caused about 2000 deaths and destroyed 1.7 million houses as well as much of the infrastructure (bridges, roads, power systems, etc.) (Gemenne et al. 2010, pp.18–19). The impacts of the floods on human security were severe not so much because of climate change, rather due to mismanagement of embankments and river borders, partly related to the reduction of wetlands and drainage as well as ineffective maintenance of flood control constructions (Inman 2010). Traditionally floods of the Indus river occurred when monsoon rainfall and snow melting from the Himalaya converged. Today the flow of the Indus is diverted east or west, according to the need for water on farmlands, including natural floodplain and wetlands for farming and other needs. While the Indus River Basin holds less water, floods are becoming worse than in the past. This illustrates the vulnerability of existing flood control systems and the lacking effectiveness of current institutions for water management which would be further aggravated by extreme events related to climate change.

To reduce the risks from river flooding, various mitigation and adaption measures can be applied for more regular and natural flooding of the Indus (Mustafa and Wrathall 2011,
This includes better protection and maintenance of embankments, e.g. through restoring of removed wetlands and the planting of trees that act as soil binders and as barriers to flood flow (Inman 2010). Re-naturalization of river systems could be combined with approaches to adapt structural elements to floods (e.g. raising the base of houses or improving drainage) and strengthen the social resilience of vulnerable communities building on traditional practices to cope with periodical floods (e.g. developing institutions with better adaptive capacity to location-specific characteristics or better access to core services for water, energy and health). This requires an open and participatory way of consultation, involving local communities and empowering women (Iyer 2008, p.40). Refugees from environmental crisis need to be protected, but could also play an active role in resilience building, e.g. through transfer of knowledge and remittances.

**Storms and Sea-level Rise in Coastal Regions**

Intense storms, heavy precipitation and sea-level rise increase the risk of natural disasters in Asian coastal zones. According to IPCC (2007b, p. 50), coastal areas, especially heavily populated mega-deltas in South, East and Southeast Asia, will be at greatest risk due to increased flooding from the sea and, in some mega-deltas, flooding from the rivers. Along the Asian Pacific rim, the risk of floods and storms is significant, in particular where urban areas lie below sea level. Many coastal cities are located on the estuaries of large rivers. Even in areas above sea-level, the process of land subsidence increases the risk of severe floods. At least eight of the twenty-one largest cities on the Pacific rim have experienced marked subsidence in the twentieth century (WBGU 2008, p.104). In China alone the estimated number of potentially affected cities and districts is 45 (Ibid. p.104). According to some projections, urban coastal flood risk in Asia is set to increase dramatically over the coming decades, from around 30 million vulnerable people in 2000 to more than 190 million by 2060 (Black et al. 2011, p. 448).

Storm and flood events generate rising social and economic costs in high-risk coastal areas that have weak economies and governments. Damage from storms along the densely populated eastern coasts of India and China could intensify already difficult-to-control migration processes (WBGU 2008, p.3). In the most vulnerable locations, disastrous events exceed the ability of affected societies to cope with the magnitude and speed of these events, possibly leading to a temporary local collapse of state functions that contributes to conflict. Especially in areas of domestic political tension, adaptation and crisis management are more difficult (Scheffran and Battaglini 2011).

The Bay of Bengal region is most vulnerable to extreme weather events and climate change which threaten a large population (Scheffran and Battaglini 2011). Possible reasons for these extreme impacts are the shallow coastal waters in the Bay, the high tidal range, a large number of inlets in the Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna deltaic system, damaging cyclone tracks and the high population density (Dube et al. 2004, p. 437).
Climate change would severely affect human security in Bangladesh, one of the poorest and most densely populated countries of the world. Bangladesh’s deltaic geography is defined by seven major and over two hundred minor rivers, and shapes the way of life of its people who to a large part depend on agriculture and natural resources for their livelihoods. During the monsoon season, large areas of Bangladesh are flooded by rain and river water. Although flooding is part of the livelihood structure and culture, climate change will add to the pressure on this already dynamic environment. Millions of Bangladeshis would be exposed to increased flooding, severe cyclones, and sea level rise. More than 5 million people live in areas highly vulnerable to cyclones and storm surges, and over half the population is located within 100 km of the coast, most of which is less than 12 meters above sea level (IPCC 2007a, p.319). Of 8.5 million ha of agricultural lands in the Ganges delta, about 486,000 ha would be inundated by a 2 meter sea level rise (Warner 2009, p.13).

In the Global Climate Risk Index of Germanwatch for the period 1992-2011 Bangladesh (together with Pakistan) is among the first 10 most affected countries (Harmeling & Eckstein 2012, p.4). The impacts of projected sea-level rise in Bangladesh could affect coastal ecosystems and biodiversity, agricultural, forestry, fisheries and livestock resources, challenging the economy. A one metre increase in the sea-level could inundate about 17% of Bangladesh and put some 40 million people at risk. The health conditions of poor and malnourished people are expected to worsen. The intrusion of seawater would destroy large amounts of agricultural land and decrease agricultural productivity. With climate change, human insecurity and the fight for survival are likely to increase in Bangladesh, challenging internal social and political stability. More people could be forced to leave threatened areas (if they are able to move) and settlements would spread to higher and flood-protected lands (Scheffran and Battaglini 2011).

On several occasions, the migration of impoverished people has contributed to violent clashes within Bangladesh and between emigrating Bangladeshis and tribal people in Northern India (Hafiz and Islam 1996, p. 65). In response, India has extended a border fence to control migration between Bangladesh and India (Shamshad 2008). The complex interaction of both human-and nature induced trends and their socio-economic and political implications may further lead to situations of political instability and violent clashes across borders. In India an adverse combination of global warming, migration, and civil war could result in local instability that could spread to larger areas (Bhattacharyya and Werz 2012, p. 41). As different sub-regions will be affected to various degrees, regional migration may be significant. Climate-induced migration is not sufficiently discussed in the region, even though it needs to be studied in order to understand which levels of migration will be problematic.

When vital elements of the regional ecosystem are damaged (such as forests and wetlands), protection against floods and storms is lost. There are a various possible adaptation strategies and interventions to reduce climate change impacts on agriculture,
water resources, human health, coastal livelihood resources in Asia (for a review of climate change adaptation practices in South Asia (see Sterrett 2011). Each of these measures requires investments and major changes. If these measures fail, early warning, disaster management and conflict resolution are important to limit the damage and control and prevent further escalation of a crisis into conflict (Scheffran & Battaglini 2011). These activities are an important field for international cooperation.

**Water Insecurity in Central Asia**

River systems connect Central Asia and the HKH region. Mountain ecosystems and particular the Himalaya glaciers are vital for water availability in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. More than three quarters of the farmland in these countries is irrigated, using up to 90% of the region’s water resources (Scheffran and Battaglini 2011). Hydroelectric power supplies most of the region with its electricity. Too much water during floods and too little during drought put at risk the hydroelectric power infrastructure, threatening agriculture and the population. Both types of water use depend on glacial melt water from nearby mountain ranges. Non-sustainable exploitation of these water sources has contributed to a water crisis which affects water reservoirs, most importantly the shrinking of the Aral Sea.

Climate change adds to these problems. The IPCC projects a sharp temperature rise in Central Asia and a significant glacier loss in the next decades which will negatively affect water, food and energy security which have a direct influence on the livelihoods of the countries’ populations (IPCC 2007a:11). Glacial melting is accelerating and water runoff could be substantially reduced in the coming decades. Water flows connect unstable regions with each other. For instance, Afghanistan contributes around 25% of the Amur Daryan river basin flowing through Central Asia. Once the situation in Afghanistan is stabilising, this will put additional pressures on water availability in downstream countries (Maas and Scheffran 2011, p.2).

During Soviet times water and energy infrastructure in Central Asia were designed to integrate the whole region. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Central Asian countries strived for autonomy and experienced diverging political, economical and social developments. Though water scarcities are the consequence of inefficient water use and poor coordination, leading to local level disputes and conflict over water and natural resources that can quickly escalate to the regional level. Due to low resource efficiency and insufficient governance and coordination, the region is not adequately prepared to address the challenges of climate change (Maas and Scheffran 2011, p.3). Central Asian states are suffering from a number of economic and political problems, including largely closed economic markets, extreme social disparities, weak state structures and corruption, affecting their ability to cope with such massive changes (WBGU 2008, p.141). In the past, struggles over land and water resources played a major role in this region, which are further aggravated by ethnic disputes, separatist movements, and the presence of religious-fundamentalist groups.
Several regional cooperation mechanisms have been established to address the transboundary challenges of prudent water resource management. Among others, the German Federal Foreign Office launched the Central Asia Water Initiative to improve regional coordination and cooperation. The German-funded Transboundary Water Management Programme for Central Asia (TWMCA) addresses all levels - from grassroots to regional level - to develop and integrate, sustainable and peaceful approaches to water use in Central Asia (Maas and Scheffran 2011, p. 2) Coordination between the different regional cooperation initiatives remains insufficient, leading to duplications of efforts and unintentional competition between them. Water and energy are particularly used for economic purposes which lead to water competition. Large potentials for renewable energy exist in Central Asia, particularly solar and wind power, which could reduce pressures on hydropower. To overcome the deficits and address the water-energy-climate nexus, successful regional cooperation needs to build confidence between key actors and take into account the political and cultural specificities of the region (Ibid.).

**Cooperation, Governance and Institutional Frameworks**

Climate change can induce different responses some of which may cause additional problems and conflicts. For instance, the revival of nuclear power to prevent climate change might increase concerns about safety and security, in particular about nuclear proliferation. Another example is the unsustainable expansion of biofuels which might mitigate carbon emission reduction but could lead to land use conflicts and increase food insecurity (Scheffran 2009b). If the military finds a justification in fighting the impacts of global warming, climate change could turn from a non-traditional to a traditional security threat. The traditional instruments of security policy, such as military buildup, interventions and the use of violence, will not only be ineffective against climate change but tend to further aggravate the risks.

While climate change may cause security risks and violent conflicts, it could also unite the international community to avoid dangerous climate change through a globally coordinated climate policy (WBGU 2008, p.1). Regional and local-scale research can help to develop a common understanding of climate change needs to set the course for adopting a dynamic and globally coordinated climate policy that combines mitigation and adaptation strategies. Implementing solutions requires joint international efforts to stabilize climate change at levels that will avoid disruption of global security and stability whereas the developed world would have to take the lead in achieving the ultimate goal of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) to ‘prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system’. The largest emitters of greenhouse gases have a particular responsibility as well as the power to reach an agreement on reducing emissions to a level that keeps the risks within limits (Scheffran and Battaglini 2011).
Cooperation among regional actors is essential to strengthen adaptation to climate change. Adaptive capacities are supported by the wealth per capita and the spread of democracies, as well as the growing humanitarian aid and development assistance. International efforts to prevent and manage conflicts have reduced the number of armed conflicts and battle deaths (Scheffran et al. 2012b, p.870). While this trend has slowed down in recent years, sub-national conflicts, multiple crises and the number of fragile states has increased. To prevent a destabilisation of the most affected regions and possible military responses, effective institutional frameworks and governance mechanisms are important to contain violent conflict.

Large-scale climate change is not only a challenge for the countries and regions affected, but also for the world’s governance structure which without fundamental reforms will likely be over-stretched. The magnitude of the potential risks of climate change requires determined policies to manage global change within a new well-designed global governance system that combines sustainable environmental policy, development policy and preventive security policy. A global science-based diplomacy is required to contain climate-induced conflicts, develop compensation mechanisms for those affected by climate change, implement an effective energy and migration policy, and measures to stabilise the world economy (WGBU 2008, pp.175-176).

While climate change can lead to more conflict, it can also induce more cooperation. Cooperation is in the countries’ best interest if it supports local environmental goals, low-carbon investments and advanced technology to fulfill both environmental and economic goals. To tackle the challenge and overcome diverging interests it is important to build coalitions among those with common interests to establish a regime for sustainability and climate security (Scheffran 2011, p.755). A global climate regime is possible to provide an equitable balance of costs and risks that allows sustainable development for those in greatest need.

The integrative concept of conflict-sensitive adaptation recognises how climate change or climate adaptation can cause conflicts and takes into consideration that adaptation operates in conflict zones (Yanda and Bronkhorst 2011). This concept includes technical responses as well as multidisciplinary projects to build comprehensive resilience against climate impacts. Climate sensitivity allows planners and decision-makers to address current vulnerabilities and development priorities and improve ongoing activities in development, peacebuilding and environmental management (Ibid. p.3). Policy makers between countries and regions need to work together to develop plans and institutions for adaptation that are conflict-sensitive. Research, policy, funding and practical work for climate adaptation need to be further interconnected.

Regional dialogue processes are important to address potential security risks and concerns related to climate change. One example is the Climate Security Dialogue Series that was held in 2011 in the German Foreign Ministry together with non-governmental
organisations (NGOs).² During the presentations and discussions participants jointly identified key climate change-related risks and response measures in South Asia, Central Asia and the Himalaya region. Some of the region-specific recommendations are summarised in the following (see Comardicea et al. 2011, p.4; Maas and Scheffran 2011, pp.3-4).

1. **Integrated risk assessment**: Jointly assess risks based on regional scientific cooperation, knowledge exchange and research on climate threats. Another key issue is ecosystem assessment and stewardship which develops a holistic picture of climate change impacts in the Himalaya region – including on forests, wetlands, floodplains, and biodiversity. Assessments indicate future availability of natural resources -including distributional challenges -as well as increasing numbers and intensity of natural disasters. As a result, risks from climate change may arise in the areas of health, migration, food, energy, and water pollution.

2. **Data sharing and monitoring**: It is easier and less controversial to share qualitative data. In terms of increasing cooperation potential, data could also be jointly collected by cross-country actors. Most important would be a trusted repository for collected data, a role that could be played by the International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development (ICIMOD) which could support cooperation efforts, on international and domestic levels.

3. **Science-based platforms**: Academic exchange needs to be strengthened as an important pillar of cooperation. Scientific facilitator teams can provide a regional platform for different stakeholders (academic, parliamentarian, civil society, political foundations, etc.) to collaborate, e.g., on environmental data exchange. Ecosystem assessment and stewardship develop a holistic picture of climate change impacts in the Himalaya region – including on forests, wetlands, floodplains, and biodiversity.

4 **Thematic and geographic widening**: It is necessary to go beyond a single-sector approach for regional cooperation. Instead, the water-food-climate-energy nexus needs to be addressed comprehensively. Gradually and in the long-term, cooperation mechanisms need to include all countries across the Himalaya mountain range which has a key role for water security in the larger area. Given the difficult political situation, clear terms need to be defined how this could be achieved.

5. **Framework of regional coordination and cooperation**: A broader framing is necessary that includes institutional actors across different levels, such as governmental actors, civil society and academic stakeholders. A framework needs to be created to improve coordination between regional cooperation arrangements and for sharing of data

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² NGOs included the Research Group Climate Change and Security (CLISEC), the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at Hamburg University (IFSH) and Adelphi Berlin. See results at <http://clisec.zmaw.de/Climate-Security-Dialogues.1876.0.html>, accessed 20 June 2013.
and information. This would encourage integration of climate change in regional initiatives and agreements on shared water resources and transparent management.

6. **Combine top-down and bottom approaches:** To foster regional stability, top-down approaches should be complemented with bottom-up actions to face climate change impacts. – including Track II as well as initiatives for sharing knowledge and experiences among actors at the community level. Including external stakeholders needs to be conscious of national and cultural sensitivities to increase trust and ownership.

7. **Disaster diplomacy:** It would be useful to draw up mechanisms and institutions to prevent disasters and build resilience. Preventive approaches of disaster diplomacy at the sub-regional and regional levels establish processes for third party facilitation and regional platforms. Countries outside of the region (e.g. EU) can help in strengthening national disaster management capabilities throughout the region, sharing knowledge and experience through best practices networks such as INTERREG, on interregional cooperation.

8. **Renewable energies:** There are large renewable energy potentials in the region (hydropower, solar, wind power and biomass) that need to be systematically exploited to improve energy security and reduce pressures on water resources. Encourage solutions to bridge financial gaps for renewable energy, and support local manufacturing for renewable energy sites to fostering economic development and encourage green technology industries.

9. **Migration as adaptation:** Consider migration not simply as a conflict risk, but as a legitimate adaptation measure to climate change. Constructive approaches would develop the potential dividends of migration, e.g. when migrant networks and diasporas mobilise resources, and raise awareness to the risks of climate change.

10. **Building on existing initiatives:** To tackle multiple challenges, existing structures such as ICIMOD should be used and strengthened. A possible starting point could be a technical expert meeting at an existing organisation such as the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), with gradually increasing the level of political participants. A thorough analysis of capacities for existing regional structures and institutions would build trust and increase resilience in the areas facing climate threats.

11. **New institutions and governance approach:** The creation of new institutions for preventive disaster diplomacy and cooperation – on specific challenges such as sea-level rise or glacier melting for instance – need to be considered. Increasing adaptive capacity and resilience of societies requires innovative governance models, involving multi-level dialogues from the grass-root level to the regional level. For instance, peace-parks provide a helpful example of cross-border conservation areas. Although positive experience has been gathered from implementing such projects around the world, in
South Asia there have been little actions taken following consultations around this topic. Learning from other regions – perhaps through academic networks – is relevant in this regard.
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Climate Change and Human Insecurity in South Asia
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Abstract
Climate change is no longer a scientific speculation, it is rapidly becoming a reality which has direct bearing on the two essential components of human security: ‘freedom from fear’ and ‘freedom from want’. Natural disasters occurring from extreme weather lead to both ‘fear’ and ‘want.’ In the context of South Asian countries, there are at least two components of human security that are likely to be affected adversely by climate change: food security and health security. Using panel data of four South Asian countries for the period 1973-2009, the paper finds that health is being negatively affected by an increase in temperature and precipitation. Similarly, increase in temperature tends to reduce the availability of food, whereas an increase in precipitation tends to increase its availability. The study also finds that inflation has a negative relationship with availability of food items and wellness of health due to low income of people. The per capita GDP and openness have a positive impact on health and food security indicators.

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Introduction

*Human security means, first, safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression. And second, it means protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life* (UNDP 1994, p. 23).

Provision of security to citizens has been recognised as the primary responsibility of the state. During the Cold War era, security was defined 'as security of territory from external aggressions or as protection of national interests in foreign policy or as global security from the threat of a nuclear holocaust' (UNDP 1994, p. 22). After the end of the Cold War, the concept of security broadened to include both traditional (military and political security) and non-traditional security (environment, food, health, water, terrorism etc.) dimensions (Gupta 2003). In this regard, the UNDP (1994, p.24) highlights seven basic components of human security - food, health, environmental, economic, personal, community and political securities.

South Asian countries encompass the world’s greatest ecological, economic and cultural diversity. Despite rapid economic development in recent times, approximately 40% of the world’s poor belong to South Asia; 600 million people earn less than US$1.25 per day (World Bank 2010).

In order to accelerate economic growth and curtail poverty, countries need to boost their industrial base, which will result in acceleration of emissions of greenhouse gases, with limited abatement capacities involving huge environmental costs. As per the Climate Change Vulnerability Index 2010, computed by Maple-croft, 16 out of 170 countries were identified on the extreme risk. Among them, Bangladesh, India, Nepal and Pakistan were ranked as 1st, 2nd, 4th and 16th most vulnerable countries on the planet respectively.

Consistent with global temperature trends, South Asian countries are also experiencing a warming trend in recent decades. Climate modelling studies indicate that increase in temperature in Asia is projected to be 0.5–2°C by 2030 and 1–7°C by 2070 (Preston et al. 2006). It is also predicted that arid areas of northern India and Pakistan are likely to get warmer more quickly resulting in increased rainfall during summer monsoon and decreased rainfall in winter. It is further projected that global sea level will rise by approximately 3–16 cm by 2030 and 7–50 cm by 2070 (Ibid.).

South Asian economies have low capacity for disaster management. The devastation caused by natural hazards recently in South Asia provides ample evidence of their poor capacities to cope with these hazards, e.g. during the 2010 floods in Pakistan, ‘more than 20 million people were affected (over one-tenth of Pakistan’s population) with over 1,980 people reported dead and nearly 2,946 injured’ (ADB, GoP and World Bank 2010, p.20).
Climate change is resulting in degradation of land, ecosystems, water and air quality, undermining food security and health problems. IPCC (2007) reports that as a result of climate change, the Himalayan glaciers are receding due to melting and disrupted precipitation patterns. This situation could lead towards frequent droughts in Pakistan and India. According to FAO (2010) food insecurity increased during 2006-09. 'The undernourished population also went up in Pakistan from 23.7 million in 1995 to 36.5% in 2006' (MHDC 2009, p. 181).

Health security implies adopting preventive measures to protect people from infectious diseases. The ability to live longer and healthier is also recognised as a basic human right. Many climate sensitive diseases like dengue, malaria, diarrhoea, cholera, as well as cardiovascular and respiratory diseases are expected to increase due to rising temperatures and humidity levels (WHO 2008). Extreme weather events such as flooding have a direct impact on human health, as they not only increase the risk of drowning and injury, but by destroying the health and sanitation infrastructure, exacerbate water-borne infectious diseases like cholera and diarrhoea. According to WHO (2009), food security has three pillars: 'food availability – sufficient quantities of food available on a consistent basis; food access - having sufficient resources to obtain appropriate food for a nutritious diet, and food use - appropriate use of food based on knowledge of basic nutrition and care, as well as adequate water and sanitation.' Climate change affects all three pillars in different ways.

As climate is one of the primary determinants of agricultural productivity, climate change and food availability are directly interlinked (Moench et al. 2003; and Ludi 2009). Climate change may also initiate the vicious cycle of infectious diseases which cause hunger and in turn make the affected population more vulnerable to diseases (Schmidhuber and Tubiello 2007).

Malik (2010, p.68) argues that out of 22 conflict affected districts in Pakistan (that are either classified as ‘Taliban strongholds’ or having ‘Taliban presence’), 15 are extremely food insecure. Climate change induced food and health insecurity may potentially exacerbate trends in radicalization and support for violent conflict in Pakistan.

**Climate Change and Food Security**

According to the World Food Summit, FAO (1996, p. 29): 'food security exists when all people, at all times, have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life.'

As mentioned earlier, weather conditions are considered main determinants of agricultural productivity; hence, climate change and availability of food are closely interlinked. Studies suggest that climate change affects input supplies, production, hydrologic balances and other components of agricultural systems (Adams et al. 1998; Schmidhuber and Tubiello 2007).
Climate change causes erratic rainfall, extreme weather events, soil degradation, shorter growing seasons and reduction in crop yields (Iqbal et al. 2009). Climate change is also likely to change the frequency, types and intensities of various pests, as well as availability of irrigation water (Adams et al. 1998). Due to increased flooding, coastal areas will be more vulnerable. The changing weather patterns will negatively affect production of agricultural commodities across the world particularly in South Asia. Already, the yields of rice, wheat and other cereals have reduced significantly in South Asian countries (Mittal and Sethi 2009).

Pakistan’s agriculture is heavily dependent on water; increase in temperature together with a decline in precipitation will reduce its availability. Increase in population and food demand has resulted in decreasing per capita water availability transforming Pakistan from a water-affluent to a water-stressed country. The per capita water availability in Pakistan has dwindled by over 406 percent from 5,260 cubic metres in 1951 to 1,100 cubic metres in 2006, only marginally above the 1,000 cubic metres per person threshold value under the global criteria (WAPDA 2012). According to the Briscoe and Qamar (2006), Pakistan is now heading towards becoming a water-scarce country (as it has been predicted that per capita availability will become less than 1000 m$^3$/y by 2035).

One of the major sources of water in Pakistan is rainfall, particularly the monsoon; its rivers are largely fed by glaciers and snow melt from the Himalayan glaciers. A greater variability of monsoon rains and the long-term depletion of Himalayan glaciers are projected as a result of climate change thereby threatening water security in Pakistan. Ground water is already depleting rapidly and according to UNEP (2000), the availability of groundwater to farmers in the future will be limited preventing intensive use of land leading to a reduction in crop production. Already Pakistan’s agriculture remains far below its potential (Ibid). Increase in temperature is not only predicted to reduce the supply of water thereby constraining crop production, but is also predicted to shorten the growing season of crops (Mahmood 2008). The heat waves across the Indian subcontinent caused reduction of approximately 10 to 40% crop yields during 2005 (Ibid. p. 4).

Using crop simulation models, severe crop losses are projected for rain-fed areas in South and South East Asia. Under the business as usual scenario of climate change, the net cereal production of South Asian countries has been predicted to decline by at least 4-10% by the end of the present century (Khatun and Hossain 2012, p. 11). The UNEP (2000, p.117) country study for Pakistan predicts that by 2050, the demand for wheat would be 43 million tonnes against the projected production of 36 million tonnes indicating a shortfall of 7 million tonnes. Similarly, a shortfall of 4 million tonnes for rice and around 40 thousand tonnes for sugarcane is predicted by 2050 (Ibid.). These projections will have significant repercussions on food security in the region.
Climate Change and Human Insecurity in South Asia

IPCC (2007) also predicts that climate change can be a major limiting factor in terms of meeting food demands of a growing population in the developing countries of Asia. A serious risk of hunger is projected in Asia as approximately an additional 49 million, 132 million and 266 million people are estimated to face malnutrition and hunger by the years 2020, 2050 and 2080 respectively (Cruz et al. 2007, p. 482 quoting Parry et al. 2004). In terms of sectors, water resources, biodiversity, food and fibre, coastal ecosystem, land degradation and human health are vulnerable to climate change. In terms of health, higher incidence of malaria is predicted due to warmer and wetter climatic conditions (Martens 1999).

Oxfam (2010) summarised that the agriculture sector in South Asia is heavily reliant on monsoons, as approximately 70% of the annual rainfall of the region occurs during the monsoon period. Similarly, ‘approximately 60% of the cultivated area in South Asia is rain-fed’ (World Bank 2012a, p.10). Hence, the spatial extent, duration and total amount of rainfall during the monsoon period are significant factors affecting livelihoods of the greater part of rural population. Resilience is typically low in rural areas due to limited assets and low financial base. Since 1950s, the Indian monsoon has dwindled by around 5 to 8% and this pattern is expected to become more intense, longer and widespread. It resulted in the droughts of Balochistan and Sindh provinces of Pakistan in 2002 and Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan of India in 2004 (Meehl et al. 2008; IPCC 2012).

Climate change affects food security in terms of availability and accessibility. It affects food availability through shrinking of production and food inaccessibility by causing inflationary trend in food prices due to reduced production. Even if reduced production is not large enough to cause non-availability, food inflation severely affects affordability of vulnerable population; it affects their accessibility to food markets. Food price plays a crucial role in poverty and social well-being of the population. Soaring food inflation since 2008 has severely affected the South Asian population. Rising food prices would increase the incidence of poverty (Ivanic and Martin 2008b; Wodon and Zaman 2008; and, Chaudhry and Chaudhry 2008) and it has made millions of people at risk of becoming food insecure across the globe (Ivanic and Martin 2008a; UN 2008; and DFID 2009). It is noteworthy that the poorest households who spend around four-fifth of their income on food items are badly hit by a rise in food prices.

Over the years, many developing countries have made significant progress in hunger reduction. For example, Armenia achieved MDG 1 i.e. halving extreme poverty and hunger in 2010. Similarly Ethiopia, Peru, and many other developing countries are on track towards eradicating hunger. However, South Asian countries, particularly India, Bangladesh and Pakistan still lag far behind in terms of meeting MDG 1 (FAO 2010).

Nelson et al. (2010, p. 51) has estimated that around 40% of the world’s hungry people live in South Asia. Mittal and Sethi (2009) are of the view that state of food security worsened in recent times due to decline in agricultural growth and persistent increase in
population. Natural disasters also triggered malnutrition issues. During the 2010 floods in Pakistan, 58% of the households lost wheat flour and eatables, 32% lost lentils and pulses, and 38% lost oil, ghee and butter. Most of the households were forced to consume less preferred foods items and more than one-third started practicing borrowing. Also, approximately 20% of the households were found skipping their meals (WFP 2010, pp. 13-15). Malik, Awan and Khan (n.d. p.59-60) quote UNDP figures that ‘as a result of floods, the proportion of population below the minimum level of dietary energy consumption increased by 3% (from 52 to 55%); thereby adding an additional 5 million people to the pool of undernourished people in Pakistan. The malnutrition rate may go up further after relief activities are phased out and agricultural activity is not recovered in due time.’

Global food security does not have a direct link with global food production as enough food is being produced, but there are still 830 million undernourished people (Chatterjee and Khadka 2011). Global food production particularly of cereals can face supply shocks and climate change amplifies these shocks. Schmidhuber and Tubiello (2007) reported that due to climate change, dependency of developing countries on import of food items will significantly increase. Fischer et al. (2005) indicated that although mitigation of climate change is extremely helpful in reducing the negative effects of climate change on food insecurity, there are time lags involved in the climate system due to which the impacts of mitigation actions will be visible only after 2050.

**Climate Change and Health Security**

Climate change—a direct consequence of increased greenhouse gas emissions caused by human activities—is likely to affect at least two basic requirements for maintaining good health: clean air and water. More specifically, climate change is likely to result in (a) increase in average global temperatures and the intensity of heat waves; (b) changes in mean annual precipitation rates (c) incidence of extreme weather events such as droughts and flooding; and (d) deterioration in air quality. All of these parameters are likely to have dire consequences on human health.

Rising temperature and increased frequency of heat waves are likely to augment the risk of heat related mortality and morbidity in the urban poor and older population groups. According to WHO (2012) estimates, ‘Global warming that has occurred since the 1970s caused over 140 000 excess deaths annually by the year 2004.’ Heat waves will likely increase cardiovascular and respiratory diseases (WHO 2008). According to an IPCC report, in India, ‘eighteen heat waves were reported during 1980-98’, of which the heat wave of 1988 affected ten states and caused 1,300 deaths (Confalonieri et al. 2007).

It is also expected that asthma will increase due to rising levels of pollen and other aeroallergen. Rising humidity and temperature levels will stimulate the spread of vector-borne diseases such as dengue fever, malaria, encephalitis and yellow fever (Githeko et al. 2000).
It has been predicted that an increase of 3-4°C in the average temperature would result in a 100% increase in the reproduction rate of Dengue virus (World Bank 2010). Similarly, many other vector-borne diseases including Chagas Disease, Schistosomiasis, River Blindness and Sleeping Sickness are also projected to increase with the increasing levels of temperature. The increased Ultra Violet (UV) radiation is predicted to increase the risk of Cataract Blindness.

Climate change may increase the incidence of Meningitis due to droughts (World Bank 2010). Droughts occur in regions where annual precipitation rates are expected to decline and the timings of rainfall are expected to change. Droughts also result in malnutrition particularly in low income countries. Malnutrition not only retards growth particularly amongst children, it also reduces immunity and increases the risk of deaths from infectious diseases.

Many air pollutants are affected by temperature and humidity (WHO 2008). Climate change is, therefore, predicted to exacerbate air pollution levels and increase the concentration of ground-level ozone. Due to higher exposure to ground-level ozone, several respiratory diseases such as asthma, tuberculosis, chronic obstructive airways disease, chronic bronchitis, acute respiratory infections (ARI) and lung cancer are likely to increase. Exposure to particulate matter (PM) – a pollutant which is a multifaceted mixture of small particles and liquid droplets and is affected by the climate change - is one of the main causes of visibility impairment (haze) in cities and parks. The inhalation of PM can also cause damage to lungs.

As discussed before, flooding has a direct impact on human health because it not only increases the risk of physical injuries and drowning, but numerous water-borne infectious diseases e.g. cholera and diarrhoea; particularly in areas with poor sanitation facilities. Floods also cause social disruption and displacement resulting in a decline in individuals’ incomes and their capacity to buy health care.

Malik, Awan, and Khan (2010) write that ‘According to World Bank (2010), diarrheal diseases from climate change are projected to increase by 5% in 2020 in countries with per capita income less than US $6,000. Other water-borne diseases such as Hepatitis and intestinal worms also increase in flooded areas.’ Apart from damage to physical infrastructure such as hospitals and basic health units, a severe shortage of human resources such as doctors, paramedical staff, midwives and lady health workers (Ibid. p.55) occurs in the affected areas. They report that ‘around 10,600 lady health workers representing one-third of the total were unable to function’ (p. 55) and ‘515 health units (representing 5% of the total available facilities) were partially or totally destroyed’ (p. 7) during the 2010 floods in Pakistan.
Crucial health services such as child birth attendance are also curtailed due to natural disasters. Many women are forced to give birth in the absence of skilled birth attendance thereby increasing the risk of child and/or maternal mortality (Malik, Awan and Khan 2010).

The proportion of births attended by skilled health personnel was only 39% which may go down further to 36% due to floods in Pakistan. Access to safe water and sanitation is severely affected by natural disasters; it results in increasing the vulnerability of people to infectious and water borne diseases such as diarrhoea, typhoid, intestinal worms and hepatitis. During the 2010 floods in Pakistan access to safe water was curtailed by 20% in flood affected areas (UNDP 2010 as quoted by Malik, Awan and Khan 2010, pp. 55-56).

In many cases water pipes were contaminated with sewerage water.

The Damage and Needs Assessment (DNA) conducted by the World Bank and Asian Development Bank estimated that the amount of drinking water polluted with sewerage as a result of floods was 632,000 m³ per day (Malik, Awan and Khan 2010, p. 56).

‘Empirical evidence in the realm of public health shows that one of the important determinants of human health, both across countries and within countries, is the level of income’ (Preston 1975; and Pritchett and Lawrence 1997 as quoted by Malik, Awan and Khan 2010, p. 44). Any shock to the income and livelihoods of people through extreme weather events is therefore bound to affect human health.

It shows that impact of climate change on health may be mediated through a diverse set of causal pathways which lead to income loss due to destruction of health infrastructure and the lack of education and awareness related to hygiene (Ibid.p.44).

**Empirical Model and Description of Data**

The availability of data is one of the major obstacles in the analysis of impacts of climate change on human insecurity. The analysis requires long time series data not only on climate change indicators, but also on food security and human health indicators; especially the indicators that are sensitive to climate change, such as climate sensitive diseases.

Although historical data on climate change and agriculture is available, data on human health is hard to find. Even if such data is available, it is a daunting task to isolate the impact of climate change on human health from many other factors such as technological improvements, demographic changes and socio-economic
development that occur concurrently with climate change (Malik, Awan and Khan 2010, p. 31).

Due to non-availability of data regarding climate sensitive health indicators in South Asian countries, the present study uses life expectancy as proxy for health security. In order to see how food and health security are affected by the climate change; panel data spanning over 1972-2009 for Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Bangladesh and India were used. In this regard, the following reduced form model has been estimated:

\[
\begin{align*}
hi_{it} &= \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 \text{inf}_{it} + \alpha_2 y_{it} + \alpha_3 \text{op}_{it} + \alpha_4 \text{tmp}_{it} + \alpha_5 \text{pr}_{it} + \xi_{it} \\
fi_{it} &= \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 \text{inf}_{it} + \alpha_2 y_{it} + \alpha_3 \text{op}_{it} + \alpha_4 \text{tmp}_{it} + \alpha_5 \text{pr}_{it} + \psi_{it}
\end{align*}
\]

Hi and fi are major dependent variables representing health and food security indicators respectively. Similarly, inf(inflation), y (per capita GDP), op (Openness), tmp(temperature) and pr(precipitation) are used as independent variables and \(\xi_{it}\) and \(\psi_{it}\) are the error terms.

In order to estimate the panel data, Fixed Effect and Random Effect models are most commonly used. The objective of the present study, however, is to analyse the impact of climate change on both health and food security, for which the most appropriate way is to use the system estimation model. As model 1 is a Seemingly Unrelated Model, it will be estimated by using Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) technique (Wooldridge 2002, 2005; and Baltagi 2005). In this regard, three different specifications are tested: in 1st specification temperature, in 2nd specification precipitation and in 3rd specification both temperature and precipitation are used as indicators of climate change. It is also noteworthy that all the variables are used in the log form. A brief description of the data is presented in Table 1:
Selection of an indicator of climate change is an extremely critical issue. In this regard, GHG emission levels, atmospheric GHG concentration levels, global mean temperature, sea-level rise and intensity or frequency of extreme events are most commonly used indicators. In the present study, annual temperature and precipitation have been selected as indicators of climate change for two reasons. Firstly the impact can be directly related to a change in mean temperature and rainfall. Secondly, the changes in mean temperature have a direct relationship with GHG concentrations.

**Estimation Results**

As mentioned earlier, empirical model 1 has been estimated by using SUR modelling for three different specifications. The estimation results are summarized in Table 2.
Table 2: System Estimation Results (SUR)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Specification 1 (Temperature)</th>
<th>Specification 2 (Precipitation)</th>
<th>Specification 3 (Temperature &amp; Precipitation)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Equation 1:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$h_t = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 \text{inf}_t + \alpha_2 \text{y}_t + \alpha_3 \text{op}_t + \alpha_4 \text{tmp}_t + \alpha_5 \text{Pr}_t + \epsilon_t$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>9.35*</td>
<td>4.74</td>
<td>8.42*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(5.89)</td>
<td>(1.38)</td>
<td>(3.77)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflation (inf)</td>
<td>-0.04**</td>
<td>0.01*</td>
<td>0.02**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-1.74)</td>
<td>(2.10)</td>
<td>(1.69)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per Capita GDP (y)</td>
<td>0.41*</td>
<td>0.21*</td>
<td>0.39*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.07)</td>
<td>(3.80)</td>
<td>(2.17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Openness (op)</td>
<td>0.24*</td>
<td>0.56*</td>
<td>0.31*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.21)</td>
<td>(2.54)</td>
<td>(4.51)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temperature (tmp)</td>
<td>-0.19*</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>-0.24*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-4.94)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(-3.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Precipitation (Pr)</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>-0.32**</td>
<td>-0.29*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(-1.72)</td>
<td>(-3.65)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.1057</td>
<td>0.1023</td>
<td>0.1843</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R-squared</td>
<td>0.0955</td>
<td>0.1703</td>
<td>0.1692</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Equation 2:        | 
| $f_t = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 \text{inf}_t + \alpha_2 \text{y}_t + \alpha_3 \text{op}_t + \alpha_4 \text{tmp}_t + \alpha_5 \text{Pr}_t + \psi_t$ | 
| Constant           | 4.38*                          | 5.62*                          | 2.72*                                         |
|                    | (7.42)                         | (2.03)                         | (3.40)                                        |
| Inflation (inf)    | -0.10*                         | -0.18*                         | 0.09*                                         |
|                    | (-3.03)                        | (-2.77)                        | (-1.98)                                       |
| Per Capita GDP (y) | 0.51*                          | 0.61**                         | 0.39*                                         |
|                    | (3.04)                         | (2.81)                         | (2.12)                                        |
| Openness (op)      | 0.09*                          | 0.18**                         | 0.29*                                         |
|                    | (2.90)                         | (2.77)                         | (3.54)                                        |
| Temperature (tmp)  | -0.42*                         | ---                            | -0.39*                                        |
|                    | (-2.44)                        |                                 | (-4.22)                                       |
| Precipitation (Pr) | ---                            | 0.27*                          | 0.57*                                         |
|                    |                                 | (2.63)                         | (3.10)                                        |
| R-squared          | 0.2012                         | 0.2134                         | 0.2708                                        |
| Adjusted R-squared | 0.1953                         | 0.2083                         | 0.2631                                        |
| Determinant residual covariance of the Model | 0.091 | 0.089 | 0.106 |

Note: Values in parenthesis are the t statistics; * and ** denote significance at 5% and 10% respectively.

The results reveal that inflation by reducing people’s capacity to purchase health services and food items negatively affects health and food security. It can be inferred that in order to cope with human insecurity, it is important that inflation be kept under check. It is also
noteworthy that inflation in food commodities benefits producers, but harms consumers. The analysis of inflation’s impacts should be conducted in a framework where effects on producers and consumers are separately identified. In line with the conventional wisdom, per capita GDP has a positive impact on food and health indicators as developed countries having higher per capita GDP enjoy better health and food security. Openness by creating awareness and increased availability of food across borders has significant and positive impact on food and health security. Food security was found to be most adversely affected by reduction in precipitation than a rise in temperature. In a similar study (Akram 2012), it has been found that among agriculture, manufacturing and services sectors, agriculture is most vulnerable to climate change. Although contribution of South Asian countries to global warming is small, any neglect or failure to develop and adopt technologies for climate change mitigation and adaptation of environment friendly practices by these countries have the potential to cause severe food insecurity in the region. The adverse impacts of climate change on agriculture were also highlighted in some earlier studies including Reilly (1999) and Mendelsohn (1994). However, an increase in temperature and an increase in precipitation both negatively affect health indicators. In conclusion, climate change effects are more severe on food security as compared to those on health security.

**Conclusion and Policy Implications**

The present study, using panel data, explores the relationship between climate change, food and health security in the South Asian economies. The results show that temperature has negative and significant, while precipitation has positive and significant relationship with availability of food. An increase in temperature will result in reducing food production, while an increase in rainfall will increase food production. However, temperature and precipitation both have negative and significant relationship with health security.

The study asserts that if climate change is not controlled, food and health insecurity of South Asia will increase. However, being low emitters of GHGs, South Asian countries alone are unable to cope with climate change; they need to be assisted financially and technologically, to adapt to the adverse effects and to mitigate climate change.

At the micro level, both adaptation and mitigation measures are needed to cope with impacts of climate change in different sectors. Need for development of local level adaptation strategies, reducing undesirable human interventions in forests, glaciers, wetlands and pastures is crucial in this regard. As South Asian countries are facing similar environmental problems, there is a need for joint actions to cope with the challenge of climate change. In this regard, environmental issues can provide a good pathway for cooperation when viewed as a shared vulnerability. It is suggested that:

i. Initiatives for sharing knowledge and experiences among South Asian countries may be supported and joint assessment studies for the future regarding availability of
natural resources be conducted that include challenges of increasing frequency and intensity of natural disasters.

ii. Academic exchange may be strengthened as a crucial pillar of cooperation. In order to collaborate on environmental data exchange, South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) can provide a regional platform. Furthermore, joint research projects should be encouraged and supported.

iii. Contribution of regional institutions such as the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN), South Asian Network for Development and Environmental Economics (SANDEE) and International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development (ICIMOD) on environmental issues should be recognised and supported at the government level. Also, the need for establishment of regional institutions on specific challenges such as glacier melting, sea-level rise should be realised.
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Epilogue:
Mega Trends and Game Changers through the South Asian Lens
Abid Q. Suleri*

Abstract
Six ‘mega trends’ have been observed in Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Nepal: individual empowerment; demography and urbanisation; diffusion of power; cultural changes and consumerism; agrarian transformation; and climate change. Each of these mega trends can either be a boon or a bane for these South Asian economies depending on how ‘game changers’ like state of the regional economy; frequency of natural and human-made disasters; openness and transparency; violent conflicts; new technologies; governance and energy availability impact them. While these game changers can pose a serious threat to the overall stability of the region, there is still potential for a sustainable, peaceful and prosperous South Asia, given the current level of advancement in mega trends and two possible scenarios for a new regional order.

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Introduction
Danish Nobel Laureate in Physics Niels Bohr once said, ‘Prediction is very difficult, especially about the future.’ Fortunately, he did not say the same thing about hopes and dreams even when these two have the same relationship with the future as predictions – all are premised on factors found or missing in the past and the present. Any talk about the future of sustainable development in South Asia, in the same vein, has to be a combination of predictions, with apologies to Mr. Bohr, as well as of hopes and dreams. And like all predictions, futuristic hopes and dreams are based upon factors which we already see around us. These factors are divided here into ‘mega trends’ and ‘game changers’. While the former are phenomena which are visible and verifiably present in all countries in South Asia, the latter are essentially natural or human-made circumstances which may determine whether the mega trends lead to positive change in the region or they produce negative outcomes to the benefit of no one and to the loss of everyone.

The world in a few years would be radically transformed and no country—whether United States (US) or China would have hegemonic power. The empowerment of individuals and diffusion of power among states and from states to other actors within states would have dramatic impact on the discourse of power in the world, largely diverting power corridors from the West to the Asian region (USNIC 2012).

Mega Trends

Individual Empowerment
A South Asian individual, whether a man or a woman, is more empowered today due to recent developments that have taken place in the region compared to twenty years ago. For instance, percentage of people living below the poverty line has definitely decreased across the region even when the absolute number of poor people living in poverty remains staggeringly high. Figure 1 shows the average annual change in national poverty rates across South Asian countries. In Sri Lanka and Bangladesh, poverty levels are decreasing at much greater speed than their neighbours.
In many countries, especially India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh this has been accompanied by a steady rise in the number of people in the middle class. A recent study reveals that 51% of Indians (close to 600 million citizens) define themselves as middle class (Silk Road Associates 2013). Making a conservative estimate, I argue that the combined size of South Asian middle class is now easily close to 450 million people which are roughly equivalent to the total population of all the 27 countries in the European Union (EU). The reduction in poverty levels and increase in the size of the middle class have led to many more South Asians having come out of subsistence level existence and slave-like economic conditions than in the past.

Secondly, print, electronic, social and alternative media, as well as information and communication technologies have penetrated almost all South Asian societies like never before. Television and radio are now ubiquitous – in Pakistan close to 12 million

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1 Who is the middle class? It is a slippery term that differs markedly by country. It is often used to describe the segment of population between the working class and wealthy. Based on average per capita GDP of US$ 1514, 50% of Indians define themselves as middle class (Silk Road Associates 2013).
households have access to a television set (PEMRA 2010); in India, the number of satellite television channels is 850 (MIB 2012), and if we include the cable channels operating in all cities of India, the figure would be somewhere in the range of 2500 to 3000; in Nepal, there were 404 FM radio stations in 2011 (Infoasaid 2011). The number of FM radio stations proportional to its population is perhaps the highest in the developing world.

Almost every South Asian seems to have access to a mobile phone (Figure 2) – this has led to increased social and economic mobility, especially among women and the marginalised groups who, as for instance in Bangladesh, are running small businesses using mobile phones as their offices, portable shops and their bankers all rolled in one. The Grameen Bank member women (who are the poorest among poor)…

…..have entered the age of information technology by leasing and purchasing cellular phones. The mobile phones not only create new business opportunities for the poor, but also bring access to information, market, health and other services to the remote rural areas of Bangladesh. With Grameen Bank financing, a borrower buys a mobile phone to become the ‘Telephone Lady’ of the village. She provides telecommunication services to the village, while earning profits for herself. By the end of 2011, there were about four hundred sixty four thousand village phone ladies who have together taken loans amounting to BDT 2.68 billion² (Grameen Bank 2011).

Computers and the internet are expanding rapidly (Figure 3) and so is social media which together let people raise all kinds of questions about every individual or institution and create networks for any imaginable cause. Coupled with laws and constitutional provisions, the right to information, has helped people expose the corrupt, make the powerful responsive and answerable and barge onto everyone’s computer and/or mobile phone screen to highlight the plight of the sick, the suffering and the suppressed.

² US$ 0.03 billion as of September 2013’s exchange rate.
Similarly, South Asia today is more educated than in the past: school enrolment figures are improving in every country even when they lag behind those in the second and first world nations. South Asians are also living longer than they did twenty years ago—mortality rates at birth are decreasing and the number of health care professionals and health care facilities per unit of the population is increasing.
Individual empowerment of South Asians can be seen in Nepal’s Civil War (1996-2006) to overthrow the monarchy; in Pakistan’s judicial revival movement (2007-09), and in protests against Hazara community killings in the Balochistan province (2012) which forced the former Pakistan People’s Party led government to depose its Chief Minister; and in India’s anti-corruption movement led by social activist Anna Hazare (2011-12). All these trends are indicators of empowerment and depending on game changers these individuals can play a constructive or destructive role in reshaping South Asia.

Demography and Urbanisation
South Asia is home to more youngsters than any other region in the world (Euromonitor International 2012). They are also migrating both within their own countries as well as to other parts of the world. Within country, people are moving from villages to cities turning Delhi, Mumbai, Kolkata, Dhaka, and Karachi among the top 10 urban agglomerations in Asia and the Pacific countries (UNESCAP 2011). People are also leaving their countries for work in the West, Persian Gulf countries and now increasingly Australia. These include highly educated professionals as well as skilled and semi-skilled menial workers. As a result, South Asians form the biggest diaspora after the Chinese. India, Bangladesh and Pakistan are among the top remittance receiving countries. In 2010, India topped the list of remittance receiving countries with US $55 billion, Bangladesh was 7th with US $11.1 billion and Pakistan stood at 11th with US $9.4 billion (World Bank 2011). In 2012, Pakistan received US $13.92 billion in remittances (SBP 2012). The influence of South Asian diaspora is not only visible by the record amount of annual remittances received, but also by the role these emigrants are playing in the socio-political arena of their host countries. On the domestic front, educated and often urbanised youth are proving quite influential in challenging traditional power centres.

Diffusion of Power
New centres of power are emerging in South Asian countries and the state’s traditional monopoly over power is facing challenges from multiple new claimants. In Pakistan, for instance, the military’s single-handed hold on power is now replaced by a number of new players – the parliament, the superior judiciary, corporate owned media and, after the 18th and 19th Amendments in the Constitution, provincial governments and provincial assemblies. The 18th Amendment has provided autonomy to the provinces, and 19th Amendment’s major contribution is right to information. There is also emergence of new political players, for example, results of the 2013 General Elections in Pakistan saw Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) emerging as the second biggest party in terms of votes

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3 In 2012, India had the youngest population in terms of size with the number of people aged below 30 at 704 million, whereas Pakistan had 124 million people in this age bracket.

received. The overall voter turnout in the 2013 General Elections was recorded at 55.02% — a much higher percentage than elections since the 80s (ECP 2013).

The media has also emerged as a major power centre in South Asia. India is the first country in South Asia to grant electronic media freedom where the total number of satellite television channels in 2012 was 850 (MIB 2012). There is also a quantum leap in the number of television channels in Pakistan which has increased from 4 in 2003 to 85 in 2010\(^7\) (PEMRA 2010, p.16). Likewise, 138 private radio channel licenses were issued till 2010 (Ibid. p. 46).

In India, big business, media, civil society, regional parties and state governments as well as Maoists and other rebels in some areas like the Northeast have challenged the state’s monopoly over power – in many cases quite successfully. In the electoral sense, coalition governments with the support of provincial/sub national parties seem to have become a norm both in Pakistan and India – validating the contention that the days of a single player dominating the entire playing field are over. In Bangladesh, the civil society led by social enterprises like Grameen, Brach, etc. has as much money and power as the ruling elite – or perhaps more. In Nepal, it was the loss of state monopoly over power which led to its abolition, but one of the many reasons why a new state structure is failing to emerge is the empowerment of erstwhile marginalised communities and smaller ethnic groups through elections and their consequent demand of power sharing. I argue that the weakening of traditional Kathmandu-based parties like the Nepali Congress and Communist Party of Nepal – Leninist Maoist is indeed symbolic of the diffusion of power across the political and ethnic spectrum. One country that seems to have bucked the trend is Sri Lanka where the centre seems to have regained monopoly over power through the use of force but, without the political and constitutional resolution of the perpetually simmering ethnic, regional and even religious tensions, runs the risk of boiling over again in the near future.

**Cultural Changes and Consumerism**

There are some visible cultural changes taking place across the South Asian region. Growing middle class, access to information and technology, and improved literacy has led to consumerism. Cost of consumer goods is an important component of the import bill in all the countries of South Asia. Businesses are responding to the consumer culture and redefining the social fabric, at least in urban centres. For example, a decade ago Valentine Day was considered taboo in Pakistan, but now it is a major event in all its urban hubs. Similarly, despite growing extremism and sectarian intolerance in Pakistan, special transmissions on Christmas and New Year on Pakistani cable channels are a manifestation of the changed cultural trends in the country.

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\(^7\) This is the number of licences awarded till 2010.
Influence of the Bombay Film Industry (Bollywood) is another visible trend in South Asia. While South Asia may be divided along possible fault lines, they seem to be united when it comes to their love for Bollywood cinema which is rapidly making Hindi/Urdu a widely understood language. Compared to two decades ago, when neighbouring countries were portrayed as enemies, Bollywood movies are increasingly promoting regional peace.

Consumerism in South Asian countries is also manifested through imports of consumer goods, processed food and beverages as well as items like chocolate and food items containing cocoa and milk; and cream and milk products (excluding cheese and butter). Figure 4 shows the imports of prepared food stuffs, beverages, spirits, vinegar and tobacco for Pakistan: there is significant increase in imports from 2003-04 when these imports were US $89 million and reached US $1,000 million in 2010-11. Figure 5 shows the imports of processed fruits, juices and miscellaneous processed goods for India from 2003-12. It is observed that in 2003-04, the import of these goods was US $305 million which reached US $1104 million in 2011-12. Figure 6 shows the imports of only milk and cream for Bangladesh, which shows a four time increase in these items from 2003 to 2012. Figure 7 shows the imports of consumer goods for Sri Lanka, in 2003, these items amounted to US $1367 and in 2010 this figure increased to US $2870 million dollars. Increase in import of these commodities is reflective of change in consumer behaviour in South Asia.
**Figure 4**

Source: Calculated from State Bank of Pakistan dataset. All figures in million US$.

**Figure 5**

Source: Calculated from Reserve Bank of India dataset. All figures in million US$.

**Figure 6**

Source: Calculated from Bangladesh Bank Economic Data. All figures in million US$.

**Figure 7**

Source: Calculated from Central Bank of Sri Lanka. All figures in million US$. 

Agrarian Transformation
In South Asia, more than 75% of the population depends on agriculture for daily subsistence and livelihoods (FAO 2013). However, the above mentioned trends are rapidly transforming agriculture in the region. Peri-urbanisation is eroding into cultivable land; hence the focus is on intensive cultivation, to grow more in the shortest possible time so that land can be utilised for the next crop. High responsive varieties have been introduced, but they only give high yield in response to increased inputs like fertilisers, water and pesticides. The indiscriminate use of chemicals is not only leading to pest resistance against pesticides, but also contaminating the ground water, thus making it unsafe for human consumption. Likewise, indiscriminate ground water extraction is lowering the water table and also causing water salinity. On the other hand, despite all transformation, agriculture value added as a percentage of GDP in the South Asian region is decreasing, contributing 22% to the regional GDP (World Bank 2009). The share of agriculture in GDP is being taken by the services and manufacturing sector.

Climate Change
Human activities, policies and practices are held responsible for climate change. South Asia with its varied geography, high population density, rapid urbanisation and pollution is proving to be very vulnerable to climate change. According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)’s fourth assessment report, climate change is expected to have severe impacts on South Asian countries due to increased floods and droughts (Cruz et al. 2007). Transformation in agriculture is leading to a situation where water, food and energy are becoming interdependent, and effects of climate change are exacerbating. This is perhaps most acutely visible in Pakistan where water needs for agriculture, therefore for food, are competing with needs for power production through hydro-electric power plants. To keep the plants running, river water storage for irrigation has to be curtailed or to ensure the availability of water for crops the production of power has to be compromised. All this is just one part of the problem emerging from climate change which is upsetting weather patterns and thereby impacting ecology, crop patterns, energy requirements as well as production and consumption of food.

Game Changers
Each of the above mentioned ‘mega trends’ can either be a boon or a bane for South Asia depending on how the following ‘game changers’ impact them:

State of the Regional Economy
Take regional economy, for instance. Even when the rest of the world, especially Europe and the United States, were facing recession in recent years, most South Asian economies, with the exception of Pakistan, were doing rather well. This has helped the mega trends move in a positive direction – poverty and illiteracy levels have come down, health indicators are improving and more people are joining middle income bracket each
year; economies doing well are putting youth bulge to good use with more hands to earn and fewer mouths to feed; urbanisation is able, in most parts of the region, to assimilate and provide jobs to people pouring in from the rural areas and expatriate South Asians are sending money back home to buy houses and make other capital investments. The increasing size of the economic pie is helping emerging power centres like media, middle class and ethnic and fringe groups to claim, and in some cases get, better, open and transparent economic and political governance and a larger share of the pie; and lastly, economies doing well are allowing most countries in the region to take care of food and energy shortages at the same time, though water woes and climate change problems are worsening.

Now reverse the situation and you will see how a poorly performing economy is affecting the mega trends in a negative way. One can see it within various regions of each South Asian country, but its manifestation is very clear in Pakistan: Less than desirable growth has increased the percentage of poor people in the country as compared to mid-2000s; illiteracy remains the highest in comparison to other states in the region; the scale and standard of healthcare is decreasing; an emerging middle class is getting squeezed due to increasing cost of living, poor service delivery and deteriorating law and order; and fewer job opportunities run the risk of turning youth bulge into a problem rather than an opportunity; flight of capital is far higher than the remittances and aid money coming in; and urbanisation is leading to ethnic, economic and political conflicts in already cramped urban spaces like Karachi.

How an economy performs has a direct bearing on its commitment towards improved service delivery, especially in the field of education and health. Pakistan’s slow economic pace, high illiteracy rate, and little public expenditure on education have a vicious nexus. To some extent the same is true for Bangladesh too. Nepal and India on the other hand, spend more than 3% of GDP on their education. Sri Lanka has always performed well in terms of literacy and currently has the highest literacy rate (97%) in the region. It spends 2% of GDP to sustain it.
Table 1: Public Spending of Education (% of GDP)\(^6\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country/Years</th>
<th>Pakistan</th>
<th>Sri Lanka</th>
<th>India</th>
<th>Bangladesh</th>
<th>Nepal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: World Bank n.d (b), Development Indicators.

Thus, economic growth and resultantly public sector development expenditures are important game changers to determine whether the mega trends would lead to societal coherence or to an increased perception of exclusion and marginalisation. This perception of marginalisation may turn into a struggle between have and have nots in countries like Pakistan, where close to 50% of the country is food insecure (WFP-SDPI-SDC 2010) and energy shortages have peaked,\(^7\) while per capita water availability is going drastically down and threats of environmental disasters loom large.

It is important to note that societal perception of exclusion and marginalisation bring impatience and restlessness in emerging power centres such as media, middle classes and regional stakeholders. One can observe that in Pakistan these actors, instead of becoming a part of the solution by providing political and intellectual leadership in driving the economy and the country out of troubled waters, are making the situation worse with half-baked ideas and less than practical demands.

Frequency of Natural and Human-made Disasters

Similarly, if natural and human made disasters start taking place more frequently than they do now, it goes without saying that they will have a negative impact on all the mega trends. Different studies of South Asian countries show that climate change is going to impact the overall economic activity in these countries.

*Kumar and Parikh (2001) show that even after accounting for farm level adaptation, a 2 °C rise in mean temperature and a 7 % increase in mean precipitation will reduce net revenues by 8.4% in India* (as cited by Kelkar and Bhadwal 2007).

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\(^6\) Missing figure for a particular year indicates that data for this year is not available on the World Bank Data Set.

\(^7\) During summer 2013, energy demand was 21000 MW, while on certain days production was only 16000 MW.
For Pakistan, wheat yields are predicted to decline by 6-9% in sub-humid, semi-arid, and arid areas with 1°C increase in temperature (Sultana and Ali 2006 as cited by Kelkar and Bhadwal 2007).

For Sri Lanka, Wijeratne (1996) shows that... ‘an increase in the frequency of droughts and extreme rainfall events could result in a decline in tea yield, which would be the greatest in regions below 600 metres’ (as cited by Kelkar and Bhadwal 2007). According to Karim, Hussain and Ahmed (1996), there will be ‘net negative effect on the yields of rice, the staple food of the population in Bangladesh’ (as cited by Kelkar and Bhadwal 2007).

The disasters responded to with inappropriate policies and practices lead to wrong prioritisation of resources by states and the result is individual insecurities, thus, turning the positive tide of mega trends negative.

Openness and Transparency
While openness and transparency are generally seen as forces for permanent good, their champions have shown the tendency to put them even above elections and democracy. Such simplistic insistence on these values, no matter how important, can lead to discrediting of the political class with dangerously destabilising consequences for the polity. Attempts to realise openness and transparency in isolation from democracy, or rather at the expense of democracy, may let the dark forces of dictatorship emerge all over the region. Even in India, analysts like the former editor of the Times of India, have talked about the rise of middle class fascism on the twin issues of corruption and transparency which may succeed in toppling India’s democracy which so far has proved to be the only guarantee for the country’s continued survival (Padgaonkar 2013). The January 2013 long march of Islamic cleric Tahir-ul-Qadri in Pakistan for transparency in the electoral system (especially accountability of candidates), before the country’s General Elections created serious doubts that the elections being postponed (AFP 2013). The thirst for openness and transparency is a major game changer which may alter the direction of mega trends.

Violent Conflicts
Distributive justice is a prerequisite, both for peace as well as sustainable development. In its absence, the growth process in South Asia would be less inclusive. Once the marginalised get a collective identity-be it creed, ethnic, national, or any other identity-they immediately find a group or a country who is usurping their rights and that is what leads to conflict between the ‘have and have-nots’ at societal level, and trans-boundary, natural resource conflicts at the regional level (Suleri 2010). Countries, like Pakistan, which face continuous threats from external and internal militants and instability, are also a big issue for the region.
New Technologies
The impact of new technologies (for example the mobile and internet usage by the countries mentioned earlier) definitely warrants some attention. These technologies are positively contributing to individual empowerment, social and demographic mobility, diffusion of power to the marginalised communities and ethnic groups and management of natural resources like water. They, however, have time and again proved to be sources of trouble for all the mega trends – for one, they lead to atomization of power, making it impossible to understand and locate the sources of trouble generated. They have also had negative impacts on social and demographic mobility as in the case of recent riots in the Indian state of Assam between the Bodo tribesmen and local Muslims (Aljazeera 2012) when panicked text messages led to the exodus of thousands of Bodos from southern states like Tamil Nadu, Karnataka and Kerala (Sialo 2012).

Democratization of new technologies has, indeed, led to the diffusion of power to an unmanageable extent and consequently demands for natural resources have reached such unprecedented levels that no state and society in the region has the capacity to even listen to them all, let alone sufficiently and satisfactorily address them.

Protests in Pakistan about a controversial anti-Islam movie that was uploaded on youtube inflicted a loss of around Rs. 76 billion (Mughal 2012) to the economy of Pakistan; meanwhile, the damage done to the lives of people and the way life stopped in many cities of the country is immeasurable. Pakistan saw worse impacts during similar protests a few years back when a Danish cartoonist had drawn the caricatures of Prophet Muhammad (Peace Be Upon Him).

Governance
One can go on and on about the impact of various game changers, but ultimately the latter are shaped by policies and processes we adapt, in other words facets of governance. Contrary to the general definition of governance, i.e., planning and decision-making by the state and its institutions, there is a societal notion of ‘governance’ too which includes how decisions are made within a certain society or nation; who is involved in these decision-making processes and who has which powers to decide. On which evidence is planning based and which planning documents are taken as the basis for decision-making? How are conflicting views dealt with? (Geiser and Suleri 2010) Answers to these questions not only determine the quality of governance, but can help in understanding whether the mega trends would prove a challenge or opportunity for South Asia.

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*US$ 71 million as per September 2013 exchange rate.*
Energy Availability

Finally, energy is another game changer which can directly affect the mega trends. Sustainable development in any part of South Asia would be defined by its energy mix. It is not only about the availability of energy, but also about the availability of eco-friendly energy at affordable price and for a sustained period of time. South Asian countries need to develop strategies and infrastructure for lower carbon emitting growth. As in case of Pakistan, the additional financial needs for mitigation for a cleaner development future range from between US $ 8 billion and US $ 17 billion (Khan et al. 2011). In a recent poll by SDPI and HBS published in Herald Magazine (2013) on socio-political preferences, Pakistanis ranked the energy crisis higher than terrorism and corruption. The top four economic issues highlighted were unemployment (21%); energy shortage (19%); currency devaluation (13%); and both inflation (12%) and foreign debt burden (12%).

Leaving aside the business as usual which we all experience in its best and worst forms and know well through our first hand experiences, let us first see how the worst case scenario can materialize in one or more parts of the region, but in the end to the detriment of everyone in South Asia. Collapsing economies, uncontrollable and unmanageable demographic changes, withering away of the traditional centres of power, food and water shortages combined with environmental disasters may – either in tandem or separately – lead to the disintegration of the state in countries like Afghanistan, Nepal, Pakistan and even parts of India where a Maoist insurgency rages on. Consider Afghanistan first: A failed Afghan state, totally or partially under Taliban control after the withdrawal of international forces could give impetus to Islamic militancy not just in neighbouring Pakistan but also in India, Bangladesh and even Sri Lanka, sucking the entire region into religious violence and conflicts. A crumbling Pakistan will have immediate impact on India, possibly leading to or resulting from a war between the two countries involving the dreaded use of nuclear arsenal. If the state in Nepal fails, India might have to send its armed forces there to stop the trouble from spreading into northern Indian states as well as to stem the out-flux of Nepalis migrating into Indian cities.

The Silver Lining: A New Regional Order

Given the bad news above, it might seem difficult to envision much good news. But there is a silver lining and I call it the ‘new regional order’ for the lack of a better term, for a model sustainable, peaceful and prosperous South Asia:

1. South Asia remains a highly militarized zone where militaries have been used against one’s own people, rather than foreign forces. A sustainable, peaceful and prosperous region will require a drastic reduction in the number of military personnel in all the countries. In fact, there needs to be a paradigm shift in the way conflicts are resolved in South Asia. We have seen time and again that the use of force within states and amongst them has, indeed, led to worsening of conflicts, rather than their resolution. Wars have failed to solve any issues between India and Pakistan; India has failed to quell unrest in Kashmir and its northeast, despite
deploying an army there in large numbers; Pakistan has failed to tackle the militancy in its tribal areas and Balochistan in spite of several operations. Is it not about time to give diplomacy, politics and negotiations a chance – if not as a replacement for the military operations then at least as a mandatory corollary to them?

2. Economies in the region are more integrated with the rest of the world than they are within the region. This makes them vulnerable to external shocks; but a regionally integrated South Asian economy may have a better chance to withstand outside pressures and overcome internal bottlenecks and shortcomings. Together the region is endowed with unparalleled human resources and each country has something productive to bring to the table of cooperation. India can chip in with information technology and healthcare; Pakistan with cement and textiles; Bangladesh with garments; Sri Lanka with expertise in how to universalize literacy; Nepal and Bhutan together have the potential to produce more electricity than the entire region will need in the next twenty years (Thapa, Sharma and Gupta 2007) and Afghanistan can serve as the much desired gateway to Central Asia and China, two huge but unexplored markets sitting right next to South Asia. In an atmosphere of peace and cooperation, it is also highly likely that South Asian states will be able to manage natural and human-made disasters and natural resources, both internally and in the region, in a more sustainable and equitable manner.

The choice is ours- we may not have control over the mega trends. However, we can certainly influence the game changers, influence them in a way that they affect the mega trends in a positive manner. This is the common dream of many South Asians and indeed a pathway to sustainable development in the region.
References


Sultana, H. and Ali, N. 2006, ‘Vulnerability of Wheat Production in Different Climatic Zones of Pakistan under Climate Change Scenarios using CSM-CERES-Wheat Model’, Second International Young Scientists’ Global Change Conference, sponsored by START (the global change SysTem for Analysis, Research and Training) and the China Meteorological Administration, 7-9 November, Beijing, China.


World Bank n.d (a), ‘World DataBank-Poverty and Inequality Database’, The World Bank, Washington D.C., USA,
Annexure:

SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTH ASIA: SHAPING THE FUTURE

SDPI'S FIFTEENTH SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT CONFERENCE
11-13 DECEMBER 2012
ISLAMABAD, PAKISTAN

CONFERENCE PROGRAMME
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Activity</th>
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| 9:15 am –11:30 am | **Opening Plenary**  
|                  | Welcome Address: Dr. Saeed Shafqat, Chairperson, Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, Pakistan |
|                  | Introduction to the Conference: Dr. Abid Qaiyum Suleri, Executive Director, Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, Pakistan |
|                  | Keynote Speaker: Mr. Javed Jabbar, Vice President, IUCN, 2004-2012; former information minister and senator; writer; film-maker; and, policy analyst |
|                  | Plenary Title: National diversities; regional dimensions |
|                  | Remarks by the Chief Guest: Syed Naveed Qamar, Federal Minister for Defence, Pakistan |
|                  | Launch of SDC Anthology: Redefining Paradigms of Sustainable Development in South Asia |
|                  | Launch of SDPI's Annual Report |
|                  | Book launch: Clustered Deprivation: District Profile of Poverty in Pakistan; The SDC Series in a Glance by Mr. Ahmad Salim (Urdu Publication) |
| 11:30 am – 12 noon | **Discussion** |
|                  | **Tea / Coffee**  
11:30 am – 12 noon |
**Tuesday, 11 December 2012**

**Concurrent Panel A-1**

**Title:** Global governance and development in South Asia: Future prospects

**Chair:** Dr. Khaqan Najeeb, Ministry of Finance, Islamabad, Pakistan

**Special comments by:** Dr. Hans Frey, The Council of Social Sciences (COSS), Islamabad, Pakistan; and, Dr. Sunil Dasgupta, University of Maryland Baltimore County and Brookings Institution, USA

**Panel Organiser and Moderator:** Ms Mome Saleem, Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad, Pakistan

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<tr>
<td>Mr. Johannes Blankenbach, Researcher, German Development Institute/Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE), Germany</td>
<td>Global, regional and local development post-2015: Why global governance matters</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dr. Stephen Commins, University of California at LA, USA</td>
<td>Global Governance and social accountability: Whose voices? Whose choices?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ms Mome Saleem, Research Associate, Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
<td>SAARC: A building block?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mr. Shakeel Ramay, Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
<td>Analyzing the global governance systems</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mr. Nadeem Ahmad, Social Policy and Development Centre, Karachi, Pakistan</td>
<td>Managing global governance: A perspective from South</td>
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**Discussion**

**Lunch**

2:00 pm - 3:00 pm
**Tuesday, 11 December 2012  
Day One**

**Concurrent Panel A-2**  
12 noon – 2:00 pm

**Title:** Will media be a catalyst for change?  
**Chair:** Ms Moneeza Hashmi, President, Commonwealth Broadcast Association, Lahore, Pakistan  
**Special comments by:** Mr. Ejaz Haider, Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad, Pakistan; and, Mr. Mohammad Malick, Dunya News, Islamabad, Pakistan  
**Panel Organisers and Moderators:** Ms Imrana Niazi and Ms Uzma T. Haroon, Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad, Pakistan

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<tr>
<td>Mr. Fahd Hussain, Waqt News, Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
<td>How media has gatecrashed the Power Club</td>
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<td>Mr. Farrukh Khan Pitafi, News One, Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
<td>Our future and the media’s conduct</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mr. Badar Alam, Editor, Herald, Karachi, Pakistan</td>
<td>How media’s financial model hampers it from being a champion for change</td>
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**Discussion**

**Lunch**  
2:00 pm – 3:00 pm
**Tuesday, 11 December 2012**

**Concurrent Panel A-3**

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<th>Title: Dynamics of non-traditional security threats in South Asia</th>
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<td>Chair: Dr. Saba Gul Khattak, Member BoG, SDPI, Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
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<td>Special comments by: Mr. Karamat Ali, Pakistan Institute of Labour Education and Research (PILE), Karachi, Pakistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>Panel Organisers and Moderators: Mr. Shakeel A. Ramay and Ms Sehrish Jahangir, Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
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<th>Speakers</th>
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<tr>
<td>Mr. Tahir Dhindsa, Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
<td>Regional conflict from the prism of energy</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dr. Naeem Akram, Economic Affairs Division, Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
<td>Climate change and human insecurity in South Asia</td>
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<td>Mr. Khurram Javed Kazi, Diplomatic Academy, Azerbaijan</td>
<td>Conflict and cooperation on the future of energy in South Asia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dr. Bishnu Raj Upreti, National Centre of Competence in Research (NCCR) North-South, Nepal</td>
<td>Non-traditional security challenges in post-conflict Nepal</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dr. Jürgen Scheffran, Research Group Climate Change and Security (CLISEC), Germany</td>
<td>Climate change and security in South Asia and the Himalaya region: Cases of conflict and cooperation</td>
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**Discussion**

**Lunch**

2:00 pm – 3:00 pm
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<th>Title: Public financing of education in Pakistan: Estimating gaps and future costs</th>
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<td>Chair and Special Comments by: Mr. Tasadduq Rasul, Acting Country Director, ActionAid, Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
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<td>Panel Organiser and Moderator: ActionAid Pakistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mr. Hamza Abbas, Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
<td>Public financing of primary education in Pakistan: Estimating gaps and future cost</td>
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<td>Mr Zohair Zaidi, Girls Education Programme Team, Oxfam, Islamabad</td>
<td>Aid effectiveness</td>
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| Discussion |

| Lunch | 2:00 pm – 3:00 pm |
## Roundtable Discussion:

**Title:** Future of food security analysis in Asia: Integrated phase classification (IPC)

**Chair:** Mr. Ahmed Bakhsh Lehri, Secretary, National Ministry for Food Security and Research, Islamabad, Pakistan

**Special comments by:** Mr. Rajendra Aryal and Mr. Krishna Pahari, FAO, Islamabad, Pakistan

**Panel Organiser:** Ms Duaa Syed, Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad, Pakistan

**Moderator:** Mr. Shahbaz Bokhari, National Coordinator IPC Pakistan, FAO, Islamabad, Pakistan

**Closing remarks by:** Mr. Jean-Luc Siblot, Country Director, World Food Programme, Pakistan

### Speakers and Title

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<tr>
<td>Mr. Erminio Sacco, FAO, Bangkok, Thailand</td>
<td>IPC Experience in Asia</td>
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<td>Mr. Kaija Korpi, Global Support Unit FAO</td>
<td>IPC – A global perspective</td>
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<td>Dr. Abid Suleri, Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
<td>IPC analysis of Pakistan</td>
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<td>Ms Maria-Bernardita Flores, Government of the Philippines</td>
<td>IPC analysis of the Philippines</td>
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<td>Mr. Sahib Haq, Programme Officer, WFP</td>
<td>Food security issues in Pakistan</td>
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**Discussion**
Tuesday, 11 December 2012  
Day One

Concurrent Panel A-6  
3:00 pm – 5:00 pm

**Title:** Civil-military imbalance and its policy implications

**Chair:** Dr. Saeed Shafqat, Chairperson, Board of Governors, Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, Pakistan

**Special comments by:** Dr. Ali Cheema, Lahore University of Management Sciences, Lahore, Pakistan; and, Dr. Ilhan Niaz, Quaid-e-Azam University, Islamabad, Pakistan

**Panel Organiser and Moderator:** Mr. Ejaz Haider, Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad, Pakistan

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<tr>
<td>Maj Gen (retd.) Athar Abbas, Former Director General, Inter Services Public Relations, Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
<td>National security imperatives and CMR in Pakistan</td>
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<td>Mr. Ejaz Haider, Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
<td>Changing dynamics of CMR in Pakistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dr. Sunil Dasgupta, University of Maryland Baltimore County and Brookings Institution, USA</td>
<td>South Asian civil military relations in comparative perspective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Bishnu Upreti, Regional Coordinator, South Asia Regional Coordination Office (NCCR), Nepal</td>
<td>Civil-military relations and post-conflict stability in Nepal</td>
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**Discussion**
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<th>Title: Third wave of democracy: A myth or reality from South Asian perspective</th>
<th>3:00 pm – 5:00 pm</th>
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<tr>
<td>Democracy, participation and governance in South Asia</td>
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<td>Chair: Mr. Shams-ul-Mulk, Former Chief Minister of KPK, Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
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<td>Special comments by: Mr. Harris Khalique, Team Leader Aawaz, Islamabad, Pakistan; Prof. Jan Breman, Netherlands; and, Dr. Dr. Talat Mahmood, Social Science Research Center, Berlin, Germany</td>
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<tr>
<td>Panel Moderator: Ms Sadaf Liaquat, Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
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## Speakers

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<tr>
<td>Mr. Nihal Rodrigo, Former Secretary General-SAARC, Sri Lanka</td>
<td>Third wave of democracy: Myth or reality from Sri Lankan perspective</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mr. Abdul Wali, Pakistan Institute of Development Economics (PIDE) Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
<td>Is Pakistan a praetorian democracy?: Questioning the foundations of democratic culture in Pakistan</td>
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## Discussion
**Tuesday, 11 December 2012**  
**Day One**

**Concurrent Panel A-8**  
**3:00 pm – 5:00 pm**

**Title:** Conflicting female and feminist identities after 9/11  
**Chair:** Dr. Saba Gul Khattak, Member BoG, SDPI, Islamabad, Pakistan  
**Special comments by:** Dr. Lubna Chaudhry, State University of New York, Binghamton, USA  
**Panel Organisers and Moderators:** Dr. Nathalene Reynolds and Ms Sadia Sharif, Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad, Pakistan

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Shama Dossa, Asian Pacific Resource and Research Centre for Women (ARROW), Canada</td>
<td>Caught between an onslaught of imperialism: Struggles of constructing feminists identities in contemporary Pakistan</td>
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<td>Dr. Nathalene Reynolds, Visiting Research Fellow, SDPI, Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
<td>Conflicting female and feminist identities in France: The political instrumentalisation of veil</td>
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<td>Dr. Nida Kirmani, Assistant Professor, Lahore University of Management Sciences, Lahore, Pakistan</td>
<td>Women’s rights advocacy and Islam in the post-9/11 context: Comparing the Indian and Pakistani women's movements</td>
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<td>Ms Sara Khan, Search for Common Ground, Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
<td>A critique of Pakistani liberal feminist's response to Chand Bibi incident</td>
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**Discussion**

**Wednesday, 12 December 2012**  
**Day Two**

**Concurrent Panel B-1**  
**9:30 am – 11:30 am**

**Title:** Role of public infrastructure in reshaping Asia’s future  
**Chair:** Prof. Dr. Manzoor Hussain Soomro, Pakistan Science Foundation, Islamabad, Pakistan  
**Special comments by:** Dr. Vaqar Ahmed, Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad, Pakistan  
**Panel Organiser and Moderator:** Dr. Vaqar Ahmed, Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad, Pakistan

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<td>Dr. Nadia Tahir, Lahore University of Management Sciences, Lahore, Pakistan</td>
<td>Development and efficiency: Analysis of Pakistan Railways in comparison with China and India</td>
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<td>Ms Yumei Zhang, Associate Research Fellow, Agricultural Information Institute, Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences, China</td>
<td>Growth and distributive effects of public infrastructure investments in China</td>
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<td>Mr. Naveed Iftikhar, Ministry of Finance, Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
<td>Reshaping public infrastructure in Pakistan: Energy and transport sectors</td>
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**Discussion**

**Tea**  
**11:30 am—12 noon**
**Wednesday, 12 December 2012**  
**Day Two**

**Concurrent Panel B-2**  
9:30 am – 11:30 am

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<th>Title: Reducing impact of climate driven migration on women</th>
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<td>Chair: Mr. Shafqat Kakakhel, Member BoG, SDPI, Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
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<td>Special comments by: Dr. Stephen Commins, University of California at LA, USA</td>
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<td>Guest of Honour: Ms Lena Lindberg, Country Director UN Women, Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
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<td>Panel Organiser and Moderator: Ms Mome Saleem, Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dr. Giovanna Gioli, Research Group Climate Change and Security (CLISEC), Germany; and, Mr. Talimand Khan, Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
<td>Gender and environmental migration in Gilgit-Baltistan, Pakistan</td>
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<td>Ms Zahida Rehman, DevCon, Sanghar, Pakistan</td>
<td>Role of men and women in a changing global climate: The case of 2011 floods in Sanghar, Pakistan</td>
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| Tea | 11:30 am – 12 noon |
**Wednesday, 12 December 2012**

**Concurrent Panel B-3**

**Title:** Will social movements empower poor and marginalised people to struggle for improved livelihoods and well-being?

**Chair:** Mr. Karamat Ali, Pakistan Institute of Labour Education and Research (PILER), Karachi, Pakistan

**Special comments by:** Dr. Aasim Sajjad Akhtar, Quaid-e-Azam University, Islamabad, Pakistan; and, Prof. Geof Wood, Development Studies Association, UK and Ireland

**Panel Organiser and Moderator:** Dr. Urs Geiser, Senior Researcher, University of Zurich, Switzerland

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<td>Mr. Muhammad Luqman, Institute of Agricultural Extension and Rural Development, Faisalabad, Pakistan</td>
<td>Social movements and local organisations in the Hazara Division of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Pakistan: Visions and practices</td>
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<td>Mr. Awanish Kumar, Tata Institute of Social Sciences, India</td>
<td>Land and caste in a Maharashtra Village: Old issues, ‘new’ social movements?</td>
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<td>Mr. Mahendra Sapkota, PhD Fellow, Kathmandu University and NCCR, Nepal</td>
<td>Dynamics of social movement and poverty reduction: Case study of the Tharu Movement in Nepal</td>
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<td>Dr. Urs Geiser, Senior Researcher, University of Zurich, Switzerland</td>
<td>Everyday rural poverty and the promise of grassroots mobilisation</td>
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**Discussion**

**Tea**

11:30 am – 12 noon
**Wednesday, 12 December 2012**  
**Day Two**

**Concurrent Panel B-4**  
**9:30 am – 11:30 am**

**Title:** Promoting sustainable enterprises in South Asia  
**Chair:** Mr. Altaf M. Saleem, Shakarganj Mills, Lahore, Pakistan  
**Special comments by:** Mr. Mujeeb Ahmad Niazi, National Director, Center for Afghan Civil Society Support, Afghanistan  
**Panel Organisers and Moderators:** Mr. Qasim Shah and Ms Anam A.Khan, Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad, Pakistan

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<td>Sustainable development: Experiences and challenges from the grassroots – Small producers' perspectives</td>
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<td>Dr. Shahamin Zaman, CSR Centre, Bangladesh</td>
<td>Responsible business – Making it a reality</td>
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<td>Ms Anam A.Khan, Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
<td>Regulation versus voluntary corporate social responsibility: Next 20 years</td>
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<td>Mr. Mochan Bhattarai, Environmental Camps for Conservation Awareness (ECCA), Kathmandu, Nepal</td>
<td>CSR status in Nepal: Problems and opportunities</td>
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**Discussion**

**Tea**  
**11:30 am – 12 noon**
Wednesday, 12 December 2012  Day Two

Concurrent Panel B-5  12 noon – 2:00 pm

**Title:** Women's economic empowerment: Advances and breakthroughs  
**Chair:** Ms Rhonda Gossen-Ehsani, Counsellor, Development and Head of Aid, Canadian High Commission, Islamabad, Pakistan  
**Special comments by:** Dr. Nazre Hyder, SDPI, Islamabad and Ms Ameena Saiyid, Oxford University Press, Karachi, Pakistan  

**Panel Organisers and Moderators:** Ms Rhonda Gossen-Ehsani, Counsellor, Development and Head of Aid, Canadian High Commission, Islamabad, Pakistan; and, Ms Mome Saleem, Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad, Pakistan  

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Menonite Economic Development Associates (MEDA), Waterloo, Canada | Breakthrough changes from value chain development for women: Pakistan and Afghanistan |
| Dr. Linda Jones, International Centre for Women's Leadership, Coady  
International Institute, Canada / Ms Umbreen Baig, Canadian High Commission, Islamabad, Pakistan | Experiences of successful incremental approaches to women's economic empowerment in South Asia |
| Mr. Waheed Ahmed, Massey University, New Zealand | Social sustainability in transport: Women's empowerment through mobility in urban areas of Pakistan |
| Ms Farida Khan, ILO, Islamabad | Mainstreaming gender in the departments of labour |

**Discussion**

**Lunch**  2:00 pm – 3:00 pm
Wednesday, 12 December 2012  

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<th>12 noon – 2:00 pm</th>
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</table>
| **Title:** Addressing NTBs in Indo-Pak trade: Implications for South Asia  
*Chair:* Mr. Khurram Dastagir Khan, Member National Assembly, Islamabad, Pakistan  
*Special comments by:* Dr. Pervez Tahir, Former Chief Economist, Planning Commission, Lahore, Pakistan  
*Discussant:* Mr. Iqbal Tabish, SAARC Chamber of Commerce & Industry, Islamabad, Pakistan; Dr. Safdar A. Sohail, Director General (Trade Policy), Ministry of Commerce, Pakistan  
*Panel Organisers:* Dr. Vaqar Ahmad, Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad, Pakistan; and, Mr. Bipul Chatterjee, Consumer Unity and Trust Society International, India |

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<tr>
<th>Speakers</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eng. M. A. Jabbar, Qaim Filters, Karachi, Pakistan, presented in absentia by Mr. M. Adnan, Research Assistant, Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad</td>
<td>Harnessing of business opportunities and addressing of NTBs in Indo-Pak trade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Saad Rajput, Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
<td>Non-tariff barriers for Pakistani exports to India</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mr. Ali Khizar, Business Recorder, Lahore, Pakistan</td>
<td>Politics and reality of non tariff barriers of trade between Pak and India</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Bipul Chatterjee, CUTS International India, presented in absentia by Dr. Vaqar Ahmed, Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad</td>
<td>Addressing NTBs in Indo-Pak trade: Implications for South Asia</td>
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<th>Discussion</th>
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<p>| Lunch | 2:00 pm – 3:00 pm |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Speakers</th>
<th>Title</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Stephen Commins, University of California at LA, USA</td>
<td>Livelihoods and markets in post-conflict settings: No short cuts, no quick fixes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Bishnu Upreti, Regional Coordinator, South Asia Regional Coordination Office (NCCR) Nepal</td>
<td>Foreseeing the future of livelihoods, basic services and social protection in post conflict Nepal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Babar Shahbaz, University of Agriculture Faisalabad, and, Visiting Fellow, Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
<td>Household food security concerns and coping strategies in disaster and conflict affected areas: The case of Battagram and Mansehra Districts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Qasim Shah, Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
<td>Livelihoods, basic services and social protection in conflict affected North Western Pakistan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Discussion**

**Lunch**  
2:00 pm – 3:00 pm
**Wednesday, 12 December 2012**  
**Day Two**

**Concurrent Panel B-8**  
12 noon - 2:00 pm

**Title:** Conflict: Anatomy, impact, challenges and resolution

**Panel Organiser:** Mr. Moammad Asif, AAWAZ, Islamabad

**Chair:** Dr. Yunas Samad, Professor, University of Bradford, UK

**Special comments by:** Mr. Damon Bristow, Head of Governance Group, DFID, Islamabad, Pakistan; Dr. Sunil Dasgupta, University of Maryland Baltimore County and Brookings Institution, USA

**Panel Organiser:** AAWAZ

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<tr>
<th>Speakers</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Khadim Hussain, Peshawar, Pakistan</td>
<td>International and Pakistan’s policy and mis-governance factors perpetuating conflicts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Shamimur Rahman Malick, Lahore, Pakistan</td>
<td>Different conventional, non-conventional and statutory mechanisms and legislative recommendations for resolving disputes at community level</td>
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**Discussion**

Lunch  
2:00 pm – 3:00 pm
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<tr>
<th>Speakers</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Kanwar Dilshad, Former Secretary Election Commission of Pakistan,</td>
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<tr>
<td>Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
<td>Women’s role in the forthcoming general election</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mr. Shabir Ahmad, IFES Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
<td>Electoral participation of women in Pakistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ms Marvi Sirmed, Strengthening Democracy through Parliamentary</td>
<td>History of women in the parliament</td>
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<td>Development, Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
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Discussion
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<tr>
<th>Speakers</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Muhammad Ashfaq, Institute of Agricultural and Resource Economics, University of Agriculture, Faisalabad, Pakistan</td>
<td>Assessing the food security situation among rural households of District Faisalabad, Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Nirmal Kumar, Kathmandu University/NCCR North South Lalitpur, Nepal</td>
<td>Hunger breeds human insecurity: A case from the Far-Western region of Nepal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Zahid Asghar, State Bank of Pakistan, Islamabad</td>
<td>Assessing the calorie-income and macro-nutrient income elasticity using HIES 2007-08 data of Pakistan</td>
</tr>
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</table>
Wednesday, 12 December 2012

Concurrent Session B-11
3:00 pm – 5:00 pm

Title: Religious freedoms: South Asian perspectives

Chair: Dr. Khalid Masud, Director General, Islamic Research Institute, International Islamic University and Adhoc Judge Shariat, Appellate Bench, Supreme Court of Pakistan

Special comments by: Mr. Ahmed Salim, Senior Advisor, Education and Religious Diversity, Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad, Pakistan

Panel Organisers and Moderators: Mr. Ahmad Salim, Mr. Qasim Shah and Ms Afsheen Naz, Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad, Pakistan

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Speakers</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Imdad Hussain, Assistant Professor, Center for Public Policy and Governance (CPPG), Lahore, Pakistan</td>
<td>Hope in the time of despair: Possibilities of interfaith peace in Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Nathalene Reynolds, Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
<td>On the civic rights of Muslims of the Indian state of Gujarat: Events since 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Yunas Samad, Professor, University of Bradford, UK</td>
<td>Religious freedoms in Pakistan: Alternative future</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Khatau Mal, Thardeep Rural Development Programme, Mithi, Pakistan</td>
<td>Contribution and struggles of Hindu Community in Sindh, Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Message from Dr Heiner Bielefeldt, UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion and Belief. Introduction to the film by Dr. Shobha Das, Minority Rights Group International, UK</td>
<td>Religious freedoms globally and in Pakistan - reflections from the UN</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Discussion
### Technical Session I: Reducing environmental risks in South Asia
#### The way forward for a sustainable ship recycling industry in South Asia

**Chair:** Mr. Ghulam Mohayuddin Marri, Member Infrastructure, Planning Commission of Pakistan, Islamabad

**Special comments by:** Ms Delphine Reuter, Shipbreaking Platform Secretariat, Belgium; Dr. M. A. Khwaja, Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad, Pakistan; and, Mr. Ahmed Aslam, Expert Member, Basel Convention Secretariat; Consultant, World Bank

**Panel Organisers and Moderators:** Mr. Kanwar Javed, SDPI; and, Ms Patrizia Heidegger, Shipbreaking Platform, Belgium

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<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ms Patrizia Heidegger, Executive Director, NGO Shipbreaking Platform Secretariat, Brussels</td>
<td>Safe and environmentally sound ship recycling: The implementation of international norms in South Asia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mr. Muhammad Majid Bashir, Ex-Judge, Senior Lawyer Supreme Court of Pakistan</td>
<td>Legal enforcement mechanism for decent work in shipbreaking industry of Pakistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mr. Kanwar M. Javed, Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
<td>Off the beach agenda: The way forward for green shipbreaking yards in Pakistan</td>
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**Discussion**
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<th>Thursday, 13 December 2012</th>
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<tr>
<td>Concurrent Panel C-1</td>
<td>9:30 am –11:30 am</td>
<td>Title: Building resilient nations and safer communities: Disaster management in South Asia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chair</td>
<td>Mr. Arif Jabbar, OXFAM, Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>Special comments by</td>
<td>Ms Irina Mosel, Technical Expert, Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>Panel Organiser and Moderator</td>
<td>Mr. Shafqat Munir, Oxfam GB Asia, Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>Speakers</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mr. A. Z. M. Saleh, Research Communication &amp; Outreach Associate, Unnayan Onneshan, Bangladesh</td>
<td>Innovation and regeneration in agriculture for building climate resilient communities and sustainable livelihood in Bangladesh</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ms Atiya Ali Kazmi, Fatima Jinnah Women University, Rawalpindi, Pakistan</td>
<td>Mainstreaming disaster risk reduction into development and the concept of resilient communities</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mr. Sanaullah Rustamani, Hyderabad, Pakistan</td>
<td>Analysing floods in Sindh, Pakistan</td>
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<td>Discussion</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tea</td>
<td>11:30 am-12 noon</td>
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<tr>
<td>9:30 am – 11:30 am</td>
<td>Concurrent Panel C-2: Reducing environmental risks in South Asia</td>
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<td>Impacts of climate change on mangrove ecosystem in South Asia</td>
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<td>Chair: Mr. Mahmood Akhtar Cheema, IUCN, Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
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<td>Special comments by: Mr. Rab Nawaz, WWF, Sindh Office, Pakistan</td>
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<td>Panel Organisers/Moderators: Mr. Kashif Majeed Salik and Ms Sehrish Jahangir, Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
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<td>Speakers</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mr. Moshur Rahman, Institute of Water Modelling, Bangladesh</td>
<td></td>
<td>Salinity distribution in the sundarban areas and future threats</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dr. Zia Hashmi, Global Change Impact Study Centre (GCISC), Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
<td></td>
<td>Analysis of hydrological regime in the mangrove forest region of Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ms Sehrish Jahangir, Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
<td></td>
<td>Socio-economic and environmental vulnerability assessment of Indus Delta: A case study of Keti Bundar in Pakistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mr. Kashif Salik, Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
<td></td>
<td>Ecological assessment of Indus Delta in the context of environmental flows requirement</td>
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<td>Tea</td>
<td>11:30 am – 12 noon</td>
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<td>Time</td>
<td>Session C-3</td>
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</table>
| 9:30 am – 11:30 am | **Title:** Educational and social exclusion: Perceptions, practices, and possibilities  
**Chair:** Ms. Sadiqa Salahuddin, Indus Resource Center, Karachi, Pakistan  
**Moderator:** Mr. Fayyaz Yasin, Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad, Pakistan  
**Special comments by:** Mr. Fayyaz Yasin, Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad, Pakistan  
**Panel Organiser:** AAWAZ  
**Speakers:**  
Ms. Sadia Jabeen, Virtual University of Pakistan, Lahore, Pakistan  
Mr. Fawad Usman Khan, Pakistan  
Dr. Sajid Ali, Aga Khan University, Karachi, Pakistan  
Mr. Arif Naveed, SDPI, and University of Cambridge, UK  
**Title:** Evaluating gender inequality in South Asia: Reflections from textbooks of India, Nepal and Pakistan  
**Title:** Gender and religious discrimination in Pakistan  
**Title:** Education and zones of exclusion: The life chances for a Pakistani child  
**Title:** Education and social exclusion: The constraints of access  
**Discussion**  
**Tea**  
11:30 am – 12 noon |

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<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Session C-4</th>
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| 9:30 am – 11:30 am | **Title:** Regional climate agenda in the context of Doha outcomes  
**Chair:** Mr. Shafqat Kakakhel, Member Board of Governors, Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad, Pakistan  
**Special comments by:** Mr. Farrukh Iqbal Khan, Global Environment Facility, Washington DC, USA (on Skype); Dr. Tariq Banuri, University of Utah, USA; and, Mr. Shakeel Ahmad Ramay, Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad, Pakistan  
**Panel Organiser:** Mr. Shakeel Ahmad Ramay, Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad, Pakistan  
**Speakers:**  
Mr. Tirthankar Mandal, Climate Action Network South Asia (CANSA), India  
Mr. Harjeet Singh, ActionAid International, India  
Mr. Manjeet Dhakal, Clean Energy Nepal, Nepal  
**Title:** Post Doha Climate Policy: imperatives for South Asia  
**Title:** Post Doha Climate Policy: imperatives for South Asia  
**Title:** Doha outcomes: Financial and technological development  
**Discussion**  
**Tea**  
11:30 am – 12 noon |
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<tr>
<td><strong>Special Plenary</strong></td>
<td>12 noon—2:00 pm</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Future of sustainable development in South Asia</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Chair:</strong> Dr. Ishrat Husain, Dean and Director, Institute of Business Administration, Karachi, Pakistan</td>
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<td><strong>Plenary speakers:</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>1. Dr. Ishrat Husain, Dean and Director, Institute of Business Administration, Karachi, Pakistan</td>
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<td>2. Dr. Tariq Banuri, Professor, University of Utah, Salt Lake City, USA</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Dr. Saba Gul Khattak, Member Board of Governors, Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Dr. Abid Qaiyum Suleri, Executive Director, Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
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**Thursday, 13 December 2012**

**Day Three**

**Closing Plenary**

3:00 pm – 5:00 pm

- **H. U. Beg Memorial Lecture**

- **Keynote Speaker:** Dr. Mahendra P. Lama, Founding Vice Chancellor, Central University of Sikkim, India

- **Plenary Title:** Sustainability discourse and practices: Repositioning South Asia

- **Summary of proceedings and vote of thanks:** Dr. Abid Qaiyum Suleri, Executive Director, Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad, Pakistan

- **Remarks by Guests of Honor**
  - Dr. Nadeemul Haq, Deputy Chairman, Planning Commission of Pakistan, Islamabad, Pakistan
  - Mr. Qamar-uz-Zaman Kaira, Minister of Information and Broadcasting, Pakistan

- **SDPI Lifetime Achievement Award**

- **SDPI’s Documentary:** Out of Teens (20 years of SDPI)

- **Book launch:** Environment, Trade and Governance for Sustainable Development

- **High Tea / Coffee**
Sustainable Development in South Asia: Shaping the Future

Despite the intrinsically political nature of most sustainable development challenges facing the world today, most theories, deliberations, research and even implementation linking sustainability to development primarily follow apolitical and linear policy processes. Bringing together a range of subjects - from civil military relations, role of public and private sector in development, food and climate security, religious freedoms, and feminism after 9/11 - this book 'Sustainable Development in South Asia: Shaping the Future' uniquely examines the reasons why national governments, together with international aid agencies, have been unable to provide real and binding solutions to the myriad of problems standing in the way of emerging South Asia economies.