SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT:

ENVISAGING
THE FUTURE TOGETHER
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About the Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI)

25 Years Charting the Course of Research Excellence
Born on 4 August 1992 in a small office in the capital of Pakistan with a handful of dedicated employees, the Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI) is now known as South Asia’s leading non-partisan policy research organisation providing the global development community representation from Pakistan and the region as a whole. Over the past 25 years, it has remained staunchly committed to the mission it set for itself upon inception:

To catalyse the transition towards sustainable development, defined as the enhancement of peace, social justice and well-being, within and across generations.

SDPI remains one of the few organisations in Pakistan that has been consistently ranked internationally by the Global Go To Think Tank Index. In its latest 2016 report, the Institute’s rankings have improved:

103/150 Top Think Tank Worldwide (non-US)
55/150 Best Independent Think Tank
15/95 Top Think Tank in Southeast Asia and the Pacific
25/95 Top Environment Policy Think Tank
42/80 Best Transdisciplinary Research Think Tank
43/105 Think Tank to Watch in 2017

Even in the newest categories of ‘Top Think Tanks by Special Achievement’, the Institute has carved a niche for itself:

99/100 Top Social Policy Think Tank
65/90 Best Advocacy Campaign
61/90 Best Institutional Collaboration Involving Two or More Think Tanks
83/85 Best Use of Social Media and Networks
75/75 Think Tank with the Best External Relations/Public Engagement Programme
60/60 Best Use of Media (Print of Electronic). ¹

Within Pakistan, the Inter-University Consortium for the Promotion of Social Sciences (IUCPSS) National Award for Contributions to the fields of Social Service, Social Sciences, Arts and Humanities was also given to SDPI for the year 2016.\(^2\)

**Where We Come From**

The Institute’s genesis lies in the Pakistan National Conservation Strategy (also known as Pakistan’s Agenda 21), which approved by the Federal Cabinet in March 1992, outlined the need for an independent non-profit organisation in the country to serve as a source of expertise for policy analysis, evidence-based research and training services.

**What We Do**

We function in an advisory capacity by carrying out robust research, policy advice and advocacy and in an enabling capacity by strengthening other individuals and organisations with resource materials and training. Specifically, our broad-based yet holistic mandate is to:

- conduct evidence-based research, advocacy and trainings from a broad multidisciplinary perspective;
- promote the implementation of policies, programmes, laws and regulations based on sustainable development;
- strengthen civil society and facilitate civil society-government interaction in collaboration with other organisations and activist networks;
- disseminate research findings and public education through the media, conferences, seminars, lectures, publications and curricula development; and,
- contribute to building national research capacity and infrastructure.

**How We Do It**

The diverse array of projects and programmes, from inclusive economic growth to institutional governance, from energy economics to climate change, from food, water and human security to education, from sustainable industrial growth to hazardous waste management, from religious tolerance to peace and gender equity, which SDPI has been involved in over the past 25 years, outline the following core activities:

- Providing policy advice to the government;
- Facilitating and organising forums for policy dialogue;
- Supporting in-house, local, regional and international academics, students and researchers;
- Publishing critical research for public and private sector use;
- Acting as a conduit for North-South and South-South dialogue;
- Creating an environment for information dissemination and training;
- Campaigning for regional advocacy and networking.

**Why We Do It**
The Institute’s efforts remain unwavering in its vision to become a Centre of Excellence on sustainable development policy research, capacity development and advocacy in the country and South Asia by producing knowledge that not only enhances the capacity of the state to make informed policy decisions, but also engages civil society and academia on issues of public interest for the betterment of current and future generations.

**How We Reach Out**
Since its inception, SDPI has organised innumerable seminars, national and international conferences. The Sustainable Development Conference (SDC) series has become a flagship event of the Institute that not only provides a forum for highlighting SDPI’s own research, but also offers space to other researchers and academics from South Asia in particular and across the globe in general, to share their work and engage in constructive dialogue with fellow intellectuals, movers and shakers from the public and private sector, students and the general public.

To date, SDPI has organised **nineteen annual Conferences**. This collection of working papers, speeches and policy briefs was presented at the Nineteenth SDC held over a three-day period (6-8 December 2016) in Pakistan’s capital Islamabad (see Annexure 1 for the detailed Conference Agenda and Annexure 2 for the list of published anthologies).
About the Sustainable Development Conference (SDC) Series

Introduction
The Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI) has organised nineteen Sustainable Development Conferences (SDCs) since its inception. The SDC has become a flagship event of the Institute which is not only a forum for SDPI’s own research, it also invites other researchers and academia from Asia and beyond to share their work and engage in dialogue with fellow panellists and the audience. The SDC Series is also a prime Conference in South Asia with a major focus on regional sustainable development issues.

First SDC
The First SDC, titled The Green Economics Conference, was organised by SDPI in 1995. This Conference focused on the interaction between economics and the environment, and included research papers on trade, fiscal policy, Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs), green accounting, forestry, energy, industry and the urban environment.

Second SDC
The Second SDC, in 1996, addressed the broad theme of sustainable development including pollution abatement, resource management, conservation of biodiversity, the transfer and use of technology, trade and environment, human development and poverty alleviation, and social capital and governance. The Conference was successful in highlighting key issues facing Pakistan and bringing out the latest thinking and analysis to identify solutions.

Third SDC
The theme of the Third Conference was A Dialogue on Environment and Natural Resource Conservation. The Conference, held in 1998, focused on stimulating dialogue on practical policy options for key environmental challenges facing Pakistan. The two broad thematic areas of Urban Environment and Natural Resources concentrated on urban pollution, water resource management, deforestation and sustainable agriculture with presentations by experts from Pakistan and South Asia.

Fourth SDC
The Fourth SDC titled Discourse on Human Security was held in 2000. It focused on the changes and improvement in government policies and practice with regard to human security. The Conference was designed to raise awareness of senior policy-makers, key federal and provincial government officials and civil society groups like the media and non-government organisations (NGOs) on security issues. The immediate feedback from government, NGOs and media was extremely encouraging.
Fifth SDC

The Fifth Conference titled *Sustainable Development and Southern Realities: Past and Future in South Asia*, held in 2002, critically re-examined the conceptualisation and implementation of sustainable development in its multiple dimensions: economic, political, social, and moral. The delegates scrutinised and consolidated some of the ideas presented at the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg, and resituated debates in the South Asian context.

Sixth SDC

The overarching theme of the Sixth SDC was *Sustainable Development: Bridging the Research/Policy Gaps in Southern Contexts*. Held in December 2003, it focused on the problematique of knowledge production in the South. It explored policy/research gaps in two directions: in some places policy needs to be fed by better research; while in others, policy needs to take better account of existing solid research. It focused on the ways and means for translating this knowledge into effective policy initiatives locally, nationally, regionally and internationally by identifying the multiple gaps between research and policies in different sectors.

SDPI specifically tries to be gender sensitive while organising the SDC (as well as all its other events and initiatives) and invites both women and men as speakers, chairs and discussants.

Of the 116 speakers who participated in this SDC, there were 69 male speakers and 47 female and of the 1,340 people who attended the Conference, some 818 were male and 522 female.

Seventh SDC

*Troubled Times: Sustainable Development and Governance in the Age of Extremes* was the overarching theme of the Seventh Sustainable Development Conference held in December 2004. The Conference tackled various questions such as whether there is sound governance around development and whether this is ensuring just development? Whether there is more sharing of resources, including natural and institutional? Is there a strengthening of regional and international institutions? How much progress has been achieved in South Asia vis-à-vis governance? Is government more transparent today than it was a decade ago? Have governments kept their promises to the marginalised, whether the poor, women or minorities? How can we avoid repeating the mistakes of the past? What would be the effective strategies to do so? Or is it a world of extremes—a world that is extremely rich but with unparalleled inequalities of income and access to resources—with the marginalised becoming even more marginalised. It provided an opportunity to discuss the global economy, the new terms of trade, the transfer of resources from the developing world to the first world and whether such moves are benefiting a few only. The Conference brought together some 150 panellists from 18 countries. The gender ratio of the panellists was 64 percent (male) and 36 percent (female).
Eighth SDC
SDPI held its Eighth SDC from 7 - 9 December 2005 in Islamabad, Pakistan titled At the Crossroads: South Asian Research, Policy and Development in a Globalized World. 136 panellists from 11 countries participated and examined the multiple facets of sustainable development in the context of South Asia. The speakers discussed how problems and issues in South Asia could be dealt effectively at various levels based on prior experience of successful policy interventions.

Ninth SDC
The Ninth SDC was organised from 13 - 15 December 2006 in Islamabad, Pakistan under the overarching theme Missing Links in Sustainable Development (SD): South Asian Perspectives. The concept of SD is essentially an interdisciplinary one. Economists, environmentalists, anthropologists, political scientists and others have advanced rigorous theories to explore its various dimensions. Yet, often their findings and suggestions have not been noticed beyond disciplinary boundaries. Rather, they have been ignored in the policy arena, and thus, have been unable to contribute to solving problems at the grassroots level. Narrowing the gaps in sustainability research and bridging the space between the scientific discourse on SD and practical steps towards a sustainable South Asia has been the mission of SDPI’s Conference Series. This Conference, thus, aimed at identifying the missing links in SD for South Asia and proposed fillers for those. The region’s pool of cutting-edge academics was tapped and top researchers invited together with policy-makers, activists and other relevant stakeholders for a vibrant three-day debate.

Tenth SDC
The Tenth SDC was held from 10 - 12 December 2007 in Islamabad, Pakistan under the overarching theme Sustainable Solutions: A Spotlight on South Asian Research. The Conference explored sustainable solutions to problems of poverty, illiteracy, mortality and morbidity, environmental degradation and disaster management, gender inequality, insecurity, violence and history. It focused on looking at both innovative solutions, as well as indigenously developed alternatives that have survived generations of development. Some 65 panellists from ten countries participated in the Tenth SDC, while an audience of some 1,000 attended the three-day event. The SDC anthology titled “Missing Links in Sustainable Development: South Asian Perspectives” consisting of peer reviewed papers from the previous Conference was also launched at the occasion.

Eleventh SDC
Peace and Sustainable Development in South Asia: Issues and Challenges of Globalisation was the theme of the Eleventh SDC held from 1 - 3 December 2008. Speakers deliberated on various sustainable development concerns such as where we stand in solving the dilemmas of inequality, poverty, climate change and energy scarcity, natural resources degradation, trade liberalisation policies, food insecurity, violence and conflict, re-writing history, and poor governance. The Conference aimed to explore how resolving some non-conventional security threats may turn into added dividends for peace. About 70 panellists participated
from nine different countries. The Tenth SDC anthology titled “Sustainable Solutions: A Spotlight on South Asian Research” was also launched at the inaugural session of the Conference.

Twelfth SDC
From 21 - 23 December 2009, SDPI held its Twelfth SDC on *Fostering Sustainable Development in South Asia: Responding to Challenges*. The SDC focused on the six ‘Fs’ crises - issues related to food, fuel, frontiers, functional democracy and the fragility of climate. Scholars from South Asia and other regions were invited to delve further on these issues and shared with the audience where South Asia stands today vis-à-vis coping with the six “Fs” crises facing the region. Gender remained a crosscutting theme. Over 92 delegates from 11 countries participated in this three-day Conference. An audience of over 1,400 came to listen and participate in the 21 panels and two keynote plenary sessions. An anthology based on peer reviewed papers from the Eleventh SDC was launched at the inaugural session. The book titled “Peace and Sustainable Development in South Asia: Issues and Challenges of Globalisation” was jointly published by SDPI and Sang-e-Meel Publications.

Thirteenth SDC
SDPI held its Thirteenth SDC from 21 - 23 December 2010 titled *Peace and Sustainable Development in South Asia: The Way Forward*. Speakers deliberated on how economic challenges could be handled with positive results in terms of natural resources, while at the same time increasing the capacity and effectiveness of institutions. The panels covered themes such as post-flood situation in Pakistan, food insecurity, energy and financial crisis, the issue of land acquisition, trade and financial liberalisation, social protection, the eradication of violence against women, the role of think tanks in peace and sustainable development, sound management of chemicals, climate change, religious diversity, labour issues, and so on. An audience of over 1,500 participated during the three-day deliberations and listened to 60 speakers from 11 different countries. SDPI also launched its anthology based on 11 peer reviewed chapters/papers presented at the Twelfth SDC. The title of the book is “Fostering Sustainable Development in South Asia: Responding to Challenges” and was jointly published by SDPI and Sang-e-Meel Publications.

Fourteenth SDC
The Fourteenth SDC titled *Redefining Paradigms of Sustainable Development in South Asia* was organised from 13 - 15 December 2011 in Islamabad, Pakistan. It showcased 28 panels and two plenary sessions. In these sessions, 162 panellists participated from Bangladesh, Belgium, Canada, Germany, India, Nepal, Pakistan, Palestine, Sri Lanka, Switzerland, UK and the USA. Of the 162 participants, 103 were speakers, 31 discussants and 28 chairs. The Conference featured a broad spectrum of themes: livelihood, governance, literature, Sufism, poverty, geo-politics, forest management, REDD+, social accountability, 18th Amendment, land rights, food security, education financing, feminism, economic non-cooperation, water governance, and, energy and sustainability. The SDC anthology titled “Peace and Sustainable Development in South Asia: The Way Forward” based on papers presented at
the Thirteenth SDC was also launched at the occasion along with SDPI’s Sustainable Development Television (SDTV). For the first time, the Conference was streamed live and video packages of the sessions were produced and uploaded.

**Fifteenth SDC**

The overarching theme of the Fifteenth SDC, held from 11 - 13 December 2012, was *Sustainable Development in South Asia: Shaping the Future*. As the title suggests, speakers looked at the future of sustainable development in South Asia. They analysed how things will look 20, 30 or even 50 years from now, threw light on issues that will be looming large, made concrete suggestions on how to overcome future challenges, and, gave practical policy recommendations about a sustainable South Asia. Fifteenth SDC showcased 24 panels and three plenary sessions hosting 145 delegates from 18 countries including Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Belgium, Canada, China, Germany, India, Nepal, New Zealand, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Switzerland, Thailand, the Netherlands, UK, and the USA. The Conference was host to over 1,600 audience members during the three days.

**Sixteenth SDC**

Creating Momentum: Today is Tomorrow – the Sixteenth SD Conference - held from 10 - 12 December 2013 showcased 27 panels and two plenary sessions. In these sessions, 161 panellists participated from Afghanistan, Australia (via Skype), Bangladesh, Canada, Ecuador, Finland, Germany, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Thailand (via Skype), UK and the US. Of the 161 participants, 122 were speakers, 56 special commentators, chairpersons and guests of honour. The SDC highlighted our present position and inclination to forecast and potentially modify our decisions that may improve our tomorrow. Under various sub-themes, the Conference brought to attention that failure to act urgently is premised on the argument that waiting for another tomorrow for action will result in wasting opportunities that may not be available ever again.

**Seventeenth SDC**

The Seventeenth SDC was held from 9 - 11 December 2014 on *Pathways to Sustainable Development*. It looked at leadership change in China, Pakistan, Iran, Bangladesh, India, and Afghanistan that could hold the key to shaping development pathways in South Asia which needs political and executive leadership that has a commitment to strategise for peace and human security and raise tangible safeguards for the political economy of the region while engaging with the primary stakeholders, i.e. the people. In this backdrop, issues of climate change, migration, sustainable and inclusive economic growth, sharing energy resources across the region, environmental challenges, food security, human rights, women in the peace process, regional connectivity, and many others were deliberated on. The Conference aimed to identify the role of different stakeholders, especially governments, civil society and private sector that may engage differently to define new SD pathways. In the 28 panels and three plenary sessions, 194 panellists from 18 countries participated as speakers, special commentators, chairpersons and guests of honour. This was the highest number of panellists as compared to the previous years. The 18 countries that the panellists represented included
Afghanistan, Australia, Bangladesh, Belgium, Bhutan, Brazil, France, Germany, India, Ireland, Kazakhstan, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Thailand, UK, and the USA.

**Eighteenth SDC**

Two events, SDPI’s Eighteenth SDC and the Eighth South Asia Economic Summit (SAES), were held in parallel from 7 – 10 December 2015 in Islamabad, Pakistan. The mega events hosted a total of 225 panellists of which 152 were from Pakistan and 73 from 16 other countries. Panellists came from Afghanistan, Australia, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Canada, Germany, India, Italy, Kazakhstan, the Netherlands, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Turkey, UK and the USA. The Eighteenth SDC titled *Securing Peace and Prosperity* had a thinkers’ agenda, a gathering of regional think tanks working closely with policy-makers of their respective countries and representatives of existing and potential South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) member countries - a congregation of visionaries in Islamabad. It focused on understanding regional integration and the attempt of SAARC countries at various forums in 2015 to establish new corridors to achieve sustainable development in the region and beyond.

The Eighth South Asia Economic Summit (SAES), the premier regional platform for debate and analysis of politico-socio-economic issues and problems facing South Asia, brought together stakeholders to review and reflect current issues facing South Asian countries. The overarching theme of the SAES was *Regional Cooperation for Sustainable Development in South Asia*.

**Nineteenth SDC**

This overarching theme of the Nineteenth SDC was *Sustainable Development: Envisaging the Future Together*. It was held from 6 - 8 December 2016 in Islamabad, Pakistan. The Conference focused on cooperation between developed and developing countries for sustainable development, Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), and human centredness. Under the overarching theme, the Conference hosted sessions on a wide variety of sub-themes including recovering from conflict, the SDGs, trade, economic growth, environment, sustainable energy, regional economic integration, minority rights, disaster management and preparedness, climate change, youth employment, gender and demography, gender and democracy and so on. A total of 29 concurrent sessions and three plenary sessions were organised during the three days. An audience of over 2,500 attended the three-day Conference. 152 panellists participated from 18 countries including Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, Canada, China, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Germany, India, Italy, Kenya, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Turkey, UK, and the USA. 42 of these were international delegates from other countries.
Acknowledgements

Donors and Partners
The list of organisations which made SDPI's Nineteenth Sustainable Development Conference (2016) a success is long. Special thanks, however, goes to the following donors and partners:

1. International Development Research Centre (IDRC)
2. Secure Livelihoods Research Consortium (SLRC)
3. United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
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5. Heinrich Boell Stiftung (HBS), Pakistan
6. Canadian High Commission in Pakistan
7. Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES), Pakistan
8. World Food Programme (WFP), Pakistan
9. Overseas Development Institute (ODI), UK
10. Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE)
11. Nestlé Pakistan
12. South Asia Partnership Pakistan (SAP-PK)
13. Solar Radiation Management Governance Initiative (SRMGI)

SDC Anthology Review Panel
The Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI) prides itself in producing valuable and credible research. The blind peer review process is, therefore, a crucial means of determining both quality and validity of the research work which is published each year in the Sustainable Development Conference (SDC) Anthology. This Anthology also contains peer reviewed papers presented at the Nineteenth Sustainable Development Conference.

While our Panel of Referees grows each year, we remain cognizant that reviewer selection is just as critical as the review itself and hence, we chose each one carefully based on their reputation and expertise. Given how important and yet often invisible this activity is to the outside world, we truly appreciate the unbiased and timely feedback we received on the papers that were peer reviewed this year. The Institute and anthology editors wish to thank the following academics, researchers and professionals for their fair, constructive, and informative critique of the submitted works:

**Dr Aneel Salman** is Head of Management Science Dept. at the COMSATS Institute of Information and Technology in Islamabad, Pakistan. He is a Fulbright Scholar and alumnus of Rensselaer University, USA, Cambridge University, UK, and University of Bern, Switzerland. His areas of expertise include institutional and behavioural economics, trade and water diplomacy, and organisational analysis. He has also served as Dean, Faculty of Management Sciences at Ghulam Ishaq Khan Institute of Engineering Sciences and Technology (GIKI), Pakistan.
Dr Arshi Saleem Hashmi is Associate Professor and head, Department of Peace and Conflict Studies at the National Defence University (NDU) in Islamabad, Pakistan. She specialises in religion and violent conflicts, peace and conflict resolution. Dr Hashmi is a member of Women without Borders, Vienna and its project Sisters Against Violent Extremism (SAVE). She has been a Kodikara Fellow, Rotary International Peace Fellow and Yale World Fellow, and has studied counterterrorism at the Harvard University, USA under the South Asia Leadership Programme.

Dr Faisal Jamil is Assistant Professor of Economics at the School of Social Sciences and Humanities, National University of Sciences and Technology (NUST) in Islamabad, Pakistan. He has published and supervised research on topics related to Public Policy and Resource Economics.

Dr Fatima Sajjad is Assistant Professor of International Relations at the Department of Political Science, University of Management and Technology in Lahore, Pakistan. Her research focuses on peace building and peace education in Pakistan, and has presented her work on educational reforms in Pakistan in Turkey, Japan, and Spain as well as published in leading national and international journals. She has a PhD in International Relations from Punjab University, Pakistan.

Dr Ghulam Muhammad Arif is former Joint Director, Pakistan Institute of Development Economics (PIDE) based in Islamabad, Pakistan.

Mr Hammad Siddiqui is associated with the Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE) in Pakistan. He specialises in capacity building of business associations on strategy, membership and revenue generation, small business development and career coaching.

Dr Humaira Ishfaq is the Urdu Editor and a Research Fellow at the Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI) in Islamabad, Pakistan. She has more than 12 years experience as a media person, writer, literary critic, and teacher of Urdu literature at various local universities. She has authored more than 24 publications.

Dr Imran Saqib Khalid is a Research Fellow at the Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI) in Islamabad, Pakistan. He heads the water governance component of the multi-country Pathways to Resilience in Semi-arid Economies (PRISE) project in Pakistan. He holds a PhD in Environmental and Natural Resources Policy from SUNY College of Environmental Science and Forestry, Syracuse, USA.

Ms Imrana Niazi is Coordinator of the Sustainable Development Conference (SDC) at the Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI) in Islamabad, Pakistan. She has been associated with the Institute since 2008. She has also been associated with the Bahria University in Islamabad and Fatima Jinnah Women University (FJWU), Rawalpindi, Pakistan as a Lecturer. Ms Niazi has co-edited six SDC anthologies, including this one. She has done Masters in Communication Sciences from the Fatima Jinnah Women University (FJWU), Pakistan.
Dr Mohammad Zubair Khan has been consulting for the World Bank, Asian Development Bank, UNDP and other international organisations on macroeconomic stabilisation policies, monetary policy, trade and exchange rate issues, fiscal and external debt sustainability, fiscal federalism, tax administration and poverty related issues in Pakistan. He also lectures at the Central Banks of Egypt and Sri Lanka, National Institute of Public Administration (NIPA), Administrative Staff College, and the National Defence College in Pakistan. Apart from previously working with the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), he has served as Federal Minister of Commerce (1996-97), Government of Pakistan.

Mr Maqsood Ahmad Jan is Peace and Development Specialist at the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, University of Peshawar, Pakistan. He has worked as a researcher with many organisations of national and international repute, focusing on socioeconomic uplift of the poor in different parts of the country. The focus of his work has been on development research and intervention.

Mr Mustafa Talpur is working as Asia Regional Lead of the Inequality Campaign with Oxfam International in Pakistan. His areas of expertise include research, policy advocacy, campaigning and media engagement with strong thematic focus on humanitarian response and disaster risk reduction, water & land governance, livelihood & food security, inequality & fiscal justice and water & sanitation. He has written more than a dozen scholarly papers and reports. Previously, Mr Talpur has worked with Wateraid, ActionAid International, World Wildlife Fund and the International Water Management Institute over the past 15 years in Pakistan and the Asia region.

Dr Noor ul Haq has been associated with the Islamabad Policy Research Institute (IPRI) in Pakistan from 2011 to 2016 as a former Acting President and Senior Research Fellow. While the main thrust of his research is on South Asian affairs, he has also written extensively on education, governance and strategy. Dr Haq’s most recent publication is a monograph titled Management of Pakistan-India Relations: Resolution of Disputes (2017). He is Associate Alumnus of the Near East South Asia (NESA) Center for Strategic Studies, National University, Washington, D.C., USA.

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Ms Sarah Siddiq Aneel has more than fifteen years of research and editorial experience in the development sector of Pakistan. Her most recent work as volume editor includes Strengthening Peace and Cooperation in South Asia: Incentives and Constraints (2017), and the monograph India's Defence Budget and Armed Forces Modernisation: An Analysis (2017). A Chevening Fellow in ‘Governance and Environmental Democracy’ and LUMS McGill
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Looking Beyond the Horizons
Abid Qaiyum Suleri

Let me begin by welcoming you to the beautiful city of Islamabad. This annual conclave of thought leaders, policymakers, researchers, academicians and members of the civil society from Pakistan in particular, and South Asia and the world in general, is a labour of love - for those who work tirelessly every year to make it happen, and make it happen successfully, for those who make the effort to be here from different corners of the globe, for those who prepare and read out papers and presentations, and for those who come here for exchanging views and seeking knowledge. Every year this has been so and this year is no different.

But then, this year is also different in ways that make this Conference more relevant than in the past. This, after all, is the year when a South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) Summit scheduled to take place in this very city has not happened. This is also the year when we have twice seen senior-level officials leaving multilateral regional forums halfway because of bilateral differences. This is also the year when we have seen our governments talk at each other more than they have done in the past. And this is also the year when smog has blurred boundaries between Lahore and Ludhiana and an impeding drought is set to afflict farmlands in Bahawalpur and Bathinda alike.

The very fact that this Conference is taking place this year is an affirmation that the idea of sustainable development has sustained in spite of increasing competition among powerful countries and the even more powerful companies to exploit the earth’s shrinking pool of resources. It is also a manifestation of our shared commitment to uphold the ideas of cooperation, collaboration and camaraderie at a time when geo-political differences within the region are at their peak and communities and countries are more prone to talking at each other rather than talking to each other.

The idea of sustainable development and the ideals of shared human future are under threat today like they never have been since this Conference first took place in the 1990s. Today, not just in South Asia but also in many parts of the world, cooperation and collaboration are being increasingly replaced with clashes and conflict. Regional and global institutions put together painfully over the last many decades are either suspended — as in the case of SAARC — or they run the risk of falling apart — as is the case with European Union after the British exit and the recent international agreements on reversing carbon emissions after the results of America’s Presidential elections.

Only recently, an influential thinker of our age wrote a book and proclaimed that history has reached its climactic end. The almost universal spread of democracy and market capitalism

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1 Introductory remarks given by the Executive Director of the Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI) at the inaugural plenary of the Institute’s Nineteenth Sustainable Development Conference on 6 December 2016.

2 Dr Abid Qaiyum Suleri is the Executive Director of SDPI, Islamabad, Pakistan.
even in such socialist places as Vietnam and China looked like having won the battle of political and economic ideas forever. Today, history is making a comeback with vengeance. Historical prejudices are rearing their ugly heads in such established democracies as the United States and Great Britain. Political parties and politicians in many parts of Europe are invoking an imaginary past, promising a future that brings back lost, past glories and even racial unity.

Within South Asia, India’s beef ban is a nod to a mythical past that may, or may not, have existed thousands of years ago; Buddhist attacks against Christians and Muslims have their origin in injuries and insults inflicted decades, even centuries ago; religious and sectarian violence in Pakistan is nothing if not based on historical arguments and counterarguments.

It was also not long ago when an eminent sage told us that the world has become flat. That barriers, boundaries and borders have ceased to matter in the age of free flow of information on the Internet. That the twin forces of globalisation — that is, information and communication technology and the increasingly free flow of money and merchandise across the world — has made us ‘netizens’, citizens of a virtual world where differences of language, culture and class have evaporated, making us simultaneously belong nowhere and everywhere.

Today, the world is more divided both geographically (due to conflict between nations and countries) and civilizationally (due to conflict between individuals and communities on linguistic, ethnic, religious, economic and cultural grounds). Today, the freedom to partake in a global discussion about global issues such as climate change and the plight of people running from violent conflict is under serious threat due to increased internet and communication surveillance everywhere, due to reinvigorated media and Internet censorship practices in almost every country, and due to the criminalisation of revolutionary changes such as electronic transfer of money across international borders.

In short, confidence in and support for regional and global cooperation and integration are sagging everywhere. The world today seems to be closing in rather than opening up. It is increasingly becoming fashionable to blame neighbours, the outsiders for all that has gone bad over the years, from loss of jobs, shrinking and degrading natural resources such as land and water, economic stagnation and rising disparity between haves and have-nots.

There is certainly much to despair about today, but there is also much to hope for and expect. Since today is as much a historical moment to take initiative into our own hands as it is a time for serious introspection on what has gone wrong, where and why to put a globalised and shared view of our shared future back on the agenda. This is why we have gathered here to reiterate and reaffirm our commitment to that shared and sustainable future.

The course of history today seems to be moving in a direction that is opposite to the ideas and ideals that all of us in this room and beyond cherish and champion. The political
Looking Beyond the Horizons

economy of the world is changing in such a way that all of us appear to ourselves as hapless bystanders who can only wring their hands in despair and do nothing else.

It is times like these when individuals and institutions that dare to challenge the course of history matter. I am talking of individuals and institutions that have the courage of conviction to contest received wisdom of the day, and the intellectual strength to counter the dominant ideas and ideologies of the times. It is these individuals and institutions who change the course of history by first challenging it, who prepare the ground for new breakthroughs in knowledge by countering received wisdom, and who lay the foundations for a new and better future by countering dominant ideas and ideologies. From Galileo to Einstein and from Moses to Marx, this has been the history of human kind and this is how it will be.

I will be repeating what we have been sharing at this forum time and again — that today’s challenges are global and that no national solutions can effectively address them. Seas, rivers, mountains, glaciers, deserts, rain and wind know no boundaries. What happens to glaciers in the Himalayas impacts river flows in Bangladesh, raises sea levels in Maldives and beyond and impacts agriculture everywhere in South Asia. Can any country in the region on its own address these issues? The answer, as we all know, is a resounding no.

If we know that answer, it is only logical that we then work towards implementing it. No, it is imperative to bring shared regional and global issues back on top of a shared regional and global agenda.

This Conference is an effort to do just that. It is our annual reiteration and reaffirmation to our abiding commitment that a common, equitable and sustainable future for humanity is not just possible, it is imperative. It is the only way to create an equitable, peaceful and prosperous comity of nations and community of individuals that is not just at peace and harmony within itself but also with the natural world around it.

This Conference offers a moment to contemplate what we have done wrong in the past, to analyse how well or badly we are faring in the present and to plan what we need to do in the future to avoid a repeat of our past mistakes, and to learn from all that is good and great in our present — not just the bad and the ugly that is hampering our collective progress.

For this contemplation, along with other relevant themes, this year as part of a Securing Livelihoods Research Consortium, we have organised seven special panels on services delivery, state-building, legacies of conflict, and livelihood restoration. All the parallel sessions will be live-streamed, and their deliberations would be available on our android app.

With my sincere gratitude to Pakistani missions abroad for issuing visas to our participants, let me welcome you to the Nineteenth Sustainable Development Conference.
SAARC Nations’ Approach to Achieving the Sustainable Development Goals*

Sartaj Aziz**

The annual Conferences on Sustainable Development have become important events for development planners and policymakers in Pakistan, but this year’s Conference has special significance for three important reasons:

First, this Conference coincides with the start of a new journey of sustainable development on which we embarked in September 2015 when the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Sustainable Development Goals under Agenda 2030. It, therefore, provides a valuable opportunity to analyse different dimensions of this Agenda and identify specific national priorities and implementation plans through which these goals and targets can be achieved. How to convert those goals into national targets? How to devise implementation strategies for each goal and target? This task of converting them is not that easy because some countries are way ahead. There are other countries which are way behind the goals. In case of Pakistan, national targets are a summation of provincial targets.

Second, the first year of Agenda 2030 coincides with some very disturbing developments on the global stage, e.g. Brexit. Both in the United States and Europe, we have seen decisive political shifts towards inward looking nationalistic policies. If these trends continue, the three important prerequisites for global partnerships in implementing this Agenda, inclusivity, integration and universality would become more difficult to realise. This Conference can and should discuss the full implications of these developments and prospects for elements where action is dependent on global and regional partnerships. It is, thus, in this context that the importance of South-South cooperation has grown over the period for achieving these Sustainable Development Goals. China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), as we are all aware, is an outstanding example of South-South cooperation. There are other examples as well in this regard on which we can build, not as substitutes rather as supplements.

Third, Pakistan is much better prepared for the 2030 Agenda than it was for the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The eight MDGs adopted in 2000, for the period 2000-15 were never translated into national goals. There were some items of MDGs which were incorporated by the United Nations Children’s Fund. There were a couple of others which were identified. But, there was no systematic attempt to translate the MDGs into national goals. There was no proper monitoring mechanism for MDGs. This time, we are setting up proper monitoring machinery at the national and provincial level to assess progress. In the past 12 months, Pakistan has taken a number of important steps for giving national

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* Keynote address delivered at the inaugural plenary of SDPI’s Nineteenth Sustainable Development Conference on 6 December 2016.

** Mr Sartaj Aziz is the Deputy Chairman, Ministry of Planning, Development and Reform, and former Advisor to the Prime Minister on Foreign Affairs, Government of Pakistan.
ownership to SDGs and for mainstreaming them into national development priorities. These include:

1. Unanimous approval of a resolution by the Parliament in February 2016, adopting the 2030 Agenda as Pakistan’s National Development Agenda.
2. Initiating actions in consultation with the Provincial Governments to translate SDGs into country-specific goals and targets for capacity building needs. Monitoring mechanisms help in inter-country comparison.
3. Setting up monitoring mechanisms, both at the provincial and federal levels to prepare annual reports on the progress achieved in implementing the SDGs.

Pakistan’s quest for pursuing the SDGs has been greatly facilitated by the exercise completed by the Planning Commission in August 2014 on Vision 2025. The seven pillars and 25 goals spelled out in Vision 2025 are fully in line with the 17 goals and 169 targets laid down in the SDGs.

Similarly at the regional level, the last meeting of Council of SAARC Foreign Ministers held in Pokhara, Nepal, in May 2016, agreed to set up a coordinating group to learn from each other’s experience, both in converting the global goals into national goals and in formulating concrete implementation strategies. Recognising the importance of environmental challenges facing South Asia, we had proposed cooperation on climate change as an important agenda item for the SAARC Summit. By the latter’s postponement, the people of South Asia have been deprived of an important opportunity for cooperation to collectively meet the targets of the UN Climate Change Conference COP21.

As most participants of this Conference are aware, poverty eradication is the most important goal among the SDGs. Let me quote from the preamble to SDGs:

This agenda is a plan of action for people, planet and prosperity. It also seeks to strengthen universal peace in larger freedom. We recognise that eradicating poverty in all its forms and dimensions, including extreme poverty, is the greatest global challenge and an indispensable requirement for sustainable development. All countries and all stakeholders, acting in collaborative partnership, will implement this plan. We are resolved to free the human race from the tyranny of poverty and want and to heal and secure our planet. We are determined to take the bold and transformative steps which are urgently needed to shift the world onto a sustainable and resilient path.¹

The real obstacles for poverty reduction are political because of the way resources are controlled and biased economic and agricultural policies are formulated — so I hope that this topic gets some attention.

The SDGs are not meant for developing countries only. They also apply to developed countries not only as providers of development assistance but also for creating space, through appropriate policies, to adopt more sustainable forms of consumption both to protect the environment and to allow sustainable development to take place.

In this context, Pakistan’s policy to emphasize trade, rather than aid, as a more effective means of North-South cooperation is very timely. When traditional forms of financing for development are increasingly becoming scarce and Official Development Assistance (ODA) faces increased budgetary pressures, innovative investment policies to bridge the gap between what is available and what we need to reach the SDGs and a level playing field for trade among nations can become more important.

Investment in development is perhaps one of the smartest investments we can make for our collective future. Lack of development is starkly reflected in the lack of education, health facilities and fewer jobs, and also in a sense of despair, where basic human dignity is violated. This can lead to tensions and instability.

I believe that many internal conflicts and crises in the developing world could have been avoided if nations had truly invested in the lives of their people, and if the wealthiest nations on earth were better partners.

One of the writers of the United Nations Charter, Ralph Bunche said:

    Peace is no mere matter of men fighting or not fighting. Peace, to have meaning…must be translated into bread or rice, shelter, health, and education.

The Government of Pakistan is fully conscious of the imperative of peace and development for our people and people of the region. Our policy for a peaceful neighbourhood is intended precisely to promote that goal. I think this is an objective that should bring us together for the benefit of our present and future generations. Thank you.
II

Linking Policy with Practice in Pakistan
Emerging Methods for Policy Engagement and Public-Private Dialogue in Pakistan

*Majyd Aziz*

Public-private dialogue has become a formidable tool in developing consensus on policy matters between the government and private sector. This concept has transformed policymaking from a unilateral planning and implementation mechanism into a viable and practical system of ushering in a process of sensible thinking and conciliatory behaviour. This has enabled the government and policymakers to formulate policies that are reasonably accepted by the private sector and have the general support of stakeholders. Public-private understanding and decision-making, although not all-encompassing in Pakistan, is being gradually put in motion, albeit more so when desired by the government rather than any persuasive demand of the private sector.

The success of such dialogue is largely dependent on the will of the government, especially political will, and is manifested in the acceptance by bureaucracy that it lacks the thorough knowledge and expertise of technicalities, capacity, and confidence to implement the policies. Hence, recourse is needed towards involving the private sector in structuring and framing doable policies that do not create implementation issues.

The government of the day must make a paradigm shift towards getting the private sector on board and ensure that a facilitation process is formalised so that desired momentum is created to achieve the objectives. The government must also adopt a broad-based posture and maintain a transparent outlook along with development of trust and good governance if there is to be progress in implementation.

Governments in most countries depend on mutual consultation and bridge the gap of mutual distrust by involving the private sector into a comprehensive and well-defined consultative process. Fast moving global dynamics, power of social media, the critical mass of think tanks and research houses, stronger role of private sector representative organisations, and the influence of media have changed the old landscape. It has become imperative for the government to reach out to the private sector for its input and support.

Public-private dialogue in Pakistan is still wobbly and needs to be streamlined and made effective and practical. There is an inherent aversion to involving the private sector in a true sense, mostly due to the fixed mind-set of government hierarchy as well as bureaucracy to promote themselves as all-knowing and considering their decisions and policies as the final word. Over the years, many policies have fallen flat or have been stubbornly opposed by the private sector, thus, resulting in a vociferous outcry or dislike of the government or even

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* This chapter has been approved as a Policy Brief/Paper by the referee.
** Mr Majyd Aziz is former President of the Karachi Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Pakistan.
threats of disobedience. By taking the private sector into confidence, the government would be prominently placed to undertake reforms, develop cohesion, and inculcate widespread acceptance.

At the same time, it is obligatory upon the private sector to build capacity to understand economic issues and to develop solid recommendations if it is to become a contender for equal partnership in the prosperity of the nation. The issue here is that in the private sector, there is just a modicum of unity among its various components. This has made consultation difficult and time-consuming by providing ammunition to the public sector to exert its powers and writ. Moreover, there are seldom any efforts made to interact with political parties and impress upon them to utilise the services and advice of the expertise available, for example, in Chambers and Associations. Political parties do issue their manifestos and include a grandiose vision of the economy. However, these are abstract notions or playing to the gallery. There are no workable solutions or a pragmatic timeframe to achieve fiscal objectives and targets. The economic manifesto is usually a medley of targets and political leaders are at pains to explain or elucidate how they would navigate the course to achieve the targets.

A very disturbing scenario is that whenever the Prime Minister or any senior Minister chairs a consultative meeting to discuss relevant issues, it has become the norm for business leaders to spend more time fawning over and praising the dignitaries excessively. The leaders of business organisations must focus on raising pertinent issues at consultative sessions with the government hierarchy rather than spending so much time on superfluous laudatory remarks. The essence of the session is usually lost and serious consideration of the agenda is not achieved. In fact, those stakeholders who participate after due preparation are side-lined because most of the time is hogged by business leaders expressing their utmost loyalty to the dignitaries. This has been the bane of all such public-private dialogues.

There are many vivid examples where the private sector has been remiss in asserting its views forcefully and with conviction because it has focused on a shorter menu of interaction. The prime concentration is on the Federal Bureau of Revenue and on utilities. Of course, some advocacy is undertaken with other concerned departments and agencies, but this lobbying is more to do with individual needs rather than adopting an institutionalised approach. Photo opportunities, long flowery speeches, plaque presentations, and meaningless interaction have been the norm. Once again, the real time engagement opportunity is lost and the audience is left hanging on a precipice.

There is also an obvious disconnect between think tanks and business organisations. Most Chambers and Associations do have research cells but, as is generally witnessed, most daily research output comprises of cut and paste news items, minimal research, and speech writing. Many businessmen do take the initiative to write on myriad economic issues and the newspapers whole-heartedly give prominence to these members of the private sector. However, it is rare to see any economic position paper penned by the business leadership or the heads of business organisations.
Many respectable research houses and think tanks have the competency, personnel, and the quality to produce an action plan for the private sector. Notwithstanding the availability of this treasure, the Chambers and Associations maintain a nonchalant attitude and bias against them, and thus, most think tanks are supported and funded by foreign donors. In today’s volatile global environment, especially when Pakistani businessmen are at a disadvantage, there is an imperative need to muster cooperation, support and guidance of think tanks to structure policies and position papers for the private sector so that there is clarity in the arguments and that there is a holistic approach to lobby and decide on reforms and policies.

The media can become a strong ally in this cause. Business enterprises invest millions in promoting their goods and services through the media. They do get mileage for their products, but there is no joint effort to get the media to promote the private sector in a forceful manner. An institutionalised approach is thus, required.

The Federation of Pakistan Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FPCCI) and major Chambers must have a team of retired senior bureaucrats, retired members of higher judiciary, retired diplomats, senior economists, and think tanks as an Advisory Group to assist in preparation and formulation of required policies and to dissect policies announced by the government. This exercise should not be left just to Managing Committee members or officers of these business organisations. The examples of Confederation of Indian Industries or the US Chamber of Commerce and even the City of Milan Chamber of Commerce are noteworthy. The Milan Chamber of Commerce develops initiatives tailored to businesses in order to promote innovation, access to credit, training and environmentally friendly practices. It contributes to the competitiveness of businesses while supporting them in internationalisation processes. It offers a broad range of services to businesses and research centres, directly through its in-house capabilities or via third-party structures. The Chamber of Commerce in Italy ‘Innovhub’ provides information and support services for product/process innovation; analyses, tests, and quality controls (raw materials, semi-finished and finished products); selects technological partners; supports in exploiting opportunities for financing; participates in fairs and brokerage events; trains researchers; and conducts technical standardisation. It includes five experimentation divisions equipped with modern laboratories on gemology, paper, fuel, oil and grease, and new textiles and silk. It collaborates with various governmental and non-governmental organisations to develop linkages and provide a formidable platform for members to obtain the required research and support.

The worrisome reality is that despite the fact that organisations such as the Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI) etc. deliberate, discuss, and structure various position papers emanating out of dedicated research and study, business organisations rarely examine these studies and research and still rely on their personal experiences and limited research. Resultantly, they succumb to the viewpoints and decisions of policymakers who are adept at looking for holes and gaps in the presentation of business representatives.

It is high time that a functional nexus is created between business organisations and the development practitioners in the country. There is a lot happening on the economic front and keeping pace with changing realities is advisable and imperative. Public-private dialogue,
commonality of views, and serious engagement would be reliable ammunition in the arsenal of all stakeholders in order to establish good governance practices. As Charles Darwin stated:

It is not the strongest of species that survives, nor the most intelligent, but the one most responsive to change.
Sustainable Development Goals: A Provincial Perspective*

M Aman Ullah**

The year 2015 can be considered historical for the development sector with the introduction of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The SDGs replaced the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) by introducing a new, elaborate framework for improving the socioeconomic status of countries. The global mobilisation behind MDGs produced the most successful anti-poverty movement in history. Many countries such as Malaysia, Indonesia, Ecuador, Cambodia, Mexico, Vietnam, the Philippines and Sri Lanka, have made positive progress on MDGs via achievement of their country-specific objectives and targets, whereas some countries showed dismal performance by missing many targets and goals. Pakistan’s performance, despite significant resource allocations in various sectors, remained bleak. The available data on MDGs in Pakistan reports that out of the 41 indicators, we were able to fulfill only nine. Provincially, Punjab performed relatively better than other provinces owing to its conducive environment and initiation of well-informed, targeted projects, but the overall situation raised a number of questions regarding institutional arrangements that took place for the implementation of MDGs. Being a representative of the Government of Punjab (GoPb), I take this forum as an opportunity to shed light on the efforts by the Punjab government with regards to the SDGs:

Punjab Growth Strategy: The Punjab Growth Strategy 2018 envisions Punjab as a secure, economically vibrant and knowledge-based province. The Strategy has included the achievement of SDGs as one of its objectives. The GoPb will be taking into account the SDGs in provincial and local level planning and service delivery.

Establishment of P-SDG Unit: In an effort to learn from the MDGs experience, the SDGs agenda is being implemented with a different approach by localising the agenda and increasing the role of local governments. For this reason, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the Planning and Development Department, GoPb, have established a Punjab SDGs (P-SDGs) Unit to support the GoPb’s efforts for Mainstreaming, Acceleration and Policy Support (MAPS) for SDGs — a common approach to support SDGs implementation as laid down by the UN. The Unit is fully operational and closely working with provincial departments and other stakeholders for building synergies and strengthening coordination for prioritisation and localisation of the SDGs. The Government has formulated a Development Framework for the bottom 10 districts which are lagging behind according to the Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) in the province, in order to bring them at par with the developed regions. The plan will be rolled out for two pilot districts of Punjab (Rajanpur and Bhakkar) and the rest of the districts will follow.

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* This chapter has been approved as a Speech by the referee.
** Dr M. Aman Ullah is Chief Economist at the Planning and Development Department, Civil Secretariat, Government of Punjab, Lahore, Pakistan.
Bottom-up Approach: This approach is being followed to ensure ownership of the SDGs at the local level. The GoPb is working closely with the districts to develop the provincial action plan for SDGs implementation. The action plan will have local targets that will contribute to achievement of the global targets placing local development at the centre.

The P-SDGs in Detail
According to the GoPb along with prioritisation of SDGs, identification of key priority areas must be supported with extensive consultations with relevant key departments and evidence-based feedback. For this, the P-SDGs Support Unit in collaboration with UNDP drafted an action plan, which included:

Localising the SDGs
The P-SDGs has initiated the process of localisation of SDGs in bottom two districts of Punjab. This process will then expand to 10 district and then all districts in Punjab. The two districts selected for piloting the localising efforts were identified as performing poorly in the MP Index in the province. The scope of work for localising will include understanding the district’s unique development challenges, proposing solutions, developing a district SDG plan and a monitoring framework.

Stocktaking Exercises
Stocktaking became both a device for accountability and a forum for resolving problems and obstacles which emerged. It helped keep everyone focused on driving the system forward, and ensured that people received the help they needed when they hit obstacles. Quick stocktaking exercises are crucial to ensure that all stakeholders come to the table with a sense of their respective contributions towards the SDG agenda in Punjab, as well as an informed opinion on priority concerns in the province or sector.

Selection of Indicators and Targets
The P-SDG Support Unit, in consultation with other provincial departments, is also seeking inputs on selection of indicators, setting their baseline values and targets. The indicators shall be selected and prioritised based on their relevance and need for the concerned provincial departments. This will provide a comprehensive framework for formulation of next year’s development budget.

Need Assessment and Costing
Another important element critical for implementation of SDGs is conducting need assessments, costing and extensive resource allocations for the SDGs interventions. To mobilise resources and investments, GoPb has a clear vision to bring together adequate public and private resources for investment in key development areas through regulations, taxes or subsidies which may help redirect private investment towards supporting the SDGs. In this regard, UNDP has also commissioned a situation analysis study of existing and potential financial flows for sustainable development in Punjab. The analysis will help GoPb in developing its own financing strategies that distinguishes between private financing
opportunities, incremental government resource mobilisation, and international public financing.

**Capacities and Institutional Strengthening**

Analysis of the MDGs era provides explanations of why Pakistan failed to perform better on certain targets. One of the major reasons for failure was the lack of financial, technical and resource capacity within the departments and institutions at both the provincial as well as the national level. The P-SDGs Support Unit, in collaboration with UNDP, is working on the following key institutional arrangements in this regard:

- Creating a Project Technical Committee (PTC).
- Establishing a Coordination Forum to strengthen coordination among all provincial stakeholders as well as nomination of focal persons for SDGs from each provincial department.
- Thematic clustering of SDGs in four key areas: Social Sector, Economic Growth, Governance, and Environment and Climate Change for seeking inputs from diverse stakeholders.
- Creating Thematic Working Groups on education, health and agriculture for supporting and guiding SDG Support Unit activities.
- Enhancing CSO engagement for seeking inputs from citizens and grassroot level organisations.
- Collaborating with think tanks, academia and experts for advice and expert opinion.
- Developing Learning Alliances with other countries in Asia and Europe for knowledge gain and technical assistance.
III

Raising Voices for Minority Rights in South Asia
Examining the ‘Religious’ Roots of Discrimination against Minorities in Pakistan*

Eaisha Tareen**

Abstract
This chapter examines the 'religious' roots of discrimination against minorities in Pakistan. Although discrimination against any group is a multifactorial phenomenon, with complex historical, social, economic and political factors underpinning it, discrimination that is justified on religious grounds is more insidious and threatening to the fabric of a society as it effectively silences those who attempt to contest it. The chapter briefly outlines the current situation of religious minorities in Pakistan and some of the historical and political developments that have shaped it. It examines the religious ideology used as the rationale for discrimination against minorities, with particular focus on the Blasphemy Law. It looks at how the issue of blasphemy is addressed in the primary scriptural sources in Islam. It also looks at the traditionally held view by many religious scholars of religious minorities being second-class citizens, which continues to impact their status in Muslim countries today. Finally, it considers the views of some reformist scholars who advocate a re-examination of traditional concepts which are no longer valid in the modern nation-state.

* This chapter has been approved as a Scholarly Research Article by the referee.
** Dr Eaisha Tareen is a clinical psychologist based in Lahore, Pakistan. Her doctorate, from the University of Essex, was in the area of social support and depression in Pakistani women. She has a special interest in Islam, gender issues and minority rights and has taught Islamic Studies courses at the undergraduate and postgraduate level at the University of London, UK.
**Introduction**

Minorities have been discriminated against and subjected to persecution throughout the course of human history. In the modern era, however, the international community has made immense progress in formulating standards for the protection and promotion of individual human rights, including freedom of religion. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the United Nations in 1948\(^1\) contains specific provisions related to freedom of religion as does the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966).\(^2\) Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, including the freedom to change one’s religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest one’s religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance. Pakistan is signatory to both these documents.

However, the current situation of religious minorities in Pakistan is a far cry from the principles enshrined in these documents and a very far cry from the vision of the country’s founding father Mohammed Ali Jinnah. In his address to the first Constituent Assembly of Pakistan he stated:

> You are free; you are free to go to your temples, you are free to go to your mosques or to any other places of worship in this State of Pakistan. You may belong to any religion or caste or creed — that has nothing to do with the business of the State…. We are starting with this fundamental principle that we are all citizens and equal citizens of one State..... you will find that in course of time Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense, because that is the personal faith of each individual, but in the political sense, as citizens of the State (Burke 2000).

Article 20 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan on freedom to profess religion and to manage religious institutions states:

> Subject to law, public order and morality
> a) every citizen shall have the right to profess, practice and propagate his religion, and;
> b) every religious denomination and sect thereof shall have the right to establish, maintain and manage its religious institutions (Government of Pakistan 1973).

Article 25 states that all citizens are equal before law and are entitled to equal protection before law. There are also other articles which refer to safeguarding different religious rights. The fundamental rights given in the preamble of the Constitution also include the right to freedom of belief, faith, worship and association. However, over the years, amendments have been made to the Constitution and ordinances introduced that directly contradict the

\(^1\) Adopted 10 December 1948, GA Res. 217, UN Doc. A/810,71.
provision of fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution. Religious minorities in Pakistan are not only treated as second-class citizens and systematically discriminated against, but are often subject to gross human rights violations.

According to 2001 government statistics, religious minorities make up less than four percent of the population of Pakistan. These include Christians, Hindus, Sikhs, Bahais, Parsis and Ahmadis. The latter community is now included in official data as a religious minority having been officially declared non-Muslim in 1974. Prior to that, they were counted as part of the majority religion of Islam, albeit a sect within the mainstream. Interestingly, at the time of the creation of Pakistan (which included Bangladesh), the proportion of religious minorities was 23 percent (Ispahani 2015) and this figure would not have included Ahmadis. The paradox of a state that was created to safeguard the rights of a religious minority group subjecting its own minorities to oppression and persecution, to the extent that they are forced to leave the country, has been highlighted by many (Ispahani 2015; Jafri and Kamal 2014). Although all religious minorities have been subject to discrimination and persecution of varying degrees, Christians, Hindus and particularly Ahmadis have borne the brunt of it. In recent years, there has been violent persecution of the Shia community, which comprises the second largest Muslim denomination. However, the scope of this study is confined to minorities that fall within the official category of ‘non-Muslim’.

**Historical/Political Developments**

Since the inception of Pakistan, rather even before, there has been a complex interplay of religious and political ideologies, which has had profound and far reaching consequences. Religious organisations that had opposed the creation of Pakistan decided that it would be politically expedient to realign themselves in the fledgling state. The Objectives Resolution, adopted by the Constituent Assembly in March 1949, was the first official amalgamation of politics and religion. It was formulated within a clearly Islamic framework. Although there was mention of provisions to safeguard the interests of minorities and enable them to freely profess and practice their religion and culture, it was opposed by minority leaders in the Assembly on the grounds that there should be no state religion in a country where there are people of different religions.

Since then, different religious organisations and groups have vied with each other for political power and influence, serving as pressure groups, creating alliances with non-religious political parties, often serving the ends of the political elite. The discriminatory legislation that was passed over the years was largely to cater to their demands or to harness their support. It was religious groups that instigated the demonstrations and violence against the Ahmadi community in 1953. The declaration of Ahmadis as non-Muslims in 1974 by Zulfiquar Ali Bhutto was meant to placate the religious right after the violent riots, murders and persecution that took place throughout the country. This marked the beginning of official religious intolerance (Rais 2004).

Things came to a head with General Zia-ul Haq’s attempts to enforce what he called *Nizami-Mustapha* (System of the Prophet). This ‘Islamisation’ period saw the introduction of
various constitutional, legislative and administrative changes, many of which were punitive and reactionary in nature (Rehman 2000). These changes fostered a culture of intolerance and extremism, resulting in severe violations of the rights of religious minorities. The anti-Blasphemy Laws, the Hudood Ordinances and the Qanoon-e-Shahadat (Law of Evidence) Order 1984 were promulgated and justified on the basis of establishing an Islamic system of government (Ibid.). He amended the Pakistan Penal Code by adding provisions that made it a criminal offence for Ahmadis to 'pose' as Muslims, to preach or propagate their faith and to use Islamic terminology or Muslim practices of worship. His introduction of separate electorates led to even greater marginalisation of religious minorities (Rais 2004).

The primary tool for the persecution of religious minorities, as well as Muslims, is said to have been the Blasphemy Law (Pakistan Institute of Parliamentary Studies, in Yousaf 2014). This law has gained a sacred status, not only for religious organisations but also in the minds of the general public, to the extent that any query or criticism is deemed blasphemous in itself. Hence, it is necessary to examine it in some detail.

**What is the Blasphemy Law?**
Several sections of Pakistan’s Penal Code comprise of the Blasphemy Law, including those that prohibit Ahmadis from calling themselves Muslims and preaching or propagating their faith. Section 295 was inherited from the British who originally introduced it in 1860 to protect religious sentiments. This prohibited ‘injuring or defiling places of worship, with intent to insult the religion of any class.’ In 1927, when religious riots swept the Indian subcontinent, Section 295-A was promulgated which prohibited ‘deliberate and malicious acts intended to outrage religious feelings of any class by insulting its religion or religious beliefs.’ This law was amended by General Zia ul Haq in 1982 as 295-B, to include defiling the Holy Qur’an.

**295-B:** Defiling the copy of Holy Qur’an: Whoever wilfully defiles, damages or desecrates a copy of the Holy Qur’an or of an extract there from or uses it in any derogatory manner for any unlawful purpose shall be punishable with imprisonment for life.

Notably it only provides protection to the Scripture of one religious faith. This law was again amended in 1986 as 295-C to include blasphemy against the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH).

**295-C:** Use of derogatory remarks etc., in respect of the Holy Prophet: Whoever by words, either spoken or written, or by visible representation, or by any imputation, innuendo, or insinuation, directly, defiles the sacred name of the Holy Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) shall be punished with death, or imprisonment for life and shall also be liable for fine.

This was further amended by a judgment of the Federal Shariat Court in 1991 making the death penalty mandatory on conviction for the offence of desecrating the name of the
Prophet Muhammad (PBUH). For the first time, religious qualification was added so that only a Muslim judge could hear the case under this section (Section 295-C). It is significant that the term “wilfully” is not present in this text, putting intentional and unintentional offences on the same level, liable to the same punishment.

Other amendments to the Pakistan Penal Code related to punishments for making insulting remarks about holy personages, misuse of epithets, description and titles reserved for holy personages or places of Islam by Ahmadis, and for Ahmadis ‘posing’ as Muslims or propagating their faith or outraging religious feelings of Muslims.3

**Consequences**

Although blasphemy laws exist in other countries, Pakistan’s Blasphemy Laws have been extensively criticised for their lack of clarity regarding what constitutes a violation, severe punishments, ease of making allegations and lack of measures to hold to account or penalise those who make false accusations (MRG and SDPI 2014). The current Blasphemy Law has led to severe persecution of religious minorities, often to settle personal disputes and rivalries as well as to gain economic and political benefit. It has led to gross human rights abuses, some of which are reported in the media, while the majority are not publicised. Allegations of blasphemy are also used against Muslims to settle scores or quell dissent. Individuals suffering from mental illness have also been incarcerated under this law.

Those who raise their voice against the law or call for its reconsideration or repeal are themselves branded as blasphemers and are targets of violence or forced into exile. In recent years, the case of Aasiya Bibi, the Christian woman who was accused of blasphemy and the Punjab Governor Salman Taseer who was killed by his bodyguard in 2011 for his criticism of the Blasphemy Law is a highly publicised one. Clement Shahbaz Bhatti, the Federal Minister for Minority Affairs and the only Christian member of the Cabinet was also killed for his criticism of the Blasphemy Law in 2011. The litany of cases of those falsely accused of blasphemy, with severe and often fatal repercussions on them and their communities, is extensive. The Christian couple, Shahzad Masih and his wife Shama Bibi were beaten and burnt to death in a brick kiln by a mob on false charges of blasphemy in November 2015, just sixty kilometres from the city of Lahore. Five of the accused have recently been sentenced to death. An Ahmadi woman and two children were burnt to death when a mob attacked the homes of the Ahmadi community in Gujranwala in July 2014. Sawan Masih, a Christian falsely accused of blasphemy was sentenced to death in 2014, while no charges were brought against mob members who torched the houses of the Christian community where he resided. There are regular reports of forced conversions of Hindu girls, who are then married to Muslim men.

These are not isolated incidents. Violent persecution of minorities appears to be steadily increasing. Even more alarming is the proliferation of extremist organisations who have been responsible both for target killings and for killing religious minorities on a mass scale, either

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3 Pakistan Penal Code: Act XLV of 1860, as amended from time to time.
by suicide bombings or targeted attacks on places of worship. According to the National Commission for Justice and Peace, since the 1980s, more than 1400 people have been accused of blasphemy — 633 Muslims, 494 Ahmadis, 187 Christians and 21 Hindus (Yousuf 2014). Although the death penalty has not been executed to date for a blasphemy conviction, 53 people have been killed since the 1980s in violent incidents around accusations of blasphemy.

The Minority Rights Group (MRG) International declared Pakistan one of the world’s most dangerous countries for religious minorities in 2014. An MRG and SDPI (2014) report asserts that persecution of religious minorities has intensified in recent years and they live in fear of harassment and intimidation. The report explores the factors that contribute to continued discrimination — social, legal and political and links them to the incompetence of the government and law enforcement agencies. Apart from calling for effective security and protection measures for minorities and their places of worship, it recommends reform of discriminatory legislation, provision of full political participation and steps to end religious discrimination in educational institutions.

‘Religious’ Roots of Discrimination
Although there are many factors underpinning discrimination against religious minorities — economic, political, social, historical, religious — often a complex amalgamation of contributing and maintaining factors, religion is subject to the most powerful exploitation in this context. The nexus of religion and politics in Pakistan’s historical/political development as has been noted earlier has had a fundamental role in the country’s discriminatory legislation such as the Blasphemy Law. Due to the powerful influence of various religious factions, the Blasphemy Law has acquired such sacrosanct status in the minds of the general public that many view it as a divinely ordained law. Criticism of the Law is viewed as criticism of the Qur’ān or criticism of the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) or criticism of Islam in general. In other words, criticism of the Law is itself considered blasphemy. Examining its religious foundations and creating public awareness can be the first steps in influencing public attitudes. The following sections will focus on exploring the primary religious sources of Islam which involves examining what the Qur’ānic position is on blasphemy and the guidance given by the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) on this issue.

Another factor fuelling discrimination against religious minorities is seeing them as second-class citizens. Despite the fact that Article 25 of the 1973 Constitution clearly states that all citizens are equal before law and entitled to equal protection, the Blasphemy Law of the same Constitution contradicts this.

Since creation of Pakistan, the religious establishment has opposed the equal treatment of religious minorities, referring to the concept of dhimmis4 in early Islam. This is another concept that needs to be examined in light of the Qur’ān and Sunnah. Since discrimination

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4 Literally – protected person. Non-Muslims living in Muslim lands.
against religious minorities is fundamentally based on their different religious belief systems, this study will start by examining what the Qur’an says about freedom of religious belief.

**Freedom of Religious Belief in the Qur’an**

The clearest statement of freedom of religious belief is in verse 256 of the second chapter of the Qur’an:

> There is no compulsion in religion: true guidance has become distinct from error, so whoever rejects false gods and believes in God has grasped the firmest handhold, one that will never break. God is all hearing and all knowing (2:256).

The rejection of force and compulsion in this verse is equivalent to an endorsement of freedom to choose one’s religion. This implies freedom to enter into a religion and also freedom to leave it (Kadivar 2006). This proclamation guarantees freedom of religion and worship, which means that non-Muslims living in Muslim territories should have the freedom to follow their own faith without fear or harassment (Hassan 2000). There is also a repeated pattern of:

> You have your religion and I have mine (109:6).
> I act for myself and you act for yourselves (10:41).

The Qur’an describes itself as a continuation and confirmation of the previous scriptures (12:111) and its Prophet (PBUH) as only one in the long line of Prophets Muslims have to believe in (2:136). Addressing all people, the Qur’an says:

> People, We created you all from a single man and a single woman, and made you into nations and tribes so that you should get to know one another. In God’s eyes, the most honoured of you are the ones most aware of Him: God is all knowing, all aware (49:13).

In another verse, God addresses Muslims and the followers of other religions:

> We have assigned a law and a path to each of you. If God had so willed, He would have made you one community, but He wanted to test you through that which He has given you so race to do good: you will all return to God and he will make clear to you the matters you differed about (5:48).

The Qur’an upholds that God has created people to be different, and they will always remain different, not only in their appearance but also in their beliefs (11:118-19) and it is up to each individual whether to become a believer or not:

> Had your Lord willed, all the people would have believed. So can you [Prophet] compel people to believe? (10:99).
Christians and Jews who lived among the Muslim majority are referred to by the term *Ahl al Kitab* (People of the Book). Muslims are instructed not to argue with the People of the Book except in the fairest manner and to say to them:

> We believe in what was revealed to us and in what was revealed to you; our God and your God is one [and the same]; we are devoted to Him (29:46).

They are also instructed to appeal to the People of the Book through what is common between them and Islam:

> Say, People of the Book, let us arrive at a statement that is common to us all, we worship God alone, we ascribe no partner to Him, and none of us takes others beside God as lords. If they turn away, say, ‘Witness our devotion to Him’ (3:64).

This freedom of choice, tolerance of other religious beliefs, and celebration of diversity is a far cry from the intolerance and fanaticism witnessed in Pakistan today. The verses above illustrate that freedom of belief and freedom to worship is enshrined in the Qur’an.

**References to Blasphemy in the Qur’an**

There are no verses in the Qur’an that prescribe any kind of punishment for blasphemy in this world, whether it relates to defiling the Qur’an or insulting the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH). The one verse that can be said to relate to blasphemy is:

> Those who insult God and His messenger will be rejected by God in this world and the next – He has prepared a humiliating punishment for them (33:57).

Many religious scholars, like the earlier Muslim jurists, conflate blasphemy with apostasy — the rejection of the Islamic faith after having accepted it. They assert that the one who blasphemes is an apostate, thereby, deserving of the penalty for apostasy, claimed to be the death penalty. There are several Qur’anic verses which refer to apostasy, again none of which prescribe any punishment in this world rather refer to punishment in the Hereafter:

> As for those who believe, then reject the faith, then believe again, then reject the faith again and increasingly disbelieve, God will not forgive them, nor will He guide them on any path (4:137).

If apostasy carried the death penalty, the apostate could hardly have had the opportunity of repeated belief and disbelief. Thus, even apostasy does not merit capital punishment, according to the Qur’an (Kamali 1992).

**References to Blasphemy in the Sunnah**

The second major source of knowledge in Islam is the *Sunnah*, which refers to the example and conduct of the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH). If blasphemy carried the death penalty, the Prophet (PBUH) would have ordered the killing of hundreds of his enemies who instead
later became his closest companions. The majority of Meccans opposed, humiliated, cursed and even tried to kill him, yet he forgave them and prayed for divine mercy for them. The old woman who used to throw garbage on him was sought by him when she did not do so as she was sick and he went to enquire about her health. When the people of Taif made their children chase him out of town, throwing stones at him, he prayed for their forgiveness. When Suhail bin Amr, a poet who composed verses blaspheming against him was captured in the Battle of Badr, the Prophet (PBUH) asked his companions to show kindness towards him (Abdullah 2011). There are many more such examples which demonstrate that the Prophet (PBUH) never advocated violence towards those who insulted him:

The Qur’an and the authentic teachings of the Prophet describe the practice of showing irreverence to God and His messenger as acts of ignorance, deliberate provocation or hatred. Yet the two sources of Islamic guidance never proposed punitive action on the basis of theological dissent or religious differences or irreverence (Ibid.).

Later, legal scholars formulated their opinions regarding blasphemy on the basis of their understanding of Christian and Jewish texts that supported laws against those who committed blasphemy (Ibid.). Their legal rulings were developed under the influence of despotic Muslim rulers who abused their power to manipulate religious scholarship to serve their vested political interests.

Those who claim that the Prophet (PBUH) issued the death penalty for blasphemy refer to the matter of Ka’b ibn al-Ashraf, a Jew who it is claimed was ordered to be killed by Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) because he ‘annoyed’ him by his blasphemous poetry. This has been disproved by many scholars on the basis of other hadith and historical narrations. Ka’b did not merely write satirical verses, but broke the peace agreement between the Jews and the Muslims in Medina, incited the enemies of the Prophet (PBUH) to attack Medina and organised an assassination attempt upon the Prophet (PBUH).

Ka’b bin Malik who was one of those whose repentance was accepted said Ka’b ibn al-Ashraf used to satire the Prophet and incited the infidels of the Quraysh against him (Shahzad 2016 citing Sunan Abi Dawud: Book 19, Hadith 2994).

Another incident frequently given as an example of the Prophet (PBUH) ordering the death penalty for apostasy (which some equate with blasphemy) is that of Ibn Khatal, who was killed at the time of the conquest of Mecca. A closer look at the historical context of that particular hadith reveals that he was killed as punishment for the murder of his servant after which he renounced Islam and went into hiding. Narrated Aisha, the wife of the Prophet:

Allah’s Messenger never took revenge for his own self in any matter presented to him till Allah’s limits were exceeded, in which case he would take revenge for Allah’s sake (Sahih Al-Bukhari, vol. 8, Book 82, Hadith 836).
Like the Prophet’s *Ahadith* on apostasy, those relating to blasphemy which refer to the death penalty, on deeper contextual examination, are found to be correlated with treason, aggression or other capital crimes (Abdel Haleem 2011).

It seems reasonable to conclude that in the primary Islamic sources of the Qur’an and the *Sunnah*, there is no evidence that any form of corporal punishment was prescribed solely for blasphemy. Hence, the Blasphemy Law in its current form cannot be said to be in accordance with the principles of the Qur’an and *Sunnah*.

However, the secondary sources of knowledge, comprising *fiqh*, or the classical schools of jurisprudence by their very nature are based on the opinions and judgments of scholars and jurists, and thereby, reflect differences of opinion. They were products of their time, influenced by the political milieu as well as by the scholarship of other religions which supported the death penalty for blasphemy. Although discussion of these sources is beyond the scope of this chapter, it is worth noting, by way of illustration, that the Hanafi School of Jurisprudence views blasphemy as a pardonable offence if the blasphemer repents, whereas the Malikī School views it as an unpardonable offence. In the case of blasphemy by a non-Muslim, the penalty is more lenient compared to that by a Muslim, and if it is a first offence by a non-Muslim, some Hanafi scholars (for example, al Tahawi) hold that the offender can be excused with a verbal warning if he repents (Mazhar 2014). However, these differences of opinions and nuances in rulings appear to have been totally overlooked or misconstrued in the formulation of the current law as well as by the majority of religious scholars despite the Hanafi School being the dominant theological school in Pakistan.

**The Concept of Dhimmis**
The view of religious minorities being second-class citizens in Islam is allegedly derived from the concept of *dhimmis*. This was the term given to Jews and Christians and other non-Muslims who lived under Muslim rule. The term literally means ‘those who enjoy protection’. Being non-Muslims, they were not obliged to serve in the army, but they were required to pay a nominal tribute called *jizya* as contribution to the defence of the state they lived in. The *jizya* was one dinar a year for every able-bodied man who could join the army — monks were exempted. In return for this, they also enjoyed state social security (Abdel Haleem 2011). Muslims, however, were required to serve in the army and had to pay the much higher *zakat* tax, part of which was spent on defence. When non-Muslims chose to serve in the army, they were exempted from the *jizya*.

In recent times, with regard to religious minorities, some scholars advocate the traditional practice of tolerating the People of the Book, as protected communities, with specific rights, privileges and duties. They argue that this treatment was much better than that which religious minorities experienced in Europe until the last two or three centuries. Others have reformulated these concepts into the language of modern state structures (Nielsen 2003). Maududi, for example, views many of the specific rights and duties of non-Muslims as the same as those of Muslims, but insists that as an Islamic state is an ‘ideological state’, only those who share the official ideology can fully participate. Hence, public expressions of any
minority religion must be restricted (Maududi 1961).

However, the traditional concept of dhimmis has been challenged in recent times by some religious scholars. The basis of an Islamic state is said to be the collective citizenship established by Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) in the Charter of Medina, in 622 CE, which was a citizenship founded on a common commitment to the Prophet under God. Also known as the Constitution of Medina, this served as a unifying document in a city of diverse tribes, cultures and religions. It protected fundamental human rights for all citizens, including freedom of conscience and religion. It was the first document in history to establish religious freedom as a constitutional right. This original community, the Ummah, included the Jewish tribes of Medina. Later, medieval scholars developed the jurisprudence of this community into the status of dhimmis for all People of the Book by analogy with the Jews of Medina (Nielsen 2003 citing al-Awwa 1989).

According to al-Awwa, the modern state represents a new kind of Islamic sovereignty to which much of classical law cannot apply and ijtihad must be used to develop a new system. In his view:

The modern Muslim state is the result of a common struggle for independence and nation-building in which the Muslim majority and the non-Muslim minority participated. In this way, it differs sharply from the early Muslim state that was based on conquest. In this situation, it is the duty of the Muslim majority to concentrate on applying the principles established by God and the Prophet rather than stubbornly insisting on applying outdated and inappropriate rules. The discourse has changed from one of contract (aqd) to one of constitution (dustur) and from dhimmi to citizenship (muwatan) (al-Awwa, in Nielsen 2003: 329).

According to Nielsen (2003), other scholars such as A.K. Abu al-Magd have argued that the dhimma was a historical expression of rights and duties and that the conditions originally necessary for this institution no longer exist. The Egyptian scholar, Muhammad Imara also discusses the constitution of Medina, which, within the shared community/Ummah, has space for religious pluralism (Ibid.). It distinguishes between Ummah as a religious community and Ummah as a political community, the status of Jews is cited as an analogy. The Tunisian writer Rashid al-Ghanushi also relegates the concept of dhimmi to a past history that is no longer relevant. He agrees with other authors that non-Muslims have equal civil and political rights, including full rights of employment, even within the government, except in religious posts. Regarding jizya, he holds that the Qur’anic verse that it should be collected ‘with submission’ (9:29) is linked to a specific event. As it was paid in lieu of military service, in the shared citizenship of the modern state, this duty is shared by all, hence, the requirement to pay jizya no longer exists (Ibid.).

However, in the context of Pakistan the concept of non-Muslims being ‘lesser’ citizens

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5 Editors’ Note: Islamic legal term referring to independent reasoning or the thorough exertion of a jurist’s mental faculty in finding a solution to a legal question.
continues to hold sway, particularly in the clergy. The fact that mobs can be roused with such ease to rampage and burn the houses of religious minorities on the first allegation of blasphemy is a consequence and reflection of this view. The following sayings of the Prophet (PBUH) are rarely pronounced in sermons according to Abu Daud and al-Tibrani:

Whosoever persecutes a non-Muslim or usurps rights or takes work from him beyond his or her capacity, or takes something from him or her with ill intentions, I shall be a complainant against him or her on the Day of Resurrection (Doi 1981).

Whosoever hurts a non-Muslim, he hurts me, and one who hurts me hurts Allah (Ibid.).

Nine years after the Charter of Medina was promulgated, the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) entered into a treaty with the Christians of Najran and the surrounding areas, in 631 CE, which provided religious and administrative autonomy to them. The following extract is a strong indictment against the behaviour of those who engage in persecution of their non-Muslim fellow citizens:

The security of God and the pledge of his Prophet are extended for their lives, their religion and their property – to the present as well as to the absent and others beside; there shall be no interference with (the practice of) their faith or their observances; nor any change in their rights and privileges; no bishop shall be removed from his bishopric; nor any monk from his monastery; nor any priest from his priesthood, and they shall continue to enjoy everything great and small as heretofore; no image or cross shall be destroyed; they shall not oppress or be oppressed; they shall not practice the rights of blood vengeance as in the Days of Ignorance; no tithes shall be levied from them nor shall they be required to furnish provisions for the troops (Ali 1923: 85-86).

**Future Directions**

An overview of recent developments in Muslim countries reveals varying degrees of Islamic influence in both private and public spheres, which in turn has wider international ramifications. This influence is formally reflected in the constitutions of some countries such as Pakistan which declare Islam to be the religion of the state and provide for state courts that apply Islamic law. Hence, there is a need to engage with Islamic law in relation to promotion and protection of human rights. In the words of human rights scholar, Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im (2000: 95):

The implementation of international human rights norms in any society requires thoughtful and well-informed engagement with religion (broadly defined) because of its strong influence on human belief systems and behaviour …. Religious considerations are too important for the majority of people for human rights scholars and advocates to continue to dismiss them simply as irrelevant, insignificant, or problematic.
Examining the ‘Religious’ Roots of Discrimination against Minorities in Pakistan

The poor human rights record of governments in most Muslim countries, including Pakistan, encourages the notion that Islam is not compatible with human rights, particularly when governments try to justify their human rights violations by making allusions to Islamic law. These arguments need to be challenged by relevant evidence that Islam does not support human rights violations such as the death penalty for apostasy and blasphemy (Tareen 2015).

When the term ‘Islamic’ is associated with any law or ordinance, it becomes much more difficult to bring about change, as has been demonstrated by the lack of effectiveness of successive governments in Pakistan to amend the Blasphemy Laws. Education of public through mass awareness campaigns and an education system which is non-discriminatory and sensitised to the needs of different religious communities and celebrates diversity can play a role in curtailing the ‘religious’ roots of discrimination.

The way forward lies with Islamic scholars who advocate reopening the doors of *ijtihad* (independent reasoning) and engaging with the primary sources of Islam, enabling fresh interpretations that address the needs of contemporary societies. The focus on the spirit of the Qur’an and the Prophetic tradition as well as continuous *ijtihad* has gathered momentum in the last few decades. Within this reformist discourse, democratic pluralism emerges as a major theme, which is viewed as a salient feature of the Qur’an and Sunnah:

The challenge for Muslims today, as ever, is to tap the tradition of Koranic pluralism to develop a culture of restoration, of just intrareligious and interreligious relationships in a world of cultural and religious diversity. Without restoring the principle of co-existence, Muslims will not be able to recapture the spirit of early civil society under the Prophet (Sachedina 2001).

It is heartening to note that efforts are being made in this direction. The Marrakesh Declaration was a statement made in January 2016 by over 250 Islamic scholars, jurists and government ministers from Muslim countries, including Pakistan, regarding the protection of religious minorities, which was said to be rooted in traditional Islamic law. This gathering made the case that the ‘Charter of Medina’ issued by the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) in 622 CE, which is believed by some to be the first written constitution, necessitates protection of religious freedom and minority rights. This declaration made various recommendations for the full protection of rights and liberties of all religious groups and concluded that ‘it is unconscionable to employ religion for the purpose of aggressing upon the rights of religious minorities in Muslim countries.’

In the context of Pakistan, some recent positive developments also need to be noted. These include a 2015 Supreme Court ruling that debating and changing the Blasphemy Law to protect against its misuse or misapplication is permissible and not tantamount to blasphemy. On 2 December 2016, a Parliamentary Committee met to discuss and amend procedural aspects of the Blasphemy Law. It decided to take into account the recommendations of a previous committee (the Standing Committee on Law and Justice) that in 1992 had questioned what punishments were given for blasphemy at the time of the Prophet (PBUH).
and the first four *Caliphs* and highlighted the need for a more specific definition of the offence as ‘in its present form it was very generalised.’ One of the Senators debating in the current Parliamentary Committee (Senate Functional Committee on Human Rights) proposed a critical re-examination of Section 295-C, particularly because it did not have the unanimous support of Islamic scholars. Also, that proof of intent is necessary to secure a conviction. Another member proposed including the aspect of repentance in the substantive law as forgiveness was allowed by Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) to those who repented (Dawn 2016). Another recent development is the passage of a bill against forced conversions in Sindh.

Of course, it is necessary to move beyond declarations and legislation towards implementation. Only then can we hope to make progress towards the development of ‘just, peaceful and inclusive societies’ which is one of the Sustainable Development Goals promulgated by the United Nations in 2015.

**Glossary of Terms**

*Abadith* (plural of *hadith*): Sayings of the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH).


*Dhimma*: treaty or obligation. In Islamic legal literature, the term is used for the obligation of people in general and of Muslim rulers in particular to grant protection to non-Muslims living under their rule.

*Fiqh*: literally – knowledge or understanding. Islamic Jurisprudence.

*Hudood* Ordinances: Laws enacted in Pakistan by General Zia to establish an ‘Islamic’ system of government.

*Ijtihad*: literally – effort. Islamic legal term meaning ‘independent reasoning’.

*Jizya*: A tax levied on non-Muslim adult males of a particular age in lieu of protection by the state, as they were not obliged to fight for the Muslim army.

*Qur’an*: sacred scripture of Islam.

*Qanoon-e-Shahadat*: Law of Evidence.

*Sunnah*: the example or conduct of the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH).
Examining the ‘Religious’ Roots of Discrimination against Minorities in Pakistan

References


The Missing: Indian and Pakistani Demography*
Nathalène Reynolds**

Abstract
Notwithstanding their differing religious make-up, society in India and Pakistan is far from welcoming in its attitude towards female children. In patriarchal structures, families prefer male children and boys tend to be pampered. It is true that in the absence of free universal healthcare, as well as of a pension system accessible to all, males represent the economic future of the family, notably of ageing parents. As for the status of women within the family unit, it is based, at least during the first years of marriage, on their reproductive function and their 'capacity' to give birth to boys; ironic, given that biology teaches us that the female ovum is sexless.

The French demographer, Jean-Claude Chesnais (1996: 72) emphasises that 'demography is a kind of [...] moral statistics since it allows us to measure the degree of integration or disintegration of a society. It [...] measures the potential for growth or decline, for expansion or regression of human groups, civilisations or religions.' It is interesting to examine the issue of the equality of sexes in Pakistan and India from a demographic perspective and one of its corollaries: that of the status of women within society and their access to public space but also the issue of malnutrition in male and female children in countries where the level of poverty remains significant. These can be seen as two indicators of the relative positions of men and of women. The chapter will look at the Indian and Pakistani context in turn, and attempt what is a challenging comparison.

However, beforehand one should emphasise the ethnic, religious, economic and social diversity that the two countries are home to. Indeed, socio-political structures in Pakistan and India have tended to strengthen belief in a patriarchal system that, to this day, lauds male superiority and the perpetuation of practices derived from it. The religio-cultural justifications put forward by defenders of the hierarchy of genders in Pakistan continue to have the effect of masking the durability of ancestral practices that in part pre-date the turn to monotheism.

India is a particularly interesting case study. With more than 1.2 billion inhabitants, according to the census of 2011, this demographic giant is confronted by one major issue that threatens its equilibrium: the alarming deficit in female births that will further aggravate the position of women if the authorities fail to take rapid and effective remedial steps. Through looking at this phenomenon, one can better comprehend a fundamental issue: that while India is a society advancing at different speeds, belief in traditional patriarchal values remains the norm. Technology now offers once inconceivable opportunities to families that are seeking to reduce their overall size and who are, therefore, all the more desirous to have only male offspring. Pakistan,

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with its considerable population of 201 million (CIA 2017a), seems at first sight to be spared a serious decrease in female live births. Based on the 2006 figures in the CIA’s World Factbook, the deficit of female births appears negligible. Are Pakistanis more attached to divine principles of protecting human life? Or, more prosaically, is access to echography more difficult in rural areas, while the country regulates access to medical abortion strictly? It is also possible to ‘lose’ female babies post-partum. Pakistan faces the challenge of overcoming the sombre legacy of the Islamisation initiated by President General Zia-ul-Haq (July 1977-August 1988), during which period women had little opportunity to claim a place in society outside the confines of the family structure. Yet, it is in nurturing genuine social, and thus economic, promotion for women that in Pakistan – and India - will enable communities to raise baby girls – and baby boys – the right way, bringing about a future for both sexes.
Introduction

Image of a Subcontinent Wrought by the ‘War on Terror’

The slogan ‘Shining India’, or most recently ‘Rising India’, tends to squeeze out a reality that foreign observers familiar with the subcontinent are only too aware of. A significant section of the population continues to live in rural areas that are particularly affected by a level of poverty that is difficult to measure, not least since it has been the object of repeated efforts at statistical sleight of hand. The Indian state is proud of the progressive eradication of poverty, that, from 56 percent in 1973-4, hit ‘only’ 26 percent of the population in 1999-2000 (Radhakrishna and Panda 2006: 14) and 21.9 percent 12 years later (Press Trust of India 2013). Numerous observers, both Indian and foreign, keep underlining India’s impressive economic growth, and emphasise improvements in the standard of life that will surely stem from this. The country is, it is true, an ally that the West would like to keep very much on-side, given concerns about an assertive People’s Republic of China and worrying political developments in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Indeed, ‘the biggest democracy in the world’, land of Gandhism (to take up a vision much loved in the West), enjoys a positive image abroad. One is quick to forget the social ills that are in many respects similar, regardless of the religion, social or caste background of the victims or perpetrators, to those that mark life in two of its neighbours, Bangladesh and Pakistan. The overwhelming majority of populations in the subcontinent remain firmly attached to the roles that were traditionally played by men and women.

For its part, Pakistan1 has every right to be annoyed at the simplistic portrayal of the country that has been and continues to be propagated in foreign media, particularly in the West. In the aftermath of the attacks of 11 September 2001, these tended to grant disproportionate space to the honour crimes that occur frequently in the Islamic Republic. Western media, little familiar with Indian or Pakistani society, were only too eager to blame the latter, implying the country was mired in obscurantism. They forget that Pakistan is a mosaic of economic, social and ethno-cultural diversity.2 They seemed oblivious to such diversity in India, as well as to the fact that the latter country was also the scene of such happenings. It is true that as the justification of the ‘War on Terror’ was celebrated, Islam was, at least during the successive terms in office of George W. Bush (2001-08), a favoured target of criticism. Kafb (1999: 2) reminds us:

Challenges to Western representations of the Muslim woman, from feminist as well as Islamic apologist starting points, have tended to ignore the ‘representation’ part

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1 In June 2016, Pakistan, based on the Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) announced ‘a sharp decline with national poverty rates falling from 55 to 39 percent from 2004 to 2015 (…). Rather than income and wealth alone, the MPI uses broader measures to determine poverty based on access to healthcare, education and the overall standard of living, thus, giving a more detailed understanding of poverty (…). 38.8 percent of Pakistan’s population lives in poverty. A majority of the rural population (54.6 percent) lives in acute poverty while this ratio is only 9.4 percent in urban areas’ (Rana 2016).

2 One should emphasise that such aspects scarcely help to explain the violence to which women (and children) are subjected, particularly within the conjugal (or family) setting.
and instead contest the realities of ‘the Muslim woman’... The actual condition of Muslim women is a serious and complex topic. Its study, however, does little to explain the development of the Western narrative. This narrative has a genealogy and logic of its own, emerging from missing developments in Western representations of gender, of the self, and the foreign or Other.

In this way, Islam was portrayed tacitly as the primary cause of crimes of honour: it stood accused of promoting the primacy of masculinity and of forcing women to accept a subordinate position in society. This neglected two significant historical dimensions: the persistence of pre-Islamic customs that the state had made little effort to eradicate through education. The adoption of a political approach still in its infancy, and the work of non-government organisations (NGOs) seeking to raise awareness in communities as to the need for gender equality have already shown some results. Notwithstanding the country’s diversity, Pakistan has in this way been able to emphasise that several ancestral practices go against the precepts of both the religion of the majority, Islam, as well as Christianity. It is worthwhile to draw attention to another aspect: the interpretation of various monotheist and polytheist religions has most often been masculine, since men, with few exceptions, had been the sole holders of worldly power. The West may be the proud heir to Christian values, but should not forget that the all-male body of cardinals sitting in the Vatican still refuse any space to the nuns who dare express the desire to take up similar positions themselves. Tokhtakhodjaeva and Balchin (1995:18) notes that:

In all major religions, at their early stages of development the preachers of the new belief sought support from the socially deprived sections of society, and women were among the first converts because the new teachings addressed them as individuals, speaking of their worth and right to choose. Later, the right to interpret religion became the privilege of the state and its institutions, which assigned women a secondary and subordinate role in society and in the family. The denial of women’s equality has taken different forms in Christian and Muslim countries, effectively allowing discussion of the place of women in society to be diverted away from their true problems and towards a pointless comparison of the unequal status of Christian women with the unequal status of Muslim women.

This chapter looks at the issue of gender in India and Pakistan from social and demographic perspectives. Jean-Claude Chesnais (1996: 72), a French demographer, rightly reminds us that demography reflects issues that underline many social processes. It is also in a sense a kind of ‘moral statistics’, since it illustrates the state of health of a society and its ‘potential for growth or decline, for expansion or regression of human groups, civilisations or religions.’ The question of women’s empowerment has tended to relegate demographic issues away from the spotlight. Its promoters announced the imminent achievement of an equality of the

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3 The term designates a geopolitical reality that was the legacy of the Cold War in which the Western and Soviet blocs opposed one another.
genders, thanks to mobilisation of women in urban and rural areas. To quote the analysis of Ramachandran (2015):

In the mid-1970s, 1980s and even until the end of the 1990s, the word empowerment was synonymous with collective action (...). Towards the mid-1970s, it was used with much anticipation and hope. We really believed that empowerment was about women gaining greater control of their lives as a group. The process of sharing one’s personal situation and journeys enabled us to move out of the ‘this is my problem’ syndrome to one of understanding the social and economic situation and locating it in the specific context of community, region or economic status.

This was to foresee that Indian and Pakistani societies, mainly as a result of economic growth, would, if not rapidly then at least gradually, come to reject ancestral and patriarchal values. The example of India, a society developing at differential rates, illustrates the possible co-existence of value systems that appear, at least at first view, in contradiction with what may be termed modernity. The alarming deficit of female live births, that will further aggravate the condition of women if the authorities fail to remedy matters soon, is evidence of this. Families, of whatever socioeconomic level, religious belief, caste or ethnic background often seek to limit their size by the use of echography and ‘get rid’ of female foetuses. Poor conditions for women are widespread in Pakistan too, but attachment to religious norms appears to make ‘preventive abortion’ unusual for the moment, at least. But, it is perhaps above all due to legislation that outlaws abortion. There remains the issue of how young girls are looked after: usually rather less well than their brothers. Perhaps, since women, more centrally than men, are charged with reproducing the species, they may tend to be more resilient in adversity than the latter.

Outline

Before looking at male and female demographics in India and Pakistan (including the conditions of children), and, in brief, given the diversity of both countries, the political, economic and social factors at play, it seems useful to examine the issue of status of women in these two countries taking into account two phenomena that attract attention of the media in the subcontinent: the issue of rape in India, and that of crimes of honour in Pakistan. These two issues are notorious nationally and internationally and portrayed as symbols of the social ills prevalent in the two countries. A young kinesitherapy student, Jyoti Singh was raped in New Delhi on 16 December 2012, as was Mukhtaran Mai, from a Gujjar tribe in the village of Meerwala, Muzaffargarh District in the province of Punjab, Pakistan (22 June 2002).4

4 The reader may question why the author will treat India first and Pakistan second, but it seems useful to start with the former as an emerging power so celebrated overseas, but that struggles to get rid of some age-old practices. We will not neglect Pakistan, which has in any case suffered considerable negative media coverage over the first part of the Twenty-First Century.
Readers may wonder at a choice that might appear arbitrary. They may believe this gives too much credit to the media which dramatises an event that may not reflect broader dynamics in Indian society. They will also no doubt feel that many Pakistani NGOs, in their quest to secure funding from Western donors, have placed too much emphasis on crimes of honour, when the subcontinent is confronted by numerous other challenges. The fact, however, remains that a section of Indian society is concerned about the security of women, particularly in urban areas at night; and there is a debate in Pakistan about crimes of honour and their eradication, not least since the focus on the ‘War on Terror’ seems to have blocked a genuine appraisal of social problems facing the country. Jalal (2006: 284) reminds us that:

Discourses about Muslim women’s victimisation, which have intensified during the US-led ‘War on Terror,’ position Muslim women as objects in a debate of Islam versus the West, tradition versus modernity, and threaten to erase accounts of Muslim women’s agency and activism within their own societies. We need to examine Muslim women’s ambivalent positioning within religion, society and politics, and family and nation and recuperate the ways in which women appropriate contradictory discourses to assert their identities as daughters and citizens.

The Uneasy Position of Women

India

‘The World’s Biggest Democracy’ marked by Traditional, Patriarchal Values

In 2015, a court in New Delhi condemned three men to thirty years imprisonment, adding that they should serve the entire sentence. They had been found guilty of the collective rape of a young woman from Uganda. The court declared that the men ‘were on the prowl like a hungry wolf’ (Sheriff 2015). We will allow ourselves to add, for the benefit of readers unfamiliar with the subcontinent, that this was a highly significant verdict. Of course, rape is seen to be severely punished, while the language employed by the judge implicitly condemns the patriarchal values that continue to imply that victims are themselves to blame for their fate. Above all, the young Ugandan was black. India’s countryside is still today frequently the scene of rape. Men from upper castes prey upon young girls and women from lower castes, whose skin colour is often darker than that of their aggressors, and who are generally from the humblest of social backgrounds. For a long time, such a phenomenon attracted but limited interest in the press, and it was left to Indian and foreign anthropologists to examine the survival of a caste system that had, in principle, been abolished by Article 15 of the Constitution.

For some ten years, rumours in towns spoke of kidnappings in the street and rapes that took place in moving vehicles. The foreign observer tended to see this as a sign of the real worry of the middle-classes and well-to-do in the face of massive and constant rural migration towards the cities, itself a symptom of rural poverty. It was only following the dramatic gang rape on 16 December 2012 of young Jyoti Singh, that the courts, the press and the public came to publically condemn rape as unacceptable aggression. Until then, rape was seen as one of many unavoidable social ills, that one hoped was not so widespread, since men stuck to their
social role of protector of the ‘weaker sex’. In the aftermath of the attack, India became the setting for a series of unprecedented demonstrations, especially of male and female students, which reminded the authorities of the need to ensure the security and freedom of movement of women.

The Position of Mukesh Singh

Sentenced to death, those guilty of the 16 December 2012 drama expressed their surprise - were there not plenty of rapes in India that went unpunished? Interviewed by a British documentary film-maker, Leslee Udwin, one of them, Mukesh Singh, said that Jyoti Singh – who had been subjected to terrible torture – would have survived had she not tried to resist. Her fate, he implied, was a just punishment had she not been outdoors in the company of a man with whom she had no family ties. Employing an image of which Hindi makes ready use, he declared in that ‘you can’t applaud with one hand, you need two’ (Udwin 2015). He added that:

A good girl is not wandering the streets at 9 o’clock in the evening. A girl is far more responsible for a rape than the boy. Boys and girls are not equal. Girls must dedicate themselves to housework, and not roam around discos and bars after nightfall, doing bad things [i.e. morally reprehensible acts], wearing bad clothes [tight clothing]. Only 20 percent of girls are good (Ibid.).

It is true that Mukesh Singh tried to justify the rape with an iron bar that had been inflicted on Jyoti Singh, when, assumed to be dead, she had, along with her companion, Awindra Pandey, been thrown from the bus into which she had climbed, believing it to be in service. Mukesh Singh added that if the law bore down on the guilty, the latter would not spare the lives of their victims, for fear that they would go to the police.

When Udwin sought to broadcast her documentary, India’s Daughter, a title earlier used by the Indian press, Indian civil society mobilised against it, in the belief that it would spread the views of the guilty who showed no contrition for their acts. The Central Government, meanwhile, obtained a court order on 4 March 2015, banning its broadcast, arguing notably that the film-maker should not have been allowed inside the high-security jail of Tihar in Delhi in order to meet Mukesh Singh. The Government led by Prime Minister Narendra Modi also took exception to the negative image of the country that the foreign journalist was trying to propagate.

Shown only once on BBC4 (4 March 2015) and difficult to watch on the internet, the documentary is a useful tool to help understand Indian society, especially its poorest segments whose lives are marked by various forms of violence. Moreover, it underlines, like the Indian press, how a significant part of public opinion remains firmly wedded to patriarchal values that justify rape. A.P. Singh, one of the two lawyers for the defence, for example, is from a privileged background, unlike his clients. Following the death sentence verdict for Mukesh Singh, Pawan Gupta, Akshay Thakur and Vinay Sharma, he stated
forcefully that he would burn his sister or his daughter alive, before the eyes of the rest of his family, if they had an illegitimate (i.e. pre-marital) relationship.

**Three Causes for Concern**

According to some estimates, a ‘rape is committed once every twenty minutes in India’ (Tulshyan 2013). Does an increasingly eroticised Bollywood push men who generally still marry in accordance with the wishes of their family to such acts?

The sad reality is that only a very small proportion of victims dare come forward and make a formal complaint. In doing so, they undergo the risk of being faced with police officers, who, in the best case, content themselves with ironic comments and deny the dramatic character of the circumstances. In the worst case, they may even attempt to themselves rape the victim who approaches them for help. Thus, as mentioned earlier, women from ‘lower’ castes (and in some cases, ethnic groups deemed inferior) do not dare to submit official complaints, convinced that so doing would only aggravate their own problems, as well as those of their community. This great burden on society weighs particularly heavily on the countryside, although towns are not entirely spared its effects. One should, however applaud, in India as well as in Pakistan, the efforts of civil society through NGOs to work towards the betterment of conditions for women, increasing awareness of their constitutional rights, and the position in society towards which they or future generations of women may legitimately aspire. Moreover, communities like the Dalits are mobilising all the more thanks to the support from members of their own community who have gained access to education and social position, as a result in particular of the policy of reservation.5

Another issue is that of qualified women who reach positions that were traditionally considered by the majority to be reserved for males. Men who fatalistically accept an unfair social structure do not hesitate to attack, rhetorically at least, women in lucrative posts. Jyoti Singh was from a modest background, but her parents had backed her quest for a professional future. Does her torment show that a significant part of the male population is opposed to the increasing visibility of women in the public sphere? The fact that women enjoying a certain financial, and therefore, social autonomy are no longer so dependent on the status of their husband may also exacerbate this opposition. In addition, men who enjoy, as a result, a privileged social and financial position are scarcely inclined to cede their place to women, even to those who conform to conservative dress codes. Their very identity depends in a sense on their subordinate position. The West is an example of an unfinished struggle. Examples include women in senior positions who have difficulty finding the right partner in marriage, and men in modest positions who are reluctant to marry in such a way as to emphasise their ‘inferiority’: those of equal or superior position often retain every intention of remaining ‘master at home’.

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5 This refers to a series of measures of affirmative action designed to enable members of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes to benefit from reserved seats in the various assemblies, government jobs and places in educational institutions. The aim is to remove as quickly as possible the oppression that such groups have suffered, allowing them the same opportunities in society as other groups.
Over and above considerations of social class, one must also look at the poor condition of women of all religious backgrounds. Rape, as well as acid attacks\textsuperscript{6} that are on the rise, and infanticide have become issues for which the public authorities now show official concern. Indian births, as shown by the 2011 census, are marked by a clear deficit of female births that will be examined in the second part of this chapter. To the range of methods available to a society that is traditionally unwelcoming towards girls, abortion can be added. Future parents, having determined the sex of their foetus through an echography, often ‘get rid’ of females, employing medical abortion if they have the means, and forced abortions if they cannot afford this second cost. The law now forbids medical personnel from revealing the sex of the infant, but some doctors seem to succumb rather easily to financial incentives.

It is important to note that mothers as well as fathers wish for male children, even as the tendency is towards smaller families. Their argument is based on a social practice formally outlawed since 1961 - dowry. This represents an ever bigger expense for families with girls as the appetite of the groom’s family grows in proportion to the temptations offered by a consumer society. In addition, such a phenomenon conceals a religiously and socially conditioned preference for boys. The latter, once married, continue to live under their parents’ roof, promising material support in old age. They also bear responsibility for funerary rites believed indispensable if one is to attain salvation in the after-life.

It is also the case that women who give birth to only girls are deemed to have bad ‘karma’ and to weigh heavily on the future prosperity of their family. Mothers of such daughters (in India as well as in Pakistan) are often the strongest defenders of a system that remains a burden on India as a whole. Furthermore, no government has launched a public information campaign to inform men that it is their sperm alone that determines the sex of the embryo. Marriage is certainly not without risks for girls, but it remains the most likely way to offer them a secure and dignified future. At least, this is generally the case in the countryside. A minority of urban-dwelling women now claim regular, formal employment that offers them an assured income. All around the world, however, women still struggle to earn the same income for similar work as their male counterparts.

\textbf{Pakistan}

\textit{Women - The Repositories of Male Honour}

The dialectics of rape, or of the justifications that its perpetrators employ, impacts the place of women in society. Those who venture out, especially after nightfall, have, in such a way of thinking, only themselves to blame if they are confronted by violence. The guilty deem themselves free of wrong-doing, even if their act is condemned by society, which still today tends to apportion blame first and foremost to the woman as having provoked the incident. One may question the impact of a phenomenon that is at the very least paradoxical, given that patriarchal values, to differing extents in different countries, continue to dictate much of

\textsuperscript{6} This phenomenon also affects neighbouring Pakistan.
how societies function. Fashion, more and more central to the consumer society, instrumentalises the female body, pushing women to wear tighter and tighter clothes, revealing more and more of their body. This is especially the case in the West, despite rhetoric and legal equality of the sexes. Men, for their part, are free – or even encouraged – to remain sober in their manner of dress. Ironically, the veil is even condemned in parts of Europe as a threat to the dignity of women. One may wonder whether the full veil is not a constraint on women’s freedom of movement and even to their physical well-being, but shouldn’t one also wonder why a significant number of women in the West agree to wear clothing that until recently signified ‘loose moral standards’ or even a life of prostitution. Note that Engineer (1992:13) underlines the existence of what he terms ‘cultural prejudices’ that weigh down on the inferior status of women in the subcontinent, whatever their religious belief. Looking at the issue of purdah, he writes:

All that the Qur’an requires of women is that they not display their sexual charms, but dress in a dignified manner. These prejudices emanated in the feudal era wherein the ruling Muslim classes wanted to protect their womenfolk from others, and hence, kept them under strict seclusion. However, that tradition was given Islamic legitimacy. Is it then the biological condition of women7 and the disdain it has attracted across the centuries that underpins the status to which they remain linked, even in Western societies, notably when women8 fall victim to sexual aggression? Or the difficulty, by virtue of the social structure itself, for women across the centuries to organise themselves?

At the end of the Second World War, an era that was anything but kind towards women who turned away from convention, de Beauvoir (1956: 18-19) dared assert that:

The proletarians have accomplished the revolution in Russia, the Negroes in Haiti, the Indo-Chinese are battling for it in Indo-China; but the women’s effort has never been anything more than a symbolic agitation. They have gained only what men have been willing to grant; they have taken nothing, they have only received.

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7 de Beauvoir (1956:33) wrote, ‘Woman? Very simple, say the fanciers of simple formulas: she is a womb, an ovary; she is a female – the word is sufficient to define her. In the mouth of a man, the epithet female has the sound of an insult, yet he is not ashamed of his animal nature; on the contrary, he is proud if someone says of him: “He is a male!” The term “female” is derogatory not because it emphasises woman’s animality, but because it imprisons her in her sex; and if this sex seems to man to be contemptible and inimical even in harmless dumb animals, it is evidently because of the uneasy hostility stirred up in him by a woman. Nevertheless, he wishes to find in biology a justification of this sentiment.’

8 Note that young boys and men who have gone through similar experiences face an even greater degree of social discredit. Their virility is somehow put into question. They are implicitly accused of having failed to defend themselves.
The Missing: Indian and Pakistani Demography

The reason for this is that women lack concrete means for organizing themselves into a unit which can stand face-to-face with the correlative unit. They have no past, no history, no religion of their own; and they have no such solidarity of work and interest as that of the proletariat. They have not even promiscuously herded together in the way that created community feeling among the American Negroes, the ghetto Jews, the workers of Saint-Denis, or the factory hands of Renault. They lived dispersed among the males, attached through residence, housework, economic condition, and social stating to certain men – fathers and husbands – more firmly than they are to other women. If they belong to the bourgeoisie, they feel solidarity with men of that class, not with proletarian women; if they are white, their allegiance is to white men, not to Negro women. The proletariat can propose to massacre the ruling class (…); but women cannot even dream of exterminating the males.

In any case, questions of sexuality remain largely taboo. The publication of the blog of Dawood Khalid on 1 December 2016, titled ‘How do I tell my parents? What should I do? What are people going to think of me? I was sexually abused and discovered my friends were too’, may serve to illustrate this. The journalist relates, in a fictionalised account, the story of a fifth-grade girl raped by an attendant. In this way, Khalid advocates for an end to the silence that allows the guilty to escape justice, even as victims remain walled up in a suffocating silence.

Feminists from the subcontinent do not hesitate to denounce the instrumentalisation of women’s biological role, with the aim of restraining their freedom and of reducing them to the status of wife and mother, and to their reproductive functions. Bhasin (2006: 8) considers, for example, that:

> The ideology of motherhood is considered one of the basis of women’s oppression because it created feminine and masculine character types which perpetuate patriarchy; it creates and strengthens the divide between private and public; it restricts women’s mobility and growth and it reproduces male dominance."
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Shaheed (1992: 61), for her part, rightly points out that:

Together, culture, customs and law outline the space available for women’s definition of self, the cross cutting factors she must daily negotiate in her action, and the boundaries against which she needs to push for self-affirmation and change… The same can be said to apply to the concept of ‘manhood’, but the implications are not alike.

Taking into account the recent history of their country (notably the push for Islamisation started by Zia-ul-Haq (July 1977-August 1988) and the opprobrium cast on Islam by the ‘War on Terror’), Pakistani feminists have a tricky task. They have to demonstrate (at least if they are Sunni Muslim) their attachment to their religion of origin, that also dominates across the state. In parallel, they work courageously to show that the dominant religious interpretation following the birth of Pakistan has tended to confine women to a role of repository of values that, notwithstanding the ethno-cultural diversity of the country, has reinforced a male primacy deemed divine will. In effect, powerful ‘internalised rules of a society’ (Ibid: 62) enclose women’s lives.

As for defenders of equality in Pakistan, it is important for them to try to demonstrate that pre-Islamic customs somehow dress themselves in religious legitimacy in order to assert their permanence. It may be that such a phenomenon is all the more significant in rural areas where education is very basic and big land-owners are happy for obscurantist beliefs to back up the status quo. Urban areas may be more exposed to ‘dangerous’ ideas like that of offering real space in society to women, including access to formal employment. In examining this question, both in rural and urban areas, it is important to also look at the issues of social class and household income. Women from modest backgrounds in the subcontinent are often called to work outside the family home. In the countryside, however, it is men who sell the harvest, as women often work in the fields; in towns, women may work in the informal sector. In both cases, however, it is often men who manage the family income, women’s role being limited to spending small sums essential for managing the household. There remains the case of women who raise their children alone. There is also the matter of the school curriculum for children and the images it projects. Moreover, success in further education for women is the route to social position, as well as financial power, something that was long been the preserve of men.
A Very Courageous Pakistani: Mukhtaran Mai

Lal (2005:2894) writes:

Physical assault, harassment and rape – all point towards the massive sexual disequilibrium that exists in our tremendously patriarchal society. The story of Mukhtaran Mai of Pakistan who was gang-raped by men in her village points towards another dimension as one comes to grips with the grim reality that even those women who have tried to fight back have been systematically suppressed.

The author recalls the odious circumstances of the rape of Mukhtaran Mai, a 30-year old woman, whose morality was already deemed suspicious since she was a divorcee, and therefore, no longer under the protection of a man. Her brother, Shakoor, even if only 12 years of age, was accused of having had sexual relations ‘with a woman from a land-owning tribe [the Mastoi], higher up in the social hierarchy.’ It appears that ‘two or three Mastoi men’ had, in fact, raped the boy.

The village panchayat, or council of elders, who are entrusted with the task of delivering justice, decided in its wisdom – for wisdom it is that ‘elders’ of the panchayat are supposed to have – to visit punishment upon Mukhtaran Mai. The elders, who in the culture of the subcontinent are enjoined to treat any young woman like their own daughter, decreed that Mukhtar be gang-raped by Mastoi men (Ibid.).

Lal stresses that:

The burden of keeping ‘moral’ standards falls most heavily upon women, and infractions of the moral order are instantly laid at their door (Ibid.).

Above all such a punishment was intended to ‘convey a message to other men’, using ‘bodies of women as the medium through which they throw a challenge to other men’:

One of the many ways in which men seek to inflict defeat upon their opponents in war is to scar and assault their women. Men do not only satisfy their lust and assert their naked domination when they rape women, but also engage in rites of aggressive and competitive masculinity (Ibid.).

Having been raped by four men, the young woman was forced to return home, naked, in full view of 300 villagers. Rather than commit suicide, Mukhtaran Mai dared register a formal complaint with the police, despite the unjust laws that, by virtue of the Offence of Zina
Nathalène Reynolds

(Enforcement of Hudood\(^{10}\)) Ordinance\(^{11}\) require the evidence of four Muslims of recognised piety who have witnessed the penetration…presumably without having protested against it. In the absence of this, the plaintiff risked being accused of zina (fornication), since she was not legitimately married to the man (in this case men) with whom she had had ‘relations’.

Less than a month after this terrible drama, the guilty (the four rapists and two other men who had abetted the rape) were brought before the Anti-Terrorism Court of Dera Ghazi Khan, which sentenced them to death by hanging. On 3 March 2005, however, the Lahore High Court acquitted five of the condemned, including the four rapists. Like neighbouring India, the country was in the grip of a patriarchal justice system proud of its adhesion to a particular interpretation of religious precepts which in turn bolstered the ‘sanctity of culture’. Kabeer and Subramaniam (2000: 7) are right to remind us that:

Resistance to any form of change in gender relations has increasingly taken on the rationale of the ‘sanctity of culture’. The discourse of ‘culture’ is the obvious next line of defence when arguments based on the discourse of ‘biological difference’ start to look shaky since it accommodates the defence of the very same gender division of roles, responsibilities and privileges that the earlier arguments on the grounds of biological difference were used to defend.

Ironically, the Declaration on the Rights of Women in Pakistan adopted by the Women’s Rights Committee on 24 October 1976 underlined in its first article that:

> Discrimination against women is contrary to the injunctions of Islam, violates Constitutional guarantees and constitutes an offence against human dignity.

\(^{10}\) We will not look here at ‘Hudood Ordinances’ as a whole, but simply emphasise that the term ‘Hudood’ refers to the ‘limits’ that the law wishes to impose and the punishment to be imposed on those who fail to respect those ‘limits’.

\(^{11}\) The 1979 Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance does not make the traditional distinction between zina (generally translated as ‘fornication’ or ‘adultery’) and zina-bil-jabr (rape). It defines zina-bil-jabr as follows: ‘A person is said to commit zina-bil-jabr if he or she has sexual intercourse with a woman or man, as the case may be, to whom he or she is not validly married, in any of the following circumstances, namely: (a) against the will of the victim; (b) without the consent of the victim; (c) with the consent of the victim, when the consent has been obtained by putting the victim in fear of death or of hurt; or (d) with the consent of the victim, when the offender knows that the offender is not validly married to the victim and that the consent is given because the victim believes that the offender is another person to whom the victim is or believes herself or himself to be validly married. Explanation: Penetration is sufficient to constitute the sexual intercourse necessary to the offence of zina-bil-jabr’ (section 1, Article 6). With the most conservative Muslim groups refusing abrogation, this Ordinance was intended to partially correct the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance.
The second article stipulates that:

All appropriate measures shall be taken to abolish prejudicial practices, customs and usages which are discriminatory against women and to ensure adequate legal protection for safeguarding the rights of women.

An Impossible Struggle against Male Primacy?
Some Worrying Figures Regarding Female Demography

Looking at the social significance of the cases of Jyoti Singh and Mukhtaran Mai, emblematic of a social malaise, one cannot but understand – without, of course, approving – that the birth of female children is by no means always welcome in India and Pakistan. The governments of the two countries, from independence onwards, have not put great efforts into tackling the poor status accorded to women, preferring to highlight the adoption of constitutions that guarantee respect for fundamental rights and provide women, like men, the right to vote. They blame the colonial period for the existence of codified personal laws which leave each religious community to interpret its own holy texts and to determine how these may impact everyday life. It remains for civil society to try to influence dominant collective mentalities which, in towns as in the countryside, still deny full citizenship rights to women. As already noted, such an issue would also involve changing school curricula to make them more gender-friendly. In this way, young children would learn respect for diversity, be it ethnic, caste, religious or gender. Boys would, thus, get used to the idea that girls may also aspire to a professional activity that would provide them with an income. This would be jointly managed by both halves of a couple in the case, for example, of a farming enterprise. Whatever the case, society would gradually be brought to reflect on the issue of financially independent women. One can mention other social practices here: advertising (as elsewhere in the world) that instrumentalises the female body and their social role, television dramas that reinforce the traditional role of each sex. These are a powerful vehicle, especially since they promise fulfilment to both sexes: provided they respect social norms.

Counting more than 1.2 billion inhabitants according to the 2011 census, and covering a surface of almost 3 million km², India is a demographic giant, confronted by a major issue: the alarming deficit of female live births that will further aggravate the condition of women if the authorities fail to remedy matters soon. Pakistan, with an area of about 800,000 km², has a population of 201 million according to the 2006 figures for the World Fact book of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The most recent census in Pakistan dates back to 1998.

Pakistanis and Indians still bend to the wishes of their family in adhering to duties deemed fundamental, which they link both to the respect of customs and religious duties – whatever

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12 Some might object to citing the CIA, given the agency’s reputation, notably following its involvement in the ‘War on Terror’ in ‘AfPak’ (Afghanistan-Pakistan), but the Fact book provides reliable, regularly revised figures.
their own religious faith.\textsuperscript{13} Marriage is the archetypal social act, since it constitutes an alliance between two families, generally of comparable wealth and status, but also of the same ethnic group, and in the case of India, from the same caste. The objective is still procreation - and a male line.

The most recent census in India of 2011 concluded that the fertility rate has dropped from 6 children per woman in the 1950s to 2.6 (Haub and Sharma 2011). Estimations for 2016 suggest it may have fallen further to 2.45 children per woman. The use of contraceptive methods is widespread (54.8 percent, according to the figures dating from 2007-8) (CIA 2016a). In Pakistan, the fertility rate according to 2016 estimates is 2.68 children per woman (CIA 2017a), a striking statistic if one considers the equivalent figure was 6.3 at the start of the 1970s and that the country had only really begun to look at the need to limit births from the middle of the 1960s onwards (Sattar 2001). The use of contraceptive methods in Pakistan is estimated at 35.4 percent according to figures from 2012-13 (CIA 2017a). As with India, this figure does not allow an analysis of the gap between the majority rural population and its urban counterparts. The catch-all character of the term ‘contraception’ does not distinguish between methods, some of which may put women’s health in jeopardy.

Pakistan has a population growth rate of 1.45 percent, while there are 22.3 live births per 1,000 population (estimate for 2016, CIA 2017a). These are higher than the corresponding figures for its neighbour to the East. The population growth rate in India is 1.19 percent, with 19.3 live births per 1,000 population (CIA 2016a). While the demographic transition in both countries has brought about positive effects since the 1950s onwards, the infant mortality rate has remained high. In Pakistan, it stands at 53.9 deaths per 1,000 live births, with biological differences (57 per 1,000 for male babies, compared to 50.6 per 1,000 for female ones) (CIA 2017). In India, infant mortality remains quite significant at 40.5 deaths per 1,000 live births, but the rate is higher for female babies than for male ones (41.8 per 1,000 compared to 39.2 per 1,000 respectively) (CIA 2016a). This difference may be explained by the fact that there is a stronger tendency for families to provide better care to male babies. Since health professionals are often not present at births in either country, it is difficult to interpret these data further.\textsuperscript{14}

About 27.71 percent of India’s inhabitants are less than fourteen years old. The median age is 27.6 years (26.9 for men and 28.3 for women) (Ibid.). About 31.99 percent of Pakistanis

\textsuperscript{13} According to estimates dating from 2010, 96 percent of the Pakistani population is Muslim (Sunnis account for 85-90 percent of these, Shias for 10-15 percent) (CIA 2017a). India, meanwhile, is overwhelming Hindu (80.5 percent), with Muslims comprising a significant minority (13.4 percent) (Government of India 2011c).

\textsuperscript{14} Note that in the West, women generally give birth in a hospital, allowing the state to ‘protect’ the life of the new-born baby through immediate registration of the birth. Earlier, women gave birth at home, and, in an era when contraception was lacking, some did not hesitate to ‘get rid’ of babies they felt unable or unwilling to bring up.
are in the age-range of 0-14 years, while the median age is 23.4 years (23.3 for men, 23.4 for women) (CIA 2017a). The two countries might take heart at possessing such potential human resources: Asia will soon be affected by a worrying ageing population, something that is already the case in some East Asian countries, such as Japan. As for the People’s Republic of China, it too will not be spared, since it has scarcely begun to battle against the ‘negative side-effects of its earlier coercive policies’ (Dumont 2006: 1). It remains the case that husbands, in Pakistan and especially in India, are on average older than wives, particularly in rural areas where brides are traditionally considerably younger than their grooms. One may wonder how customs may come to evolve through demographic pressure. More worrying is the population pyramid in the two countries, although less so in Pakistan than in India. Ironically, the population of the two countries are both convinced that they have too many girls and not enough boys. This is perhaps a remnant of the valid historical consideration that a traditional society was often engaged in battle, and required adequate numbers of males to defend itself.

Figure 1: Pakistan’s Population Pyramid

Source: CIA (2017a).
Table 1: Age Structure in Pakistan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Range</th>
<th>Ratio %</th>
<th>Male/Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-14 years</td>
<td>31.99</td>
<td>Male 33,195,073</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Female 31,429,440</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-24 years</td>
<td>21.31</td>
<td>Male 22,194,064</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Female 20,845,816</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-54 years</td>
<td>36.87</td>
<td>Male 38,680,978</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Female 35,794,333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55-64 years</td>
<td>5.43</td>
<td>Male 5,498,126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Female 5,463,453</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65 years and over</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>Male 4,139,899</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Female 4,754,358</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CIA (2017a).

For Pakistan, the age structure shows slightly more males than females, that public policy could presumably correct if addressed in a timely fashion. A ‘shortage’ of women is a risk in part due to the danger to women’s health posed by over-frequent pregnancies, especially in rural areas where mothers often give birth at home, far from hospitals or dispensaries. It seems, based on press accounts and reports by national NGOs, that the population rarely makes use of echography to allow them to determine the sex of the foetus and have a ‘preventive abortion’ carried out. The situation in India is much more problematic.

Figure 2: India’s Population Pyramid

Source: CIA (2016a).
In India, inhabitants of rural areas (and no doubt cities), where they lack the means to get an echography carried out and ‘if necessary’ a medical or ‘home-made’ abortion, seem to accept that a first-born child be female, but if the second is also a girl, some may ‘get rid’ of her. Certain popular beliefs would have that this is the best way to help ensure the third will be a boy.

Profile of India by State

In outlining here, the sex-specific demographic figures we will focus on India, since the most recent census in Pakistan dates back to 1998 and comprehensive recent figures are not available. The census does not provide data on birth rates by community, and similarly does not try to address the question as to which socioeconomic groups practice selective abortion. The second point would, in any case, be almost impossible to ascertain with any degree of accuracy.

Of the 29 states and seven union territories that make up the Indian Union, six are particularly important in terms of population and surface area - between them, they comprise about half the population and one-quarter of the territory (Dumont 2006: 93). In ascending order of population, they are: Madhya Pradesh (72 million), Andhra Pradesh (84 million), West Bengal (91 million), Bihar (104 million), Maharashtra (112 million), and last, but by no means least, Uttar Pradesh (200 million) (Government of India 2011a). This demographic imbalance is reinforced by an unequal demographic transition. In Kerala, this process may be considered to be more or less completed (Dumont 2006:94). The level of literacy in this state is remarkably high (93 percent of all Keralites, with 91.98 percent among women and 96.02 percent of males); at the national level, about 74 percent of Indians are literate – 82 percent of men and 65 percent of women (Government of India 2011a and b).\footnote{57.9 percent of Pakistanis (69.5 percent of men and 45.8 percent of women) according to 2015 data are literate (CIA 2017a).} India can be proud that this is the fruit of policies introduced and promoted

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The Missing: Indian and Pakistani Demography

### Table 2: Age Structure in India

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Range</th>
<th>Ratio %</th>
<th>Male/Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-14 years</td>
<td>27.71</td>
<td>Male 186,420,229&lt;br&gt;Female 164,611,755</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-24 years</td>
<td>17.99</td>
<td>Male 121,009,850&lt;br&gt;Female 106,916,692</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-54 years</td>
<td>40.91</td>
<td>Male 267,203,029&lt;br&gt;Female 251,070,105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55-64 years</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>Male 46,398,574&lt;br&gt;Female 46,105,489</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65 years and over</td>
<td>6.09</td>
<td>Male 36,549,003&lt;br&gt;Female 40,598,872</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CIA (2016a).
by the post-independent leaders of the country. This is perhaps worth underlining, given the tendency amongst Hindu nationalists to question the legacy of Prime Minister Nehru, in power from 15 August 1947 until his death on 27 May 1964.

A further interesting aspect of Kerala is that it is one of the few Indian states or union territories in which the sex ratio (1084) is slanted in favour of women. Next in line are Pondicherry (1037), Tamil Nadu (996), Andhra Pradesh (993) and Manipur (992) (Ibid.). The 2011 census indicated that the ratio for India as a whole is 940, with states in north of the country, including some in the ‘Hindi Belt’; perhaps a reputation for misogyny is not undeserved. These are also prosperous and relatively urbanised states like Punjab and Haryana that have benefited from the Green Revolution from the 1960s onwards.

**Brief Remarks: Possible Modification to the Traditional Social Structure**

An editorial piece published in the *Hindustan Times* argued that:

A nationwide decline in the number of girls born per 1,000 boys from 909 during 2011-13 to 906 for 2012-2014 period. The fall is the steepest in Delhi – from 887 to 876. Uttar Pradesh comes next. The findings of the sample registration system (SRC) 2014, released last week, indicate that sex selection isn’t limited to the Hindi heartland but is spreading to states such as Tamil Nadu, where the number dropped to 921 from 927.

While socioeconomic conditions and lack of job opportunities for women – and not just gender discrimination or patriarchy – might have contributed to fewer families welcoming a girl child, the key problem seems to be that the states have been unable to implement the Pre-Conception & Pre-Natal Diagnostic Techniques Act 1994 (PCPNDT Act) in letter and spirit. A few months ago, women and child development minister Maneka Gandhi opened a can of worms when she proposed the introduction of mandatory tests to determine the sex of an unborn child to counter female foeticide in the country. While obstetricians and radiologists welcome the proposal, saying restrictions are not a solution as ultrasounds are a medical necessity, women’s rights groups condemned it because such a move could lead to victimisation of women and lead to more unsafe abortions (The Hindustan Times 2016).

The foreign observer is confronted by a paradox: unlike other states in which increased wealth and newly available technology have helped reduce the stigma attached to girl babies, in India, it tends to reinforce it. Its leaders, no doubt worried about maintaining the ‘Rising India’ brand image, seem to have little intention of initiating a mass campaign that might drag the country towards change in dominant collective mentalities. It is true that in the West, the concept of the ‘child-king’ has gradually come into being, as the living conditions of most of the less privileged got better, the welfare state provided for the population, offering healthcare, as well as taking measures to assure material security even for those
struck down by periods of unemployment or sickness. The rise of populism in the West, following a severe economic crisis, now tends to push couples to avoid large families. The consumer society has also promoted something condemned by most religions: individualism.

The path taken by society in India and Pakistan is different. No doubt many remain attached to traditional values, but one may be sure that consumerism will come to play a bigger role, and some of those values will come to be seen by many as passé and out-dated. This was, at least, the case in Western Europe and North American societies. It is the case that governments in these regions were concerned by the threat of communism, against which they sought to build a rampart through allying democracy, education – for the most free, and healthcare. Globalisation took over after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and economic liberalisation has rendered individuals responsible for their own economic and social fate. In such an environment, one may doubt whether the Indian and Pakistani authorities will, belatedly, acknowledge that enlightened universal education and free healthcare for needy are necessary steps on the path to developing a social structure that undermines ancestral hierarchies. The first beneficiaries would be men, since they enjoy unrestricted access to the public sphere. Improvement in living conditions for men is probably also a condition for the progressive betterment of living standards for women, as well as for changes in the legal system, including personal laws based around religious community that continues to keep women within an enclosed space. Once upon a time, the West was equally attached to Christian values that were in effect traditional – and patriarchal – codes. In this author’s view, the push for women’s empowerment will remain ineffective unless men, traditional decision-takers within the family, have different opportunities; only then they may accept to cede a part (and initially it will be a very small part!) of their prerogative of power.

Childhood and Malnutrition

There remains the issue of unfavourable indicators, particularly in the fields of health and education. Life, especially in the countryside in both states, is still tough. Both have developed nuclear weapons, but other more basic policies to ensure the well-being of their citizens are yet to be put in place. In such a context, it is the most vulnerable – women but also children – who pay a heavy price. Despite India and Pakistan being regional powers, malnutrition remains only too prevalent:

Half of the world’s malnourished children are to be found in just three countries – Bangladesh, India and Pakistan. There could be no greater irony than the fact that of the seven declared nuclear states in the world, two – India and Pakistan – account for more undernourished children than any other country in the world in absolute terms. In fact, the child malnutrition rates in India and Pakistan are (…) much higher than in sub-Saharan Africa on average (Mehrotra 2006: 912).

Mehrotra underlines the point that many of the consequences of malnutrition on a child are more or less irreversible. He reminds us that these 'start in utero and extend well into adolescent and adult life':
First, low birth weight (LBW) infants who have suffered intra-uterine growth retardation (IUGR) as foetuses are born undernourished and are at a far higher risk of dying in the neo natal period or later infancy. If they survive, they are unlikely to catch up on this lost growth later and have a higher probability of suffering a variety of developmental deficits. Second, during infancy and early childhood, infections and insufficient intake of nutrients exacerbate the effects of foetal growth retardation (...). Third… even if the adolescent catches up on some lost growth, the effect of early childhood malnutrition may not be fully corrected (Ibid.).

In a document entitled *The Hidden Hunger: Malnutrition in Pakistan*, the website of Triple Bottom-Line (TBL), which describes itself as a knowledge-based publication, focusing on corporate social responsibility (CSR) issues, lists the causes of malnutrition in the country. For example:

Iodine deficiency is a major public health problem in Pakistan and is a threat to the social and economic development of the country. The main factor responsible for iodine deficiency is a low dietary supply of iodine … the most damaging disorders induced by iodine deficiency are irreversible mental retardation and cretinism. If iodine deficiency occurs during the most critical period of brain development (from the fetal stage up to the third month after birth), the resulting thyroid failure will lead to irreversible alterations in brain function. While cretinism is the most extreme manifestation, of considerably greater significance are the more subtle degrees of mental impairment leading to poor school performance, reduced intellectual ability and impaired work capacity (TBL n.d.).

In addition:

It is well-documented that iron deficiency leads to impaired cognitive development and poor performance in school. Iron deficiency is one of the most prevalent nutritional disorders and has a large impact on economic productivity…Protein-energy malnutrition is also very common in Pakistan and leads to a condition called kwashiorkor. Lack of protein can cause growth failure, loss of muscle mass, decreased immunity, and weakening of the heart and respiratory system (Ibid.).

It would be simplistic to blame families that privilege male offspring, forgetting that girls and young women also need sufficient calorie intake even as males are still considered the main family bread-winners. One also needs to look at why there is not adequate nutritious food to go round. Boys may well get more on their plate than their sisters, but both may suffer from malnutrition. Figures from the World Health Organisation (WHO) tend to refute the suggestion that boys enjoy a balanced diet. This perhaps simply goes to show that only a negligible section of the population is in a position to stave off hunger. The WHO website provides figures allowing one to gauge the extent – considerable – of infant malnutrition in India and Pakistan. Curiously enough, in Pakistan, boys seem to suffer this more commonly than girls. May this be since biologically they have higher caloric intake needs than girls?
Table 3: Children Aged <5 Years Underweight (%) in Pakistan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Both Sexes</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Male</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2012-2013</td>
<td>31.6</td>
<td>29.1</td>
<td>34.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>30.9</td>
<td>30.4</td>
<td>31.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>31.3</td>
<td>31.1</td>
<td>31.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>34.2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990-1994</td>
<td>35.3</td>
<td>36.5</td>
<td>34.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990-1991</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>37.6</td>
<td>40.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985-1987</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>48.3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


India, meanwhile, has managed to reduce the gap between girls and boys, which is less significant than one might have expected.

Table 4: Children Aged <5 Years Underweight (%) in India

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Both Sexes</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Male</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2005-2006</td>
<td>43.5</td>
<td>43.9</td>
<td>43.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998-1999</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>43.8</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996-1997</td>
<td>41.1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992-1993</td>
<td>50.7</td>
<td>48.8</td>
<td>52.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991-1992</td>
<td>56.6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988-1990</td>
<td>59.5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974-1979</td>
<td>67.3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Conclusion and Recommendations

This chapter has described two events that have gained particular infamy: in India, the horrible gang rape of Jyoti Singh on 16 December 2012, and the justifications raised by those who merit the term ‘killers’; and in Pakistan, the gang rape of Mukhataran Mai, condemned to this fate by the village panchayat on 22 June 2002. Even years later, these tragedies continue to provoke an involuntary shudder, particularly amongst women. After the Second World War, Allied Control Council (established by the victors in Germany) included rape as a crime against humanity. Yet, it was not until the beginning of the Twenty-First Century that world powers formally agreed, on 19 June 2008, when the Security Council adopted Resolution 1820 which states that:

... rape and other forms of sexual violence can constitute a war crime, a crime against humanity, or a constitutive act with respect to genocide, stresses the need for the exclusion of sexual violence crimes from amnesty provisions in the context of conflict resolution processes, and calls upon Member States to comply with their obligations for
prosecuting persons responsible for such acts, to ensure that all victims of sexual violence, particularly women and girls, have equal protection under the law and equal access to justice, and stresses the importance of ending impunity for such acts as part of a comprehensive approach to seeking sustainable peace, justice, truth, and national reconciliation (United Nations Security Council 2008).

This is an indication of the slow changes in the dominant collective wisdom. There are many circumstances in which the female body is objectified. The right to abortion continues to provoke a particularly intense debate. Many are quick to condemn women who rid themselves of an unwanted birth, implying they are denying society lives that are its due. At the same time, however, far fewer contest the outbreak and pursuit of wars that inevitably bring about the deaths of persons whose birth and childhood have cost society so much.

The clothes that enclose women’s bodies are in a sense evidence of the difficulty they have to fully assert their citizenship. To simplify, there are two competing visions today; that prevalent in the West, of a consumer society in which a ‘free’ woman is expected to dress lightly, and that widespread in the East which emphasises the respect that a woman owes to herself by adopting ‘modest’ dress. In both cases, one might imagine that, left to their own devices and without pressure from childhood through to adulthood, the great majority of women would opt for sober clothing – like men tend to do.

In effect, some in India express indignation at the abandonment of the traditional *shalwar kamiz* (comprising a loose shirt and baggy trousers) for forms that mould the line of the body. It is in Haryana that the most extreme position has been adopted by a *khappanchayat* that called on women to avoid spices in order, it was implied, to keep sexual desires under control; the female body should service solely as a receptacle for the growing foetus (Majumdar 2013). These *panchayats* push male relatives into ‘honour killings’ of their ‘womenfolk’ who wear western dress. They also insist that women should be chaperoned by a man when using a mobile phone. Following the murder on 18 September 2013 of a couple from the village of Garnavati (Rohtak District, Haryana), 130 kms west of Delhi, the *khappanchayat* of the locality approved the act, arguing that:

Narendar Barak (…) had killed his daughter Nidhi Barak and beheaded Dharmendra Barak for defying the Jat norm proscribing marriage within the same *gotra* (clan). As a chilling warning to other youngsters, the bodies of the murdered couple were put

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16 *Khappanchayat* are community groups — usually comprising elderly men from the *Jat* community — that set the rules in an area comprising one or more villages. Transgressors’ penalty can be serious. This council of elders has regained authority after an amendment to the Hindu Marriage Act (1955) that outlawed marriages within the same *gotra* (sub-caste), including the mother’s *gotra* and within the same village. Local customs dictate that a boy and girl of the same *gotra* are brother and sister (The Hindustan Times 2010). Note that according to the Free Dictionary (2016 edition) the *Jats* are a ‘peasant caste residing in the Punjab and other areas of northern India and Pakistan, comprising Muslim, Hindu, and Sikh groups’. 

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on a tractor and paraded across the village…Khap leaders argue that if women wear Western clothes, young men get attracted towards them, leading to either sexual assault or consensual sexual relations in disregard to social norms, which leads to killings that are ‘necessary to protect the community’s honour’ (…)．

Hardeep Singh Ahrawat, the chief of the Rohtak Chaurasi Khap, an umbrella body of 84 khaps across the district. “Western wear, especially in colleges, leads to sexual attraction,” he says. “And this leads to rape in some cases. In other cases, it leads to incestuous relationships and marriages between boys and girls belonging to the same gotra or the same village, both of which are forbidden in our community (Ibid.).

Hardeep Singh Ahrawat declared himself against ‘honour killings’. However:

The onus to prevent them has been put squarely on the shoulders of young women, who must conform to the khaps’ diktats, or else, be prepared to face the consequences (Ibid.).

The journalist Majumdar concluded with a cry of alarm, ‘Welcome to the medieval world of khaps, still alive and kicking in the Twenty-First Century’ (Ibid.).

Neighbouring Pakistan is also the scene of ‘crimes of honour’. In her introduction, Ali (2001: 8) writes that:

In Pakistan, when a man takes the life of a woman and claims he did so because she was guilty of immoral conduct, it is called an ‘honour killing’, not murder. The killing of the ‘adulterous’ female – and sometimes, but not always, of the man named as her illicit partner – is intended to ease shame, restore honour and enforce a social code that defines and controls women’s lives. Thus ‘honour killing’ is also a term that is advanced – and often accepted by the community and the state’s judicial system – as acceptable motive and a legitimate defence for murder…Essentially, the conduct of a woman is to be regulated and judged by men. If she transgressed the boundaries, she dishonours them and is punished for it.

The author added that:

The major taboo of course remains sex outside marriage which, for a woman, may constitute a certain invitation for killing. Today, however, she puts her life at risk if she chooses to assert her autonomy in the area of marriage and divorce (Ali 2001: 31).

At a second stage, this study endeavoured to tackle the demographic issues in India and Pakistan, in particular how these affect women. It looked at the preference of families, especially those who aim to remain small in number, for male children. The situation in India is especially alarming, since inhabitants have often used echography and sex selective abortion. The country is, thus, short of women of marriageable age. Social workers with
whom the author of this article spoke in Kolkata in 2011 stated that some Punjabi males travelled to Bengal, a much poorer state, to purchase a bride. If the price was too high, two or three brothers might share the same spouse, the rule being that the first-born was the child of the eldest brother, the second that of the middle brother, and the third offspring would be for the youngest of the siblings. Evidently, the mother was expected to give birth to boys, if not she might risk rejection and ‘re-sale’. Despite the terrible social consequences of such a state of affairs, the social workers assured the author that it was impossible to convince the men that it was the sperm alone that determined sex of the infant. This also appears to be the case in neighbouring Pakistan, as a number of social workers have informed the author. Recent figures that would allow the researcher to draw similar conclusions regarding the use of echography, however, are not available. Abortion is illegal, but there are other means to ‘get rid’ of unwanted female births, such as neglecting the care provided to them.

The issue of clothing, ‘crimes of honour’, gender-based violence but also demographic issues mask a significant dimension - that of a society still structured by patriarchal principles that work to oppose a slow evolution towards greater visibility of women in spheres long deemed male domains. The aim is, thus, to freeze the position of women, including those who wear traditional dress. It is to block their access to better education and to paid formal employment in a town, or to prevent them assuming, like males in the household - a leading role in a farming business. In showing their attachment to the practice of women confined to the same role that was theirs since centuries, men betray their fear of a diverse society that can evolve and in which their role would inevitably be constrained insofar as women would take on a broader one. One should note here, notwithstanding the above, that many men in the subcontinent work actively towards better conditions for women.

It is difficult to offer female babies a cherished place when their own mothers find themselves in such a socio-cultural environment. The foreign researcher in the subcontinent, particularly if he or she is of Western origin, who raises such an issue is likely to be told in no uncertain terms in Pakistan and even more so in India, that one should not confute sensationalising media pieces with a much more nuanced reality. Fair enough. And yet, the issue of female birth rates (especially in India) is linked to the existence of those who refuse to see patriarchal ancestral values replaced by (or even modified) citizenship values, which they claim for men alone.

Two terms have become particularly de rigueur: ‘education’ and the spreading of ‘awareness’, in order that society as a whole can rid itself of these evils. However, echography and sex-selected abortion are above all practiced by the Indian middle-classes. How can a change be brought in the dominant collective mentality, so that these demons cannot be exorcised? Meanwhile, most Pakistani and Indian political parties benefit from traditional gender and

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17 This chapter was written in 2016. In 2017, after a gap of 19 years, Pakistan held a national census.
class structures and have little intention of modifying these. They will not risk taking away from many Indian and Pakistani males their only power.

It is, thus, a sensitive matter to call on them to work, if not for the equality of the sexes, then at least the protection of the female sex and the improvement of the status of women. The call must be made to civil society that it take the initiative in campaigning across towns and the countryside to sensitise families to the danger that these countries as a whole face as a result of the imbalance between boys and girls as reflected in their population pyramids.

It should also appeal to the authority of religious leaders in order that the latter proclaim loud and clear that it is a crime to prevent the birth of male and female being that the Almighty has chosen to bring into the world. It is essential to remind the medical profession of its duty to respect the Hippocratic Oath. Doctors would then oppose abortions that are not a medical necessity due to health risks to the mother or foetus, where the simple desire to avoid having a baby daughter was the apparent motivation. They could draw support from legislation implemented rigorously by the authorities, underlining that they respected the freedom of the individual, but also the rights of the foetus. The two countries also need to recruit social workers, who, as in the West, should visit families which deny care to their daughters. This would be a sensitive task of monitoring, relying on schools (if such children attend) or the neighbours of negligent families. A majority of Pakistanis and Indians continue to believe that only boy children will look after them in their old age, and are aware that comprehensive welfare systems are still a long way off. Only the establishment of a proper health system and the payment of retirement benefits would allow a measure of security in the face of an uncertain future. Such recommendations are unsatisfactory, since one should also attempt a description of the living conditions of those in rural areas, including sanitary issues. Additionally, one should look at the question of marriage and the protection that personal law systems can offer to women.

The highly respected Communist leader from Kerala, E.M.S. Namboodiripad (1909-1998), who used to refer to pitiful rights allowed to women, by the system of personal law, was of the view that the first priority to rectify this was to promote education. Girls who grow up to be educated women would be in a position to demand their own rights within their own communities. The author is conscious of the obligation imposed by mehman nawazi (hospitality), from which the foreign visitor benefits in India and Pakistan. We will, therefore, abstain from addressing the personal law issue directly. To conclude, instead, the author emphasises the need to reform a political, economic and social structure that tends to perpetuate inequality. It is for elites in India and Pakistan to rediscover the messages that the founding fathers of the two countries had crafted. These envisaged a nation for all, male or female, of whatever religious or ethnic origin, of whichever social background. Similarly, independent Pakistan and India foresaw a place of respect for women, adopting constitutions that enshrined fundamental rights, including that of the vote, to both sexes. The elite of the two neighbouring states, concerned about private interest, seem to have partially forgotten the role of driver of progress that ought to have remained theirs.
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The Missing: Indian and Pakistani Demography


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Discrimination in Pakistan’s Legal Profession: Attitudes and Perceptions of Minorities and the Majority*
Muhammad Jamal Janjua**

Abstract
The Constitution of Pakistan is the guardian of the fundamental rights of its citizens, irrespective of religion, caste, creed or colour. Articles 20 and 25 of the Constitution provide equal protection of the law, prohibit any form of discrimination, and provide guarantees of religious freedom, freedom of thought and conscience to the citizens. However, due to several interconnected factors, society has become increasingly unaccepting of the faith of minority communities, and has slid towards majoritarianism. This drift away from democratic ideals has allowed certain sections of the majority to gain disproportionate space in Pakistani society. In this context, a research was carried out (between November 2015 and January 2016) to gauge the level of religious discrimination within the legal fraternity, and how much of the society’s attitudes towards minorities are reflected in the justice system. It assessed the Bar associations, their structure and the level of integration of different religious groups within these bodies. In addition, it determined the perception and opinions of practicing lawyers on human rights, equality and other ideals; and assessed to what extent internationally accepted standards are adhered to. There were a series of interactions with judicial officers, regarding the concept of religious freedoms, equality, equality of law and how they manifest within the judicial system and the decisions of the courts.

During the course of the study, it was observed that the Bar as well as the Bench have exhibited insensitivity, and in some cases outright discrimination towards non-Muslim legal practitioners; its reflection can be seen from Bar politics in hiring of judicial officers, and in some incidents even in the decisions made by the courts. The study recommends that certain constitutional and legal provisions should be revisited in light of internationally accepted norms on equality and human rights. The judgment of the Supreme Court in a suo moto action regarding a ‘suicide bomb attack on 22 September 2012 on a church in Peshawar, and threats given to the Kalash tribe and Ismailis in Chitral’ should be implemented. Better training of judges along with comprehensive and fair selection process should also be ensured for all candidates. In addition, adequate opportunities and fair chances of progression should also be given to non-Muslims within the judicial system.

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Introduction

Rationale for the Study

This study looks primarily at the perceptions and attitudes of lawyers and judges towards their colleagues from minority communities in four districts of Pakistan. In addition, it addresses the related issue of the impact that discriminatory constitutional and legal frameworks have had on society. The aim is not to assess the overall discriminatory mindset that prevails in the country, but merely to look at how it is reflected in the legal profession. This is a sector in which professionals are in a special position, since they are not only affected by general social attitudes, but also understand constitutional provisions and relevant legal instruments that can marginalise communities such as minorities.¹ The general attitude of majority lawyers and judges towards their minority colleagues not only reflects the problems faced by the latter, but also indicates the reduced odds of minorities getting justice compared to the majority.

For civil society, it is important to understand the internal dynamics of the justice system, considering that there has been a lot of criticism of Jirgas and other informal mechanisms. Not only are these structures patriarchal, they also do not allow any space to members of minorities and other marginalised groups. The whole campaign of civil society is to encourage people to move away from these informal mechanisms towards more formal structures of the state. These efforts will not be worthwhile until citizens have faith in the judicial system and believe that it will dispense justice irrespective of creed and socioeconomic standing.

This research, thus, examines the justice system and its functioning, and will try and gauge the forms and extent of discrimination that exists within this system. The idea is to capture and highlight problems in the formal structures, keeping in mind these are the very institutions that are intended to protect the rights of vulnerable groups. If they themselves have widespread discrimination, how can they be expected to aid in the dispensation of justice to the most vulnerable groups in our society? It will subsequently address the following questions: Do minority lawyers feel discriminated against by their fellow majority lawyers and judges? What is the level of participation and representation in Bar elections and structures, respectively? What is the perception and attitude of majority judges and lawyers, regarding judges from minority communities? In addressing these questions, the study will gauge the working environment of judges and lawyers from minority communities, and explore the nature and level of discrimination they face while practicing their profession.

Methodology

In examining opinions of minority lawyers and judges, and the perceptions and attitudes of majority judges and lawyers towards their minority colleagues, the study attempts to capture both covert and overt discriminatory attitudes and practices prevalent in the system. This

¹ Majority lawyers and judges include those who are Muslims, both Shia and Sunni, and minority refer to all non-Muslim communities.
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will help in understanding the working conditions of practitioners from minority communities.

This study was undertaken in Multan, Lahore, Rawalpindi, and Peshawar. These cities have very different dynamics which help one understand the relationship between discriminatory attitudes and varying socio-cultural contexts. The tools for data collection used were Focus Group Discussions (FGDs), Key Informant Interviews (KII), and observations of the researcher. A total of 12 FGDs were carried out with lawyers and Bar members in these four areas. There were three FGDs per district: one with a group of lawyers from minority communities, the second with a group of Muslim lawyers, and the third with majority female lawyers. KIIs were carried out with lawyers and judges from both minority and Muslim communities. A total of 40 KIIs were carried out during the course of the study, 10 each in Lahore, Multan, Rawalpindi, and Peshawar. Half of the KIIs were with senior lawyers and the rest with retired and serving judges of both lower and higher courts.

Minorities in Pakistan: An Overview
Pakistan was initially envisaged as a state that would not only protect the rights of Muslims against the Hindu majority in combined India, but also protect and treat at par the minorities who reside in it. Over time, it has moved towards becoming one of the most inhospitable countries for religious minorities. According to the ranking issued by Minority Rights Group International, since 2008 Pakistan has continuously featured in the top ten countries in the ‘people under threat’ rankings. The US Commission on International Religious Freedom has recommended that the State Department designate Pakistan as a Country of Particular Concern (CPC), which can lead to economic and other sanctions (Six and Ispahani 2015). It would not be wrong to say that the state has been instrumental in creating an enabling environment for discrimination towards minorities in Pakistan. Its origins can be traced from the time when religion was brought into formal matters of the state through the Objectives Resolution in 1949 (see Annexure A). In response to the tabling of this Resolution, Sri Chandra Chattopadhyay in his speech to the Constituent Assembly stated:

What I hear in this Resolution is not the voice of the great creator of Pakistan, the Quaid-e-Azam (may his soul rest in peace), not even that of the Prime Minister of Pakistan, the Honourable Mr Liaquat Ali Khan but of the ulemas2 of the land… This Resolution, in its present form, epitomises that spirit of reaction. That spirit will not remain confined to the precincts of this House. It will send its waves to the countryside as well (Jilani 2013).

The role of religion in matters of the state was further enhanced under the Islamisation programme during General Zia-ul-Haq’s era, which promoted an orthodox view of Islam within Pakistan. This, together with Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and Pakistan’s support

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2 Religious clerics.
for the mujahideen created an atmosphere in which religious parties and groups became increasingly influential in decisions of the state. Even after Zia’s death, the situation did not improve as intolerance and religious extremism had already taken root in society and there was no conscious effort by the state to reverse the trend. The impact of these events was not limited to minorities as Muslims were also targeted by a group that sought to make its ideology dominant over all others.

Discrimination cannot only be attributed to the interplay of socioeconomic factors in the country, as legal frameworks had and still have an important role in either deterring or encouraging certain unwanted practices. The state in Pakistan has made persecution of minorities by the majority an easy task by introducing discriminatory legal structures. As a result, there have been a number of reported cases of discrimination and persecution of minorities, and consequently, we see many minorities migrating out of the country. For instance, according to United Nations (UN) statistics, some 4,000 people are believed to be living illegally in Thailand after fleeing from Pakistan (Six and Ispahani 2015).

**A Few Recent Events**

Recent events give a glimpse into the condition of minorities living in Pakistan. In November 2015 in Jehlum, a chipboard factory was torched by a mob on accusation that a copy of the Qur’an was burnt by the security guard in-charge who was an Ahmedi. The next day, an Ahmedi worship place in Jehlum was torched by another mob in reaction to the accusation (Kayani 2015). In another incident, a shopkeeper at a popular shopping plaza Haifeez Centre in Lahore placed a sign outside his shop, prohibiting the entry of Ahmedis. Reacting to his subsequent arrest, traders observed a strike and demanded his immediate release. The protestors also demanded that Ahmedis be forced to wear identification badges (Gabol 2015). Perhaps the most significant and horrific incident occurred in 2010 when an attack by armed men on an Ahmedi worship place led to over 95 people being killed and scores being injured (CNN 2010).

The situation of other minorities groups in the country is not very encouraging either. Christians face not only social discrimination, but are now increasingly being targeted by militant groups. In 2009, in Gojra, Toba Tek Singh, a mob killed eight people and burnt down 60 houses in a Christian colony, after rumours circulated that a few Christians had desecrated the Holy Qur’an. In 2013, a mob in Lahore attacked the Christian colony in Badami Bagh, ransacking and burning a number of houses following allegations of blasphemy against a Christian man (Ali 2013). In November 2014, a Christian couple in Kasur was set on fire by a mob in a brick kiln on charges of blasphemy (Ansari 2014). The Blasphemy Laws are used against Christians in particular to systematically persecute them in Pakistan. In quite a few cases, it has been observed that the matter is not even taken to courts anymore, and either an individual or a mob murders the accused as society ends up acting as judge, jury, and executioner. There are 14 people currently on death row for blasphemy,

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3 Those engaged in Jihad or holy war.
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including four Christians, while another 19 people are serving life sentences (Six and Ispahani 2015).

As a result of these developments, minorities in Pakistan live in a perpetual state of fear, and their participation in every field is restricted by a discriminatory legal framework and socioeconomic marginalisation. There have been no serious efforts by the state to tackle this issue, either due to political reasons or fear, especially after a series of assassinations of political and social workers who had openly opposed such persecutory laws. In order to stem growing extremism in the country, sustained and serious efforts will have to be made by the state to build a counter-narrative and bring an end to the enabling environment it has provided to religious groups.

**Constitutional Provisions and Laws Enacted**

Pakistan has a turbulent constitutional history. After the passage and eventual nullification of two previous constitutions, the present constitution was passed in 1973 during the government of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. It was agreed upon only after more than half of the country’s population had decided to part ways. All political parties, both religious and secular, signed the Constitution, which allowed for the formal role of religion in matters of the state. Islamic provisions were incorporated to satisfy and cater to the demands of the religious parties, which had emerged as important stakeholders in the country’s political arena.

The Constitution of Pakistan has provisions that are directly discriminatory or give preference to one religion over others, which in turn leads to discrimination. Going through some of the Articles in the Constitution, one can understand how the state laid a foundation for discrimination against minorities. Over time, this has seeped into politics, judicial and executive systems, and in the societal texture in general. For a brief overview of the major discriminatory constitutional provisions see Annex 1.

The declaration of Ahmedis as non-Muslims was a watershed moment in Pakistan’s history. This was the first occasion when the state entangled itself in a religious dispute, and took up the matter of defining who was a Muslim and who was a non-Muslim. With Ahmedis being termed non-Muslim, this definition was made part of the Constitution. However, the problem with the state siding with one or another interpretation of religion has been aptly explained by Justice Munir (1954) in his report on the anti-Ahmedi riots in Lahore. He notes:

> Keeping in view the several different definitions given by the Ulema, need we make any comment expect that no two learned divines are agreed on this fundamental… And if we adopt the definition given by anyone of the Ulema, we remain Muslims according to the view of that Alim, but Kafir⁴ according to the definition of everyone else.

⁴ Non-believers.
However, with this constitutional foundation laid down by the state, subsequent governments began enacting laws and amending some already existing ones, such as Article 295-C. Some of these laws were directly targeted at a particular community, for example Ordinance XX, 1984, due to which certain actions and even usage of certain words by Ahmedis became criminal offences under the Pakistan Penal Code (see Annex 2). As a result of this, some 3,800 Ahmedis have been booked under these laws between 1984 and 2014, for offences that include posing as Muslims, keeping a certain length of beard, and even displaying the *Kalima* (Aftab and Taj 2015). Furthermore, they note that the entire population of Rabwah, which is around 60,000 people, has been charged under 298-C twice – once in 1989 and then again in 2008. Similarly, the entire community of Ahmedis was charged under the same section for repairing their place of worship.

Other laws that have been enacted were based on the rationale that religious feelings and sentiments of different groups in Pakistan should be protected. However, these laws such 295, 295-C, 298, and 298-A are now being misused by the majority to persecute minorities in Pakistan (see Annexure B). One of the most controversial laws, and arguably the most misused one, is what is popularly called the Blasphemy Law. Since the amendment in 1986, which increased the sentence to life imprisonment, almost 1,300 cases have been registered under this section. According to a factsheet on the Blasphemy Law in 2010 by the daily Dawn newspaper (15 April 2010), of the total cases registered, 50 percent had been against non-Muslims, and the most affected were Christians and Ahmedi communities. Interestingly, before this amendment, only 14 cases had been reported between 1927 and 1986. In the same factsheet, one can also see a regional trend when it comes to blasphemy cases: roughly two-thirds are from Punjab, 15 percent from Sindh, followed by four percent from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK). Within Punjab, a majority of these cases were reported from regions in Central Punjab, i.e. Lahore, Nankana, Faisalabad, Sialkot, Kasur, Sheikhupura, Gujranwala, and Toba Tek Singh.

Laws have the capacity to regulate human behaviour and bring about lasting change in the structure of society. Hans Kelson (quoted in Fuller 1969) asserts that:

> [Laws] bring about a certain reciprocal behaviour of human beings: to make them refrain from certain acts which, for some reason are deemed detrimental to society, and to make them perform others for some reason, are considered useful to the society.

Laws do not always have the intended consequences, and enacted laws are not always rational and humane. If laws do not have strong fundamental rights principles backing them, they can become counterproductive and regressive for society. In Pakistan, the introduction of laws that specifically target different communities or try and give precedence to one over the rest, has moulded the society such that the majority has developed a sense of superiority over the others, and minorities have been further marginalised. After the fall of Nazi Germany, legal theorists were forced to revisit legal order theory. Drawing from the experience of Nazi Germany, they re-emphasised the principles that must be followed when making laws. And in this, the Principle of Generality was of utmost importance which states
that laws should neither support nor target specific individuals or groups, and that they should always be general in nature (Ibid.). Unfortunately, Pakistan has laws targeting specific groups and communities for their religious beliefs. And the admission of further interpretations of such discriminatory laws by the courts has set them as legal precedents, and made them part of common law. This has opened them up to wider interpretation which leads to further persecution of minorities.

Unless there is a serious effort to amend certain laws and constitutional provisions, one will continue to see these fractures grow in society and the living conditions for minorities in Pakistan will continue to get worse. Unless the government makes a focused and conscious effort to take away the legal instruments that facilitate the persecution of minorities, society will continue to experience killings, assaults, kidnappings, forced conversions, and increased migration of minorities within and outside the country.

**Research Findings**

**Understanding the Bar and Bench**

The Bar in Pakistan is divided into multiple groups competing with each other for influence and power. This division is neither based on ideology nor principle, but is merely a fight for dominance. Being associated with a strong group not only enhances lawyers’ earning potential, but also gets them an opening into the political arena, and thus they are also normally associated with some political party. The elevation of a lawyer to the Bench in the High Court greatly rests on the association with these lawyer groups. There are a very few cases in which a High Court judge was appointed without the support of a powerful lobby of lawyers. Association with one of these groups not only provides lawyers with a degree of protection against other competing institutions and stakeholders, but also determines the success of their practice.

There exists a strong *baradiri* (caste) system within the Bar, especially in Central and North Punjab. This trend, to a lesser extent, is also mirrored within the judiciary. Elections within the Bars follow the same trend that is seen in the general or local government elections. Gaining the support of two or three *baradiris* within the lawyer community significantly enhances the chances of winning elections. For instance, in Lahore, there are two major *baradiris*, the *Araeen* and the *Jutts*, and in order to have a fair chance of winning Bar elections, a candidate must align himself with either one of these groups. Apart from *baradiri*, there are many other factors that come into consideration when one runs for office. Caste, gender, social position, family background, religion, sect within their religion, and financial strength, all play an important part in one’s chances of getting elected. There have been very few cases in which a candidate was chosen solely for his competence and ability to deliver. During interviews with lawyers in Punjab, it was observed that a sizeable number of lawyers do not even vote for a lawyer who is from a lower caste. And when asked the reason, they respond: *Inn ki barkat hain theek nahi hoti* (They don’t conduct themselves properly).

Most practicing lawyers barely make ends meet, but there are others who have flourishing practices and are in a much stronger position to create influence and win favourable
treatment with the Bar and the Bench. For instance, if a lawyer runs for Bar President, even if he does not win, he would still become prominent enough to exert influence within the justice system. Contesting elections is by no means an inexpensive proposition. As per the figure given by different lawyers, it costs around 4 to 8 million Pakistani rupees to run for Bar President elections. And for the offices of district Bar in bigger cities like Lahore and Rawalpindi, the figure goes up substantially.

Lawyers who are elected to the office can exert considerable pressure on lower courts by virtue of their position. The office holders are not only elevated in terms of their stature and respect within the system, it also improves their financial standing. They begin to charge higher fees for the cases they get and clients are willing to pay more because of the higher probability of getting decisions in their favour. As some lawyers put it, Yahan chehroon ko insaaf milta hai (Only prominent lawyers get justice here). This sentiment reflects the enormous influence of certain groups, and individuals within those groups, over the Bar and the judiciary.

The socioeconomic construct of the Bar and the Bench indicates that there exists a multi-layered discriminatory attitude, ranging from gender, social standing, economic position, and religion. When it comes to minorities, most of whom are neither well off, nor enjoy high social standing, and above all are not part of the majority religion, they are placed in a very weak and vulnerable position. One should be careful to not classify minorities as one homogenous group, as there are further divisions and the level of discrimination also varies within these divisions. For instance, a female lawyer or judge from a minority community is in a far more vulnerable position compared to men. Similarly, different religious groups are also treated differently. As one case in point, the level of discrimination and hostility faced by Ahmedi lawyers and judges easily surpasses the discrimination faced by all other groups.

Discrimination against Minorities
The study was conducted in Multan, Lahore, Islamabad/Rawalpindi, and Peshawar. The findings from these areas cannot be generalised to represent the entire country, nor was this the aim. It is merely a glimpse into the working conditions of minority lawyers and judges within these main Bars in Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

It was observed that in South Punjab, the level of discrimination faced by practitioners was relatively lower compared to cities like Lahore and Rawalpindi. Moreover, in terms of discriminatory attitudes, lawyers and judges in Peshawar are in a far better position compared to their colleagues in Punjab. To explain these differences, one has to address the socioeconomic constructs of different regions as well as their histories, which is outside the mandate of this chapter and warrants a completely new study. However, the varying degrees of discrimination in these areas can be examined through some basic observations made during the research.

It was observed that there is significant correlation between socioeconomic class of the minority community lawyers, and the perception the majority holds of their colleagues. The perception of discrimination faced by minorities themselves also differs with socioeconomic
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standing. In Punjab, Christians and Hindus are traditionally associated with a certain blue-collar job, which lays the basis for discriminatory attitudes towards them. The construct of society also has an impression on the perceptions and attitudes of people. In Punjab where the social construct is more vertical and the caste system is deeply embedded, we see a higher degree of discrimination against minorities. They are not only discriminated against because they fall in the low-income strata, but also because they are low in the hierarchy of social standing, which is an important factor particularly in Punjab.

However, the usual pattern of discrimination breaks down when minority lawyers and judges move beyond a certain socioeconomic class. The lawyers and judges surveyed came from different socioeconomic backgrounds. Those who were relatively higher on the socioeconomic order had a different experience from those below them. For instance, the family members of Chaudhary Chandu Lal, who were also lawyers, due to the social status they enjoyed did not face the degree of discrimination their other colleagues experienced. Similarly, the perceptions and experiences of a former judge of the High Court who is now a practicing lawyer, did not match those of other lawyers from his community.

Perception and Understanding of Majority Lawyers

The understandings of different religions in our society are shaped by factors such as economic standing, social setups, legal frameworks, and a skewed understanding of both Pakistani and Islamic history. These factors play an integral part in shaping people’s perceptions and attitudes, which eventually reflect in their behaviour towards minorities. Being part of society, lawyers and judges have also been socialised in a manner in which they think of minorities as being inferior to the Muslim majority. One common assumption is that the attitude of lawyers might be different or better compared to the general populace since they are well versed in the concepts of individual and human rights. Interestingly, the lawyers interviewed for this study were also of the view that they were in a better situation to understand these issues, and constantly referred to themselves as the ‘cream of the society’. However, a sizable number of lawyers, either overtly or covertly, also discriminated against their non-Muslim colleagues.

During interviews, most lawyers denied that systemic discrimination exists in their profession. However, while they were not ready to admit the problem exists, the responses they gave reflected biases and discriminatory attitudes they held towards their minority colleagues. Some of these were perhaps unintentional and a result of biases that society has fed them over time, but there were many lawyers who knowingly discriminated against

\[5\] Chaudhary Chandu Lal was a prominent Christian lawyer and member of the Punjab Assembly in united India. Mr Muhammad Ali Jinnah approached him to convince him and other Christian members to cast their votes in favour of Pakistan. Mr Chandu Lal assured Mr Jinnah of unconditional support from the Christian community. When the resolution was moved to decide upon joining either India or Pakistan in the Punjab Legislative Assembly, Mr Chandu Lal and his fellow members from the Christian community voted in favour of Pakistan, and these three votes made the difference in the tally of 88 to 91, against and in favour of Pakistan respectively.
minorities. For instance, a lawyer interviewed in Multan, while boasting about his liberal credentials, constantly referred to Hindus as Indians. In another interview, again a senior lawyer in a group was adamant that non-Muslims are treated at par with Muslim colleagues and there is no discrimination in the Bar, and that most lawyers are liberal and have risen above societal attitudes. And yet, towards the end of the discussion, he also admitted that he and other lawyers have a bias against Ahmedis and further went on to refer to Hindus as nauvarbas (swindlers). However, there are also lawyers, most of them in Multan, who were mindful of the fact that there is discrimination against their minority colleagues, and narrated many such incidents. They had a better understanding of the issues and were more sensitive towards the problem.

**Peshawar as Opposed to Areas in Punjab**

It was encouraging to see that the attitude of lawyers in Peshawar (KPK) was different from their colleagues in Punjab. They were more open about the issues and discussed them willingly and with ease. In Peshawar, the Muslim lawyers reported very few incidents in which non-Muslim lawyers were discriminated against. The exception to the above trend is the Ahmedi community, which faces similar conditions in Peshawar and Punjab. The perception and understanding of Muslim lawyers on discrimination closely matched the perception of the lawyers from religious minorities in Peshawar, which was not the case in Punjab. The lawyers in Peshawar were also more open and less emotional about discussing religious opinions. Furthermore, discussion on issues such as blasphemy was not considered taboo. In Peshawar, this issue was discussed openly with the lawyers, and it was also debated in a group while sitting inside the Peshawar High Court Bar room. However, in Punjab it would be comparatively difficult to discuss the Blasphemy Law openly while sitting in Bar rooms.

It was interesting to note that Muslim female lawyers were more sensitive and aware of the issues faced by their minority colleagues, especially those faced by women. Female lawyers not only narrated incidents of discrimination against their fellow lawyers, they were also more open about sensitive religious issues. They recounted a number of incidents of discrimination, and some of these were the same ones that their male counterparts had narrated. However, the assessment and understanding of those issues was quite different from their male colleagues. For instance, female lawyers mentioned a minority female lawyer who was coerced into voting for a specific candidate in Rawalpindi Bar elections. The men were of the opinion that it would have happened to anyone irrespective of religion, but female lawyers did not agree with this. They said that if the female lawyer in question had been Muslim, the whole Bar would have stood behind her.

They spoke openly about religiously sensitive cases, and issues such as forced conversions, rapes, and abductions. They were also more mindful of the feelings of their minority colleagues and in some cases made conscious efforts to make them feel welcome. When they were asked in the FGDs in all the locations whether they can discuss blasphemy cases in the female Bar rooms, they responded in the affirmative, and also said that they did not think
majority female lawyers would create any problems. A few of them referred to the reason for blasphemy cases as ‘men fighting with each other for power and nothing else.’

It was also interesting to note that when majority lawyers and judges were asked for a percentage of lawyers who they perceive as conservative and holding a bias against their minority colleagues, the number hovered around 20-30 percent. This was significantly different from the perception of minority lawyers, who saw this percentage at around 80 percent. In general, lawyers reported that religiously conservative lawyers have a sizable vote bank, which can significantly enhance chances of reaching office. They also said that the reason why around 400 lawyers signed a petition to defend Mumtaz Qadri was that it would allow them to tap into the religiously conservative vote bank amongst lawyers. The overall attitude in Bars can also be gauged by another widely reported incident in which a resolution was passed in the Rawalpindi Bar that no lawyer was to work as prosecutor in Salman Taseer’s murder case. Although Bar resolutions are not binding, they are largely followed or adhered to by a majority of lawyers.

This research ascertains that there is a significant number of lawyers and judges who have discriminatory attitudes and behaviours towards their minority colleagues, and the number goes further up when religiously sensitive cases are tried in the court. This comes from the social structure, educational curriculum, and a sense of religious superiority over others, which is deeply reflected in their practices. Moreover, during interactions with Muslim lawyers, both through FGDs and KII, it was observed that a majority of Muslim lawyers did not see it as a prevalent problem and constantly denied that there was any form of discrimination in their profession. One can see a clear pattern of either denial or lack of understanding of the issues faced by minorities.

**Perception and Understanding of Minority Lawyers and Judges**

The perceptions of minority lawyers were quite different from those of Muslim lawyers. They reported quite a few incidents of discrimination against them, which they felt were deemed normal by the majority. Minority lawyers, especially in smaller cities, keep to themselves and try to stay out of politics and the spotlight. They felt that the mind-set and general attitude of lawyers was not very inclusive. It was also observed that the sense and perception of discrimination varied widely between those lawyers who came from strong social and economic backgrounds compared to those who had neither lineage nor wealth to fall back on in times of trouble. The feeling of being discriminated against was particularly high among minority lawyers who were the first out of their families to pursue this profession. Interestingly, it was not uncommon to see that incidents that would normally be considered discriminatory were taken in stride as part of life, and there was an attitude of resignation to fate. A very senior lawyer and ex-judge, when asked what he felt about the constitutional provision barring a non-Muslim from becoming the President of Pakistan, did not see it as discrimination and argued that out of 180 million only one becomes the President, so ‘it doesn’t really matter to us.’
Very few cases were reported in which minority lawyers were referred to as *chooras* or with any other derogatory term. One lawyer narrated an incident that while he was standing outside a lecture hall to attend a lecture of a senior minority lawyer, he overheard two lawyers outside the hall saying out loud, *kisay chorian de gal sunan ja rahe ho*? (Why are you going to the lecture given by a Christian?), and they did not realise that there were many Christians standing around them. But such cases are few and it cannot be inferred that they are usual occurrences in the Bar. When asked if they face any trouble in renting offices in *katcheris* (courts), all the people interviewed reported that they had neither experienced nor heard of any such incident. However, this observation does not hold true when it comes to the Ahmedi community. Minority lawyers did report being asked to convert numerous times by their fellow lawyers. This was occasionally slipped in casually during normal conversations, and they were advised to follow the right path and convert. This is not something uncommon for minorities in Pakistan, but to expect this from an educated group, which is well versed in law and concepts of human rights warrants mention.

When asked about interaction with minority community lawyers, both Muslims and minority groups, and respondents were of the view that in terms of professional exchange, they saw relations between them as normal, but one would rarely see members from the majority and minority being very close to each other. It was observed that there were certain boundaries that the minorities were not comfortable going beyond.

Furthermore, cases were reported where integration efforts by the Bar ended up reflecting a sense of superiority and to a certain degree callous attitude towards the sentiments of the minority community. It was reported by lawyers in Rawalpindi that the district Bar organised an event to celebrate Christmas, and the event started and ended with *naats* (verses in praise of Prophet Muhammad PBUH). This incident is a reflection of the general lack of understanding and sensitivity of majority lawyers towards their minority colleagues. In fact, the same event was narrated by Muslim lawyers as an example of how they have risen above these attitudes, which was quite different from the perception of minority lawyers.

Female minority lawyers are in an even more vulnerable position as they face issues in addition to the general problems faced by the minority. Women reported that they have been asked out and even sent marriage proposals by male Muslims colleagues, who argue that they can marry them as they are *Ahl-e-Kitab* (People of the Book). Marriage proposals, expressions of interest, and even harassment incidents were reported by Muslim female lawyers as well. But the difference is that Muslim women have confronted lawyers who have harassed them, but minority women out of fear do not stand up to such people. A case was reported in the Multan Bar where a female lawyer filed a complaint against a fellow lawyer for harassment; when women lawyers were asked if a minority female lawyer could also have taken the same step, most of them were of the view that for a non-Muslim female lawyer, this line of action may not be possible and would create further problems for her. According to the Christian female lawyers, the most frustrating part in such situations is their inability to react and confront, which leads to a sense of helplessness. This observation holds true for minority women in general, despite the fact that one would expect lawyers to be aware of their rights, and be more willing to stand up for them, even approaching legal forums in
place to protect them. However, that was not the case. Minority female lawyers were not willing to risk confrontation with the majority.

A female civil judge from a minority community reported that throughout the time she was practicing she was referred to as 'Christian kurri wakeel' (Christian female lawyer). 'I was not referred to as a lawyer but as a Christian, then a woman, and then lawyer,' she recounted. She reported that she was even asked questions such as whether she will be cremated like Hindus when she dies. She also said that during the interview for appointment as a judge, 'I was asked whether I would decide as per my faith or the law of the land,' which she saw as very offensive. Similarly, other female prosecutors and retired judges also reported similar questions being asked during the selection process.

Women also had an acute sense of perception of discrimination as opposed to their male counterparts. There were issues that women felt were discriminatory as opposed to minority men who took them as the norm. For instance, women objected to the fact that they were referred to as Christian lawyers and not lawyers, but men did not really see it as a problem.

Religiously Sensitive Cases
It was reported that when religiously sensitive cases such as forced marriages and conversations come to the courts, the attitude of lawyers in general, specifically of those arguing against them, becomes hostile. Minority lawyers are immediately taken out of the category of fellow lawyers who are practicing their profession, and placed in the non-Muslim category. Even the Muslim lawyers who take up such cases are asked: ‘Why are you taking this case, they [minority lawyers] have to, because they are the same, but why you?’ Lawyers from minority communities argued that when they confront such issues in any way — through cases, in politics, in clientele, or any other issue — the line of religion is immediately drawn and they have to step back a little. One Christian lawyer in Lahore reported that one of his Muslim colleagues, while sitting in the Bar room, used objectionable language against Jesus Christ. On confronting him, other lawyers intervened to diffuse the situation. When asked if he thought of getting an FIR registered under 295-C, he smiled and said, ‘I can’t go against the majority, and even if I did, it would have somehow ended up on my head.’

It was also interesting to note that when minority lawyers were asked if being a minority is a hindrance in getting elected to the Bar, almost all respondents were of the opinion that religion becomes a factor when they run for elections. One lawyer quoted his Muslim lawyer friend as saying, ‘If by some chance you do get elected, the maximum they will tolerate is you becoming an executive member and nothing more.’ When the same question was put to Muslims lawyers, they argued that as such there is no restriction on anyone contesting elections, but also that being non-Muslim limits the chances of getting elected.

The diminished chances are not only because of religion, but also due to caste and baradiri structures that are devoutly held onto within the lawyer community. Non-Muslims are generally considered to be from low social castes and not part of a strong baradiri. This
coupled with their religion makes it almost impossible for them to get elected to positions in the Bar. This is again much more prevalent in Punjab than in KPK, where people were more open to the idea of non-Muslims being elected and gave an example of Zakir Paul who was elected Vice President of Abbottabad Bar in 2013-14.

**Attitude of Judiciary**

When both Muslims and minorities were asked about the attitudes of judges in general when dealing with minority lawyers, most were of the opinion that as such the attitude of judges in routine cases is normal and minority lawyers are treated at par with Muslim lawyers. An incident was reported when a judge was dismissive about the case of sanitary workers in Rawalpindi, and referred to the case as ‘Choorian da case’ for which he later apologised to the counsel who happened to be a Christian. But such incidents are few and this cannot be termed as a trend or general attitude of the judges.

Minority lawyers and even Muslim lawyers, however, did object that when it comes to family cases of minorities, judges are generally not well versed in them. They reported numerous cases where judges have given decisions on inheritance and divorce cases based on Muslim laws. This in itself is not strictly discrimination, but, within the minority lawyer community it is perceived as discrimination and reflective of very insensitive attitude of the judiciary. This situation can be attributed to two factors. First, there are not many cases pertaining to minorities that reach the courts, and judges tend not to get many such cases in their careers. Second, there is no training of judges on minority family and private laws, which in some cases do not exist. Despite these problems, minorities see the attitude of judges as discriminatory and argue that they make them feel unimportant by passing judgments without any regard for it becoming case law, which will be used later by other courts.

Numerous incidents were narrated, both by judges and lawyers, where the judges’ attitudes and decisions dramatically changed when sensitive cases such as blasphemy were being tried. When it comes to other cases such as family laws, and forced conversions and marriages, the attitude of judges towards clients and lawyers also hardens. One lawyer narrated an incident in which when a matter pertaining to forced conversion was brought to the court, the judge on the first hearing congratulated the girl on converting, and even asked the counsel to give her the copy of Holy Qur’an to read. The lawyers complained that after these remarks there was practically nothing left to argue in the case.

The lawyers, both majority and minority, also reported that there are some religiously inclined judges in the judiciary. They reported one additional session judge from Rawalpindi who has now been posted to Lahore, and another High Court judge, who are known to give decisions based on principles derived from their interpretation of Islam rather than the written law. In cases regarding conversions and abductions, the religious feelings of the judge do override the law and there are numerous such cases. In a case reported by a minority lawyer, a nine-year old boy who had been abducted, was allowed to convert by the court and the judge accepted his plea despite the fact that he was not old enough to make that decision.
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on his own. Such decisions may not be against the law *per se* but they do create a sense of being discriminated against in the minds of the minorities.

**Minority Judges – Experiences and Perceptions**

During interviews with minority judges, the general impression was that there is no problem in their attitudes when they are in court. However, they do shy away from sensitive cases, such as blasphemy and forced conversations, and are reluctant to take them. The fear of being labelled or being bracketed into a religious group because of their decisions is at the back of their minds, and they move rather carefully throughout their careers, avoiding controversial cases and decisions. This fear, they noted, in some cases does hinder their ability to dispense justice.

The judges also narrated that during their appointment they were asked questions from *Islamiat*, were asked to recite specific *Ayats* (Quranic verses), and were even asked if they would decide cases as per their faith or the law of the land if they were appointed as judge. They felt these questions were inappropriate, discriminatory, and offensive, and should not be asked during the selection process. They held a perception that they are not treated at par with other judges, and their chances of promotion are significantly diminished because of their religion. One of them, referring to a former Chief Justice of the Lahore High Court, said: ‘What do you expect him to do – favour judges from the minority community?’ They also argued that even if they are, in terms of competence, at par with Muslim judges, the probability of a Muslim judge getting promoted is much higher. They complained that when it comes to disciplinary action, it is taken rather quickly against them compared to Muslims, and mentioned a specific case of a Muslim judge who was previously associated with a strong lawyers group.

It was also reported that when sensitive cases come to the court, there is pressure on the judge not only from lawyers but also from fellow judges, and in order to fit in and be accepted, judges have to give decisions that they normally may not. One of the judges narrated a recently upheld death sentence of two people accused of blasphemy by a judge of the High Court, which he felt was not on merit.

**Blasphemy Cases**

The attitude of lawyers and judges, who otherwise seem reasonable, changes dramatically when the Blasphemy Law comes into the equation. During such cases, there is a general sense of insecurity that exists within lawyers from minority communities. They reported that during the case of Mumtaz Qadri, not only were there people from outside the legal fraternity who came in to support him, but a large number of lawyers were also there chanting slogans in his favour and showering him with petals. One of the Christian lawyers commented that despite the accused and the victim both being Muslims, minority lawyers still had to face a very hostile situation and some of them did not attend the courts for a couple of days and waited for the matter to settle down.
The Blasphemy Law not only affects minorities, but also Muslims since half the cases of blasphemy in Pakistan have been registered against Muslims (Unruh 2015). Lawyers, whether non-Muslims or Muslims, fear for their lives while defending those accused of blasphemy, and the murders of Governor Salman Taseer, MNA Shahbaz Bhatti, and Rashid Rehman, Advocate in Multan, have all added to the insecurity of lawyers. Rashid Rehman was defending a lecturer at Bahauddin Zakria University on whom there were blasphemy allegations. His colleagues said that they had been receiving threats for quite some time and no longer took them seriously. However, Rehman was openly threatened in court by the opposing lawyer, and two days later, he was shot in his office by unknown gunmen. The lawyer who had threatened him is still practicing, and immediately after Rehman’s murder he was given an important legal advising position with a Federal Government organisation in Islamabad.

After the murder of Rashid Rehman, the head of Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) in Multan said, ‘We were asked to back down and maintain a low profile for a while.’ The case was taken up by a lawyer from Lahore and he now travels to Multan to appear on behalf of the blasphemy accused. When a request was filed in Lahore High Court for moving the case to Lahore the judge argued, ‘They don’t need a visa to come here,’ referring to the security threat they faced and the request was declined.

Similarly, the judge who gave the decision against Mumtaz Qadri had to flee the country and keep a low profile for a couple of years before coming back to Pakistan and resuming his duties in another city in Punjab. But he still fears for his life and keeps a very low profile. One lawyer who knew of him said, ‘Eventually someone will point him out, and then you know what usually happens.’

The above mentioned incidents are those of Muslims being accused of blasphemy and the threats that Muslim lawyers and judges then faced during proceedings in the court. One can imagine then the conditions of minorities who are part of these cases, whether they are the accused or lawyers and judges. Usually, very few Muslim lawyers are willing to take cases of blasphemy, but even when some of them do, they are under pressure from other lawyers to withdraw. A non-Muslim lawyer in Lahore narrated that when one of their Muslim lawyer colleagues did agree to represent the case of a blasphemy accused, he was approached by other Muslim lawyers and asked, ‘We can understand them [Christians] representing him in the case, but you are not one of them, why are you defending him?’ This shows that when it comes to blasphemy, a line is drawn between Muslims and non-Muslims, and in the minds of the majority they suddenly become collaborators, even if they are not even remotely related to the case.

Narrating another incident, a lawyer mentioned a blasphemy case in which his ex-chamber colleague was representing the accused who was a non-Muslim. After the first few proceedings, the judge unofficially asked the counsel of the accused not to appear in court when the lawyers from the other side were present there. He was told to come in either before the other side’s lawyers arrived, or after they had left, in order to avoid any incident. This again puts the accused at a disadvantage because the judges are under pressure, and for
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them to give a decision in their favour is highly unlikely. Such a situation also does not allow the lawyer of the accused to counter the arguments and evidence from the other side, which eventually weakens the case.

Barring a few exceptions, it has been observed that most judges, especially of lower courts, are scared of making a judgment based on merit even if they feel the accused is falsely implicated. There are some religiously inclined judges who are reported to have behaved as a party in the case as opposed to being impartial and fair. Some judges also informed that even when they can knock out cases of blasphemy for lack of evidence or even technicalities such as a Superintendent Police (SP) level officer not investigating the offence, they still do not do it. They argued they do not want to put themselves and their families in danger, and interestingly also reported that it has been unofficially communicated to them by the High Courts that they should not dismiss such cases on technicalities, and should allow them to go through to higher forums. In the meantime, the accused languishes behind bars and it could be years before the higher forums decide his or her fate. Although this holds true for both Muslim and non-Muslim accused, there is a strong feeling within minority lawyers that if a Muslim is accused, there are more chances of him/her getting a fair hearing as opposed to a non-Muslim accused.

The conditions for minority lawyers become hostile when such cases are being heard. A Christian lawyer also reported that when cases of blasphemy come to the court, Muslim lawyers suddenly start treating Christians and other non-Muslim lawyers as a homogeneous group. As one lawyer said, ‘We are all seen as accomplices.’ The lawyers while narrating cases of blasphemy also mentioned a Khatam-e-Nabuwat lawyers’ forum, saying that they gather as a group in the courtroom when the blasphemy case is being heard. They provide transport, lunch, and even prepare witnesses on how and what to say. The lawyers also reported that lawyers of those accused, as well as judges, are under tremendous pressure and even a small slip of the tongue or a line of argument which is a little controversial, is feared by defence lawyers. This hinders their ability to defend the accused.

A Christian lawyer in Bahawalpur shared that in one such case, he was threatened by fellow lawyers in court and things became really charged. When he complained to the judge that he was being threatened openly in the court right in front of him, the judge instead of taking action, got up from his seat and quietly withdrew to his chamber and did not say or do anything out of fear.

The situation in the higher judiciary is relatively better. However, during FGDs with minority lawyers in Lahore, they also reported an incident of the Lahore High Court in which the face of the judge turned red with anger during a case against a non-Muslim blasphemy accused, especially when facts and events of the case were presented. They further said he had a dark expression on his face, had tightened his fist in anger, and continuously huffed while the arguments were presented. The lawyer who was representing the accused said, ‘He was behaving like an office bearer of a religious party rather than a judge and ended up deciding against the accused.’
In a case being heard by a former Chief Justice of Lahore High Court, the lawyer moved the court for 426, which is a CrPc provision. It mandates that if an appeal from a minority person is pending and there is no chance of it being decided in the near future, then the accused who is appealing his sentence can apply for temporary release from prison on bail. The High Court as a rule also grants temporary bail if the appeal has been pending for more than two years and nothing has been done. When it was pointed out to the judge that he himself in a previous case had granted bail to the accused because his appeal was pending for two years, he replied, 'I had made a mistake back then,' and blamed the Attorney General for misguiding him in the previous case. The irony was that even in this case it was the same AG, who was assisting the court. So the honourable judge decided against granting bail to the accused, negating his own previous judgment, and not deciding as per the law of the land but as per his own interpretation of the law, derived from his religious beliefs.

Christian lawyers in Lahore also reported that apart from the judges, the staff at court also behaves in a threatening way when it comes to cases of blasphemy. One lawyer mentioned that during a case being presented at the Lahore High Court, the reader and other staff seemed visibly upset and the reader was constantly shaking his head while noting the proceedings.

This law, rather than protecting religious feelings of citizens, which is supposed to be its basis, is increasingly being used by the powerful to suppress the weak. At numerous occasions, during interaction with lawyers and judges, misuse of this law was mentioned and how it constantly keeps them in a state of fear. They are afraid to speak up and are wary of the fact that they cannot cross an invisible line when discussing any issue, be it civil or criminal. The minority lawyers said that they feel that their lives and the directions they take depend largely on the goodwill they create with the majority. With this law, the majority is able to discriminate against minorities with full backing of constitutional, legal, and institutional frameworks. The state has provided an enabling environment to extremists to persecute minorities. With social attitudes backed by legal frameworks, minorities live in constant fear that a mere accusation will push them in a hole from which there is no way out.

**Ahmedis**

The extent of discrimination faced by the Ahmedis in Pakistan, and indeed the attacks on them due to their beliefs, is greater than any other community. The first problem faced while carrying out this research was to find Ahmedi lawyers and judges in different cities. Except for a few, the majority do not declare that they are Ahmedis. The community not only faces discrimination and hatred from society, which is increasingly under the influence of conservative social actors, but also the state, which through constitutional amendments and ordinances now legally discriminates against them. Ahmedis, thus, have been left with no social or legal defence at all.
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As noted above, it was observed that attitudes and behaviours of people when it comes to other minorities change significantly with socioeconomic class. Well-to-do lawyers and judges from minority communities had a much better experience compared to those from lower socioeconomic classes. However, in case of the Ahmedi community, there is no respite no matter which class the individual belongs to. The discriminatory attitude toward them remains consistent in different regions and is not determined by their standing in society. Moreover, for Ahmedis, it is not just social discrimination they face, but also a serious threat of physical violence.

In the FGDs and interviews, Muslim lawyers openly admitted that they have a bias against Ahmedi lawyers, and they were unapologetic about it. When the Ahmedi lawyers were asked what the majority thinks of them, they said most had negative opinions and there is a social boycott of sorts when it comes to Ahmedis in Bars. There have been incidents reported by lawyers that in Bar rooms and katcheries, lawyers have openly preached against Ahmedis and have called for other lawyers not to interact with them on both social and professional levels. They also said that if someone is accused or suspected of being an Ahmedi, he has to declare openly on oath that he is not from the Ahmedi community, so that he is treated normally. Muslim lawyers in Multan narrated that when an Ahmedi worship place was attacked in Lahore in 2010 and some close relatives of one of their Ahmedi colleagues was killed in the attack, barring a few lawyers, no one went over to their place for condolence, which is a normal social practice. They also narrated that there were lawyers in the Bar who were actually pleased that the attack had taken place and some even reported that there had been a small celebration in the Multan Bar.

The lawyers narrated another incident involving a senior Muslim lawyer was wanted to run for Bar elections. He had been sporting a French beard (or a goatee), and was accused of being an Ahmedi, and subsequently asked to prove and take an oath that he was not. This was set as a precondition for lawyers to vote for him in the elections. He eventually decided not to run for elections as he saw the whole situation as disappointing. In fact, lawyers and judges who are even suspected of being Ahmedis are discriminated against both socially and professionally. When Muslim lawyers were asked if they knew of an Ahmedi lawyer in the Bar, they mentioned quite a few names they suspected were Ahmedis, but were not sure. The lawyers kept minimal interaction with even those they suspected were Ahmedis and avoided them.

A few Ahmedi lawyers who had not declared their religion out of fear were asked during this study what it is like living such a life, they narrated different personal incidents: ‘We have been part of conversations where our colleagues were calling Ahmedis wajib-ul-qatal (liable to be killed),’ and, ‘I had no option but to agree with them.’ Similarly, they have to sometimes go and pray with their majority colleagues especially on Fridays in order to avoid any suspicion. They also narrated that a lot of lawyers and other members of their community do not go to Friday prayers to their designated places of worship, out of fear that a colleague would see them.
Ahmedi lawyers do take up cases pertaining to matters of their community, but they still do not declare that they are Ahmedis. When asked about their support for the case and reason for taking it, they cover it up by saying they are only concerned with money and nothing else.

One can gauge the level of discrimination against Ahmedis by the Lahore Bar resolution a few years ago, which banned the popular Shezan drink from the cafeteria, because the company is owned by Ahmedis. This shows the mind-set prevalent in the Bar as well as the deep-rooted bias and to a certain extent, even hatred towards this community.

One Ahmedi lawyer recounted that he was once sitting with a friend who is a judge and they were talking about a case he was arguing in another court. The case was about building minarets on an Ahmedi worship place. His friend, the judge, advised that he should argue that building minarets is not something limited to Islamic architecture as its construction pre-dates Islam. The lawyer after listening to the proposed arguments asked his friend, 'What if I had given you these arguments, would you have decided it in my favour?' He smiled and said, 'No, I want to live.'

Some judges, perhaps out of fear, do discriminate against the judiciary but there are quite a few who have internalised this discrimination against Ahmedis. It was reported by some lawyers in confidence that two senior Ahmedi lawyers were offered positions as High Court judges if they converted (to Islam), and when they refused, they were not even considered for the position. According to them, this suggestion was made by a senior sitting judge of the Lahore High Court, who had close ties with the higher judiciary.

Recommendations
This study shows instances and attitudes that are a reflection of broader issues within Pakistani society, and to tackle the issues of discriminatory mind-sets, the state needs to adopt long-term policies and show sustained commitment to counter existing narratives and biases. Changes need to be made in school curricula, as well as implementation of hate speech laws, and the state needs to end lending support to militant and Islamist groups. Moreover, it should amend provisions in the Constitution that either directly or indirectly pave the way for discrimination against minorities. More specific recommendations focused towards issues faced by practicing minority lawyers and judges who feel they are being discriminated against by the majority include:

**Government**
The government needs to ensure that constitutional provisions and laws that specifically affect any community or group are amended. Laws that are constantly being misused to persecute minorities should be amended so that they can no longer be abused. The state needs to make conscious effort to stay out of mediating or getting involved in religious arguments and interpreting religion. Adequate security to judges should be provided so they can make tough decisions without fear of security for themselves and their families. The Supreme Court judgment on a *suo moto* action (2012) PLD 2014 SC 699 regarding a
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suicide bomb attack on 22 September 2012 on a church in Peshawar, and threats given to the Kalash tribe and Ismailis in Chitral should be implemented (see Annex 3).

**Judiciary**
The judges appointed in lower courts go through very basic training and by no means are trained in a comprehensive manner to adjudicate proceedings in the court, related to minorities. Thus, adequate and comprehensive training mechanisms need to be formulated. They also need to be trained on matters pertaining to minority laws such as family and inheritance. A system of accountability needs to be introduced within the judicial system through which judges can be held accountable for making decisions that are not strictly within the confines of the law. A mechanism should be developed to assess the performance of judges, and to reward by further promotion of those who are competent. Quota of minorities should be strictly implemented when appointing prosecutors and judges. The process of selection of judges should be made transparent and it should be ensured that written exams and the interviews are designed to cater to the needs of minorities.

**Bar**
Bar rooms can play an important role in improving the atmosphere at the courts, and should be more sensitive about the cases of discrimination against minorities. There should also be linkages between the formal mechanism the Bar sets up and the judiciary to confront the discriminatory attitudes of the Bench. The Bar and lawyers in general must ensure that minority members are encouraged to run for office in district bars.

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References


Annexures


Article 2: Islam shall be the State religion of Pakistan.
Article 2A: The Objectives Resolution

Objectives Resolution
Whereas sovereignty over the entire universe belongs to Allah Almighty alone and the authority which He has delegated to the State of Pakistan, through its people for being exercised within the limits prescribed by Him is a sacred trust;

This Constituent Assembly representing the people of Pakistan resolves to frame a Constitution for the sovereign independent State of Pakistan;

Wherein the State shall exercise its powers and authority through the chosen representatives of the people;

Wherein the principles of democracy, freedom, equality, tolerance and social justice as enunciated by Islam shall be fully observed;

Wherein the Muslims shall be enabled to order their lives in the individual and collective spheres in accordance with the teachings and requirements of Islam as set out in the Holy Quran and the Sunnah;

Wherein adequate provision shall be made for the minorities to [freely] profess and practice their religions and develop their cultures;

Wherein the territories now included in or in accession with Pakistan and such other territories as may hereafter be included in or accede to Pakistan shall form a Federation wherein the units will be autonomous with such boundaries and limitations on their powers and authority as may be prescribed;

Wherein shall be guaranteed fundamental rights including equality of status, of opportunity and before law, social, economic and political justice, and freedom of thought, expression, belief, faith, worship and association, subject to law and public morality;

Wherein adequate provisions shall be made to safeguard the legitimate interests of minorities and backward and depressed classes;

Wherein the independence of the Judiciary shall be fully secured;

Wherein the integrity of the territories of the Federation, its independence and all its rights including its sovereign rights on land, sea and air shall be safeguarded;
So that the people of Pakistan may prosper and attain their rightful and honored place amongst the nations of the World and make their full contribution towards international peace and progress and happiness of humanity.

**Article 31: Islamic Way of Life**

(1) Steps shall be taken to enable the Muslims of Pakistan, individually and collectively, to order their lives in accordance with the fundamental principles and basic concepts of Islam and to provide facilities whereby they may be enabled to understand the meaning of life according to the Holy Quran and Sunnah.

(2) The state shall endeavour, as respects the Muslims of Pakistan: to make the teaching of the Holy Quran and Islamiat compulsory, to encourage and facilitate the learning of Arabic language and to secure correct and exact printing and publishing of the Holy Quran, to promote unity and the observance of the Islamic moral standards; and to secure the proper organisation of zakat, ushr, awqaf and mosques.

**Article 41: The President**

(2) A person shall not be qualified for election as President unless he is a Muslim of not less than forty-five years of age and is qualified to be elected as member of the National Assembly.

**Part IX - Islamic Provisions**

It states that all the laws shall be brought in conformity with Quran and Sunnah. It also provides for the formation of Islamic Council which will give recommendations to Parliament on making laws in conformity with the teachings of Quran and Sunnah.

**Article 260**

(3) In the Constitution and all enactments and other legal instruments, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context

(a) ‘Muslim’ means a person who believes in the unity and oneness of Almighty Allah, in the absolute and unqualified finality of the Prophethood of Muhammad (peace be upon him), the last of the prophets, and does not believe in, or recognize as a prophet or religious reformer, any person who claimed or claims to be a prophet, in any sense of the word or of any description whatsoever, after Muhammad (peace be upon him); and

(b) ‘non-Muslim’ means a person who is not a Muslim and includes a person belonging to the Christian, Hindu, Sikh, Buddhist or Parsi community, a person of the Quadiani Group or the Lahori Group who call themselves ‘Ahmedis’ or by any other name or a Bahai, and a person belonging to any of the Scheduled Castes.
The Ordinance XX, 1984 brought changes in the Pakistan Penal Code (PPC). According to this amendment, using of specific titles such as Khalifa-tul-Mumineen, Khalifa-tul-Muslimeen, Sahaabi or Razi Allah Anho by Ahmedis was made a criminal offence. Furthermore, Ahmedis calling themselves Muslims, referring to their worship place as a mosque and even preaching their faith, were also made criminal offences with imprisonment up to 3 years.

298-B
Misuse of epithets, descriptions and titles, etc., reserved for certain holy personages or places:
(1) Any person of the Qaudiani group or the Lahori group (who call themselves ‘Ahmedis’ or by any other name) who by words, either spoken or written, or by visible representation:
(a) refers to or addresses, any person, other than a Caliph or companion of the Holy Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him), as ‘Ameer-ul-Mumineen’, ‘Khalifatul-Mumineen’, ‘Khalifa-tul-Muslimeen’, ‘Sahaabi’ or ‘Razi Allah Anho’;
(b) refers to, or addresses, any person, other than a wife of the Holy Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him), as ‘Ummul-Mumineen’;
(c) refers to, or addresses, any person, other than a member of the family ‘Ahle-bait’ of the Holy Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him), as ‘Ahle-bait’; or
(d) refers to, or names, or calls, his place of worship a ‘Masjid’;
shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, and shall also be liable to fine.

(2) Any person of the Qaudiani group or Lahori group (who call themselves ‘Ahmedis’ or by any other name) who directly or indirectly, poses himself as a Muslim, or calls, or refers to, his faith as Islam, or preaches or propagates his faith, or invites others to accept his faith, by words, either spoken or written, or by visible representations, or in any manner whatsoever outrages the religious feelings of Muslims shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, and shall also be liable to fine.

298-C: Person of Qaudiani group, etc., calling himself a Muslim or preaching or propagating his faith:
Any person of the Qaudiani group or the Lahori group (who call themselves ‘Ahmedis’ or by any other name), who directly or indirectly, poses himself as a Muslim, or calls, or refers to, his faith as Islam, or preaches or propagates his faith, or invites others to accept his faith, by words, either spoken or written, or by visible representations, or in any manner whatsoever outrages the religious feelings of Muslims shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine.

295-B: Defiling, etc. of the Holy Qur’an:
Whoever wilfully defiles, damages or desecrates a copy of the Holy Qur’an or of an extract therefrom or uses it in any derogatory manner or for any unlawful purpose shall be punishable with imprisonment for life.
295-C: Use of derogatory remarks, etc., in respect of the Holy Prophet:
Whoever by words, either spoken or written, or by visible representation or by any
imputation, innuendo, or insinuation, directly or indirectly, defiles the sacred name of the
Holy Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) shall be punished with death, or
imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine.

298: Uttering words, etc., with deliberate intent to wound religious feelings:
Whoever, with the deliberate intention of wounding the religious feelings of any person,
utters any word or makes any sound in the hearing of that person or makes any gesture in
the sight of that person or places any object in the sight of that person, shall be punished
with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to one year or with
fine, or with both.

298-A: Use of derogatory remarks, etc., in respect of holy personages:
Whoever by words, either spoken or written, or by visible representation, or by any
imputation, innuendo or insinuation, directly or indirectly, defiles the sacred name of any
wife ('Ummul Mumineen'), or members of the family ('Ahle-bait'), of the Holy Prophet
(peace be upon him), or any of the righteous Caliphs ('Khulafa-e-Rashideen') or companions
('Sahaaba') of the Holy Prophet (peace be upon him) shall be punished with imprisonment
of either description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both.
Discrimination in Pakistan’s Legal Profession: Attitudes and Perceptions of Minorities and the Majority

Annex 3: Supreme Court Judgment on *Suo Moto* Action regarding the Suicide Bomb Attack on 22 September 2012 on a church in Peshawar and threats to Kalash Tribe and Ismailis in Chitral

**Important Points**

• That Federal Government should constitute a taskforce tasked with developing a strategy of religious tolerance.
• That appropriate curricula should be developed at school and college levels to promote a culture of religious and social tolerance.
• That Federal Government should take appropriate steps to ensure that hate speeches in social media are discouraged and the delinquents are brought to justice under the law.
• That National Council for minority rights should be constituted.
• That special police force should be established with professional training to protect the places of worship of minorities.
Qualified Equality: Forms of Discrimination in the Legal Framework of Pakistan*

Shaqaib Arslan Lilla and Zain Mansoor**

Abstract

The Constitution of Pakistan 1973 provides basic guarantees and rights to the minorities. This study focuses on various pieces of secondary legislations, acts and policy guidelines, drafted by the Executive and passed by successive parliaments/martial law regimes which dictate and regulate the lives of minorities in Pakistan. Equality is one of the cherished goals of the Constitution (through Article 4 and 25), however, over the years, it has been circumvented by various amendments, acts, policies and executive excesses resulting in the present situation of utter despair for minorities. Through various interviews and field studies, this chapter provides an exhaustive list of legal frameworks and policy guidelines which form the basis of discrimination and injustice in this country. Furthermore, this chapter looks at different rules and regulations passed by the Parliament and Executive which, although not discriminatory in their language, have been the basis of indirect discrimination. The research finds that the State suffers from lethargy, executive excesses and general disregard for the protection of the constitutional rights of minorities. Furthermore, the State has also failed to implement various well intentioned and progressive judgments of the Supreme Court.

* This chapter was approved as a Working Paper by the referee.
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**Introduction**

Equality of status and opportunity, and socioeconomic and political justice form salient features of the Constitution of Pakistan. Rule of Law is not just an imperative doctrine for an equitable society, but also provides the foundation for impartial administration and governance, whereas equality and non-discrimination remains its cornerstone. It remains the shield against the excesses of the state and majoritarianism by ensuring protection not just against direct and indirect discrimination, but also ensures equality through all organs of the state.

In Pakistan, the lack of implementation of fundamental rights and privileges remains a major concern. The Supreme Court of Pakistan has in the recent past given some progressive judgments. However, unfortunately even the guidelines set by the Court are yet to be implemented.

**Rule of Law**

The constitutional principle of Rule of Law has an overarching significance especially in contemporary legal framework. It does not simply mean constitutional or statutory laws, as the laws might possibly, themselves be inequitable, unjust and discriminatory in nature or paving the way for inequality and discrimination. The principle of Rule of Law connotes a higher philosophical and legal structure which promotes equality, constitutionalism, control on excessive arbitrary authority and protection of liberties and privileges. As in the words of John Locke (1690: 400) ‘Wherever law ends, tyranny begins.’ The doctrine has been ascribed to A.V. Dicey, who in his 1885 writings on the constitution of Britain divided the Rule of Law into three distinct conceptions: (i) absence of arbitrary power, (ii) equality before law, and (iii) individual liberties. The conceptions meant that nobody can be harmed except for a distinct breach of law, no one is above the law, and the individual liberties in Britain are actually judge-made. Comparable, though not identical ideas existed in other countries. In Germany, for example, the term used is Rechtsstaat (‘recht’ means law, ‘staat’ means ‘state’), in France, l’Etat de droit, legally constituted state (Le Sueur et al. 2013: 79).

Although the aforementioned conception of Dicey have been criticised by some legal theorists, it still remains relevant because of the ideals of equality and individual liberties. Different theorists and legal philosophers have made efforts at defining this principle, but a succinct or statutory definition has not been formulated. Amongst the most comprehensive works is that of Lord Bingham of Cornhill (2006). In his lecture titled 'The Rule of Law', Lord Bingham advanced and analysed eight sub-rules to give a comprehensive explanation of the doctrine:

I suggest, that all persons and authorities within the state, whether public or private, should be bound by and entitled to the benefit of laws publicly and prospectively promulgated and publicly administered in the courts (Bingham 2006: 5).
Bingham propounded that without laws being applied equally to all, subject to any objective differences, the requirements for Rule of Law cannot be fulfilled. He further added that the law must afford adequate protection of fundamental rights.¹ According to Jain (2004: 7):

The basic emphasis of the Rule of Law is on exclusion of arbitrariness, lawlessness and unreasonableness on part of the government.

In essence, it is the duty of each organ of the state to protect this principle and ensure equality and protection of fundamental rights and freedoms. Judiciaries in many jurisdictions of the world have kept a check on executive authority through the principle of Judicial Review, wherein it is possible to get relief from the higher courts against arbitrary and capricious executive authority. It is pertinent to state here that Article 4 of the Constitution of Pakistan is called the Rule of Law provision, and higher courts, through the powers vested by the Constitution, can judicially review actions of the executive branch subject to Article 199 and 184(3).

**Article 4 and 25 of the Constitution: Focus on Equality and Fundamental Rights**

The text of Article 4 is as follows:

Right of individuals to be dealt with in accordance with law, etc.
(1) To enjoy the protection of law and to be treated in accordance with law is the inalienable right of every citizen, wherever he may be, and of every other person for the time being within Pakistan.
(2) In particular:
   a) no action detrimental to the life, liberty, body, reputation or property of any person shall be taken except in accordance with law;
   b) no person shall be prevented from or be hindered in doing that which is not prohibited by law; and

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¹ Bingham (2006), 8 sub-rules [Rule of Law]:

1. The law must be accessible and, so far as possible, be intelligible, clear and predictable;
2. Questions of legal right and liability should ordinarily be resolved by application of the law and not by the exercise of discretion;
3. The law should apply equally to all, except to the extent that objective differences justify differentiation;
4. The law must afford adequate protection of human rights;
5. Means must be provided for resolving, without prohibitive cost or inordinate delay, bona fide civil disputes which the parties themselves are unable to resolve;
6. Ministers and public officers at all levels must exercise the powers conferred on them reasonably, in good faith, for the purpose for which the powers were conferred, and without exceeding the limits of such powers;
7. Judicial and other adjudicative procedures must be fair and independent; and,
8. There must be compliance by the state with its international law obligations.
c) no person shall be compelled to do that which the law does not require him to do.

Articles 4 and 25 of the Constitution of Pakistan outlaw discrimination and have made equality and equal protection of law an inalienable right. The decision of the Lahore High Court, Reference no. 8, Irza Pharma (Pvt.) Ltd. through Managing Director v. Monopoly Control Authority (2007) CLD at 868, states:

Every Citizen of Pakistan has an inalienable right to protection of law which cannot be snatched in derogation of law applicable.

Equality means ensuring that individuals or groups are treated fairly and equally and no less favourably, specific to their needs, including in areas of race, gender, disability, religion or belief, sexual orientation, and age (University of Edinburgh 2016). It is pertinent to state here that the Supreme Court of Pakistan has in several judgments reiterated the principle of ‘objective differentiation’ where the reasonability test is applied in context.

Article 4 acts as a shield between citizens and excessive and arbitrary authority of the government. As per case law Ref 11, Shaukat Ali Mian v. Federation of Pakistan before Lahore High Court (1999) CLC at 607:

This Article embodies the concept of dignity, equality and saves citizens from arbitrary/discriminatory laws and actions by government.

This provision is in addition to the Fundamental Rights chapter; it complements the Fundamental Rights and is justiciable, which the Legal Information Institute, Cornell University (n.d.) defines as ‘suitable for courts to hear and decide on the merits. If a case is not justiciable, the court must dismiss it.’ The right is not just limited in its application upon citizens of Pakistan, but to any individual who is present in Pakistan. The provision duty bounds the state functionaries, federal and provincial, to implement the doctrine and embody the principle of equality. The Supreme Court in its interpretations has held it to be a function of every organ of the state to ensure protection of fundamental rights. It declared that, ‘Fundamental Rights of the citizens have to be enforced by the court in discharge of its judicial function’ in the case of Watan Party v. Federation of Pakistan, Ref No 13, PLD (2011) at 997, while the Lahore High Court decision in the case Ref No. 1, Shaukat Ali Mian v. Federation of Pakistan (1999) CLC at 607 emphasised the same. Moreover, the Supreme Court has also insisted that every organ of the state is to uphold constitutional frameworks, stating in the case Ref No. 14, Punjab Road Transport Corporation v. Zubida Afzal (2006) SCMR at 207 that:

Reasonable classification – see for instance, Ref No. 10, Province of Punjab through Chief Secretary and another versus Samuel Bhatti before Supreme Court of Pakistan (2009) SCMR at 1034; and Ref No. 10, Govt. of Balochistan versus Azizullah Memon before Supreme Court of Pakistan (1993) PLD at 341.
In view of Article 4 read with Article 5(2) of the Constitution, it is the duty of each and every organ of the State and people of Pakistan to work within the framework of the Constitution and law.

The subject provision is a protection against all unlawful acts which may harm life, liberty, body, reputation or property of any individual except for distinct breach of law, as highlighted by the Supreme Court in case Ref No. 15, Federation of Pakistan v. Shaukat Ali Mian, PLD (1999) at 1026. No individual can be barred from acting within one’s rights. At the same time, no-one can be forced to act in a manner not required by law. The provision is specifically advantageous to minority groups against any illegal and arbitrary authority of state departments and functionaries or any commercial establishments. This is, for instance, elaborated in the case Ref No. 16, Shamshad Ali v. Chief Administrator before the Lahore High Court (2000) CLC at 1422, which states that:

It is the duty and obligation of public functionaries to redress the grievances of citizens as is envisaged by Article 4 of the Constitution without fear, favour and nepotism.

As a general principle under Article 25 of the Constitution, all citizens are not just equal but shall be afforded equal protection of law. Fortunately, the Constitution categorically bars discrimination on the basis of sex; unfortunately no categorical statement regarding discrimination on the basis of religion, race, caste or place of birth is stated.

**Discrimination: Direct and Indirect**

Discrimination is defined by the Oxford Law Dictionary (2015) as:

Treating a person less favourably than others on grounds unrelated to merit, usually because he or she belongs to a particular group or category. As well as direct discrimination, this may involve indirect discrimination, victimisation, or harassment. It is unlawful to discriminate on racial grounds, on grounds of sex, religion or belief, disability or age.

As mentioned earlier, Equality is the foundation upon which the framework of fundamental rights is established. It is a cherished goal of the Constitution, as highlighted for instance in the case Ref No. 19, Khalid Khan v. State before Peshawar High Court (2016) PLD at 35, among several others. Although the case law developed by the constitutional courts of Pakistan recognise the concept of objective and reasonable classification, with the aforementioned case also noting that:

Rule of classification was also an established principle of law as well as Islamic jurisprudence on the principle of intelligible criteria.

Similarly, Ref No. 20, N.W.F.P. Public Service Commission v. Muhammad Arif before Supreme Court of Pakistan (2011) SCMR at 848 also asserted that:
Reasonable classification which is not arbitrary or violative of doctrine of equality cannot be questioned.

The Supreme Court of Pakistan laid down the following principles, among others, in Ref No. 21, *Govt. of Balochistan v. Azizullah Memon*, PLD (1993) at 341:

- That equal protection of law does not envisage that every citizen is to be treated alike in all circumstances, but it contemplates that persons similarly situated or placed are to be treated alike; and,
- That reasonable classification is permissible but it must be founded on reasonable distinction or reasonable basis.

It is pertinent to state here that age, disability, religion, race, etc., have not been categorically mentioned in the judgments aforementioned. It is also very unfortunate that no legislation or case-law recognise indirect discrimination. The Supreme Court of Pakistan observed in the case Ref No. 22, *Pir Imran Sajid v. Managing Director / General Manager (Manager Finance) Telephone Industries of Pakistan* (2015) SCMR at 1257 that:

Object of good governance cannot be achieved by exercising discriminatory powers unreasonably or arbitrarily, without application of mind but such objective can only be achieved by following rules of justness, fairness and openness in consonance with the command of the Constitution, as enshrined in different articles of the Constitution including Article 4 & 25 which is the supreme law of the country.

This has also been highlighted in Ref No. 22, *Sadiq Amin Rahman v. Pakistan International Airlines Corporation before Karachi High Court-Sindh* (2016) PLC-Labour 335. It is pertinent to state at the onset that there is no definition under Pakistani statutory law for indirect discrimination. It has only been mentioned in context in case-law and that too on extremely rare occasions. In addition, there is no government policy on the subject. The progressive judgment and recommendations of Supreme Court dated 19 June 2014, Ref No. 23, *Suo Moto actions regarding suicide bomb attack of 22-09-2013 on the church in Peshawar and regarding threats being given to Kalash tribe and Ismailies in Chitral, PLD (2014) SC at 699*, which included formation of minorities’ council and a detailed policy to curb discrimination and address the grievances of the religious minorities remains unimplemented.

Currently, efforts are being made domestically and internationally to identify indirect discrimination so further legislative and executive actions can be taken to control it. Indirect discrimination in the European Community law is defined as:

…where an apparently neutral provision, criterion or practice would put persons protected by the general prohibition of discrimination at a particular disadvantage compared with other persons unless that provision, criterion or practice is
It is a huge exercise to identify all the problem areas in the context of indirect discrimination. An effort is being made to identify some areas for the better understanding of the concept. Indirect discrimination can result because of legislation, an executive action or even a court order. In the absence of any express provisions under the law, minorities only have the redressal forums and mechanisms to turn to.

Article 4 and 25 clearly state that every citizen is equal and make equality an inalienable right of each and every citizen of Pakistan. Fundamental Rights are guaranteed to every individual as well. However, religious minorities groups say that certain provisions of the Constitution itself are either discriminatory or lead to discrimination. The second contention arises from non-implementation of Fundamental Rights stringently by the executive branch. As is clear, most constitutional provisions promote the principle of Rule of Law, Equality and Non-discrimination. But discrimination does occur as a result of implementation, and at a societal level, which is of an indirect nature.

This study found that in the enjoyment of fundamental rights and freedoms, there often remain hindrances even where the law itself remains non-discriminating such as those pertaining to the freedom of assembly (Article 16), trade and business (Article 18), speech and expression (Article 19), religion (Article 20), safeguard as to educational institutions (Article 22), provision as to property (Article 23) and safeguard against discrimination in services (Article 27). In addition to these, less or non-participation in the political sphere of the country was reported, low presence in civil and judicial services of Pakistan as a result of direct and indirect discrimination, and non-implementation of the quota to uplift minorities was also reported widely.

This trend trickles down into statutory laws, rules and regulations too. These are the everyday concerns of citizens, where they have to interact with statutory bodies and public officials. An example for basic understanding of one form of indirect discrimination is the Punjab Security of Vulnerable Establishments Ordinance 2015, where the law itself does not discriminate but it has affected the poor Hindu community of Punjab. Under Section 7 of the requisite Ordinance, the caretakers of the vulnerable establishment themselves have to have appropriate and sufficient security arrangements. Subject to the same Ordinance the establishment can also be sealed. Unfortunately, most of the Hindu community in Punjab is from the lowest economic strata, so it directly affects them. A temple in Rahim Yar Khan, Punjab has been sealed using the powers vested in the officials, through the aforementioned Ordinance.

**Article 27 of Pakistan’s Constitution**

No citizen otherwise qualified for appointment in the service of Pakistan shall be discriminated against in respect of any such appointment on the ground only of race, religion, caste, sex, residence or place of birth.
Article 27 is a facet of, and traces its roots from, Article 25 of the Constitution. The provision recognises the equality of opportunity in matters of employment in both federal and provincial services of Pakistan.\(^3\) The subject article categorically bars discrimination in employment of the state on the grounds of race, religion, caste, sex, residence and place of birth. The requisite provision, unlike Article 4, is only applicable to the citizens of Pakistan, which makes it narrower in scope. The prohibited grounds of discrimination are categorically stated, are wide in scope and complement Articles 4 and 25.

Any laws, rules regulations in the service of Pakistan which are repugnant to Article 27 of the Constitution shall have no legal effect and would be held discriminatory since ‘the guarantee against discrimination on the ground of religion is absolute and not subject to reasonable qualification or restriction’ as highlighted in Ref. No. 34, Shaukat Ali Wahla, superintendent, Zonal office, Auqaf, Sargodha v. Chief Administrator of Auqaf, Lahore, Punjab before Lahore High Court (2005) MLD at 1053. In addition to Article 27, there is an additional 5 percent quota in federal and provincial services of Pakistan for religious minorities. This is subject to the recognition that minorities are a disadvantaged economic group. This reserved quota is other than open merit. The reserved seats, if not filled by successful qualified candidates, are to be carried forward and non-Muslim candidates may fill that position.

During this research, it was hard to find case-law on the subject matter, especially in the context of religious minorities. This was supplemented by research data after conducting several interviews with people from different professions and socioeconomic backgrounds. It was reported that there are no forums for grievance redressal except for higher judiciary; which in turn takes a lot of time, is not cheap and as a result further discrimination at work and society has to be faced.

**Methodology of the Study**

The key areas researched in this study included existing constitutional and statutory provisions and policies which are discriminatory or lead to discrimination against religious minorities. The study was designed to research both direct and indirect discrimination towards minorities and issues of equal or fair opportunities for minorities in service of Pakistan. Various Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) and Key Informant Interviews (KII) were conducted in Karachi, Lahore, and Rawalpindi/Islamabad. These cities were chosen as they had considerably large population of different minorities, whose experiences of state or legislative discrimination differed as they belonged to varying socioeconomic and cultural backgrounds. Our special focus was on individuals or groups who had specialised knowledge of the various laws, legislation and service experience in the state institutions including lawyers, judges, teachers, clergy and government employees in various cadres.

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\(^3\) According to Article 260, Constitution of Pakistan: ‘Service of Pakistan, means any service, post or office in connection with the affairs of the Federation or of a Province, and includes an all-Pakistan Service, service in the Armed Forces and any other service declared to be a service of Pakistan by or under Act of Parliament or of a Provincial Assembly.’
A total of ten FGDs were conducted in Karachi, Multan, Peshawar, Lahore and Islamabad, with 10-12 participants. They only included people from minority communities, and it was ensured that they included representative voices of the community, including at least two women in every FGD. The help of local community leaders was sought to organise these groups. The religious minorities primarily included individuals from the Christian and Hindu communities, while there was also representation from Ahmedis and Sikhs. Common themes that emerged from the discussions were then extracted from the FGDs and interviews, and condensed. In essence, the study broadly explored the following questions:

I. Are primary and secondary legislations inherently discriminatory in nature and has their enforcement by the state led to unfair treatment of the minorities?

II. Which laws, in their opinion, were the basis for indirect discrimination of minorities?

III. Are there any forums for redressal of grievances for direct and indirect discrimination?

IV. Is the quota system for minorities introduced for employment in state institutions being implemented fairly?

V. Are the minorities working in state institutions treated fairly with regard to all aspects of their employment, and if not, what are the mechanisms available for complaints?

Findings of the Study

Perceptions and Understanding of the Constitution

As mentioned above, the fieldwork for this study was conducted with groups and individuals of various minorities and a common theme was observed in all discussions regarding the Constitution and legal framework of Pakistan. During the discussions, the Constitution of 1973 was a source of major concern and the Islamic nature of the Constitution was considered the focal point of discriminatory laws against the minorities. The fact that the state had a religion\(^4\) and the state was obliged to not only protect but also encourage the Islamic way of life in the country was also a source of major concern. It was repeatedly reported that the state itself should not be involved in propagating or favouring any religion as this caused a sense of deprivation amongst the minorities.

The fact that the head of the state\(^5\) i.e. the President and the head of the executive i.e. the Prime Minister\(^6\) of this country can only be a Muslim was also raised as an issue and an obvious example of discrimination, which not only relegates the minorities to the second strata of society, but also segregates them from the majority. Furthermore, it was pointed out during interviews of various minority lawyers that the Constitution barred them from appearing before the Federal Shariat Court (FSC).\(^7\) The FSC is a constitutional court which

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\(^4\) Preamble, Article 2 and 2A of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan.

\(^5\) Article 41.

\(^6\) Article 91 (3).

\(^7\) Article 203E (4).
interprets and can call into question any law or cases decided especially under Hudood Laws in Pakistan as being repugnant to the teachings of Islam. The interviewees considered it unfair and discriminatory that they could not be allowed to represent their clients.

The Constitution’s discriminatory nature was further highlighted with regard to the Ahmedi community. The fact that the Constitution has defined a Muslim and a non-Muslim with the restrictive definition signalling out the Ahmedis as non-Muslims was the basis for systematic discrimination of this community without the usual respect or protection granted to other minority members of society. It was quite difficult to meet or single out members of the Ahmedi community who openly profess their faith whilst being employed in government services due to this blatant state bias towards them (Janjua 2015).

Various Discriminatory Acts and Legislations
One of the main focus of this study was various laws and secondary legislations which are either discriminatory in nature or provide basis for discrimination against the minorities. This discrimination is manifested through the language of the drafted law or through biased implementation. Various laws and acts were highlighted which have been passed and which were not only in direct contravention of various articles of the Constitution, but were also discriminatory.

Blasphemy Laws
Blasphemy Laws are part of the Pakistan Penal Code and were first introduced in the British era in 1927 as a result of the religious riots which took place in pre-partition India. The basic provision of Section 295-A was promulgated. Deliberate and malicious acts intended to outrage religious feelings of any class by insulting its religion or religious beliefs were made punishable with imprisonment and fine. In 1982, a further section 295-B was added which made defiling of the Qur’an a punishable offence with life imprisonment. This was further added to in 1986 in the shape of Section 295-C which made blasphemy against the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) an offence with a maximum punishment of life imprisonment (Raza 2010), the capital punishment being made mandatory if convicted, by a judgment of the Federal Shariat Court in February 1990 (Talbot 1998: 282). Along with

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8 Article 203 D.
9 Section 295-A of Pakistan Penal Code: ‘Whoever, with deliberate and malicious intention of outraging the religious feelings, or any class of the citizens of Pakistan, by words, either spoken or written or by visible representations, insult or attempts to insult the religion or the religious beliefs of that class, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, or with fine, or both.’
10 Presidential Order 1 of 1982. Section 295-B of PPC; defiling the copy of Holy Qur’an: ‘Whoever wilfully defiles, damages or desecrates a copy of the Holy Qur’an or of an extract there from or uses it in any derogatory manner for any unlawful purpose shall be punishable with imprisonment for life.’
12 Use of derogatory remarks etc., in respect of the Holy Prophet: ‘Whoever by words, either spoken or written, or by visible representation, or by any imputation innuendo, or insinuation, directly, defiles the sacred name of the Holy Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) shall be punished with death, or imprisonment for life and shall also be liable for fine.’
Qualified Equality: Forms of Discrimination in the Legal Framework of Pakistan

this amendment, a restriction, which violates the principles of Equality, was also introduced by which only Muslim judges are allowed to hear cases under this offence.

These offences have over recent years been of particular concern to the members of the minority communities. They were highlighted repeatedly in discussions and interviews carried out. Various horrifying incidents were narrated by respondents in which members of their community were unfairly targeted under these laws. The causes of such incidents are numerous and mostly emanate from social and economic factors. However, this study is limited to the legal consequences and issues regarding the uniform and just implementation of these laws.

The main legal concern and basis for discrimination is the unfair implementation of these laws. A few incidents were narrated in which minority community members tried to file a First Information Report (FIR) against a Muslim for making derogatory remarks against Jesus Christ. The police either did not lodge the FIR or even if they did lodge it, they pressured the complainant to settle the matter. One particular instance reflecting the double standards of the state machinery was pointed out in the cases of Gojra fire incident and Youhanabad. Both localities situated near Lahore. In the Gojra fire incident, 145 houses of the Christian community were burned down and seven people died in the incident. The police did not listen to the specific complaints of the people and lodged an FIR nominating no-one in particular but an unidentified mob. The case fizzled out and nothing came of it. However, in the Youhanabad incident where a church was bombed, the police itself identified two culprits who were later burned to death by an enraged mob, 47 people were named in the FIR who have been denied bail by all courts of Pakistan and are still languishing behind bars.

It was further pointed out that whosoever is convicted under Section 295-C PPC will be awarded death penalty as it involved blasphemous remarks against the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) but why should not the same punishment be awarded under Sec 295-A when somebody makes similar blasphemous remarks against Jesus Christ, a prophet who is also recognised and respected in Islam?

Instances where minorities are accused of blasphemy are often reported to various community workers, and almost every time it is done to satisfy a personal grudge of somebody against that minority member. These instances are prevalent in all parts of the country, with a higher frequency in Punjab, and were reported by the majority of those who were interviewed for this study. These laws are in urgent need of amendments or to be made uniform against persons of all religions as they are being abused by the majority in direct contravention of the cardinal principles of Rule of Law and Equality.

Private Laws
Until recently, all laws and regulations regarding the private and family matters of minorities were from the days of the Partition. The state has been negligent in updating or reforming various laws that govern these aspects of the lives of the minorities. During the past few
years, initiatives have been taken, at provincial levels (mostly in Sindh) initially and followed, almost reluctantly, at the Federal level, to reform these outdated private laws. These laws, as outlined below, do not conform to the modern principles of Equality and their outdated provisions have serious shortcomings and often have discriminatory outcomes.

Hindu Marriage Laws
Under the Muslim Family Law Ordinance 1964, different provisions deal with all aspects of family laws with regard to the Muslim population of the country. Similarly, Christian marriages are regulated by the Christian Marriage Act 1865. However, until recently, the Hindu community in Pakistan did not have any law under which their marriages and family issues could be regulated and apart from Sindh, the situation still remains the same for Hindus in all other provinces. Pakistan has yet to pass a comprehensive law on the lines of the Muslim Family Law Ordinance which comprehensively deals with these issues of the Hindu community.

The recently passed Sindh Hindu Marriage Act 2016 was sharply criticised by members of the Hindu community who were interviewed, as the Act only deals with the registration of Hindu marriages, but stops short of regulating various other aspects of family life like divorce, maintenance, etc. As Hindu marriages are not registered or regulated, it causes great hindrance and difficulty for Hindu families to get themselves registered with the National Database & Registration Authority (NADRA) for their Computerised National Identity Cards (CNIC) and other documentations like birth certificates, establishment of inheritances, applying for visas, etc. These legal hindrances are especially worrisome in the matter of forced conversion as there is no legal way of establishing that a particular Hindu woman is married or not.

It was argued by some of the participants in the discussions that there is no provision for divorce in Hindu religion. However, the same view was opposed by some, especially those living in the urban centres, who argued that in the prevalent social structure and modernisation of society, couples should have the option to end marriage as is also prevalent in India. Recently, the National Assembly of Pakistan passed the Hindu Marriage Bill 2017 which amongst other rights provides for the registration of Hindu marriages and the right to divorce.

Christian Marriage and Divorce Laws
The Christian Marriage Act 1872 deals with the solemnisation and registration of Christian marriages, while the Christian Divorce Act 1869 deals with the divorce rules and procedures. These laws were introduced in the British era and are more than a century old. They have not been amended since independence. Minimum age for marriage under the Christian Marriage Act 1872 is 13 for girls and 16 for boys. The law for Muslims was changed to 18 years for both sexes in Pakistan recently, but this law does not apply to Christian girls and under the aforementioned act, a minor girl can be given into marriage by her parent or legal guardian. There is strong demand to amend this law so that a uniform legal age exists for these minority couples too. Furthermore, the law explicitly states that marriages have to be
solemnised between the hours of 6am to 7pm. This rule, it was argued and unanimously agreed upon has lost its relevance in the modern era and was a nuisance for Christians at large.

With regard to the Divorce Act 1869, the interviewees were divided. Various clergymen and members of the community argued that the law does not need to be reformed as Christianity does not allow divorce and the stringent conditions for divorce as laid down in the Act were correct. A recent judgment of Justice Mansoor Ali Shah in which he reinstated the repealed Section 7 of the Act, allowing couples to divorce on various reasons, without alleging adultery on the part of either spouse, came under sharp criticism. However, the same judgment was considered as God-sent by several other participants as it made the process of divorce easy without any one party alleging adultery, a grave and unpardonable sin. They were of the opinion that modern times and the changing socioeconomic dynamics of society made amendments necessary.

**Succession Laws**

Since independence from the British Rule in 1947, there has not been any reform with regard to succession laws for any of the minorities in Pakistan. The Succession Act 1925 was promulgated to provide a consolidated Act which dealt with all the succession issues of various religious communities. However, after independence, there were amendments made to the law in India in 1956. However, no such amendment or improvement has been made in Pakistan.

Various customary laws are being followed by different sects in different religious communities in Pakistan. The rules of inheritance for Christians, dealt with in section 31 to 49 of the same Act, were discussed at length by the Lahore High Court in its judgment of Ref No. 51, *Samuel v. Piara Masih*, *(1996) CLC* at 562, and categorically stated that the rules drafted in the Succession Act 1925 were not only in consonance with Biblical rules but all customary practices for various Christian communities had also been abolished through this Act.

During interviews for this study, it was pointed out that women are being denied inheritance as various old customary laws are being practiced to deny people their rightful inheritance in both Hindu and Christian communities in Pakistan. Lawyers from both communities were quite vocal in their insistence that Succession Laws need urgent reforms as people face a lot of hardships and long legal battles due to the absence of any meaningful inheritance laws. Women, in particular are vulnerable as a result of various customary laws gaining precedence over codified law. Various instances were reported where the local clergy has been party to denying women, especially widows, of their rightful inheritance right by issuing bogus and frivolous certificates pertaining to the way the deceased’s estate should be divided.
Prohibition on Drinking and Licenses for Sale of Alcoholic Beverages

Sale and consumption of alcohol is banned for Muslims in Pakistan under the Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order 1979 and different punishments have been prescribed in the Order for the violation of the particular rule. However, non-Muslims are allowed to buy and consume alcoholic beverages if they hold a permit to do so from the local authorities. In the provinces of Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, various five-star hotels are allowed licenses and permits to sell alcohol; while in Sindh and Balochistan, permits are also issued to various local shops along with various luxury hotels to sell alcohol.

The issue of these permits and alcohol being allowed for non-Muslims was raised as a matter of grave concern by the minority community who were interviewed. The matter was particularly sensitive in Sindh as the subject of licenses issued to various local shops was being litigated in the Sindh High Court at the time this study was being conducted (The Express Tribune 2016). The basic criticism of this legislation, which allowed non-Muslims to buy and consume alcoholic drinks was that both Hinduism and Christianity prohibit consumption of alcohol. This particular law allowed only Catholic Christians to be given permits. This has created a misconception in the minds of the majority that drinking alcohol is allowed in Hinduism and Christianity, whose followers are in-turn influencing or facilitating the general Muslim population to drink. Several members of the minority communities claimed that they had never touched alcohol in their lives as it was religiously prohibited, but this particular law created a certain distance and misunderstanding against them amongst the majority population. Furthermore, it was pointed out that generally alcohol was consumed by the Muslim population and the high consumption was a tempting source of income for the youth of the minority community. These youth, instead of holding a regular job or doing a business, preferred to deal in the supply and sale of these alcoholic beverages to the local Muslims and earn money. There was a general demand that alcohol should either be banned for all in Pakistan, and if that cannot be done then the ban should be lifted entirely as the main consumers were the Muslim population and not the minorities.

Conversion Laws

The issue of conversion from one religion to another is quite complex and has many socioeconomic aspects. There are no particular laws in Pakistan which deal with the issue of conversion, and every citizen is free to profess, propagate and practice her/his religion as per the Constitution under the freedom provided in Article 20. Similarly, there is no particular law which deals with the issue of reverting back to one’s old religion, or apostasy. However, the religious minorities in Pakistan, especially those belonging to the lower strata of society, have been severely traumatised by the issue of forced conversion, rape and abduction by members of the majority religion. These issues are particularly grave in Sindh and South Punjab and affect both Hindus and Christian communities in these areas. Horrifying incidents of abduction of underage girls of these communities were narrated to during FDGs and KII, although one cannot go into the details of these as these are not pertinent to the issue at hand, these tales do identify and point out the deficiencies in law which have been exploited by people who have allegedly kidnapped innocent girls and forced them to convert to Islam. It was pointed out during this study that Pakistan’s law does not allow minors
under the age of 18 to get married, but this restriction is not enforced when it comes to Hindu and Christian minors. The police and even the courts have allowed girls as young as 13 years to have their religion changed without even their parents being present. In 2012, the matter was adjudicated before the Supreme Court of Pakistan in Ref No. 55, *Pakistan Hindu Council v. Pakistan through Ministry of Law, (2012) PLD at 679* and it was argued that in light of the recent rise in incidents of forcible conversions of minorities to Islam, there should be a comprehensive law against such practice. However, the then Chief Justice, in his brief judgment did not agree with this contention and stated that in the presence of Article 20 which guarantees citizens religious rights, there was no need for any specific legislation on this matter. It is problematic that the Chief Justice not only skirted the issue, but also avoided any particular ruling on forced conversion as ‘where there is forced conversion, the law takes it due course.’

As mentioned earlier, there is no particular law for conversion and NADRA does not have any provision to help those who want to revert back to their old religion once they have become Muslims. This hindrance has, and still is, causing great heartache for victims of forced conversion or people who have had a change of heart. On 17 November 2016, the Sindh Provincial Assembly passed the Minority Rights Commission Act, which not only criminalised acts of forced conversion and stipulated imprisonment from five years to life and fine, and also criminalised the acts of facilitators of forced conversion as well. It also made 18 years the minimum age of conversation, with underage conversion no longer being recognised (Tunio 2016).

**Evacuee Trust Property Board (ETPB)**

One of the particular pieces of legislation highlighted and of particular concern was the Evacuee Trust Property Board (ETPB). This Board of trustees was established under the Evacuee Trust Properties’ (Management and Disposal) Act 1975 to look after the properties attached to educational, religious or charitable trusts left behind by Hindus and Sikhs who migrated to India. Furthermore, it maintains and upkeeps various places of worship of Hindus and Sikhs. This Board is entrusted with properties and places of worship of minorities but as pointed out during this study, the Board was not funding any initiatives to help the minorities. When pointed out that this assertion is not entirely true, the argument was that more funds should be allocated and various minority projects should be initiated. Furthermore, the Board was being headed by a Muslim and Board members were also mainly Muslims with token membership given to minorities. The workings of the ETPB has been under scrutiny in recent times over its handling of the large acres of property under its supervision and it was pointed out during discussions that the Board had recently been in the limelight for various corruption scandals in which money and property has been misappropriated.

One particular incident was pointed out with regard to properties owned by a Hindu family before Partition, both commercial and residential in Sukkur city, which was taken over by the ETPB. There is no accountability with regard to these funds, nor were the funds being generated used for the welfare of the Hindu community in the city or the province. The
Supreme Court had taken *suo moto* notice of the ETPB’s decision to sell some of the land it was managing to the Defence Housing Authority (DHA Lahore and Islamabad) in Ref No. 48, *Suo moto action regarding illegal selling out the Auqaf Properties by the Chairman Evacuee Trust Property Board (2014) PLD at 100*. Not only did the Supreme Court direct DHA Lahore and Islamabad to return the property it had acquired from the ETPB, but also directed the Ministry of Religious Affairs, the controlling ministry for the ETPB, to conduct a forensic audit of the Board for the last five years. It further directed the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) to expedite its on-going investigation against the members involved in this matter, especially the former Chairman, so that civil and criminal actions could be initiated against them.

It was the view of the respondents that the Board should at least be headed by a member of the minority and the minority places of worship should be run by particular members of the religious community. Various schools and colleges are being run by the Board and they have all been given Muslim names, when the same are being run by money generated from non-Muslim trusts and property. As one senior minority lawyer pointed out, ‘how would the Muslims feel if we start handling all the mosques and shrines?’

In addition to this, sections 3, 4 and 5 of the Punjab Waqf Properties Ordinance 1979, bar positions of Chief Administrator Auqaf, Administrators and Deputy Administrators Auqaf and General Appointments to be held by non-Muslims. Justice Jamshaid of the Lahore High Court observed in Ref. No. 49, *Shaukat Ali Wahla, superintendent, Zonal office, Auqaf, Sargodha v. Chief Administrator of Auqaf, Lahore, Punjab (2005) MLD at 1053*:

> The guarantee against discrimination on the ground of religion is absolute and not subject to reasonable qualification or restriction. The exceptions to that said guarantee have been provided by the Article itself. Therefore, the provision to section 5(1) added to the Punjab Waqf Properties Ordinance, 1979 (IV of 1979) by the Punjab Ordinance NO. XIII of 1984 is repugnant to the Article 27 and is thus void by virtue of operation of Article 8 of the Constitution.

**Benefits Provided to Hafiz-e-Qur’an by the State**

The Government of Pakistan issued a notification in 1986 under which anyone who claims to be a *Hafiz-e-Qur’an* (someone who has completely memorised the Qur’an), and passed the particular test prescribed in that notification would be granted 20 additional marks while qualifying for admission to government institutions for various professional studies i.e. medical and engineering degrees.\(^{13}\) The issue was highlighted recently when this notification was challenged by a student of Christian faith before the Lahore High Court (Siddiqi 2012).

In his petition, the student argued that as a Christian, he had been denied admission to a government medical college as a result of somebody else being granted the additional 20 marks. He argued that he should also be given extra marks for his knowledge of the Bible.

Similarly, jail rules and regulations provide for remissions of various periods and lengths when a convict is able to complete various Islamic Studies courses or becomes a *Hafiz-e-Qur’an*.¹⁴ These educational remissions are in addition to those provided to convicts if they complete the normal educational courses and are only applicable on Muslim convicts.

The argument forwarded against such educational benefits was that these, albeit small things that are sponsored by the state, show that it is biased towards a certain section of society, and there is no level playing field provided to the younger generation of the minorities violating their constitutional rights of Equality and fair treatment.

**Representation in Parliament**

Pakistan has a parliamentary system and the representatives of the people, both in the provinces and at the Federal level, are elected through a joint electoral system, meaning thereby that all members of a particular constituency, regardless of their caste, creed or religion, vote to choose their preferred candidate from the choices available. Although it was a general demand of the minorities that a joint electorate system be introduced in the country and this demand was duly introduced, many flaws of this were pointed out during discussions.

The fact that minority members of the Parliament are nominated and do not represent their constituency was a matter of great resentment. The argument presented against such nomination was that those nominated did not have any constituency to answer to and thus did not feel the need to represent their constituency’s problems at their respective level of government. Furthermore, these people were merely puppets in the hands of their respective parties and none had any real power. Even minority ministers had no real power and were powerless to defend their respective constituents while policies were being implemented or made. An example was given with regard of the ongoing Orange Line Project in Lahore, where three major churches were in danger of being razed as they were in the way of the proposed route. The Minorities’ Minister did not take any step to protect or argue the matter before the Chief Minister of Lahore even when different delegations of the Christian community met with him.

Political parties have also ignored the genuine demands of the minority electorate as they also do not field minority candidates in areas where a certain minority has a majority. Only a single non-Muslim Member of Provincial Assembly (MPA) has been elected from Sindh even when there are several areas where the minorities, especially Hindus are in majority. During discussions for this study, it was proposed that an amended system be introduced, where specific constituencies could be marked in areas with majority population consisting of religious minorities in major cities in all provinces, where only candidates belonging to the minority community could stand for elections, so that those elected were not only from the minority community but also answerable to the whole electorate as well. This would also

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bridge the divide between the majority and minority in general as those wanting to contest and eventually get elected, would also canvass for their votes within the Muslim members of the constituency as well.

**Education: Syllabus and Policies**

The Constitution of Pakistan guarantees education to every citizen under Article 22. Although there are no particular laws which are a hindrance or are detrimental to the minorities, the issue of educational syllabus and reforms in the area was raised. The educational syllabus in the country is very security-centric and has many historical anomalies, which need to be rectified. As it was pointed out during discussions, it is India which is considered Pakistan’s enemy and not Hindus as such, and Hindus have to face severe backlash even at the start of their educational career by being labelled as enemies of the country, their children labelled as traitors in schools and the books being taught confirming this stereotyping of all Hindus as enemies. The authors were provided with examples where children had to be taken out of particular schools when they had to face such discriminatory attitude.

The issue of religious studies in the curriculum was also a topic of concern for many. It was alleged that Civics as a subject instead of Islamiat single out the minority members, which is contrary to the guarantees provided under Article 22. It was further alleged that as a general rule, Civics is marked quite strictly in Pakistan, which puts many at a disadvantage when it comes to merit-based professional studies examination. As a consequence, many simply prefer studying Islamiat and avoid all these difficulties. There was a general demand that religion should not be taught in the national curriculum, as religious studies should not be a state’s responsibility, and the guarantees provided under the Constitution are being violated by such discriminatory marking against minority students.

It was generally demanded that various national heroes like SP Singha, Ganga Ram, Cecil Chaudhry, Jamshed Mehta, Durab Patel, Rana Bhagwandas, Dr Abdusalaam should be highlighted in the national curriculum to promote multi-culturalism and acknowledge the services of these extraordinary people from the minority communities. This change and acknowledgment will go a long way in shifting the general attitude towards minorities.

**Equal Opportunities**

Minorities in Pakistan are provided a 5 percent quota in public sector employment in Federal Services via notification of Government of Pakistan, Cabinet Secretariat, and Establishment Division dated 26 May 2009. This is in addition to being appointed on merit. This policy of the Federal Government has been adopted by the provincial governments as well. With regard to this quota, the participants in the study panel and in individual interviews, were quite vocal. The view of the majority was that many provincial departments in several remote or interior cities of Sindh and Punjab were simply not aware

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of the said quota and were unable to provide any kind of data with regard to employment of minorities. It was further reported that until 20 jobs are advertised collectively, only then a single seat for minorities is reserved, which usually is not the case and remains another impediment in seeking jobs.

It was reported that only sanitary workers get the reserved seats. Unfortunately, discriminatory attitude is prevalent even in public mainstream newspapers where such jobs are advertised as ‘for non-Muslims only’. The example of the service rules of Ministry of Health, Punjab, were pointed out in which it was, until recently, expressly written that preference will be given to Christians in employment for sanitary staff in all government owned hospitals and dispensaries in the province. An official complaint and considerable pressure was exerted before this was deleted in the service rules. Moreover, anyone who was employed in these public offices in the officer cadre had been appointed based on merit and had not taken advantage of the quota system. It was observed, by those interviewed, that the minorities were held to a different standard while striving for employment or promotion in these departments and had to show extra brilliance to advance. An example was given of M.S. Lal, a senior officer in Sindh Government who was denied promotion to Grade 22 and resigned as a result. Another example was given of Cecil Chaudhry, who was in line to lead the Pakistan Air Force, but was denied just because he was a Christian.

The study findings highlight that in the presence of Article 27, reservation of quota was not a successful or even a desirable option. First, it was pointed out that in many places in interior Sindh and South Punjab, minorities, especially Hindus, were in majority and it was unreasonable to restrict employment to this quota. When pointed out that this quota was in addition to applying on the basis of merit, it was argued by the majority that the government departments ignore minority applications on merit and allocate positions according to quota only. Secondly, this quota has not been extended to any other branches of the state e.g. the Armed Forces or the Parliament or in educational institutions, especially professional colleges. It was argued that despite a large population of minorities in different areas of Pakistan, the Pakistan Army does not include any Hindu. A single Sikh from Punjab was recruited recently with much fanfare, but it was argued by majority of Hindu interviewees that Hindus and Sikhs are not the same. Hindus are considered enemies of the state, but the Sikhs, due to the Punjabi influence in the Pakistani state machinery, are considered brothers even when, as it was quite ironically pointed out, the Partition riots in Punjab took place between these two communities and very few, if any, Hindus participated in them. Furthermore, this quota system should be introduced in professional education institutes also, especially medical and engineering colleges, to encourage students from minority communities to have achievable aspirations for a professional degree. The majority population of minorities belong to the lower strata and do not have the economic means to afford private education, let alone expensive private education for professional degrees.

It was a general demand that this quota should be applicable to the national and state legislatures as well. There are currently only 10 minority members in the National Parliament (National Assembly of Pakistan 2016); and even when quota is applied the figure comes to 16 members. Additionally the quota system, if it was to be continued, should also
be introduced in the yearly national awards announced by the Government, so as to honour and acknowledge members of the minorities excelling in various fields in the country.

The only area or public sector department where this quota system was satisfactorily being implemented was appointments through the Central Superior Services (CSS) examinations. It was generally accepted and acknowledged that the quota system was working well in minority applicants being selected and appointed through this competitive examination. However, the authors were unable to find any data to back up this assertion or whether seats were carried forward if there were not enough applicants to be filled on the given quota.

A common complaint of Christians in Karachi was that the quota system did not specify as to how it will be divided between different religious minority groups. In Karachi, Hindus and Parsis are well off as compared to the Christian community, and this puts the Christians at a disadvantage when competing for public sector jobs. The exact opposite was reported with regard to Christians being in majority in Punjab and denying Hindus public sector employment. This argument led to the disadvantage the whole minority community felt due to the non-availability of recent or up-to-date population figures as a result of non-holding of census for nearly two decades now. All those interviewed were of the view that the overall percentage of minorities in the total population of Pakistan has grown in recent times and the designated quota was simply not enough.\textsuperscript{16}

Lastly, there is no separate dispute resolution mechanism provided to minorities with regard to their employment or disputes regarding the implementation of the quota system. Departments have no data nor any mechanism to provide data as to how many minority members were employed in various seats and whether these seats would be carried forward in the next round of appointments if the given quota was not fulfilled. There is no departmental or legal remedy provided to minority applicants if this quota is not fulfilled or somebody is terminated as a result of his particular religion or caste. This was particularly felt when dozens of Christians around Lahore lost their jobs in the aftermath of the Youhannahabad incident. These people did not have any legal remedy available to them as they were simply terminated on the basis of their religion even when they had no connection whatsoever to the incident. It was felt that such mechanism should be provided so as to be a deterrent to the departments/employers for the implementation of this quota system, if the government is serious about implementing and providing any sanctity to the guarantees that the Constitution provides.

\textbf{Conclusion and Recommendations}

The State of Pakistan has by and large failed in implementing its constitutional duty of protecting the rights of the minorities as enshrined in the Constitution. Most laws, especially private laws, which are in force today in relation to minorities, were enforced/promulgated before the Partition. The Parliament has not given due importance to new legislation of laws pertaining to minority rights and have allowed these old laws to govern the issues of the

\textsuperscript{16} Editor’s Note: The National Census 2017 had not taken place when this chapter was written.
minorities. There was a general consensus among those interviewed that these laws have created confusion or simply become obsolete in the modern era and are in urgent need of reforms.

The study revealed that recently, due to the rise of extremism and intolerance in society, Hindus have had their fundamental constitutional right under Article 23 and 24 violated, as they have been restricted from entering or buying property in various areas of Karachi e.g. newly constructed residential buildings in Bath Island, Vinsy Mall. An active member of a Hindu organisation in Karachi and a businessman reported that he wanted to buy flats in the newly constructed residential building in Bath Island, but when the booking agent found out that the applicant was a Hindu, he was informed that Hindus were not allowed to buy any property in these buildings. Those who reported such incidents said that they did not want to report such incidents to the police as they did not have any confidence in the police or the State to take any action against such individuals or companies and wanted to avoid getting embroiled in such controversies.

Moreover, there are other reforms needed in various laws and policies of the Government, which are a source of growing dissatisfaction and disillusionment with Pakistan and its society. Almost everyone was of the opinion that the State needs to change its policies so as to provide a sense of belonging to the minority communities and stem the rising trend among the minorities to migrate, to India in the case of Hindus, both from Sindh and South Punjab; and to various western countries in case of Christians.

Equality and non-discrimination are inalienable rights of every citizen. No law repugnant to the fundamental rights can be legislated, and if legislated, it would be against Article 8 of the Constitution and shall be void. It is the duty of every organ of the State to strictly adhere to doctrine of Rule of Law and the principle of Equality. The state is duty bound to legislate progressively against direct and indirect discrimination. It is unfortunately true that in the course of this research violation of the doctrine of Rule of Law by all organs of the state was noted i.e. the executive, legislature and judiciary. The following list of recommendations, although not exhaustive, is based on the research and interviews with minority members:

1. Strict adherence to the principle of Equality and Rule of Law by all organs of the state and at every level of governance.
2. Establishment of an Equal Opportunities Commission.
3. Establishment of a Minority Council as recommended by the Supreme Court.
4. Promulgation of a national law against forced conversions.
5. Amendments in discriminatory laws and reforms in the private laws of minorities.
6. Additional marks to Hafiz-e-Qur’an to be recalled.
7. Representation in the Parliament and provincial assemblies to be made more democratic.

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17 Laws inconsistent with or in derogation of fundamental rights to be void, Article 8, Constitution of Pakistan.
8. Overhaul of the Evacuee Trust Property Board to add or even make a minority member its Chairman.
9. Quota to be strictly enforced in all public sector departments and cadres of Pakistan.
Qualified Equality: Forms of Discrimination in the Legal Framework of Pakistan

References


Appendices

Appendice 1: Educational Facilities and Entitlement of Remission

All prisoners i.e. under trial prisoners, convicted prisoners and condemned prisoners confined in Punjab Jails are allowed to appear in any examination in Jail premises to get the following education under rule 215 of Pakistan Prisons Rules 1978:

- Formal education i.e. Matric, F.A, B.A, M.A etc.
- Oriental Languages i.e. Urdu, Punjabi, and Arabic etc.
- Religious education i.e. Hafiz-e-Qur’an, Nazra Qur’an, Taleem-ul-Qur’an courses, Tarjama-ul-Qur’an etc.

Award of Education Remission

For timely disposal of education remission cases of convicted, committees have been nominated and meetings on monthly basis are being conducted.

After amendment in Rule 215 (i) education remission has been awarded to 1939 convicted prisoners for passing various religious as well formal educations courses / exams.

The Education Remission on Middle, Matric, F.A, B.A, M.A and oriental language i.e. Arabic, Urdu, Bengali, Punjabi, Persian, Sindhi, Pushto (Not more than two remissions in oriental language examination), under Clause of Rule.215-a to d (i)(ii)(iii) are as under:

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<tr>
<th>Sentence</th>
<th>(i) Upto 40% marks =2 months</th>
<th>(ii) 41-60% marks =3 months</th>
<th>(iii) Above 60% marks =4 months</th>
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<td>Upto 2 Years</td>
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<td>Sentence exceeding 10 Years</td>
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Note: The Ombudsman, Punjab decided complaint of convict Basim Liaq of C.J LHR vide order dated 04.11.2006 and directed that education remission be also granted under rule
215 a to d clause (i,ii,iii) according to the sentence and percentage marks obtained in the oriental, examination passed by the prisoners (Implemented on 27.12.2006).

- On qualifying Primary Classes Examination Conducted by District Education Officer, 2 Months Remission is entitled under Rule 215 Clause-(c)
- On qualifying Nazra Qur’an Courses, 3 Months Remission is entitled under Rule 215 Clause-(d)
- On qualifying Taleem-ul-Qur’an Courses following remissions are entitled under Rules 215 Clause-(e):
  - 1st Course = 15 Days
  - 2nd Course = 15 Days
  - 3rd Course = 30 Days
  - 4th Course = 60 Days
  - 5th Course = 60 Days

On qualifying Tarjama-ul-Qur’an Courses following remissions are entitled under Rules 215 Clause A to (d) (Amended dated 11.09.2000):
- sentence upto 2 yrs = 02 months
- sentence upto 6 yrs = 03 months
- sentence upto 10 yrs = 04 months
- sentence exceeding 10 yrs = 06 months

On qualifying Hafiz-e-Qur’an Courses following remissions are entitled under Rules 215 Clause-(f):
- sentence upto 3 yrs = 06 months
- sentence upto 6 yrs = 06 months
- sentence upto 10 yrs = 12 months
- sentence exceeding 10 yrs = 02 years.
IV

Researching Conflict in South Asia: Impacts on Livelihoods and Services
Hospitality and Exclusion: Post-war Tourism in Passikudah, Sri Lanka

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Abstract
After the end of Sri Lanka’s 30-year civil war, the eastern seaboard – previously a primary theatre of war – became the epicentre of investment in hospitality and tourism developments intended to showcase the country as a ‘miracle of Asia.’ In the eyes of the post-war state, hospitality and tourism presented an opportunity to increase incomes and employment opportunities for Sri Lankans. However, post-war reconstruction efforts that focus on economic development rather than justice – such as investments in the tourism industry – have had limited success. This chapter explores the economic, social and political dynamics and effects of tourism development in the Special Tourism Zone of Passikudah. It focuses on the effects on the traditional local fishing industry, wage labour, skills gap and employment opportunities in tourism, especially for women, self-employment and debt. While finding exclusion of the local population and subjectivities that reproduce ethnic animosity and patriarchal norms, the authors offer several pointers for a pathway from narratives of discrimination and exclusion to inclusion and distributive justice.
Introduction

Background of the Study

Following the end of Sri Lanka’s 30-year civil war,1 former President Mahinda Rajapaksa set the country on a path of maximising economic growth. The emphasis was on large-scale urban transformation and infrastructure development to attract global capital and tourism. In line with the lofty ambitions for the tourism industry as ‘the next big thing’ was the post-war state’s belief in its potential to generate employment and increase incomes. The Mahinda Chinthana – the previous regime’s national policy framework – therefore identified tourism as an important industry that could ‘provide benefits to every segment of society in a justifiable manner’, while ‘promoting investments on infrastructure based on commercial and economic returns’ and creating ‘equitable access to such infrastructure development to enable people to engage in gainful economic activities’ (Department of National Planning 2010: 164).

Rajapaksa’s post-war development agenda was also premised on the idea that economic development was a panacea for the ethnic conflict. This narrative saw the war as having impeded development and growth and the war’s end as the inauguration of an era of fast-paced development, especially in the North and East. The result was that the primary theatre of war became the crucible for centrally-driven, high-investment mega development interventions, often with military involvement, that could showcase Sri Lanka’s transition from a war-torn country to the ‘miracle of Asia.’

Today’s Passikudah, a luxury resort on Sri Lanka’s eastern seaboard and the focus of this research, is a product of this ideology. The estimated number of foreign visitors to Passikudah’s high-end resorts is approximately 58,000 a year (ILO 2014: 9). Approximately 17,000 local tourists visit the area every year and, on average, every tourist spends five days, while 62,000 visitors make day trips to the beach strip each year (Ibid.). At the time of data collection, there were seven resorts and 14 guesthouses and homestays in the Passikudah-Kalkudah area, amounting to a total of 469 accommodation units or rooms (Ibid.).

Passikudah, and other similarly designated tourism zones, are not merely part of an industry but a key to transforming the political and subjective economies of the nation. These tourist zones are seen as key to generating economic wealth as well as rebranding Sri Lanka as a ‘mosaic of tourist destinations.’ Tourism was positioned to be the number one foreign exchange earner by 2020, in addition to generating 700,000 new jobs driven by the projected arrival of 2.5 million high-spending tourists by 2016 to ‘the world’s most treasured and greenest island’ (Department of National Planning 2010: 164). Moreover, the return of development to the war-torn North and East was underpinned by an understanding that any problem that remained after the end of the war was related to development and not justice.

1 In May 2009, the armed forces of the Government of Sri Lanka confirmed victory over the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) declaring the end of the civil war that had ravaged the island since 1983.
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The change of regime in January 2015 did not see any dramatic change from the emphasis on linking economic development (including tourism) and reconciliation and justice. In his Parliamentary Address on 5 November 2015, Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe stated that ‘many qualified people prefer well-paying jobs’ and it was ‘not viable to maintain a low paying production based economy’ and ‘we need to look into sectors like ICT [information and communication technology] and tourism to create employment opportunities in the short run’ (News.lk 2015). Investment in tourism, thus, ranked high in the budget proposal of 2016 (News.lk 2016) and the Tourism Development Strategy 2011–16 is still shaping policy.

Notwithstanding all the state-sponsored optimism, evidence that post-war development initiatives in Sri Lanka have in fact contributed to employment generation is extremely sparse. A number of studies present evidence that tourism development, particularly in the war-affected North and East, has not managed to create sustainable jobs for people from war-affected communities (Sarvananthan 2016). It is in this light that this research aims to understand the social, economic and political dynamics and effects of post-war tourism development in Sri Lanka. Through a case study of Passikudah, it casts light on how multiple local and supra-local interests and conflict-related fragilities are embroiled in post-war tourism development.

The study views tourism as a post-war dynamic that is best understood through its ‘effects’ rather than its ‘impacts’ which tend to be unidirectional and read as highlighting either the positive or the negative sides of the industry. To this end, it presents a contextually grounded and fine-grained analysis of the political as well as the subjective economies of the communities which constitute tourism development in Passikudah. Such an analysis assumes significance given that war-affected communities in Sri Lanka are engaged in a seemingly endless struggle to secure livelihoods and rebuild their lives while positioned along many inimical social, economic and political faultlines. These faultlines operate not only at the level of gender, class, caste and ethnicity but also in relation to capital and labour, the market, state and the centre and periphery (Murray 2001:2).

**Research Questions**

The main research question driving this enquiry is: What are the economic, social and political dynamics and effects of tourism development in war-affected areas such as Passikudah? This question is further deconstructed into sub-questions relating to the political and subjective economy of post-war tourism development:

- How has tourism development altered political economic relations in Passikudah?
- What are the continuities and changes in patterns of livelihoods and employment?
- With respect to the above questions, what has been the role of the state and how has it shaped ideas of accountability and responsibility on the part of state and private actors engaged in tourism-related activities?
- What are the diverse subjective meanings allocated by different actors to tourism development in Passikudah?
- What is the social and political economic import of these meanings, especially in
terms of (i) gender and ethnic relations and (ii) the role of state and private actors engaged in tourism-related activities?

- How is tourism development reordering the post-war social fabric?
- What is the nature of the attendant anxieties and opportunities and how are they being deployed and leveraged, especially in the context of pre-existing or new social faultlines?

**Methodology**

*A Qualitative Approach*

This research employed multiple qualitative methods. Document analysis was used to analyse policy documents on tourism. The primary data collection process was planned and implemented in three phases. The formulation of research questions and case selection was informed by 17 key person interviews who included academics, development workers, social workers, researchers and activists. They had a deep understanding of and experience in tourism in Sri Lanka and/or tourism in Eastern province, the post-war political economy and gender issues in war-affected areas, and the political and economic dynamics of Batticaloa district.

The first phase of data collection took place between October and December 2014, with primary data collection in Passikudah conducted in multiple waves from January to June 2015. Initially, ten key person interviews were carried out to understand the context of tourism development in Passikudah. In this case, the key persons included government officials, development and/or social workers, researchers and hoteliers in Batticaloa. During repeated visits to Passikudah, several interviews and focus group discussions (FGDs) (40 engagements in total) were carried out in Kalkudah Grama Niladhari (GN) division (the administrative unit to which Passikudah belongs). Respondents included current local government officials (GNs) (interviewed four times), a former GN (interviewed twice), a labour department official, six divisional secretariat officials (one FGD), five bank officials, seven resort managers, three small-scale hotel owners, three individuals from Kalkudah working in resorts or hotels and ten hotel employees.

During visits to Passikudah, six FGDs were carried out among women, youth and the elderly in each of the villages in closest proximity to the resorts – Paddiyadicheni (PC) and Karenkalacholai (KKC) to ascertain perspectives and experiences (Asbury 1995) of tourism development. Additionally, FGDs were held with a local fisherfolk cooperatives (six male respondents) and the small hotel owners association (one female and five male respondents). Data were collected through a semi-structured group interview process moderated by a native Tamil speaker who was well-acquainted with the area. Two or three note-takers attended the FGDs and each captured verbal and non-verbal data. To collect information about employment and sourcing practices of resorts and small hotels, a rapid survey was conducted. This covered all the resorts (seven) and ten out of the 14 small establishments in Passikudah.


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Study Limitations

• The research team did not interview tourists/guests of resorts as the assumption was made that their reasons for coming to Passikudah would be reflected in interviews with resort managers.
• The resorts did not provide access to their corporate human resource practices.
• The research team was not able to access any records pertaining to land transactions between resort owners and state officials.
• The researchers did not have access to investment records or terms and conditions of investment in Passikudah.
• The research team interviewed respondents in their workplace, which may have meant they were more cautious in sharing their thoughts about tourism in Passikudah.

The Research Site

Given that the eastern seaboard is home to some of the most beautiful beaches in Sri Lanka, tourism was always conceived of as an important sector with enormous potential. With the highly contested Eastern provincial council elections in 2008 and the consequent re-establishment of civil administration, the prospect of developing tourism in the province, mainly along the coastal belt, re-emerged in the policy domain. State authorities popularised the slogan *Negenahira Udawa* (Awakening of the East) to signal the impending push for developing the East. Even before 2008, the Sri Lanka Tourism Development Authority (SLTDA) had already begun redeveloping the tourism industry in Passikudah, which had been completely devastated by the tsunami in 2004. However, it was after 2008 that the central government revived its plan to develop a resort-based Special Tourism Zone (STZ) in Passikudah.²

At the time of data collection, the Divineguma Department, headed by former President Rajapakse’s brother Basil Rajapakse, had a tight rein on development matters in the Eastern province. International and local non-state actors as well as local government authorities

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² Although the concept of STZs did not surface in the official language until after the tsunami in 2004 when a number of tourist establishments along the coastal belt were destroyed, the government’s plans to establish STZs date back to the 1999–2000 period (Samaranayake 2012:750). Until recently, with the exception of Bentota, all tourist developments in the coastal Southern and Western regions took place in an unplanned, organic manner, at the initiative of entrepreneurs building small and medium-sized hotels. These establishments had self-planned infrastructure facilities – access roads, sewage and waste disposal systems, electricity, water and telecommunications – which over a short period of time had created severe environmental problems. Such issues included poor roads, bursting cesspits and soakage pits and unhygienic waste disposal (Ibid.: 751). Responding to these issues, the Sri Lanka Tourist Board (SLTB) worked on improving specific infrastructure in the Southern and Western region coastal areas. With financial assistance from the Japan Bank for International Cooperation and the UN Development Programme and technical advice from the World Tourism Organization, the SLTB charted a comprehensive plan to operationalise planned tourism zones in the Southern and Western regions in November 2000 (Ibid.: 752).
confided in us that the central government had imposed tight restrictions on their role in shaping development priorities and that their every move was subject to close surveillance. The space for civil society engagement was at an all-time low at the time of data collection.

An important reality of the initial stages of tourism development was the military’s rapid foray into tourism and travel services in the post-war era. This also enabled folding of the development agenda into the national security state (Senaratne 2014), wherein the militarisation of civilian life and a crackdown on dissent created an environment ripe for corruption.

The Sri Lanka Tourist Board’s (SLTB’s) ownership of the Passikudah STZ resort area dates back to the land reforms in 1972 (SLTDA 2014). While the state has the legal right to the land, it did not follow a participatory process to develop the resorts in the post-war period. An FGD with local government authorities in Valaichchenai revealed that there were several stakeholder consultations prior to building the resorts. These meetings, convened by SLTB, were heavily attended by prospective investors in resorts, representatives of local government and fishermen from the area whose livelihoods were at stake as a result of the development of the resort area. According to a local government representative who attended these meetings, there were hardly any community members present.

During this study, researchers found that the process of selecting investors and allocating land to build resorts involved neither transparency nor the participation of government actors in Passikudah. In every one of the interviews with government officials, when inquired about whether information on selecting investors could be shared, the uniform answer was, ‘it cannot be released to the public domain.’ Resort owners adopted the same approach and expressed that the researchers sought ‘confidential corporate information.’ Thus, official information on the basis of which selections were made and on the individuals of the state and the private parties who were signatories to the official documents remains unavailable. Interviews with civil society actors revealed that the appropriation of land to the resorts was based on political patronage:

These resorts were doled out to Basil [Rajapaska] and Gota [Gotabhaya Rajapaksa – former Secretary of Defence and another one of the former President’s brothers] and Karuna³ was here to facilitate it.⁴

The process of selection of investors (for resorts) occurred from the top at central

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³ Vinyagamurthy Muralitharan, or ‘Colonel Karuna’, LTTE’s eastern military commander, split from the LTTE and formed the Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Puligal (TMVP), which became a crucial part of the government’s counter-insurgency campaign in the East. Later, with the support of the TMVP and pro-government Muslim politicians and the Sri Lanka Freedom Party, the ruling party was able to win the May 2008 provincial council elections. Karuna was appointed to a vacant seat in Parliament in 2008.

⁴ Male, Interview, 26 January 2015.
government level, with little consultation with local officials or representatives at the divisional or district secretariats, local governments or even the provincial council. Interviews with officials in the Divisional Secretariat revealed that once appraisal is completed and recommendations are made regarding certain investors, the respective project proposals are sent to the local authorities to execute the process of registration.

Passikudah as a destination is, therefore, a distinct post-war phenomenon. The post-war narratives of ‘pristine’ and ‘unspoilt’ beaches and their integration into the political economy of global tourism masks the economy of violence, conflict and militarisation that shaped social and economic relations. It was open as a destination for business soon after the end of the war even while thousands remained displaced, dispossessed and vulnerable to high levels of militarisation. In this sense, ‘the discursive and material production of tourist destinations – an intensive process of touristification’ (Hyndman 2015, citing Ojeda 2013 on Colombia) and securitisation went hand-in-hand to produce Passikudah and other destinations in post-war Sri Lanka.

Political and Subjective Economy of Tourism Development

Commercialised Hospitality

Tourism, by its very nature, has the ability to invoke strong emotional reactions in consumers and indeed is often interpreted according to this capacity. In particular, hospitality has been a common way to understand the affective dimension of tourism. Quite explicit in this idea of hospitality is an economy of exchange (Westmoreland 2008), one that renders tourism as nothing but ‘commercialised hospitality’ (Cohen 1984, in Scott 2006: 105). In Sri Lanka, the potential of the tourism industry to earn foreign exchange is explicit in the state policy discourse. The Tourism Development Strategy 2011–16 states:

The Government’s vision is to transform Sri Lankan tourism sector, by 2020, to be the largest foreign exchange earner in the economy (Ministry of Economic Development 2011: 24).

The potential that lies within the tourism industry to create employment opportunities is another reason it is considered an important sector of the Sri Lankan economy. The Tourism Development Strategy (2011–16) states that:

The Government recognises the effect of tourism development in creating employment opportunities and distribution of wealth through a variety of economic activities predominantly in the SME [small- and medium-sized enterprise] sector, taking the advantage of SMEs being able to link micro enterprises from one side and large-scale corporate sector on the other side (Ibid.: 4).

The number of persons employed in the tourism sector (considered ‘direct employment’) was 112,550 in 2013; the previous year had 67,862 (a 65.9 percent increase) (Ibid.). It is often argued that tourism entails direct, indirect and dynamic effects (Ashley et al. 2007). Its
direct effects are tied to its job creation potential, as tourism uses a relatively high proportion of unskilled and semi-skilled labour (Mitchell and Faal 2006). This is particularly attractive for countries undergoing structural transformation of their economies, as tourism may be able to absorb the surplus labour from declining agriculture.

As stated in Sri Lanka’s Tourism Development Strategy (2011–16), it is common for policymakers to base their decisions to invest in tourism merely on the number of jobs. However, less attention is paid to the types of jobs created with regard to wages, employment security, bargaining power, career opportunities and skills of potential employees. Indeed, many argue that employment in tourism is relatively low-wage, seasonal and part-time (Blank 1989; Luloff et al. 1994; Stynes and Pigozzi 1983) and generally contradicts long-term developmental plans of high-wage employment creation (Bernhardt et al. 2003; Pond 1988).

The tourism value chain is also expected to produce indirect effects (Ashley et al. 2007). For example, tourism is a consumption-heavy industry that links food and beverages, construction, transportation, furniture, arts and crafts and other cottage industries. Some studies have found that indirect effects of tourism can add value to the extent of 60-70 percent of the direct benefits (Lejarraga and Walkenhorst 2006). However, the much-touted ‘multiplier-effect’ of tourism is also contested. Research assessing tourism’s capacity to boost other related industries is sparse, and the limited number of studies that assess the distributional effects of tourism find mixed results (Lee and Kang 1998). Locating tourism in the context of the political economy of Third World underdevelopment, Britton noted way back in 1982 that:

Physical, commercial and socio-psychological terms... tourism in a peripheral economy can be conceptualized as an enclave industry (341).

The movement of tourists from the global metropolitan centres is mediated by operators and agents through to resort enclaves, from where:

Tourists will make brief excursions from their “environmental bubbles” into artisan and subsistence sectors of the economy for the purchase of shopping items, entertainment, and sightseeing (Ibid.: 343).

Drawing on Britton (1982) and Sanyal (2007), it is important to consider a disaggregated view of Passikudah’s political economy. It is especially important to recognise the differentiation within and the linkages between its key economic spaces. As such, this study focuses on the following: resorts, local guesthouses, primary production in the form of fisheries and wage labour. By taking this approach to tourism development in Passikudah, it attempts to nuance the arguments presented by the two dominant narratives surrounding tourism development in post-war Sri Lanka. The first of these is that large-scale luxury tourism is a panacea for rapid local economic transformation and employment creation; the second, and opposing view is that tourism is wholly detrimental to culturally sensitive and community-driven economic development goals.

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Analysis of Study Findings

Legacy of War and Socioeconomic Profile of Passikudah

Kalkudah GN division, the administrative unit of Passikudah beach, is situated on the eastern seaboard of Sri Lanka, which was a hotbed of violence during the war. By the 1980s, the East was at the heart of the militant Tamil nationalist movement to create a separate state of Tamil Eelam. A heavily militarised region, it remained volatile throughout the 2002–06 peace process, with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) killing many dissenting Tamils, forcibly recruiting children and continuing its harassment of Muslims (ICG 2008). The massive death and destruction caused by the December 2004 tsunami led to the displacement of hundreds of thousands and increased levels of poverty and debt.

Koralai Pattu, the Divisional Secretariat Division in which Kalkudah is situated, is among the poorest regions: 38 percent of families earn less than USD 6.90 per month (as of 2013). A total of 30 percent of households in this administrative unit have no toilet facilities and 30 percent have no access to drinking water (Batticaloa District Secretariat 2014). Over 95 percent of the people are Tamil, and the rest of the ethnic composition is Sinhala and Burgher. In 60 percent of the families at least one member engages in fishing as the primary livelihood. Most of the families that now live in the GTZ resettlement zone and KKC were living on or near the Passikudah beach strip (the location of the resorts) before the tsunami and were resettled in their current villages after 2004. As a result of pervasive income poverty in the GN division, nearly 60 percent of households in Kalkudah are part of Samurdhi, the state-sponsored social protection scheme.5 Around 100 families in Kalkudah receive more than one type of state-sponsored monetary assistance owing to lack of income.6

Primary Producers in the Shadow of the Resort Economy: Fisherfolk in Passikudah

There is no chance for our children to survive doing fishing.

Like in coastal areas elsewhere on the island, fishing as a livelihood has a long history in and around Passikudah. Alongside other forms of wage labour and paddy cultivation, fishing has constituted a major source of both food and income.7

During the war, fisherfolk had to contend with fighting, on land and at sea, and also heavy surveillance and restrictions imposed by the Sri Lankan Army, the LTTE and other armed groups. A complex and unpredictable regime of checkpoints, curfews, security zones and passes meant that, when possible at all, fishing was risky and had to be conducted within a narrow window of time. Fighting between the Army and the LTTE dictated when fishermen went to sea and when they returned, as there were times when they could not return to land.

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5 This proportion is higher than the average for Koralai Pattu – 48 percent.
6 Public Assistance Monthly Allowance, Temporary Disability Allowance and Permanent Disability Allowance.
7 Interview, Regional Planning Director, SOLID, 26 January 2015.
owing to heavy fighting. Moreover, timely access to markets was often blocked or greatly hindered, frequently causing delays that resulted in significant losses, given the perishable nature of the produce.

The environment of fear, whereby men were seen as especially vulnerable to abduction, murder and forced recruitment, led to women developing a larger public role navigating through checkpoints to access markets (Bohle and Funfgeld 2007: 678; Fernando and Moonesinghe 2012: 12; Goodhand et al. 2000: 399). But the attendant risks for women meant this too was not always a reliable or secure channel. As a result, fishing was often reduced to being subsistence or a survival economy, heavily dependent on external factors and the security situation.

While relations of exchange were unreliable and survival was often a priority during the war, fishing nevertheless remained an important source of food and livelihood within the limits imposed by the war economy. But the tsunami of 2004 was a major setback for fishing communities in the area. The present settlement pattern, which includes fishing communities settled significantly inland, is a result of post-tsunami resettlement. KKC and PC were two villages in which fishing communities were resettled after the tsunami. 'Kumar', a local government official (30, male) in Kalkudah, conceded that many in Passikudah were unhappy with their resettled locations.8

Following the tsunami, fisherfolk moved from their original harbour and began docking their boats on what was SLTB land, now the Passikudah resort strip. The Divisional Secretariat office in Valachchenai confirmed that they were invited to 'stakeholder meetings' to discuss plans for tourism development in Passikudah. They said fisherfolk did not object to the development of resorts on the land where they had begun to store their boats on the assurance that a proper fisheries harbour would be built for them – a promise that remains unfulfilled. 'Vinayahamothy', 57, a fisherman from KKC, said that:

> Previously we used to land boats in an area near [what is currently] the hotel strip, but since hotel development, we have been forced to move to a much smaller area.

Fisherfolk are now being pressured to move to their old harbour, but many oppose this because the original harbour is smaller and experiences higher tides, making it a more dangerous place to dock.

The post-war resort economy has thrown up new challenges for this community. More than one government official and several fishermen spoke about how one resort, situated closest to the jetty currently being used, has attempted to restrict the access of fisherfolk to the sea by blocking the access road adjacent to the resort. On the demand side, many resorts claimed they were buying fish locally, and thereby contributing to the local economy. While this is true, the reduction in the fish catch and the political economic structure of fishing, which in

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8 Interview, 3 March 2015.
turn does not support a positive transformation in the fishing industry (i.e. building a fisheries harbour, providing storage facilities and ice plants, etc.) in Passikudah limit the production capacity of local fisherfolk.

Meanwhile, even though the resorts claim to source fish and seafood from local suppliers, whether or not the fish come from local fishermen cannot be guaranteed, as many intermediaries in the fishing industry have now entered into business circles that import fish to Sri Lanka from countries such as Vietnam, the Seychelles and China.9 The importation of fish became standard practice during the war, and the Armed Forces represented one of the biggest buyers of imported fish. With the end of the war in 2009, fish import circles diversified into supplying to the hospitality industry, operating either through the Ceylon Fisheries Corporation10 or independently through their own commercial networks. In other words, broader environmental issues and the political economy of fishing in Passikudah, and in Sri Lanka in general, are not conducive for fisherfolk gaining very significantly from this market.

Central to Passikudah’s fishing economy are fisherfolk ‘bosses’, referred to as such locally, who provide fuel, light and other facilities to boat owners in addition to owning boats and nets. The boss decides how much they pay for the catch and also deducts money by way of ‘operating cash’ for the resources they provide.11 More often than not, it is these bosses who act as middlemen, through whom resorts procure fish. This form of procurement, which relies on local supply chains driven by the local elite, is now accepted as standard practice. But bosses or mudalalis who exert control of local supply chains are interested in maximising their commissions12 and seek to pay as little as possible to fishermen while charging as much as possible from the hotels. In other words, fisherfolk are not gaining even if the produce is being sourced locally.13

Despite a majority of households in and around Passikudah being engaged in fishing, given the context, people were not positive about the future of fishing as a livelihood and in fact look to the resort economy for secure livelihoods:

Fishing is no longer a stable livelihood. The fish catch has reduced considerably. Earlier, we could easily catch 1 kg worth [of] fish; now, even if you stay overnight, there are days we do not catch much at all. Jobs at hotels are much more stable. Even a job as a gardener gives you a monthly pay cheque. The gardeners work at their own pace but the hotel still pays them well. It is consistent income, whereas

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9 ‘Mark’, a Colombo-based representative of a fish import company.
11 Kalkudah GN, Interview, 3 March 2015.
12 ‘Maria’, a 50-year old female tourism entrepreneur in Batticaloa.
13 Interview, 27 January 2015.
fishing does not offer that.\textsuperscript{14}

In Passikudah today, the integration of fisherfolk into the local supply chain generally happens at the bottom, and the precarious nature of fishing means they face disproportionate risks relative to other livelihoods also at the bottom of the value chain. Thus, integration at the bottom end of the wage pyramid with relatively less risk, such as being a gardener in a resort, emerges as attractive. The undermining of primary production is also inextricably connected with questions of access to the commons. The use of the beach by fisherfolk rubs up against it being pristine and reserved for tourists.

Drinking water is a scarce resource in Kalkudah and a considerable proportion of people still struggle to access it. At the time of data collection, all the resorts had their own systems of pumping water for their daily operations. While their turquiose eternity pools were always full, their lawns were emerald green and warm, clear water whirled in their jacuzzis, it is a daily struggle for villagers in Kalkudah to gain access to drinking water. Roughly 30 percent of households in Koralai Pattu have no access to a water source within 250 m; the same proportion of households has no access to proper sanitation facilities within the premises of their houses (Batticaloa District Secretariat 2015).

**Precariousness, Wage Labour and Employment in Passikudah’s Tourist Economy**

In considering Passikudah’s economy from the point of view of wage labour, it is important to reiterate the distinction between the formal resort economy of high-end luxury establishments and the less formal guesthouse economy exemplified by low-cost, cheap home-based or small-scale bed and breakfast establishments. There are seven high-end resorts, all of which are located on the beach strip, and 14 smaller establishments located in the interior without beach access.

One of the major contentions about any economic development programme, such as Passikudah’s tourist zone, is its ability to generate employment and livelihoods, especially for local communities. Tourism’s multiplier effect is often cited in this regard and assumes particular importance in the context of the high unemployment rate among those aged 18–25 in Batticaloa district.\textsuperscript{15} The Passikudah area is no different, and FGDs with youth revealed that a number of those employed, whether the employment is steady, seasonal or occasional in nature, are engaged in a range of waged labour, from working on coconut board land to masonry and painting to work on fishing boats or farms and indeed in resorts or guesthouses.

Several resort managers interviewed for this study spoke repeatedly about the difficulties in hiring locally – that is, from in and around Passikudah especially – because of a skill gap, a

\textsuperscript{14} Elders FGD, PC, 6 March 2015.

\textsuperscript{15} Batticaloa District Secretariat, Interview, 28 January 2015.
point discussed further. None of the resorts was willing to provide exact details of numbers of employees, the nature of their employment and how many were local. Nevertheless, while three managers insisted that 30–40 percent of their staff were local, another said the number was as high as 60 percent. But these proportions contradict information provided by government officials, people in the communities in Passikudah and civil society experts. Many locals employed in the resorts said very few people from their own community worked there. A local government official in Kalkudah and an officer in the Divisional Secretariat office in Valachchenai said only about 60 locals were employed in all the resorts together. One reason for the discrepancy could be how resort managers define ‘local’: it is likely that they consider people from anywhere in the district or even the province as local.

In other words, there are people from the local community seeking employment in the tourist economy but not finding it. A government official in Batticaloa attributed the lack of local youth employed in hotels to the absence of a good hotel school in the area to render them employable. He, and indeed others, also underlined lack of knowledge of English, almost a necessity for certain jobs in the resorts, as another factor. Employment options for locals in the tourist economy were largely only in the unskilled or lower ranks. A group of young men from PC spoke of the work they found in the hotels:

*We are asked to help build the foundation of a hotel or work as labourers. The work is temporary and sometimes dangerous. We worked for a company that had a labour contract with a hotel for construction. Because it is a labour contract, there is so much pressure on us to finish quickly.*

Furthermore, there are also examples of locals employed in the resort economy but under what appear to be casual or informal arrangements, and in these cases, though resorts are part of the formal sector, the work lacks stability and security. Employees are often unaware of their rights, which have enabled resorts to avoid adhering to labour regulations. There is also inconsistency in the way they treat employees, as well as a gap between entitlements they claim to give and what employees actually receive.

The resorts are not the only establishments perpetuating the informalisation of labour within the formal circuit of capital. The guesthouse economy, while relying almost exclusively on local labour, does so in conditions whose precariousness reflects its informal character. Employment in the guesthouse economy is characterised by high turnover, low upward mobility and low salaries.

The gaps in functioning and scrutiny by the provincial and district Department of Labour contribute to the perpetuation of informal working conditions experienced by those working in both the resort and the guesthouse economies. The Department is supposed to inspect establishments every three months, but the official cited above revealed they lack the resources to do so, with some 25 field officers who are required to inspect 1,800

16 ‘Ravi’, male, youth FGD, 5 March 2015.
establishments.

**Women’s Employment in Passikudah’s Tourist Economy**

When people ask me what I do for a living, I always say that I am working in a hotel. I do not have issues telling the truth though it is frowned upon for women to work in hotels. People who are close to the family that know the woman [they] will not say anything malicious. But others — relatives, neighbours — have negative attitudes towards women working in hotels. I would not let my daughter work in a hotel.  

We met two men and two women who work in Passikudah’s hotel industry. These women have embraced and value the employment generated by the hotel industry despite the social constraints and challenges. Nevertheless, the views expressed above encapsulate how their resolve co-exists with a deep ambiguity that sometimes borders on choicelessness. Employment for women in the hotel industry is even constructed as not being ‘out of choice’ but rather driven by the family’s ‘dire need’. That said, women working in the industry stress the lack of knowledge and understanding of the industry — that is, prejudice — on the part of those on the outside who judge them negatively. However, their self-affirmation with regard to their choice of livelihood does not mean, as in the case of Chaya, that they would necessarily want their daughters to follow in their footsteps:

> It is okay for women to go abroad (except to the Middle East) but working in the hotel industry gives people the impression they are of bad character.

> If you work inside the hotel, people will talk badly. I do not want to work inside the hotel. The possible jobs are laundry and room attendance but only men go for these jobs.

Pavi’s comment suggests an interesting approach to negotiating space for women within the hotels. She differentiated ‘inside the hotel’ — that is, laundry and room attending — from other, more visible, outside spaces — such as gardening or working in the front office. The visibility of the latter spaces appears to be seen as offering relative safety for women.

Resorts and guesthouses are viewed not only as male spaces but also specifically as spaces occupied by male ‘others’, which generates narratives of ethnic and cultural contagion. This was reflected in narratives from men and women about Muslim businessmen fraternising with local Tamil women in guesthouses or liaising with foreigners or even Sinhalese. As one female elder claimed, working in hotels is not suitable for women as the hotel setting means interacting with a lot of men; a lot of outside men (Sinhala). This is not viewed positively.

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17 ‘Chaya’, female, 52, Interview, KKC, 6 March 2015.
18 ‘Sri’, 27, Interview, KKC, 6 March 2015.
19 ‘Pavi’, 37, Interview, PC, 27 March 2015.
20 Interview, 4 March 2015.
Hospitality and Exclusion: Post-war Tourism in Passikudah, Sri Lanka

All of this, of course, appears to be encouraging greater policing of women. Some men are not only against women working in the hotels but also against women working outside the house in general:

I do not think the hotels are a good place for women to work. I do not think women should be going out and working in general.21

It is evident that the generalised vulnerability of women and girls to the male gaze, accepted as normal, is mapped onto hotels. On the other hand, hotels are also seen as spaces in which social relations are beyond the sphere of direct control of, and in a sense even out of sight of, the community, thus even potentially providing opportunities for women and girls to express themselves in ways not approved of, and that too with outsiders.

Thus, aside from fears of being preyed upon, particularly by outsiders, the gendered opposition to women working in Passikudah’s hotels is also shaped by fears around women and girls in hotels acting in ways that break established boundaries of behaviour. The discussion above also underlines the importance of critically considering views echoed by many men and women that hotels and tourism pose a threat to the local culture and way of life. Entrenched forms of gendered social control, which are generative of resistance to political economic shifts that may be seen as altering gendered roles and relations, are by no means a post-war phenomenon. A feminist academic and researcher from Batticaloa recalled that similar reactions emerged in the post-tsunami period, when the proliferation of NGOs created a number of employment opportunities for women.22 According to her, ‘the community here does not recognise a woman’s right to work’ and much of the resistance is by those who do not want to see women gain an economic foothold that might enable greater autonomy or a shift in gender roles and relations.23 While there is little evidence to suggest that employment in Passikudah’s hotel industry is either inherently empowering for women (or men for that matter) or precipitating socio-political transformation, what is clear is that resistance to or anxiety regarding the industry within the local communities is shot through with perceptions of threats to existing structures of social relations that are deeply patriarchal and ethnicised.

Yet the narrative of the ‘outsider’ also has other dimensions. For one, this mistrust of the ‘other’ must also be located in the context of the complicated contours of protracted ethnic conflict and the entrenchment of identity politics in eastern Sri Lanka. The massacres of Muslim civilians in nearby Kartankudy and Eravur in 1990, followed by the mass expulsion of Muslims by the LTTE, as well as narratives regarding the complicity and collaboration of Muslims (including some armed elements) with the Sri Lankan Army in violence and massacres involving Tamil civilians, continue to cast a long shadow on ethnic relations in the

22 Even the LTTE, which boasted of women fighters, put out a code of conduct for women working in NGOs.
23 Interview, 19 March 2015.
East. These relations also need to be seen in the light of tensions resulting from war-related dispossession and displacement, post-war contestations over land and economic resources and a legacy of intense inter- and intra-ethnic political competition since the ‘Eastern Liberation’ in 2007.

Ethnicised visions of the ‘outsider’ or ‘other’ are also shot through with class issues, however. A local government functionary, posted in the area between 2005 and 2013, noted:

Sinhala men were coming into the area during hotel construction to provide their labour. They were not getting married and settling down but were causing problems with women in the village.24

In other words, as real as they are, anxieties around the ethnic and class ‘other’ intersect to generate a subjective economy of tourism in Passikudah that is layered with gender, class and ethnic identities and anxieties.

Skills Gap and Narratives of Discrimination and Exclusion

A recurring theme in conversations with managers of resorts, industry experts and Colombo-based tourism officials was the skills gap, which all of them underlined as the main barrier to increasing the number of people employed in the resorts from the local community in Passikudah. At the same time, a recurring theme with members of the community, youth in particular, and some local government officials was that of discrimination and exclusion.

The narratives of ‘discrimination’ and ‘skills’ gap’ are in fact intertwined in Passikudah. However, it is crucial to situate them in light of the encounter between large (and often global) capital that enjoys state patronage on the one hand, and precarious wage labour and primary production in war-torn and tsunami-affected local communities in Passikudah, on the other. It cannot be denied that Passikudah’s resort economy has not provided economic opportunities for some. In fact, it reveals what is often a characteristic of industrialised hospitality, which ‘invokes exclusions as well as inclusions’ (Bell 2009: 30). These inclusions, as pointed out earlier, are often at the lower end of the value chain, often in the shadow of precariousness.

Three quotes from the FGD (5 March 2015) involving five youth between the ages of 18 and 25 years from PC exemplify the narrativisation of ideas of Tamil marginality and Sinhalese dominance in Passikudah’s hotel industry that are in circulation locally:

I work at [X Resort] and have been there for one year. Earlier, I was at [Y Resort] for nine months. Y is Sinhala-dominated whereas X is mostly Tamil. Previously, at Y, I was treated badly. The management was nice and my co-workers were nice but the middle management did not treat me well. I felt that I was always targeted

24 Interview, 28 March 2015.
because I was Tamil. There are people with English knowledge and who had completed management diplomas. But in the big hotels, all the upper management is Sinhala and because of that the locals do not get opportunities in the higher-level jobs. Also, Tamil labourers are given manual tools and Sinhala workers are given machines. That puts us in more risk and danger of getting injured on the job. It is the contractor’s job to give us hard-hats and to ensure our safety. But it seems like the Sinhala labourers are safer than us.

Many in the local communities echoed the view of one official in the Valachchenai Divisional Secretariat that in the hotels ‘skilled workers are all Sinhalese’ (Female, Interview, 29 January 2015). Consider, for example, the view of ‘Indra’, a 37-year-old woman from PC employed in one of Passikudah resorts:

My supervisors are mostly Sinhala but there are some Tamils. The cleaning department and lower levels of employment include a mix of both locals and outsiders. However, outsiders, who are usually Sinhala, occupy higher positions.25

That all of this is also seen in terms of discrimination is no surprise. The response of the hotel industry is exemplified by the general manager of one of the largest resorts in Passikudah:

We have vacancies but we are unable to fill them because there is a large skills gap. The gap between the skills we want and what the locals have to offer is so great.26

This is echoed, and in fact amplified, by a representative from a facility that channels resources from a major bilateral donor to small businesses in Northern and Eastern provinces. Defending their policy of not incentivising these businesses to hire locally, she argues:

We have no conditions that the employer hires people from the locality. It would be foolish to recommend that… There is a skills gap and a mind-set gap. The mind-set gap is about people not being used to working a regular job with set hours, clear tasks, etc.27

Views of resort managers and bilateral donors promoting local labour in tourism were laced with ideas of creating a new class of wage labourers and inculcating a mind-set of valuing work and money (Marx 1990). The assumption among resort management and other advocates of tourism in Passikudah that, while they do have the potential to acquire the skills to work in the hospitality industry, the locals are ‘backward’, ‘ignorant’ or unwilling to capitalise and change is echoed by studies on the garment industry in eastern Sri Lanka.

25 Interview, 27 March 2015.
26 Male, Interview, 29 January 2015.
27 Female, Interview, January 2014.
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(Goger and Ruwanpura 2014). While resort managers lamented the lack of skilled workers available locally, they also felt locals needed to catch up, modernise and realise the positive changes tourism would bring to their lives.

The path to upward mobility in the resort economy is widely advocated to be institutional training. But there is also a widely held opinion across people from the industry and government that locally accessible institutional training, such as hotel schools, is either non-existent or of poor quality. One official from an agency that works closely with SLTDA criticised the government for its lack of emphasis on proper training for locals so they can gain from the tourism and resort industries. But there are also questions to be asked of the industry – that is, the resorts themselves – about their investment in and commitment to training and building local capacities. As a senior academic and civil society activist said, ‘they [the resorts] cannot always wait for trained employees.’

While resorts reported some levels of training, even if unstructured and on-the-job, it is clear that there is a long way to go. In some cases, the gap is elsewhere. For instance, ‘Rani,’ a 35-year-old woman employed in a resort, said:

I started in housekeeping but became a senior attendant after two years. I received a salary increase after that. I threatened to leave if they did not increase my salary. I can go to the next level, which is supervisor, but I do not have the English abilities. [My resort] does not provide money to take English classes.

Fundamentally, though, this discussion raises questions about what institutional hospitality training means and what skills it is meant to reproduce. The critical issue here is that skills and capacities are understood as socially and politically neutral. But as Mann (2008: 111–112) has argued:

At the high-skill/low-skill intersection, skill is in itself, socially and politically defined, assigned, and maintained, constituting and reproducing social divisions that have origins both inside and outside the sphere of production.

As such, people’s designation as ‘unskilled’ is not always objectively determined but is also politically determined (Ibid.: 117).

Passikudah represents an attempt to impose a luxury resort and hospitality economy on a context marked by mass death, dispossession, displacement, traumas, enforced disappearances and numerous other harms owing to 30 years of war, added to which was the human, psychosocial and material cost of the Indian Ocean tsunami of 2004. This is the context in which the ‘skills’ gap has arisen – that is, the ‘gap’ is the legacy of a place made by war, conflict and disaster, an experience some are now seeking to reframe as lost

28 Interview, 7 March 2013.
29 Interview, PC, 27 March 2015.
development time. The making of Passikudah as a high-end tourist destination marks an attempt to remake a place through bypassing rather than confronting the legacy of war-related devastation and disaster.

**Self-employment and Debt**

Self-employment through home-based livelihoods and micro-entrepreneurship is an important part of Passikudah’s political economic terrain, especially for women. A retired local government official noted that the introduction by NGOs of microcredit-linked livelihoods schemes, targeting women in particular, in the aftermath of the tsunami marked a significant expansion of this sector, and much the same is in evidence during the post-war period. Home-based livelihoods and micro-enterprises in Passikudah are promoted by the state as a means of strengthening livelihoods for vulnerable households. Some have leveraged the state’s support to build capacities for self-employment and to scale it up beyond subsistence. For example, ‘Sita’ lives in PC with her husband, who works as a mason, and their four children. She makes a living by selling handicrafts to the resorts. In her case, the training and support likely enabled her to take a further step to move beyond and consolidate avenues to create a steady source of income and accumulate capital. Others in the community have also taken advantage of past experience and knowledge to leverage the tourism market. One such example is ‘Romesh’, a 50-year-old male from KKC, who owned a cabana on the beach during the first tourism boom in the 1970s. In response to post-war tourism development, he rented a glass boat to take tourists on rides and also offers snorkelling. His clientele includes both Sri Lankan and foreign tourists, whom he canvasses on the beach. Recently, he purchased his own boat, which cost approximately USD 2289.30

These stories, though few, are significant because they underline that at least some can indeed embrace avenues for self-employment, drawing on a combination of external support and their own experience, skills and initiative to take advantage of the tourism economy. These examples are also important because they challenge notions that the local community is caught in a dependency syndrome and are displaying a lack of initiative in not identifying and leveraging economic opportunities. Some resort managers shared this negative view of the local community. The underlying narrative here is that people are failing to take responsibility for capitalising on the economic opportunities tourism has created in Passikudah. But this masks important structural dynamics.

Notwithstanding instances such as the ones referred to above, where self-employment has increased incomes or enabled a diversification of livelihoods, it is crucial to understand self-employment in structural terms *vis-à-vis* broader political economic relations. As an academic and activist at a women’s organisation in Eastern province underlined, while self-employment may offer an alternative livelihood option for people who cannot find employment in the formal economy, development interventions promoting self-employment are in fact broadening informal market activity that has no social safeguards or safety nets.31

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30 Interview, 5 March 2015.
31 Interview, 29 September 2015.
It also keeps people like Sita, Mary and Romesh, who have carved out a living through entrepreneurial activities, on the fringes of the formal circuits of capital. International development actors, such as the World Bank, speak of the importance of recognising and supporting informal sector employment and its ‘role’ in helping those in poverty (Sanyal 2007: 151). A key modality through which this support and the role itself have been articulated is microfinance and microcredit. Passikudah, like many other sites, has witnessed a rapid financialisation of development, with the government and NGOs, as well as banks and other commercial institutions, actively promoting the idea since the tsunami and even more so in the post-war era. Microfinance-driven self-employment appears to have been put in place without an understanding of the risks that define the context in which these people live. Microfinance agencies are, in fact, finding new alliances in NGOs. Women are the favoured targets of NGOs, banks and financial institutions, given their association with responsibility and ‘virtue’ (Young 2010). The ‘construction of the “financially responsible” woman’ (McClean 2012: 8) is ruptured, however, when they fail, for which they are expected to assume responsibility. A former GN of Kalkudah bemoaned the negative consequences of microfinance:

In my view, the supply of micro-loans has spoiled women in our communities. The NGOs and now banks give large sums of money to women and they do not know how to manage this money. Women cannot handle large amounts of money. They are incompetent when it comes to big business and they have failed.32

The incompetency, financial illiteracy or lack of capacity narrative hides the deeper structural dimension of financialisation of development and debt-driven self-employment and livelihood programmes, whose emergence is inextricably linked to the virtual end of remunerative, secure and long-term employment or primary production. A dependence on credit-reliant and debt-driven self-employment in a context like Passikudah in fact underlines the exclusion at play. Even in the handful of relatively successful cases, self-employment within the tourist industry has worked primarily to enable diversification and spread risk rather than enabling the capital accumulation that enable a transition out of precariousness.

Conclusion
Exclusion of the Local
Passikudah’s luxury tourist enclaves exemplify the superimposition of luxury and excess on a social and economic landscape of fragility and precariousness. There is virtually no scope for integration, given that the local economy is in no position to even add value to any of the resorts, let alone sustain them. Information pieced together from interviews with managers of Passikudah’s resorts and other market sources suggest that, apart from using labour for construction, some basic construction material and a small percentage of the workforce, the

32 Male, 68, Interview, 6 March 2015.
resorts are completely disconnected from the local economy. While some of the resorts appear to source some proportion of their fresh seafood locally, a significant proportion of this, as well as vegetables, dairy, poultry, meat and dry rations, is sourced through large-scale Colombo-based vendors or from markets in Dambulla, Nuwara Eliya and Colombo, or is imported.

All-inclusive tourism, while very profitable to tourists, tour operators and hotels, in that order, tend to have the least benefits for the local as well as the national economy of the destination country. Even excursions for tourists within Passikudah are often conducted in collaboration with businesses from outside the area. While tourists in upscale resorts in Passikudah consume vast quantities of local resources – fresh water in particular – and generate significantly more waste than the local community, the resort economy contributes relatively little to the local economy. While some jobs have been generated, it is clear that (i) they are far fewer in number than what was and is still claimed by government officials as well as resorts, and (ii) jobs for locals tend to be low-paid, at the bottom end of the wage pyramid and in many cases precarious.

A rapid survey of guesthouses and their interaction with the local economy in terms of their procurement value chains revealed, as expected, a far higher level of integration. Most of them procure their seafood from the local fishing vaadi and source vegetables, meat and dry rations from Valachchenai or Batticaloa town. Similarly, almost their entire infrastructure, such as furniture, linen, etc., generally comes from Batticaloa town. While this may well underline the benefits of small-scale tourism, it is important to note that working conditions in the local guesthouses tend, on some counts such as leave, working hours, contracts and benefits, to be worse than in the resorts. There is also a high degree of exploitation of women’s labour in the smaller guesthouses, as women are often contributing family workers, who are generally underpaid (or not paid at all), and have very few opportunities to engage in an occupation of their choice.

Subjectivities that Reproduce Ethnic Animosity and Patriarchal Norms

Post-war Passikudah’s enclaves of luxury tourism loom over a landscape of precariousness and a legacy of suffering. The exclusion of the ‘local’ is also manifest in how any ‘ethnic’ ethos and subjectivity that pervades the resorts generally tends to be distinctly Sinhalese. One is welcomed at most resorts with an ayubowan, a Sinhalese welcome greeting, but not the Tamil equivalent, vanakkam. But, given how few Tamil speakers there are in the resorts, particularly in guest interface positions, this is unsurprising, even if the area itself happens to be 98 percent Tamil-speaking.

While a handful of resort employees from the local community saw opportunities for a better life in the resorts, the dominant narrative was discomfort with what is perceived as outsider – read Sinhala – occupation of their land, beaches and culture, for commercial purposes. The way tourism is being developed in war-affected areas begs an interrogation of the simplistic narrative that economic development can ever be a panacea for the deep-seated and structural exclusion that underlies the ethnic problem.
**Moving Forward: From Trickle-Down to Distributive Justice**

It is critical to go beyond claims that the Passikudah model is a success, on the evidence of some trickle-down, especially in the form of local wage and self-employment or the unspecified value addition nationally. To begin with, it is crucial to undertake more detailed accounting of costs and benefits, without externalising any of the social or environmental costs. A robust and focused state-mediated engagement with powerful stakeholders in the resort economy is crucial to develop a road map for inclusion. Such a road map must leverage the core business as well as initiatives beyond, such as corporate social responsibility commitments, to enhance inclusion and equity. But fundamental to drawing up such a road map is facilitating social mobilisation and crucial to this are detailed participatory and community-based assessments of needs, assets and capacities at both the community and the household level. Securing the role and ‘place’ of women and women-headed households in the process is equally critical.

This, in turn, requires a significant change in approach on part of the state. Empowering provincial, district and local officials to act and developing a coherent institutional and policy framework to assess, monitor and engage with the resorts to maximising local and national benefits are critical. To begin with, there is an urgent need for rigorous monitoring of compliance with labour and environmental regulations and standards, in both the resort and the guesthouse economies. It is also critical that any such process accounts for the fact that Passikudah’s resort economy engages multiple economies also interacting with each other – a guesthouse economy, primary production, especially fishing and agriculture, self-employment, other forms of wage labour, etc.

Given that the balance of state power is so heavily weighted towards capital, none of this is likely to happen without considerable pressure from civil society and advocacy groups. Indeed, even international advocacy, global partnerships and initiatives are necessary to generate the pressure to redress the imbalances and exclusions that characterise Passikudah today. Resorts and government alike must be made responsible, but crucial to this is local mobilisation and if there was ever a conducive political moment to do this, it is now.

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Saffron: The Social Relations of Production in Afghanistan

Giulia Minoia and Adam Pain

Abstract

While Afghanistan is not currently a major exporter of saffron, it is posed as a solution to several challenges facing its flagging agrarian economy. Specifically, its production is seen as a possible alternative to growing opium, a way for women to gain more economic opportunities, and a route to generating more jobs through the agricultural sector. This chapter examines these assumptions through interviews with farmers in Herat province, where most of Afghanistan’s saffron is cultivated. It explores the current state of the saffron market, and whether it will be able to provide tangible benefits to women and poor people.

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Introduction

This chapter focuses on the cultivation of saffron at the lower end of its value chain within Afghanistan. Saffron is a global high-value commodity in which Afghanistan so far is a minor player. In 2010, Iran exported 107,900 kgs of saffron compared with Afghanistan’s 1,000 kgs (Schuller and Morelli 2013), so the challenges for Afghanistan in expanding its global market share are considerable. It is the potential transformative role that saffron is seen to offer within Afghanistan that is the focus of this study.

Donors and the government have promoted saffron as a possible answer to three major challenges in Afghanistan’s agrarian economy. First, it has been strongly advocated as a legal alternative to the cultivation of opium poppy, providing apparently comparable returns and responsive to a high-value global market (DACAAR 2006; Saifullah 2012). Second, it is a commodity that fits with a market-led approach to Afghanistan’s agriculture sector that still sees agricultural growth as the driver of the country’s economy despite the sector’s poor performance since 2001. Agriculture is seen as capable of creating jobs (World Bank 2014) through a focus on high-potential areas, such as the Hari Rud River basin in Herat, the location of this study. Third, saffron has been portrayed as a crop that can enhance women’s participation in economic activities and their productive role outside the household. It has been suggested that its particular value chain structure has the potential to increase women’s participation in agriculture and their economic opportunities and income (World Bank 2011). These claims for saffron frame the specific questions of this chapter:

• To what extent and in what ways can saffron be seen as an alternative to opium poppy?
• Does it provide the basis for growth and employment creation envisaged?
• What does it offer in terms of economic opportunities and employment for women?

Despite being widely promoted as an alternative to opium, the successful cultivation of saffron has been largely confined to Herat, though efforts have been made to encourage its cultivation in Wardak, Logar and Kunduz (APPRO 2010). Introduced by various parties during the 1990s and afterwards, one source estimated that 900 hectares (ha) of the crop are now cultivated in Herat province, comprising about 60 percent of the national crop area. Of the 900 ha, 800 ha are to be found in just two districts within Herat – Ghoryan and Pashton Zarghon.1 The hectares that were under cultivation gave rise to a total production of 3,000 kgs in 2012, which by 20152 had risen to 4,000 kgs. As with most agricultural and other statistics in Afghanistan, these are, at best, ‘guesstimates’ of area and production, but the empirical data collected in this study is consistent with an expansion of the crop in Herat over this past decade or more. However, given the scale of opium poppy cultivation, which in 2015 reached an estimated 183,000 ha (UNODC 2015a), Afghan farmers have clearly in

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1 Male, Interview, 8 August 2015.
2 Male, Interview, 8 August 2015.
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general not seen saffron as much of an alternative to opium poppy. And while saffron generated employment in 2015 for 6,000 people (World Bank 2015), this cannot be compared with the employment generated by opium poppy, which is estimated by various sources to support at least 200,000 households (UNODC 2015b).

Moreover, Herat, where saffron cultivation has taken hold, has never had a significant area of opium poppy cultivation. At best, it recorded about 2,500 ha in 2006 (UNODC 2015a), whereas Farah, a neighbouring province, in 2015 cultivated over 21,000 ha of opium poppy – and labour from Herat migrates there during the season (Huot and Pain 2016). Yet, the data provided by the informants in this study confirm that saffron is a profitable crop for those who grow it, many of whom have expanded their area under cultivation. However, in contrast with opium poppy, saffron is a semi-perennial crop with a cultivation period of about five to six years. As a semi-perennial, it displaces for several years the cultivation of annual food crops such as wheat, which for land-poor households may have food security implications. It also has high capital investment costs and provides returns only in the second year; these rise incrementally in subsequent years. All these aspects raise a question as to who is cultivating the crop? Is the crop neutral to scale (Feder et al. 1985) with both large and smaller farmers adopting it and deriving proportionally equal benefits, as happens with opium poppy? Or, given its semi-perennial nature and capital investment requirements, is it more likely to be adopted by larger farmers and selectively benefit them and, if so, what are the implications of this for the agricultural growth agenda and poverty reduction? Moreover, what is its cultivation contributing in terms of jobs and employment since, as will be seen, it is primarily women who have gained work through it?

Profitability is one metric on which a comparison between saffron and opium poppy can be made. However, market support provided to smallholder agriculture to reduce risk is also critical (Poulton et al. 2010), and one of the attractions of opium poppy has been the level of support in terms of credit and inputs and farm gate purchase that it attracts from traders (Pain 2008), which contributed to its spread. In contrast, market support for saffron appears to have been restricted largely to the formation of village-level producer associations, which, as this study found, are concerned mainly with the organisation of production rather than with input provision, credit or post-production and international marketing in the value chain. Not only do the formation of these associations, require the navigation of a complex bureaucracy for which good social networks are needed, the evidence also suggests these associations tend to work for the benefit of the more powerful, echoing concerns raised by Pain and Kantor (2011) about assumptions of associational activity serving all equally at the village level.

While saffron’s potential as an opium poppy substitute and high-value crop has been part of the rationale for its promotion, a key part of the saffron story has been seen to be what it offers for women as producers and workers (World Bank 2011). A number of women producer associations have indeed been formed, indicating that certain women have access to, if not necessarily direct ownership of, land. While this may reflect the more liberal environment of Herat and the influence of Iran, and therefore may be more a matter of context (Leslie 2015) rather than crop, it also raises questions as to how women have access
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to this land, who has been able to do this and to what extent it has proved possible for them to move beyond production into other aspects of the saffron value chain? It is clear from the evidence provided here that a considerable number of women (and children) are being employed in saffron cultivation every harvest season for the cleaning and processing of saffron flowers. This work is generally piece rate and lower paid than comparable work by men, and usually takes place in spaces designated for women. There are some examples of women moving from one village to another to undertake the work. So the gendered impact of saffron cultivation differs from that of opium as it creates labour opportunities mainly for women but not for men. And saffron cultivation has not generated an increase in rural wage labour rates like opium did (Pain 2010).

But, it is uncertain why harvesting and cleaning is or has become designated ‘women’s work’. The standard response was that women are better at it – but they are not paid more for doing it; rather, they are paid less than male labour wages. So what does this say about the structural conditions that govern women’s work? It is possible that the high labour demand of the short harvest season cannot be met by available male labour supply, much of which has migrated to Iran for work – so women are substituting for scarce male labour. Observations on opium cultivation in the Hari Rud a decade ago indicated that women worked in the family fields then also, as labour gangs, because of an acute need for household labour generated by opium poppy cultivation, and they were paid well for doing this (Pain 2008). So is the movement of women into poorly paid saffron farm work transformational, or potentially so, as some hope (World Bank 2011), or is it simply a feminisation of farm labour, as seen elsewhere in Asia as men move out of farm-based work?

The following section briefly describes the methods of the study and the criteria for the selection of informants. It then sets the context for the expansion of saffron in Herat province, examining production conditions, its role within the cropping system and its labour demand. The next section discusses the findings, considering producer associations, production processes and the role of women in production. This section concludes with an examination of the role of trading companies and their relation to producer associations. The last section presents the conclusions and implications of the study.

Methodology of the Study
Primary data was collected through qualitative interviews conducted in Herat by a research team consisting of two men and two women. An initial scoping study of 45 interviews was undertaken with the support of a Herat-based researcher in June 2015. This was followed up with further fieldwork in Herat city and the districts of Injil, Ghoryan and Pashto Zarghon in August 2015. These districts are major saffron-producing districts in the province. Following the scoping study, 35 in-depth interviews were held with informants at different positions in the saffron value chain. These included traders and key informants from the government of Afghanistan and the United Nations (UN) in Herat city and male and female saffron association heads, saffron producers and female seasonal workers in the sample villages. These village-level informants were purposively selected in discussion with the village elders or community development council (CDC) leadership.
One saffron-growing village was purposively selected per district. An additional consideration was accessibility and security of access, to ensure the research team and local partners were not put at risk. The three villages and the three districts provided contrasts in terms of proximity to Herat city and its markets, access to road and water resources and household livelihoods. A partnership with a non-governmental organisation (NGO) providing health services enabled the team to access villages in Ghoryan and Pashton Zarghon and manage the unreliable security conditions on the road between Herat city and the districts.

Figure 1: Map of Herat Province and the Districts

The first village was in Injil district, which has well-irrigated agricultural land neighbouring the outskirts of Herat city. The roads are partially paved and villagers can commute on a daily basis from the district to urban Herat. Opium is no longer cultivated, and proximity to the city makes the district relatively secure. Given employment opportunities in the city, levels of poverty in this district are probably lower than the other districts, and there appears to be less outmigration to Iran for work. In contrast, the second study district, Ghoryan, is located close to the border with Iran and is where saffron cultivation first started in Herat. The roads are unpaved and the study village has water constraints. Irrigation is available from a spring in winter, but during the summer farmers have to pay to irrigate the fields at a cost of USD 4 per ha for the use of water from a pipe laid for drinking water. The third village was in Pashton Zarghon district, about an hour’s drive from Herat city. A Danish NGO, the
Danish Committee for Aid to Afghan Refugees (DACAR), played a major role in the introduction of saffron to this district, which lies along the Hari Rud River, with the village relatively well-irrigated.

Interviews with Herat-based traders focused on the introduction of saffron cultivation in Afghanistan, aid funding for companies to establish themselves and the current and future perspectives of government support to traders. Interviews with farmers and farmers associations investigated the nature of the relationship between the Herat saffron market and the districts and villages. During interviews with farmers and seasonal labourers (15 women), the discussion focused on wage rates for female and child labour, the scope for negotiation of these rates, the possibilities for women to work outside the private space of the household and therefore negotiate purdah (veil) norms and outcomes of the saffron economy for the village. All interviews with women were conducted by two female members of the research team and were arranged by previous negotiation between the male team leader and the village elders or arbob or the head of a farmer’s association. In two districts (Ghoryan and Pashton Zarghon), interviewers met women in a communal space; in Injil district, women had been gathered in the house of the head of the saffron growers’ association.

**Analysis of Study Findings**

The discussion on findings is organised in four sections. It starts with a direct comparison of the benefits of saffron and opium poppy cultivation. The second section discusses the support provided to saffron production and the role of associations and investigates who is growing saffron. The third section explores the specific engagement of women as producers and workers in the saffron industry, and the fourth section examines the links between the saffron trading companies, saffron production and farmers.

**Saffron Cultivation Compared with Opium Poppy**

As noted earlier, much has been made of the virtues of saffron as a viable alternative to opium poppy, providing equivalent if not greater returns (World Bank 2015). All informants of this study agreed that in terms of net income per jirib\(^1\) (around 0.2 ha), the income from saffron was equivalent to or better than that of opium poppy. Speaking for many, one informant gave the following calculation:

> When I was cultivating opium my yearly income was Afs\(^4\) 10,000–15,000 (approximately USD 146–220) from 1 jirib of land while my income from 0.5 jirib of saffron is more than that. In this 0.5 jirib of land the first year I had Afs 6,000, the second year Afs 15,000, the third year Afs 44,000 and the fourth year Afs 67,000, and this will add up to more than Afs 170,000 if I count both the sale of bulbs and saffron.\(^5\)

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\(^1\) Unit of measurement, 1 jirib = approximately 0.2 ha.

\(^4\) Afghan currency.

\(^5\) Male, Interview, 2 August 2015.
However, it should be noted that the farmer had to wait until the third year of saffron cultivation before the income exceeded that of the cultivation of opium poppy over a three-year period. For those who can afford to discount the present for a future higher income, there is no doubt that saffron offers a better long-term return. However, for those who might struggle to do so and be more concerned with immediate food needs, higher returns in the future need to be discounted against surviving in the present. One also has to take account of the significant costs of the saffron bulbs in contrast with the opium poppy seed. As we see later, for many farmers who do cultivate saffron, the costs of the saffron bulbs are still a significant challenge. Thus, the odds are somewhat stacked against resource-poor farmers in terms of taking up saffron cultivation.

A second question that arises is that of the labour demand for cultivating the crop. Again, all respondents agreed that in comparison with wheat or vegetables, the cultivation of saffron requires considerably more labour. Notably, this is concentrated around the short harvest season of about 20 to 30 days. This demand also rises with the year of cultivation. In the first year, five people per jirib per day are needed for harvesting, and an equivalent number for processing – so equivalent to 250 person days per jirib. By the third year, this rises to about 30–50 people per day per jirib for the harvesting and an equivalent amount for the processing, thus requiring in total about 2,000 person days per jirib.

There are various estimates of opium poppy’s labour requirements, but generally a figure of about 70 person days per jirib is used (Pain 2010). So on the face of it, the labour demand per jirib of saffron is significantly greater than that of opium poppy. But the maximum area of saffron cultivation of about 1,000 ha pales into insignificance compared with an estimate of 183,000 ha of opium poppy cultivation in 2015 (UNODC 2015a). So, while on the basis of a per jirib estimate of job creation, saffron appears to have the advantage, given the scale of opium poppy the effects of saffron cultivation on employment are at best likely to be very local, which is not to deny its significance. In sum, for individual farmers, there are financial benefits in saffron over opium poppy cultivation and, as many reported, saffron cultivation also meant they were no longer subject to informal taxation by the police and other authorities. But it is far from evident that saffron can ever have the scale effects in terms of employment and non-farm economy benefits that one saw with opium poppy.

**Men and Saffron Production**

**Grower Associations**

About 30 growers or producer associations have been established in Herat province, with support from various organisations, including DACAAR. Katawazy (2013) reports 28 such associations, of which four are women’s associations; Schuller and Morelli (2013) list 33, of which ten are women’s associations. The formation of women’s associations provides evidence of their direct involvement as saffron producers and not just as labour for harvesting and processing. This confirms their ability to access land through direct ownership or through leasing land.

Male growers’ groups are registered as social organisations with the Ministry of Labour,
Social Affairs, Martyrs and Disabled (MOLSAMD) and are not registered or formally supposed to operate as businesses (Ibid.). Thus, in practice, the role of these groups appears to be limited to liaising with traders, connecting farmers to the Directorate of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock (DAIL), and participating in projects financed by donors and international agencies. In contrast, female associations are reportedly registered with the Ministry of Women Affairs (MoWA), although the reasons for this difference are not clear (Ibid.).

Association formation has been a key strand in the Afghanistan Rural Enterprise Development Programme (AREDP) but the benefits and effects of this are far from clear. Assumptions are clearly being made about the nature of collective action through association formation (Pain and Kantor 2011) at the village level, which have rarely been examined. Support to the formation of rural producer associations assumes that accessing services (e.g. advice and training), economies of scale in procurement and sales and knowledge-sharing can benefit those at the bottom of the value chain. But the evidence suggests these grower associations are not cooperatives or organised in a way to ensure that benefits and costs are distributed according to specified rules. They appear to be strictly limited to organising inputs and services with a narrow focus on the production level within the saffron value chain (Poulton et al. 2010). Little or no attention goes to post-production activities that could be used as a vehicle for getting support and increasing returns.

The registration of these associations is highly bureaucratic and requires good personal connections. Informants also made clear that the associations, once formed, often do not provide the benefits of market connections that producers expect, but tend to benefit the key players within them, who are often the more influential personalities at village, district and provincial level. Until recently, the head of the association had to register in person in Kabul. For the women, as with the men’s associations, the process starts with the Ministry of Justice. But in the case of women’s associations, it is often a male member of the family of the female head of the association who formally does the registration. The registration process requires good connections and networks to work the system. As became very clear from the interviews with the head and members of the associations, those individuals who have the networks tend to be the village elite, with larger landholdings and influence within the village.

In Injil district, the head of the Taban Saffron Association is an arbob. He has been growing saffron for the past 10–12 years and was previously cultivating opium on 1 jirib of land (2,000 m2). He reported that when he decided to move to saffron cultivation and abandon opium poppy cultivation, another 70 farmers in the village followed his example. The Taban Association works only within the district, and it now has 170 members and 6 employees. It is hoping to receive a grant from MAIL. According to the arbob, the provincial offices of MAIL have received USD 500,000 for the purpose of supporting associations but so far they have not received anything. Each farmer member pays a fee of Afs 10 a month (USD 0.20)

6 Traditional village head.
to allow him or her to sell saffron through the association to saffron companies. The association works, therefore, mainly as a facilitator, and in a year it trades about 400 kg. However, the association, and often the head of the association directly, have played a key role in providing loans to start cultivation.

In Ghoryan district, there are reported to be six saffron associations. The Almas Saffron Farmers Association was established five years ago. The Association initially received some funds from the Italian Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) (USD 20,000) for construction and machinery for drying and packing. The Head of the Association said that in 1992 he was the first to introduce saffron in Afghanistan. During the ten years he spent in Iran as a refugee, he learnt how to cultivate saffron. When he returned to Herat, he decided to smuggle 407 kg of saffron over the border. The man said he was the one who had trained farmers in Pashtoon Zarghon, including the trader and grower who became ‘Babai Saffron’ (grandfather of saffron) and who had received a medal from President Karzai in 2009. The Almas Association has seven members and sells its saffron to Herati traders, about 30–40 kg per year. The head claimed to be able to sell saffron to traders for USD 1,750/kg. Almas works mainly for its own village, but also provides intermediation for farmers in other villages.

Even though the heads of associations often claimed they helped farmers market their production, informants in Ghoryan had a rather different view. They did not see their district associations as protecting farmers’ interests, and they felt they were not distributing bulbs to farmers as they should. A farmer and arbob in another village said saffron associations were just ‘brokers’ of the traders. He felt that, while the government should be protecting farmers, instead it protected companies that were buying cheap and selling on the market at the highest price possible. Others felt farmers with small volumes of production would do better to sell to shopkeepers rather than associations.

In Pashton Zarghon, NGOs such as DACAAR have had a long-term presence promoting saffron cultivation, the formation of its 12 associations and organising trainings for farmers. However, Babai Saffron, a prominent member of the district’s powerful Alokozai tribe, dominates the saffron market. Babai Saffron returned from Iran 22 years ago and heads one of the saffron growers associations that has 120 members. He has his own company and a retail shop run by his son (Harvard University - South Asia Institute 2015) in Herat and he buys most of the saffron produced by farmers in Pashton Zarghon. Respondents here said that they often preferred to sell saffron themselves, not through associations. One farmer who had been growing saffron for the past 12 years said he had been motivated by Babai Saffron and in turn had been motivating other farmers. However, he prefers to sell directly to traders in Herat rather than through associations. This way he can actually sell to those who are ‘buying at the right price’. He proudly said he had sold 1kg to Aryana Saffron

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7 Male, Interview, 4 August 2015.
8 Male, Interview, 4 August 2015.
9 Male, Interview, 4 August 2015.
Company for USD 1,300 in the previous season.

It is, thus, far from clear what the real function or benefits of these growers’ associations really are and whose interests their formation have served. In part, they seem to have been supply-driven, with multiple funding agencies and NGOs promoting the cultivation of a crop that could be championed as an alternative to opium poppy.10 This hope generated a considerable level of funding – the Almas Association receiving USD 20,000 from the Italian PRT – but this has clearly been unevenly spread and created further expectations, which may have contributed to the formation of further associations. The bureaucratic burden of forming an association has favoured those with connections, and it would appear that village customary elites in the person of the *arbobs* have come to establish themselves as association heads. In turn, they have come to play a key role in providing credit to other members of the association, although we do not know the terms under which this is provided. However, there are evidently views that the *arbobs* in some cases are acting more in their own interests than in those of members of the association. Otherwise, the functions of these associations are very limited.

Who is Growing Saffron?

In 2013, a survey carried out by Sanayee Development Organisation (SDO) estimated that about 3,000 farmers were growing saffron, although the respondent reporting this did not make clear whether this was for Herat or the country as a whole.11 A report from the Afghanistan Investment Support Agency (AISA) at the same time (Katawazy 2013) stated that nationally there were about 1,300 farmers growing saffron on about 250 ha. Whatever the figures are, it is clear this it is not a crop that everyone with land is growing, and it has not spread to the extent that opium poppy did. More exacting growing conditions for saffron in contrast with opium poppy may be part of the reason for this. However, the economics of the crop may also represent a barrier for smaller farmers to move into saffron cultivation. For a start, and according to various sources, there are the initial costs of purchasing the bulbs to plant with. The head of the Taban Association in Injil estimated the costs as follows:

> If we count each item like the bulbs then we need 800 kg for 1 jirib of land and the price of each kg of bulb is Afs 400 [approximately USD 6] (giving a total cost of Afs 320,000 [approximately USD 4690] for the bulbs), the cost of planting of bulbs and land preparation will be at least Afs 500,000 [equivalent to USD 7,300].

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10 A 2010–12 Alternative Livelihood Policy (MCN 2012) proposed allocating USD 9 million to such activities.

11 Male, Interview, 6 August 2015.
The costs of planting, fertilising and irrigation may amount to a further Afs 10,000 per year (USD 150). Harvesting, as noted, takes place only from the second year, and the labour demand for this rises in the following years, generating substantial costs which need to be met. Saffron sales from the second year onwards contribute to meeting these. Finally, there is the trade-off between allocating land to saffron production for a period of years and losing land area that meets household food needs. The risks of the trade-off will depend on the household economy and other sources of income that households have, particularly from remittances from Iran. Accounts of starting small and building up the cultivated area of saffron are common to most saffron growers in the other Herat districts as well. The ability for existing growers to expand cultivation rather suggests it is the farmers with larger landholdings who are benefiting from its cultivation.

Women and Saffron Production

Women as Saffron Growers

The discussion of women’s role in saffron production starts with an examination of their direct involvement in the growing of saffron. At least ten female growers’ associations have been established showing the direct involvement of women in saffron production. The 32-year old head of the Azada Social Saffron Growers Association provided information on its activities. The Association was set up in 2010 with the help of DACAAR, which provided women with the saffron corms (or bulbs). Azada has at least 40 members in 12 villages within Ghoryan district. The primary function of the Association seems to be providing a connection between members and traders in the city. It usually sells its saffron to one of three companies – Ariyana Saffron, Talai Sorkh and Babai Saffron. The head noted that they had a permit only to form an association and not to trade in the saffron market, so their role is to link female growers and traders. In the previous year, they had sold 10 kg of saffron and they also had an income from the sale of saffron corms to other farmers, of USD 5,600.

Two female saffron producers in Ghoryan were interviewed. The first was a 50-year old widow who said she had taken 1 jirib of land on lease for Afs 16,000 (USD 320) five years ago. She did not say where this land was, but researchers assume it probably would have been in her village, where she worked with her three daughters and one son. This made it possible for her, as an older woman and widow, to work in the public eye. She also did not say where she obtained the saffron bulbs but these may have come from the saffron association. She did not employ any additional labour as she did not have the funds to do so. She reported that in the earlier years, she had harvested 2 kg of saffron, which increased to 6 kg by the fourth year. Because she did not sort or package her saffron well, she sold it at Afs 70,000–80,000 (USD 1,000) per kilo, which she considered to be a low price, to local traders. Not taking account of the costs of her labour and other inputs she appears to have gained (at Afs 70,000 per kg) a gross income of Afs 124,000 (USD 2,480) in the early years, rising to Afs 404,000 (USD 8,000) more recently.

The second female producer in Ghoryan was 30 years old and was also working as a teacher. She reported that she had taken with her father a lease on 2 jiribs of land with a third party and together the three had formed a business partnership. From her account, it was clear she
was the effective manager of the enterprise. Her father had cultivated saffron in the past and she had learned about its cultivation from him before she got married ten years ago. Her husband did not have land and was in irregular and badly paid self-employment. Accordingly, three years ago, she decided to start the cultivation of saffron. She had recruited a male employee to act under her instructions to manage the crop since the leased land was about one hour away and women could not go there. Through him, she had employed men and children to harvest the crop and bring the flowers to her. She then organised her husband to distribute the flowers to the houses of 30–40 women she had identified and employed to clean the flowers.

Five women were interviewed in Pashto Zarghon who were directly or indirectly engaged in saffron production. The first three were all from Gul Meer village. The first, a 52-year old woman, is related to Babai Saffron, and her husband is one of the biggest landholders in the village, cultivating some 8–9 jiribs of land. She provides labour on her husband’s saffron crop and is paid in common with other female labour, Afs 50 (USD 1) per kg harvested. Underlying this arrangement is the fact that she is the first wife of the husband and without children. Her husband has taken a second wife with whom he has children. However, when she inherited some land from her father she decided to set up growing saffron on her own, selling her jewellery and buying 20 mann (80 kg) of corms. The second informant was a 50-year old woman whose husband had gone to Iran and not returned. She reported that she had about 10 jiribs of land that she was gradually bringing under saffron cultivation. She supervises all her saffron production and has even built a wall around 1 jirib of her land so that younger and married women, who cannot work on the open land unlike older and widowed women, can work for her without fear. She reported that it was Babai Saffron who had encouraged her to cultivate saffron. In the beginning, she did not have money, but she had a house in the city that she mortgaged to provide the cash to buy the corms to start cultivation eight years ago. She started cultivation on 1 jirib of land, in the second year expanded to a second jirib and in the third brought another 2 jiribs under cultivation. After three years, she had earned enough to pay the mortgage on the house and recover it. Now she is cultivating nearly 10 jiribs of land under saffron. She commented that the price was now about Afs 120,000–130,000 per kg (USD 1,800).

These various accounts of the direct involvement of women in saffron production, whether on an independent basis or through their families, reveal a number of interesting features. First, in these Herat villages, women have access to and use of property and land, either through inheritance, marriage or contractual arrangements such as leasing. Second, while in many cases these appear to be better-off women – or come from families with assets – this is not always the case, as with the first wife who leased land to secure a degree of economic independence. Third, whether or not they have land, women are able to exert management authority over the business. Fourth, even where women do not have independence but work within a family, they clearly see themselves as actively involved, with certain limits, in the saffron business and contributing to the family economy. This evidence of the engagement of women in farm production challenges the widespread perception of women’s non-involvement in productive activities. An argument might be made that this has been a transformative effect of the spread of saffron cultivation in the province. However, women’s
existing involvement (Grace and Pain 2011) in other farm production activities (e.g., livestock) and other income generation activities (embroidery) suggest this is not necessarily such a significant change from the past. It is possible that the perception of saffron cultivation as women’s work, driven by their involvement in crop processing, which has become part of the narrative built by NGOs and donors and well accepted in the districts, has made taking a step into saffron production an easier one. But equally, as seen below, the low wages women receive for their labour has been an incentive for farmers and village elites such as arbohs to allow females to work with saffron, as this has increased their returns. The study also takes into account the fact that Herat has long been seen as one of the more liberal regions in Afghanistan for women. The influence of Iran and the experience of many Heratis there as refugees are likely to have contributed to the relaxation of purdah (veil) norms.

Women as Saffron Labour

Saffron generates a significant but very short demand for casual labour for harvesting and processing. Saffron production increases year by year during its five-year production cycle, raising demand for each jirib of saffron cultivation. After harvesting, the stamens have to be separated from the flower, and cleaned, sorted and dried within a short period of time to maximise the value obtained from the crop, so for up to 20 days there is an intensive need for labour. This rises and falls over the harvest period. In the third year of production, 20–25 people are needed per day; in the fourth, up to 30–40 may be required per day per jirib. The labour required to process the flowers is equivalent to that required to harvest it. The quality of saffron rapidly declines after harvest as one informant made clear:

> When the women collect flowers from the fields, the other labour have just seven to eight hours for separating saffron from the flowers, otherwise it will lose its quality.
> If more than ten hours pass, then saffron quality will be very low.\(^\text{12}\)

The demand for labour for saffron was consistently contrasted with other crops: wheat or barley, for example, require about three people for harvesting 1 jirib of land. So it is easy to see how saffron cultivation has dramatically increased this very seasonal demand for labour. A thousand women or more might be working at the district level during the harvest season. There were consistent statements that about 80 percent of this labour was female and that tasks were segmented by gender. The men work on land preparation, planting, weeding, fertilising and irrigation and only to a limited extent on processing. They also harvest the corms when they are ready to be lifted and sold as new planting stock. Women work primarily on processing, although older women can also work on the harvesting.

While researchers may not know the genesis of the involvement of women in the processing of saffron and how this has come to be seen as ‘women’s work’, one factor may be, given the scale of the time-bound demand for labour and the imperative of timeliness, that there are simply not enough men around to provide the labour. It was commonly reported and also

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\(^{12}\) Male, Interview, 1 August 2015.
found in the livelihood panel study in Herat (Huot and Pain 2016), that most young men from the village are working in Iran because of the lack of sufficient employment opportunities. However, shortage of male labour was not the reason given for saffron processing becoming women’s work. Expressing the commonly stated view on why women are so heavily involved, one respondent gave three reasons, all very gendered in assumptions and expectations for the use of women in saffron processing:

The first one is the low wage, mostly women work on a low wage as compared to men. The second reason is their patience, collecting saffron needs more patience and mostly men do not have patience and as a result people prefer to hire women, because they have more patience than men. The last reason is the hard work of women, compared with men. Women are more loyal in their work and their perfectionism makes them more desirable in the saffron market.13

There is no doubt that wages are gender-differentiated. There also seems to be variation, with some labour paid on a daily basis and some on a piece rate. Farmers justified the low wages women received in terms of the high fixed costs saffron requires in terms of initial capital investment and the paternalistic explanation that saffron processing allows women to work in a private space and sit together and this is good for them.

The labour requirement for harvesting 1 jirib of wheat is three men at Afs 200 (approximately USD 3) per day per man. For saffron, 100 women at Afs 100 are required for harvesting and processing. The relative costs of labour in relation to the sale price (crop sale price less labour costs) for saffron are clearly much greater than those of wheat, and labour costs absorb about 4 percent of the crop value per jirib of wheat and about 11 percent of the crop value per jirib of saffron. However, the absolute return to saffron farmers, even taking into account the start-up costs of planting and crop maintenance and the time delay on returns is considerably higher for saffron. No justification was given for the lower wage rates for women (other than the stated cultural fact that they are paid less, and producers could get away with it). Implicitly, however, to support the gender differential, there seems to be a comparison between heavy agricultural work versus light processing work.

This clearly stated interest in employing women and paying them low wages reflects the deep gender structures of employment in the rural economy. It also ignores the likely profit margins growers and traders are obtaining by using cheap female labour. And it should be noted that there was no suggestion from the women growing saffron as members of female associations that they were paying better wages to their workers. Given the limited scale of employment (a month at best), the wage levels, the (secluded) conditions under which such labour is carried out, the attitude towards women working and the scarcity of other employment for them, this casual employment could hardly be called transformative, although this is not to deny the benefits it can generate for those women who do find work.

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13 Male, Interview, 29 July 2015.
Female Labour and Inter-Village Movement

The time-bound nature and scale of demand for processing the saffron raise challenges in mobilising sufficient labour. As was seen earlier, one female producer could not afford to employ labour and used only family labour to meet her requirements. Moving to any scale of production, however, requires the mobilisation of labour beyond the household supply. While it might be possible for individual producers to use relatives and networks within a village to do this, there is also evidence that this may not meet demand and that there is mobilisation of female labour from outside the village, primarily by the saffron associations. In Injil, the head of one saffron association confirmed that they had labour supply problems during the harvesting season and that they had to seek labour elsewhere. However, inter-village movement of labour appears to happen mainly between villages that are close to each other. It is very difficult for women to move beyond this. Further, such movement requires transport, and a male member of the woman’s family has to accompany her. In sum, rather than generating higher-paid labour, as happened with the cultivation of opium poppy, one sees this as creation of short-term low-paid labour for women. The short duration of this work and low wages provided can only be seen as reinforcing the lower economic status of women.

Saffron Companies

Saffron associations are licensed solely to undertake activities in relation to the organisation and coordination of saffron production. The sale of saffron, whether it is done by an association or directly by the farmers, is meant to be undertaken with one of the 14 firms that have been licensed by the Afghanistan Investment Support Agency (AISA) to trade in and export saffron (Katawazy 2013) or as an intermediary trader. According to Katawazy (2013:27), there is high concentration in the market, with three companies (two in Herat and one in Kabul) dominating. Katawazy is fairly scathing of what he sees as the short-term perspectives of these companies in seeking short-term profits over long-term investment and strategy, with ‘a few big players who control and set the prices’ (Ibid.: 41). This statement is consistent with the observation made by many saffron producers that there is a large gap between what they are paid by these firms and what saffron sells for in the international market. There are also mentions of a powerful saffron oligopoly that consciously bars women from entering the market and competing fairly, with a case cited of a trader trying to block the funding of a women’s saffron association packaging and branding initiatives (APPRO 2010). Many of these companies were able to establish themselves with international funds, linked with efforts to displace opium and a supply-driven approach to the development of saffron.

When the saffron business started 18 years ago, those who could access funds allocated for investments in Herat were part of a small network: one trader received USD 50,000 through a World Bank loan (Male interviewee, 1 August 2015); a second (Male interviewee, 7 July 2015) started his business by selling bulbs to UNODC under a contract to implement saffron cultivation in the South. This second trader had been doing business with UNODC up to 2008 providing technical support to a poppy eradication programme in the southern provinces. This same trader has family links to the panel of experts within Herat University
Giulia Minoia and Adam Pain

who guide the distribution of funds at provincial level in the saffron market. It is also evident that tribal affiliations and kinship connect key players. The focus of this chapter, however, is not on the upper end of the saffron value chain and its international trading, but more on the relations of production in Afghanistan. In view of this, the role of the saffron companies as direct producers themselves is worth noting. For this purpose, three trading companies were interviewed in Herat.

The first informant was the director of Aryana Saffron Company, to which the Adalat Association in Pashton Zarghon sells most of its saffron. This set up was registered as a company in 2011 with USD 60,000 start-up capital. It has grown in size to over USD 500,000. The informant said they had also received a World Bank loan. They have land in three districts (17.5 jiribs), some of which they own and the rest leased, which produced about 50 kg of saffron in 2014. In total, they exported 800 kg of saffron in 2014, buying the balance from associations such as the Adalat Association. They manage their lands by hiring farmers and paying them a salary. However, they directly hire and manage female labour for flower collection and the processing and packing of saffron. They also provide a full range of credit services to independent saffron farmers. Although the terms of this credit are not known, farmers are in effect required to sell saffron to Aryana at harvest time at a price set by the company. The second trader was from a much smaller company called Takchine. They started the business with about USD 80,000 in capital and are directly involved in production. They own 12 jirib of land and have another 30 jirib on lease, where they have cultivated saffron for the past three years. They also buy saffron directly from farmers and reported an annual trade of around 350 kg. As with the first trading company, they recruit female casual labour seasonally at the going rates. The third trading company, Tela-e-Surkh (literally Red Gold) has been in the business longer. It was established in 2002 although it received its trading license only in 2008. They started with capital of USD 50,000. They own 80 jiribs in four districts and buy saffron from farmers in Ghoryan and Pashton Zarghon districts and from other provinces in Afghanistan. Tela-e-Surkh have two permanent staff to manage production and the recruitment and management of labour at the district level. They employ 150–200 seasonal labourers for harvesting, processing and packing the flowers. They commented that the arbob has a key role in organising and supervising seasonal labour in the districts: The role of the arbob or village leaders in mobilising and supervising male labour for the harvesting of the crop is an aspect of the labour market that did not emerge from other informants but is consistent with their role in regulating access to labour at the village level.

Conclusion

The case of saffron as a high-value crop with export potential is well-evidenced by existing sources. This study focused more on the socioeconomic effects of saffron cultivation in Herat, and on its impacts on the social relations of production, investigating who is likely to benefit from its cultivation and the scale of employment it is likely to generate. The evidence reported shows that saffron cannot provide (at the national level) a viable alternative to opium poppy. It will never achieve the scale of production that opium poppy has, which in 2016 reached a new record (Mansfield and Fishtein 2016). In part, this may reflect the more
exacting growing conditions required for saffron in comparison with those for opium poppy. Is it then more of a niche crop, which at a local level can substitute for opium poppy, although it should be remembered that the scale of opium poppy production in Herat province has always been limited? As the evidence reported shows, on the basis of income per unit area, those farmers who are growing saffron reported that it was more lucrative than opium poppy and the employment it was generating per unit area also exceeds that of opium poppy. But as a semi-perennial crop with high capital investment costs and returns that are only significant from the second year onwards, it is evident that saffron is more likely to be grown by farmers who can easily meet their subsistence requirements, have sufficient land area or other sources of income to take the risk of investment and can afford to take risks. It is likely, therefore, to be less attractive to farming households that have insufficient land to be food-secure or limited sources of other income. The evidence suggests that those who have been able to move into its production have gained considerable benefit; they tend to be male farmers with larger landholdings. There are also examples of women who have gained a foothold in production, through land inheritance or access to land through relations or leasing.

The formation of associations has been seen as a key instrument in promoting saffron cultivation, but these largely address the production supply side. Support for post-production and international marketing has been limited. The bureaucratic process required to legally form an association and the restrictions imposed on the scope of their activities further constrains them. Leadership of the male associations appears usually to be provided by the village landed elite, who not only act as lenders of credit for other farmers who wish to move into saffron production, but also have close links, or are even part owners of the key saffron trading companies. However, a few associations have been formed by women, some through women who are wives of the heads of male saffron associations and who come from households with more land.

The comparison with the market support given by traders to opium poppy cultivators is striking. For opium poppy, traders provide credit, inputs and farm gate purchase, and it is this level of market intermediation by traders that has been critical to small farmer engagement. It is precisely this level of support, including the supply of agricultural advisory services by the state, that was so crucial in making the new varieties of wheat and rice during the Green Revolution period less risky to smallholders in South-East Asia (Hazell 2009) and that supported their adoption. While Afghanistan’s Agricultural Sector Review (World Bank 2014) makes explicit reference to the Green Revolution model and the role of the state in its support, it argues that there are greater opportunities in Afghanistan for the private sector and NGOs to help provide market-led solutions to reduce market risks (p.vi). There is little evidence that the private sector or NGOs in the case of saffron have provided such support, and the absence of effective market intermediation to reduce market risks for smallholders will restrict the adoption of saffron by small farmers.

One reason saffron has been promoted is its potential to generate employment, particularly for women. Around 5,000 women and children are being hired in Herat province every saffron harvesting season to clean and process saffron flowers. This work is generally piece
rate and significantly lower paid than comparable work by men, and usually takes place in spaces designated for women. There are some examples of women moving from one village to another to undertake the work. A common justification for the use of women is precisely that they are lower paid, but the short-term nature of employment and the low rates do not offer a living wage or significantly change the employment constraints women face. The reason women are employed is probably that this is an activity that can be carried out in screened or private conditions where men are not present. Nevertheless, women who are employed as casual labour are appreciative of what it offers and the benefits to be gained from it.

It is uncertain why harvesting and cleaning are designated as ‘women’s work’. The standard response is that women are better at it and that it is ‘light’ work— but they are not paid more for doing it. Whether these reasons are used to justify the fact that women are doing the work and therefore they can be paid less than men is unclear. A contributory factor might be that the short harvest season with high labour demand cannot be met by the available male labour supply, much of which has migrated to Iran for work. Observations on opium cultivation in the Hari Rud a decade ago indicated that women also worked in the family fields then because of acute needs for household labour generated by opium poppy cultivation; they earned higher wages to do so.

So, is the movement of women into saffron farm work transformational or simply a feminisation of farm labour, as seen elsewhere in Asia as men move out of farm-based work? Given the patriarchal structures of Afghanistan’s rural economy, even in the more liberal environment of Herat, it is difficult to see this, at least in the short-term, as a significant change. Nor is saffron going to achieve the scale needed to drive the transformation of the rural economy that is expected of it. It would appear from the evidence that, while saffron offers benefit to some, the structure of its market and the way it is currently regulated limits wider benefits; and poor people and women face specific structural constraints in gaining significant returns from it.

**Glossary of Terms**

*Af.:* Afghan currency.

*Arbob:* Traditional village head.

*Dong:* Unit of measurement, 1 dong = 330 m2.

*Jirib:* Unit of measurement, 1 jirib = approximately 0.2 ha.

*Kharwar:* Unit of measurement, 1 kharwar = 400 kg.

*Mann:* Unit of measurement, 1 mann = 4 kg.

*Seer:* Unit of measurement, 1 seer = 7 kg.
References


Pakistan Dealing with Climate Change
Climate Change Resilience through Migration: A Case of Pakistan*
Kashif Salik, Ayesha Qaisrani, Muhammad Awais Umar, and Syed Mohsin Ali**

Abstract
This study assesses the role of rural to urban migration in enhancing livelihoods resilience and introducing new economic opportunities in semi-arid regions of Pakistan. Pakistan has a considerably high urbanisation rate with estimates from 2010 to 2015 averaging between 2.8 to 3.3 percent annually, thereby transforming the demography of certain areas, especially semi-arid regions which include ‘migration hotspot’ areas. The authors developed a Livelihood Resilience Index comparing the resilience levels of migrant and non-migrant households. Data was collected at the household level, comprising of a sample of 600 households in three semi-arid regions of Pakistan (D.G.Khan, Faisalabad and Mardan).

From the results, the authors conclude that migration has the potential to strengthen livelihood opportunities, social and human capital and the overall level of resilience among households. Therefore, it is likely to be a successful adaptation strategy to climate change and other external shocks. However, it does not imply that merely facilitating migration would be a viable option for enhancing resilience. The way remittances are used has a significant contribution to the resilience of a household.

The authors’ findings call for a policy-mix that promotes the positive impacts of rural-urban migration, while staying cautious of the adverse impacts. Efforts are needed to attract remittances towards strategic development sectors with potential for improving livelihoods and production, thereby enhancing peoples’ resilience.

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Introduction
The fifth assessment report of Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) raised the level of confidence on (irreversible) impacts of climate change on natural and human systems (IPCC 2014). The slow rise in temperature and variability in rainfall may cause severe negative impacts on crop yields and shifts in high agriculture productive lands into less fertile, that reduce farm incomes and jobs as well as food security in rural areas (Ibid.). There is emerging evidence that such persistent shifts in climate and increased frequency of extreme weather impacts are driving people out of their habitats and pushing them to migrate (Myers 2005; Parry 2007; Saeed et al. 2016). A study on Pakistan by Mueller et al. (2014) concludes that extreme high temperature during winter season caused about one-third decline in wheat yields. As a result, the landless agricultural labour opts to migrate to other villages or urban areas subject to the availability of socioeconomic assets. As most rural population, including poor and landless rural labour, resides in these agricultural lands, many may be persuaded to migrate owing to declining agricultural yields (Saeed et al. 2016). Migration provides them the opportunity to spread risks and diversify livelihoods by taking migration-as-adaptation option (Scheffran et al. 2011). Such migration flows due to climate change are mostly internal or within the country (ADB 2012), where migrants expand their social networks, gain capabilities and improve social and human capital essential for complete family migration and livelihood expansion (Scheffran et al. 2011).

Under this backdrop, there is a need to empirically test whether migration can serve as an efficient adaptation strategy by building the resilience of the migrant households. This study focuses on the state of the resilience of migrant and non-migrant rural households in the context of Pakistan. The study tried to look into what role migration can play in enhancing new economic opportunities (taking into account distributional effects, especially for the poor and women) for improving resilience in semi-arid lands of Pakistan.

Migration and Rural Areas: The Socioeconomic Context
In Pakistan, poverty is largely a rural phenomenon. Latest estimates provided by the Government of Pakistan (Ministry of Planning, Development and Reform 2016) show that about 39 percent of the population of Pakistan is facing multidimensional poverty. There is a stark contrast between urban and rural incidence of poverty: urban poverty is about 9.3 percent, whereas rural poverty is estimated to be about 54.6 percent (Ibid.). On average, rural incomes in Pakistan are 38 percent less than urban incomes based on the estimates of 2013-14 (PBS 2015), while estimates of multidimensional poverty show that about 48 percent people in rural areas are deprived in contrast to 18 percent multidimensional poverty rate in urban areas (SDPI 2012). Agriculture remains pivotal in affecting the rural economy and living standards on the rural side.

A number of studies have attempted to understand the dynamics of rural poverty and well-being of the rural population for the case of Pakistan. Ali (2011) focused on studying the underlying forces behind rural poverty in Punjab and compared different divisions of the province for their poverty trends. He found that northern and central Punjab has relatively less incidence of poverty as compared to southern and western Punjab and rural poverty was
Climate Change Resilience through Migration: A Case of Pakistan

found to be twice the urban poverty rate. Clear depictions of poverty pockets could be observed with the analysis, necessitating the need for area-specific policy packages for alleviating rural poverty in these pockets. Qazi et al. (1997) stated that to some extent, the incidence of poverty in different regions of Pakistan is related to water availability. Areas outside the Indus Basin which include Barani lands, Rod-kohi areas, Sailaba, deserts, coastal areas, etc., tend to be poorer than regions within the Indus Basin.

People living in rural areas are facing a low living standard as compared to urban areas and they continue to suffer from the lack of availability of education and health facilities, safe drinking water and sanitation along with other social services and physical infrastructure (Rahman 2011). The rural population of Pakistan has decreased from 67.9 percent in 1996 to 60.8 percent in 2015; on the other hand, the urban population has increased from 32.1 percent in 1996 to 39.2 percent in 2015 (Hussain 2014). Structural transformation in the economy is driving people towards cities - resources are reallocated from low productive (agriculture) to high productive (industry and service) sectors (Ibid.). The productivity of agriculture sector has declined because of high input prices, water shortage, natural events (flood, heavy rain and drought), which reduces the earnings of the rural population (State Bank of Pakistan 2015).

The role of migration is widely acknowledged globally as a ‘positive force’ or ‘key intervening apparatus’ for development, a way for reducing inequalities and poverty (Raghuram 2009; Bakewell 2007). Some consider migration as an important poverty reducing strategy, while others regard it as a reason for increasing poverty in urban and rural areas. The former view relates poverty reduction to the inflow of remittances that supplement rural incomes and contribute to the rural economy by increasing consumption, expenditure on social sector and household savings (IOM 2005). Conversely, other studies exploring the links between poverty and migration recognise that the poorest often cannot afford to migrate (Hear et al. 2012).

Migration patterns in Pakistan indicate a predominant poverty-migration linkage (Gazdar 2005), however, the links between migration and poverty are neither linear nor simple (Deshingkar and Sven 2005). Rural areas are undergoing rapid socioeconomic transition and internal migration is undeniably an important contributor to this change (Marshall and Rahman 2012). However, on the research front, internal migration appears to be less visible, possibly because it is less recorded as compared to international migration (IOM 2005).

**Analytical Framework, Data and Methodology**

This research follows Tanner et al.’s (2014: 23) definition of livelihood resilience which explains it as ‘the capacity of all people across generations to sustain and improve their livelihood opportunities and well-being despite environmental, economic, social and political disturbances’. To estimate livelihood resilience, this study uses the conceptual framework developed by Bahadur et al. (2015) and Tanner et al. (2014). The framework allowed to look into three important aspects of livelihood resilience: (1) Adaptive capacity – ‘the ability of social systems to adapt to multiple, long-term and future climate change risks,
and also to learn and adjust after a disaster’ (Bahadur et al. 2015:13); (2) Anticipatory capacity – ‘the ability of social systems to anticipate and reduce the impact of climate variability extremes through preparedness and planning capacities’ (Ibid.:23); and (3) Absorptive capacity – ‘the ability of social systems to absorb and cope with the impacts of climate variability and extremes’ (Ibid.:30). This framework allowed an ex-ante context of livelihood vulnerabilities, coping strategies and community’s economic opportunities and well-being (Ibid.).

This study focused on two districts of Punjab and one district of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) provinces of Pakistan i.e. Dera Ghazi Khan, Faisalabad, and Mardan. These districts are located in semi-arid regions of the country and constitute largely of agro-based livelihoods. The district of Dera Ghazi Khan was selected mainly because it is a rural district with around 86 percent of the total 1.6 million population living in rural areas (PBS 2014). The district is also the least developed area within the province with one of the highest incidence of multidimensional poverty (Naveed and Ali 2012). The livelihood of majority population is directly related to agriculture sector, while a considerable dependence on remittances is also observed. Further, the district has a dry semi-arid climate having very little rainfall (220mm/year) (Government of Punjab 2015) and is highly vulnerable during the monsoon period to floods and inundation by Indus River resulting in soil erosion and large-scale crop damages. For the remaining year, there is a drought-like condition, especially for the rainfed areas of the district, which often pushes the poverty-trodden people towards canal-irrigated areas as well as other parts of the country in search of food, drinking water, fodder and better economic opportunities (Qaisrani 2015).

The selection of district Faisalabad as the second study site is based on its diverse economic activities including both agriculture and large industrial sector (ASER 2008). This enables one to study migration phenomenon and resilience potential under different contexts of development. The district of Faisalabad has two key limiting factors to its development: firstly, its brackish ground water which is unsuitable not only for human consumption but also for many industrial processes such as dyeing and tanning as well as for crops and livestock production. This has increased many dependencies on surface water supplies through irrigated canals, which are highly challenging due to variable and declining river flows and increasing water demand by different sectors (Irfan et al. 2014). Surface water is primarily used for agricultural purposes only. Secondly, the climate of the district is dry semi-arid and characterised by erratic rainfall and increasing heat waves (Saeed et al. 2016) resulting in increasing incidence of agricultural droughts, frequent crop failures and drop in crop (especially wheat) productivity (Mueller et al. 2014). According to Farooq et al. (2005), this has caused an increase in rural-to-urban migration in Faisalabad district, which is already affected by other factors such as low-paying jobs and lack of economic opportunities in the rural areas, scarcity of agricultural land and social discrimination to rural poor and landless communities.

The third site is district Mardan, which is the second most populous district after Peshawar (the provincial capital city) in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province of Pakistan. With an estimated 2.3 million population, the district has 20.2 percent urban population, leaving the
majority residing in rural areas (USAID 2009). The authors selected this site because agriculture sector (which is largely based on the production of wheat, sugarcane, and tobacco) is highly vulnerable to climate variability and declining water for irrigation (Saeed et al. 2016). This has induced the rural population to migrate over the years.

A survey was conducted using a structured household questionnaire (n=600; and n=200 for each site). Multi-level sampling techniques were used. First, within the district, purposive sampling was used to select two union councils that were farthest from the district capital. Within the union council, two villages were randomly selected. Selection of households from within the villages was stratified based on the nature of livelihood i.e. landless, small landholders (farm size less than 12.5 acres), large landholders (farm-size more than 12.5 acres) and non-farm households. Although ‘sampling error’ cannot be avoided, it can be reduced by obtaining a sample of sufficiently large size and by using an ‘appropriate sampling technique’. An appropriate sample size of 600 was calculated (200 from each district). Sample size is calculated on the basis of following factors: Level of Significance, which describes the level of uncertainty in the sample mean or prevalence as an estimate of the population mean or prevalence, will be 95 percent; Margin Of Error (MOE) indicates the expected half-width of the confidence interval. The smaller the MOE, larger the sample size needed. For this project it is 0.05, which makes it 5 percent of the total population. Baseline Levels of Indicators (BLI) elaborate the estimated prevalence of the risk factors within the target population. Values closest to 50 percent are the most conservative, so in this study it is 0.5. Design Effect (Deff) describes the loss of sampling efficiency due to using a complex sample design, in this study it is 1.0. Selection of the sample size is also based on variation in target population (based on secondary population); available resources for this study (calculated in budget portion) and time frame.

The questionnaire was pre-tested (n=30) for the purpose of its flow and refinement at the local level. Migrant households are defined as those households in which at least one member of the household lives away from home for more than three months and who has strong ties with the household (through remittances, transfer of knowledge and information or visits to the rural household, etc.).

The study follows the procedure coined by Cutter et al. (2010) for constructing the resilience index for migrant and non-migrant households. The authors used a comparative approach and utilised proxy variables for the construction of the Resilience Index. A careful review of literature helped in selecting proxy variables for each of the sub-component of the resilience index (references have been provided in Annex 1). Since research based on resilience indices for migrants and non-migrants is still in infancy, selection of variables is ad-hoc in most studies, considering the multifaceted nature of resilience. Comparing the Resilience Index of both migrants and non-migrants is not a straightforward method. It is important to validate that resilience of the sample of migrant households and non-migrant households is, in fact, comparable. In case of two groups, which are fundamentally different from each other, indicating that resilience is a linear function of migration cannot be directly justified. Therefore, it is important to understand the underlying factors that may differentiate between the two groups, in order to comprehend the differences in resilience.
For this purpose, firstly, a Wealth Index was developed by using Principal Component Analysis (PCA). Wealth Index is an economic indicator which is constructed using household asset items such as households’ ownership of different durable consumer products i.e. car, television, washing machine, tractor, etc., and assets i.e. type of house, access to water, access to electricity, etc. In other words, a Wealth Index determines the living standard of people and divides them into wealth quintiles. It provided five categories (i.e. Very Poor to Very Rich) of both migrant and non-migrants and these categories are merged to form three categories out of those five (i.e. Poor to Rich). This technique provided three homogenous groups of the selected population. Finally, the resilience of migrants and non-migrants was compared by considering the homogeneity of the selected population.

Results of Resilience Index

The results of Resilience Index for migrant and non-migrant households are shown below in Table 1. The indicators included in each category are provided in Annex 2. This Resilience Index consists of three major components: adaptive capacity, anticipatory capacity and absorptive capacity, each component further divided into sub-components. The results show that migrant households are comparatively better off than the non-migrants in all three major components. Migration is known as an important approach for adaptation if society faces disparities in economic opportunities, political and environmental conditions (Waldinger 2015). According to the results, migrant households are more resilient, show more adaptability to any shock because they generally have a higher level of income, lower dependency ratio, diversified income sources and higher population of employees. Despite the fact that migrant households have a high rate of agricultural and livestock ownership, the rate of dependency for livelihood on agriculture is higher in non-migrant households. The higher response on the percentage use of water for irrigation by the non-migrants represents their dependency on agriculture for employment or livelihood. Along with this, the lower percentage of income diversification of non-migrants indicates the lack of economic opportunities or their reliance on a single sector (agriculture or livestock) for livelihood. Non-migrant households are less resilient because of their largely single sector dependency and a higher percentage of non-commercial use of agricultural products.

The scores of the anticipatory capacity component reveal that migrants have the ability to deal with problems much more easily than non-migrants. Generally, migrants take decisions about their life more freely, have more opportunities to learn new things and show their capabilities. Migrant households are more resilient than non-migrants because they have better future planning, understanding of the climate change impacts, better strategies to cope with food security situation and access to the media, which enhance their capacity to anticipate any upcoming extreme events. Migrants are perceived to have the opportunities to reduce vulnerabilities and contribute to enhancing the resilience of their communities of origin by creating new diversified livelihood sources, having information, knowledge, and understanding to mitigate hazards (Warn and Adamo 2014). In most developing countries, migration is considered an important strategy for risk management to deal with shock or stressor (Waldinger 2015).
Similar to the aforementioned results, migrants have the advantage to efficiently absorb external shocks or stressors as compared to non-migrants. Most of the non-migrants in this survey lived under the poverty line and took formal or informal loans to fulfil their basic needs. On the other hand, the trend of taking loans is lower in migrant households and most of the time they took a loan for investment purpose to improve livelihoods. They also have more advantage of substituting water sources for drinking and domestic purposes. Remittances are the plus point for migrants that help to improve their livelihood and enhance their capacity to absorb any shock. Remittances provide an opportunity to the recipients to invest in the capital stock, enable them to deal with food insecurity, improve their education and lifestyle. Study findings reveal that migrants have a high percentage of real estate / financial property, agriculture land, and livestock ownership, they have more population above the poverty line and are more food secure.

It is clear from the above discussion that migrant households are more resilient to any shock or stressor as compared to non-migrants: their resilient score is comparatively higher than non-migrants. Thus, it indicates that migration has been a viable strategy to cope with any shock or stressor (climatic or non-climatic) (Sallu et al. 2014). In practice, accrediting higher resilience to migration may come off as a little too straightforward. It may be argued that migrant households may already be more resilient than non-migrant households prior to migration and that this difference in resilience may come from other socioeconomic and behavioural discrepancies. In such a case, migration may not be considered a contributing factor to resilience, rather an outcome of already-possessed higher levels of resilience in some households.

To consider this aspect, the authors have constructed the Wealth Index to divide the population into three homogeneous groups based on the differences in their wealth status. Following that, they calculated Resilience Index of migrants and non-migrants for all income groups drawn from the Wealth Index. The results in Table 2 represent that migrant and non-migrant households are following the same trend of resilience (migrants are more resilient as compared to non-migrants) regardless of their wealth status. On the other hand, richer population has higher resilience score as compared to middle-income group, and the middle-income group has a higher score than that of the poor population.
Table 1: Resilience Index Scores of Migrant and Non-migrant Households in Semi-arid Regions of Pakistan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Livelihood Resilience/ Determinants</th>
<th>Migrant Score</th>
<th>Non-Migrant Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Adaptive Capacity</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assets, access, income and food security</td>
<td>0.526</td>
<td>0.462</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strengthening and adapting livelihoods</td>
<td>0.467</td>
<td>0.401</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Anticipatory Capacity</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preparedness and planning</td>
<td>0.526</td>
<td>0.452</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity, information, and mobilisation</td>
<td>0.589</td>
<td>0.536</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Absorptive Capacity</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saving and safety nets</td>
<td>0.504</td>
<td>0.470</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Substitutable and diverse assets and resources</td>
<td>0.211</td>
<td>0.146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Resilience Index Score (Sum of Adaptive, Anticipatory and Absorptive Capacities)</strong></td>
<td>2.822</td>
<td>2.467</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Based on structured questionnaire interview of 600 respondents in D.G. Khan, Faisalabad, and Mardan conducted during February 2016.

Table 2: Resilience of Migrant and Non-migrant Households with Respect to Wealth

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories by Wealth and Migration Status</th>
<th>Resilience Score</th>
<th>Adaptive Capacity</th>
<th>Anticipatory Capacity</th>
<th>Absorptive Capacity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Poor Migrant</td>
<td>2.301</td>
<td>0.816</td>
<td>0.948</td>
<td>0.537</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Migrant</td>
<td>2.003</td>
<td>0.717</td>
<td>0.820</td>
<td>0.466</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle Migrant</td>
<td>2.780</td>
<td>0.999</td>
<td>1.077</td>
<td>0.704</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Migrant</td>
<td>2.607</td>
<td>0.890</td>
<td>1.035</td>
<td>0.683</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rich Migrant</td>
<td>3.299</td>
<td>1.181</td>
<td>1.252</td>
<td>0.866</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Migrant</td>
<td>3.052</td>
<td>1.115</td>
<td>1.170</td>
<td>0.768</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Based on structured questionnaire interviews of 600 respondents in D.G. Khan, Faisalabad, and Mardan conducted during February 2016.

Discussion of Results

The study estimated the livelihood resilience in semi-arid regions of Pakistan to test the hypothesis: does improving resilience through migration movements aspire to encourage adaptation (to climate change) as well as to boost economic opportunities? Or does migration prove to be a maladaptive strategy that results in socioeconomic deprivation for the left-over family members (including poor and vulnerable, women, elderly people and others) who are unable to work or participate in productive activities? It was found that migration movements critically strengthen the livelihoods opportunities, social and human capital and overall resilience in out-migration regions. This research also concludes that there is a positive role of migration in improving the resilience of migrant’s left-over families through better living standards, access to resources, and higher potential to utilise remittances for productive purposes.
Adaptive capacities are essential to sustain and improve livelihood strategies against any social, economic, political and environmental stresses (Tanner et al. 2014) as well as to learn and the ability to the change in behaviour after a disaster (Scheffran et al. 2011; Jones et al. 2010). The study found a strong association between migration and increase in adaptive capacities of rural areas. It is concluded that migrant families are more capable of gathering livelihood assets, improving incomes and ensure food security than non-migrants families.

Better resilience can further be achieved through anticipatory capacities that refer to the ability to prepare and plan pro-actively for an upcoming stress (Boyd et al. 2009). It requires predictive capacities, knowledge, skills and experience (Folke 2006) to explain the notion of anticipatory capacity (Tschakert and Dietrick 2010). Study analysis suggests that anticipatory capacities of migrant households are better as compared to non-migrants households. They are more capable of anticipating through learning new skills, better social networks to deal with issues, access to information and understand ways to mitigate risks and hazards.

Resilience also requires enhancing absorptive capacity which is the ability to absorb and cope (during and after) with the impacts of disturbances (OECD 2014). Similarly, Béné et al. (2012) explain absorptive capacity in terms of ‘persistence and stability’ influenced by supportive economic resources such as asset holdings and savings, as well as links to informal safety nets and social capital (Starr and Tabaj 2015). The absorptive capacity index score indicates that migrant households have better access to financial resources and more alternative options than non-migrant households. Migration diversifies household assets and human capital that result in better housing and living standard, access to health facilities and transport, etc., essential for appropriate response to any shock or stress.

However, understanding resilience in societies with varying social, economic and cultural values is challenging. Tanner et al. (2014) raised an important concern: ‘resilience of what type, for whom?’ Resilience is a concept about the system’s capacity to ‘bounce back’ to its original conditions. What if these previous circumstances are ‘undesirable’, people may be locked in poverty, injustice, inequality and discriminations (Ibid.). In other words, resilience (especially for poor and marginalised) needs to be redefined and there is a need to develop consensus on ‘desired states’ (Ibid.). For example, migration occurs in the state of inequalities as it is beneficial for those who were previously well-off and would only help them to build resilience, leaving behind poor and marginalised worse off (Lipton 1980). This study was carried out under this limitation and only presents the ex-ante perspective of resilience with respect to migration. A focus to incorporate transformational aspects of resilience with some thinking on desired states of adaptation essential to respond climate change impacts is needed to fill the gap in the future.

Migration is a normal social aspect of human life emerging from the historical and current patterns of inequality in development among regions, poverty and unemployment, human insecurity, disparities in living standards and discrimination embodied within and across societies of origin and destination (Castles 2010, 2013; Hear, Bakewell and Long 2012; Adepoju 1998; King and Skeldon 2010). The results from the authors’ three case studies
show similar causes of migration. Most of the migrants moved from areas of origin because of the extremely low wage rates and lack of work opportunities in the villages as they find better job opportunities in the cities. Some other factors are considered important such as lack of quality education and health services in rural areas; and adverse environmental or climatic factors. These reasons for migration indicate that the agriculture sector of Pakistan, in general, has struggled to provide enough opportunities to rural communities and pushed them to look for opportunities elsewhere. The growth in agriculture sector in Pakistan slowed drastically since the 1980s and its share to Gross Domestic Product declined to 21 percent in 2014 from 49 percent in 1951 (Salik et al. 2015; Zaheer 2013). Given the lack of support of the government in the agriculture sector, the decline in agricultural productivity is mainly due to the lack of water for irrigation; high input prices; frequent heavy and abrupt rainfalls and recurrent floods; soil salinization and seepage, etc. Most migrant families indicate that staying in the agricultural profession could not yield enough benefits for their families. It is evident from the fact that in the study areas, majority of the small to medium farmers do subsistence agriculture and have nothing or very less to sell in the market. The majority of the rural households have faced high food insecurity situations for many months in a year. In order to spread the risk of food insecurity, the youth in rural areas finds no incentive to stay and decides to migrate for better and stable livelihoods in the cities.

Evidence suggested that in the study areas, remittances are mostly used for household consumption and spent on food, health, weddings, education, repaying debts, etc. and, less on investment for expanding livelihoods or other productive purposes. For example, from all income groups, up to 80 percent of migrant families are receiving remittances that constitute 50 percent or even more of their monthly household income. This also highlighted the contribution of remittances in the reduction of rural poverty in the study areas. Nevertheless, remittances have also been used for the purpose of investment in advanced agricultural practices and agro-based businesses by the return migrants in the authors' study areas that have boosted local industry and growth.

The debate on migration and its effects on inequality are varied and inconclusive (Black et al. 2005). When considering the context and selectivity of migration, literature indicates that inequality of any kind (such as in income, social order, access to opportunities, gender, or lifestyle) can generate specific type of migration (internal or international; short distance or long distance, etc.) and define migrants work and benefits (Lipton 1980; de Haan 1999). Because migration involves risks and costs, the poorest people are less likely to migrate (Black et al. 2005). This study showed similar inequalities, as the majority of non-migrants are willing to migrate (at least one member of the household) within the country to improve livelihoods if they are able to manage the financial resources up to PKR 100,000 (USD 1000). This willingness to migrate is more common among the landless, small landholders and non-farm poor households. However, within the current migrant households, migration is also common among rural poor and landless farmers at least over a short distance to work in nearby factories as labourers.

Many scholars argue that migration and inequality outcomes need to be looked at in the wider spectrum of political, economic and social-cultural institutional perspectives, rather
than only in terms of income or wealth outcomes (Black et al. 2005; de Haas 2006). The role of formal and informal networks in sharing the cost and risks of migration especially for marginalised groups are critical in reducing initial level of inequalities and poverty in both migrations sending and receiving regions (Ibid.). This study also suggests that social networks and advice from relatives and friends played an important role in the decision to migrate. In conclusion, this research found a positive role of migration in improving the socioeconomic conditions of rural households, such as reduction in overall poverty, securing livelihoods, and improving opportunities for household development and growth.

**Conclusion**

This study provides an assessment of the state of resilience of migrant and non-migrant rural households in the semi-arid regions of Pakistan. The authors used livelihood resilience framework and case study approach to answer some key questions about the role of migration in improving resilience in semi-arid lands of Pakistan. Further, the study tried to explain how migration can possibly be shaped as an adaptation strategy and its potential to introduce new economic opportunities through the role of remittances and return migration. It has been found that the major causes of internal migration in semi-arid regions are extremely low wage rate; lack of work opportunities, quality education and health services in rural areas; high food insecurity; and adverse environmental or climatic factors.

It is concluded that migration movements critically strengthen livelihood resilience in out-migration regions. The migrants are able to diversify livelihoods opportunities, reducing risks of income failure and able to expand social and human capital. Migrant families experience the positive outcome of migration by getting better living standards, access to resources, and higher potential to utilise remittances for productive purposes. Remittances are important to make livelihoods more secure, to reduce income uncertainty and to provide a source of new investment in land and property purposes. They can also help to reduce rural poverty in the study areas. Return migrants can invest in advanced agricultural practices and agro-based business. The research also found inequality in opportunities of migration in rural areas. The majority of non-migrants are willing to migrate internally (at least one member of the household) to improve livelihoods if they are able to manage the minimum financial resources essential to migrate.

Results of this study call on the government to revisit its approach of viewing rural-to-urban migration in a pessimistic context. Pakistan does not have an internal migration policy, however, the general concern of internal migration discourse has always called for measures to ‘control’ urban in-flows. The government should recognise the resilience-enhancing potential of migration rather than viewing it as a rapid urban agglomeration issue. Policy focus needs to promote the positive impacts of migration while considering the negative impacts.
References


Climate Change Resilience through Migration: A Case of Pakistan


Kashif Salik, Ayesha Qaisrani, Muhammad Awais Umar, and Syed Mohsin Ali


Climate Change Resilience through Migration: A Case of Pakistan


Climate Change Resilience through Migration: A Case of Pakistan

USAID 2009, ‘District Health Profile, Mardan’, Pakistan Initiative for Mothers and Newborns, USAID, Pakistan Office.


## Annexures

### Annex 1: List of Variables Used for the Construction of Resilience Index

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Livelihood Resilience/Determinants</th>
<th>Explanatory Variables</th>
<th>Effect on Resilience</th>
<th>References</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Adaptive Capacity</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assets, Access, Income and Food Security</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household income</td>
<td>Percent of households living above poverty line</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>Tanner et al. (2014); Brown (2011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependency</td>
<td>Ratio of individuals in non-working age group to working age group</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>Barr et al. (2010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nature of dwellings</td>
<td>Percent of households having houses made of permanent material</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>Brooks and Adger (2005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food insufficiency</td>
<td>Percent of households food insecure</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>Wright et al. (2012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Livestock ownership</td>
<td>Percent of households having livestock</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>Nelson et al. (2007); Ostrom (2009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land ownership</td>
<td>Percent of households having agriculture land</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>Nelson et al. (2007); Ostrom (2009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment rate</td>
<td>Percent of work force employed</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>Adger et al. (2002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Percent of people educated at secondary level and above</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>Himes-Cornell and Hoeting (2015)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to drinking water</td>
<td>Percent of households having access to improved drinking water facility</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>Salik et al. (2015)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unequal access to resources</td>
<td>Gini-coefficient (0=equality; 1=inequality)</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>Twigg (2007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Strengthening and Adapting Livelihoods</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth Population</td>
<td>Percent of non-elderly (14-29) population</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>Adger et al. (2002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income diversification</td>
<td>Percentage of households with more than one source of income</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>Adger et al. (2002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main purpose of agriculture and livestock produce</td>
<td>Percent of households selling crop and livestock produce in the market</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>Adger et al. (2002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source of water for irrigation</td>
<td>Percent of farming households having access to surface/tube well water</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>Ellis (2014)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destabilisation of the livelihood system</td>
<td>Percent of households faced problems in livelihood activities</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>Adger et al. (2002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural disasters</td>
<td>Percent of households affected by natural disaster in last five years</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>Ellis (2014)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female involvement in workforce</td>
<td>Percent female labour force participation in livelihood activities</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>Muthoni and Wangui (2013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional well-being</td>
<td>Percent of households satisfied with current profession</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>Tschakert and Dietrich (2010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Anticipatory Capacity</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preparedness and Planning</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk management perception</td>
<td>Percent of households dealing with problems with ease</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>Jones and Tanner (2015); Tschakert and Dietrich (2010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Learning new skills</td>
<td>Percent of households learn new things in life</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>Tanner et al. (2014); Tschakert and Dietrich (2010)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# Climate Change Resilience through Migration: A Case of Pakistan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Livehood Resilience</strong> / Determinants</th>
<th><strong>Explanatory Variables</strong></th>
<th><strong>Effect on Resilience</strong></th>
<th><strong>References</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Degree of self-determination</td>
<td>Percent of households decide freely about life</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>Tanner et al. (2014); Tschakert and Dietrich (2010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planning for future</td>
<td>Percent of households do planning for future</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>Tanner et al. (2014)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coping (food) strategies</td>
<td>Percentage of households dependent on more than three coping strategies</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>Tanner et al. (2014)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Capacity, Information and Mobilization**

| Lack of representation/ Social inequality | Percent of households think that have little chance to show their capabilities | Negative | Tanner et al. (2014); Tschakert and Dietrich (2010) |
| Degree of well-being and self-satisfaction | Percent of households think that they are satisfied and have valuable contribution to society | Positive | Tanner et al. (2014); Tschakert and Dietrich (2010) |
| Understanding climate change impacts | Percent of households perceive that climate change has impacted livelihood activities | Positive | Tschakert and Dietrich (2010) |
| Access to TV/newspaper | Percent of households have access to TV/newspaper | Positive | Swanson et al. (2007); Colten et al. (2008) |

**Absorptive Capacity**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Saving and Safety Nets</th>
<th>Credit accessibility</th>
<th>Percent of households who have loans</th>
<th>Positive</th>
<th>Himes-Cornell and Hoelting (2015)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reasons for taking loan</td>
<td>Percent of households take loans for livelihood improvement</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>Himes-Cornell and Hoelting (2015)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Real state/financial property</td>
<td>Percent of households have real state/financial property</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>Cutter et al. (2008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>Percent of households with a vehicle of any type</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>Cutter et al. (2010)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Substitutable and Diverse Assets and Resources**

| Substitute of domestic use water supply | Percent of households have substitute source of domestic use water supply | Positive | Frankenberg et al. (2013) |
| Substitute of drinking water supply | Percent of households have substitute source of drinking water supply | Positive | Frankenberg et al. (2013) |
| Water storage | Percent of households able to store water | Positive | Scheffran, Marmer, and Sow (2011) |
| Use of remittances for investment | Percent of households use remittances for livelihood investment purposes | Positive | Scheffran, Marmer, and Sow (2011) |
### Annex 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Livelihood Resilience/ Determinants</th>
<th>Explanatory Variables</th>
<th>Effect on Resilience</th>
<th>Migrant</th>
<th>Non-Migrant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Adaptive Capacity</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assets, Access, Income and Food Security</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household income</td>
<td>Percent of households living above poverty line</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>0.717</td>
<td>0.548</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependency</td>
<td>Ratio of individuals in non-working age group to working age group</td>
<td>Negative</td>
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<td>0.323</td>
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<td>Nature of dwellings</td>
<td>Percent of households having houses made of permanent material</td>
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<td>0.652</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food insufficiency</td>
<td>Percent of households food insecure</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>0.193</td>
<td>0.138</td>
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<tr>
<td>Livestock ownership</td>
<td>Percent of households having livestock</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>0.693</td>
<td>0.657</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land ownership</td>
<td>Percent of households having agriculture land</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>0.544</td>
<td>0.489</td>
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<tr>
<td>Employment rate</td>
<td>Percent of workforce employed</td>
<td>Positive</td>
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<td>0.406</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Percent of people educated at secondary level and above</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>0.309</td>
<td>0.253</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to drinking water</td>
<td>Percent of households having access to improved drinking water facility</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>0.816</td>
<td>0.764</td>
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<td>Unequal access to resources</td>
<td>Gini-coefficient (0=equality; 1=inequality)</td>
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<td>0.390</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Average</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.526</td>
<td>0.462</td>
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<td>Strengthening and Adapting Livelihoods</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth Population</td>
<td>Percent of non-elderly (14-29) population</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>0.353</td>
<td>0.325</td>
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<tr>
<td>Income diversification</td>
<td>Percentage of households with more than one source of income</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>0.819</td>
<td>0.388</td>
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<td>Main purpose of agriculture and livestock produce</td>
<td>Percent of households selling crop and livestock produce in the market</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>0.445</td>
<td>0.392</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source of water for irrigation</td>
<td>Percent of farming households having access to surface/tube well water</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>0.561</td>
<td>0.610</td>
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<tr>
<td>Destabilisation of the livelihood system</td>
<td>Percent of households faced problems in livelihood activities</td>
<td>Negative</td>
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<td>0.366</td>
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<tr>
<td>Natural disasters</td>
<td>Percent of households affected by natural disaster in last five years</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>0.389</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female involvement in workforce</td>
<td>Percent female labour force participation in livelihood activities</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>0.067</td>
<td>0.083</td>
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<tr>
<td>Professional well-being</td>
<td>Percent of households satisfied with current profession</td>
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<td>0.612</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Average</strong></td>
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<td>0.467</td>
<td>0.401</td>
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<td>Anticipatory Capacity</td>
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<tr>
<td>Preparedness and Planning</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk management perception</td>
<td>Percent of households dealing with problems with ease</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>0.418</td>
<td>0.306</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Learning new skills</td>
<td>Percent of households learn new things in life</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>0.287</td>
<td>0.199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree of self-determination</td>
<td>Percent of households decide freely about life</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>0.721</td>
<td>0.697</td>
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<tr>
<td>Planning for future</td>
<td>Percent of households do planning for future</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>0.775</td>
<td>0.711</td>
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</table>
## Livelihood Resilience/ Determinants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Explanatory Variables</th>
<th>Effect on Resilience</th>
<th>Migrant</th>
<th>Non-Migrant</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coping (food) strategies</td>
<td>Percentage of households dependent on more than three coping strategies</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>0.427</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Average</strong></td>
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<td><strong>0.526</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.452</strong></td>
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### Capacity, Information and Mobilisation

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Explanatory Variables</th>
<th>Effect on Resilience</th>
<th>Migrant</th>
<th>Non-Migrant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lack of representation/ Social inequality</td>
<td>Percent of households think that have little chance to show their capabilities</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>0.324</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree of well-being and self-satisfaction</td>
<td>Percent of households think that they are satisfied and have valuable contribution to society</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>0.820</td>
</tr>
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<td>Understanding climate change impacts</td>
<td>Percent of households perceive that climate change has impacted livelihood activities</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>0.547</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to TV/newspaper</td>
<td>Percent of households have access to TV/newspaper</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>0.664</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Average</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>0.589</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.536</strong></td>
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### Absorptive Capacity

<table>
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<th>Explanatory Variables</th>
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<th>Non-Migrant</th>
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<tr>
<td>Credit accessibility</td>
<td>Percent of households who have loans</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>0.693</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reasons for taking loan</td>
<td>Percent of households take loans for livelihood improvement</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>0.462</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real state/financial property</td>
<td>Percent of households have real state/financial property</td>
<td>Positive</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>Percent of households with a vehicle of any type</td>
<td>Positive</td>
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<td><strong>0.504</strong></td>
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### Substitutable and Diverse Assets and Resources

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Explanatory Variables</th>
<th>Effect on Resilience</th>
<th>Migrant</th>
<th>Non-Migrant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Substitute of domestic use water supply</td>
<td>Percent of households have substitute source of domestic use water supply</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>0.045</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Substitute of drinking water supply</td>
<td>Percent of households have substitute source of drinking water supply</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>0.066</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water storage</td>
<td>Percent of households able to store water</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>0.471</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of remittances for investment</td>
<td>Percent of households use remittances for livelihood investment purposes</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>0.263</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Average</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>0.211</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.146</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Sum of Averages

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Effect on Resilience</th>
<th>Migrant</th>
<th>Non-Migrant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>2.822</strong></td>
<td><strong>2.467</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Promoting Resilience and Competitiveness in Textile Manufacturing in a Changing Climate: A Policy Perspective
Samavia Batool

Abstract
Decline in cotton production during 2015-16 (almost 33 percent as compared to the previous year) (Muhammad 2016), has raised serious concerns for policymakers, agriculturalists, economists and textile manufacturers. Cotton production is gradually declining in southern districts of Pakistan. There are many factors responsible for low cotton productivity, but climate change is a prominent one. A major point of concern is that climate events not only affect the productivity of crops, but also pose threats to a large number of livelihoods associated with it, along with risks to overall competitiveness of the value chain. Given these vulnerabilities, there is a need to identify vulnerability pathways through which climate impacts the textile manufacturing sector and the possible adaptation strategies to promote competitiveness and sustainable livelihoods. This chapter looks at implications of climate risks facing the textile manufacturing sector and policy interventions that could help build resilience and sustain livelihoods in the cotton-textile value chain. The analysis is based on Key Informant Interviews and Focus Group Discussions held with textile manufacturers.

* This chapter has been approved as a Working Paper by the referee.
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**Introduction**
Climate change is a global threat that challenges the existence and operation of each and every entity on earth beyond borders. While agriculture is a primary victim of climate change (Kurukulasuriya and Rosenthal 2003), analysts have started to shift their focus on identifying climate risks for agro-based (secondary) industries (Kumar and Yalew 2012) as they are also being affected, which has huge implications for economic performance, livelihoods, employment opportunities and security of a country.

Pakistan is dependent on agro-based industries, especially textiles as it contributes to the employment of about 40 percent of the industrial labour force and makes up 60 percent of the exports of Pakistan (GoP 2016). Given these, any adverse impact on cotton crop has implications for business operation of textile manufacturers and in turn, for the economy. In order to identify climate risks facing textile manufacturers, a detailed research on the cotton value chain was conducted. This chapter presents initial findings of the research\(^1\), which is primarily based on qualitative tools (Key Informant Interviews - KIIs and Focus Group Discussions - FGDs). Some policy recommendations have been put forth that can help promote competitiveness of the textile industry and secure livelihoods keeping in view ever-increasing climate threats.

**Pakistan’s Climate Risk Profile**
Identification of climate risks is a fundamental step in developing an adaptation and risk management framework at the local, national and regional level (Cartwright 2012). Businesses (mostly in developed countries) today, are more aware of possible climate threats and are incorporating climate risks into their business management plans and strategies. Not only is the private sector acknowledging climate change, but governments throughout the world are now mainstreaming climate risks in their national development plans because climate change presents huge implications for economies (NDPA 2006).

Future climate projections, highlighting the likelihood of occurrence of a particular climate event (gradual or sudden), are getting more refined and provide a more reliable picture of future climate risks (IPCC 2014). This, however, does not rule out the high degree of uncertainty associated with each projection. Despite that, we now have stronger evidence on critical climate indicators which will undergo major changes in the coming decades for each region.

In case of Pakistan, a study by Rio et al. (2013) found increasing temperature trends during the last few decades, especially in March and pre-monsoon period. Sadiq and Qureshi (2010) also found warming trends (with varying levels of change) for various major cities in

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\(^1\) This chapter presents initial findings of a detailed research on climate impacts on the textile value chain, which is currently in progress. This research work has been carried under ‘Pathways to Resilience in Semi-Arid Economies’ (PRISE), which is a five-year, multi-country research project that generates new knowledge about how economic development in semi-arid regions can be made more equitable and resilient to climate change.
Pakistan. Not only this, there are trends showing increase in both maximum and minimum annual temperatures in various cities in Pakistan (Khattak and Ali 2015). This increasing trend in temperature is projected to get stronger by the end of this century (Ali et al. 2016). Figure 1, in line with the literature, shows both past trends and projections of increasing near surface temperature for Pakistan in the coming years:

**Figure 1: Surface Temperature Trend and Future Projections**

Rainfall, another major climate indicator having serious implications for agriculture, water and energy, has a greater likelihood of variability, both in the positive (heavy rainfall) and negative direction (implying droughts), at the end of this century for Pakistan (Ali et al. 2016; Ikram et al. 2016). Past trends of precipitation also shows an increasing trend for Northern Pakistan and a decreasing trend for Southern Pakistan (Salma et al. 2012). A deeper look at the location specific precipitation changes are highlighted by Hussain and Lee (2014). They found that there is a decrease in annual precipitation and annual number of precipitation days for Murree hills, the upper Indus plain, and the Northwestern Balochistan plateau. Contrary to this, the central plain, the Northwestern mountains, and the Southern region of the country are shifting to more annual precipitation rate. There are strong variations in precipitation patterns on annual basis but an overall stable trend is depicted primarily due to difference in the direction of change between Northern and Southern regions of Pakistan (Figure 2):

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2 Based on Global Climate Model (GCM): CMIP5 (IPCC AR5 Atlas subset), RCP 4.5 scenario.
Climate Risk Implications for Private Textile Manufacturing Firms

KII s and FGDs were conducted with cotton farmers and textile manufactures to identify climate specific vulnerabilities. While textile industry depends primarily on cotton production, any adverse impact of climate change on the cotton crop would cause the textile firms located higher up the value chain to incur losses. The degree of vulnerability is, however, variable and depends on a number of factors, which are discussed below:

Vulnerability to Climate Events

Based on the analysis of cotton value chain structure (Batool and Saaed 2017) and system, this study finds that the level of vulnerability decreases as we move up the value chain. This implies that the actors at the upstream level (cotton farmers and ginners) are more vulnerable to climate risks as compared to actors in the downstream level (spinners, weavers, ready-made garments, etc.). On the horizontal scale, level of vulnerability depends on the following factors:

1. Size of the firm: small firms are more vulnerable to climate shocks as compared to large firms.
2. Type of final product: firms producing hosiery-based products, having short demand season are susceptible to change in raw material supply as compared to home-textile industries that have year-long demand cycle.
3. Type of market targeted: Firms who target local market (for example, ginners) mostly rely on local raw materials and are most affected as a result of decrease in raw cotton in the domestic market. On the other hand, firms catering mostly to the...
Promoting Resilience and Competitiveness in Textile Manufacturing in a Changing Climate: A Policy Perspective

international market rely on imported raw cotton and yarn both to meet international buyers’ demands and domestic market supply gap. It is also reported that the changing domestic market preferences (demand for high quality products, for instance) will cause more loss to firms in case of deteriorating quality of local cotton due to changing climatic conditions.

4. Type of industry: Secondary industries, mostly found at various horizontal levels of CVC, are also a major victim of climate change. Respondents from cottonseed oil units reported that the recent decline in cotton crop has reduced their business operation from six to two months. Some of the oil units have closed down, whereas, others have started to buy cotton seed from other cities and even other provinces, especially Balochistan. Alternatively, large cottonseed oil units have now started to stock cotton seed which can be used year-long. This, in turn, reduces the availability of seed oil for small firms.

Climate Associated Business Risks

There are no major physical climate risks (damage to infrastructure) to the textile sector, which is primarily clustered in Faisalabad. No major climate catastrophes have been recorded in Faisalabad in the last two decades. However, climatic changes related to changes in temperature and rainfall pattern are evident.

Major indirect impacts of climate change on the cotton crop reveal themselves in the form of reduction in supply of raw material to the industry (cotton crop) and deterioration in quality of cotton. Decrease in the quality of domestic cotton due to increase in temperature and erratic rainfall is causing problems for ginning, spinning and weavers’ units. Some quality issues facing spinners and weavers are as follows:

1. Changes in rainfall pattern alters Micronaire (MIC) of the cotton boll. MIC is a measure of the air permeability of compressed cotton fibres. It is often used as an indication of fibre fineness and maturity (Cotton Inc. 2017). Spinners reported that the quantity of MIC is higher than the last three years which makes it difficult to spin it into fine yarn.
2. Sometimes excessive rainfall increases moisture content in the cotton boll due to which it attracts trash content. As a result of this, spinners have to invest more in its cleaning.
3. Due to increase in temperature, the crop gets mature before the required time period. This causes the fibre to lose its strength. Temperature variation also changes the moisture content of the soil, and hence, affects crop health.
4. High temperature results in pest and disease outbreak which has implications for the cotton boll. First, if the farmer resorts to increase in the number of sprays to overcome disease/pest attack then the quality of cotton boll is affected, and, hence more mechanical effort goes into cleaning cotton. Secondly, pests make the fibre of the cotton boll weak and yellow in colour, which produces low quality yarn.

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For the current research study, the focus is only on the semi-arid regions in Punjab.
Rapid changes in seasons (early summers and late winters) have caused huge losses to the hosiery industry. For example, the usual operation period of socks factories was from September to February, but with the changes in seasons, their operation time has shrunk from November to January. According to key informants, their losses are up by 35 percent. This, on the other hand, has given rise to opportunities for product innovation as they are now starting to move away from pure cotton-based socks to other lighter material socks that are wearable in mid-season.

Current Adaptation Practices
In order to cover the supply gaps in the domestic cotton markets, textile manufacturers resort to the following practices to sustain business operation and profit margins:

Implications of reduction in the supply of cotton in the domestic market vary with the size of textile manufacturers. Large firms resort to imported cotton, whereas, small firms, solely dependent on local production bear the brunt of the decrease in supply. In some cases, it has been reported that small firms purchase cotton from large firms from their stock in case of decrease in supply of domestic cotton. Due to supply issues, even medium-sized textile firms, which did not import cotton, have now resorted to imported cotton as they are uncertain about the quantity of raw material available in the domestic markets.

Another adaptation strategy used by large manufacturing units (especially spinners) is the use of man-made fibres which has seen a rising trend since 2005. In case of shortage of raw material supply, cotton is mixed with nylon, polyester, etc., to meet supply demands. This strategy is very limited because it is demand-determined (manufacturers cannot mix other material if the buyers demand 100 percent cotton).

A large number of export-oriented textile firms have started to target the domestic market. As these firms were unable to remain competitive abroad, they have entered the local home textile markets to sustain profit margins.

Conclusion and Recommendations
Keeping in view the current scenario of low level of adaptation and varying vulnerabilities against climate change, it is important for all the concerned stakeholders, especially policy makers, to come together to reduce climate vulnerabilities.

There is a need to invest more in research and development (R&D) to make Pakistan’s cotton crop climate resilient, so that textile manufacturing units can also ensure smooth business operations. The private sector believes that ‘cotton cess’ (collected by the government on purchase of every bale of cotton, meant for cotton research and development) is not being effectively used. This is a huge reserve (on annual basis) which, if utilised effectively, can help develop better quality, drought and excess water resilient seeds, pesticides for new pests and diseases and better fertilisers. Directorate of Cotton Cess Management, Ministry of Textile Industries and the Pakistan Central Cotton Committee should come together to see how best these funds can be put to better use. There needs to be
Promoting Resilience and Competitiveness in Textile Manufacturing in a Changing Climate: A Policy Perspective

A transparent mechanism of spending and accountability tools need to be put in place. An alternative could be to involve private bodies like the All Pakistan Textile Mills Association, etc., to oversee spending of the cotton cess.

Regional cooperation can be key to promoting inclusive growth and increasing competitiveness of industries. While India is another major player when it comes to cotton and textile, there should be cotton and textile related trade and investment bilateral agreements (for cheaper trade of raw materials, horizontal transformation of products, etc.). This would not only benefit the local industry, it would also reduce vulnerabilities to climate extremes as raw material supply gap can be filled through cheaper imports from and exports to India.

Acknowledgement of climate issues at the policymaking level is crucial. The existing Textile Policy does not take into account any such risks, and climate change is not a focus of policymakers as well as textile manufacturers. The private sector needs to be aware of climate risks, along with its implications for the industry and their role in promoting adaptation (both at the community and industry level). In this context, the role of research organisations is important. Seminars and awareness raising campaigns may be designed in collaboration with the Ministry of Textile Industries to promote awareness among textile manufacturers, especially small and medium enterprises and firms.
References


Promoting Resilience and Competitiveness in Textile Manufacturing in a Changing Climate: A Policy Perspective


A Self-Help Resilience and Disaster Risk Reduction Model from Village Tibba Malhanas, Pakistan*

Salman Danish**

Abstract

The devastating floods in 2010 eroded the support structures and livelihoods of vulnerable communities in southern Punjab, Pakistan impeding their resilience and weakening development. This chapter looks at resilient development at the community level in the aftermath of the post-2010 floods. The analytical proposition developed for this study from the literature on resilience looks at it in the context of communities, and provides new understanding on how to manage hazards and community development. It finds that resilience in this context means empowering communities to decide their own development needs and access resources individually and collectively to make their development and rebuilding efforts more resilient to future floods.

* This chapter has been approved as a Working Paper by the referee.
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Salman Danish

**Introduction**

Resilience is the ability of a system, community, or society exposed to hazards to resist, absorb, accommodate to, and recover from the effects of a hazard in a timely and efficient manner (UNISDR 2009).

Pakistan is prone to floods as it has five major rivers - Indus, Ravi, Sutlej, Chenab and Jhelum - that flow from north to south covering major parts of the country which receive heavy rainfall during the monsoon season starting in July and ending in September almost every year. The region has been hit by ten severe floods from 1950 to 2014:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Direct Losses (US$ million)</th>
<th>Lives Lost (No.)</th>
<th>Affected Villages (No.)</th>
<th>Flooded Area (Sq-km)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>17920</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>679</td>
<td>6945</td>
<td>20480</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>11609</td>
<td>74406</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>4498</td>
<td>16003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>3902</td>
<td>10424</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>2388</td>
<td>474</td>
<td>9719</td>
<td>41472</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>318</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>8628</td>
<td>34931</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>1,621</td>
<td>425</td>
<td>18390</td>
<td>81920</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>848</td>
<td>2185</td>
<td>4657</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>1,036</td>
<td>393</td>
<td>9199</td>
<td>30597</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>2071</td>
<td>4191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>643</td>
<td>1882</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>251</td>
<td>1093</td>
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<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>399</td>
<td>508</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>6144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>1,400</td>
<td>1008</td>
<td>13208</td>
<td>38758</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>392</td>
<td>431</td>
<td>1622</td>
<td>5568</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>591</td>
<td>6852</td>
<td>16686</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>17553</td>
<td>160000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>8923</td>
<td>10152</td>
<td>127375</td>
<td>567132</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Federal Flood Commission (2011: 11).*

Table 1 shows that Pakistan has faced 18 heavy floods since 1950 till 2010, almost one flood every three years. The floods in 2010 were of such high magnitude that they inundated 160000 square kilometres and were caused by the Indus River system and its tributaries which generated heavy water discharge due to the unprecedented monsoon rainfall that started in the catchment areas in July 2010 and continued till September 2010 (Ibid.). Table 2 shows country-wide losses/damage due to rains/floods of 2010:
### Table 2: Country-Wide Losses/Damage due to Rain/Floods (2010)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province/Agency</th>
<th>Total Affected Districts</th>
<th>Cropped Area Affected (Ha)</th>
<th>Population Affected (million)</th>
<th>Houses Damaged</th>
<th>Road Mileage (km)</th>
<th>Villages Affected</th>
<th>Water-courses Damaged</th>
<th>Person Died</th>
<th>Persons Injured</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Punjab</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>746,500</td>
<td>8.20</td>
<td>375,773</td>
<td>2,819</td>
<td>1,778</td>
<td>2,998</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sindh</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>1,043,500</td>
<td>3.80</td>
<td>859,978</td>
<td>8,467</td>
<td>11,988</td>
<td>6,990</td>
<td>411</td>
<td>1,255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPK</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>121,500</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>25,720</td>
<td>6,511</td>
<td>544</td>
<td>1,909</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balochistan</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>123,500</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>79,720</td>
<td>2,077</td>
<td>2,896</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FATA</td>
<td>#</td>
<td>#</td>
<td>#</td>
<td>#</td>
<td>#</td>
<td>#</td>
<td>#</td>
<td>#</td>
<td>#</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gilgit-Baltistan</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7,900</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>3,157</td>
<td>382</td>
<td>347</td>
<td>960</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AJK</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>33,100</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>3,575</td>
<td>6,843</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>657</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G. Total</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>2,092,800</td>
<td>20.185</td>
<td>1,608,184</td>
<td>25,081</td>
<td>17,553</td>
<td>13,042</td>
<td>1,954</td>
<td>2,946</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source of information**
- NDMA as on 24.2.2011 Page 153 of DNA Report
- NDMA as on 24.2.2011 Page 89 of DNA Report
- NDMA as on 24.2.2011 Page 129 of DNA Report
- NDMA as on 24.2.2011 Page 153 of DNA Report
- NDMA as on 24.2.2011 Page 153 of DNA Report

# Data not received by NDMA.

*Source: Ibid.: 39.*
Salman Danish

Hashmi (2012) states that sub-par performance of the country during the 2010 floods can be blamed on a few key factors: poor capacity of flood protection systems, weak early warning and floods forecasting mechanisms, and lack of continuous maintenance of flood protection spurs, levees and embankments along with insufficient water storage on the flow of River Indus, meagre budget allocations for flood protection and community resilience building programmes, and primitive flood management approaches adopted by the fledgling National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) and Provincial Disaster Management Authority (PDMA). He goes on to comment that:

Pakistan needs to do all it can to stop weather disasters becoming catastrophes and to protect people from future catastrophic flood disasters and increase the resilience of infrastructure, economies and communities (Ibid.).

According to NDMA (2014), the floods in 2014 also caused substantial damage to crops (about 1 million acres), houses (129880), community infrastructure and livelihoods. NDMA in collaboration with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and other partners carried out Recovery Needs Assessment (RNA 2014-16) that put estimated costs for recovery and reconstruction in aforesaid sectors at USD 439 million, including USD 56 million for building resilience through a variety of structural and non-structural measures (Ibid.). In 2014, although floods devastated parts of Punjab, the Sindh province was not affected as much due to early warning and preparedness actions by the Sindh government, including evacuation and setting up of camps.¹

About the Study

The key objective of the study was to review key best practices and lessons learnt from the efforts to make communities resilient against floods. Focusing on this objective, the study explored to what extent the 2010 floods affected development of the community, how resilient they were when the floods hit, what measures were taken by both Government and Non-Government actors and the community itself towards enhancing flood resilience. As can be seen in Tables 1 and 2, the floods in 2010 were the most severe in the history of Pakistan, and affected all seven units (provinces/agencies) of the country with heavy losses (FFC 2011).

This study is important as it looks at the impacts of the efforts being taken by the Government under National Disaster Management Programme (NDMP 2012-22), local NGOs, and vulnerable communities themselves in terms of developing their own resilience models at the community level. It is, however, limited in nature as it only profiles one community living in Tibba Malhanas village in Muzaffargarh district as to how they have built their resilience against floods after being severely affected in 2010.

¹ Member DRR, National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA), Key Informant Interview, 2016.
Methodology
To undertake this study, a mix methods research approach was adopted. Secondary data was collected by reviewing, scanning and analysing flood risk management and response plans, policies and strategies of the Government at national, provincial and local levels. The secondary data analysis built a narrative in this study of the floods/disaster management structures in Pakistan, especially in the district chosen for this study. Interviews with key informants were conducted to seek qualitative data.

Scanning through the strategies, plans and policies of the national and district authorities working on disaster response and preparedness gave an overview of the pre, during and post 2010 floods situation and vulnerabilities of communities and the development structures in the district. The public officials handling disaster management at national and district levels were also interviewed to verify validity of the documents. The communities who were badly hit by the 2010 floods were contacted through a non-government organisation 'Doaba Foundation' which alongside other humanitarian actors has been working to build resilience of communities in Muzaffargarh district. Community members (male and female) were invited for two separate gender-segregated Focus Group Discussions (FGD). The community, however, decided that ten men and ten women will take part in the discussion as a mixed group instead of separate focus groups, being similarly vulnerable to floods and needing equal amounts of resilience building. Both shared their experiences as to how they saved lives and livelihoods once they were trained in DRR modelling for their village. During the FGD, women also expressed some divergent opinions as per their distinct experiences.

Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) and Floods
The literature looks at the devastation caused by floods impacting communities in terms of deaths, injuries, relocation, losses to infrastructure, livestock, agriculture and overall economy. Floods comprise 40 percent of natural disasters and claim half of the death toll (Ohl and Tapsell 2000; Jonkman and Vrijling 2008). Frequency of floods has increased due to extreme weather trends. Researchers and scientists cite climate change as one of the reasons. The European Council (2007) believes that human actions increased potential frequency of floods in terms of damaging livelihoods. These human activities include unsustainable land use patterns which may mar the retention of water flows. Such effects on flood trends have been investigated in other studies as well (Wooldridge et al. 2001; Camorani et al. 2006).

Moreover, people become more vulnerable in flood prone/risk zones when their livelihood and economic assets are located in these areas. The flood-risk areas in the study district are agriculture and fruit rich. Due to favourable conditions, communities rear cattle and poultry, grow various crops and mango orchards. Since flood-risk analysis is always calculated with potential damages, it provides space to increase opportunity for more economic development if the potential damages increase (Merz et al. 2007). It is important to have a complete flood management cycle, from preparedness and readiness to response and rehabilitation. As part of flood risk reduction or preparedness, embankments and levees or any other water
Retention structures are constructed according to certain technical limits and they are designed on the basis of acceptable probability of overtopping and level of risk, such as residual risk (Vis et al. 2003). Van Manen and Brinkhuis (2005) believe that residual flood risks remain unaccounted for on the pretext that levees and water restraining structures minimise the risks.

This study finds that communities who are hit by floods several times are not ready to leave their lands; they are hit and devastated and again rehabilitate as their livelihood and cultural and historical linkages are rooted in the flood prone areas since centuries. That is why flood management is being thought through with a resilient approach and the logic behind ‘resilience to development’ approach focusing on ‘living with floods instead of fighting the flood’. The very concept of resilience emerged from ecology (Holling 1973) while later on, it was used in flood management (De Brujin and Klijn 2009). Under a resilience approach, flood waters can be routed through specified areas where the impacts can be minimised by adopting better planning and management of land use (Vis et al. 2003).

Disaster resilience has recently evolved as an important concept as it focuses on ‘building back better’ and making communities prepare in advance to face future floods and other disasters. The concept of resilience has origins in social–ecological systems (Berkes and Folke 1998; Holling 1973), but more recently it has emerged in the fields of community development and in an effort to describe a distinctive resilience process and many theories and frameworks have been posited (Berkes and Ross 2013; Kulig et al. 2013; Norris et al. 2008), although researchers have faced a slew of inherent challenges while attempting to measure this concept (Berkes and Ross 2013; Kulig et al. 2013, Leykin et al. 2013).

As the focus of this chapter is on the community resilience building aspect, it may be appropriate to mention that resilient communities have several notable traits and characteristics one of which is social cohesion (Rolfe 2006). Additionally, Rolfe (2006) closely relates social cohesion to support networks, social capital, degree of unity, and social services. Recently, a case study research reinforced this notion as it generated six attributes of the concept of disaster resilience included among which are elements of social cohesion such as engagement of people and places, the presence of community infrastructure, community networks, and governance (Maclean et al. 2014). The present research traces some of these characteristics in the case study of village Tibba Malhanas in Muzaffargarh highlighting the community resilience self-help model.

The literature on DRR and community resilience building gives importance to the role of women right from conceptualisation to implementation and monitoring of the DRR/Resilience programmes. The Economist Intelligence Unit (2014) published a report titled ‘The South Asia Women’s Resilience Index’ after thorough research in eight South Asian countries - Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, the Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. The study was commissioned by ActionAid, an INGO, to examine the role of women in preparing for and recovering from disasters. The report ranks the South Asian countries according to the participation of women in disaster preparedness and resilience building efforts. It finds that by and large, women in South Asia have not been given the
desired role in community resilience building and disaster risk reduction efforts, though the situation varies from country to country. Benchmarking the scores with Japan that stands at 80.6 out of 100 in terms of giving role to women on both counts, the report concludes that none of the eight South Asian countries could score more than 46.4 on the Index. The report also comments that even though South Asian countries cannot match Japan’s level of efforts as they lack its massive technical and financial resources, they need to show seriousness towards investment in DRR/resilience building.

The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) also developed a Framework for Community Resilience in 2014 to promote community resilience approach towards disaster management. The Framework calls for building and strengthening resilience right from individual, household, community to local and national levels, including that of humanitarian organisations, regional and global institutions linked with the development sector (IFRC 2014).

**CBDRM Model – District Muzaffargarh**

District Muzaffargarh in Southern part of Punjab was selected to analyse a Community-Based Disaster Risk Management Model (CBDRM) based on which a community living in village Tibba Malhanas was trained. Tibba Malhanas is a village in Union Council Rangpur which is is about one and half kilometres (kms) away from River Chenab. The District borders with other southern districts of Multan, Layyah and Dera Ghazi Khan. It spreads over an area of 2,052,571 km² with 1,182,889 km² under cultivation. The area has three characteristic terrains, plain fertile areas, riverine belts and sandy dunes/terrains. The district is divided into four Tehsils (subdivisions) with 111 Union Councils. According to Wikipedia, the district boasts a population of 3.8 million as of 2012.

The overall literacy rate for the region is 41 percent, with 37 percent of males being literate in rural areas and 64 percent in urban areas, while for the females only 10 percent of rural women are literate compared to 44 percent of urban females (Government of Punjab 2016). The main source of livelihood in rural communities is agriculture and livestock rearing.

During floods, both these assets are at risk as flood water destroys crops and harms animals and can lead to waterlogging in the fields. The high water levels also lead to an increase in snake-bites and water-borne diseases for both humans and animals. Road connectivity is also an issue during floods in the area as both roads connecting Muzaffargarh to Multan have bridge sections going over the Chenab River and are vulnerable to the flood waters. The railway network is also vulnerable near the newly constructed Muzaffargarh-Dera Ghazi Khan Bypass (Government of Punjab 2016).

The number of people affected by floods in Muzaffargarh in 2010 was 366,476 while this number was brought down to 65,787 for a flood of not quite the same but significantly large magnitude in 2014 (Ibid.). During interviews, a District Disaster Management Authority (DDMA) official from Muzaffargarh attributed these low figures to the measures taken in the area to build resilience and preparedness of the communities and infrastructure by the DDMA and the Government of Punjab in collaboration with international organisations.
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like the United Nations, donor agencies, and Community-Based Organisations (CBOs). These actors also helped establish Local Early Warning Mechanism and Networks among the communities.

The local government has a key role in identifying and understanding the hazards and risks that can impact the safety and sustainability of communities. For this reason, the DDMA Muzaffargarh came up with the District Disaster Management Plan (DDMP) for 2016 which, among other things, details the roles of and coordination mechanisms between various sectors’ lead agencies, the military, NGOs and volunteers. The following Organogram shows the coordination mechanism in detail:

**Figure 1: Coordination Organogram for the District Disaster Management Plan**

![Coordination Organogram for the District Disaster Management Plan](source)

*Source: Government of Punjab (2016).*
As can be seen from Figure 1, there is close coordination between all actors under the leadership of Chairperson and Secretary of DDMA Muzaffargarh. All these actors are put on high alert before the start of the flood season and coordination starts well before any potential flood may hit the district. Volunteers from communities are given training in various essential skills so that they can respond in minimum time in case of flooding. Some are trained for search and rescue, others for petter engine repairs and in First Aid and emergency communications. This was verified by community members during the FGD for this study.

District authorities keep an inventory of ‘strategic reserves’ (Government of Punjab 2016) which include equipment such as boats, lifejackets, hydraulic cutters, search lights, ambulances, boat carriers and trolleys etc. These reserves are carefully monitored and maintained particularly in the flood season. The DDMA also requires its partner NGOs (including Doaba Foundation, which supported this research in the field) and other agencies to submit a list of similar assets in order to facilitate appropriate distribution and their usage during floods. However, it must be noted that demand for equipment is much higher than is available amid logistical constraints and may lead to delays in response times.

A lack of technically skilled human resource is also a bottleneck during flooding and it needs to be improved by providing even more trainings and tools to community members as a self-help measure. One focus group participant explained the need for training by saying that once a petter engine on a boat failed during floods, they had to wait several hours, (and sometimes up to a day), for mechanics/technicians to be brought to the location from nearby Rangpur city in 2010. But when the community was trained to repair petter engines, they did not face such long delays when the flood hit in 2014.

**Doaba Foundation and CBDRM Project**

Doaba Foundation is an organisation that has been actively involved in relief and rebuilding efforts since the 2010 floods hit parts of Southern districts of Punjab. The organisation established its offices in all the districts where floods hit and has been responding to the floods in collaboration with donor agencies. Along with a focus on quick recovery, Doaba Foundation has a goal of developing resilience of the affected communities by training them to have warning of imminent hazards in advance and be prepared for such disasters.

To pursue this aim, Doaba launched a ‘Community-Based Disaster Risk Management (CBDRM) in Flood-Affected Communities of Southern Punjab’ project with the financial support of Welthungerhilfe (WHH), a German INGO, in four Union Councils (UC) of District Muzaffargarh: UC Rangpur, UC Muradabad, UC Taleeri, and UC Umar Pur Janubi. The underlying objective of the project was to strengthen self-help capacities and responsiveness of local communities on disaster preparedness and prevention and build resilience against floods in disaster prone areas, that is, the 20 villages of four UCs of district Muzaffargarh.
According to Doaba Foundation’s documents, the beneficiaries of the project were 2000 households with 14,000 individuals in total; of them, 2499 women, 2401 men, while 9100 are children under the age of 18 (Haider 2014). Marginalised communities, locally called Moore communities, women, widows and women-headed households, orphans, people with special needs/chronic diseases, elderly, people who live in low quality dwellings, and small land holders/ farmers were given special emphasis. As implied by the title CBDRM, the project was community-based and community-led.

The idea was to establish and strengthen village-based DRM committees to mitigate disasters and risks. These committees, in turn, developed and implemented disaster preparedness plans for each village and enlarged the circles of knowledge to other people as well. The committees also established local level early warning systems and went through extensive simulation exercises. Doaba’s impact assessment report indicates that approximately 80 percent of the target-area beneficiaries have improved knowledge on disaster risk reduction/management and they were able to reduce and minimise the risks caused by the floods and they have been successful in building their resilience through DRR activities (Ibid.).

The project has four components with each having its own weightage: disaster preparedness 45 percent, First Aid 1.2 percent, household products and equipment 3.8 percent and 50 percent capacity building. These percentages illustrate how the project prioritises the enhancement of knowledge and skills of local communities on DRR and community resilience. The CBDRM project was conceptualised and implemented with four target goals which are as follows:

- To raise and strengthen awareness of the local population and other stakeholders on disaster prevention/ mitigation.
- To establish and functionalise Village-Based Disaster Risk Management Committees and Community-Based Relief Centres.
- To ensure that an early warning system is established at local level (village and/or district) and is functional.
- To build capacity through training and facilitation to achieve reduction of vulnerability to livelihoods and food security.

According to Haider (2014), specific interventions were undertaken to achieve each of the above goals. For the First Goal, broad based meetings and local level consultations were held in the communities. These meetings served as a platform to sensitise the communities and to raise their awareness. To help reinforce the lessons and information disseminated directly to the communities, radio programmes to spread key messages on preparedness, response, early warning, soil erosion, sedimentation, etc. were aired by local channels.

Information, Education and Communications (IEC) material was also produced and disseminated among the communities through various means such as display boards, posters, banners, informational brochures, etc. bearing key messages/ information about DRR,
Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH), and resilience as well as the laws, policies and plans relevant to the communities. These IEC materials were created in Urdu language which is widely spoken and taught in the country, as well as in English. The aim of this was to provide the communities with bite-sized pieces of critical knowledge and information.

In order to achieve the Second Goal, CBDRM committees in communities and trainings were conducted in clusters to allow people from different areas to interact with each other. This facilitated the learning process and was also helpful in allowing people from different villages/communities to form social connections which were later useful for the community-based Early Warning System. There was an extensive follow-up by the project teams to ensure that these committees were well prepared and well equipped to respond to floods. The communities also identified and donated space for Community-Based Relief and Resource Centres (CBRRRC) and took part in labour and helped monitor the process. Both male and female community members have since been actively conducting routine meetings. Certain members were also trained in technical skills, such as petter engine repair, that not only benefited the community during floods but also allowed them to earn reasonable wages during normal days (Ibid.).

As part of achieving the Third Goal, village disaster management plans (VDMPs) were developed. As a result, the people are now aware of their responsibilities in ‘Pre’, ‘During’, and ‘Post’ flood situations. They are aware of evacuation routes and safe places within and outside the village. The plans were partly implemented during 2013 floods as early warnings served as preparatory measures for the villages (Ibid.). This intervention has helped in creating a planning culture among the people. According to a female focus group participant, the community now has the ability to update and refine their plan of action for a flood since they can get an early warning of its magnitude.

To meet the Fourth Goal regarding capacity development, trainings were organised and communities were facilitated to reduce their vulnerability by building raised platforms for their houses and food, vaccinating their cattle and protecting their feed to secure their livelihoods.

Reflections from Tibba Malhanas

To analyse how these four objectives under the CBDRM project impacted the lives and livelihoods of the communities, and to analyse reflections of the community on the effectiveness of the post-2010 floods efforts in making them resilient, a FGD and a field visit was organised for this study. The researcher visited the selected community living in village Tibba Malhanas and held a loosely structured group discussion with community people. Under the CBDRM project, a Village Self-Help Organisation was set up in Tibba Malhanas to undertake activities of the project. Following are the key points generated from the FGD:

When asked what the community members do in their daily routine, a female participant narrated that women get up for early morning prayers and start household chores - cook breakfast for family members, send children to school, wash clothes and when the men are
not at home, take care of the cattle, feed and milk them and protect them from heat and cold. A male participant said that men in the community are largely engaged in farming, cattle rearing and daily wage labour to earn their livelihood. Another male participant said men of the community cut grass and other green fodder for their cattle, take care of them, milk them and sell milk and cattle to generate income. One of the male participants pointed out that males and females work together to raise their kids, rear cattle and grow food for themselves and for income generation.

On a question regarding perceptions of the community about risks and dangers, a female participant said that floods are always a threat for them as they live near the river. Another female participant said that though floods damage assets and crops, they also bring opportunities. She was of the view that in the floods of 2010, they did not know of any precautionary and preparedness measures and did not receive appropriate early flood warning, so crops, cattle and other household items were washed away. But afterwards, when they received CBDRM training from Doaba Foundation, she claimed that most people felt more secure/resilient as they now have a system in place to get early flood forecasting information along with plans for evacuation and embankments of their own. It was also pointed out that earlier the flood had caused contamination of water sources that led to diseases among family members and cattle. Now they know how to make water drinkable through the CBDRM project.

Sharing their indigenous knowledge about causes of floods, the participants were of the view that heavy monsoon rains, construction and cropping in the river beds disrupt flow of the rivers and population explosion may also be one of the reasons. One of the participants who was an educated young man cited climate change as a reason for increased flooding. Narrating the successes of their village organisation, almost all participants (10 females and 11 males) were of the view that they had been living in miserable conditions before setting up of the self-help village organisation (under CBDRM model). A female participant stated that there is now a proper system in place - the Management Committee of the organisation keeps the community informed of flood forecasting information and the Information Committee remains in touch with the district government/PDMA Muzaffargarh, water head-works known as head Tremu. The Information Committee, through a loudspeaker (megaphone) gives early warning messages to the community and at times, children are also charged with shouting and repeating such messages to make sure that everyone is aware of the potential danger. One of the male participants demonstrated how they pronounce early warning messages in the local language to keep the people aware of floods and levels of water discharge from the head Tremu and expected time frame when the flood may hit their area.

A female participant stated that the village organisation keeps in touch with District administration and hospitals to request for an ambulance service in emergency and boat services to rescue people trapped in floods. A young woman who was trained in First Aid and part of the village First Aid Committee shared that now they can provide immediate treatment for snake bites to both humans and livestock which happens frequently during floods. She said they have the medical kits ready for immediate First Aid, after which they send the patients for proper treatment to hospitals they are in contact with. Another female
participant said that the Health Committee also keeps villagers informed of measures to protect them from mosquitoes. A male participant informed that since their livestock is a big part of their livelihood, they have set up a special committee to look after cattle in terms of timely vaccination as under the CBDRM project as part of preparedness measure before the floods hit. The participants also spoke of a Petter Engine Committee that is trained to repair these engines so that they remain functional during floods to flush out water and run boats. The Rescue Committee has boats and lifejackets and they help people reach safer places and protects them from drowning. When asked about preparedness capacity of the villagers, a male participant said that they have been trained so that as soon as an early warning announcement is made, the community immediately prepares to evacuate, along with their cattle, kids and food and necessary household utensils.

When asked who is the first to help the community when floods hit, a female participant said all the community members, especially males and young children provide immediate rescue and relief work. They evacuate women, children, elderly and people with disabilities to safer places and bring them back once the water recedes. A male participant commented that now they are also aware of how to contact officers from the Revenue Department and bring them to the village for a real time assessment. He went on to state that before, assessments were done in a politically influenced environment and used to deprive the actual flood hit populations and someone else would be given compensation. But, now the community knows how to get real time assessment done and the village organisation leaders work with the local government and Revenue Department officials so that no one is deprived of their due compensation.

Turning to the question of resilience of communities when the floods hit in 2010 and 2014, all the participants were of the view that now they feel more secure and resilient in the face of floods as compared to 2010 as at that time they did not have enough awareness of building and protecting their resources such as food, cattle, and documents relating to their immovable assets along with having no plans or resources to de-water their homes and pathways.

A male member said the district administration of Muzaffargarh had trained key members of the village organisation on how to follow early warning messages from Water Department authorities and convey the same onwards to the community. Two of the participants, a husband and wife, said that their animals were big assets for them in addition to land as they rear cattle and poultry to get extra cash for education and marriages of their children. Another female said that only from the sale of village-raised chickens (which has higher price in the market than the broiler chicken), families can earn PKR 40,000 (USD 380) in a three-month cycle. This extra income is spent on education of daughters, she explained. A male participant explained that in 2010 almost all the houses in Tibba Malhanas were partially or fully destroyed as they were submerged in the water. But in 2014, losses from house damages were much lesser than 2010 as after getting DRR trainings under the Doaba project and District Administration’s support, they rebuilt their homes and food storage better on raised platforms. Another participant added that in 2010, community members
lost their cattle, but in 2014 they could protect them by vaccinating and evacuating them. They were protected against diseases and mosquitoes as well.

A female participant raised the issue that in 2010, they had lost their National Identity Cards which were mandatory for any assessment to get relief goods and compensation for losses from the Government. But in 2014, they had learnt to protect their cards and other tenancy agreements (in sealed polythene bags); and the village’s Management Committee worked with the District Administration of Muzaffargarh to have real time assessment; and since the community members had their valid identification documents, they received compensation for their assessed losses through ‘Watan Card’ - an Auto Teller Machine (ATM) card to get cash from any bank.

On further improving their lives and livelihood, community members who took part in the FGD suggested a series of measures that are needed to improve the situation. A male member called for improving the community’s links and connectivity with relevant government institutions and an alliance-building among various villages’ organisations from nearby villages to raise their collective voice for building a school in their vicinity so that their children (girls and boys) do not have to travel far. A female participant suggested an improved skills training so that they can access more diverse livelihood options - training in detergent and soap making, etc. Another female participant said the community has realised that they should provide girls the opportunity to get education. She proudly shared that she could not read or write but her daughter has taught her to read a little and how to sign her name on documents. According to her:

One should not always be at the receiving end rather we need to be strong enough to be able to help others.

The community under CBDRM model set up a Children Club at the village level so that children after coming back from schools take part in healthy activities. These children have also been given training in expressing their thoughts through theatre. The children presented a theatre at the end of the FGD that showed their level of awareness about floods, their impacts and how to mitigate and adapt to disasters.

Reflections of community members during the FGD and the children through their theatre theme explicitly establish that the post-2010 flood DRR efforts to build resilience of this community against floods have been effective as the CBDRM self-help model in Tibba Malhanas is working well and highlights an example that may be replicated elsewhere to make communities and their development resilient.

Recommendations
Given what this study has found, the following general recommendations are made:

- Coordination among relevant government departments/agencies, donors, UN and humanitarian agencies, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), Community-
Based Organisation/Self-help groups and private sector should further be improved to work together in disaster risk management while preparing contingency plans, preparedness of communities and DRR and humanitarian response plans for better disaster management at district (local) level.

- By facilitating and coordinating with I/NGOs and the private sector, the District disaster authorities may enhance the scope and quality of their humanitarian response.
- The NDMA and PDMAs should extend full support to DDMAs to ensure that they fulfil their mandated roles and responsibilities. Each DDMA should be given better equipment for its emergency operations, a management information system and stronger technical capacity.
- The contingency stocks should be stored in the vicinity of vulnerable areas so that boats and other relief and rescue work can be started immediately.
- The community should be sent timely early warning messages in their local language and context.
- There is an urgent need to build capacity of local/city governments in small and big cities to establish emergency service such as Rescue 1122, with adequate communication systems, equipment and technical capacity.
- The communities at risk of disasters must be included in Disaster Risk Reduction planning, implementation and monitoring and review activities. As part of CBDRR, communities should be trained to build embankments around rivers, building and designing disaster proof housing and infrastructure, appropriate early warning system, inclusive rapid evacuation plans (with a special focus on women, children, elderly and people with disabilities).
- Disaster response and DRR should be made part of school syllabus at local levels.
- The Government should allocate sufficient financial resources in the national budget for DRR/preparedness activities. It should develop a comprehensive risk financing strategy with a range of financial instruments, especially risk insurance schemes.
- The Government must undertake a national rapid risk assessment using existing data and tools and ensure that systematic methods are in place for collecting disaster risk information.
- The Government should ensure physical resilience of new infrastructure and increase compliance with building codes through improved supervision of new construction.
- The community should be given a say right from planning to implementation to evaluation stages of any community-based DRR plans and projects.

**Conclusion**

Amid solid commitments expressed in the United Nations Revised Plan of Action on DRR for Resilience (2016) from the global community and Pakistan’s national humanitarian architecture and the National Disaster Management Plan 2012 on building resilience of community, this study finds that these commitments seem functional at the local levels and communities are being taken on board through extensive programmes and investment on
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Community-Based Disaster Risk Management (CBDRM) to train them to build their resilience.

The community members from village Tibba Malhanas explicitly talked of the success of the CBDRM model based on self-help perspective and narrated how it benefited them. They said they have learnt to live with floods, rather than fighting against them as they did in the past. Now they know when to evacuate and when to come back; when and how to protect their belongings; when and how to save their seeds, cattle, food, cash, land and documents. Since, NGOs and community-based groups have their limitations, it is recommended that the Government should pick such best practices as case studies and replicate them in other areas with appropriate funding under respective disaster management plans. The Government needs to accept and take wisdom from what the UN Secretary General has said that all investment in development should be risk-informed so that one can achieve the goal of resilient development which ultimately meets the criteria of sustainable development.
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VI

Pakistan’s Macro and Micro Economic Picture
Macroeconomic Performance: Pakistan’s Post-IMF Outlook

Pervez Tahir

The hazard of being the last presenter is that not much of interest is left unsaid. One can either take liberties with the topic or give a dry run of the discussion before. Even more hazardous is the fact that the session is being held in the perspective of an ambitious research programme called the ‘Economy of Tomorrow’. Like the late seventies movie, the problem in our unfortunate Islamic Republic is that Tomorrow Never Comes.

The moment we thought that we are rid of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and started parting ways, Brexit happened and we started worrying about our textile exports and the trade preferences we had gained with such great difficulty. As if that was not enough, oil prices started to rise again. Now this is the real story about the IMF programme. When Pakistan entered the programme, oil prices were well above USD 100. During the programme, the price crashed and was well below USD 50. There were a lot of God-send opportunities to exploit. The balance of payments, the major preoccupation of the IMF, got a massive relief as the value of oil imports fell drastically. It also created fiscal space, as all of the relief was not passed on to the consumer.

Pakistan Oilfields Limited (POL), it must be remembered, is the most taxed item in Pakistan. This fiscal space was used to increase public investment to revive growth. With bulk of the electricity provided by thermal units, the cheaper oil also softened the constraint imposed on growth by the power outages. But this was not enough to revive private investment, a major objective of the IMF programme. The programme turned off the tap of inflationary borrowing from the State Bank at a time when inflation was falling anyway due to lower oil prices. The doors were, thus, open for the Government to borrow with impunity from commercial banks, crowding out the private sector. The latter failed to revive, despite falling interest rates. There were signs of increased credit for fixed investment in the private sector towards the end of the programme, but it was too small to meet the employment challenge thrown up by a population of 200 million growing at 2 percent per annum. It is easy to say that the Government mopped up most of the bank credit, but it is also true that private investment is refusing to pick up, although the investment climate has improved reasonably.

It seems there are some fundamental reasons. In Punjab, a hub of the textile industry, textile exporters and workers have been on strike in the past and have threatened a lock down again. There are other issues, but the recent agitation is about the price of gas. Under the 18th Amendment, a province producing gas has the first right of use. The differential between prices of imported and domestic gas, together with the tax policy, has pushed up the price of

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1 This chapter has been approved as a Speech by the referee.
2 Dr Pervez Tahir is Chairman of the Bank of Punjab, Pakistan.
Pervez Tahir

gas in Punjab to twice the level in Sindh. The controversy over this constitutional requirement is spilling into other constitutional matters, viz., the already delayed National Finance Commission (NFC) award. It is argued that the 7th NFC was too generous to the provinces, leaving insufficient resources with the Federal Government for the provision of security. A proposal to allocate 5 percent of the divisible pool of revenues for security is on the table. During the IMF programme, provinces were obliged to show budgetary surplus to ensure achievement of the fiscal deficit agreed with the Fund. The proposal to deduct a security charge is another way of continuing the practice of sharing federal burden. The practice, however, undermines the financing of the social sector, now nearly entirely the responsibility of the provinces.

Despite large additional flows of resources to the provinces, the state of the social sector is not satisfactory. A massive enrolment gap, a serious gender gap, high rates of infant and maternal mortality and wide prevalence of malnutrition and the resulting stunting are issues that our approach to achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) failed to address. In the post-IMF period, the SDGs present an even larger challenge.

It is said that the reform agenda agreed with the IMF remained unimplemented. Policymakers never made a secret of the true rationale of the IMF programme. In their reckoning, there was no other way to pay back the money borrowed by the previous government from the IMF. In its turn, the IMF did propose its stock-in-trade reform, but the manner of pre-tranche negotiations reveals that both sides were quite clear about the real intent of the programme. Power sector and taxation keep suffering from our perennially low interest in better governance. Sadly, this is the story of all programme loans in general. These loans are in the nature of budgetary support. Money is provided to the Government in the hope that it will be utilised on agreed reforms. More often than not, the priorities of the Government do not match the reforms proposed and ‘agreed’ with the donors. This is different from project loans of the past, where funding was provided for a specific project. At the conclusion of the loan, there usually was an end product in the form of a dam, canal or a university. In the former case, the Government is in the driver’s seat and, in the latter, the donor is in the driver’s seat. It seems that when the governments have the right to choose, they make a mess of it. The IMF programme ended at the right time for the political class. It is elections time and whatever little was achieved in the name of reform, the post-IMF rush into spending will wipe that out.

In terms of cold statistics, the IMF programme was highly successful. There was a very high fiscal deficit before the programme began. Current account deficit was unsustainable. Inflation was in double digits. GDP growth rate was barely above the population growth rate. All these numbers are now on a trajectory of improvement. Hence, the programme is successful. But it is like the old saying that ‘the operation was successful, but the patient died.’ This is because the moment we signed on the IMF programme, we lost the lever on discipline. There is so much talk about sovereignty, but when it comes to discipline, we leave it to the IMF. We should be disciplining ourselves and do what needs to be done. And what needs to be done is not very complex.
The standard macroeconomic indicators have begun to look up (Annex I). Post-IMF, there is an opportunity to move forward. We need to put together a strategy of sustainable debt, especially in context of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). Debt per se is not bad. Before contracting debt, however, its benefits must be evaluated. Among the benefits that are foremost is improvement of the human condition. The latest numbers show that inflation is beginning to rise again. Even during the period it was falling, the out-of-pocket expenditure on education was rising at a higher rate than the rate of inflation. This tells an unfortunate story. As the public sector education fails to improve, people have to pay more and more for the education of their children.

While economic indicators have improved, social indicators have not (Annex II). There is disconnect between economy and society. Our experience of meshing the two is reflected in our disastrous record on the MDGs. When we talk about economy, we forget about the society. When we talk about society, we only offer platitudes. No strategic thinking is done about where we see our society in the future. It is time that social scientists, and not just economists, get together to formulate a social strategy that is geared to meeting critical concerns in a manageable time horizon. The ‘Economy of Tomorrow’ initiative raises some hope that progress is possible in this direction. But the initiative needs to extend to disciplines other than Economics. Economists tend to look at efficiency and productivity. Efficiency is maximised when robots rather than labour are employed. Productivity is the highest when labour use is the lowest. These notions have a political context. For instance, when trade was good for America, it was declared good for all countries. Now that trade has meant rusting of the manufacturing belt of America, trade is no more good. The interaction between economists and other social scientists is necessary to place the economy in the service of society. Let post-IMF Pakistan be a socially conscious economy. If that happens, tomorrow might come.
References


## Annexes
### Annex I: Economic Indicators

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<td>Total Investment</td>
<td>% of GDP</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>15.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private Investment</td>
<td>% of GDP</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Savings</td>
<td>% of GDP</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>14.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Inflation and Money Supply</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPI Inflation</td>
<td>Growth rate %</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>2.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WPI Inflation</td>
<td>Growth rate %</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>-1.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Money Supply (M2)</td>
<td>% of GDP</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>43.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Credit to Private Sector</td>
<td>% of total deposits</td>
<td>49.0</td>
<td>47.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>External Sector</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exports</td>
<td>% of GDP</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imports</td>
<td>% of GDP</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>15.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade Deficit</td>
<td>$ Billions</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>24.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Reserves</td>
<td>$ Billions</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>23.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SBP Reserves</td>
<td>$ Billions</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>18.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remittances</td>
<td>$ Billions</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>19.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Private Investment</td>
<td>$ Billions</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Debt</td>
<td>% of GDP</td>
<td>62.5</td>
<td>64.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fiscal Sector</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Total Revenue</td>
<td>% of GDP</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>15.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tax Revenue</td>
<td>% of GDP</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>12.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal Tax Revenue</td>
<td>% of GDP</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>11.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provincial tax Revenue</td>
<td>% of GDP</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Direct Taxes</td>
<td>% of tax Revenue</td>
<td>33.5</td>
<td>32.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total Expenditure</td>
<td>% of GDP</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>19.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Current Expenditure</td>
<td>% of total expenditure</td>
<td>76.0</td>
<td>81.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Debt Service</td>
<td>% of current expenditure</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>26.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Budget Deficit</td>
<td>% of GDP</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>4.6</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

*Sources: GoP (2016a), and State Bank of Pakistan (2016).*

*Note: CPI is consumer price index; WPI is Wholesale Price Index.*
### Annex II: Social Indicators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>2012-13</th>
<th>2014-15 or Latest Available</th>
<th>MDG Target 2015</th>
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<tr>
<td>Net Primary Enrolment Ratio</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literacy Rate</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>88</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gender Parity Index (GPI) for primary education</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>1.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Education Expenditure/GDP</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of Fully Immunized Children 12-23 months</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>&gt;90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infant Mortality Rate</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>70.6</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maternal Mortality Rate</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life Expectancy at Birth</td>
<td>66.0</td>
<td>66.2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health Expenditure/GDP</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of Population (Urban and Rural) with Sustainable Access to improve Water Source</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of Population (Urban and Rural) with Access to Sanitation</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Regional Economic Blocs: Where Does Pakistan Stand? *
Majyd Aziz**

Introduction
Pakistan’s track record as a formidable member of regional trade and cooperation blocs has been dismal and unfavourable to the overall economic prosperity of the country. Pakistan has not benefited in any significant way nor has taken maximum advantage of the facilities and attractions provided by these blocs and organisations. Moreover, the domestic private sector has also been at fault in promotion of its products and services among trade partners. The fault also lies with the authorities who have their own preferences when composing a trade delegation. It has become a norm in Chambers and the Federation to include small-time exporters who are not able to deal with the potential buyers. This writer has witnessed the low quality being exhibited and sold at the Pakistan Pavilions in India and Bangladesh. Trade Associations and the redundant Trade Development Authority of Pakistan (TDAP) must orient exporters about the importing country and present research as to what is saleable. The pathetic export statistics are proof of the depressing performance of Pakistan’s exporters. At times, other contentious issues, whether political, diplomatic, or territorial, have overshadowed trade and investment initiatives and movement.

Regional trade and linkages have become powerful channels and tools in enhancing trade and investment and the success rate of regional economic blocs and organisations have generally brought about significant advantages for member countries. No nation can produce everything required by its citizens and that is why countries import and export. Therefore, the need to forge alliances and cooperation through a structured organisation becomes important. The advantage of having regional trading blocs is that a common interdependent platform enables members to develop a functional framework of tariffs, custom procedures, protection policies, quality standards, and even bilateral arrangements.

Regional Blocs
Pakistan joined Iran and Turkey to form the Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD) in 1964 to strengthen socioeconomic development. However, RCD was dissolved 15 years later because it did not live up to expectations. In 1985, the three erstwhile partners of RCD formed the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) that was expanded in 1992 with the inclusion of Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. As is the case, there is no focused structure and most of the energy is spent in meetings and preparing documents, and little beyond generic statements. There have been no substantial economic benefits for Pakistan. The total bilateral trade of Pakistan with other ECO members is a pitiful USD 3.50 billion and there are scant signs of a surge in this

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* This chapter has been approved as Perspective / Argument Essay by the referee.
** Mr Majyd Aziz is former President of the Karachi Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Pakistan.
Remarkably, 65 percent of this figure is Pakistan’s bilateral trade with Afghanistan, a country that has contentious issues with Pakistan on a regular basis. ECO countries are fortunate to possess over 25 percent of the world’s energy resources but so far, there is no energy trade in the real sense. There is no fast track synergy within ECO to formulate a process where energy-rich nations could divert resources to energy-deficient nations. The Iran-Pakistan Gas Pipeline has succumbed to external pressure and the economic sanctions on Iran. Conventional wisdom is that it would take many years for this pipeline to be a reality. The other two innovative initiatives are the CASA-1000 and the Turkmenistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan–India (TAPI) gas pipeline.

Pakistan is also a member of the Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC) Programme along with ten countries, namely, China, CAR countries, Georgia, Mongolia, and Afghanistan. CAREC is supposed to help Central Asia and its neighbours realise their significant potential by promoting regional cooperation in four priority areas: transport, trade facilitation, energy, and trade policy. Here too, Pakistan has not successfully penetrated CAR countries, while official trade with Afghanistan is on the decline. Imports from China have shot up to over USD 11 billion, although this figure does not reflect actual imports because of under-invoicing, mis-declaration and smuggling.

In 2005, Pakistan, as well as India, was inducted as members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). At the Dushanbe (Tajikistan) Summit in 2000, members agreed to:

…..oppose intervention in other countries’ internal affairs on the pretexts of ‘humanitarianism’ and ‘protecting human rights’ and support the efforts of one another in safeguarding the national independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, and social stability.

Despite the presence of China and Russia, the Indo-Pak border situation is hostile and aggressive. There has been no counselling, mediation, or reprimand from the SCO headquarters. India has traditionally been in the Russian camp and even her defence industry became a potent sector, mainly due to Russian technical and financial support. China and India are major regional trade partners and their bilateral trade has exceeded USD 75 billion. Although, Pakistan is crucial for the success of China’s One Belt-One Road (OBOR) vision and although Russia has commenced sending positive feelers expressing its participation in mega investments, the fact is that both countries are refraining from direct mediation in the Indo-Pak imbroglio.

Then, there is the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) of eight countries. SAARC was considered as the ideal forum for Pakistan to enhance regional trade, ensure a peaceful environment, create a citizen-centric facilitation mechanism, and promote a myriad of auxiliary initiatives within the South Asian region. This visionary cooperation agreement should have led to a friendly atmosphere between India and Pakistan. The huge economy of India should have been the driving engine to promote trade and investment and provide the critical mass to neighbours to take positive advantage of the giant Indian market. SAARC Preferential Trading Arrangement (SAPTA) and South Asian Free Trade Area
Regional Economic Blocs: Where Does Pakistan Stand?

(SAFTA) were to be the game changers. However, there has been no worthwhile benefit to Pakistan in real time. The fate of SAARC Head of State Summits is primarily dependent on the whims and desires of New Delhi. The 2016 cancellation of the Islamabad Summit is a vivid example of this fact. So much so, even Sri Lanka, the most vocal supporter of Pakistan in SAARC, also toed the Indian line. Bangladesh routinely rattles Pakistan. Bhutan, Nepal, Maldives, and even Afghanistan look more towards India rather than attempting to bridge the divide between Islamabad and New Delhi.

All in all, Pakistan has been getting the short end of the stick. The depressing fact is that Pakistan’s political leadership, as well as private sector, has seldom attempted to give importance to regional forums in the true sense. There is always a flurry of activity in attending and hosting meetings and conferences, but when it boils down to brass tacks and essence, there is no institutionalised or cohesive plan of action to gain meaningful advantage and make pragmatic and profitable inroads. Trade negotiations are handled by bureaucrats who seldom solicit guidance from private sector stakeholders. The prevailing mind-set of encouraging imports is all-pervasive in Islamabad. Exporters’ associations often issue quarter-page advertisements highlighting the disadvantages of the trade agreements. The famous quote in William Shakespeare’s play, Julius Caesar, reflects the prevailing situation:

The fault, dear Brutus, is not in our stars
But in ourselves, that we are underlings.

Pakistan has Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) with Sri Lanka, China, and Malaysia while Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs) have been signed with Iran, Indonesia, and Mauritius. This is Pakistan’s record card. Every now and then, the Prime Minister or Commerce Minister announces the imminent signing of PTAs with a host of countries such as Turkey, South Korea, Thailand, Jordan, etc. Nothing much comes out of these statements, and there is a standstill on the FTA/PTA front. Moreover, Pakistan has not taken maximum advantage of export enhancement, while these Agreements have been a boon for importers. Pakistan has signed three FTAs (Sri Lanka, China and Malaysia) and few PTAs. The rationale was that Pakistan would be able to scale up her exports to these countries. Regrettfully, these FTAs and PTAs have directly affected the local industry and, at the same time, trade balance has been negative, except in the case of Sri Lanka, where the trade balance was already positive pre-FTA. The reason behind this is that Pakistan is rapidly turning into a major importer, while exports are on the downside for the past several years.

One of the pillars of the Strategic Trade Policy Framework (STPF) 2015-18 stipulates market access through enhancing share in existing markets, exploring new markets, trade diplomacy and regionalism. STPF highlights a number of steps to be taken through multilateral, bilateral, and regional ways. Visions and policies become a reality only if properly and passionately implemented. There is time to navigate through turbulent waters and achieve relative success. Achieving success would be a litmus test for the Government since national elections are due in 2018 and trade indicators are not positive at present.
Pakistan and Afghanistan are still trying to remove cobwebs from the Afghanistan Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement and there is a long hiatus in the process of negotiating and approving the Afghanistan Pakistan Tajikistan Transit Trade Agreement. Pakistan ratified the Transports Internationaux Routiers (TIR) Convention in 2015 and is in the process of implementing it. Moreover, the proposed Land Port Authority is still just on paper and no progress has been reported.

**Stakeholders’ Roadblocks**

The two prime stakeholders responsible for securing a strong presence in the global marketplace are policymakers and the exporters. The export regime has substantially been affected by the narrow vision of decision-makers to accord priority and importance to exports from Pakistan. Exporters face many roadblocks and hindrances and it is imperative that these are removed. From non-payment of export refunds, from misuse of Export Development Funds, from infrastructure shortages, from outdated and regressive laws, rules and regulations, and to other facilitation, there is hardly any comfort zone for exporters. Ironically, most of Pakistan’s regional competitors are providing open and hidden subsidies and facilities to their exporters.

There is also an obvious disconnect between prestigious think tanks and research enterprises and the private sector. This writer has been interacting with think tanks and research organisations. The Federation of Pakistan Chambers of Commerce & Industry (FPCCI), Karachi Chamber of Commerce & Industry (KCCI), Lahore Chamber of Commerce & Industry (LCCI), etc., depend on in-house research cells rather than sourcing out to those organisations that have the critical mass to obtain empirical evidence and structure position papers or studies. As an example, someone in the Research Cell at LCCI complained that most of their time is wasted writing speeches for office bearers and leaders of the Chamber. KCCI does not even have one PhD, while FPCCI has one who is more involved in ECO affairs. The only time this writer remembers interacting with a research enterprise was when Pakistan Japan Business Forum (PJBF) outsourced a study on Pakistan’s economy for presentation in Japan. It was done by Karachi’s premier Institute of Business Administration (IBA) but then PJBF further spent money to get this study restructured by a think tank. It is high time that policymakers, private sector, as well as think tanks initiate a long-term action plan to get Pakistan on the export wagon. The focus should be on global marketing of Brand Pakistan and the recommendations should be practical, workable, and owned by both the government and private sector. A vision on paper is worth nothing. A vision, if implemented, is worth its weight in gold. That is where the critical mass of think tanks comes into play. Too much water has flowed under the bridge and the export regime continues to fall into the abyss. This dire situation is effectively eviscerating the country’s ability to invest in the prosperity of its people.

**Conclusion**

Since membership in regional forums is not helping Pakistan, rethinking is required. Initially, Pakistan must announce that she is unilaterally suspending membership in SAARC since the regional bloc has proved to be of little advantage. Pakistan should also not take
active part in any organisation under the SAARC umbrella, such as SAARC Chamber of Commerce and Industry, and the South Asian Free Media Association (SAFMA), etc. The success and continuity of SAARC largely depends on India and, since other SAARC countries are dependent on more trade with India, their bias is obvious. The postponement of the SAARC Islamabad Summit because of Indian Prime Minister Modi’s unwillingness to attend is a case in point. The rest of the SAARC countries, including Sri Lanka, also expressed their inability to attend. Instead, Pakistan should concentrate on connectivity with China, Russia, Iran, Afghanistan, and CARs through multilateral and bilateral means. After all, as Edward Porter Humphrey said:

True wisdom is to know what is best worth knowing, and to do what is best worth doing.
Annexure 1: Conference Agenda
SDPI’s Nineteenth Sustainable Development Conference

Sustainable Development:
Envisaging the Future Together
6 – 8 December 2016

Organised by:
Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, Pakistan

Venue: Islamabad Marriott Hotel, Aga Khan Road, Shalimar 5, Islamabad, Pakistan
### DAY 1: Tuesday, 6 December 2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
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| 9:15am – 11:30am| **SDC Opening Plenary:**  
**Welcome Address:** Ambassador Shafqat Kakakhel, Chairperson, Board of Governors, Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, Pakistan  
**Introduction to the SDC:** Dr Abid Qaiyum Suleri, Executive Director, Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, Pakistan  
**Guest of Honour:** H.E. Mr Sartaj Aziz, Advisor to the Prime Minister, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Pakistan  
**Keynote Speech:** SAARC Nations’ Approach to Achieve the Sustainable Development Goals  
**Inaugural Remarks by the Chair:** Mr Zahid Hamid, Minister for Law and Justice and Federal Minister of Climate Change  
**Launch of Publications:**  
- SDC-SAES Anthology 2017 ‘Securing Peace and Prosperity’;  
- SDPI’s Annual Report 2015—2016;  
- Social Enterprise Policy Landscape in Pakistan; and  
- Tracking Change in Livelihoods, Service Delivery and Governance |
| 12 noon – 2:00pm | **Concurrent Session A-1**  
Pakistan’s Macroeconomic Performance: Post-IMF Outlook  
**Concurrent Session A-2**  
Sustainable Energy Solutions for the Region  
**Concurrent Session A-3**  
PODIUM DISCUSSION SDGs: Opportunities and Challenges for the Health Sector – Importance of Data  
**Concurrent Session A-4**  
SLRC Session 1  
It’s What You Do and How You Do It – What Types of Services and What Processes Build Legitimacy  
**Concurrent Session A-5**  
Gender, Demography and Democracy  
**Concurrent Session A-6**  
Leveraging CPEC for Regional Cooperation in Energy and Transport Infrastructure  
**Concurrent Session A-7**  
Cancelled  
**Concurrent Session AA-1**  
Energy Smart Grid and Remapping the T&D System of Pakistan  
**Concurrent Session AA-2**  
Solar Geoengineering and Pakistan: Science and Research Governance |
| 3:00pm – 5:00pm | **Concurrent Session A-8**  
SLRC Session 2  
Gender, Conflict and Livelihoods Recovery |
**Inaugural Plenary**

**Welcome Address:** Ambassador Shafqat Kakakhel, Chairperson, Board of Governors, Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, Pakistan

**Introduction to the SDC:** Dr Abid Qaiyum Suleri, Executive Director, Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, Pakistan

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- SDPI’s Annual Report 2015-2016
- Social Enterprise Policy Landscape in Pakistan
- Tracking Change in Livelihoods, Service Delivery and Governance

**Refreshments**

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Tuesday, 06 December 2016

Day One

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title: Pakistan’s Macroeconomic Performance: Post-IMF Outlook</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chair/Moderator: Dr Vaqar Ahmed, Deputy Director, Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panel Organisers: Dr Vaqar Ahmed and Mr Shujaat Ahmed, Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Speakers</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dr Pervez Tahir, Chairman, Bank of Punjab, Lahore, Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr Sakib Sherani, Former Principal Economic Advisor, Government of Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mrs Roshan Khursheed Bharucha, Member Board of Governors, Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Quetta, Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr Abdul Qadir, Programme Coordinator &amp; Advisor, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr Ali Salman, Executive Director, PRIME, Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
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| Discussion |

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<tr>
<th>Lunch</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2:00 pm - 3:00 pm</td>
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</table>
Tuesday, 06 December 2016

Concurrent Panel A-2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title: Sustainable Energy Solutions for the Region</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chair: Dr Musadiq Malik, Advisor to Prime Minister for Water and Power, Government of Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderator: Ms Mome Saleem, Heinrich Boell Stiftung, Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panel Organisers: Ms Mome Saleem, Heinrich Boell Stiftung, Islamabad, Pakistan; and Ms Eva Kussner, Heinrich Boell Stiftung, Germany</td>
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**Speakers**

- Ms Rebecca Bertram, Heinrich Boell Foundation, Germany
  *via skype*
- Prof. Dr Tanay Sidiki Uyar, Head, Energy Section, Faculty of Engineering, Marmara University; and Vice President, World Wind Energy Association, Turkey
- Mr Zeeshan Ishfaq, World Wind Energy Association (WWEA), Pakistan
- Mr Tao Wang, Assistant Dean, Yicai Research Institute, Beijing, China

**Discussion**

**Lunch**

2:00 pm – 3:00 pm
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tuesday, 06 December 2016</th>
<th>Day One</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Concurrent Panel A-3</strong></td>
<td>12 noon – 2:00 pm</td>
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</table>

**Title:** SDGs: Opportunities and Challenges for Health Sector – The Importance of Data  
*Podium Discussion*

**Chair:** Mr Neil Buhne, Resident Coordinator, United Nations, Pakistan  
**Moderators:** Dr Peter Taylor, International Development Research Centre, Canada; and, Ms Saadiya Razzaq, Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, Pakistan  
**Panel Organiser:** Ms Saadiya Razzaq, Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, Pakistan

**Speakers**

- Dr Sajjad Akhtar, Member Economic Survey, Islamabad, Pakistan
- Dr Rajendra Kumar, Nepal Public Health Foundation, Nepal
- Dr Mahbub Elahi Chowdhury, Scientist, Health Systems and Population Studies Division, Dhaka, Bangladesh
- Dr Najma Afzal Khan, Member Health, Social Welfare and Bait-ul-Maal, Faisalabad, Pakistan

**Discussion**

**Lunch**  
2:00 pm – 3:00 pm
Tuesday, 06 December 2016

Concurrent Panel A-4

12 noon – 2:00 pm

**Title:** SLRC Session 1: It’s What You Do and How You Do It – What Types of Services and What Processes build Legitimacy

**Chair:** Mr Paul Harvey, Director, Secure Livelihoods Research Consortium (SLRC), London, UK

**Panel Organisers:** Secure Livelihoods Research Consortium (SLRC), London, UK; and Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, Pakistan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Speakers</th>
<th>Titles</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ms Georgina Sturge, Researcher, Secure Livelihoods Research Consortium, and Overseas Development Institute, London, UK</td>
<td>Do Services and Support to Livelihoods contribute to State Legitimacy after Conflict? Findings from the SLRC 5-Country Longitudinal Panel Survey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr Mirza Jahani, Senior Governance Advisor, Department for International Development (DFID), Afghanistan</td>
<td>The Impact of Service Delivery on State-building in Tajikistan (based on DFID and Aga Khan Foundation Work)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr Adam Pain, Lead Researcher, SLRC Afghanistan, and Researcher, Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences (SLU), Uppsala, Sweden</td>
<td>Building Village-level Institutions in Afghanistan – or Not?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr Babar Shahbaz, Institute of Agriculture Extension &amp; Rural Development, University of Agriculture, Faisalabad, Pakistan</td>
<td>Post-Conflict Livelihood Interventions and Local Realities - The Case of Swat and Lower Districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Pakistan</td>
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**Discussion**

**Lunch**

2:00 pm – 3:00 pm
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title: Energy-Smart Grid and Remapping the T &amp; D System of Pakistan</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chair: Engr. M. A. Jabbar, Member SAARC Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Karachi, Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderator: Ms Maha Kamal, Queen Mary, University of London, England</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panel Organiser: Mr Arshad Abbasi, Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mr Cao Shunli, Manager Overseer, Henan Kosen Enterprise Development Company Ltd., China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr Ma-Lin, Chairman, Anhui Tianying Electrical Equipment Manufacturing Co. Ltd., China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr Wang Nan, Henan Kosen Enterprise Development Company Limited, China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr Zahng Biangsu, Advisor, Anhui Tianying Electrical Equipment Manufacturing Co. Ltd., China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr Zou Shijie, Deputy General Manager (Overseas Development), Henan Kosen Enterprise Development Company Ltd., China</td>
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<tr>
<th>Discussion</th>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lunch</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2:00 pm – 3:00 pm</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
**Concurrent Panel A-5**

### Title: Gender, Demography and Democracy

**Chair and Special Comments:** Ms Khawar Mumtaz, Chairperson, National Commission on the Status of Women (NCSW), Islamabad, Pakistan  
**Moderator:** Mr Shahid Minhas, Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, Pakistan  
**Panel Organisers:** Dr Nathalene Reynolds, Peace Operations Network, Ethiopia; Mr Shahid Minhas, Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, Pakistan; and Dr Gulnaz Anjum, Department of Social Sciences & Liberal Arts, Institute of Business Administration, Karachi, Pakistan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Speakers</th>
<th>Titles</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dr Muhammad Luqman, Post-Doc Research Fellow, Agricultural Information Institute, Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences, Beijing, China</td>
<td>Factors contributing to Gender Disparity in Education in Rural Areas: Evidence from Three Districts of Punjab, Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ms Faiza Mahmood, MPhil Economics Student, Institute of Agricultural and Resource Economics, University of Agriculture, Faisalabad, Pakistan</td>
<td>Gendered Academic Performance in Two Public Universities in Faisalabad, Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr Nathalene Reynolds, Visiting Fellow, Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad, Pakistan; and Member, Peace Operations Network, Ethiopia</td>
<td>The Missing: Indian and Pakistani Demography</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ms Batool Zaidi, Doctoral Candidate, Department of Sociology, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, USA</td>
<td>In the Pursuit of Sons: Additional Births or Sex-selective Abortion in Pakistan?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr Gulnaz Anjum, Assistant Professor of Psychology, Department of Social Sciences &amp; Liberal Arts, Institute of Business Administration, Karachi, Pakistan</td>
<td>Impact of National and International Policy Recommendations on Support for Women’s Rights</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Discussion**
**Tuesday, 06 December 2016**

**Concurrent Panel A-6**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>3:00 pm – 5:00 pm</th>
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</table>

**Title:** Leveraging CPEC for Regional Cooperation in Energy and Transport Infrastructure

**Moderator:** Dr Abid Q. Suleri, Executive Director, Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, Pakistan

**Panel Organisers:** Dr Vaqar Ahmed and Ms Rabia Manzoor, Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, Pakistan

**Distinguished Speakers**

- Mr Mir Hasil Khan Bizenjo, Federal Minister for Ports and Shipping, Government of Pakistan
- Dr Miftah Ismail, Minister of State and Chairman, Board of Investment, Government of Pakistan
- Dr Safdar Sohail, Joint Director, China Pakistan Economic Corridor, Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, Islamabad, Pakistan
- Mr Frank Sun, Master of Social Policy, Yunnan University, China
- Mr Wang Nan, Henan Kosen Enterprise Development Company Limited, China
- Mr Shakeel Ramay, Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, Pakistan

**Discussion**
## Concurrent Panel A-8

**Title:** SLRC Session 2: Gender, Conflict and Livelihoods Recovery  
**Chair:** Mr Harris Khalique, AAWAZ - DAI, Islamabad  
**Panel Organisers:** Secure Livelihoods Research Consortium (SLRC), London, England; and Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, Pakistan

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Speakers</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ms Rachel Gordon, Researcher, SLRC, Gender, Uganda, and Tufts-Feinstein International Center, Somerville, USA</td>
<td>Sexual Violence in Uganda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ms Danielle Huot, Researcher, SLRC, Afghanistan, London, UK</td>
<td>Networks and Livelihoods: The Importance of Relationships in Afghanistan’s Distributional Economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ms Leah Wilfreda RE Pilongo, Researcher, Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, Afghanistan via skype</td>
<td>The Other Side of Inequality: Men and Masculinities in Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr Ayesha Khurshid, Assistant Professor, Florida State University (FSU), USA</td>
<td>Becoming Educated, Becoming Empowered: Gender, Islam, and Modernity in Rural Communities of Pakistan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Discussion**
| Title: Solar Geoengineering and Pakistan: Science and Research Governance |
| Chair: Ambassador Shafqat Kakakhel, Chairperson, Board of Governors, Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad, Pakistan |
| Special Comments: Mr Naseer Gillani, Ministry of Planning, Development and Reform, Government of Pakistan |
| Panel Organisers: Dr Andy Parker, Project Director, SRM Governance Initiative, and Research Fellow, Institute for Advanced Sustainability Studies (IASS), Potsdam, Germany; and, Mr Junaid Zahid, Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad, Pakistan |

| Speakers |
| Dr Qasim Jan, University of Peshawar & COMSTEC, Islamabad, Pakistan |
| Dr Andy Parker, Project Director, SRM Governance Initiative, and Research Fellow, Institute for Advanced Sustainability Studies (IASS), Potsdam, Germany |
| Dr Fahad Saeed, Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad, Pakistan |

| Discussion |
## DAY 2: Wednesday, 7 December 2016

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<tr>
<th>Time</th>
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<th>Concurrent Session B-5</th>
<th>Concurrent Session B-9</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9:15am – 11:30am</td>
<td>The Distributional Effects of Out-Migration and Livelihood Resilience in Semi-Arid Regions of Asia and Africa</td>
<td>Securing Livelihoods and Promoting Competitiveness of the Cotton Value Chain (CVC) in a Changing Climate</td>
<td>Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) and Resilience Building in South Asia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 noon – 2:00pm</td>
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<tr>
<td>3:00pm – 5:00pm</td>
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### Concurrent Session B-2
- Future of SAARC: Current Challenges and Potentials for Peace, Development and Prosperity

### Concurrent Session B-5
- Securing Livelihoods and Promoting Competitiveness of the Cotton Value Chain (CVC) in a Changing Climate

### Concurrent Session B-9
- Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) and Resilience Building in South Asia

### Concurrent Session B-3
- Challenges of Conflict and Service Delivery in South Asia

### Concurrent Session B-6
- Regional Economic Integration in Central and South Asia

### Concurrent Session B-10
- Priority Actions for the SDGs and Leave No One Behind Agenda in South Asia

### Concurrent Session B-4
- SLRC Session 3 Making a Living In and After Conflicts

### Concurrent Session B-7
- Minorities in Pakistan’s Legal Framework

### Concurrent Session B-11
- Inclusive South Asian Societies - Raising Voices for Ethnic and Religious Minorities as Equal Citizens

### Concurrent Session B-8
- SLRC Session 4 Markets, Value Chains and Social Networks

### Concurrent Session B-12
- SLRC Session 5 The Legacies of Conflict
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title: The Distributional Effects of Out-Migration and Livelihood Resilience in Semi-Arid Regions of Asia and Africa</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chair:</strong> Dr. Mukhtar Ahmed, Chairperson, Higher Education Commission (HEC), Pakistan</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Special Comments:</strong> Dr. Aliya H. Khan, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad, Pakistan; and, Mr. Hasan Akhtar Rizvi, Group Leader CSD, Lead Pakistan, Islamabad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Panel Organisers:</strong> Mr. Kashif M. Salik and Ms. Ayesha Qaisarani, Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Speakers</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Fred Atieno, Agriculture, Environment and Climate Change Specialist, University of Nairobi, Nairobi, Kenya</td>
<td>Assessing Household Economic Resilience to Climate Change-Induced Migration in Semi-Arid Lands of Kenya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ms. Zhanna Babagaliyeva, Climate Change and Sustainable Energy Program Specialist, Tajikistan via skype</td>
<td>Migration, Remittances and Climate Resilience in Tajikistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Kashif Salik, Senior Research Associate, Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
<td>Migration Futures: Economic Opportunities and Distributional Effects in Pakistan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Discussion |

| Refreshments |
**Wednesday, 07 December 2016**

**Concurrent Panel B-2**

**9:15am – 11:30 am**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title: Future of SAARC: Current Challenges and Potentials for Peace, Development and Prosperity</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chair: Mr Muhammad Tahseen, South Asia Partnership Pakistan (SAP-PK), Lahore, Pakistan</td>
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**Panel Organisers:** Mr Muhammad Tahseen, South Asia Partnership Pakistan (SAP-PK), Lahore, Pakistan; Mr Moazzam Bhatti and Mr Shafqat Aziz, Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, Pakistan

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<tr>
<td>Mr Karamat Ali, Director, Pakistan Institute of Labour Education &amp; Research (PILER), Karachi, Pakistan</td>
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<td>Dr Pervez Tahir, Chairman, Bank of Punjab, Lahore, Pakistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mr Naseer Memon, CEO, Strengthening Participatory Organization, Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ms Marvi Sirmed, Strengthening Democracy through Parliamentary Development (SDPD), Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mr Majyd Aziz, Former President, Karachi Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Pakistan</td>
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**Discussion**

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<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Concurrent Panel B-3</th>
<th>9:15 am – 11:30 am</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Title:</strong></td>
<td><strong>Challenges of Conflict and Service Delivery in South Asia</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Chair:</strong></td>
<td>Senator Afrasiab Khattak, Government of Pakistan</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Special Comments:</strong></td>
<td>Mr Zahid Hussain, Analyst and Author, Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Panel Organisers:</strong></td>
<td>Ms Shirin Gul, AAWAZ - DAI, Islamabad, Pakistan, Ms Rabia Tabassum and Dr Shehryar Khan Toru, Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Speakers</strong></td>
<td><strong>Titles</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Ms Shirin Gul, Research and Policy Expert, AAWAZ - DAI; Mr Saadat Ali, Political Analyst, and Mr Adnan Sher, Political Activist and Social Researcher, Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
<td>Service Delivery in Public Policy: Narratives of Conflict and Trust</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dr Shehryar Khan Toru, Research Fellow, Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
<td>Political Economy of Public Goods and Service Delivery</td>
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<td></td>
<td><strong>Discussion</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Refreshments</strong></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
### Concurrent Panel B-4  
9:15 am – 11:30 am

**Title:** SLRC Session 3: Making a Living In and After Conflicts  
**Chair:** Dr Vagisha Gunasekara, Lead Researcher, Secure Livelihoods Research Consortium (SLRC) Sri Lanka, and the American Institute for Sri Lankan Studies, Colombo, Sri Lanka  
**Discussant:** Mr Ejaz Haider, Capital TV, Lahore, Pakistan  
**Panel Organisers:** Secure Livelihoods Research Consortium (SLRC), London, UK; and Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, Pakistan

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<tr>
<th>Speakers</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dr Adam Pain, Lead Researcher, SLRC Afghanistan, and Researcher, Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences (SLU), Uppsala, Sweden</td>
<td>Afghanistan’s ‘Surplus’ Rural Population</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr Richard Mallett, Research Fellow, Secure Livelihoods Research Consortium and Overseas Development Institute, London, UK</td>
<td>Markets, Jobs and Youth in Uganda and Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr Paul Harvey, Director, Secure Livelihoods Research Consortium (SLRC), London, UK</td>
<td>Findings from the SLRC 5-Year Panel Survey</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Discussion**

**Refreshments**
### Concurrent Panel B-5

**Title:** Securing Livelihoods and Promoting Competitiveness of the Cotton Value Chain (CVC) in a Changing Climate  

**Chair:** Mr Hasan Iqbal, Secretary, Ministry of Textile Industry, Government of Pakistan  

**Co-chair:** Ms Romina Khurshid, Member National Assembly, Government of Pakistan  

**Special Comments:** Dr Khalid Abdullah, Cotton Commissioner, Ministry of Textile Industry, Government of Pakistan  

**Panel Organisers:** Dr Fahad Saeed and Ms Samavia Batool, Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, Pakistan

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Speakers</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mr Sebastian Gollnow, Visiting Researcher, Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
<td>Climate Change Risks in the Cotton Value Chain - Seed Cotton Production</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ms Samavia Batool, Research Assistant, Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
<td>Climate Risks facing Cotton Value Chain Actors and Processes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr Issiaka Sombie, Economics Department, University of Ouaga, Burkina Faso</td>
<td>Cotton Value Chain Analysis and Changing Climate in Burkina Faso</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr Elizabeth Carabine, Research Fellow, Overseas Development Institute, London, UK</td>
<td>Value Chain Analysis for Resilience in Drylands (VC-ARID): Adaptation Options in Key Sectors</td>
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</table>

**Discussion**

<p>| Lunch | 2:00 pm – 3:00 pm |</p>
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<th><strong>Wednesday, 07 December 2016</strong></th>
<th><strong>Day Two</strong></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Concurrent Panel B-6</strong></td>
<td><strong>12 noon – 2:00 pm</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Title:</strong> Regional Economic Integration in Central and South Asia</td>
<td><strong>Chair:</strong> Dr Vaqar Ahmed, Deputy Director, Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Panel Organisers:</strong> Dr Vaqar Ahmed and Syed Shujaat Ahmed, Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Speakers</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Mr Majyd Aziz, Former President, Karachi Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Karachi, Pakistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mr Haroon Sharif, Regional Advisor, The World Bank, Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>H.E. Omar Zakhilwal, Afghanistan’s Ambassador to Pakistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ambassador (Retd.) Ms Fauzia Nasreen, Department of Center for Policy Studies, COMSATS Institute of Information Technology, Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mr Guntur Sugiyarto, Chief Economist, Asian Development Bank, Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Discussion</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Lunch</strong></td>
<td><strong>2:00 pm – 3:00 pm</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Title: Minorities in Pakistan's Legal Framework</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chair: Advocate Majid Bashir, Supreme Court of Pakistan, Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>Special Comments: Dr Nathalene Reynolds, Visiting Fellow, Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad, Pakistan; and, Member, Peace Operations Network, Ethiopia; and Mr Shafqat Munir, Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panel Organisers: Mr Jamal Janjua, AAWAZ-DAI, Islamabad, Pakistan; and Ms Rabia Tabassum, Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
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<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mr Muhammad Jamal Janjua, Programme Officer, AAWAZ Voice and Accountability Programme, Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
<td>Discrimination in the Legal Profession: Attitudes and Perceptions of Minorities and the Majority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr Shaqaib Arslan Lilla, Consultant, AAWAZ, Islamabad, Pakistan; and Mr Zain Mansoor, Consultant, AAWAZ, Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
<td>Qualified Equality: Forms of Indirect Discrimination in Pakistan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Discussion

Lunch 2:00 pm – 3:00 pm
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Speakers</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dr Abid Q. Suleri, Executive Director, Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
<td>Swat Fruit Markets and Recovery in FATA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr Giulia Minoia, Researcher, Secure Livelihoods Research Consortium (SLRC), Afghanistan</td>
<td>Networks of Access in Afghan Rural Commodity Markets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ms Irina Mosel, Research Fellow, Humanitarian Policy Group (HPG), Overseas Development Institute, London, UK</td>
<td>Markets in Crisis in Pakistan, Mali and South Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr Foqia Sadiq Khan, Researcher and Freelance Consultant, Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
<td>Inter-Generational Hereditary Entrepreneurship: Family and Caste Capitalism in the Textiles Sector in Pakistan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Discussion**

**Lunch**

2:00 pm – 3:00 pm
**Wednesday, 07 December 2016**

**Concurrent Panel B-9**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title: Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) and Resilience Building in South Asia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chair and Special Comments:</strong> Mr Shafqat Munir, Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Panel Organisers:</strong> Dr Imran Khalid and Mr Shafqat Munir, Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Speakers** | **Titles** |
---|---|
Dr Imran Khalid, Research Fellow, Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, Pakistan | Flood Risk Management in a Changing Climate: Policy Avenues for Pakistan |
Dr Bina Akram Khan Jabori, Assistant Professor Public Health, Women Medical College Abbottabad and Master Trainer, GOAL/NEST. Soothing the Inner You, Islamabad, Pakistan | Human Aspects of Disasters |
Ms Zainab Naeem, Fatima Jinnah Women University, Rawalpindi, Pakistan | Effects of Anthropogenic Activities on Pore Pressure of the Earth’s Crust - A Desk Review |
Mr Salman Danish, Research Associate, Journalists for Democracy and Human Rights (JDHR), Islamabad, Pakistan | Self-Help Resilience and Disaster Risk Reduction Model: The Case of Village Tibba Malhanas, Muzaffargarh District in Pakistan |

**Discussion**
Title: Priority Actions for the SDGs and Leave No One Behind Agenda in South Asia  
Chair: Mrs Roshan Khursheed Bharucha, Member Board of Governors, Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Quetta, Pakistan  
Special Comments: Dr Naeem uz Zafar, Advisor SDGs, United Nations Development Programme, Islamabad, Pakistan; and Dr Rabea Malik, Research Fellow, Institute of Development and Economic Alternatives (IDEAS), Lahore, Pakistan.  
Moderator: Dr Shehryar Khan Toru, Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, Pakistan  
Panel Organisers: Ms Amina Khan, Overseas Development Institute, UK; and Ms Rabia Manzoor, Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, Pakistan

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<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ms Amina Khan, Senior Research Officer, Growth, Poverty and Inequality Programme, Overseas Development Institute, UK</td>
<td>Projecting Progress: The SDGs in Asia and the Pacific</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Leaving No One Behind: A Critical Path for the first 1,000 Days of the SDGs</td>
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<td>Progress under Scrutiny: Poverty Reduction in Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr Vaqar Ahmed, Deputy Executive Director, Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
<td>Promoting Youth Employment in South Asia</td>
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<td>Implementing the SDGs during the first 1,000 Days: Briefing Note on the Asia Regional Dialogue</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Discussion
**Concurrent Session B-11**

**Title:** Inclusive South Asian Societies - Raising Voices for Ethnic and Religious Minorities as Equal Citizens

**Chair:** Mr I. A. Rahman, Director, Human Rights Commission of Pakistan Secretariat, Lahore, Pakistan

**Special Comments:** Dr Navsharan Singh, Senior Programme Specialist, International Development Research Centre (IDRC), New Delhi, India; and Mr Ahmed Salim, Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, Pakistan

**Panel Organiser and Moderator:** Ms Tehreem Hassan, Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, Pakistan

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dr Nathalene Reynolds, Visiting Fellow, Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad, Pakistan; and, Member, Peace Operations Network, Ethiopia</td>
<td>On the Muslim Minority in India</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr Eaisha Tareen, Clinical Psychologist, Lahore, Pakistan</td>
<td>Examining the 'Religious' Roots of Discrimination against Minorities in Pakistan</td>
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**Discussion**
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ms Rachel Gordon, Researcher, Tufts University/Feinstein International Center, Somerville, USA</td>
<td>The Impact of War Crimes on Recovery in Uganda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ms Georgina Sturge, Researcher, Secure Livelihoods Research Consortium (SLRC) and Overseas Development Institute, London, UK</td>
<td>The Legacy of Displacement on Livelihoods: What Happens when Forced Migrants Return?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr Babar Shahbaz, Institute of Agriculture Extension &amp; Rural Development, University of Agriculture, Faisalabad, Pakistan</td>
<td>The Legacies of Conflict in FATA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Discussion**
Dinner Plenary
7:00pm – 9:00pm

Dinner Plenary: Inclusive and Sustainable Economic Growth for South Asia

Introductions by: Dr Vaqar Ahmed, Deputy Director, Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, Pakistan

Guest of Honour: Dr Miftah Ismail, Minister of State and Chairman, Board of Investment, Government of Pakistan

Keynote Speech: Mr I. A. Rahman, Director, Human Rights Commission of Pakistan Secretariat, Lahore, Pakistan

Special Comments: MNA Mr Rana Afzal, Parliamentary Secretary, Ministry of Finance, Government of Pakistan

Launch and Presentation of SLRC Study: Mr Paul Harvey, Director, Secure Livelihoods Research Consortium (SLRC), London, UK

Chair: Dr Abid Q. Suleri, Executive Director, Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, Pakistan
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Concurrent Session C-1</th>
<th>Concurrent Session C-2</th>
<th>Concurrent Session C-3</th>
<th>Concurrent Session C-5</th>
<th>Concurrent Session C-6</th>
<th>Concurrent Session C-7</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12 noon – 2:00pm</td>
<td></td>
<td>Water Stewardship, Sustainability, and the Way Forward for Pakistan</td>
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<td>3:00pm – 5:30pm</td>
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<td>SAARC Charter Day: Mr</td>
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**H.U. Beg Memorial Lecture**

**Chair:** MNA Mr Rana Afzal, Parliamentary Secretary, Ministry of Finance, Government of Pakistan

**Guest of Honour:** Mr Asad Umar, Member National Assembly (MNA), and Policy Head, Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), Islamabad, Pakistan

**Summary of Proceedings and Recommendations:**
Dr Abid Q Suleri, Executive Director, Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad, Pakistan

**H.U. Beg Memorial Lecture by:** Dr Tariq Banuri, University of Utah, USA

**Special Comments on SAARC Charter Day:** Mr Zubair Ahmad Malik, Former President SAARC Chamber of Commerce and Industries
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<td>SLRC Session 6</td>
<td>SLRC Session 7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Community Driven</td>
<td>Building Capacity in Conflicts</td>
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<tr>
<td>Development and Social Protection in Conflicts</td>
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**Remarks by the Guest of Honour:**
Mr. Asad Umar, Member National Assembly (MNA), and Policy Head, Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), Islamabad, Pakistan

**Remarks by the Chair**

**Launch of Pakistan Data Portal**

**Lifetime Achievement Award:** Presented to Ms Fauzia Javed (late), former Manager Admin, Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad, Pakistan

**Launch of Publications:**
- SDC-SAES Anthology 2017 'Securing Peace and Prosperity'
- SDPI's Annual Report 2015-2016

**Vote of Thanks:**
Ambassador Shafqat Kakakhel, Chairperson, SDPI Board of Governors, Islamabad, Pakistan

**Refreshments and Staff Group Photo**
## Title: Transforming Poverty and Inequality: Urban-Rural Linkages in South Asia: What the Future Holds?

### Chair:
Ms Marvi Memon, Chairperson, Benazir Income Support Programme, Government of Pakistan

### Special Remarks:
Mr Muhammad Tahseen, Executive Director, South Asia Partnership Pakistan (SAP-PK), Lahore, Pakistan

### Moderator:
Mr Mustafa Talpur, OXFAM, Pakistan

### Panel Organisers:
Mr Shafqat Munir and Ms Sadaf Liaquat, Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, Pakistan

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### Speakers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Topic</th>
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<tr>
<td>Dr Muhammad Yaseen, Assistant Professor, University of Sargodha, Pakistan</td>
<td>The Impact of Poverty Alleviation Policy on Urban Household Demand in China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr Abdul Hameed Leghari, Federal Urdu University of Arts, Science and Technology, Islamabad, Pakistan; and Economic Analyst, Innovative Development Strategies (Pvt.) Ltd, Pakistan</td>
<td>Estimating Poverty Level and Sustainable Development in Rural Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr Junaid Zahid, Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad, Pakistan; and, Aadil Hameed Shah, MPhil Student, Pir Mehr Ali Shah (PMAS) Arid Agriculture University, Rawalpindi, Pakistan</td>
<td>Dynamics of Multidimensional Inequality in Pakistan</td>
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### Discussion

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### Refreshments
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<td><strong>Concurrent Session C-2</strong></td>
<td>9:15am - 11:30am</td>
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| **Title:** Water Stewardship, Sustainability, and the Way Forward for Pakistan  
**Roundtable Discussion**  
**Chair and Moderator:** Engr. Shamsul Mulk, former Chairman, Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA), Government of Pakistan  
**Special Comments:** Mr Waqar Ahmed, Head Corporate Affairs, Nestle, Lahore, Pakistan  
**Panel Organiser:** Dr Imran Khalid, Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, Pakistan |

**Speakers**

- Dr Imran Khalid, Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, Pakistan *(Presentation)*
- Ambassador Shafqat Kakakhel, Chairperson, Board of Governors, Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, Pakistan
- Dr Tariq Banuri, University of Utah, USA
- Dr Zubair Khan, Bela Power Pvt. Ltd., Islamabad, Pakistan

**Discussion**

**Refreshments**
**Concurrent Session C-3**

**Title:** Effective Institutions, Capacities and Partnerships for Implementing SDGs: A Provincial Perspective

**Chair:** Dr Waqar Masood Khan, Secretary, Ministry of Finance, Government of Pakistan

**Moderator:** Dr Vaqar Ahmed, Deputy Director, Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, Pakistan

**Concluding Remarks:** Mrs Roshan Khursheed Bharucha, Member Board of Governors, Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Quetta, Pakistan

**Panel Organisers:** United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Dr Shehryar Khan and Ms Rabia Manzoor, Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, Pakistan

### Speakers

- Mr Ignacio Artaza, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Islamabad, Pakistan
- Mr Malik Amin Aslam Khan, International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN), Islamabad, Pakistan
- Dr Khalida Ghaus, Social Policy and Development Centre (SPDC), Karachi, Pakistan
- Dr Aman Ullah, Planning and Development Department, Civil Secretariat, Lahore, Pakistan
- Ms Rabia Manzoor, Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad, Pakistan

*Presentation: Implications of Implementing SDGs at the National Level: A Case of Pakistan*

### Discussion

### Refreshments
Thursday, 08 December 2016  
Day Three

Concurrent Session C-4  
9:15am - 11:30am

**Title:** SLRC Session 6: Community Driven Development and Social Protection in Conflicts  
**Chair:** Dr Ashfaque Hasan Khan, Dean, National University of Science and Technology, Islamabad, Pakistan  
**Panel Organisers:** Secure Livelihoods Research Consortium (SLRC), London, UK; and, Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, Pakistan

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<tr>
<th>Speakers</th>
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<tr>
<td>Dr Anita Ghimire, Swiss National Center of Competence in Research, North-South Regional Co-ordination Office, Nepal</td>
<td>Taking the Challenge: Building Capacity of Local Actors in Conflict Situation in Nepal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ms Sony KC, Researcher, SLRC Nepal, PhD Researcher, Kathmandu University; and Visiting Associate, Nepal Center for Contemporary Research (NCCR), Kathmandu, Nepal</td>
<td>Old Age Allowance and Perceptions of the State in Rolpa District of Nepal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr Yashodan Ghorpade, Economist, The World Bank</td>
<td>Calamity, Conflict and Cash Transfers: How Violence Affects Access to Aid in Pakistan</td>
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**Discussion**

**Refreshments**
### Title: Pakistan Food Security and Nutrition Strategic Review: Preliminary Findings

**Chair:** Dr Abid Q. Suleri, Executive Director, Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, Pakistan  
**Opening Remarks:** Mr Stephen Gluning, Acting Country Director, World Food Programme, Pakistan  
**Discussant:** Dr Nomeena Anis, Nutritionist and Gender Focal Person, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Islamabad, Pakistan  
**Panel Organisers:** International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), Islamabad, Pakistan; Aga Khan University, Karachi, Pakistan; and Ms Rabia Manzoor, Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, Pakistan

### Speakers and Titles

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<th>Speaker</th>
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</table>
| Dr Stephen Davies, Senior Research Fellow and Program Leader, IFPRI Pakistan Agricultural Capacity Enhancement Program, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), Islamabad, Pakistan | • Overview of the Food Security and Nutrition Situation in Pakistan  
• Preliminary Ways Forward from Food Security Strategic Review  
• Food Security and Nutrition: Recommendations |
| Dr Shujaat Zaidi, Senior Social Scientist (Research), Division of Women and Child Health, Aga Khan University, Karachi, Pakistan | Preliminary Ways Forward from Nutrition Strategic Review |

### Discussion

### Lunch

2:00 pm – 3:00 pm
**Day Three**

**Concurrent Session C-6**  
12 noon - 2:00pm

**Title:** Regional Cooperation in light of the Paris Climate Agreement  
*Podium Discussion*

**Chair:** Dr Tariq Banuri, University of Utah, USA  
**Special Comments:** Mr Nisar Memon, Former Minister of Information and Broadcasting, Government of Pakistan; and Ambassador Shafqat Kakakhel, Chairperson, SDPI Board of Governors, Islamabad, Pakistan

**Discussant:** Mr Naseer Gillani, Ministry of Planning, Development and Reform, Government of Pakistan  
**Panel Organisers:** Dr Imran Khalid and Mr Ahmed Awais Khaver, Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, Pakistan; and, Ms Mome Saleem, Heinrich Boell Stiftung, Islamabad, Pakistan

**Speakers**

- Dr Imran Khalid, Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, Pakistan  
  *Presentation*

- Mr Sanjay Vashist, Climate Action Network South Asia, India  
  *(via skype)*

- Mr Syed Mahmood Nasir, Inspector General of Forests, Ministry of Climate Change, Government of Pakistan

- Ms Nazima Shaheen, Action Aid Pakistan, Islamabad, Pakistan

- Mr Shakeel Ramay, Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, Pakistan

**Discussion**

**Lunch**  
2:00 pm – 3:00 pm
Thursday, 08 December 2016  

Day Three

Concurrent Session C-7  

12 noon-2:00pm

**Title:** Emerging Methods in Policy Engagement and Public-Private Dialogue  

**Chair:** Mr Rana Muhammad Afzal, Parliamentary Secretary, Ministry of Finance, Government of Pakistan  

**Moderator:** Mr Hammad Siddiqui, Country Director, Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE), Karachi, Pakistan  

**Panel Organisers:** Dr Vaqar Ahmed and Mr Fazal Bukhari, Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, Pakistan

**Speakers**

- Engr. M. A. Jabbar, Member SAARC Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Karachi, Pakistan  
- Mr Majyd Aziz, Former Chairman, Karachi Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Karachi, Pakistan  
- Dr Khaqan Najeeb, Ministry of Finance, Government of Pakistan  
- Ms Sarwat Aftab, Senior Private Sector Specialist, The World Bank, Islamabad, Pakistan  
- Mr Ali Khizar, Head of Research, Business Recorder, Lahore, Pakistan

**Discussion**

**Lunch**  

2:00 pm – 3:00 pm
**Concurrent Session C-8**  
**Title:** SLRC Session 7: Building Capacity in Conflicts  
**Chair:** Engr. Miangul Adnan Aurangzeb, former Member of Parliament, Government of Pakistan  
**Special Comments:** Mr Mirza Jahani, Senior Governance Advisor, Department for International Development (DFID), Afghanistan  
**Panel Organisers:** Secure Livelihoods Research Consortium (SLRC), London, UK; and Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, Pakistan

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<td>Mr Richard Mallett, Research Fellow, Secure Livelihoods Research Consortium and Overseas Development Institute, London, UK</td>
<td>State Capacity to Tackle Malnutrition and Teenage Pregnancy in Sierra Leone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr Paul Harvey, Research Director, Secure Livelihoods Research Consortium, London, UK</td>
<td>Findings from the SLRC Global Capacity Synthesis Paper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr Gopikesh Acharya, Research Officer/Associate, Nepal Centre for Contemporary Research (NCCR), Kathmandu, Nepal</td>
<td>Capacity Building through the Drinking Water Service: Performance Narrative of the Local Governance and Community Development Programme (LGCDP) in Post-conflict Nepal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr Abid Q. Suleri, Executive Director, Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
<td>Local Institutions in Conflict-affected Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Pakistan</td>
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**Discussion**

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3:00 pm – 5:30 pm</td>
<td>Closing Plenary</td>
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**Refreshments and Staff Group Photo**
Annexure 2

List of SDC Anthologies
(1997-2017)
Anthology Titles (Year of Publication)

Green Economics (1997)

Pakistan: To the Future with Hope (1998)


Sustainable Development: Bridging the Research/Policy gaps in Southern Contexts Volume 1 & 2 (2005)


Missing Links in Sustainable Development (SD): South Asian Perspectives (2008)

Sustainable Solutions: A Spotlight on South Asian Research (2009)


Fostering Sustainable Development in South Asia: Responding to Challenges (2011)
Peace and Sustainable Development in South Asia: The Way Forward (2012)

Redefining Paradigms of Sustainable Development in South Asia (2013)

Sustainable Development in South Asia: Shaping the Future (2014)

Creating Momentum: Today is Tomorrow (2015)
Pathways to Sustainable Development (2016)

Securing Peace and Prosperity (2017)
This anthology coincides with Pakistan’s 70-year independence celebrations and SDPI’s 25 years as a research and advocacy organisation. The journey of both has been similar and monumental. From a country with a negligible industrial base, Pakistan’s economy is now worth nearly USD 300 billion. Opening its doors as a small think-tank struggling to survive with unpredictable and meagre funding avenues, SDPI is now ranked and recognised internationally as the 15th Top Think Tanks in Southeast Asia and the Pacific.

The book is a canvas, not just of ideas about where Pakistan needs to go in the next decade to realise the United Nations ‘great’ sustainability agenda under the Sustainable Development Goals, it is also an honest assessment of serious challenges the nation faces such as religious and gender discrimination, climate change and debt restructuring.

But Pakistan is not alone.

If anything, the volume also tells the story of other neighbouring countries, like Afghanistan and Sri Lanka, which are battling their own demons of conflict, envisaging their people’s determination towards the shared dream of a peaceful, inclusive and well-governed civilisation.

The authors help deepen our reflection on how ‘policy’ can be linked with ‘practice’, how to grapple with the foreboding reality of climate change in a country and region which has witnessed far too many weather-related calamities in the recent past and of late, and review the role of monetary institutions and regional blocs. They ponder the architecture of peace in countries hit by war and internal strife, and take stock of how this region treats its minorities.