YEARS OF DEVELOPMENT:
THE WAY FORWARD
# Seventy Years of Development: The Way Forward

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About the Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI)

Charting the Course of Research Excellence

Founded on 4 August 1992 in a small office in the capital of Pakistan, with a handful of dedicated employees, the Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI) is now known as South Asia’s leading non-partisan policy research organisations providing the global development community representation from Pakistan and the region as a whole. Over the past 26 years, it has remained staunchly committed to the mission it set for itself upon inception:

_to catalyse the transition towards sustainable development, defined as the enhancement of peace, social justice and well-being, within and across generations._

SDPI remains one of the few organisations in Pakistan that has been consistently ranked internationally by the Global Go To Think Tank Index since 2016.

Where We Come From

The Institute’s genesis lies in the Pakistan National Conservation Strategy (also known as Pakistan’s Agenda 21), which approved by the Federal Cabinet in March 1992, outlined the need for an independent non-profit organisation in the country to serve as a source of expertise for policy analysis, evidence-based research and training services.

What We Do

SDPI functions in an advisory capacity by carrying out robust research, policy advice and advocacy; and in an enabling capacity by strengthening other individuals and organisations with resource materials and training. Specifically, the Institute’s broad-based yet holistic mandate is to:

• conduct evidence-based research, advocacy and trainings from a broad multi-disciplinary perspective;
• promote the implementation of policies, programmes, laws and regulations based on sustainable development;
• strengthen civil society and facilitate civil society-government interaction in collaboration with other organisations and activist networks;
• disseminate research findings and public education through the media, conferences, seminars, lectures, publications and curricula development; and,
• contribute to building national research capacity and infrastructure.
How We Do It
The diverse array of projects and programmes, from inclusive economic growth to institutional governance, from trade, regional connectivity, energy economics to climate change, from food, water and human security to education, from sustainable industrial growth to hazardous waste management, from religious tolerance to peace and gender equity, that SDPI has been involved in over the past 26 years, outline the following core activities:

- Providing policy advice to the government;
- Facilitating and organising forums for policy dialogue;
- Supporting in-house, local, regional and international academics, students and researchers;
- Publishing critical research for public and private sector use;
- Acting as a conduit for North-South and South-South dialogue;
- Creating an environment for information dissemination and training;
- Campaigning for regional advocacy and networking.

Why We Do It
The Institute’s efforts remain unwavering in its vision to become a Centre of Excellence on sustainable development policy research, capacity development and advocacy in the country and South Asia by producing knowledge that not only enhances the capacity of the state to make informed policy decisions, but also engages civil society and academia on issues of public interest for the betterment of current and future generations.

How We Reach Out
Since its inception, SDPI has organised innumerable seminars and national and international conferences. The Sustainable Development Conference (SDC) series has become a flagship event of the Institute that not only provides a forum for highlighting SDPI’s own research, but also offers space to other researchers and academics from South Asia in particular and across the globe in general, to share their work and engage in constructive dialogue with fellow intellectuals, movers and shakers from the public and private sector, students and the general public.

To date, SDPI has organised twenty annual conferences. This collection, of research papers, speeches and policy briefs, was presented at the Twentieth SDC held over a three-day period (5-7 December 2017) in Pakistan’s capital Islamabad (see Annexure for detailed Conference Agenda).
About the Sustainable Development Conference (SDC) Series

Introduction
Since its inception, SDPI has organised 20 Sustainable Development Conferences. The first SDC was held in 1995. After every SDC, the Institute produces and publishes a peer reviewed book in the form of an anthology. The anthologies are, in fact, the outcome of the deliberations and discussions held during the different panels at their respective SDCs. Following is the brief history of past SDCs and their outcomes.

First SDC (1995)
The First SDC, titled *The Green Economics Conference* focused on the interaction between economics and environment. It included research papers on trade, fiscal policy, Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs), green accounting, forestry, energy, industry, and urban environment. After this conference, an anthology titled *Green Economics* was published.

Second SDC (1996)
The Second SDC highlighted the broad theme of sustainable development, including pollution abatement, resource management, conservation of biodiversity, the transfer and use of technology, trade, environment, human development, poverty alleviation, social capital and governance. The conference was successful in highlighting key issues facing Pakistan and bringing out the latest thinking and analysis to identify solutions. The anthology produced as a result of the conference proceedings was titled *Pakistan – To The Future with Hope*. 
Third SDC (1998)
The theme of the Third SDC was *A Dialogue on Environment and Natural Resource Conservation*. The conference focused on stimulating dialogue on practical policy options for key environmental challenges being faced by Pakistan. The two broad thematic areas of Urban Environment and Natural Resources concentrated on urban pollution, water resource management, deforestation and sustainable agriculture with presentations by experts from Pakistan and South Asia. The anthology produced as a result of the conference proceedings was titled *Can the Environment in Pakistan Wait?*

Fourth SDC (2000)
The Fourth SDC titled *Discourse on Human Security* mainly focused on the changes and improvements in government policies and practice with regard to human security. The conference was designed to create awareness among senior policymakers, key federal and provincial government officials and civil society groups like the media and non-government organisations on security issues.

Fifth SDC (2002)
The Fifth SDC titled *Sustainable Development and Southern Realities: Past and Future in South Asia* reexamined the conceptualisation and implementation of sustainable development in its multiple dimensions: economic, political, social, and moral. The delegates scrutinised and consolidated some of the ideas presented at the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg, and resituated debates in the South Asian context. The anthology produced as a result of conference proceedings was titled *Sustainable Development and Southern Realities: Past and Future in South Asia*. 
Sixth SDC (2003)
The overarching theme of the Sixth SDC was **Sustainable Development: Bridging the Research/Policy Gaps in Southern Contexts**. It focused on the problematique of knowledge production in the South. It explored policy/research gaps in two directions: in some places policy needs to be fed by better research; while in others, policy needs to take better account of existing solid research. It focused on the ways and means for translating this knowledge into effective policy initiatives locally, nationally, regionally and internationally by identifying the multiple gaps between research and policies in different sectors. The anthology which came out as a result of this SDC was titled *Sustainable Development: Bridging the Research/Policy Gaps in Southern Contexts*.

Seventh SDC (2004)
**Troubled Times: Sustainable Development and Governance in the Age of Extremes** was the overarching theme of the Seventh SDC that took up the key questions such as whether there is sound governance around development and whether this is ensuring just development? Whether there is more sharing of resources, including natural and institutional? Is there a strengthening of regional and international institutions? How much progress has been achieved in South Asia vis-à-vis governance? Is government more transparent today than it was a decade ago? Have governments kept their promises to the marginalised, whether the poor, women or minorities? The anthology that came out as a result of this SDC was titled *Troubled Times: Sustainable Development and Governance in the Age of Extremes*.

Eighth SDC (2005)
The Eighth SDC titled **At the Crossroads: South Asian Research, Policy and Development in a Globalized World** examined the multiple facets of sustainable development in the contexts of South Asia. The speakers discussed how problems and issues in South Asia could be dealt effectively at various levels based on prior experience of successful policy interventions. The anthology which came out as a result of this SDC was titled *At the*
Ninth SDC (2006)
The Ninth SDC titled *Missing Links in Sustainable Development (SD): South Asian Perspectives* aimed at identifying the missing links in sustainable development for South Asia and proposed fillers for those. The region’s pool of cutting-edge academics was tapped and top researchers invited together with policymakers, activists and other relevant stakeholders for a vibrant three-day debate. The anthology which came out as a result of this SDC was titled *Missing Links in Sustainable Development (SD): South Asian Perspectives.*

Tenth SDC (2007)
The Tenth SDC and its subsequent anthology titled *Sustainable Solutions: A Spotlight on South Asian Research* explored the sustainable solutions to problems such as poverty, illiteracy, mortality and morbidity, environmental degradation and disaster management, gender inequality, insecurity, violence and history. They focused on looking at both innovative solutions, as well as indigenously developed alternatives that have survived generations of development.

Eleventh SDC (2008)
*Peace and Sustainable Development in South Asia: Issues and Challenges of Globalisation* was the theme of the Eleventh SDC and the book which followed discussed various issues such as where we stand in solving the dilemmas of inequality, poverty, climate change and energy scarcity, natural resources degradation, trade liberalisation policies, food insecurity, violence and conflict, re-writing history, and poor governance. They explored how resolving some non-conventional security threats may turn into added dividends for peace.
Twelfth SDC (2009)
The Twelfth SDC titled *Fostering Sustainable Development in South Asia: Responding to Challenges* focused on the six ‘Fs’ crises - issues related to food, fuel, frontiers, functional democracy and the fragility of climate. Scholars from South Asia and other regions were invited to delve further on these issues and shared with the audience where South Asia stands today vis-à-vis coping with the six ‘Fs’ crises facing the region. Gender remained a crosscutting theme. The anthology which came out as a result of this SDC was titled *Fostering Sustainable Development in South Asia: Responding to Challenges*.

Thirteenth SDC (2010)
The Thirteenth SDC titled *Peace and Sustainable Development in South Asia: The Way Forward* deliberated on how economic challenges could be handled with positive results in terms of natural resources, while at the same time increasing the capacity and effectiveness of institutions. The panels covered themes such as post-flood situation in Pakistan, food insecurity, energy and financial crisis, the issue of land acquisition, trade and financial liberalisation, social protection, the eradication of violence against women, the role of think tanks in peace and sustainable development, sound management of chemicals, climate change, religious diversity, labour issues, etc. The anthology which came out as a result of this SDC was titled *Peace and Sustainable Development in South Asia: The Way Forward*.

Fourteenth SDC (2011)
The Fourteenth SDC featured a broad spectrum of themes: livelihood, governance, literature, Sufism, poverty, geopolitics, forest management, REDD+, social accountability, 18th Amendment, land rights, food security, education financing, feminism, economic non-cooperation, water governance, and, energy and sustainability. The anthology which came out as a result of this SDC was titled *Redefining Paradigms of Sustainable Development in South Asia*. 
Fifteenth SDC (2012)
The overarching theme of the Fifteenth SDC Sustainable Development in South Asia: Shaping the Future analysed how things will look 20, 30 or even 50 years from now, threw light on issues that will be looming large, made concrete suggestions on how to overcome future challenges, and, gave practical policy recommendations about a sustainable South Asia. Its anthology was titled Sustainable Development in South Asia: Shaping the Future.

Sixteenth SDC (2013)
Creating Momentum: Today is Tomorrow was the theme of the Sixteenth SDC, which highlighted our present position and inclination to forecast and potentially modify our decisions that may improve our tomorrow. Under various sub-themes, the conference brought to attention that failure to act urgently is premised on the argument that waiting for another tomorrow for action will result in wasting opportunities that may not be available ever again. Its anthology was titled Creating Momentum: Today is Tomorrow.

Seventeenth SDC (2014)
The Seventeenth SDC looked at leadership change in China, Pakistan, Iran, Bangladesh, India, and Afghanistan that could hold the key to shaping development pathways in South Asia. The region needs political and executive leadership that has a commitment to strategize for peace and human security and raise tangible safeguards for the political economy of the region while engaging with the primary stakeholders, i.e. the people. In this backdrop, issues of climate change, migration, sustainable and inclusive economic growth, sharing energy resources across the region, environmental challenges, food security, human rights, women in the peace process, regional connectivity, were discussed and published in its peer reviewed proceedings titled Pathways to Sustainable Development.
Eighteenth SDC (2015)
The Eighteenth SDC titled Securing Peace and Prosperity had a thinkers’ agenda, a gathering of regional think tanks working closely with policymakers of their respective countries and representatives of existing and potential South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) member countries - a congregation of visionaries in Islamabad. It focused on understanding regional integration and the attempt of SAARC countries at various forums in 2015 to establish new corridors to achieve sustainable development in the region and beyond. The same year Eighth South Asia Economic Summit (SAES), the premier regional platform for debate and analysis of politico-socio-economic issues and problems facing South Asia, was also held. The summit brought together stakeholders to review and reflect current issues facing South Asian countries. The overarching theme of the SAES was Regional Cooperation for Sustainable Development in South Asia. The published anthology of SDC and SAES was titled Securing Peace and Prosperity.

Nineteenth SDC (2016)
The overarching theme of the Nineteenth SDC focused on cooperation between developed and developing countries for sustainable development, Sustainable Development Goals, and human centredness. The themes highlighted in this conference were recovering from conflict, SDGs, trade, economic growth, environment, sustainable energy, regional economic integration, minority rights, disaster management and preparedness, climate change, youth employment, gender and demography, gender and democracy, etc. The anthology which came out as a result of this SDC was titled Sustainable Development: Envisaging the Future Together.

Twentieth SDC (2017)
The Twentieth SDC titled Seventy Years of Development: The Way Forward from 5 – 7 December 2017 will be remembered within and by the development sector of Pakistan and the region for some time as one of the largest congregation of the best and brightest minds coming together in 40 panels, roundtables and podium discussions, many of which were concurrent, including four plenary sessions. It examined 70 years of development in Pakistan and the region with participation from around the world. A total of 269 panellists representing the following 16 countries became part of this mega event:
Afghanistan, China, Ethiopia, Finland (via Skype), France, Germany, India, Italy, Nepal, Pakistan, Thailand (via Skype), The Philippines, Sri Lanka, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States of America. An audience of over 3,000 attended the three-day flagship event. This book consists of the peer approved papers, speeches and policy briefs presented at the conference.
Acknowledgements

Donors and Partners
The list of organisations which made SDPI’s Twentieth Sustainable Development Conference (2017) a success is long. Special thanks, however, goes to the following donors and partners:

1. The World Bank
2. UN Women
3. World Food Programme (WFP), Pakistan
4. United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
5. United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP)
6. Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES), Pakistan
7. The Asia Foundation (TAF)
8. Overseas Development Institute (ODI), UK
9. Centre of Excellence for China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CoE CPEC)
10. International Development Research Centre (IDRC)
11. Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE)
12. International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI)
13. Ministry of Climate Change (MoCC)
14. Heinrich Böll Stiftung (HBS)
15. Climate Action Network South Asia (CANSA)
16. Aurat Foundation (AF)
17. Nestlé Pakistan
18. South Asia Partnership Pakistan (SAP-PK)
19. GIZ Pakistan
20. Commission on Science and Technology for Sustainable Development in the South (COMSATS), Pakistan
21. National Rural Support Programme (NRSP)
22. Asian Development Bank

SDC Anthology Review Panel
SDPI prides itself in producing valuable and credible research. The blind peer review process is, therefore, a crucial means of determining both quality and validity of the research work which is published each year in the Sustainable Development Conference (SDC) Anthology. This Anthology also contains peer reviewed papers presented at the Twentieth Sustainable Development Conference.
While our Panel of Referees grows each year, we remain cognizant that reviewer selection is just as critical as the review itself and hence, we chose each one carefully based on their reputation and expertise. Given how important and yet often invisible this activity is to the outside world, we truly appreciate the unbiased and timely feedback we received on the papers that were peer reviewed this year. The Institute and anthology editors wish to thank the following academics, researchers and professionals for their fair, constructive, and informative critique of the submitted works:

**Mr Ahmad Salim** is a poet, writer, social scientist, teacher, journalist and drama writer. At present, he is working at the Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, as well as heading the South Asian Research and Resource Centre (SARRC) Islamabad to facilitate doctoral students and scholars on South Asia’s socio–politicocultural themes in Pakistan.

**Ms Anam A. Khan** is an independent social scientist working in the development sector. She has a Masters degree from the International University College of Turin. Her recent works include ‘ICIMOD Gender Mapping of the Indus River Basin’; ‘Local Governance Strategy UNDP’; and ‘The Role of Youth in Sustainable Development: Perspective from South Asia’.

**Mr Asad Feroze** is Partner In-charge Junaid Shoaib Asad Chartered Accountants at Lahore, Pakistan; and is also Chairman and a Fellow member of Institute of Chartered Accountants of Pakistan (ICAP) Northern Regional Committee. He is also a member of the Association of Chartered Certified Accountants (ACCA) of the United Kingdom.

**Dr Christine Lutringer** is Executive Director and Senior Researcher at the Albert Hirschman Centre on Democracy, Geneva, Switzerland.

**Dr Fahad Saeed** is working as a Scientific Model and Data Manager at Climate Analytics, Berlin, Germany. He has previously worked as a Research Fellow on climate change at the Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, Pakistan.

**Ms Huma Nawaz Syal** is a visiting researcher at the Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, Pakistan, having previously worked with the Pakistani and British governments on research pertaining to the economy. She is also an educator, and is currently researching issues related to education in Pakistan.
Dr Humaira Ishfaq is the Urdu Editor and a Research Fellow at the Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI) in Islamabad, Pakistan. She has more than 12 years’ experience as a media person, writer, literary critic, and teacher of Urdu literature at various local universities. She has authored more than 24 publications.

Dr Imran Saqib Khalid is a Research Fellow at the Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI) in Islamabad, Pakistan. He heads the Environment and Climate Change Unit at the Institute. Dr Khalid holds a PhD in Environmental and Natural Resources Policy from SUNY College of Environmental Science and Forestry, Syracuse, New York, USA.

Ms Khawar Mumtaz is Chairperson of Pakistan’s National Commission on the Status of Women (NCSW), Islamabad. She is an activist who has researched and written on various aspects of women’s lives as evidence for advocacy for laws, policies and measures for ensuring women’s rights.

Dr Maaz Gardezi is Assistant Professor in the Department of Sociology and Rural Studies at the South Dakota State University, USA. His research focus is on issues of social and environmental risk and resilience.

Ms Maha Kamal is a faculty member at the School of Social Sciences and Humanities, Information Technology University (ITU) in Lahore, Pakistan. A Chevening Scholar from the Queen Mary University of London, and a graduate of Boston University, USA, she has published on topics related to energy policy and security.

Brig. (Retd) Mohammad Yasin is Senior Advisor, Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI) for Capacity Building. He has been with SDPI for over 17 years. He has previously worked in the Prime Minister’s Committee for Research and Analysis where he coordinated a number of research projects on district administration, police systems, dispensation of justice, information technology, and education.

Dr Nathalène Reynolds is a Visiting Fellow with the Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, Pakistan; and a member of the Peace Operations Network, University of Montreal, Canada.

Dr Prakash Tiwari is Professor of Geography at Kumaun University, Nainital, India. He is a climate change adaptation and natural resource management
specialist, and has worked in these fields in institutions of excellence in India and abroad.

**Dr Shafqat Munir Ahmad** is a Research Fellow at the Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, Pakistan; and head of the Resilient Development Programme. He also holds the portfolio of Director Policy at SDPI. His doctoral work was on human rights policy and influencing.

**Dr Tariq Bashir** is a UK-based academic and consultant. Besides his various commercial and non-commercial activities, he is Professor of Finance and Accounting at Karachi School of Business and Economics in Pakistan.

**Dr Vaqar Ahmed** is Joint Executive Director of the Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI) in Islamabad, Pakistan. He has worked as an economist with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Asian Development Bank (ADB), World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), World Bank Group, Irish Rural Economy Research Centre and Ministries of Finance, Planning and Commerce in Pakistan. He is a visiting faculty member at the National University of Ireland, IMT Institute of Advanced Studies in Italy, and Pakistan Institute of Trade and Development.

**Ms Wajiha Anwar** is currently teaching English communication skills and English literature at the School of Politics and International Relations, Quaid-i-Azam University in Islamabad, Pakistan as visiting faculty. She specialises in conflict and development; and has over 12 years of professional experience in the corporate and development sectors working at national and international level.

**Dr Zia Ul Qayyum** is the Vice Chancellor of the University of Gujrat, Pakistan. His area of specialisation is artificial intelligence.

**Editors**

Apart from the cooperation of panel organisers and the entire SDPI staff, the Twentieth SDC and this publication would not have been possible without the constant support of:

**Ms Uzma T. Haroon** is Director of the Sustainable Development Conference (SDC) Unit at the Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI) in Islamabad, Pakistan. She has over 21 years’ experience in media and communication and has been the tour de force behind SDPI’s annual international conference series since 2003. She is also co-editor of the past 15 SDC anthologies, including this one. She
has Masters in Communication from the University of Hawai, USA; and Masters in Journalism from the University of Punjab, Pakistan.

**Ms Imrana Niazi** is Senior Coordinator of the Sustainable Development Conference (SDC) Unit at the Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI) in Islamabad, Pakistan. She has been associated with the Institute since 2008. She has also taught at the Bahria University in Islamabad and Fatima Jinnah Women University (FJWU), Rawalpindi, Pakistan as a lecturer. Ms Niazi has co-edited seven SDC anthologies, including this one. She has done Masters in Communication Sciences from the Fatima Jinnah Women University (FJWU), Pakistan.

**Ms Sarah Siddiq Aneel** has more than sixteen years of research and editorial experience in the development sector of Pakistan. Her most recent books as volume editor include *Regional Dynamics and Strategic Concerns in South Asia* (2018); and *Changing Security Situation in South Asia and Development of CPEC* (2018). A Chevening Fellow in ‘Governance and Environmental Democracy’ and LUMS-McGill Fellow in ‘Social Enterprise Development’, she is also managing Clarivate Analytics’ ESCI-indexed HEC recognised X-category Social Sciences *IPRI Journal* in Pakistan.

**Book Cover Designer**
The title cover of this anthology has been adapted from the SDC 2017 poster designed by Brandania.

**Publisher**
Sincere gratitude goes to Mr Ali Kamran from Sang-e-Meel Publishers for his ownership of the SDC anthology despite the impossibly tight deadlines, long nights and expectations of perfection from the editors.
Plenary Discourse
Reflections on the Past, Present and Future of South Asia *

Inaugural Remarks

Abid Qaiyum Suleri**

As we meet today, we are not attending just another event in our busy calendars. We are meeting here today to mark history. The history of this country, the history of this region. Not just that, we, in fact, are also marking the history of SDPI and history of this very annual gathering.

Seven decades ago, our region, this South Asia of high mountains, deep rivers, vast deserts and expansive, fertile plains, was a political wasteland.

Economic backwater.

A British colony.

An aggregation of people who had little, if any at all, say in organising their lives.

Today, we see a vastly different South Asia.

In every single country in the region, there is democracy – if not a democracy in substance – then at least, a democracy in form. The political wasteland of the past is an incubator of change today. The stagnant economic conditions of the pre-independence era have now transformed into an economic dynamism that is impossible to ignore even for the most casual observer.

South Asia and China are considered the ‘hubs of growth’ and are the focus of global attention. Even in geostrategic terms, the region is extremely dynamic where there is no dull moment. This region, which was suppressed and subject to colonialism some seven decades ago, is a junction of three declared atomic states now. Many believe that another neighbouring state in this broader region is also capable of going nuclear, whereas the fifth state in the region has been constantly braving a conflict for the last four decades.

* Inaugural Remarks delivered at the Opening Plenary of the Twentieth Sustainable Development Conference on 5 December 2017.

** Dr Abid Qaiyum Suleri is the Executive Director of the Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, Pakistan.
Politically speaking, despite some hiccups now and then, compared to 70 years ago, we are free to choose the people we want to be ruled by. We are free to live under a political system of our own choosing. And we are free to follow emotions and monism over sanity and pluralism and vice versa.

Today as we are gathered here, we are standing witness to a positive change in our region. We have reduced poverty on a massive scale. Our products and services have competed against the best in the world and beaten them. Our emigrants are running national healthcare systems and Information Technology systems of Europe and North America. The high-rise buildings and infrastructure of the Middle East are proof of our hardworking semi-skilled and unskilled labour.

But let me also add that our economic development is still not able to address structural inequalities and exclusions. Our economic growth has made the difference between the rich and the poor as pronounced and obvious as the one between glittering high-rises of Karachi, Mumbai, or Dhaka and the most squalid slums just underneath them.

I acknowledge that we in the region, have successfully fought off dictatorships, overthrown monarchies and brought down the most entrenched political dynasties. Yet, it goes without saying that the spread and distribution of the democratic dividend has been neither uniform nor fair. Vast swathes of our region still reel under brutal suppression, feeling deliberately kept out and marginalised.

But, then let me remind you that the journey over the past 70 years was far from perfect and was made on an extremely bumpy road. It started with a river of fire and blood in 1947…a river of fire and blood that has flooded more every now and then - sometimes between two countries in the region and sometimes within the same country.

This river of fire and blood continues to live within - in our hearts and minds - dividing us from our neighbours and sometimes from our own selves.

Bigotry, extremism and violence that we inherited from the tragic incidents of the Partition has changed shapes and forms and continues to cast a dark and long shadow over our present and every now and then threatens to blight our future too.

Thus, looking at the last 70 years, one can say that the glass is half-full. Should we continue the way it is?
Which brings me to the other important piece of history that I mentioned in the beginning -- SDPI - born 25 years ago as an independent think tank to provide research-based policy input to the public and private sector. Today, it does much more than just that. It advises development partners and donor agencies, collaborates with think tanks across the region in particular and across the globe in general. It conducts field-based research, gathers data and leads and shapes public opinion on a range of national, regional, and global issues.

This very conference has a history of 20 years of bringing together the best brains of South Asia and beyond every single year. This conference is a congregation of people who believe in pluralistic values and are willing to do their best to fill the second half of the glass. The delegates of this conference, both national and international, may not share the same point-of-view, but they do share the patience and eagerness to listen and understand each other’s points-of-views.

I don’t mean to put you to sleep by continuing to pat myself and SDPI on the back. I am mentioning this history because we have made it. This has been something of our own doing. Its successes and failures have resulted from our words and acts. And SDPI is not the only one - there are many other independent think tanks in the region which are doing the same thing.

Let us put the history of SDPI at a side and analyse the history of 70 years of our independence from a different perspective. I argue that we, as a region, have played but a tiny little role in this history. Every one of us has been a small cog in a wheel that we did not invent rather inherited from our colonial masters. The spokes and rims of this wheel are already defined and shaped through geographical restructuring and through inexorable and unbreakable bonds with a global capitalist system. Our societies, our states and our economies have been an effect of an international political economy where our role in determining its features and contours has been minimal.

Allow me to return where we began.

There is history that we only mark, that we only celebrate or criticise. But then, there is a history that we make, one that we own and possess. And the challenges lie in marrying the history that we mark with the history that we make. The challenge lies in turning around what we have inherited to something we have ourselves created through the agency of our ideas and actions. For this to happen, one of the prerequisites is that independent research, collectors and analysts of robust evidence, and voices of sanity must be nurtured to balance the pressure of narrow-based
groups that reject diversity and promote monism, within and across the borders. Following populist demands and ignoring sane voices, the world is rapidly getting Trumpised, Brextised, Talibanised, Hindutised, and in Pakistan’s recent case – Rizvised.

To stop the wave of monism and extremism and to develop beyond 70, we would have to work together. The government and non-government sector, public and private sectors, policymakers and practitioners, think tanks and do-tanks, media and academia, students and mentors would have to join hands to make a new history where following the spirit of the Sustainable Development Goals, No One would be Left Behind.

And if we can’t work together, we would be throwing out from the glass that is only half-full. That will be a shame, given that we have such abundance of not just great resources, but also great ideas and bright minds – many of them can be seen gracing this august event.

With this, I welcome you all to the twentieth edition of our annual conference.

I look forward to learning from you how to build upon, for the region, on the achievements of the last 70 years; and going forward what are the right things to do, and how to do those right things which we were not doing in the right manner.

Thank you for your attention.
Economic Highs and Lows of Pakistan: Analysing the Last 70 Years

Ishrat Husain

Abstract
Pakistan’s economic performance over the last 70 years can be divided into two distinct phases. In the first phase, covering the first 40 years since its independence, the country was one of the best performing economies among the developing countries with recorded average annual growth rate of 6 percent, far ahead of India and Bangladesh. The second phase which started in 1990 and spanned over the next 25 years witnessed Pakistan becoming an economic laggard, trailing behind other countries in the South Asia region. This chapter explores the possible explanation for this divergence in economic and social outcomes. Five different explanatory hypotheses for the decline of the economy, oft cited in the literature as well as preponderant in popular opinions were tested against empirical evidence. None of these hypotheses could be validated. The study, then, carefully examined other theoretical and empirical evidence and came to the conclusion that it was the differentiation in the institutional capacity and behaviour, which provides a relatively more persuasive answer to this puzzle. Looking beyond these 70 years, it is argued that a selective and incremental approach for restructuring of at least two dozen key institutions responsible for security, growth, equity and transparency and accountability would be politically feasible instead of across the board reforms in order to put Pakistan on its past trajectory.

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* This chapter was earlier published as a Policy Note under SDPI’s Publication Series in February 2018. It was delivered as a Keynote Address at the Twentieth Sustainable Development Conference at Islamabad, Pakistan on 5 December 2017.

** Dr Ishrat Husain is serving as Advisor to the Prime Minister on Institutional Reforms and Austerity and is the former Dean and Director, Institute of Business Administration (IBA), Karachi, Pakistan.
Introduction

To propose a way forward for Pakistan’s sustainable economic growth, it is essential to understand past historical patterns, outcomes and the factors that contributed to them. The goal that Pakistan has set itself for the future is to become the 20th largest economy in the world by 2025. What are the influences that can facilitate or constrain the achievement of this proposed goal?

Pakistan’s economic history has gone through periods of boom and bust. Broadly speaking, the 70 years of Pakistan’s economy can be divided into two distinct periods. The first 40 years (1950-90) during which Pakistan was one of the top ten economic performers among the developing countries, and the next 25 years (1990-2015) when the country fell behind its neighbouring countries, with a decline in the average annual growth rate from 6.5 to 4.5 percent (IMF 2016). The reversal of this declining trend and resumption of the past growth trajectory are, therefore, the main challenges that have to be addressed in the next eight years.

This chapter attempts to examine the several alternative hypotheses that can explain the slowdown, and the reason behind the volatile and inequitable growth of the past 25 years. Through a process of elimination, it advances theoretical and empirical evidence to show that the most powerful explanatory hypothesis lies in the decay of institutions of governance. The same institutions, on the other hand, were strong and performed quite well during the first four decades despite a myriad of difficulties and external and internal shocks. It is argued that the intermediation process through which good economic policies are translated into a rise in income and equitable distribution of benefits involves these institutions. It is the quality, robustness and responsiveness of these institutions that can impact social and economic policies.

The main institutions of governance consist of the judiciary that needs to protect property rights, and enforce contracts; the legislature that prescribes laws and the regulatory framework; and the executive that makes policies and supplies public goods and services. If access to these institutions for common citizens is difficult, time-consuming and costly, the benefits from growth are distributed unevenly as only those who enjoy preferential access are the gainers. The experience of Pakistan, and lessons from other developing countries, suggests that it is the interaction between policies, institutions and leadership that promotes good governance. Sound economic policies cannot be implemented under poor institutions and weak leadership.
Examining the Popular Hypotheses

This section examines the most popular hypotheses advanced in the academic literature as well as popular discourse for explaining Pakistan’s economic decline since the 1990s.

The most common argument is that Pakistan is a fragile, failing or failed state with a large and expanding arsenal of nuclear weapons encircled by Islamic extremists; and a safe haven for nurturing and training terrorists who pose a threat to other countries. The long-standing hostility between nuclear-armed India and Pakistan, who have fought three wars, including the one in 1971 that led to the separation of East Pakistan continues to be a threat to world peace. Kashmir is still a highly contentious and volatile powder keg. Relations with Afghanistan remain tense and mutual recriminations and mistrust have vitiated the atmosphere. Though Pakistan is a non-North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) ally of the United States (US), the popular sentiment in both countries about each other is largely unfavourable. The US considers Pakistan duplicitous in its dealings with the Afghan Taliban and Haqqani network, while Pakistan is bitter that despite incurring such huge losses and sacrificing hundreds of thousands of lives, its role in the War on Terror (WoT) is not fully appreciated. Pakistan is perceived by outsiders as a source of regional instability, an ungovernable country.

Therefore, the popular hypothesis about Pakistan’s economic drift is explained by this increasing influence of religious extremists and terrorists, who have threatened law and order, and disturbed the country’s peace and security. Economic agents are reluctant to undertake new investments under this kind of environment. This hypothesis may be partially valid, but the economic decline started in the 1990s, well before the country became embroiled in the WoT in the post-2001 period. The average growth rate in the 1990s, when the country was relatively peaceful and tranquil, was already down from 6.5 percent in the 1980s to 4 percent. Investment ratios, export growth, and social indicators (e.g. poverty) took a dip in the 1990s. On the contrary, 2002-08 was a period of violence and terrorist activities, including assassination attempts and terrorist attacks on the then-President and Prime Minister of the country. Even so, the country recorded a remarkable turnaround.

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1 The Haqqani network is allied with the Afghan Taliban and the US has accused this network of carrying out terrorist activities in Afghanistan against the US and NATO forces. The Pakistani government’s participation and facilitation to the US troops has evoked negative and hostile reaction among the extremist groups. Many of these groups have coalesced to form Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) which has publicly declared a war against the state of Pakistan. They have organised suicide bombing at public places, carried out assassination attempts on the President and the Prime Minister and attacks on military installations throughout the country.
The growth rate touched 6 to 7 percent on average, investment/ Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ratio peaked to 23 percent and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) flows reached above USD 5 billion.

The more recent experience of 2013-16 is illuminating. Macroeconomic stability was achieved, economic growth rates moved in an upward direction. Confidence of domestic and international investors\(^2\) was regained. These recent developments also negate the view that Pakistan’s security situation, particularly its involvement in the WoT is responsible for the poor economic and social performance. Therefore, the security deficit hypothesis does not stand up to serious scrutiny.

Another group of analysts argues that the availability of generous foreign assistance has been the main determinant of Pakistan’s economic success or failure, and the country’s fortunes vacillate with the flows from external donors. There are two variants of this argument. First, the three periods of economic spurts in the history of Pakistan, i.e., the 1960s, 1980s and early 2000s can all be ascribed to the heavy infusion of this money into the country, and this was the major reason for the turnaround in these three periods of growth spurts. Second, Pakistan has been heavily dependent on large military and economic assistance, and this gets a boost during military rule. Despite this popular perception, the empirical evidence does not prove this assertion.

Let us examine the data on the foreign capital flows in the slow growth periods of the 50s, 70s, 90s and post-2008 period. Table 1 presents the data both for the high growth decades as well as by the type of regime. The data shows that the difference in the volume of assistance between the high growth-military rule periods of 1960s, 1980s and 2000-08, and those of low growth-democratic periods of the 1960s, 1970s, 1990s and 2008-13, was not very significant. In the 1950s, Pakistan received substantial military, civilian and food aid. It was the PL-480\(^3\) imports of food from the US that kept Pakistan away from hunger. In the 1970s, in addition to Western aid official grants and concessional loans (some of which were subsequently transformed in grants or waived off) from oil-rich Arab countries and workers’ remittances did not pose major problems and financed the huge imbalances in the current account. During 1973-74 to 1977-78, commitments of assistance from Iran

\(^2\) Pakistan was upgraded to the MSCI Emerging Markets Index (EMI) from the Frontier Markets [FM] Index; and its credit ratings by Moody’s and Standard and Poor improved. The MSCI EMI captures large and mid-cap representation across 24 EM countries. The acronym MSCI stands for Morgan Stanley Capital International, which compiles influential indexes tracked by fund managers.

\(^3\) Editors’ Note: The US’ Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, commonly known as PL–480 or Food for Peace.
and Arab countries totalled USD 1.2 billion, mostly on concessional terms. Hasan (1998) calculated that aid disbursements during the mid-1970s were at a level far above that reached during the 1965-70 period (average USD 600 million annually that included flows to East Pakistan) after allowing for international inflation. In the 1990s, while US aid was significantly curtailed, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) continued to make loans between 1988 to 1998; while Japan was the largest bilateral provider of concessional loans and grants. The government also utilised the foreign currency deposits of resident and non-resident Pakistanis in national banks amounting to USD 11 billion to finance external payments. This amount is not shown in Table 1. In the post-2008 period, the Kerry-Lugar Bill (also called the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009) authorised USD 7.5 billion of economic and military assistance from the US to Pakistan for a five-year period. Multilateral banks and the IMF increased the quantum of their support, while Pakistan became the largest recipient of aid from the United Kingdom (UK) of £ 1 billion for five years. Thus, despite higher volumes of foreign assistance, the average growth rate has hovered around 3 to 4 percent. It can be seen that there was no significant difference in the availability of foreign capital flows between the periods of high and low growth rates, thus, the hypothesis of high foreign assistance resulting in high economic performance is not validated by the facts.

Table 1: Foreign Capital Flows to Pakistan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Government Type</th>
<th>Growth Outcome</th>
<th>Annual Average Flows ($ Million)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1960s vs 1970s</td>
<td>Military</td>
<td>High growth</td>
<td>385</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Democratic</td>
<td>Low growth</td>
<td>588</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980s vs 1990s</td>
<td>Military</td>
<td>High growth</td>
<td>870</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Democratic</td>
<td>Low growth</td>
<td>1,110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000-08 vs 2009-14</td>
<td>Military</td>
<td>High growth</td>
<td>1,653</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Democratic</td>
<td>Low growth</td>
<td>2,851</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled from the Government of Pakistan ‘Economic Survey’ (various issues), The World Bank World Development Indicators and State Bank of Pakistan ‘Handbook of Statistics’.

Table 2 negates the other widely held perception that Pakistan is addicted to foreign aid and has developed a kind of Dutch disease – that it cannot survive economically without the infusion of foreign savings. The data shows that at its peak in the 1960s, foreign savings for undivided Pakistan had reached 7.4 percent of GDP and
investment for establishing a large industrial base, the Indus Basin works and the
dams and canals, tube-wells for underground water and other capital works were
undertaken in this period. The size of the economy was relatively smaller at that
time. The proportion has been gradually declining since then and is now down to
1.3 percent of a much larger economy. Therefore, the perception about excessive aid
dependence is also not true.

Coterminous with the foreign aid dependence syndrome is the widespread belief
that the US and other Western countries have supported military dictators at the
expense of democratic regimes. They are able to twist and turn the arms of the
strong man running the country to follow their agenda and interests. So Pakistan’s
economy has done well only under autocratic regimes with the blessings of the US.
The coup to overthrow Z.A. Bhutto’s government in 1977, frequent dismissal of
elected regimes in the 1990s, suspension of US aid under the Pressler Amendment
in the early 1990s and the nuclear tests in 1998, were all engineered under this
compact and the drop in economic performance was caused by the consequential
political instability. It must be recalled that the US suspended or curtailed economic
and military assistance at crucial times in Pakistan’s history when the military
dictators were still in power. US aid was suspended soon after the 1965 war with
India, after the 1971 separation of East Pakistan, and the early period of Zia-ul-
Haq’s rule, and sanctions were imposed in 1999 when General Musharraf took over.
Whenever the US’ interests converged with those of Pakistan (1950s [SEATO/CENTO];4 1980s [ousting the Soviets from Afghanistan], and 2001-16 [War in Afghanistan] the former, despite irritants and quibbles on both sides, chose
to assist the latter irrespective of the nature of the regime in power.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>% of Gross National Income</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1960 – 68</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969 – 71</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972 – 77</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978 – 88</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989 – 99</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000 – 07</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008 – 14</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: WB (n.d.).

4 Southeast Asia Treaty Organization and Central Treaty Organization.
Let us examine another factor, i.e., global economic conditions that may have played a negative role in this poor economic performance of Pakistan. The external environment between 1990 and 2008 was highly favourable. Most Emerging and Developing Countries (EDCs) made great strides as chronicled by Radelet (2016) in his book, *The Great Surge: The Ascent of the Developing World*. Between 1995 and 2013, per capita income in the EDCs increased by more than 70 percent. The number of poor halved from two billion in 1990 to 897 million by 2012 - bringing down the share of poor people in the total population from 37 to 13 percent in 2012. The share of EDCs in the world exports rose from 24 to 41 percent in this period. International capital flows jumped from USD 91 billion to USD 1145 billion. All social indicators including Life Expectancy, Maternal Mortality, Infant Mortality, Adult Literacy, Net Enrolment ratios, and Average Years of Schooling showed significant improvement. So, the external economic environment cannot be blamed for Pakistan’s poor performance.

Some analysts have attributed the overall poor performance of Pakistan to the ‘Garrison State’ syndrome (Haqqani 2005 & 2013; Shah 2014; Abbas 2005). As Pakistan has been obsessed with confronting a much larger arch rival – India – since its formation, it has had to allocate a much larger proportion of its resources to defence expenditure and to preserve and expand the corporate interests of the military. Therefore, the neglect of education, health, human development in general and diversion of resources to meet the demands of defence, nuclear capability, and other security-related expenditures has led to the present economic and social outcomes. In actual fact, Table 3 clearly establishes that the annual growth of defence spending was much higher in the first 40 years (a period in which GDP was also growing quite rapidly) compared to the last 25 years. Table 4 shows that the ratio of defence expenditure to GDP was also consistently high in the first 40 years, and is now 2.5 percent of GDP – falling from the average of 6 to 7 percent in the 1980s and earlier years. Most nuclear-related expenditure was also incurred in the 1970s and 1980s. During fiscal year (FY) 2016, the budgetary allocation for education was 2.7 percent of GDP (Naviwala 2016). Combining health and education together, the budgetary allocation is 3.7 percent - higher than that of defence and internal security, but certainly lower than what is required to fill the huge gap in enrolment and primary healthcare services. In these sectors, it is governance and management issues that are impediments in the delivery of services, not budgetary allocations. A popular myth that has now become quite entrenched and almost accepted as gospel truth in many circles is that of large corporate interests of the military (Siddiq 2007: 76).
Table 3: Growth Rates of Defence Spending and GDP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Annual Growth Rate of Defence Expenditure %</th>
<th>Annual Growth Rate of GDP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1950 - 90</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990 - 2015</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950 - 2015</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Calculated from Government of Pakistan 'Economic Survey' (various years).

Table 4: Defence Expenditure, Social Spending and Development

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>End June</th>
<th>Defence</th>
<th>Health &amp; Education</th>
<th>Development Spending</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% of Total GDP Expenditure</td>
<td>% of Total GDP Expenditure</td>
<td>% of Total GDP Expenditure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>28.3</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Government of Pakistan 'Economic Survey' (various years).

It is true that the Armed Forces have established foundations and trusts that run enterprises, but the proceeds and profits they earn are utilised for the welfare of Army pensioners, particularly the soldiers who retire at an early average age (45-50). The education and healthcare of their families are financed by the income generated by these foundations and trusts. To put this in perspective, the total market cap in November 2016 of all the listed companies owned by the Fauji Foundation (FF), Army Welfare Trust (AWT), Shaheen Foundation (SF) and Bahria Foundation (BF) together was only 4.5 percent of the total market cap of the companies listed on the Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSE). Siddiqa (2007: 2) claimed that:
The estimated worth runs into billions of dollars. Moreover, the military’s two business groups - the Fauji Foundation and the Army Welfare Trust - are the largest business conglomerates in the country.

It is true that the listed companies owned by the FF, AWT etc. are big players in the fertilizer sector, but they have equally large conglomerates competing with them such as Engro and Fatima Group. All of these companies pay full taxes on their income, sales and imports and do not enjoy any exemptions or concessions of a preferential nature. The share of other unlisted companies owned by these foundations and trusts in the total assets of unlisted companies is not known, but it would be quite insignificant as the universe of privately-owned enterprises and businesses is substantial. Therefore, the ‘Garrison State’ hypothesis, despite its highly attractive appeal, also does not meet the test of evidentiary confirmation.

Having ruled out factors such as security and terrorism, inflow of foreign assistance, preference for military rule, external economic environment, and diversion of public expenditures towards defence, which may have all played some role, but were not the main determinant of the poor performance, we turn our attention to the institutions of governance.

We begin by surveying theoretical and empirical studies relating to aggregate indicators of good governance, its sub-components and economic growth, pro-poor growth, per capita incomes at cross-country global and regional level, and then focus on the case of Pakistan. Available evidence across countries suggests a positive relationship between good governance and economic growth. Governance has a statistically significant impact on GDP per capita across 93 countries and governance explains nearly 75 percent of the cross-country variations in income per head (Baldacci et al. 2003). An ADB study shows that developing Asian economies with government effectiveness, regulatory quality, and rule of law scoring above the global mean (after controlling for per capita income) grew faster on average during 1998-2008 than those economies scoring below the global mean. The authors conclude that good governance is associated with both a higher level of per capita GDP as well as higher rates of GDP growth over time (Zhuang et al. 2010).

Numerous other studies have demonstrated the linkages between good governance and healthy economic growth. Huther and Shah (2005) explicitly linked governance to the notion of institutions, defining it as ‘all aspects of the exercise of authority through formal and informal institutions in the management of the resource endowment of a state.’ In their study, they found a high correlation between
governance quality and per capita income. The positive correlation between the ten-year economic growth rate and governance quality supports the argument that good governance is an important determinant of economic development. Kaufmann and Kraay (2002) found a direct causal effect from better governance to higher per capita income across 175 countries for the period 2000-01. Negative causal effect was found as well from per capita income to governance implying that improvements in governance are unlikely to occur merely as a consequence of development. Better maintenance of the rule of law and political stability affect economic growth (Barro 1991). Dollar and Kraay (2002) found that the rule of law indicator is positively and significantly correlated with the growth in per capita incomes of the poorest quintile. Chong and Gradstein (2004) discovered that political stability and rule of law exhibit negative and significant relation with inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient. Kraay’s (2004) analysis led him to conclude that rule of law and accountability were both positively correlated with growth and distributional changes, while openness to international trade has a positive correlation with growth and poverty reducing shifts in incomes. Kimenyi (2005) argues that pro-poor reforms cannot have the intended impact unless there are significant changes in the institutions of governance. Cross-country studies by Mauro (1995) and Knack and Keefer (1995) demonstrated that political instability, corruption, poor bureaucratic quality, absence of rule of law, and expropriation risk are strongly correlated with lower investment and growth rates.

New Institutional Economics (NIE) identified institutional capabilities that states need to make the markets function efficiently. North (1990) defines institutions:

\[
\text{...as humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic and social interactions and include the laws, rules, customs, and norms constructed to advance and preserve social order.}
\]

With regard to the link between institutions and economic development, his view is as follows:

\[
\text{How do we account for poverty in the midst of plenty? We must create incentives for people to invest in more efficient technology, increase their skills and organize efficient markets. Such incentives are embodied in institutions (Ibid.: 12).}
\]

Acemoglu and Robinson (2014) highlight that it is the institutions that determine the fate of nations. Success comes when political and economic institutions are ‘inclusive’ and pluralistic, creating incentives for everyone to invest in the future.
Nations fail when institutions are ‘extractive’, protecting the political and economic power of only a small elite that takes income from everyone else. Institutions that promote good governance and facilitate broad-based and inclusive growth have come to occupy the current consensus on development strategy. According to Acemoglu and Johnson (2005), good institutions ensure two desirable outcomes: relatively equal access to economic opportunity (a level playing field), and the likelihood that those who provide labour or capital are appropriately rewarded and their property rights are protected.

Among the components of good governance, human capital is associated with both economic growth and equity. Ali et al. (2015), using the data for 1996-2011 for 134 countries, found strong evidence that the relationship between human capital and economic growth is much less pronounced in countries with low quality of governance. Preconditions in the form of good governance are necessary for an educated labour force to contribute to the economic growth of a country. Weak governance, indicated by deteriorated law and order conditions, corruption, and maladministration, results in inefficient utilisation of human resources.

Haq and Zia (2009) have explored linkages between governance and pro-poor growth in Pakistan for the period 1996 to 2005. The analysis indicates that governance indicators have low scores and rank at the lowest possible percentile as compared to other countries. Their econometric analysis shows a strong relationship between good governance and reduction in poverty and income inequality.

The model of an elitist economy sets out the historical context and the drivers of the capture of the state and rigging of markets in Pakistan (Husain 1999). It is postulated that a narrow elite constituting about 1-2 percent of the population has used state and markets for their political power and self-enrichment to the neglect of the majority population, particularly the poor and the less privileged segments of society. This small minority was able to enjoy this unjust accumulation of wealth in the midst of widespread poverty and squalor. In the absence of a neutral umpire, markets are rigged by the elites for their own advantage, and thus, market outcomes and resource allocation are inefficient. The state, which has to ensure equitable distribution of gains from economic growth, is also controlled by the same elite that evades taxes and appropriates public expenditures for its own benefits. Inequities – interpersonal, regional, gender – become commonplace in such an environment. Access to institutions that deliver public goods and services is intermediated by the elite through a patronage-based system.
Thus, both theoretical as well as cross-country empirical evidence and our own experience lend a lot of weight in support of the argument that poor governance manifested in weak institutions, could be the predominant influence in the unsatisfactory economic and social performance of Pakistan in the last quarter century relative to both its own previous four decades and other countries in the region. The evidence to substantiate this point-of-view is the gradual decline in Pakistan’s ranking and score on the following Indices compiled by international and multilateral bodies, independent think tanks, academics, researchers, non-governmental organisations (NGOs):

- The World Bank, World Governance Indicators (WGI)
- World Economic Forum (WEF), Global Competitiveness Report
- United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Human Development Index (HDI)
- Freedom House, Economic Freedom Index (EFI)
- Transparency International, Corruption Perception Index (CPI)
- International Country Risk Guide
- United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), Education for All (EFA) Index
- Legatum Prosperity Index (LPI)

Appendix 1 shows the comparative ranking of India, Pakistan and Bangladesh against various governance indicators over time. While there is an improvement observable for India and Bangladesh (although their scores are still low), Pakistan records a downward drift.

Sherani (2017) reviewed the WGI for the period 1996-2015. His analysis shows that Pakistan has performed poorly in all six sub-components of governance. The average percentile rank for 16 years, excluding political stability and absence of violence (extremely low), ranges from 18 to 32. He writes that in four out of the six parameters - Government Effectiveness, Control of Corruption, Regulatory Quality, and Political Stability and Absence of Violence - the best scores were recorded under President Musharraf (a period in which economic growth was also averaging 6-7 percent annually). Again there was some modest improvement in the WGI, Ease of Doing Business and CPI for 2015 and 2016 when the economy was beginning to perform well. The same picture emerges by examining other indicators and indices compared to India and Bangladesh. Pakistan has fallen below these countries in the HDI, CPI, and LPI, and continues to lag behind India and Bangladesh in EFA, and EFI. The gap with India has also widened in the Global Competitiveness Index and Global Innovation Index.
Any demarcation of boundaries between different periods can be challenged for its arbitrariness. Binary classifications suffer from the inherent problem of everything being painted either black or white. If we take a continuum approach, then the shift from grey towards black became perceptible in the late 1980s and early 1990s. It has to be conceded that the seeds of institutional weakening were sown much earlier in the 1970s, but the past momentum and the intervening period of Zia regime in the 1980s did create a buffer between the civil servants and political interference which unravelled in the 1990s. The brief tenure (1985-88) of Prime Minister Mohammad Khan Junejo provided an interesting interlude when a feudal politician from Sindh insisted upon following good governance practices, but this was not sustained over time. As an irony, his successors who ruled the country between 1988 and 1999 - leaders of two established major political parties - abandoned these good practices and traditions when they assumed power and the pendulum swung in the other direction.

Diagnostic studies, particularly the volumes based on the Annual Conferences on Pakistan organised by the Woodrow Wilson Center at Washington suggest that every single crisis faced by the country – low tax mobilisation, energy shortages, unsatisfactory law and order situation, losses of public sector enterprises, poor delivery of education and health services, stagnating trade - can be traced back to this governance deficit, institutional weaknesses, exacerbated by the military rule that did nothing to strengthen the institutions.5

Tax collectors enjoy wide discretionary powers that they use to extort money and enrich themselves rather than raise additional revenues for the exchequer. Power and gas companies find a huge gap between the sales revenues they assess, bill and collect and the purchases of units which they have to pay for. Law and order suffers and the common citizen feels insecure because the police officials are appointed on the recommendations of the elected members of Parliament and assemblies in exchange for outright payment rather than on their professional capabilities. Public sector enterprises naturally face losses when they become the dumping ground to accommodate thousands of unneeded employees at the behest of the ruling party. In competitive markets, they lose market share and in public monopolies they fleece the consumers but still incur losses due to inefficiency, waste and corruption. There

5 Diagnostic studies presented at the Annual Conference on Pakistan organised by the Woodrow Wilson Center include: Hathaway and Lee (2004); Hathaway (2005); Muchhala et al. (2007); Kugelman and Hathaway (2009); Kugelman and Hathaway (2010); Nayak and Hathaway (2011); Hathaway and Kugelman (2011); Hathaway and Kugelman (2013); Kugelman (2014); Kugelman (2015).
is a general consensus in Pakistan endorsed by the international organisations, that the civilian institutions have decayed over time. According to the World Bank (2013):

In a recent analysis of binding constraints to Pakistan’s economy, bad governance and a poor civil service appear to be undermining economic growth. Without improving governance, other efforts in realizing the country’s growth potential are destined to be less effective than they would be otherwise.

The main message of this chapter is that the existing asymmetric power relationship between the military and the civilian sectors needs to be reversed. Frequent calls to the military for overt or covert interventions in aid of the civilian administration are not in the interests of long-term political, economic and social stability of Pakistan. The Armed Forces should not be distracted from performing their professional duties in an environment of high threat perceptions to the external security of the country. They are best left to do the job for which they are well-equipped and capable. There is a widely accepted belief that if the district administrations, law enforcement agencies (LEAs) and the civilian intelligence agencies were performing their job well, the illegal and unlawful activities of the militant and extremist elements would have been nipped in the bud and the country would have avoided such a massive dislocation in its economic and social life. Were basic services such as education, healthcare and justice accessible to common citizens, the drift towards the criminal-extremist nexus would not have taken root in society.

The challenge, therefore, is how to turn this ungovernable state to being democratically governable once again. This can be achieved by rebuilding vibrant, agile and effective institutions of democratic governance that can establish the writ of the state, eliminate the non-state actors engaged in criminal and militant activities, deliver basic goods and services, including justice to the majority of the population in a fair and equitable manner and reignite the growth impulses that had characterised the first half of the country’s existence.

The National Commission for Government Reforms (NCGR) consisting of members drawn from both the private and public sectors travelled throughout Pakistan during 2006-2008, consulted with different stakeholders, carried out field studies, made on-the-spot observations about the delivery of public services, reviewed research work and compiled a report (Husain 2012). The Commission made exhaustive recommendations in the structure, human resource policies, business process re-engineering of the federal, provincial and local governments,
public enterprises and corporations, and autonomous bodies etc. The recommendations of the Commission have been welcomed by various governments, but have not been formally accepted or implemented. One wishes that a successor government would move with vigour to implement this full set of recommendations, but it seems more realistic to begin with the proposition that it is unrealistic to expect that a comprehensive reform of the Civil Services and of all the civilian institutions of governance is feasible under the given political realities.

The dilemma facing academics and technocratic policy reformers is that inefficient policies and institutions exist and status quo is defended because it suits the politically influential elites; and the constituency and coalitions for efficient policies and strong institutions do not exist. If the first best solution of across-the-board and comprehensive reforms is not feasible, can a second or third best solution of selective and incremental approach by taking up a few key institutions of democratic governance be designed expecting that it may not meet the same kind of fierce resistance as those affected by these reforms would be a miniscule of the entire population of civil servants? The choice of institutions should be driven by consideration of powerful spill-over effects gradually engulfing a larger space over time.

This chapter proposes an incremental and selective reform of some of the key institutions that can help in moving towards the goal of restoring the efficacy, efficiency and effectiveness of democratic governance. It is proposed that these institutions get back on the same pathway – merit, integrity, dedicated service and problem solving – that was their main asset historically. There are already many examples of successful institutions working quite well in the midst of this general atmosphere of institutional decay and their success reflects adherence to the same principles. The performance of Punjab Government in many respects is much better than that of other provinces and it can be attributed to strong exemplary leadership, but its sustainability would be assured if its institutional infrastructure is also strengthened.

The analytical framework for this study on institutions and their linkage with economic and social development in Pakistan is based on the World Bank’s 2017 World Development Report (WDR) on Governance and Law (WB 2016). Here, the elements of policy effectiveness chain outlined in WDR are applied to Pakistan and recommendations are made that can help in strengthening this chain.

Using the above framework, the development objectives for Pakistan are identified, which are broadly shared by a vast majority of people as well as political parties and
other stakeholders. These are Security, Growth and Equity or SGE. Thus, around 25 institutions dealing with these three objectives need to be strengthened and restructured on the lines spelt out in Box 1 (Appendix 2).

The institutions are grouped together below according to their possible contribution towards achieving the development goals of Security, Growth and Equity. In addition, there are cross-cutting institutions that directly or indirectly impact all the three objectives and are mainly concerned with Accountability, Transparency, Standard Setting, etc.

**Parliamentary Committees**
- Local Governments
- Auditor General of Pakistan (AG), and the Public Accounts Committees (PACs)
- National Accountability Bureau (NAB)/ Provincial Anti-Corruption Departments
- Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP)
- Public Service Commissions (FPSC)/ Provincial PSCs
- Information Commissioners under the Freedom of Information Act
- E-Government Directorate General/ Provincial IT Boards

**Security**
- Lower Judiciary
- Police including investigation and intelligence agencies
- Federal Investigation Agency (FIA)
- National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA)
- Prosecution departments

**Growth**
- State Bank of Pakistan (SBP)
- Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP)
- Higher Education Commission (HEC)
- National Science and Technology Commission (NSTC)
- Federal Board of Revenue (FBR)
- Trade Development Authority of Pakistan (TDAP)
- Board of Investment (BOI)
- Competition Commission of Pakistan (CCP)
Equity

- Pakistan Agriculture Research Council (PARC)/ Provincial Research Institutes
- Local Government
- SBP
- HEC needs-based scholarship programme
- Benazir Income Support Programme (BISP)/ Zakat committees/ Bait-ul-Mal
- Irrigation authorities
- Urban development authorities
- National Vocational and Technical Education Commission (NAVTEC).

Conclusion

Going forward, Pakistan’s economy has to face a myriad of complex challenges arising from an uncertain global environment, an explosive knowledge economy, disruptive technologies, demographic transition, and climate change. Regionally, the country can take advantage of its strategic location linking South Asia with Central Asia and Central Asia and China with the Middle East. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) currently being implemented can play a crucial role in establishing these linkages. In the domestic arena, the battle against terrorism and extremism, equipping the young population with education and skills for productive employment, bringing about inter-provincial harmony and social cohesion by reducing inequalities and disparities and managing urbanisation, need to be aggressively pursued.

Pakistan’s goal to become the 20th largest economy in the world by 2025, in the face of these external and domestic challenges, can be achieved if the country is able to make a reasonable evaluation of the facilitating and constraining influences on its economy during the last seven decades. It would be difficult to ride the crest until the downward trend of the last 25 years can be reversed and the past trajectory of 6 to 7 percent growth rate is resumed. This chapter, therefore, examined several alternative hypotheses in an attempt to explain Pakistan’s declining economic growth rate and weak social indicators for the last 25 years and compared this with the earlier 40 years. The most satisfactory explanation lies in the decay of the institutions of governance that have failed to achieve the interrelated development outcomes of security, growth and equity. It follows, therefore, that the most important task is the resuscitation of institutions functioning under the executive, legislative and judicial branches of governance to enable them to become sufficiently strong to effectively translate policies, programmes, and projects on the ground. By doing so, it is possible to make up for lost time because effective, responsive, and well-functioning institutions would help to minimise the politics of patronage, unshackle the entrepreneurial energies of the private sector, assure delivery and
equitable access to basic services to the citizens, and empower civil society and local governments. The federal, provincial, and local governments, parliament and judiciary have to respect the boundaries within which each has to function without encroaching on each other’s domains. The current practices, norms, and mind-set that are characterised by confrontation, polarisation, fighting for turf and engaging in ‘blame the other’ games will need to end. This will indeed be the most challenging undertaking which will either make or break the economic nervous system and the security backbone of the country. It may be recalled that a study by the WEF had concluded that a slight improvement in governance results in a threefold increase in per capita income in the long run. This is the likely gain, which would accrue by improving the civilian institutions of governance in Pakistan and contribute significantly to the achievement of the set goal.

A catalogue of comprehensive reforms is easy to describe but extremely complex and difficult to implement. These reforms are unlikely to be introduced in one go as it is neither practicable nor feasible to do so, both due to the absence of political will and capacity constraints. The first best solution – sweeping reform throughout the institutions of governance – is therefore ruled out. It is, therefore, proposed that a second or third best solution that targets a subset of key institutions which, if set right, can make a substantial improvement in the governance landscape of Pakistan over time. The spill-over and knock on effects of these institutions over others would enlarge the space for beneficial outcomes over time. The challenge of reforming even this subset is formidable as the vested interests wishing to perpetuate the status quo are politically powerful and the coalition and alliances between the political leadership and the beneficiaries of the existing system are so strong that they cannot be easily ruptured. The elected governments with an eye on the short-term electoral cycles are not in a position to incur the pains of these reforms upfront, while the gains accrue later on to a different political party. The authoritarian governments are not effective as they do not enjoy legitimacy for sustaining reforms. Changing institutions is a slow and difficult process requiring, in addition to significant political will, fundamental measures to reduce the opportunity and incentives for particular groups to capture economic rents.

The exact steps required for restructuring these institutions have already been developed, some in conjunction with the World Bank and in several publications discussed earlier. Lessons learnt from the neighbouring countries outlined in this chapter, if adapted and applied, can further refine and reinforce this restructuring effort.
In the WDR framework, the drivers of change are absolutely crucial. It would not be possible to execute these reforms unless all the major political parties agree and reach a consensus so that partisanship and point scoring do not come in the way of the implementation of these reforms. Civil servants, who have retreated in a passive mode, can be reactivated, if they know that the risks of retribution and penalties involved in implementing these reforms would be minimal. The politicians, of all persuasions, have to realise that the growing disaffection for political parties and leaders in the country, the quickening spread of violence and intolerance, the rising popularity and respect for the Armed Forces and the widening gap between expectations of the general populace and delivery by the government are indeed a wake-up call for altering their past conduct, practices and behaviour. A growing educated urban middle class, information and communication revolution permeating even in the rural areas through electronic and social media should act as catalysts for this change. The ultimate beneficiaries of such altered behaviour would not only be the citizens of Pakistan, but also the political parties themselves. The cynicism and wide distrust of politicians in society at large would be replaced by improved access and delivery of essential basic services eventually bolstering confidence in the country’s political leaders and leadership.
References


Economic Highs and Lows of Pakistan:
Analysing the Last 70 Years


Appendix 1:

Comparative Indicators of Governance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Global Competitiveness Report</th>
<th>Overall Global Competitiveness Index</th>
<th>Pakistan</th>
<th>India</th>
<th>Bangladesh</th>
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<tr>
<td>Earliest year (2004)</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>100</td>
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<tr>
<td>Latest year (2017)</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>99</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Human Development Index**

| Earliest year (1990)         | 120                                 | 123      | 136   |

**Ease of Doing Business Rank**

| Earliest year (2006)         | 60                                  | 116      | 65    |
| Latest year (2017-18)        | 147                                 | 100      | 177   |

**World Governance Indicators**

| Earliest year (2005)         | "                                   | "       | "     |
| Voice and accountability     | 17                                  | 60       | 29    |
| Political stability and its absence | 5                                  | 18       | 4     |
| Government effectiveness     | 40                                  | 55       | 21    |
| Regulatory quality           | 26                                  | 47       | 17    |
| Rule of law                  | 22                                  | 58       | 18    |
| Control of corruption (Latest year 2015) | 14                                  | 43       | 5     |
| Voice and accountability     | 27                                  | 61       | 31    |
| Political Stability & Absence of Terrorism | 1                                  | 17       | 11    |
| Government effectiveness     | 27                                  | 56       | 24    |
| Regulatory quality           | 29                                  | 40       | 17    |
| Rule of law                  | 24                                  | 56       | 27    |
| Control of corruption        | 24                                  | 44       | 18    |

**Perception of Corruption Index**

| Earliest year (1998) - Score Format | 2.25 | N/A | 2.78 |
| Latest year (2015) (out of 168)     | 117  | 76  | 139  |

**Global Innovation Index**

| Earliest year (2007)   | 73  | 23  | 98  |
| Latest year (2017)     | 113 | 60  | 114 |

**Education for All Index**

| Earliest year (1980) | 0.161 | 0.24 | 0.202 |
| Latest year (2013)   | 0.372 | 0.473| 0.447 |
| Country EFA Rank (2012) | 113 | 102 | - |

**Legatum Prosperity Index: Governance**

| Earliest year (2007) | 46  | 47  | 48  |
| Latest year (2016, rankings out of 149) | 139 | 104 | 114 |

Contd. ahead
## Economic Highs and Lows of Pakistan: Analysing the Last 70 Years

### Global Competitiveness Report

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Overall Global Competitiveness Index</th>
<th>Pakistan</th>
<th>India</th>
<th>Bangladesh</th>
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<td>3</td>
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<td><strong>Polity IV; Intl. Country Risk Guide</strong></td>
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<td>5</td>
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<td>Earliest year (2012) out of 105</td>
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<td><strong>Corruption Perception Index</strong></td>
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<td>Latest year (2016) out of 176</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>145</td>
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</table>

*Source:* The indices are based on the data from various sources.\(^6\)

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Box 1

Essential ingredients for restructuring and strengthening proposed institutions:

1. Select and appoint on basis of open competition and merit a widely respected, strong and competent individual of known integrity and demonstrated leadership qualities to head the institution for a fixed tenure. Removal from the office can take place only under pre-specified conditions.

2. Agree on the mandate, terms of reference, responsibilities, functions, powers, objectives, framework agreement and key performance indicators (KPIs).

3. Appoint an independent Board of Governors, wherever necessary, consisting of eminent persons for oversight, supervision, strategic plan and budgetary allocations holding the management accountable for results.

4. Grant one-line budgetary allocation to resource the organisation, allow financial autonomy subject to internal controls and external audit.

5. Delegate the powers to the head of the organisation to appoint the professional staff and human resources of calibre through an open, transparent process.

6. Submit an annual performance report to the Parliament and appear before the relevant Parliamentary Committee to answer questions.

7. The government can give policy direction, but not interfere in day-to-day operations.
Development Beyond 70 and the Way Forward

Shamshad Akhtar∗∗

Congratulations to the team of the Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI) on its 25th anniversary. SDPI deserves special recognition. You help with public advocacy, advisory support, and allow a platform of exchange for leadership, politicians and policymakers on key issues Pakistan faces.

The 70th anniversary of the independence of Pakistan, the theme of this conference, is a soul-searching opportunity for the nation. It is a year in which Pakistan needs to prioritise the United Nations’ 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development – one which should be resolutely backed by a strong political consensus in order build an inclusive implementation architecture to ‘leave no one behind.’

So where do we stand? The nation’s development framework – Vision 2025 - focuses on inclusive growth, sustainability, and social transformation. It is in step with the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) Agenda - it is people-centric and it recognises the significance of democratic governance and active Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs). By legislating to support this sustainable agenda, the Parliament, the Planning Commission and the provinces have institutionalised the SDG Task Force and recognised the importance of the statistical system which allows for the monitoring of 55 SDG indicators.

Pakistan’s development achievements are many if we set the base year as 1947. With the emergence of a new global agenda, let us reset the base year to 2016. Keeping the core objective of sustainable development (eradicating poverty in all its forms) in mind, Pakistan has a complex and long journey ahead in order to improve the lives of the 29.5 percent of its people who live under the national poverty line. Viewed through a multidimensional lens which captures human development indicators, there are 60 million vulnerable people whose lives we need to change.

Regional records of poverty decline vary significantly across provinces. The incidence of poverty is much steeper in Balochistan and Sindh. Across the country, rural poverty incidence is about 36 percent compared to urban poverty incidence of

∗ This Concluding Keynote Address was presented at the Closing Plenary of the Sustainable Development Policy Institute’s Twentieth Sustainable Development Conference in Islamabad, Pakistan, on 7 December 2017.

∗∗ Dr Shamshad Akhtar is the former Caretaker Minister of Finance (2018), Government of Pakistan. She was earlier serving as the tenth Executive Secretary of the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP).
18 percent. A number of social indicators are truly distressing. 36.5 percent lack good access to sanitation and water shortages can be acute. Shockingly, the incidence of stunting and malnutrition among children is above 50 percent in Balochistan and Sindh. Matters are compounded by the low outcomes on key human development indicators. Public spending on education and health is barely 4 percent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Malnutrition undermines human capital and economic productivity.

The human development challenges Pakistan faces are compounded by the devastating impacts of climate change and natural disasters. According to the 2017 Global Climate Risk Index, Pakistan is ranked seventh among the countries most adversely affected by climate change. Floods and droughts regularly take a toll on agricultural production. The floods of 2010 alone affected over 18 million people. Damages were estimated around USD ten billion. They were followed by heavy monsoon rains in September 2011, affecting some 9.7 million people in Sindh and Balochistan. Climate change in Pakistan is causing and exacerbating disasters, disproportionately affecting those excluded and most vulnerable.

A strategic and sustainable approach to poverty reduction and the strategisation of SDG priorities, along with sustainable, robust and quality growth must be Pakistan’s number one priority. Political stability and a smooth democratic transition will help the public and private sectors embark steadily on this journey. At the same time, the Parliament needs to proactively promote good governance and the rule of law to underpin sustainable development. Think tanks, such as the SDPI, have a key role to galvanise political momentum, promote stakeholder, private sector and civil society engagements and independently monitor development progress. This overarching framework needs to be reinforced by action in the areas discussed below.

First, a plan must be prepared to substantially scale up social safety nets such as the Benazir Income Support Program (BISP) whose coverage in 2016-17 reached 5.4 million households. Its sustainability should be enhanced by increasing beneficiaries’ access to financial services. Despite recent improvements, less than a quarter of the adult population is currently served by the banking system.

Second, more effective vertical and horizontal federal-provincial-local fiscal arrangements would be critical. SDGs responsibility disproportionately falls on the provinces and local governments as the 18th Constitutional Amendment resulted in significant devolution to provinces of social and environmental responsibilities, along with expenditure assignment. It further called on provinces to devolve
political, administrative and financial responsibility to local governments. Decentralisation has been a landmark achievement and resource transfers were agreed upfront. However, given the scale of devolution and its implications, there is need to, among others, reflect further on the sharing of financing and expenditure burdens for joint projects, development of new cooperative federal-provincial-local institutional coordination mechanisms, and mitigate the political resistance to tax major sources of local revenues. This may call for further deliberations at the Council of Common Interest (CCI) and by provincial governments. There is a need to further think through how provincial and local governments should overhaul local taxation systems and options for financing and streamlining SDG responsibilities.

Third, Pakistan has yet to fully leverage multiple regional cooperation and integration platforms. These are critical for the country’s economic and trade diversification, the country’s deeper market integration, and enhanced seamless and multimodal transport connectivity – a connectivity, which should be coupled with energy and Information and Communication Technology (ICT) connectivity, and the implementation of other reforms to achieve transboundary SDGs. We need to sharpen Pakistan’s response to climate change and changing ecosystems, and improve natural resource management. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has given impetus to regional connectivity. Yet we should reflect on how BRI projects can mainstream sustainable development priorities and how Pakistan could take advantage of other regional cooperative arrangements. ESCAP has been at the forefront of pushing for regional cooperation and integration in Asia so that this is informed by the sustainable development agenda.

Fourth, to capitalise on institutional and operational achievements on SDGs, Pakistan should focus on mainstreaming SDGs more effectively across central and local governments’ development plans and budgets. By translating SDG targets into specific budgetary allocations, Pakistan will generate the triple dividend of achieving higher quality growth through sustainable investment; promote balanced development; and nurture social and nature harmony. Spearheading the localisation of the 2030 Agenda in the provinces and municipalities, with the latter bearing the bulk of the responsibility for urban SDGs, is vital. A bottom-up approach that will highlight the specific, operational and implementation needs of provincial governments on implementing SDGs should be followed.

Fifth, leveraging private finance and capital is critical to meet the growing demands of infrastructure. Despite substantial progress in the financial sector, there is evidence that it lacks depth and diversification. Integration of capital markets provides a unique opportunity for the country’s corporate businesses to list and
improve their governance, while raising risk capital competitively. There is significant potential and room for improvement in raising domestic resources, should the government move on strengthening its tax base, and rationalise tax incentive regimes. In order to improve the ease of doing business, there is need for more aggressive digitisation of approvals and reducing the procedural clearances. Pakistan should become a party to the ESCAP Agreement on the Facilitation of Cross-border Paperless Trade in Asia and the Pacific.

Sixth, by recognising the integrated and interdependent nature of the three dimensions of sustainable development, namely economic, social and environmental, there is substantial scope for Pakistan to develop a better understanding of intersectoral and indivisible linkages of the SDGs, and instruments to assess the energy-water-agriculture nexus and growth and environmental trade-offs. Policies to promote one subset of the goals may have significant spill-over effects - positive or negative - on the achievement of other SDGs and national targets. ESCAP is developing tools and economic modelling frameworks to promote system thinking, policy coherence and integration of environmental and social dimensions in plans and fiscal framework and their impact assessments. It is also building capacity for the application of tools to prioritise goals and define national and local responses for each goal.

To conclude, Pakistan must go beyond setting up task forces and implement deeper structural reforms. We must reflect on sector policy dynamics and strive for federal provincial fiscal coordination as well as policy coherence. Also, macroeconomic and financial stability must be recognised as key to achieving medium- and long-term growth. These are the prerequisites of sustainable development and given the resurfacing of macroeconomic vulnerabilities there is no room for complacency. Fiscal consolidation has slowed, and deficit targets remain elusive. The external current account deficit is widening as exports remain stagnant, while imports of capital goods and energy have increased. Foreign exchange reserves’ vulnerabilities could grow. While the business climate and financial inclusion reforms have continued, financial losses of ailing public-sector enterprises weigh on scarce fiscal resources, which are likely to be under pressure given the growing external risks. Normalisation of monetary policy will tighten financial conditions, growth and trading dynamics of key trading partners will change as countries enhance their competitiveness and productivity, and oil prices rise. In this context, the country’s debt sustainability must be carefully managed.

I look forward to considering SDPI’s analysis to find intelligent, balanced and progressive policy solutions in these areas in the months and years ahead.
Thematic Discourse
Institutional Reforms in Pakistan: Missing Piece of the Development Puzzle

Sakib Sherani

Abstract
After experiencing over two decades of strong growth, Pakistan’s economy has floundered since the 1990s. The country’s economic performance has deteriorated both with regards to its own historical trend, as well as when benchmarked against developing country peers. The deterioration is structural and not cyclical, manifesting itself across a wide front, and has persisted for a protracted period.

The weak performance of the economy has occurred in a context of broad atrophy of the country’s institutional framework. Is there correlation or indeed even causality between the two developments? The corpus of growth literature on Pakistan has largely ignored the country’s historical economic performance, in particular the period of decline from the early 1990s, through an institutional prism. This chapter attempts to lay out the landscape and provide a broad examination of the issues. The study also hints at possible solutions and approaches to institutional reforms, in particular relating to institutions of economic governance.

This chapter has been approved as a Research Paper by the referee.

Mr Sakib Sherani is the former Principal Economic Advisor, Ministry of Finance, Government of Pakistan; and the Founder/Chief Executive Officer of Macroeconomic Insights (Pvt.) Ltd, Islamabad, Pakistan.
Introduction
A modern state has multiple functions. At the core is its developmental role, seeking to better the lives of its citizens and future generations in an inclusive, responsive, responsible and sustainable manner. The state’s ability to meaningfully fulfil this role requires institutional capacity. A large corpus of academic literature pertaining to institutional theory over the past four decades has linked weak institutional quality and poor governance with lower private investment, lower economic growth, worse development outcomes, and higher inequality, among other correlations.

In this context, Pakistan’s institutional framework – the ability and willingness of the state to frame laws and policies for public good, to implement these, and to enforce its writ via prosecuting violations of the laws of the land – has prima facie weakened over a period of time. The atrophy appears to have started in the 1990s, and accelerated since 2008. A principal manifestation of a weak institutional framework is the ability of ruling power elites to influence or usurp state institutions and public policy for private gain, effectively resulting in the ‘privatisation of public policy’. While individuals or some segments benefit, this outcome is welfare-destroying for society at large. Corruption, especially large-scale corruption, appears to have increased sharply in this period, imposing a large hidden cost to society, apart from its quantifiable financial burden.

While a transition to civilian rule has been taking root in Pakistan since 2008, it does not appear to be accompanied by a transition to institutional democracy. This arrested or incomplete transition will undermine Pakistan’s long-term economic performance as well as development outcomes. The absence of a genuine reform constituency in the country – one that is aware, politically mobilised and sufficiently large – is a critical hurdle in the path of reforms. An equally serious impediment is the absence of a strong incentive for political parties in a parliamentary democracy to expend their political capital on a reform initiative or enterprise that is likely to yield some degree of adjustment and pain in the initial years, with the potential benefits accruing beyond the election cycle.

Importance of Institutions
Institutions and the concept of governance have been defined in a number of ways. At its most basic and fundamental level, institutions set out the ‘rules of the game’ under which societies, economies, systems and markets operate. According to Prof. Tim Besley of the London School of Economics, there are three main kinds of state capacity, namely fiscal capacity, legal capacity and a collective capacity. These state capacities are ‘assets’ which allow the state to function, and all three are needed for generating growth. Fiscal capacity supports the productive role of the state via...
investment in infrastructure and education. *Legal capacity* supports a competitive market sector as well as the protection of property rights. *Collective capacity* is needed to share the proceeds of growth to increase political sustainability, as well as to support investments in human capacities (health and education) (Besley 2016). Hence, countries with a relatively stronger institutional framework should, at least intuitively, tend to exhibit the following characteristics over a period of time:

1. A more rule of law-based, responsive, socially responsible, accountable and transparent governance, spanning the political process, public policy formulation and its implementation;
2. Impersonal, impartial/non-discriminatory, predictable, transparent administration based on a Weberian bureaucracy;
3. More inclusive and open societies as well as economies, with greater access to economic opportunity and social justice for a larger proportion of the population;
4. Lower economic and political uncertainty;
5. Lower economic ‘transaction costs’; and
6. A more stable and predictable business environment.

These characteristics, in turn, should lead to a virtuous spiral of higher investment rates and less volatile growth in the long run, and greater participatory economic development. Support for this hypothesis comes from a range of studies over the last three decades or so. According to the ADB (2010):

The empirical analysis shows that developing Asian economies with government effectiveness, regulatory quality, and rule of law scoring above the global means (after controlling for per capita income) in 1998 grew faster on average during 1998-2008 (by 1.6, 2.0 and 1.2 percentage points annually, respectively) than those economies scoring below the global means.

The World Bank maintains that corruption reduces growth and undermines development by lowering incentives for, and the efficiency of, both domestic and foreign investment (Bhargava 2006a). In this regard, the ‘Global Competitiveness Report’ for 2005-06 cites econometric evidence showing that even a slight (one standard deviation) improvement in governance results in a threefold increase in income per capita in the long run.
Institutional Performance
Pakistan’s institutional performance till the 1990s was, on the whole, fairly impressive. While the country’s path to constitutional democracy may have been fraught with challenges, in an administrative and functional sense, the institutional framework was delivering. The quality of the country’s civil service, and its ability to maintain independent judgement, was impressive, and performance across a range of economic as well as social indicators was above par when compared to many developing countries.

However, since the start of the 1990s, prima facie the institutional framework has progressively frayed, barring a period of a few years in the early 2000s. The reasons are explored in a subsequent section. However, some dimensions of the weakening of the overall institutional set-up, among many (some of which have also been covered in detail later), are as follows:

Tax Collection
With barely one million income tax filers in a population of 200 million, tax revenue of the government (federal as well as provincial) amounts to less than 11 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Tellingly, personal income tax collection is less than 1.5 percent of GDP, amongst the lowest in the world (Cevik 2016).

Educational Attainment
According to 2015-16 estimates, 22.6 million school-age children are out of school in Pakistan – one of the highest proportions of relevant cohort in the world (NEMIS 2016). The country’s education budget amounts to a paltry 2 percent of GDP, much of which is either absorbed by salaries or is subjected to misappropriation. In addition, poor institutional arrangements in some provinces lead to widespread cheating and exam paper ‘leakages’ in national board-level exams. The combined effect is that overall educational outcomes and attainment are poor.

Health Sector Outcomes
Pakistan’s total spending on the health sector amounts to an abysmal 0.7 percent of GDP, or the equivalent of just USD 10.6 per capita per annum (GoP 2016a). As a result, many of the country’s health statistics do not compare favourably with its income cohort.

Civil Service Quality
The low spending on education, and poor educational attainment for the country as a whole, has begun to be reflected even in the results of the most competitive
examination held – the annual Central Superior Services (CSS) exams to select candidates for recruitment into the civil service. Progressively, fewer and fewer candidates across the country are able to make the mark, with only 202 candidates out of 9,643 appearing in 2016 able to pass (over 90 percent failed to pass the English exam) (FPSC 2017).

State of the Judicial System
With only 3,967 judges in the entire judicial system (in all tiers of courts) for a population of 200 million people, there is one judge for over 50,000 citizens. There are over 1.7 million cases pending in the courts (Hussain 2016), many awaiting judgement for years if not decades.

Resource Management
The poor utilisation of Pakistan’s considerable economic potential and endowment of natural resources is underscored by the state of affairs in energy and the management of the country’s considerable water resources:

1. Against an identified potential of electricity generation of 56,721 MW using the country’s hydel resources, 2016 production was 6,893 MW – or utilisation of 12 percent of potential (GoP 2016b).
2. Using wind power, it is estimated that the country can produce 43,000 MW of electricity, almost twice the current installed capacity. So far, Pakistan has managed to produce 106 MW, or less than 0.25 percent of identified potential (Ibid.).
3. Pakistan’s water storage capacity is extremely low. While the United States (US) has over 5,000 cubic meters of storage capacity per inhabitant, and China has 2,200 cubic meters, Pakistan has less than 150 cubic meters of storage capacity per capita. According to the World Bank, India can store between 120 and 220 days in its major peninsular rivers. By contrast, Pakistan’s storage capacity has declined to less than 30 days of water in the Indus Basin (Bhargava 2006b).

Implementation
Another area where weak institutional capacity manifests itself is in the inability to complete ‘transformation’ initiatives (such as modernisation of the economy / diversification of exports, creating the basis for a knowledge-driven economy etc.), or in the number of years for nationally-important, ‘strategic’ initiatives (increasing the share of renewable energy in the overall mix, for example) to reach fruition. Two examples demonstrate this:
1. Pakistan established the Alternative Energy Board (AEB) in 2007 to facilitate the promotion of renewable energy generation. It has taken ten years since for the first solar and wind power plants to be set up (attributed mainly to lack of capacity to set tariffs for renewable projects). Ten years on, the share of renewables in the total energy mix is a meagre 1.7 percent. In India, the share has gone up to over 32 percent in roughly the same time period (as of December 2017), with plans to raise it to 40 percent by 2022.

2. Similarly, to promote the use of the Public-Private Partnership (PPP) model in infrastructure development, an Infrastructure Project Development Facility (IPDF) was set up in the mid-2000s under the Ministry of Finance. However, to date, virtually no major infrastructure project outside power has been successfully undertaken in the PPP mode. In India, which gave an impetus to infrastructure development under PPP at around the same time as Pakistan (the mid-2000s), over 800 major projects have been undertaken according to the World Bank, with an estimated combined project cost of USD 60-80 billion.

Pakistan’s institutional performance since 1996 onwards can be analysed using a ‘standard’ measure such as the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI). The main advantage of the WGI dataset is that it tracks and measures six components of Governance using a consistent methodology over a period of time. In addition, by reporting on a wide range of countries, it provides a basis for relative/cross-country comparisons.

Since 1996, Pakistan has performed poorly on all six sub-components of Governance measured by the WGI – voice, rule of law, control of corruption, accountability, regulatory quality and political stability/absence of violence and terrorism. However, its weakest performance on an endogenous (i.e., not externally determined, as in the case of political stability and terrorism) parameter has been in Control of Corruption (see Table 1).
Table 1: Pakistan’s Worldwide Governance Indicators

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Source: Author’s compilation from the World Bank WGI (various years).

The average percentile rank attained by Pakistan on each of the parameters for the past 16 years, for which data is available, shows that for the policy-endogenous parameters (voice, rule of law, control of corruption, accountability and regulatory quality), the average percentile rank over 16 years ranges from just 18 (Control of Corruption) to 32 (Government Effectiveness). During the period 1996-2015, Pakistan is a perennial under-performer in ‘rule of law’ and ‘control of corruption’, attaining a maximum percentile ranking of 29 in the former (1996), and 27 in the latter (2003).

In the most recent WGI releases, pertaining to 2015 and later, Pakistan has experienced a moderate improvement in some of the 6 indicators. This is a continuation of the trend from 2012, whereby all indicators have shown a moderate to significant improvement when compared to the lows attained in that year. The indicators on which Pakistan’s percentile ranking has increased the most since 2012 are: Control of Corruption, Rule of Law and Regulatory Quality. Despite the moderate overall improvement, Pakistan’s percentile ranking remains below 30th in each of the six indicators. Its worst relative performance (apart from political stability/absence of violence) is under Control of Corruption and Rule of Law (both 24th percentile).

Economic Impact

A weak institutional framework and its progressive atrophy has had detrimental results for Pakistan’s developmental outcomes. The following excerpt from

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1 Shaded areas mark the highest rank attained in each parameter along with year.
Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index 2014 neatly sums up the pernicious effects of an important element of mis-governance and corruption:

Poorly equipped schools, counterfeit medicine and elections decided by money are just some of the consequences of public sector corruption. Bribes and backroom deals don’t just steal resources from the most vulnerable – they undermine justice and economic development, and destroy public trust in government and leaders (Transparency International 2014).

The report of the National Commission for Government Reforms (NCGR 2008: 12) noted that the:

Structural economic reforms to improve Pakistan’s prospects for competing in the globalized economy require stable, functioning, competent and responsive institutions for implementation.

The long-term impact on the economy has been far deeper and broader, however, than captured here. A 2010 Working Paper by the ADB analyses cross-country evidence on governance quality as measured by performance on the WGI, and examines whether ‘better’ or ‘worse’ performance from a designated baseline has had an effect on subsequent development performance of different countries/regions. The study finds that government effectiveness, political stability, control of corruption and regulatory quality all have a more significant positive impact on country growth performance than voice and accountability and rule of law. Developing Asian countries with a surplus in government effectiveness, regulatory quality and corruption control are observed to grow faster than those with a deficit in these indicators - up to 2 percentage points annually, while Middle East and North African countries with a surplus in political stability, government effectiveness, and corruption control are observed to grow faster than those with a deficit in these indicators by as much as 2.5 percentage points annually. Good governance is associated with both a higher level of per capita GDP as well as higher rates of GDP growth over time. This suggests that good governance, while important in and of itself, can also help in improving a country’s economic prospects. Some of the important channels via which the impact of governance can be transmitted to long-term economic as well as development performance are as follows:
Investment

One of the foremost long-term effects that can be posited is on the level, as well as nature, of private investment in the country over the past few decades. Private investment has fallen from a peak of around 15 percent of GDP in the early 2000s, to less than 10 percent of GDP between 2010-11 and 2013-14, and again for 2017-18 (GoP 2017). In the presence of political instability and policy uncertainty, ‘political risk’ is deemed to rise, resulting in new investment in a country attracting higher risk premiums. This has the twin effect of raising the required financial return on capital for new projects, while shortening the investment horizon and required payback period for investors.

Investor perceptions of a high-risk scenario alters – as well as constricts – the portfolio of projects that a potential investor would look at, thus, potentially lowering the overall investment envelope of a riskier country as well as affecting the ‘quality’ of investment undertaken. Pakistan’s low – and declining – investment rate compared to its peers bears testimony to this. The increasingly higher, and sovereign-guaranteed, nature of returns demanded by private investors for large greenfield investment is also indicative of the same phenomenon.

The design and application of Pakistan’s tax policy has worsened, over a period of time, the overall business as well as investment environment. An excessive burden of taxation on large, formal businesses is increasing ‘informality’ in the economy, while the availability of a large tax arbitrage in capital gains on trading on the equity markets and in real estate, are shifting investment away from manufacturing and the real economy to less-productive areas such as secondary trading.

In addition, the dysfunctional tax system has not been generating enough tax revenue for the state to be able to support the required level of public investment in infrastructure, or to avoid ‘crowding-out’ of the private sector from the credit markets. Both these developments have had a detrimental impact on new private investment.

Widespread smuggling, under-invoicing of imports and mis-declaration, as well as the absence of state enforcement against counterfeit goods and violations of intellectual property rights, have also hurt domestic manufacturing. With an anti-export policy bias, coupled with a progressively import-friendly regime in place, since trade liberalisation began in the 1990s, import penetration has increased sharply. This process has also been exacerbated by Pakistan’s signing of a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with China that was implemented from 2006.
On a related note, one feature that can be expected to be prominent in countries with market characteristics but a weak institutional framework is ‘crony capitalism’. Politically-connected insiders are given rents via choice licences and contracts by the government, or are beneficiaries of privatisation of state assets or sale of state land at throwaway prices etc.

**Agricultural Productivity**

Pakistan’s productivity in the agriculture sector is low and well-below most of its peers. This is largely due to the progressive decline in emphasis on crop research from the 1970s onwards, despite setting up institutions for promoting such research. A major impediment to improving crop productivity and achieving higher value-addition, with its large pay-offs and spill-overs for not just the farm sector but the wider economy, is the atrophying of extension services in agriculture.

Two areas where policy neglect and institutional atrophy have adversely impacted productivity in agriculture are the unchecked availability of non-certified seeds and adulterated pesticides. With the involvement of politicians, large landowners and influential commercial interests in these businesses, enforcement of the law has been absent, hurting millions of farmers. In fact, the strong influence of this interest group, coupled with policy inertia of successive governments, has delayed passage of a modern Seeds Act for nearly ten years.

Improving yields of its crops, and making a concerted move towards higher value-added agriculture, can transform Pakistan’s rural sector and the lives of millions of its farm-dependent households. It can also generate additional surpluses that can then be diverted to other sectors of the economy such as manufacturing and exports.

**Structural Transformation**

Countries with a weaker institutional framework are more likely to have a lower level of economic structural transformation than countries with a stronger quality one. Due to policy capture, the incentives in an economy with a weaker institutional base are stacked against value addition – be it in agriculture, exports, or overall manufacturing.

**Atrophying of State’s Strategic Planning**

A fundamental change has occurred over the past two decades that has undermined the management of the economy. Till the 1990s, the country’s powerful and capable Planning Commission² was the apex public sector institution charged with

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² Now called the Ministry of Planning, Development and Reform.
the planning function as well as with overall economic management and reporting. However, since the late 1980s, Pakistan’s frequent accession to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) loan programmes shifted the centre of gravity to the Ministry of Finance. Since the loans acquired from IMF were not developmental in nature, but purely for balance of payments support, the Ministry of Finance became the ‘natural’ counter-party to the Fund and the sole ministry for negotiating and liaising with IMF, and providing all economic data to it.

Pakistan has signed up to 12 programmes with IMF since 1988. IMF programmes are designed foremost to achieve ‘macroeconomic stabilisation’ and their conditionality is structured around quarterly targets. The combination of moving from five-year plans to three-month quarterly targets under IMF programmes, and the transfer of stewardship of economic management and reforms to an agency that operates on a twelve-month budgetary cycle (i.e. the Ministry of Finance), has proved to be extremely detrimental to Pakistan’s economic well-being.

Pakistan’s strategic planning horizon has been reduced to three months from half a decade, economic growth is a ‘residual’ target under IMF programmes, subservient to the fiscal deficit target; and, the primary objective (to the exclusion of all other developmental objectives) is to undertake short-term revenue measures and expenditure cutbacks that undermine long-term developmental goals.

**Impact on Formal Economy**

Another manifestation of the shadow of a weak and atrophied institutional framework on the wider economy is the size of the informal, undocumented economy in Pakistan. The informal economy is estimated to be anywhere between 25-90 percent of the documented/recorded economy. Not only is the informal sector very large, but it appears to be growing in size at the expense of the formal, documented economy.

The formal sector in Pakistan is being hurt by weak enforcement and uneven as well as discriminatory application of laws, by the proliferation of laws/levies and taxes, and by a rising tax as well as regulatory burden. The ease of conducting informal transactions, or ones without disclosing the true identities of the transactors (such as purchase of property etc., called *benami* transactions), pervasive smuggling, mis-declaration of imports, the existence of tax arbitrage, are all hurting documented businesses in the formal sector.

This is another important area where the country’s fiscal policy and the flawed design of its tax system, combined with a corrupt and weak tax administration, is
leading to sub-optimal and perverse outcomes. The repercussions of rising informality include:

1. The growth and competitiveness of firms is hampered as economies of scale are difficult to achieve (or precluded completely) for informal firms in an economy.
2. The ability to attract FDI inflows is reduced, hurting the economy’s competitiveness, its positioning and linkages with global/regional production value chains.
3. Skill development of the workforce is less likely to take place in informal, less-organised firms, or firms that employ less-permanent contract labour. This hurts the productivity and international competitiveness of Pakistani firms.
4. Ultimately, the social mobility of the labour force can be affected, as they are ‘trapped’ in relatively lower-skill and lower-wage jobs that afford fewer opportunities for on-the-job training and skills-enhancement.

**Inequality**

There are several dimensions of inequality and ‘non-inclusion’ in development of large segments of the population in Pakistan that either stem from weaknesses in the institutional framework or are connected. The first dimension emanates from the fact that increasingly economic growth in the country, by its nature and sources, has tended to be more beneficial to higher-income households than those in the lowest quintiles.

The less-affluent and poor are also largely excluded from the development process by government spending priorities. Government expenditures are increasingly being spent on improving physical infrastructure for the urban middle classes – to the detriment of the lower-income and rural population. On the other hand, the taxation system and structure is regressive, with massive reliance on indirect taxes that get passed on to those less-equipped to bear the burden.

Lack of access to quality public education and health for the less-affluent and poorer segments of the population is also a significant factor in the lack of inclusiveness. One direct source of non-inclusion in socioeconomic development of a sizeable chunk of the population is the weaknesses in the institutional framework that exclude them from social justice, from fair treatment by state institutions such as the police and judicial system, and from financial inclusion.
Inflation
Inflation is a complex interplay of a number of external, institutional, structural and policy variables. Nonetheless, one predominant factor is excessive money creation, caused by the failure to collect taxes combined with a failure to rein-in government spending. It is no coincidence that the longest period of high inflation in Pakistan between 2008 and 2012 coincided with one of the weakest fiscal performances in Pakistan’s history. The institutional failings on the fiscal side, both with regards to expenditure as well as taxation policy and performance, have had a large spill-over effect on inflation.

Way Forward
The broad institutional atrophy that has occurred over the past few decades makes it difficult to determine a clear path for reform. This difficulty is compounded by two stylised ‘facts’ or ‘ground realities’:

1. *Insiders* have little or no incentive to change or modify the *status quo* of a system that is rewarding or benefitting them, and is likely to continue doing so in its present form and arrangement for the foreseeable future.
2. Economic governance is not divorced from political governance. The institutions of economic governance are nested within a political ecosystem; hence, expecting to introduce reform in these without wider political reform is unlikely to be realistic.

Wider political reform is likely to require a bigger critical mass of change agents, and a stronger impulse from within to alter the *status quo*. Without a broad consensus on reform and ownership across the political spectrum, no single political party in a parliamentary democracy is likely to expend its political capital on an enterprise that is likely to yield some degree of adjustment and pain in the initial years, with the potential benefits accruing beyond the election cycle. Nonetheless, keeping the challenges of ownership and implementation, as well as the issue of sequencing, aside for the time being, generating a comprehensive template of proposed reform by itself could be a useful starting point.3 In this context, the proposed principles or ‘pillars’ for reform need to be the following:

*Ensuring Independence/Autonomy of Key Institutions*
Insulating key institutions of economic governance, as well as those in the political sphere, that exert a major degree of influence on the performance of such

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3 The report of the National Commission for Government Reforms (NCGR), headed by Dr Ishrat Husain, elucidates broadly the same principles.
institutions, from the political system is critical. The institutions that matter most in this regard are:

1. Economic Coordination Committee of the Cabinet (ECC)
2. Federal as well as provincial tax administration
3. The central bank, which should have independence by law from the influence of the Ministry of Finance in the conduct of monetary policy, or from the political system as regulator of the banking system
4. The Federal Planning Commission (in project selection and implementation of reforms)
5. Pakistan Bureau of Statistics
6. Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP)

**Promoting Greater Oversight, Transparency and Accountability**

Transparency and accountability are essential pillars of good governance, both in terms of public policy formulation as well as its implementation. Ongoing oversight at the appropriate level, ideally at the level of parliamentary committees for many government policies and interventions – or by a specially-created high-level ‘delivery unit’ – should generally have preference over *ex post facto* instruments. A wide variety of instruments are in use around the world for strengthening the level of transparency and accountability in government/the public sector. Some of these include:

*Conflict of Interest Law*

A *conflict of interest* law for public office holders ensures there is no direct or indirect personal, beneficial, commercial or other benefit or interest of the office holder in the execution of his or her public trust and duty. Legislation to this effect protects the interest of the ordinary citizen from abuse of power by public officials.

*Right to Information (RTI)*

Greater access to information by ordinary citizens about government decisions regarding public policy as well as expenditure matters, increase the transparency and, hence, accountability of the decision-takers and decision-makers. A well-functioning system, backed by law, of granting access and full disclosure by the government and its agencies to ordinary citizens and media to all unclassified and non-restricted information is essential in this regard – as is ensuring that the government and state officials do not abuse the right to restrict information in the name of national interest or security.
Use of Technology
Technology-enabled provision of a range of public services, such as filing of taxes, registration of vehicles, obtaining citizenship identification documents etc., facilitates the ordinary citizen, improves the predictability, speed and timeliness of delivery, reduces the time, wait and informal costs involved, while lowering the overall cost to government. Importantly, it enhances ‘arms-length’ dealing of ordinary citizens with government officials, reducing the latter’s discretionary powers. By leaving an electronic record and trail, IT-enabled service delivery also enhances transparency and accountability in the process. Technology can also be used to achieve positive outcomes in at least two areas that are severely constraining Pakistan’s development as well as economic performance and prospects: tax collection as well as energy (Box 1).

Box 1:
Using Technology to Nab Tax and Energy Cheats and Delinquent Teachers

In 2012, an exercise was conducted by the Federal Board of Revenue (FBR) to identify potential taxpayers in the country using external databases. In this regard, the National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA)’s database, the country’s most comprehensive, was queried along with national databases on vehicles, property, bank accounts, foreign travel and arms licence registration. Based on a set of pre-identified parameters, a list of 3.2 million citizens country-wide was generated who displayed tell-tale signs of affluence but whose names were not on the national tax register. The importance of this exercise can be gauged from the fact that despite three decades of ‘effort’, the number of direct income taxpayers in Pakistan totals approximately around 1 million.

Similarly, the use of ‘smart’ power grids and smart (technology-enabled) electricity meters can sharply reduce revenue losses of power utilities that currently total approximately USD 1 billion a year from theft alone.

An innovative use of technology is being applied in Punjab where teachers in public schools with high rates of staff delinquency have been provided smartphones to monitor their presence in schools during academic hours.

Some of the other measures, processes and instruments that can be adopted for greater transparency, oversight and accountability in the management of public funds include:
1. Independent monitoring of government procurement and projects over and above a certain ‘floor’ or minimum amount. This could include the full public disclosure/availability on a website of all contract details and of the bids/tenders received, including prices and technical specifications.

2. External, third-party audits of large government procurement and projects, over and above the governmental audit conducted by the Auditor General’s office.


4. Setting up public registers/databases of contractors on public sector projects, and a list of ‘black-listed’ entities with full details of ownership, de jure as well as de facto (i.e., beneficial ownership).

5. Full public disclosure of statutory reports to the Parliament from the offices of the Auditor General, Federal Ombudsman and National Accountability Bureau (NAB).

6. The complete implementation of Right to Information (RTI) laws to government and public sector procurement actions, election declarations and filings by elected public officials, and statements of income, assets and beneficial ownership etc. by non-elected public officials.

**Strengthening Institutions of Accountability**

While a number of institutions have been periodically set up in Pakistan for purposes of accountability of public office-holders, and many are currently operating, corruption and leakage of public funds has continued unabated on a large-scale, with only a moderate improvement in terms of lower frequency and brazenness. Currently, the main institutions of accountability include:

1. National Accountability Bureau (NAB)
2. Public Accounts Committee (PAC) of Parliament
3. Federal Investigation Agency (FIA)
4. Auditor General (AG)
5. Federal Ombudsman

Pakistan has seen the accountability process being compromised by political expediency, with selective application to political opponents of the government (civilian or military). More often than not, references and cases are dragged interminably despite evidence, to be used as *quid pro quo* and political bargaining chips. This aspect of using the accountability process as part of political bargaining or patronage has intensified post-18th Amendment, whereby the two main political
Institutional Reforms in Pakistan: Missing Piece of the Development Puzzle

parties (Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz [PML-N] and Pakistan Peoples Party [PPP]) distributed the institutions of accountability amongst party loyalists or party office-holders. Hence, successive chairmen of NAB since 2008, who are appointed by the President and who have been empowered in their individual capacity to decide which case to pursue for investigation and prosecution, have not moved against high-profile corruption cases involving leading politicians and others, as detailed in a list of 150 ‘mega’ financial scams presented to the Supreme Court in July 2015.

Under the political scheme of things crafted under the ‘Charter of Democracy’ signed between the PPP and PML-N in 2006, high-profile cases of corruption against PPP co-Chairman and former President Asif Zardari and former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, leader of PML-N, have either been dropped, weakly prosecuted, or not pursued at all.

Similarly, till the recent August 2018 elections, the powerful PAC was headed by the Opposition leader in the National Assembly (a senior PPP leader), who decided the composition of the committee in consultation with the government, and which cases to take up.

The working of another hitherto fairly-independent institution of accountability, the AG’s office, has also been short-circuited since the mid-2000s with the elevation of senior finance ministry officials to the position. This has created a potential conflict of interest that weakens the independent audit of financial transactions of government departments and agencies that work in close coordination with, and financing from, the finance ministry. The politicisation of the accountability institutions and mechanisms, which has gathered pace since 2008, has weakened an important pillar of enforcing rule of law.

Professionalising the Civil Service

The civil service in Pakistan is structured and oriented towards being an ‘administrative’ bureaucracy. It is generalist in nature rather than specialised in its training and qualification, with initial postings and training in the field occurring in administrative districts. Once this phase is completed, the officer can be posted in any department or agency, with subsequent transfers also occurring usually without any reference to previous experience or expertise.

Purely in the context of reforming institutions of economic governance, and applying a measure of selectivity for reasons outlined below, the focus of ‘the way forward’ needs to be on the following three major areas:
• The institution(s) of planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of government programmes and projects
• Public Financial Management (PFM)
• National statistics.

The selection of the foregoing areas is borne out of the fact that, given the political economy which will not be conducive to broad and deep institutional reform in a ‘big bang’ or ‘shock therapy’ approach, reform areas need to be chosen based on the following criteria: where relatively lower political capital is expended, and where the economic and governance pay-offs are high.

Navigating the Political Economy of Reforms

Given how entrenched elite domination and influence has been in Pakistan, and continues to be, and how this state of affairs is in direct conflict with the wide-ranging and meaningful institutional reform that is critical to unshackle the country’s economic potential, it is imperative to present a coherent framework for carrying reforms forward. This is all the more important since Pakistan’s reform experience has been unedifying, with efforts that have been weak, sporadic, fitful and almost invariably, external donor-driven.

At its most basic, the key questions that a home-grown, endogenously-developed and indigenously-owned reforms ‘framework’ will need to address are:

• What needs to be done?
• Who will do it?
• Why will they do it?
• How will they do it?

What needs to be done?

There is already a growing awareness for the past many years within Pakistan that something needs to be done to shake the polity out of a state of morbidity and stagnation. However, while there is a growing recognition that the status quo with regards to economic management appears to be unsustainable in the long run, there is little convergence within the country of what is the way forward. Most efforts at forging a reforms agenda for Pakistan have tended to emphasise the inputs of development – such as education, energy, access to capital – without sufficiently recognising the importance of, or addressing, the framework required to deliver development (state capacity and institutional strength). Hence, a greater focus is needed on the institutional aspects of reform. A multi-stakeholder consensus on the need for institutional reform in Pakistan has to be crafted. This will be the starting
point for building a thus far missing Reform Constituency. A National Reform Agenda (NRA) can then evolve and take shape.

Who will do it?
Given the nature of institutions, as a public good that benefit everyone, they face the same challenges as other public goods, i.e., the ‘collective action’ problem with lots of free-riding. Since the benefits of public goods are spread over many people, and are usually inter-generational as well, individuals have little incentive to undertake effort to bring about their provision. They either leave it to ‘other people’ or the government to provide these. The problem with most governments, civilian or non-civilian, is that they too have little incentive to provide effective institutions that are more than likely to introduce checks and balances on their working or ability to stay in power.

Overcoming the hurdle of the lack of collective action and the prevalence of free-riding is, therefore, a major challenge in attempting to bring about institutional reforms in Pakistan. Effort has to be directed at ‘seeding’ a Reform Constituency in Pakistan consisting of stakeholders from across the societal spectrum – i.e., a Rainbow Coalition consisting of politicians, parliamentarians, civil society (media, youth, opinion leaders, academics/experts, think tanks, lawyers, teachers, NGOs), the bureaucracy as well as the military.

This effort will require a structured process, as well as time, to gain traction. The role of Parliament and the political parties is critical. As the insiders within the status quo, reform champions from within the political system have to emerge to ensure success. While a multi-party Reform Caucus needs to be identified and formed within both the houses of Parliament, with the relevant Standing Committees playing a crucial role with increased interaction with experts, the role of the Senate in shaping a National Reform Agenda on behalf of the political system can be the key.

Political parties are extremely important too, especially their next generation leaders and those who may currently be out of Parliament. Reform advocacy with political parties is important for another reason - the issue of institutional reform can be mainstreamed into the parties’ election manifestoes.

Another prong is to work with the next generation leaders of civil society – currently at universities and schools. The country’s business community is potentially another constituency, though some sections may also have conflicting interests. Initially targeting/mobilising the urban, educated, professional segment of society who
understand the issues and are affected more directly by the status quo (by, for example, predatory taxation, corruption, lack of provision of public services, security issues etc.) can be more rewarding in giving impetus to shaping a reform narrative. Multilaterals such as the World Bank, ADB and the IMF, and bilateral development aid agencies such as UK Aid (formerly DfID), Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) and USAID etc. can all play an important role by making institutional reforms part of the development narrative.

**Why will they do it?**
Finding a common motivation for multiple stakeholders with different, and usually conflicting or competing, interests and agendas to converge and agree on a reform path is absolutely critical to success. This is also perhaps the most difficult part. In this context, studying the political economy of reform by engaging with the multiple stakeholders and understanding their positions, motivations, interests, as well as concerns is of key importance in this regard. The next step is ‘framing’ the issue(s) and challenges that need to be addressed via reform in a way that reflects the concerns and interests of the various stakeholders, and provides a strong motivation to act.

In the case of required reforms in the governance and management of Pakistan’s economy, a potent framing of the issue that could appeal to the power elite is the ‘sustainability’ angle – i.e., the status quo with regards to the economy is unsustainable, especially in the context of a rapidly growing population that is deprived of basic public services; with a weakening social contract, the hold on power by the elite is likely to become increasingly tenuous. Thus, it is in the elite’s interest to focus on reforms that allow the economy to grow in a more inclusive manner. However, continuous engagement with the multiple stakeholders and interest groups is likely to lead to the most suitable ‘framing’ of the issue.

**How will they do it?**
To be successful, a formal, structured process will need to be put in place for the national, multiple stakeholder engagement to take place. To be able to achieve this, the engagement will need to be undertaken by a source or catalytic agent that is perceived to be impartial and has a strong measure of credibility with all stakeholders and enjoys their deep trust. In addition, he/she/it (as an organisation or institution) should have ‘convening power’ to be able to bring all stakeholders to the table for a long engagement. This is important since the engagement will not be one-off but will need to be regular and sustained over a period of time to be able to gain traction.
In this context, important lessons can be gleaned from efforts undertaken in different parts of the world to bring opposite sides in ‘intractable’ political conflicts to the negotiating table, as a first step in moving towards eventual resolution. One process employed in some of the most difficult conflicts in modern history – transitioning from apartheid in South Africa, negotiating peace with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia – People’s Army (FARC) in Colombia, seeking a peaceful co-habitation between Israel and the Palestinians etc. – has been dubbed ‘transformative scenario planning’. Pioneered by the oil giant Shell for long-term risk assessment of its exploration portfolio, and adapted by other large multinationals with long run, globally diversified investment interests, it has since been adapted for use in resolution of ‘political’ conflicts.

Once the national narrative for reform has been thrashed out and broadly agreed to, the roadmap of what needs to be done and how, can be entrusted to a National Reforms Commission (NRC). The NRC should be high-powered and permanent (with fixed tenures for its members), with representation both from government as well as the private sector. The NRC should be chaired by the Deputy Chairman of the Federal Planning Commission, and include senior representatives of the provinces, Gilgit-Baltistan and Azad Kashmir.

It should draw upon expertise from a wide range of eclectic disciplines, such as systems design, physics, computer sciences, social scientists (political scientists, sociologists and social anthropologists, psychologists, political and developmental economists, behavioural economists, change/transformation specialists etc.) The objective should be to redraw and ‘re-imagine’ political and economic governance in such a way as to make it more capable; more nimble and effective; and more transparent and accountable. Reducing the regulatory and fiscal burden on businesses, and overall transaction costs in the economy, should be a key underlying objective of the work of the NRC.

Conclusion
Without a new approach involving a diverse set of Rainbow Coalition stakeholders, Pakistan’s attempt at institutional reform – both political as well as economic – is likely to meet the fate of previous efforts. Finally, an important element of the ‘How’ part will be the need to integrate governance more fully as well as meaningfully into Pakistan’s national and provincial development plans. This will require adopting a set of nationally-owned governance indicators, internalising these across different levels of government, and reporting the same publicly with a regular and predictable frequency for public scrutiny and debate.


References


Streamlining Tax Harmonisation in Pakistan*  

Ahad Nazir,** Abbas Murtaza Maken,*** and Vaqar Ahmed****

Abstract

The chapter is written in context of the falling ranking of Pakistan in the Doing Business report published by the World Bank over the last several years. One of the major contributors to the Doing Business rank is the rate and administrative procedure for taxation employed in Pakistan. The sources of data employed for this chapter are primarily insights received from public sector consultations with the federal and provincial tax authorities, as well as the private sector i.e., those engaged in the Small-Medium Enterprise (SME) sector in the federal and provincial capitals. In addition, secondary information was gathered by reviewing the laws and mechanisms related to taxation in Pakistan. Finally, the recommendations and suggestions that are incorporated, were derived from the various multi-stakeholder consultations in order to propose a multitude of policy solutions and action goals for the improvement of the taxation system and streamlining legislative and administrative coordination between the provincial and federal revenue authorities.

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* This chapter has been approved as a Policy Brief by the referee.
** Engr Ahad Nazir is a Project Coordinator at the Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad, Pakistan.
*** Mr Abbas Murtaza Maken is a Project Assistant at the Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad, Pakistan.
**** Dr Vaqar Ahmed is Joint Executive Director of the Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad, Pakistan.
Introduction

Tax reforms are initiated to radically alter the process and mechanism of tax collection and management of taxes so as to simultaneously improve the administration of taxes and the provision of welfare services (Rao 2014). Tax reforms may be geared towards simplifying and enhancing the accountability of the taxation system, or minimise tax evasion and attract investment (US Legal, n.d.).

Thus, in perusal of this goal, time and again, successive governments in Pakistan have ushered in major tax overhauls in the administration and collection of taxes. In particular, the 18th Amendment in the Constitution of Pakistan delegated taxes on all types of services, under federal jurisdiction, to the provinces.

A multitude of issues have emerged from the enhanced provincial mobilisation of their resources due to greater autonomy. The facets of taxation policies are still not congruent across all the provinces in Pakistan. For instance, those wishing to or operating in the different provinces have to face multiple tax regimes at the federal and provincial levels, consequently stymieing the ease of doing business.

Additionally, the lack of recurrent updates in the data on agricultural and property incomes, due to the dismal forecasting and auditing provincial capabilities, renders the task of designing and implementing, extremely tenuous. Presently, there are a myriad of tax regimes across the four tax collecting provinces, with varying legislation regarding the tax rates and tax bases for services, property, agriculture and transportation. There is a pertinent need for tax harmonisation across all provinces.

To resolve the confusing rules and regulations that exist across the country, the Federal Board of Revenue (FBR) has proposed the establishment of a National Tax Commission (NTC). Yet, this push by the FBR still awaits fruition due to considerable resistance from the provinces as they see it in contravention of the 18th Amendment (SDPI and TAF 2017). The concerted efforts to reform the taxation system can only be successful if the provinces concur on the extent and magnitude of tax harmonisation, which may be achieved if all the provinces use similar tax rates and tax bases on which the tax liability is made. This will help reduce the arbitrary classifications and differential levies across provinces, helping raise the tax net, and ultimately, the tax revenues without increasing the tax rate.
Objectives
Thus, this chapter is designed to serve the following objectives:

• To identify important entry points for the introduction of reforms focusing on demand, but mainly on supply to boost the collection of tax revenues.
• To explore the perceptions of the private sector stakeholders about the current taxation system and the potential ways it can be overhauled.
• To examine the pertinent role of potential development partners in facilitating the government’s administration and collection of taxes in the federal and provincial arenas.

Methodology and Approach

Methodology
In order to conduct holistic research on the prevalent taxation in Pakistan and devise the most viable strategies for the initiation of much-needed reforms, the following methodology was employed:

Desk Review and Literature Review
A coherent desk and literature review was carried out to assess and appraise the laws, mechanisms and methodological framework regarding revenue collection along with the ensuing policy implementation gaps in Pakistan.

Stakeholder Consultations
The various policy goals and recommendations were generated through consultations with stakeholders, including with tax experts comprising of economists, accountants, tax bar associations, heads of tax committees in Chambers of Commerce and Industry. The main modes of data collection were through, a) 20 Key Informant Interviews (KIIs) with government officials, business leaders and senior policymakers/economists; b) Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) with all stakeholder representation in Islamabad, and one in all the provincial capitals of Pakistan; and c) A public seminar for dissemination of the findings, that was held at the 20th Sustainable Development Conference (SDC) in 2017.

Approach
A holistic approach was used for engaging with a multitude of national and provincial stakeholders such as consumer groups, trade associations, tax bar associations and labour unions. In particular, through round-table engagements, the perceptions of these institutions, pertaining to their espousal of tax harmonisation in Pakistan, was sought. Perhaps, the most fundamental question was related to what
measures may be relegated to the provincial authorities and what may fall under the domain of the federal government. These policy perceptions and suggestions of the private sector institutions, can be considered for adoption by the relevant administrative and political (i.e., legislative) authorities in each province and at the federal level.

In order to carry out the KII s and FGDs for qualitative discussion, a similar set of questions was asked to adequately gauge the perceptions of the private and public stakeholders. For instance, from those in the government circles in Islamabad and each of the four provincial capitals, the researchers sought to inquire the current efficacy of the taxation system and whether the taxation collection mechanisms was strengthened by the federal and provincial revenue authorities. Additionally, questions were asked about the magnitude of taxes on agriculture, immovable property and sales. Furthermore, the team also inquired whether the Excise and Taxation Department (ETD) in the provinces had been merged with other provincial revenue authorities. Perhaps, most importantly, these officials were inquired, whether they included the business community in their tax reform consultations.

Conversely, the questions for the business community mainly pertained to their interaction and perceptions regarding provincial and federal revenue collection systems and institutions. The questions asked pertained to the perceived fairness and transparency in utilisation of, and ease in filing the various taxes (i.e. incomes/sales/imports) for the respondents. Furthermore, the authors inquired with the Chambers of Commerce about their chosen focal department(s) within the government and whether or not these were regularly consulted to voice the grievances and concerns of the Chambers about the taxation system. This was done so that private stakeholders could convey their messages to the policymakers and parliamentarians responsible for tax reform at the federal and provincial levels.

Discussion

According to the budget proposal submitted by the Federal Tax Ombudsman (FTO) in 2014 which later also got notices and cited in the report from the Tax Reform Commission, 2015, (FTO 2014), there is a clear issue of tax administration coordination and communication, amongst provinces and between provinces and the federal tax collection authorities. This is causing the cost of doing business to go up which may result in impacting the end-user as all procedural and financial costs are trickled down to commodity prices. Furthermore, the report also stated that there is ‘duplicate taxation’ because services are taxed by both the Federal and Provincial Boards of Revenue (Ahmed 2015).
If the state is proactive in delivering services catered for social welfare, then the citizens must willingly pay taxes. Since, only when taxes are properly paid by the masses, is there surplus finance available in the central treasury, akin to an Islamic \textit{Bait-ul-Mal}. While Pakistan has the tax collection system, which is a hybrid system rooted in Islamic as well as Western principles, the indigenous system emulates none, despite the fact that innumerable benefits of taxation have been well documented in Pakistan. For instance, progressive taxation on personal income has had an outsize redistributive impact on the economy (Ahmed and O’Donoghue 2009).

The present inefficacy and fragmented state of taxation exists despite a multitude of intertwined systems collecting taxes on income, sales, customs, audits and appeals. The problem primarily is that not only are tax collectors unable to attain revenue targets, but that taxpayers are unmotivated to pay taxes because of negligible chances of refunds (SDPI and TAF 2017). Thus, all the aforementioned factors have rendered Pakistan’s domestic revenue system incapacitated and inconsequential (OECD 2014).

Perhaps, one of the factors impeding the payment of taxes is also the sheer lack of facilitation by the government evident in the meagre number of Tax Clinics. Furthermore, another problem in the tax collection system has been that regressive rather than progressive tax bases were utilised by provincial authorities. For instance, taxes are imposed on obsolete tax bases and outdated tax rates on property, cars, agriculture, utilities, services etc. (Ahmed 2017a).

Primarily, the culture of a country is also a significant determinant of the proportion of citizens that pay taxes. Thus, in Pakistan, the pervasive disregard for the values of financial integrity and honesty acts as a monumental hurdle to the payment of taxes. Also, the prevalence of the various Tax Amnesty Schemes also makes it considerably difficult to incentivise the due payment of taxes (Naqvi 2015), due to which the menace of evading taxes has persisted throughout the history of Pakistan from the highest ranking politicians to members of the working class. The perceived corruption in tax collection is cited as the biggest reasons by the average citizens for not paying taxes (Zahidi 2014).

Perhaps, the most pertinent issues in the current tax framework pertain to the taxation of services. Not only is the updated data on services extremely scarce, but, even the available data is extremely unreliable because of the exaggerated size and role of the informal sector in providing services. Due to this, the sales tax on services is subject to recurrent fluctuation and thus becomes, ineffecutal.
As there are various definitions of output, the incidence of double taxation exponentially rises. While some of this also occurs due to the variation in excise duties, the rates on some services are entirely ambiguous. The Memorandums of Understanding (MoU), signed with the Federal Board of Revenue, has not been effectively implemented. The valuation rates for some types of properties may actually differ considerably than the rate which the market charges. Despite this, seldom surveys are carried out to precisely determine the actual property and rental values. The coverage of property owners is imprecise because of this, and tax net further reduces due to the preferential treatment of influential owners.

Agriculture is another area where there are insurmountable barriers for legislative and administrative officials to gather tax revenues. Presently, taxes are levied based on agricultural activity, while taxes on land are highly inefficient. This is a considerable loss as agricultural sector still contributes a substantial chunk to Pakistan’s economy, in addition to being the mainstay of the country’s labour force, and has the potential to generate between an annual tax revenue of PKR 55-75 billion (Nasim 2012).

Perhaps, there is no other hurdle as significant and as consequential as the sheer absence of liaison among governments and between the public and private sector, due to which, the innumerable provincial exemptions and preferential treatment of certain goods cause disputes between them (Ahmed 2015). The business community is also rarely consulted by the tax collection and administrative authorities while designing rules and regulations regarding taxes, often putting them at a considerable disadvantage, and ultimately stifling the business environment in Pakistan, as is evidenced by the dismal Doing Business Index 2018 ranking of Pakistan at the 147th place out of 190 economies (Ahmed 2017b). The lack of consultations with private stakeholders is exponentially worsened by the absence of a Grievance Redressal Mechanism (GRMs) (Ahmed and Naqvi 2016). The absence of efficient GRMs, in particular, in Punjab does not bode well for the country’s trajectory of tax reforms as the latter has often been a trailblazer in this area.

**Conclusion and Recommendations**
A collective understanding on tax reforms needs to be forged and consensus needs to be built among the federal and provincial policymakers and all the private stakeholders. The tax policies formulated and the administration of taxation in Pakistan is patchy, which hinders the growth of businesses, limits consumer activity and adversely impacts governmental goals. Therefore, there can be a multitude of measures which can be introduced and implemented in order to have a cohesive and efficacious tax harmonisation framework in Pakistan.
As per the recommendations of the Tax Reforms Commission (TRC), one such measure can involve the creation of an agency that would collectively oversee the work being done by the federal and all the provincial governments to enhance coordination and cooperation among them. This agency, with a well-defined purpose, may also be responsible for revising the taxable services, along with clearly defining the criteria for taxation of services as well as devising a mechanism for the modification of tax revenues. Furthermore, the costs in tax compliance can be cut down through streamlining taxation by amalgamating provincial-revenue authorities and easing the process of filing taxes.

Provincial governments should examine the problems stymieing the taxation system in their respective jurisdiction and concerted efforts should be made to make tax collection based on uniform rationale for all provinces comprehensive and coherent. Similarly, in their jurisdictions, concerted efforts can be made to have the tax code/base of different provinces converge at one point so that tax arbitrage and double taxation can be completely eliminated. In order for this to materialise wide-ranging policy reforms can be put forth by the TRC, stipulating the establishment of research units, which shall be responsible for devising and designing a comprehensive macro-economics configuration. These units should also be tasked with providing the latest information on tax gaps and incidence in the provinces. Revenue projections, to determine the allocation and use of fiscal resources, shall also be provided by these units.

Additionally, recurrent research should be undertaken by the FBR and provincial revenue boards to appraise the socioeconomic effects of the present taxation framework. Only those who have proven to be valid tax payers, shall be given their due social security benefits. The provincial governments can, thus, establish more Tax Facilitation Centres.

Besides, the governments in all the provinces can engage in the capacity building of the institutions and officials dealing with the collection, management and utilisation of taxes. This can be done through obtaining credible estimates of the tax potential of the unorganised sector and reducing the arbitrariness in the appraisal of provincial duties.

Moreover, there should be a centralised forum for the collection of all types of taxes imposed across the provinces of Pakistan. These funds should then be distributed immediately to the relevant provincial offices. Provinces should also have the autonomy to access the federal government’s database of income and wealth records of its constituent residents so that efficacious taxes can be designed, suitable to the
needs and characteristics of the native populations. Additionally, the monetary
worth of property and assets should be gauged by impartial stakeholders on a regular
basis.

Elected governments in the provinces should have the complete discretionary
powers as far as the allocation and utilisation of tax revenues are concerned. Furthermore, at the national level, Pakistan should work towards augmenting the
simplification and competitiveness of taxes, with respect to the global arena.
References


On Malala Yousafzai’s Contribution to Improving the Situation of Pakistani Women*

Nathalène Reynolds**

Abstract
This chapter will first look at the rise of the young Pakistani Malala Yousafzai in Western public life. Governments, the media and civil society in North America and Western Europe have not usually shown much interest in understanding the positions defended by educated circles in Muslim societies, preferring more often to qualify them as conservative or even backward. They are not used to welcoming a young woman who continues to wear a headscarf. Was it Yousafzai’s youth that inspired genuine sympathy? Were the world powers, rejecting all responsibility for the terrible consequences of the ‘War on Terror’ in Afghanistan and Pakistan, seeking to soothe their consciences, while intoning the salutary qualities of education against the evils that undermined many societies in the developing world? In parallel, they tended to imply that the struggle undertaken by Malala Yousafzai in her country was in some way unique. They implicitly praised the female condition in the West, easily forgetting that the feminine revolution remained unfinished. This chapter aims to examine this issue, not forgetting to attempt when the occasion offers a comparison of the discourses – in the West as well as in the East – that hinder the difficult progress of women in a society that has remained eminently patriarchal.

This chapter will also look into the struggle for education Malala Yousafzai has waged and the influence her discourse has had in her country of origin. The impact of celebrity (in the East and in the West) on the gradual modification of the dominant collective minds that still struggle to give women their rightful place in the societal field will also be explored. Later in the chapter, we will look at what the press in Pakistan often describe as ‘women of substance’. Pakistan is home to many social workers, usually operating in difficult circumstances. Indeed, their dedication and courage would turn them into icons of feminism the country could be proud of, were it not for the lack of media coverage.

* This chapter has been approved as a Research Paper by the referee.
** Dr Nathalène Reynolds is a Visiting Fellow with the Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Pakistan; and a member of the Peace Operations Network, University of Montreal, Canada.
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Introduction

On Limitations of the Female Conditions in the West

The allegations against Harvey Weinstein are a reminder that, when a young woman is treated like an object, she is placed within an old and sickening script, one that is incredibly difficult to escape (Tolentino 2017).

The journalist Jia Tolentino, in an article titled How Men like Harvey Weinstein Implicate their Victims in their Acts published by the New Yorker on 11 October 2017, added:

If you have ever experienced sexual assault or harassment, you know that one of the cruellest things about these acts is the way that they entangle, and attempt to contaminate, all of the best things about you. If you’re sweet and friendly, you’ll think that it’s your fault for accommodating the situation. If you’re tough, well, you might as well decide that it’s no big deal. If you’re a gentle person, then he knew you were weak. If you’re talented, he thought of you as an equal. If you’re ambitious, you wanted it. If you’re savvy, you knew it was coming. If you’re affectionate, you seemed like you were asking for it all along. If you make dirty jokes or have a good time at parties, then why get moralistic? If you’re smart, there’s got to be some way to rationalize this (Ibid.).

The reputation of Weinstein, now aged 65, was already not without stain, the rumour carrying claims of sexual harassment and assault. Nevertheless, he seemed safe from prosecution. Moreover, the contribution of the man was considerable, since he helped:

…reinvent the model for independent films with movies including ‘Sex, Lies, and Videotape,’ ‘The Crying Game,’ ‘Pulp Fiction,’ ‘The English Patient,’ ‘Shakespeare in Love,’ and ‘The King’s Speech’ (Farrow 2017). ¹

¹ Note the stature of a multifaceted character: ‘Beyond Hollywood, he [Weinstein] has exercised his influence as a prolific fund-raiser for Democratic Party candidates, including Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton. Weinstein combined a keen eye for promising scripts, directors, and actors with a bullying, even threatening, style of doing business, inspiring both fear and gratitude. His movies have earned more than three hundred Oscar nominations, and, at the annual awards ceremonies, he has
The abuses of the film producer, following an investigation started on 12 October 2017, revealed a dimension that politicians, media and observers hardly evoked: that of the compromises which women feel themselves obliged to make, submitting (more frequently than told) to the demands of men with significant decision-making power. It is all the more ironic since Hollywood film productions have long nurtured a male ideal of the female sex as protecting the weak, especially women and children. The media today celebrates freedom of speech, while the victims are exonerated from the guilt they have long borne. This is a significant battle won. There remains the hypocrisy that was the norm for a long time, as those who choose to have a career, especially in such circles as film and fashion industries, must agree to the price to pay; otherwise, they still take the risk of being denied roles that would allow them to become a celebrity, which many aspire to. This is at least their conviction, while some actresses now assert forcefully that it has always been possible to oppose male pressures of such a nature. Women in the formal labour force are not spared by this phenomenon; and many of them (if one considers the testimonies they now dare to make) succumb to it. Could it be the fear of being confined to a subordinate position despite their skills? More often, they prioritise keeping their job, and thus, a certain financial independence. The dimension of sexual harassment, in any case, shows that access to education of girls as well as boys 

been thanked more than almost anyone else in movie history, ranking just after Steven Spielberg and right before God’ (Farrow 2017).

2 Asked shortly after the outbreak of the scandal to comment on the conduct of Weinstein, the French actress Juliette Binoche said: ‘In cinema, the exercise of power is very special. The producer has power, the director has power, the actor has power. Approaching this power, it’s a bit like black holes in space, they release an energy that one must know how to decrypt, feel, one can orbit around them, but must be careful not to get sucked in!’ (Nouchi 2017).

3 The Pakistani readership will undoubtedly question this desire for renown at all costs. In trying to sketch out an explanation (bearing in mind the limited space which is allotted), we have to look at an unfinished feminist revolution. Western societies no longer grant, as was the case in the past, sufficient recognition to the care women give to their homes and to the education of their children. They believe that these are tasks that still belong to women, until more men agree, little by little, to take on a greater share. At the same time, women are not exempt from professional success, which must be comparable to men’s. In addition to these various social pressures is the instrumentalisation of the female body that still figures so large in consumer society. It seems to us, then, that we can use the expression of a generation of disoriented women, far more so than their male counterparts. It is worth quoting the French writer Madeleine Chapsal here. She believes that the female body in the West is subject to a new form of male domination. She describes how the fashion industry works, writing that: ‘I had the chance to attend castings of top models ... The ritual is impressive: a series of very pretty young women wait in an antechamber, casually dressed….When their turn comes, introduced into the studio where the designer, surrounded by two or three helpers, form a jury, as in the time of slave merchants, they undress quickly, keeping only their underwear before donning one of the designer’s dresses’ (Chapsal 2014: 238).
On Malala Yousafzai’s Contribution to Improving the Situation of Pakistani Women

– in the West⁴ (in mostly mixed schools) – has not (yet) overcome clichés that continue to mark the dominant collective attitudes.

The Case of Malala Yousafzai
Far from the Hollywood scene, a young girl, who is today based in England, continues her fight for education of girls in her native country, Pakistan. Since the attack on her on 9 October 2012 to which she fell victim as an adolescent, Malala Yousafzai,⁵ who received numerous prizes and awards, including the Nobel Peace Prize in 2013, has stimulated an enormous volume of debate in Pakistan, because the West chose to celebrate her courage. Subsequently, she has turned herself into a fervent defender of children living in countries devastated by the war and poverty that affect too many parts of the Global South. She has employed a theme that is hardly original, but that has seduced many in powerful states, the media and Western civil society. She has hammered home an apparently simplistic message that ‘one child, one teacher, one book, one pen can change the world’ (ABC News 2013).

Forced to go into exile, Yousafzai also worked to promote the image of an enlightened Islam concerned for dignity and peace, and which encouraged boys and girls in equal measure to educate themselves. The attention the West showered on Yousafzai for a while provoked the suspicion of many of her Pakistani compatriots, although this gradually turned to indifference. It is evident that since the sad attack in 2012, the young woman, for fear of her life, has been unable to stay in Pakistan. One can also debate the impact her discourse and the foundation she started – the Malala Yousafzai Foundation, have had in the country. Has Yousafzai since become an icon of feminism in Pakistan, a source of inspiration for civil society engaged in the difficult struggle for gender equality?

Outline of Study
In the first part of this chapter, we will examine the journey of an eleven-year-old girl who wrote, while her home province, Swat, was besieged by the Taliban, a BBC Urdu (2013) blog. She had already understood the poor condition faced by the majority of Pakistani women. Education was, therefore, an invaluable window on

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¹ Note that the term ‘the West’ refers to a geopolitical reality born after the Second World War and the onset of the Cold War. We will return to the concept of the West later in this chapter.
² The tendency in the subcontinent, if one thinks of Benazir Bhutto, is often to call famous women either by their name or by their first name. The youth of Malala Yousafzai often incite observers, in the West as well as in the subcontinent, to call her by her first name. We will, for our part, refer either to ‘Yousafzai’ or ‘Malala’.
the world, a promise that life would not be dominated by domestic work, maternity and the education of children alone.

The second part looks at what might be considered the instrumentalisation by the West of the Malala Yousafzai phenomenon. Her contribution to the improvement of women’s status in Pakistan are also discussed, along with analysing the themes she defends both internationally and in Pakistan. It then examines, drawing in particular on Uma Chakravarti, the resistance in the subcontinent of what feminists call ‘patriarchy’. In Pakistan, adherents of patriarchy are worried about the ‘excesses’ that would arise from the access of girls to education. There are, clearly, voices in the country that speak up for gender equality. The chapter also looks at the fight waged by who the media in the Islamic Republic calls ‘women of substance’.

The West, especially since the attacks of 11 September 2001, have been using a theme beneficial to its propaganda: that of a remarkable feminine condition in Western Europe and North America. We shall seize, in the paper, the occasion to attempt to show that the feminine revolution in the West remains, at the very least, unfinished. Our aim is to emphasise the need to improve the status of women in the world, abandoning partisan political positions that only serve to confuse the debate. We should not omit to mention two more aspects: the first relates to the geopolitical ambitions of world and regional powers that have added to their discourse the theme of the female condition. The West praises the freedom ‘its’ women enjoy, forgetting that the life of the latter remains largely punctuated by patriarchal contingencies, while the consumer society and the ‘sex industry’ (if we can venture this expression in Pakistan) – shamelessly – use female bodies. The East, if we continue this schematization, insists on the women’s duty of ‘modesty’, the main goal being to preserve a patriarchal system that obstinately tries to resist changes. The role of female celebrities is delicate, especially when they have the privilege of evolving within the male-dominated field of thought.

**Malala Yousafzai: An Icon of Courage and Hope**

**Story of Gul Makai and Attack of 9 October 2012**

On 9 October 2012, a 15-year old schoolgirl and activist was the target of an attack carried out by the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) [Taliban Movement of Pakistan] in Mingora, capital of Swat District (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa). The TTP is an umbrella organisation that includes various Islamist activist groups operating mainly in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). In her book *I am Malala: The Story of the Girl Who Stood Up for Education*
and Was Shot by the Taliban. Yousafzai, writing under the ghost name of Gul Mukai, recalls the few hours that preceded what was intended to be her execution. She writes:

That morning we arrived in the narrow mud lane off Haji Baba Road in our usual procession of brightly painted rickshaws, sputtering diesel fumes, each one crammed with five or six girls. Since the time of the Taliban our school has had no sign and the ornamented brass door in a white wall across from the woodcutter’s yard gives no hint of what lies beyond. For us girls that doorway was like a magical entrance to our own special world. As we skipped through, we cast off our head-scarves like winds puffing away clouds to make way for the sun then ran helter-skelter up the steps. At the top of the steps was an open courtyard with doors to all the classrooms. We dumped our backpacks in our rooms then gathered for morning assembly under the sky, our backs to the mountains as we stood to attention (Yousafzai and Lamb 2013: 8).

6 The publication of this book has been the subject of controversy, especially as the reader can easily sense the presence of a father (Ziauddin Yousafzai) eager to profile himself. In addition, the book is mainly aimed at the West, borrowing the concepts of Pakistani NGOs without acknowledging them, thus, making of the Yousafzai family an exceptional case in Pakistan. We will not go into more details on an issue analysed in a paper recently published by the Pakistan Security Research Unit (PSRU) (Reynolds 2016). It is important to quote here at length from two book reviews that readers have posted on Amazon.com. One of them (Kellie) wrote on 14 December 2014: 'My 11-year old son read this and was so touched and inspired by Malala’s story. He normally only likes to read sci-fi, so I was shocked when he came back to me after reading the book with tears in his eyes, saying how grateful and inspired this book was for him. Nothing has ever moved him the way this story did. I highly recommend this story to any tweens and teens. It is sure to inspire empathy and understanding’ (Kellie 2014). On 22 August 2017, Andy, for his part, underlined: 'What a great thing to do on the first day of school: finish Malala’s short and very accessible autobiography. If you ever wonder if education matters anymore, remember that the Taliban shot Malala for going to school and advocating that girls around the world be allowed to do the same. It was a bit surprising at how ‘normal’ Malala’s childhood is: she is not the child of privilege or so-called liberal, modern, Western, Eurocentric indoctrination. Her mother did not learn to read and did not allow her face to be photographed until Malala’s speech to the UN. Malala herself shows great reverence toward her religion and, when recovering from the gunshot wounds in England, was deeply shocked while watching Bend It Like Beckham, which staff showed her attempting to make her feel ‘at home,’ at the women running around in sports bras and shorts. Most enlightening is the first hand description of her native Swat, a naturally abundant land caught among a weak but democratic government, a strong but self-aggrandising military, and the extremist Taliban seeking to impose its order’ (Andy 2017).

7 The choice of Christina Lamb, a British journalist, as co-writer, might have been injudicious as she has been the target of conspiracy theories. In November 2001, Lamb, the London-based Telegraph’s award-winning foreign correspondent, was deported from Pakistan ‘[…] after uncovering evidence of a covert operation by rogue elements in the ISI, Pakistan’s military intelligence service, to smuggle arms
Swatis faced a troubled period, having been under the *de facto* rule of *Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi* - TNSM (Movement for the Enforcement of Islamic Law). Indeed, on 15 February 2009, the provincial government of North West Frontier Province, after negotiations with the TNSM, agreed to enforce – in Malakand Division, this movement’s very strict understanding of the Sharia Law. The following May, the Pakistan Army decided on *Operation Rah-e-Rast* (True Path), which was intended to retake control of Swat. During the Taliban reign, more than 400 girls’ schools were destroyed (Khan 2012). The TNSM promoted the argument that the Holy Quran was opposed to girls’ education. This was also the opinion of many Muslim clerics. Malala Yousafzai, then aged 11, wrote – despite great danger – a blog for the *BBC Urdu Service*. She portrayed the daily life and aspirations of girls under the rule of the Taliban. Her pseudonym of *Gul Makai* gave her temporary anonymity, especially since the press relayed a few excerpts from the blog, now famous. In one of her first blogs (on 3 January 2009), Yousafzai underlined:

I had a terrible dream last night filled with military helicopters and Talibans. I have had such dreams since the launch of the military...
operation in Swat. I wrote about being afraid to go to school because of the Taliban edict and looking over my shoulder all the time. I also described something that happened on my way home from school: I heard a man behind me saying, “I will kill you.” I quickened my pace and after a while I looked back to see if he was following me. To my huge relief I saw he was speaking on his phone, he must have been talking to someone else (Yousafzai and Lamb 2013: 80).

Another extract – dated 5 January 2009 – aroused the Pakistani media’s interest, because it showed that the bright colours so popular with the country’s women were now banned. Malala told her blog-readers:

I wrote a lot about school as that was at the centre of our lives. I loved my royal-blue school uniform but we were advised to wear plain clothes instead and hide our books under our shawls. One extract was called DO NOT WEAR COLOURFUL CLOTHES. In it I wrote, “I was getting ready for school one day and was about to put on my uniform when I remembered the advice of our principal, so that day I decided to wear my favourite pink dress” (Yousafzai and Lamb 2013: 81). 10

It seems that voices of civil society, so insignificant at first sight can provoke the anger, but perhaps also the fear of those who seek to stifle any protest or opinion that contravenes theirs. Malala, for her part, doubted that the Taliban movement, which had adopted in December 2007, the name of Tehreek-e-Taliban-e-Pakistan, would ‘physically’ attack a girl.11 She had already gained certain notoriety, making a

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10 Returning to the question of the burqa enforced by the TNSM and its leader Maulana Fazlullah and the climate of terror that this group imposed, the author notes: ‘I also wrote about the burqa. When you’re very young, you love the burqa because it’s great for dressing up. But when you are made to wear it, that’s a different matter. Also it makes walking difficult! One of my diary entries was about an incident that happened when I was out shopping with my mother and cousin in the Cheena Bazaar: There we heard gossip that one day a woman was wearing a shuttlecock burqa and fell over. When a man tried to help her she refused and said, “Don’t help me, brother, as this will bring immense pleasure to Fazlullah.” When we entered the shop we were going to, the shopkeeper laughed and told us he got scared thinking we might be suicide bombers as many suicide bombers wore the burqa’ (Ibid.).

11 Yousafzai had given up walking to the school she attended and that her father had founded (Khushal Public School), although it was nearby. Her mother was scared of me walking on my own. We had been getting threats all year. Some were in the newspapers, some were notes or messages passed on by people. My mother was worried about me, but the Taliban had never come for a girl and I was more concerned they would target my father as he was always speaking out against them. His close friend
number of individual interviews with the local media and a documentary produced by Adam B. Ellick, a *New York Times* correspondent. She braved the taboo that a girl approaching puberty should avoid public appearances, opting for *purdah.¹²* She noted:

A group of us girls gave an interview on AVT Khyber, the only privately owned Pashto television channel, about girls dropping out of school due to militancy. Teachers helped us beforehand on how to respond to questions. I wasn’t the only one to be interviewed. When we were eleven and twelve, we did them together, but as we turned thirteen or fourteen my friends’ brothers and fathers didn’t allow them because they had entered puberty and should observe *purdah* and also they were afraid (Ibid.:73).

Following the attack, the TTP’s spokesperson, Ehsanullah Ehsan, declared that the group had repeatedly warned the adolescent. He added:

She is a Western-minded girl. She always speaks against us. We will target anyone who speaks against the Taliban […]. We warned her several times to stop speaking against the Taliban and to stop supporting Western non-governmental organisations, and to come to the path of Islam (Al Jazeera 2012).

The TTP tried to appropriate the monopoly of the interpretation of the sacred text; it made access of girls to education a Western conspiracy; finally it assumed the prerogative of punishing any person (even a girl) who would dare to dispute the moral value system it was imposing. The terrorist of 9 October 2012 targeted – symbolically – Malala Yousafzai’s forehead. And the consequence of this remains, since to this day, Yousafzai suffers from a left-side partial facial paralysis.

The attack profoundly affected the political world and Pakistan’s civil society. However, the latter did not fail to note that Yousafzai, although badly wounded, had not been the only one who was attacked; her fellow pupils Kainat Riaz, then 15, and Shazia Ramzan, 14, were also targeted, although less seriously (Smallman and fellow campaigner Zahid Khan had been shot in the face in August on his way to prayers and I knew everyone was telling my father, “Take care, you’ll be next” (Yousafzai and Lamb 2013:8).

¹² *Purdah*, also spelled *Pardah*, Hindi *Pardah* (*screen* or *veil*), a practice that was inaugurated by Muslims, and later adopted by various Hindus, especially in India, and that involves the seclusion of women from public observation by means of concealing clothing (including the veil) and by the use of high-walled enclosures, screens, and curtains within the home’ (Encyclopædia Britannica 2017).
The then, Chief of Army Staff (COAS), General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, strongly condemned ‘the act of terrorism’ (The Express Tribune 2012). He declared:

The cowards who attacked Malala and her fellow students have time and again shown how little regard they have for human life and how low they can stoop to impose their twisted ideology (Ibid.).

Recalling that it was not ‘the first time that militants had targeted children’, he underlined that the attack on Parade Lane in Rawalpindi was a reminder of their bloodlust (Ibid.). He praised Malala as an ‘icon of courage and hope, which vindicates the sacrifices that the people of Swat and the nation had given for saving the valley from the plague of terrorism’ (Ibid.). Lastly, he underlined ‘the intrinsic values of an Islamic society, based on the principles of liberty, justice and equality of man’ (Ibid.). Indeed:

Islam guarantees each individual – male or female – equal and inalienable right to life, property and human dignity, with faith and education as the chief obligations to achieve enlightenment (Ibid.).

13 The Pakistan Army, by giving medical care to Malala Yousafzai and offering her support that other Pakistanis in a similar state did not receive, saved her life. Moreover, it was, Pakistan, which covered the costs of the subsequent care which Malala received in Birmingham.

14 On 4 December 2009, ‘armed suicide attackers entered a mosque in Parade Lane area, Rawalpindi during Friday prayers. The area is surrounded by military houses and headquarters in Rawalpindi as well as frequented by retired and serving military officers. They opened fire and hurled grenades on about 150 worshippers, present in the mosque’ (Rizwan 2015).

15 The COAS reaffirmed the nation’s willingness to fight the terrorist phenomenon. In September 2014, Pakistan Army spokesman General Asim Bajwa announced the arrest of a group of ten TTP members accused of the attempted murder of Yousafzai (Boone 2014). It was an opportunity for Malala’s father, Ziauddin Yousafzai, to declare: ‘This is good news for our family and most importantly, for the people of Pakistan and the civilised world. … This first step of apprehending Malala’s attackers signifies the beginning of real hope for the hundreds of thousands of people whose lives have been affected by terrorism in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, in Swat and the whole country… We greatly appreciate the efforts of the security forces and police in bringing these men to justice and fighting for the re-establishment of peace…This is the beginning of the real restoration of the writ of the government, where the rule of law and justice prevails for all’ (Ibid.). These men, tried during a ‘secret trial’, were sentenced to 25 years imprisonment. At the beginning of June 2015, the media reported, however, that eight of them had been released ‘quietly, to avoid a media fuss’; such was at least the allegation of an anonymous ‘senior security source’ who had said: ‘The trial had absolutely no credibility as nobody was there to witness it but a public prosecutor, a judge, the army and the accused’ (Press Association and The Telegraph 2015). A rumour indicated that the arrest and sentencing of these men were a response to pressure from the West which wanted Malala Yousafzai to get justice.
Tabish Khair and a Severe Reading of the Malala Phenomenon

Yousafzai has received a remarkable number of prizes and awards. It seems interesting here to look at the analysis of an Indian (Muslim) academic who wonders about the significance of the symbol that Malala has become. Tabish Khair, in an article titled *Giving Malala Yousafzai the Nobel Could Rob Her of Power* published on 13 October 2014, writes, ‘What Islamist extremists could not do with their brutality and bullets, the West seems to have managed with adulation and accolades’ (Khair 2014).

The author insists on the *fatwa* of ‘50 Pakistani clerics condemning the attack on Malala‘ that did not prevent the Taliban from renewing their plan to murder the adolescent and her father. Finding refuge in Birmingham after several surgeries, Yousafzai ‘became a remarkable symbol of resistance to religious fundamentalism and of the right of children, especially girls, to be educated. The 29 April 2013 issue of *Time* magazine called her one of “The 100 Most Influential People in the World”‘ (Ibid.).

Almost two years after the October 2012 terrorist attack, she was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, becoming the youngest recipient of such an honour, which she shared,

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16 ‘Apart from the Nobel Prize… on 29 November 2012, the Harmony Foundation, a Mumbai–based NGO, conferred Yousafzai ‘the Mother Teresa Memorial International Award for Social Justice on Malala Yousafzai and Sima Samar, chairperson of the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission. On 9 January 2013, it was time for the French Simone de Beauvoir Prize for Women’s Freedom (prix Simone de Beauvoir pour la liberté des femmes), financed by the ′Institut Français′ [French Institute], itself under the supervision of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Development. On 20 March 2013, Malala Yousafzai was selected for the Index on Censorship’s Doughty Street Advocacy Award (Greek journalist Kostas Vaxevanis, Syrian internet activist Basel Khartabil and South African photographer Zanele Muholi were also feted at the same event). On 10 October 2013, the European Parliament deemed Yousafzai worthy of the Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought. Finally […] she was also the winner of the International Children’s Peace Prize award by the Dutch Kid’s Rights Foundation to children committed to the struggle for education. It was, nonetheless, the Islamic Republic of Pakistan that, after the attack on the adolescent, began what was to become a trend, as the state awarded her the Sitara-e-Shujat, granted to civilians who have shown great bravery’ (Reynolds 2016: 6).

17 On 12 October 2012, the journalist Richard Leiby: ‘Friday afternoon services often serve as a barometer of public sentiment in Pakistan and elsewhere in the Muslim world, and with seemingly rare exceptions, many prayer leaders included mention of Malala Yousafzai, who survived an assassination attempt this week in the northwestern Swat Valley. “Malala is a brave child who raised her voice for the education of girls and women in Swat, and she was cruelly punished for that. And we condemn it,” one Islamabad cleric, Maulana Ishaq, told his congregation in representative remarks’ (Leiby 2012).
it is true, with Kailash Satyarthi, a 60-year old Indian children’s rights activist. Khair notes:

I have only the greatest of respect for Malala as a person and an activist. And I feel that education for girls is not just a major cause to fight for, it is probably the most important cause for people like me, who come from a Muslim background. I believe that much of what is called retrograde Islamism is essentially a patriarchal backlash and the only real antidote to it is full and equal educational opportunities for every girl child in the world (Ibid.).

The second part of this chapter returns with Uma Chakravarti, to the question of patriarchy in the subcontinent and its corollary, the paternalism which disguises its least acceptable dictates. Khair explores the idea:

... yet, what is it that Malala can really do, from asylum in England, apart from be a symbol? How much has she achieved in the few years in which she had lived, courageously, and suffered in this world? There is no doubt that she is a person of great courage and integrity; there is no doubt that she is a necessary symbol. There might also be no doubting the noble intention of the Nobel committee, in this gestural award that highlights a vital need, a fight that has to be fought by every right-thinking human being (Ibid.).

Khair might not give enough importance to Malala’s courage when she wrote a blog for the BBC, which had long been searching for a volunteer. Her father, anxious for fame, probably incited her to take the role on. There remains that a young girl chose this approach, as many of well-to-do Swatis or those who had a family likely to

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18 Satyarthi had founded the NGO Bachpan Bachao Andolan (Save Childhood Movement) in 1980. Announcing its choice, the Norwegian committee declared that: “It is an important point for a Hindu and a Muslim, an Indian and a Pakistani, to join in a common struggle for education and against extremism” (The Nobel Peace Prize 2014). Such an association provoked both enthusiasm and bitter criticism amongst Pakistani commentators. One reader of the Pakistani national daily, Dawn, underlined in a comment on an article on 10 October 2014 (the date of the announcement of the Nobel Prize winners) that ‘the too politically charged Nobel Committee did not have the courage to give the Peace prize to only a Muslim, Pakistani girl. To show their political correctness, they picked an Indian from nowhere. Likewise, Edward Snowden was ignored’ (Dawn 2014). Another reader’s comment, posted the following day, noted that ‘Malala is world famous... the Indian guy not even famous in India and in my opinion not deserving of this award. This is just the world telling us that Pakistan will not be given anything without involving India in it’ (Reynolds 2016: 5).
welcome them elsewhere in Pakistan, opted for temporary exile ... and silence, a
guarantee of survival as the Taliban movement opposed any freedom of expression,
assuming the exclusive right to interpret the Holy Quran. It is true that Malala’s
own family also sought refuge outside Swat. However, Yousafzai, since she dared to
write a blog, moreover on a foreign but national language website such as BBC
Urdu, became a symbol of resistance as much for her own social group (young girls)
as for the rest of a terrorised society. Khair ponders on the role of civil society in the
subcontinent. He comments:

As someone who grew up on the other side of the Pakistan-India
border and in a Muslim family, some painful thoughts crossed my
mind too. I wondered, for instance, if our cultures have nothing
more extensive and enduring to offer as evidence of work toward
peace than a courageous 17-year old girl. If so, there is something
seriously lacking in our nations and cultures… (Ibid.).

Khair adds that many Pakistani health workers have recently risked their lives or
ever died, distributing polio vaccines to children:19

Evidently, admirable as Malala is as a person, there are many other
brave persons in places like there, and if we fail to make them
visible – concentrating instead on just one story of heroism – don’t
we actually convey a contradictory message globally, the message of
lack?…. And if the Nobel committee can see only one Malala – for
the fault is not Malala’s – then surely there is a remarkable lack of
information and knowledge even in such rarefied circles of global
opinion-making! (Ibid.).

Khair notes two types of reactions that the Nobel Prize nomination of Yousafzai
aroused. On the one hand, ‘loud acclamation, bordering on worship’, on the other
‘rabid criticism, smelling of fire and brimstone’ (Ibid.).20 The second group was

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19 Taliban argued of a Western plot – using vaccination campaigns – to sterilise Pakistan, a populous
Muslim country.
20 One should note the open letter that Dr Abdus Salam, of the Ahmadiya confession who lived in
exile, sent on 11 October 2014, to Yousafzai. He pointed out that he had grown up in a medium-sized
city in Pakistan, while his father was only an ‘education officer working for the Punjab Government’
(Talat 2014). He emphasised: ‘Like you, I took a keen interest in my studies. I enjoyed English and
Urdu literature, but excelled at mathematics. At a very young age, I scored the highest marks ever
recorded then, in my matriculation exam’ (Ibid.). Salam alluded to the difficulties for young girls to
access education, particularly during the period of troubles the country was facing, writing that: ‘My
education, however, was never as politically challenging as yours... I did not have to contend with the
implicitly angered that Malala had received and accepted so many tributes from a West that had benefitted from the global or at least regional instability it had itself helped stir up, from the December 1979 Soviet invasion/intervention in Afghanistan up to today. There are, however, many local personalities, including social workers, in Pakistan (and India) who are revered for the help they willingly give to their community. No one questions the future of such recognition, often expecting such individuals to continue their charitable mission. Those who do cease their work often continue to benefit from respect for their past actions. Yousafzai has, no doubt, easily succumbed to Western fame, also hoping to represent a country that the Western and North American media have often vilified. She does nonetheless remain, because of the courage she showed when she was only a child, an icon of feminism. Indeed, not only did she - admittedly, with the support of her father - refuse upon attaining puberty to submit to the rule of purdah, but she also opposed the Taliban phenomenon, demanding the right to an autonomous interpretation of the sacred text, regardless of age and gender.

‘Women of Substance’ in Pakistan and the Issue of Women Empowerment

On the Western Instrumentation of the Malala Yousafzai Phenomenon

Khair ponders on the ‘burden’ that weighs down ‘on such a young person’:

Is it fair to award the prize for what might be achieved, rather than what has been achieved—because, unlike Satyarthi, Malala has not had the time to organize anything of substance, despite her brave personal example and her visibility as a symbol. To date, Satyarthi and his organization are credited with rescuing and educating about 100,000 such child laborers in India. She has not had the time to rescue 100,000 children from the darkness of Taliban and its ilk.

‘Taliban destroying my school, or forbidding boys from receiving education’ (Ibid.). Praising the courage shown by the young Malala, he added that: ‘Winning the Nobel prize has enraged your attackers, as it has annoyed many of your countrymen…Not a lot has changed in this country. You were mocked and alienated by your countrymen, when you did nothing wrong. I know something of that. As a nation, we do not want to be celebrated…What we wish for, is to be pitied…They were pleased with you as long as you were another local victim. But then, you cast off your victimhood and emerged as a hero, a beacon of hope for young girls around the world. That’s where you lost them…We don’t like heroes, Malala’ (Ibid.).

21 Former President of the United States, Barack Obama, was the recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize 2009 ‘for his extraordinary efforts to strengthen international diplomacy and cooperation between peoples’ (Nobel Prizes and Laureates 2009). Yet, he did not take office until a few months earlier.
Now she might never get that chance. The adulation of well-meaning but largely ignorant people has put her beyond the pale. One original reason why she became such a fresh and enabling symbol—unlike the thousands of men or women who share her opinions in Delhi or Karachi or New York—was that she was ‘in the field’ (Ibid.).

The Taliban, by their attack and subsequent threats of death, had banished Yousafzai from the field. Khair highlights the support that Malala had obtained in her country, while even a refugee in England, ‘she still remained present in Pakistan – she was a local Pakistani story of courage and change’ (Ibid.).

Khair, noting that Malala was hailed by ‘the superior circles’22 (Ibid.), reflects on the scope of the action that was now left to her, while many activists remained on the ‘field’, risking their lives and not ignoring the struggle, far from the media that shapes any notoriety, would be long. This battle ‘has to be fought not just against hostile strangers but also against cousins and nieces and uncles’ (Ibid.).

Yousafzai, in any case, had only benefitted from the sympathy that the Taliban attack against a little girl had aroused. Still, she was not averse to playing along with an old theme, that of the ‘White Man’s Burden’ (an allegory borrowed from the poem by Rudyard Kipling).23 The West implicitly saw itself as the heir of Enlightenment philosophy, in essence European – but also, implicitly, Christian, with messianic vocation, since it gave itself, in the aftermath of the fall of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (25 December 1991), the role – at the very least – of contributing to the advent of democracy throughout the world. Moreover, the West - in the aftermath of Operation Enduring Freedom (October 2001) for which Afghanistan was the unfortunate stage – claimed to be the best defender of Muslim women throughout the world, implying they were all oppressed. This was an element of propaganda that offended many Muslim countries. Malala Yousafzai, in accepting Western praise, almost unquestioningly, tacitly agreed to adhere to such an ideological orientation.

22 Khair (2014) prefers such an expression, adding: ‘I won’t call it the West. I call it the superior circles – people with lots of good opinions, and the inability to operate in the field.’

23 An article titled Malala Now a Millionaire recalled that Pakistan praised (long before the West) the courage of the girl. Indeed, ‘Malala’s popularity increased dramatically after the attack: schoolchildren started praying for her while she was at the hospital, a march with candles and updates about her medical treatment on front pages of newspapers who were not yet controlled by the Taliban. Her message was certainly not silenced. The UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon said: “extremists have shown what frightens them the most: a girl with a book”’ (The Express Tribune 2016b).
Watching – on YouTube – videos that reproduce the many speeches that Malala has made around the world, addressing the most illustrious, we cannot help but reflect on the staged character of much of it, even if she was perhaps a passive actor in that. Was the slogan of ‘one child, one teacher, one book, one pen can change the world’ enough to captivate the imagination of the good and great in a jaded world? Or was it the youth of Malala that provoked their sympathy? If this is the case, one may wonder why the children who are dying in what is called the third or even fourth world, whose photos flow in the West, do not move them enough, inciting them to give up realpolitik to adopt a more humanistic policy. However, we must note a dimension: the young Malala, retaining the traditional costume of the subcontinent (the shalwar kamiz) and a shawl covering her hair, has also become a defender and representative of a moderate Islam that demands respect shown towards other faiths and, therefore, cultures. Malala, the ‘youngest-ever UN Messenger of Peace’ (UN News Centre 2017), appointed to this position on 10 April 2017 has, thus, become de facto an ambassador for enlightened Islam, to which women, contrary to Western propaganda, adhere just like men, because the Holy Quran responds to aspirations to the divine of the two genders. This aspect seemed to have gone almost unnoticed. Maybe commentators preferred another interpretation. Westerners boasted of their open-mindedness as they consented, they implied, to receive Malala regardless of her dress. Pakistanis critical of the Malala phenomenon lamented that the young woman dialogued with the enemy.

Here, one should evoke the question of the phenomenal fees that Malala is able to demand for her speeches, but which may be intended to finance the Foundation that she has created. In such a case, it would no longer be the West that instrumentalises Malala, but Malala who uses the West, to generate the funding she considers necessary for the action she intends to take:

By August 2015, Salarzai Ltd – a company which has been founded to protect the rights to Malala’s life story – reportedly had £2.2 million in its bank account. This year [2016], the company reported a pre-tax profit of £1.1 million… Malala’s parents — Ziauddin Yousafzai and Toor Pekai Yousafzai — are shareholders in

24 One of the numerous websites analysing the Malala phenomenon, an anonymous critic writes: ‘It is important to consider the fact that Malala is not the girl we think she is, that the leading powers are just giving us the impression that there are some good people left. Taking a random Pakistani girl from the streets, giving her father a job within the UN, setting up a terrorist attack and giving someone the Nobel Peace Prize isn’t an incredibly difficult thing to do by influential people to create a perfect propaganda against terrorism. We should always stay critical when we receive information through the media’ (Google.com 2017).
Salarzai, as is the 18-year old Nobel Laureate. Salarzai Ltd is a separate entity from the Malala Foundation, through which Yousafzai operates her charity endeavours (First Post 2016).

The Indian news and media website First Post pondered on the accumulation of such sums:

The proceeds from the sale of her memoir “I Am Malala”, account for a major chunk: The book deal was reportedly struck for £2 million; it earned a similar amount in worldwide sales (about 1.8 million copies were sold in all, according to Nielsen Book Research)...Then, there are her not insubstantial earnings from speaking engagements. Some reports state that Malala charges a fee of £114,000 per speech — it has been contrasted with the £64,000 fee purportedly charged by another Nobel Laureate, Desmond Tutu (Ibid.).

In 2016, she had to pay ‘the British exchequer £200,000 in taxes’ for the previous year (Ibid.). Moreover, at the same date, the Malala Yousafzai Foundation, in fact Malala herself, ‘donated around £750,000 (or USD 1 million) for various education-related causes’ (Ibid.). To note that she also gave $50,000 of the Nobel prize money (a little more than half of the total sum) she received to rebuild a school in Gaza (Ibid.). Nevertheless, did the fame quickly acquired by Malala Yousafzai distance her from ‘the ordinary people’? The Express Tribune dated 29 June 2016, emphasised that:

All this international media attention disappointed some Pakistanis, they were sad about Malala Yousafzai standing in the spotlight, while Pakistan has much bigger problems or other innocent children who experienced something worse like injuries caused by a drone attack. Their opinion is that the money that goes to Malala’s Foundation should be given to people in Pakistan who need basic healthcare (The Express Tribune 2016b).

**Gender Equality and ‘Interests’ Deemed ‘Superior’**

In Reading Lolita, the Iranian writer Azar Nafisi (2004: 103) narrates a scene between a male and a female character who questions the meaning of the concept of ‘political Islam’:
He [Mr Bahri] cautiously tried to make me understand what political Islam meant, and I rebuffed him, because it was exactly Islam as a political entity that I rejected. I told him about my grandmother who was the most devout Muslim I had ever known, even more than you, Mr Bahri, and still she shunned politics. She resented the fact that her veil which to her was the symbol, of her sacred relationship to God, had now become an instrument of power, turning the women who wore them into political signs and symbols.25 Where do your loyalties lie, Mr Bahri, with Islam or the state?

The author deals with unfinished female conquests in the name of ‘higher interests’. Thus, the 1936 prohibition of the veil in Iran was ‘a controversial symbol of modernization’, a powerful sign of the reduction of clergy’s power (Ibid.:112). Nafisi, then, comes to the position adopted in Iran, by ‘Marxist organizations’ which refused their support for improving the status of women, because ‘the imperialists and their lackeys needed to be dealt with first’ (Ibid.). For them, ‘focusing on women’s rights was individualistic and bourgeois...’ (Ibid.).

Nafisi feigns incomprehension:

What imperialists, which lackeys? Do you mean those battered and bruised faces shown on nightly television confessing to their crimes? Do you mean the prostitutes they recently stoned to death or my former school principal, Mrs Parsa, who, like the prostitutes, was accused of “corruption on earth”, “sexual offenses” and “violation of decency and morality,” for having been the minister of education? [...] Are those the lackeys you are talking about, and is it in order to wipe these people out that we have to defer and not protest? (Ibid.:112-113).

25 Change of morals related to the generational phenomenon. Nafisi describes her position following the 1979 Revolution in her country. She writes: ‘I told the Revolutionary Committee that my integrity as a teacher and a woman was being compromised by its insistence that I wear the veil under false pretences for a few tumans [Iranian currency] a month. The issue was not so much the veil itself as freedom of choice. My grandmother had refused to leave the house for three months when she was forced to unveil. I would be similarly adamant in my own refusal. Little did I know that I would soon be given the choice of either veiling or being jailed, flogged and perhaps killed if I disobeyed’ (Nafisi 2004:151 & 152).
Could it be that all political currents, whatever their obedience, would be marked by the prevalence of what is called the patriarchal system, their leaders (for the most part, men) refusing to give sufficient interest to the gender problematic?

Many Muslim societies still hesitate to grant Muslim females full citizenship rights, out of fear that this would prevent them from fulfilling their religious and social duties. Conservative currents, using an exclusive interpretation of the sacred text, present themselves as the guarantors of social order. 26 The Pakistani context remains – at least, for the foreign scholar, difficult to grasp. However, the latter benefits from the work of feminists in the region. Patriarchal resistance in Pakistan is, undoubtedly, one of the key elements to a conservative Islam that seeks to freeze the role of both genres, giving primacy to men. 27 The patriarchal system is also being challenged in India, a country where the majority of the population is Hindu, but which hosts other confessions. 28 It is, therefore, appropriate to mention a phenomenon that affects the entire subcontinent (the former British Raj) and its three components now constituted as states: Pakistan, India and Bangladesh.

A short article worthy of being mentioned here is titled, *A Note on Patriarchy*, written by the Indian feminist, Uma Chakravarti, and addressed to the students of the Certificate in Understanding Gender in Society, New Delhi, Society for Participatory Research in Asia (PRIA). 29 The author emphasises that the ‘women’s movements’ and ‘the feminist scholarship’ were committed, very early in the fight they started in the 1970s, to acquire ‘concepts and tools of analysis that would facilitate an understanding of gender stratification, more generally, and women’s subordination more specifically’ (Chakravarti 2013:1). They aimed at understanding the ‘complex structure that has subordinated women …from the

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26 To the reader who would object to a remark made by a foreign researcher, we would like to indicate here that she is French and Moroccan.

27 Thus, Saleem – in *The Social Shari’ah of Islam* – notes: ‘the Almighty has made it clear that the real sphere in which one should strive in outdoing others is not the sphere of inborn abilities and characteristics because in this sphere some have been ordained to hold preference over others. The Almighty has created some people superior to others as regards their mental, physical, economic and social status. Similarly is the case between a man and a woman. They have been created as counterparts such that one is by nature the active member and the other the passive. While the former trait needs domination, vigor and force the latter needs gentleness, subtlety and acquiescence... These are inborn characteristics and any effort to surpass one another in this area would be tantamount to waging war against nature. This would of course only leave them to mourn their own misfortune’ (Ghamidi 2004: 30).

28 Muslims in India are the largest minority, with 138 million people making up 13.4 percent of the total population (Government of India 2011). Pakistan’s population is 208 million according to the 2017 census (Government of Pakistan 2017).

29 The author took the said course in 2013.
mid-seventies [of the 20th Century] feminist scholars have begun to use the term patriarchy as well as imbuing it with a specific connotation’ (Ibid.).

It was necessary to revisit the term ‘patriarchy’, a ‘system of social structures and practices, in which men dominate, exploit and oppress women’ (Walby 1990:85). Questioning the relationship between women and a history that men have long written, Gerda Lerner notes:

To give the system of male dominance historicity and to assert that its functions and manifestations change over time is to break sharply with the handed-down tradition. This tradition has mystified patriarchy by making it historic, eternal, invisible, and unchanging. But it is precisely due to changes in the social and educational opportunities available to women that in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries large numbers of women finally became capable of critically evaluating the process by which we have helped to create the system and maintain it. We are only now able to conceptualize women’s role in history and thereby to create a consciousness which can emancipate women (Lerner 1986:54).

Lerner gave a definition of two important concepts. The first deals with ‘patriarchy’, which:

In its wider definition means the manifestation and institutionalization of male dominance over women and children in the family and the extension of male dominance over women in society in general. It implies that men hold power in all the important institutions of society and that women are deprived of access to such power. […] One of the most challenging tasks of Women’s History is to trace with precision the various forms and modes in which patriarchy appears historically, the shifts and changes in its structure and function, and the adaptations it makes to female pressure and demands (Ibid.:239).

Another term that Lerner defined and which is important to the understanding of the evolution of women on the social scene, that of ‘paternalism’ which ‘describes a particular mode, a subset of patriarchal relations’ (Ibid.):

Paternalism dominance describes the relationship of a dominant group, considered superior, to a subordinate group, considered
inferior, in which the dominance is mitigated by mutual obligations and reciprocal rights. The dominated exchange submission for protection and unpaid labor for maintenance. In its historical origins, the concept comes from family relations as they developed under patriarchy, in which the father held absolute power over all the members of his household. In exchange, he owed them the obligation of economic support and protection (Ibid.).

Women are not deprived of rights, influence and resources in their historical and social environment; in the same way, by no means all men are in a socially dominant position. The objective of Gerda and Chakravarti, examining the problematic of the patriarchal system, is to emphasise the existence of an ideology that continues to shape the dominant collective minds around the world. In addition to this dimension, there is what is commonly referred to as sexual ideology of culture. This concept describes ancestral customs, lasting respect for which socially conservative groups insist upon, thereby preventing social change. Kabeer and Subramaniam (2000:7) underline that the ‘technological advance gradually undermined the assumption that the division of roles and responsibilities of the two genders was natural and permanent’. The authors add:

Resistance to any form of change in gender relations has increasingly taken on the rationale of the ‘sanctity of culture’. The discourse of ‘culture’ is the obvious next line of defence when arguments based on the discourse of ‘biological difference’ start to look shaky since it accommodates the defence of the very same gender division of roles, responsibilities and privileges that the earlier arguments on the grounds of biological difference were used to defend (Ibid.).

30 Taking the case of Native Americans, Billson notes that: ‘The ingredients of a ‘good woman’ and a ‘good man’ follow remarkably different cultural recipes that in turn affect role expectations, work opportunities, and the ability to make choices. In most traditions males enjoy broader powers and fewer restrictions; women’s power and status are defined not only as different from men’s, but as inferior. The logic of women’s oppression intricately connects power and culture, because culture defines who will have what kind of power and under what circumstances. Blueprints for identity and preferred behavior pass from generation to generation, reproducing personal and political ideologies that maintain power for the dominant sex. The old model of male superiority is often cruel and restrictive, resulting in women’s economic, political, and educational isolation, which in turn undermines their position in the community and chances of achieving their – our – dreams’ (Billson 1995:5).
As for Bhasin, she dares evoking a question that thwarts those who rely on the sacred texts to refuse at least a development of the patriarchal system. The well-known Indian feminist underlines:

Most modern religions are patriarchal, defining male authority as supreme. They present a patriarchal order as being supernaturally ordained. The feminine principle of power which existed before the evolution of institutionalized religions has been gradually weakened, goddesses have been replaced by gods. All major religions have been created, interpreted and controlled by upper class and upper caste men; they have defined morality, ethics, behaviour and even law; they have laid down the duties and rights of men and women, the relations between them. They have influenced state policy and continue to be a major force in most societies; in South Asia their power and presence are enormous (Bhasin 2006:10).31

Women are also given little choice but to assume the role of trustee of a specifically male honour.32 Men, concerned with producing untainted offspring, thus, aimed at controlling the manifestations of female sexuality. They were also the heads of a family structure, the social prestige of which was reinforced by irreproachably behaved female members. The Pakistani sociologist, Farida Shaheed, notes:

Together, culture, customs and law outline the space available for a woman’s definition of self, the cross-cutting factors she must daily negotiate in her action, and the boundaries against which she needs to push for self-affirmation and change… The same can be said to apply to the concept of ‘manhood’, but the implications are not alike (Shaheed 1998:61).

31 The author also discusses the question of what she describes as ‘the ideology of motherhood’ which ‘is considered one of the bases of women’s oppression because it created feminine and masculine character types which perpetuate patriarchy; it creates and strengthens the divide between private and public; it restricts women’s mobility and growth and it reproduces male dominance’ (Bhasin 2006:8).

32 Chakravarti insists on the concept of Brahmanical patriarchy in South Asia ‘because of the need to maintain caste purity, an institution unique to Hindu society initially but also to Christian and Muslim communities in the region…Brahmanical patriarchy is a set of rules and institutions in which caste and gender are linked, each shaping the other, and where women are crucial in maintaining the boundaries between castes’ (Chakravarti 2013:4). However, such a system is not frozen, since ‘the norms of Brahmanical patriarchy’ (often drawn from the prescriptive texts’ that ‘shape the ideologies of the upper castes’) ‘are also sometimes emulated by the lower castes, especially when seeking upward mobility’ (Ibid.).
Chakravarti (2013), for her part, rightly emphasises the various expressions of the patriarchal system, noting that researchers opted for the term ‘patriarchies in order to capture the diversity and range of patriarchal practices’:

Since the formation of patriarchy has a relationship to history and is not static but has changed, its dominance can also be ended through the struggles of women, and men, committed to a more egalitarian society (Ibid.).

Girls’ access to literacy, and education more generally, is the key to greater gender equality and ultimately to a better distribution of wealth. To conclude this section, one must acknowledge the role of Pakistan’s civil society in promoting a more egalitarian state. Thus, the Declaration on the Rights of Women in Pakistan adopted by the Women’s Rights Committee on 24 October 1976 underlined in its first article that ‘discrimination against women is contrary to the injunctions of Islam, violates Constitutional guarantees and constitutes an offence against human dignity’ (Shaheed 1992). The second article stipulated that ‘All appropriate measures shall be taken to abolish prejudicial practices, customs and usages which are discriminatory against women and to ensure adequate legal protection for safeguarding the rights of women’ (Ibid.).

**Other Icons of Feminism in Pakistan**

According to the French novelist and essayist Belinda Cannone:

The extraordinary protest against harassment and violence against women, which has engulfed much of the Western world, represents a decisive leap about which we can rejoice wholeheartedly. It is difficult to imagine how the relations between the sexes will not be definitively transformed by the vigour and extent of the denunciation… Although it has been pointed out that there has sometimes been exaggeration or clumsiness, the fact remains that no man can pretend to ignore the violence inherent in attitudes

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33 ‘Apart from the control over women’s sexuality under patriarchy, women’s subordination to men also enables the latter to control women’s productive or labour power. Women’s productivity within the household, and outside, is controlled by men who also determine whether women will work outside the household or not. The control of women’s labour means that men derive economic gains from the subordination of women. To maintain the double control, over women’s sexuality and their labour, women’s mobility is often stringently controlled through practices such as confining women within the house or within certain defined spaces. The entire structure of controls is facilitated by depriving women of independent access to productive resources and making them dependent on men’ (Chakravarti 2013:1).
On Malala Yousafzai’s Contribution to Improving the Situation of Pakistani Women

that have hitherto been deemed acceptable or even normal, and no woman need worry in the future that she may be overstating the extent of her suffering from this violence (Cannone 2018).

In a tribune that the French daily *Le Monde* (The World) published on 9 January 2018, Cannone insisted on the need to ‘at last denounce the link of power and sex that deprived women of control of their body’ (Ibid.). That same day, a group of 100 women - including Sarah Chiche (writer, clinical psychologist and psychoanalyst), Catherine Millet (art critic and writer), Catherine Robbe-Grillet (actor and writer), Peggy Sastre (author, journalist and translator) and Abnousse Shalmani (writer and journalist) declared:

*We defend the freedom to importune an essential part of sexual freedom* (Collective 2018).

The group added:

*Rape is a crime. But insistent or clumsy flirting is not a crime, nor does gallantry constitute macho aggression… As a result of the Weinstein affair, there has been a legitimate awareness of sexual violence against women, especially in the workplace, where some men abuse their power... But this liberation of speech turns today into its opposite: we are intimidated into political correctness, forced to avoid speaking out on certain issues, and those who refuse to comply with such injunctions are regarded as complicit, as traitors!* (Ibid.).

The historian Perrot, co-author with the famous George Duby, of a five-volume *Histoire des femmes en Occident* (History of Women in the West), wished that ‘these 100 creative women put their knowledge of the artistic and media milieu and their

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54 The group wrote: ‘As women, we do not recognize ourselves in this feminism, which, beyond the denunciation of abuses of power, takes the face of a hatred of men and sexuality. We believe that the freedom to say no to a sexual proposal cannot exist without the freedom to importune. And we consider that we must know how to respond to this freedom to importune other than by shutting ourselves up in the role of the prey. [...] Accidents that can affect a woman’s body do not necessarily reach her dignity and must not, however hard it may sometimes be, necessarily make her a perpetual victim. Because we are not reducible to our body. Our inner freedom is inviolable. And this freedom that we cherish is not without risks or responsibilities’ (Collective 2018).
prestige’ in the service ‘of the rebels of #metoo’,35 even though they themselves had never faced harassment (Truong 2018). Perrot noted:

You can feel solidarity towards an injustice without having experienced it. Their distance as unconcerned, free and triumphant women, far from the squalor of bodies, sheltering their unassailable interior, disappoints me more than it shocks me. Their lack of solidarity for, and their unconsciousness of, the real violence suffered by women leaves me dumbfounded (Ibid.).

More than the freedom to dispose of their body that many women claim, it is a question of consenting to a redefinition of public space, a problem with which many countries (to varying degrees) are confronted with. It is, therefore, necessary to consider the soundness of the argument according to which ‘men will have to make sacrifices – changing their behaviour, or taking a financial hit – for women to achieve equality’ (Hinsliff 2018):

It’s [sic] simply not possible to ditch a system that reward man unfairly at women’s expense without there being disagreeable consequences for at least some men. The mediocre ones, especially. The ones who would have thrived a generation ago when there was no real competition but are rightly worried now (Ibid.).

The situation at the beginning of the 21st Century, at least in the West, tends towards the absolute equality demanded by new generations of women who are the heirs to the gains won by their elders. One imagines that militant movements such as the TTP, attached to the pre-eminence of men founded on the patriarchal system, have probably examined the balance of power between the two genders in the countries of Western Europe and North America. They have, no doubt, concluded that the education of girls, in these geographical areas, brought about the first cracks that were to lead inexorably to the ‘collapse of the social edifice’. In any case, one must pay homage to those women who dared to rebel against a social order declared immutable. In the West, their task was, in a sense, simplified by a secular approach that aimed at a strict separation of religious and worldly matters. Olympe de Gouges had, it is true, been guillotined on 3 November 1793, (shortly after the French Revolution of 1798). She had claimed the equality of men and women in a

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35 In October 2017, many women started using the hashtag (#MeToo) on social media to bear witness to incidents of sexual assault and harassment they had been subjected to, especially in the workplace. Social activist Tarana Burke was the first to employ such a phrase; she sought to help victims realise that sexual assaults and harassment was quite widespread and needed to be tackled.
text written two years earlier, entitled *La Déclaration des droits de la femme et de la citoyenne* (*The Declaration of the Rights of Woman and of Citizen*) on the model of *La Déclaration des droits de l’homme et du citoyen* (*The Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen*) proclaimed on 26 August 1789.

The struggle begun by the Pakistani women is all the more sensitive as conservative groups rely on the religious text to instruct women to submit to the will of men, capable of better interpreting divine commandments. Some clerics go so far as to declare that only men are so entitled. And yet examples drawn from the life of the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) abound to make clear to Muslim societies firmly attached to the precepts of the Holy Quran to grant female Muslims a dignified status. Applied to contemporary Muslim states, such an approach should lead to equality between male and female citizens not only *de jure* but also *de facto*. There is, in any case, a need to emphasise the courage shown by those the Pakistani media refer to as ‘women of substance’. According to the renowned poet Kishwar Naheed:

> In every family, there is a girl who stands up against the so-called rules and laws of the family and is labelled a ‘bad woman’. But she paves the way for other girls to live their lives according to their own wishes (Junaidi 2015).

Of a more modest stature, model and entrepreneur Nadia Hussain noted:

> This mentorship is a huge responsibility on my shoulder. We all require support systems and I can find mine in my mother, my aunts… and my husband (Qamar 2015).

On the occasion of the International Women’s Day on 8 March 2016, Pakistan’s *Express Tribune* interviewed Simi Kamal, a leading women’s rights activist and feminist, focusing on the issue of female human rights in Pakistan. Kamal was at the time Chief of Party of the Gender Equity Program, a USAID-sponsored initiative which sought to enhance ‘gender equity and women’s access to human rights’ (*The Express Tribune* 2016a). The interview focused on the plight of divorced women with insecure resources; divorced women from well-to-do backgrounds also faced a society that remained ill-disposed towards them.\(^{36}\) Many Pakistani women,\(^{36}\) Kamal insisted, however, on her privileged status, indicating: ‘When I was getting married, I insisted that I had to have equal rights in the *Nikah Nama*, and of all the many reform laws in Pakistan, I think that *Nikah Nama* [marriage] is one of the best reform laws because a woman can have an equal marriage. We had a very equal marriage; we put in equal custody and equal rights of divorce; so, when my former husband became an alcoholic and his very erratic behavior meant that I didn’t want to stay
according to Kamal, were still confronted by phenomena such as ‘poverty’, ‘disenfranchisement’, in short an invisibility in the social space. She declared:

I think one of the other things that I’m really proud of is to be able to speak out in society. I’m a great believer in secularism and I believe religion and state should be completely separate and I believe that both men and women as adults should be able to decide what kind of life they want to lead and they should be free to do so (Ibid.).

To the question posed by *The Express Tribune* about the ‘many milestones, such as right to vote’ that the women’s rights movement had attained, Kamal underlined:

A lot of women believe, or perhaps it suits a lot of men that women believe that being liberated means having the freedom to dress as you like, to appear on television, to drink and smoke and to have a great social life, that is women’s empowerment, but it doesn’t stop there and it shouldn’t stop there. We have this situation where women wear strapless, backless clothes and they are out dancing and drinking and smoking, but they cannot buy and sell their property even if they have any; they do not have the right to divorce; they don’t know anything about how much their husbands earn and how they spend it; they don’t have their own bank accounts; they cannot get up and go to work because their husbands do not allow them to; they cannot meet certain people because their mother-in-law or father-in-law won’t allow them (Ibid.).

The purpose of this section is not to revisit the issue of legislation in Pakistan that pertains to the position of women. The 2017 Sustainable Development Conference (SDC) devoted a panel to this question in an attempt to give voice to some actors who, like Malala Yousafzai, advocate for improvements to the status of women. The task is tricky since gender studies have somehow run out of steam; and the specialists are reduced, it should be admitted, to repeating – or at best reformulating – what they have already said. Here, one can add two cases that caught the attention of the Pakistani press and which deal with women from unprivileged backgrounds. The latter, if they are aware of the inequality that marks their society and the position of importance given to men, are hardly – it should be recalled – equipped

with him anymore, I could walk out very easily and it was not traumatic because it was all written and we didn’t have to go to court or anything’ (The Express Tribune 2016a).
with analytical instruments that would allow them to give meaning to their suffering.

One case that is briefly mentioned here relates to two sisters: one was a university graduate who went in search of her sister, who lived in Peshawar. The first succumbed to the heroin-filled cigarette that her sister smoked (Yusufzai 2012). It seems that a number of women (a number that would be difficult to quantify but which would include some socially privileged individuals) use tranquilizers, alcohol, but also ‘hard drugs’.

Another case that caught the attention of civil society due to its cruelty was that of Qandeel Baloch. Her real name was Fouzia Azeem; she was a 26-year old girl from a humble background. She was courageous – and foolish – enough to try to post selfies that were inspired by fashion photos in the West, featuring her wearing outfits that revealed a good part of her body. What would have been considered elsewhere – notably in the West – as a provocation to attract attention or to promote a career based on the physical attributes of her body, in Pakistan represented a sign of insubordination to the dominant patriarchy which demands control over the female body. Baloch was to go further still, in her encounter with Abdul Qavi, a 50-year old mullah (slang for cleric) who appeared frequently on television. In April 2016, both were invited (via video link) to the comedy news show ‘Ajeeb Saa’; Qandeel sat in a studio in Karachi, the cleric in Multan.

It was a match made for controversy. The mullah was known for his Islamic erudition; Baloch for her revealing outfits, Instagram poses and pouting Facebook videos. Over the past two years, she had in turn amused and scandalised Pakistani society… Ajeeb Saa’s presenter… asked Qavi what he thought of Baloch’s recent promise to perform a striptease, dedicated to the Pakistan cricket captain Shahid Afridi, if his team beat India in the World Twenty20 Cup. Would it help the effort to de-radicalise Islamist militants, the presenter asked with deadpan seriousness? And might she also dedicate a striptease to Mullah Qavi? (The Guardian 2017).

Qavi did not reply to this highly provocative question:

The cleric stuck to his role of sober Islamic scholar, batting away the mischievous questions. He did, however, announce his desire to meet Baloch the next time he was in Karachi. It seemed a throwaway remark, but later, each would accuse the other of
actively pursuing a meeting. Baloch said Qavi was in love with her. Qavi said she wanted to milk him for publicity (Ibid.).

In June 2017, Qandeel Baloch published images of her meeting with Qavi in a Karachi hotel room. In one of the selfies, she posed with him wearing his lamb’s wool cap, ‘her mouth gaping open in mock horror’. In a short video, Qavi declared that he hoped ‘to offer her “guidance on issues related to religion”’ (Ibid.). A media storm erupted over the flirtatious meeting. Qavi was suspended from the Ruet-e-Hilal Committee, the prestigious body that announces the sighting of the new moon:

‘She didn’t realise she was crossing the line,’ says Shehryar Mufti, frontman of Pakistani rock group Bumbu Sauce, who became so fascinated by Baloch that he wrote a song about her. ‘It is one thing to challenge an abstract notion like society or patriarchy. It is another thing entirely to call a state-endorsed cleric out on being a complete sleaze’ (Ibid.).

On the night of 16 July 2016, the young Qandeel Baloch was asphyxiated while she was asleep in the family house in Multan. Her brother Waseem Azeem confessed to the murder saying she was ‘bringing disrepute’ to the ‘family’s honour’ (Pakistan Today 2016). Doubts continue to exist as to who may have been behind the crime. Many speculated that Mullah Qavi, the object of public ridicule, thus sought to regain his honour.

Conclusion and Recommendations

Conclusion

This chapter started with a short review of an unusual journey: that of Malala Yousafzai, who felt from an early age that education offered women a future from which Pakistani society still tended to exclude them. It is true that little boys do not all have access to education, far from it.37 Often confronted with the problem of poor social status, men are reluctant to give up the only power that the Divine has, they believe, granted them: that of being masters at home, comforted in the belief that their lot is comparably better than that of women in their own families or from similar social classes. The uniformity of the female condition, to an extent regardless of social background, without a doubt, helps them accept with resignation their fate of being born into a society that cares little about them. While the issue of gender

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37 According to a report by ‘Alif Ailaan’ (Alif – the first letter of the Urdu Alphabet –Declaration), a local alliance for education reform, published in 2015, 55 percent of Pakistani girls (or 13.7 million individuals) and 45 percent of boys (11.4 million) were not going to school at that time (Dawn 2015).
equality is gradually challenging age-old gender relations, the economic picture is changing more quickly. One might wonder whether the phenomenon of extremist religious movements, such as TTP (in addition to its ideology of political violence), is not a symptom of the fears that advocates a rigid patriarchal system are very concerned about the ‘perenniatiy’ of that system.

Malala, during her long struggle, has made the education of children (and in particular, of girls) the spearhead of a change not only in collective mentalities, but also in the social edifice. She has always shown respect for the moral rules that govern Pakistani women’s conduct; and, moreover, she adheres firmly to them. She can convince her supporters that she is a good Muslim, and is thus, in a position to oppose conservative Muslim groups that seek to prohibit the education of girls. She declares that, on the contrary, the Holy Quran instructs both male and female believers to educate themselves. She, thereby, implicitly claims the right to comprehend divine precepts directly by reading the sacred text. Her journey is not dissimilar to that of secular feminists such as Gerda Lerner, who rejects the eternal character of patriarchy as a social construct that marked a long period of human history.

Yousafzai caught the attention of the Pakistani citizens for her bravery as she demanded that the female population gradually gain access to two areas that remained eminently masculine: the education and knowledge that would lead women to enter the professional sphere. She did, however, gracefully lend herself to the game of the world powers, whose objective, as we have already pointed out, was to emphasise that their policy was imbued with the enlightenment ideology, while they endeavoured to reinforce their own population’s belief in the idea that they aimed at the progress of humanity. Malala also refrained from commenting on the unfinished feminine revolution in the West. Such was not her role. The West had however, seized the problem of ‘Eastern’ women to emphasise its good faith, while its geopolitical ambitions, especially since the beginning of the 21st Century, had greatly contributed to what some political scientists call ‘the global disorder’. It was, thus, thought useful – in this chapter – to return to the problem of the condition of women in Western Europe and North America.

There is another icon of feminism in Pakistan. Qandeel Baloch intended to proclaim that she was a woman, and even a femme fatale. In the aftermath of her assassination, feminist and climate change activist Meera Ghani stated:

I was so disappointed to see many emancipated and independent women distance themselves from Qandeel, calling her ’vulgar’,
‘cheap’, ‘immoral’ and even a ‘prostitute.’ Qandeel was so free, confident, and self-aware that maybe many felt a pang of jealousy — in our culture, women are robbed of speaking their minds. We’ve internalised patriarchy and have found justifications in culture, societal norms, and religion (Buzzfeed 2016).

Baloch showed courage unprecedented for a Pakistani woman: besides the daring videos and photos that she posted on the net, she directly challenged a representative of religious power. She used, it is true, provocative seductive techniques that contravened public morality, that were judged by many women to be demeaning, and that alienated a large section of a conservative society. Moreover, she offered up a strong argument to the proponents of a strict Islam: left to their own devices, women, according to this reading, lose their moral bearings, as was already the case, they argued, in the West.

The authors of Borders & Boundaries: Women in India’s Partition lament the absence of genuine female analysis in the historiography of the subcontinent: ‘women do figure, but as members of prominent political families’ or as victims of a nation in search of (re)birth. ‘Supplementary to male action’, they scarcely claim the status of actors ‘in their own right’ (Bhasin and Menon 2007:8-9). The two authors examine the operation India and Pakistan conducted after they signed an agreement in November 1947. What was called the Recovery Operation, following the Partition of British India ‘was to allow women who had been kidnapped or separated from their families in the haste of departure to be reunited with their loved ones’ (Reynolds 2009:19):

Talking about the Indian policy, Bhasin and Menon (2007: 107, 109) make an analysis, that could apply in reverse to Pakistan. Two considerations were of prime importance for the Nehru government: the first followed from relations between the states of India and Pakistan, and the second from the theory that India had a protective role - what the authors call parens patria - to play with regard to female victims of rape.

Ironically, the two nations whose leaders had decided on a Partition they had declared inevitable, seized upon what had now become a political issue: that of the fate of female victims of a major historical tragedy that marked the 20th Century.

Both sides reaffirmed their attachment to family and thus national values. They implicitly accused the people of the ‘other side’ (i.e.
the majority religious community) of being responsible for, in the term employed by Menon and Bhasin, ‘an act of transgression which violated that most critical site of patriarchal control: female sexuality’ (Reynolds 2009:19).

Referring briefly to this episode, Pakistani sociologist Amina Jamal suggests that:

In contemporary Pakistan, the woman who transgresses the boundaries of clan, caste, sect, class, or religion to form sexual relationships is being slotted in this space. This is a sign of ‘woman’ who asserts her sexual autonomy, and her citizenship, either by choosing her own marriage partner or rejecting forced marriages—thereby challenging patriarchal control over a traditional site for the respectable deployment of women’s sexuality. The construct of the ‘willful’ daughter/woman that is being recuperated through the discourse of Islamization [sic] appears to interact with another one—the enduring concept of the ‘Westernized woman,’ a rights-claiming individual—that has traditionally functioned as a trope to enable the narration of the virtuous woman, be she a mother, a sister, a wife, or a daughter, as the privileged national female subject (Jamal 2006:3).

**Recommendations**

Feminists and civil societies around the world still tackle the question of patriarchy and its impact on dominant collective attitudes. They also aim at reinforcing legislation protecting women and children. In summarising the various laws that deal with the condition of women, the Aurat Foundation (‘Women’s Foundation’) praised (in 2011) the significant steps achieved:

Though women of Pakistan have reached a milestone on 12-13 December 2011, when three important bills, Prevention of Anti-Women Practices, 2011, Bill, Acid Control and Acid Crimes Prevention, 2011, Bill, and The Women in Distress and Detention Fund (Amendment) Bill, 2011 were passed by the Senate, there is a long way to go and the major challenge in the future would be to see how women parliamentarians and women’s rights movement ensure that women of Pakistan in all professions, groups and classes and in all age-groups, benefit from these laws and the de jure equality for women is transformed into de facto equality (Mirza 2011:1).
Therefore, civil society should mobilise in favour of the application of pro-women legislation. It must, in particular, put pressure on the Government of Pakistan so that the police stations in towns and in the countryside listen to the victims. The country should also organise women’s shelters in greater numbers. The state will, thus, demonstrate its commitment to protect the female population against violence, and its concern to improve the female condition. Such an approach will ultimately lead all streams of society to consider women as full-fledged citizens, entitled to equal status, with access to education being essential in this regard.

Reacting against the position of the Women’s Collective published in Paris on 9 January 2018, the French-Moroccan novelist Leila Slimani (2018) writes:

I am not a victim. But millions of women are. It’s a fact and not a moral judgment ... And in me, throbs the fear of all those who, on the streets of thousands of cities of the world, walk with their heads down. Those who are followed, harassed, raped, insulted, treated like intruders in public spaces. In me resounds the cry of those who are hiding, who are ashamed, pariahs, who are thrown into the street because they are dishonoured ....

...I hope that one day my daughter will walk at night in the street ... that she will go around the world alone, that she will take the metro at midnight without fear, without even thinking about it. The world in which she will live then ... will be, I’m sure, a fairer world.

There remains the question of the role of female celebrities in the improvement of the status of women, while, often preoccupied with their own career, they resort to, if not excesses, at least compromises.
On Malala Yousafzai’s Contribution to Improving the Situation of Pakistani Women

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CEDAW: A Tool for Addressing Violence against Women
Bandana Rana** and Victoria Perrie***

Abstract
The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) is an international treaty of the United Nations (UN). This document referred to as a Bill of Rights for women is the only international instrument that provides Member States with feedback and assessment of the human rights’ status of women in their country through Concluding Observations and recommendations. The Convention comprehensively addresses women’s rights within all aspects of life while providing opportunities to each state to address its shortcomings. The primary function of the CEDAW Committee is to monitor state implementation of the CEDAW Convention (1979) through constructive dialogue and the issuance of recommendations. Civil society plays an important role throughout CEDAW’s procedural functions, as well as in Article implementation domestically. In states that have ratified CEDAW, civil society has effectively used the Convention as a tool to bring about change, specifically in addressing Violence Against Women (VAW) and girls. There are several ways in which Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) can contribute and influence the treaty application and monitoring process. This chapter focuses on the different procedures of CEDAW, including the Concluding Observations and General Recommendations (GR), with suggestions on where and how civil society can contribute and influence.

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* This chapter has been approved as a Policy Brief by the referee.
** Ms Bandana Rana is a member of the UN CEDAW Committee. She has worked at the national, regional, and global levels for three decades as an activist advancing women’s rights.
*** Ms Victoria Perrie, B.A., J.D. is a Canadian advocate for indigenous, youth, women and human rights. She has pursued justice at both local and global levels from a Métis perspective.
Introduction
The United Nations (UN) General Assembly organised the First World Conference on Women in Mexico City in 1975. Five years later, the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW, or the Convention) was established, focusing on human rights standards for women and girls worldwide. Adopted on 18 December 1979, the Convention acts as an ‘international bill of rights for women’ and provides guidance to States on how to employ those rights. Apart from the strength inherent in the Convention’s status as a human rights treaty, its existence has special significance since it focuses on eliminating discrimination against women by surpassing conventional approaches. The Convention unravels the structural and dynamic processes of discrimination that underpin the perpetual phenomenon of gender-based inequality across the globe. As a result of the Convention’s treaty status, it demands the practical realisation of rights, and compels each and every State Party to eliminate all forms of discrimination, intended or unintended, through law, policy, practice and custom on their own territories. The responsibility to approach the problem holistically and collectively belongs to state and non-state institutions, as well as private persons.

The Convention is monitored by a group of independent experts: the Committee for the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, hereinafter referred to as the Committee under its Article 17(1). CEDAW is the first document to ‘comprehensively address women’s basic human rights within political, cultural, economic, social, and family life’ (FAWCO 2017).

After 35 years of monitoring and advancement of women’s rights, 189 State Parties have ratified CEDAW. All the South Asian states have ratified the Convention, but implementation continues to be hindered by reservations. States may make ‘reservations, understandings, and declarations’ at the time of ratification, to Articles inconsistent with State practice (Ibid.). A reservation to an Article is a declaration by a State Party that it will not be accepting a certain provision of CEDAW to be applicable in domestic law, or that it will do so, but not to the full extent required. Half the South Asian countries (Bangladesh, India, Maldives and Pakistan) have reservations, often with respect to family, personal, and citizenship laws.

This chapter will focus on the different procedures of CEDAW, including the Concluding Observations and General Recommendations (GR), with suggestions on where and how civil society can contribute and influence.
Structure

The CEDAW Committee

The CEDAW Committee is mandated by the Convention. The Committee’s purpose is to monitor a state’s progress on the implementation of the Convention, and consider individual complaints. The Committee is comprised of elected independent experts from State Parties that have ratified the Convention. Some 23 experts sit on the Committee at any given time. These experts are independent, meaning they represent their own experiences and backgrounds, and do not uphold the views of their respective nominating countries while sitting on the Committee. Each state may nominate an expert from their jurisdiction, and from those nominations, member states to the Convention cast votes by secret ballot. Since 1982, 104 experts have served on the Committee.

Of the 104 experts over the past 35 years, there have been six Committee members, covering eight terms, from South Asia. Currently, Ms Bandana Rana, Nepal’s first candidate to the Committee, and Ms Ismat Jahan, serving her second term as candidate from Bangladesh, represent South Asia. Sri Lanka has also held a seat in the past. Afghanistan, Bhutan, India, Maldives, and Pakistan have never had an elected candidate.

The 23 independent experts, which the Committee is composed of, are persons of high moral standing and competence in the fields covered by the Convention. The chairpersons of treaty bodies have repeatedly recommended that:

States parties to human rights treaties should refrain from nominating or electing to the treaty bodies persons performing political functions or occupying positions which were not readily reconcilable with the obligations of independent experts under the given treaty (UN-OHCHR 1982).

Policies and Procedures

CEDAW Articles

CEDAW has a preamble and 30 Articles. Every Article in the Convention addresses discrimination and direct or indirect forms of VAW and girls. Monitoring, eradicating, and tracking VAW and girls is an important part of the Committee’s duties. Although there is no Article in the Convention that directly condemns VAW, implicative wording is used throughout.
The Constructive Dialogue

Under Article 18 of the Convention, State Parties must submit a report to the Committee within one year of the Convention entering into force domestically, and following this initial report, every four years, or at the request of the Committee. Reports consider the legislative, judicial, administrative, and other measures adopted by the State to give effect to the Convention, and any local progress.

The Constructive Dialogue procedure is initiated when the Committee releases a list of issues regarding specific areas of concern based on the periodic report submitted by a State Party. The State then responds to those issues, and submits a comprehensive report covering compliance with the Convention. CSOs are encouraged to submit reports to the Committee that relate to State compliance and domestic implementation. Experts of the Committee review these reports and determine areas where there are gaps and make recommendations for improvement. Prior to the Constructive Dialogue, the Committee meets with CSOs from the attending State. These organisations focus on a variety of gaps in implementation against each Article of the Convention, and highlight areas for improvement. Civil society input is an important part of the Dialogue and the Committee’s process of intervention development. CSOs highlight issues, including those at the grassroots level, that States Parties may not have presented in their reports.

States appear in front of the Committee for the duration of one day. This process addresses concerns with progress, inconsistencies in reporting, and provides suggestions on moving forward. During the Dialogue, experts ask pointed questions (called interventions) to delegates of the State, to which they are then given the opportunity to respond. If the State Party is not able to fully answer the questions of an expert, they are given the opportunity to submit, in writing, a response, within 48 hours.

Throughout this process, state delegates are questioned on the discrimination and VAW related to each Article, and measures in place to remedy that violence. Problem areas are identified, and these are further explored in the Concluding Observations. Concluding Observations, for every country reviewed by CEDAW include recommendations on addressing VAW. During follow-up procedures, VAW is almost always a priority recommendation.
Why the State Reports?

The reporting process, as a whole, is a monitoring mechanism that emphasises the State’s accountability for ensuring its citizens enjoy their guaranteed rights and responsibility for violations of those rights. There are three main functions of the reporting process:

1. Emphasising the importance of thorough investigation of overt and covert violations.
2. Provide a process and forum where governments are required to answer to their responsibilities and where different ways can be used to ensure compliance.
3. Provide a forum whereby groups within countries can monitor the progress of their governments and question their progress (IWRAW Asia Pacific 2010).

The Constructive Dialogue and the Concluding Observations focus on issues related to the 16 CEDAW Articles such as constitutional and legislative framework; national machineries for the advancement of women; stereotypes and harmful practices; gender-based VAW and girls, including domestic violence; trafficking of women and exploitation of prostitution; participation of women in decision-making; nationality; education and training; employment; health; economic and social life; rural women; the situation of disadvantaged groups of women such as older women, women with disabilities, women in detention, indigenous women, women belonging to ethnic minorities, refugee and migrant women, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender women and intersex persons; equality before the law; marriage and family relations; and women, peace and security. Following are some of the queries related to VAW and girls posed by the Committee to the State Parties during the Constructive Dialogue:

- Efforts and progress made towards establishing an independent Human Rights Institution (HRI) and the national mechanism for reporting and follow-up.
- Consideration towards ratifying or acceding any international human rights instruments that the State Party may not have entered into or the withdrawing of any reservations to the Convention.
- Legal support programming available to women to strengthen and ensure their access to justice, with disaggregated data.
- The authority, capacity and resources allocated to the national machinery responsible for addressing women’s issues (in many cases, it is the Ministry of Women or Gender).
• Progress made in establishing temporary special measures to accelerate full and equal participation of women in all areas of the Convention.
• Strategies in place to counter stereotypical attitudes that discriminate against women and girls, including engaging with men and boys, and promoting an engaged media, also to eliminate harmful traditional practices that violate women’s rights.
• Steps taken to increase the protection of women and children through appropriate legislation and effective enactment of legislation, along with necessary data.
• Adoption or impact of the implementation of any law on prevention and combatting of trafficking, as well as exit programmes available to women who want to leave prostitution.
• Measures to increase the representation of women in elected and appointed bodies, local governance and all other state entities, including representation at the international level.
• Measures to ensure equal access to education, to diminish dropout rates of girls, age appropriate education and sexual and reproductive rights, etc.
• Mechanism in place to facilitate the resolution of complaints of sex-based discrimination in employment, including complaints of sexual harassment, to recognise and value unpaid care and domestic work and equal pay for work of equal value.
• Steps taken to establish sexual and reproductive health and rights, and to decriminalise abortion along with health facilities in place for women and girls.
• Information on marriage and divorce laws focusing on gender-based disparities between spouses and programmes for ending child marriage.
• Comprehensive statistical data, including sex-disaggregated data, as well as information regarding legislative, policy, administrative and any other measures taken to implement the provisions of the Convention and the Committee’s recommendations since the submission of the State Party’s last report.

**Shadow Reports**

Alternative or Shadow Reports are an avenue through which non-governmental organisations (NGOs) can intervene in the reporting process. NGOs make up many, though not all, the CSOs that attend the State review, and participate in CEDAW processes. Shadow Reports from NGOs and other CSOs ‘provide additional information to the Committee on the domestic implementation of the Convention. The Committee may use this information to develop questions for the State Party during their Constructive Dialogue’ (IWRAW Asia Pacific 2017a).
Reports may be submitted privately if, for example, there is a fear of State reprisal for contributing to the process, or as a result of the contents of the report. However, it is preferred that submitted reports can be publicly published.

**Concluding Observations**

Enactment of CEDAW is the responsibility of individual governments. Neither the United Nations, nor any other body has the authority to enforce the Convention within a sovereign State. States need to acknowledge their shortcomings and respond to recommendations in a positive way. Many South Asian states are committed to furthering women’s rights, and great advancement has been made in the area in recent years, however, VAW remains a major concern.

Following the Dialogue and a review of any additional responses submitted by the State, the Committee issues final opinions in the form of Concluding Observations, which summarise State compliance with the Convention and provide recommendations on how the State can move towards full realisation. The Committee follows up on State compliance of the Concluding Observations in the two years following their issue. For example, in November 2013, a follow-up was issued to Bhutan indicating that ‘to give priority attention to eliminating all forms of violence against women’ (CEDAW 2016b, Bhutan para. 20) had only been partially implemented. Bhutan was found to have implemented the recommendations on enacting legislation on domestic violence that ensures VAW is criminalised and those who become victims of violence have access to protection. Recommendations were made, seeking to be updated during the next periodic report, on the continued efforts of Bhutan to eliminate VAW, continue training and awareness-raising with regard to violence, and to increase the number of women working on violence issues. In February 2017, Concluding Observations were issued to Sri Lanka. While the Observations recognised Sri Lanka’s progress via the adoption of the Policy Framework and National Plan of Action to address sexual and Gender-Based Violence [GBV] (CEDAW 2017, Sri Lanka para. 5(c)), while issuing concerns about barriers to women’s access to justice, including ‘social and cultural stigma, which deter women and girl victims from reporting sexual and gender based violence’, as well as fear of reprisal (Ibid. para. 14(c)). One of the recommendations made by the Committee for Sri Lanka to improve this concern was to ‘enhance women’s legal literacy and raise awareness on the part of women and men of their rights in order to eliminate the stigmatization of women and girls who claim their rights’ (Ibid. para. 15(c)).
**General Recommendations (GRs)**

In 1991, the Committee began to issue General Recommendations on specific provisions of the Convention. These recommendations additionally addressed what the Committee described as ‘cross-cutting themes’. General Recommendations contain more detailed and comprehensive information on specific Articles, offering additional guidance to States on the application and enforcement of specific articles of the Convention. So far, the Committee has issued 36 General Recommendations, which have greatly enhanced and clarified the scope of the treaty. In this way, the Committee has demonstrated its ability to dynamically respond to emerging challenges for women’s rights and equality.

NGOs and civil society can engage in the development and formulation of GRs. The Committee strives to ensure an open dialogue with non-governmental groups, such as CSOs at all times, especially in the early stages of the process. UN agencies, NGOs and other interest groups are encouraged to submit background papers to the process, which significantly guides the Committee in finalising and adopting the GRs. Two of the GRs, are specifically focused on VAW. The first Recommendation in this regard was issued in 1992: General Recommendation No. 19 (UN Women 2009b) was followed by General Recommendation No. 35 adopted in July 2017, (UN-OHCHR 2017), issued 25 years after GR 19, updates and puts the contents of GR 19 into a modern light.

General Recommendation 19 advises States that, at the time of reporting, information should be presented on statistics on VAW (General Recommendation 19, 1992, para. 2). The GR indicates that protecting women is important and that the full implementation of CEDAW requires states to take positive steps to end VAW (Article 4). It is mostly due to the work of GR 19 that the prohibition on VAW has evolved into a practice of customary international law (General Recommendation 19, 1992, para. 2). It identifies that:

> Gender-based violence may breach specific provisions of the Convention, regardless of whether those provisions expressly mention violence (General Recommendation 19, 1992, para. 6).

GR 19 also elaborates on how Articles of the Convention can provide a clear picture on ways each can be used to end VAW. CEDAW is a unique organ: it has the ability to demand the rights of women and girls in all spheres to be free from violence.
GR 35 (UN-OHCHR 2017) was intended to complement GR 19. These documents are meant to be read together (General Recommendation 35, 2017, para. 8). One of the most important notes in GR 35 is that VAW is identified as a gendered problem, disproportionately affecting women. GR 35 terms this ‘gender based violence’ (General Recommendation 35, 2017, para. 9). This distinction is important to recognising GBV, VAW, as an issue that targets women and girls of all ages and matters to everyone, to which specific attention and state action is required.

General Recommendation No. 35 on GBV-AW, updating General Recommendation No. 19, was officially launched during CEDAW’s 68th Session, in Geneva. The working group of GR 35 presented a high level panel on 14 November 2017. Experts, CSOs, national human rights institutions, and State Parties were invited to participate in the discussion. Following the launch, a video was produced. Professor Andrew Clapham, from the International Law Graduate Institute, noted that through GR 35 the Committee has:

…gone a step further and shown how states not only have due diligence obligations to ensure that all sorts of private violence is prevented, punished, and people are protected from all sorts of non-state actors but [CEDAW] ha[s] also gone on to show how the non-state actors themselves have obligations to refrain from sexual violence (UN Human Rights 2017).

CEDAW Optional Protocol

On 22 December 2000, the CEDAW Committee added a tool for promoting the non-discrimination of and equal rights for women, i.e., the Optional Protocol. This Protocol to CEDAW, created as an additional document to the Convention itself, is the first gender-specific international complaints procedure that is actually a treaty in itself. This means that State Parties must ratify the Optional Protocol, separately from the Convention, if they wish to participate in this revolutionary process. The Communications Procedure recognises the competence of the CEDAW Committee to consider written petitions claiming rights violations from individual women, or groups of women, who have exhausted all national remedies of redress. The procedure is strictly confidential (Optional Protocol 1999, Article 4).

The Committee examines the Communications and requests a State response. The complainant has the opportunity to submit a report responding to the State’s response, following which the Committee conducts an examination of the situation. The Committee, under the Optional Protocol, has the authority to make
recommendations to states to prevent any irreparable harm from being done to the victim(s) (UN-OHCHR 1999, Article 5).

Following investigation of the complaint, which may include opportunities for dialogue, or a physical visit to the State, the Committee renders a decision where the State Party can be requested to provide redress. This quasi-judicial process can take two years. However, if there is a risk of irreparable harm, the Committee has, within its mandate, the ability to issue requests for interim measures of protection.

The Optional Protocol is a particularly valuable tool for addressing VAW. The vast majority of cases brought to CEDAW under the Optional Protocol have involved VAW. Redress, recommended to the State following conclusion of a Communication, can include providing financial assistance or other effective remedies to the victim. Human rights institutions, such as the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) in the State may also work with the victim. For example, the most recent case reviewed under CEDAW’s Optional Protocol on VAW was in 2015 - *X and Y v Georgia*. In this case, a mother and daughter brought a complaint under the Optional Protocol of Georgia’s ‘failure to prevent, investigate and punish prolonged physical violence, and sexual and psychological abuse, suffered at the hands of their former husband and father’ (European Human Rights Advocacy Centre 2015). The State was informed on several occasions, where evidence of abuse was present, however, the State never conducted a formal investigation. A CSO, INTERIGHTS, supported the mother and daughter to bring their case to CEDAW, where the Committee found that the State had made several mistakes with respect to these women, and issued several recommendations to Georgia (UN-OHCHR 2015).

The Inquiry Procedure enables the Committee to conduct inquiries into serious and systematic violations of women’s human rights in countries that have become party to the Optional Protocol. The opportunity for the Committee to initiate investigations, which may include visits to a country by Committee members to collect information, is an important advancement in the potential of the Committee to evaluate possible first-hand human rights abuses (UN Women 2009a).

This Protocol has been ratified by 109 countries, and signed by 13, with 75 countries having taken no action (ratification dashboard). Nepal, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Maldives have ratified the Optional Protocol; leaving India,
Pakistan, Bhutan, and Afghanistan as the South Asian countries that have not ratified.

**Using CEDAW to Address VAW**

Much cynicism about the Convention exists, especially where its principles have not been incorporated into domestic legislation. In spite of this, there are many examples of its use to prompt constitutional and domestic law reform. Discriminatory laws have been challenged, ambivalent provisions of the law interpreted, it has been used where the law is silent to confer rights on women, and development policies have been formulated using its framework (IWRAW Asia Pacific 2017b):

> The vibrant civil society and grassroots women’s networks in South Asia are making headway in pushing policymakers and communities to step up actions on gender equality. Efforts to improve public accountability on legislation addressing VAW have been successful. Active campaigning by local NGOs with support from the international community has ushered in stronger penalties for rape (SIGI 2014).

At the 66th Session in 2017, Sri Lanka was reviewed. In the Concluding Observations, CEDAW identified the positive efforts of the State Party in ‘improving its institutional and policy framework aimed at accelerating the elimination of discrimination against women and promoting gender equality’ (CEDAW 2017 Sri Lanka para 5). The State had adopted a National Strategic Plan to Monitor and Combat Human Trafficking (2016), as well as adopted a Policy Framework and National Plan of Action to address Sexual and Gender-based Violence (2016) (para. 5 (b) & (c)). Additionally, the State ratified the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons Especially Women and Children (supplementing the Palermo Protocol) in 2015 (Ibid. para. 6(c)). Sri Lanka has four years before the next State review. During that time, the State will need to work to address the VAW listed by the Committee in the most recent Concluding Observations. Recommendations for Sri Lanka include the establishment of a ‘special unit in the Attorney General’s department to expedite the handling of cases of sexual violence and to introduce legislation to prohibit suspended sentences and stipulate mandatory minimum sentences for acts of violence against women’, and to ‘ensure systematic collection and analysis of data on all forms of GBVAW, disaggregated by age, ethnic group, region and relationship between the victim and the perpetrator, as previously recommended by the Committee’ (Ibid. para 23(f)).
Concluding Observations were issued to Maldives in March 2015. Access to justice was a major concern for Maldives, and the Committee urged the State, in its Concluding Observations, to 'strengthen the independence of the judiciary, establish legal remedies that are expeditious and accessible to women, and ensure, through adequate regulations and procedures, that women who report violations, especially in cases of violence, are treated in a gender-sensitive manner at all stages of judicial proceedings' (Ibid. para 13(b)). The Committee additionally urged the State Party:

To strengthen victim assistance and rehabilitation by establishing a comprehensive care system for women who are victims of violence, including medical and psychological support, counselling and rehabilitation services, throughout the territory of the State party and, to that end, increase the effectiveness of the family and protection services centers and safe houses by providing adequate funding and trained personnel (CEDAW 2015, Maldives para 23(d)).

India was issued Concluding Observations for the fourth time in July 2014. In the Observations, the Committee urged India to implement the recommendations of the Justice Verma Committee regarding VAW (CEDAW 2014, India para. 11(a)):

To allow sufficient resources for the immediate enforcement of legislation on violence against women and for the establishment of special courts, complaints procedures and support services envisaged under that legislation in a time-bound manner (Ibid. para 11(k)).

The Committee also noted India’s lack of compliance, to date, with the Observations issued following the previous session. To this, the Committee reiterated the need:

To ensure that schools are girl-friendly, within a reasonable distance of communities, and have supplies of potable water and separate hygienic toilets for girls (Ibid. para. 27 (a)) [....] to address safety issues and to ensure there is proper prosecution of gender-based violence against girls at school (Ibid. para 27(b)).

Bangladesh, during the 65th Session in 2016, was congratulated on the progress made since the State’s previous review in 2011. Concluding Observations of the
Committee noted that several legislative reforms had been made by the State in regards to VAW, including Prevention and Suppression of Human Trafficking Act (2012) (CEDAW 2016a, Bangladesh para 4(c)); the National Action Plan to Prevent Violence against Women and Children (2013-2025) (Ibid. para 5(f)); Domestic Violence (Prevention and Protection) Rules (2013) (Ibid. para 5(g)); National Plan of Action for Combatting Human Trafficking (2012-14) (Ibid. para 5(h)); and the National Action Plan for Adolescent Sexual and Reproductive Health (Ibid. para 5(i)). The Committee is looking forward to Bangladesh’s continued implementation of the Concluding Observations over the next three years, including ‘effectively investigating all reports of GBV against indigenous women relating to land grabbing and tak[ing] measures to bring those responsible to justice’ (Ibid. para 19(d)). In the Concluding Observations, the Committee was very concerned about GBV. One of the recommendations issued was:

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\text{To adopt, without delay, legislation criminalizing all forms of violence against women and girls, including marital rape irrespective of the age of the victim, domestic violence and all forms of sexual abuse, and ensure that the perpetrators are prosecuted and adequately punished and that the victims have access to immediate protection, rehabilitation and means of redress, including compensation (Ibid. para. 19(a)).}
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Also during the 65th Session in 2016, Bhutan was reviewed. The Committee noted several legislative reforms in the State including the Domestic Violence Prevention Act (2013), the Domestic Violence Prevention Rules and Regulations (2015) (CEDAW 2016b Bhutan para 4(a)); Child Care and Protection Act (2011), which contains provisions on combatting trafficking in children (Ibid. para 4(b)); and the Penal Code (Amendment) Act, in 2011, which increases penalties for the crime of rape (Ibid. para 4(c)). Additionally, Bhutan has ratified the Optional Protocols to the Convention to the Rights of the Child on children in armed conflict, child pornography, and the sale and prostitution of children (Ibid. para 6). With specific reference to VAW and GR 19, the Committee, in its Concluding Observations, recommended the State Party:

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\text{To ensure that all cases of violence against women and girls are thoroughly and effectively investigated and that perpetrators are prosecuted and adequately punished, and establish specialized courts to address gender based violence against women, including domestic violence (Ibid. para 19(a)).}
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Pakistan was last reviewed in the 54th Session in 2013. At that time, the State was found to have made several legislative advancements towards adoption of CEDAW principles, including the Protection against Harassment of Women at the Workplace Act in 2010 (CEDAW 2013, Pakistan para 4(c)); the ratification of international human rights treaties including International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Ibid. para 6(c)); and, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (2008) (Ibid. para 6(d)).

Civil society around the world works to hold states accountable to the Convention, and ensure the Committee is informed of what is happening on the ground. Several reports were submitted to CEDAW on Pakistan’s compliance, highlighting areas of concern, specifically regarding VAW in 2011. The Pakistan Dalit Solidarity Network submitted a report to CEDAW noting many concerns regarding violence towards Dalit women, including caste-based exclusion and violence, trafficking, domestic violence, and the violent rape of female bonded labourers (Joint NGO Report). Shirkat Gah submitted a report acknowledging ‘women’s subordinate position, heightened insecurity and increased violence against women.’ One concern was that the lack of state action to uphold women’s legal rights, following attacks, only made perpetrators bolder (Shirkat Gah 2013: 4). Many other detailed reports were also submitted to CEDAW to aid in country review.

Nepal will be before the Committee during the 71st Session in 2018, and was last reviewed in 2011. During the 2011 session, Nepal was found to have made several substantial steps towards progress in full implementation of the Convention. Though these steps were indeed progressive, the Committee made several recommendations, of which implementation will be reviewed at the Constructive Dialogue in 2018. Some of these recommendations include giving priority attention to combatting VAW through implementation of the Domestic Violence Act (CEDAW 2011, Nepal para 20(a)); collect data on VAW within the nation (Ibid. para 20(b)); and provide training and programmes that target men and boys specifically (Ibid. para 20(b)). Several other recommendations were made by the Committee, and it is expected that Nepal will show progress at the 71st Session.

Role of Civil Society
CSOs have an important role to play under the Optional Protocol. It often supports community members who do not have a voice of their own, or may not have the knowledge of how to submit a claim to the Optional Protocol. Information about citizen rights under CEDAW, and how to use the Convention to create change and
access remedies for harms done, are some of the ways in which CSOs are able to give a voice to the citizens of a state.

There are four main features of the roles of civil society in the CEDAW process. The first is to prepare and submit either an Alternative and/or Shadow Report. The report can be submitted either before or after the State submits their report, however, submitting the report following the State’s may allow for a Shadow Report that more comprehensively fills in State gaps. Civil society reports submitted to CEDAW are publicly available online and can act as an example for organisations submitting for the first time. The next step for civil society is to come to Geneva and make submissions to Committee members on their reports. Submissions are made in meetings between CSOs and the experts where Committee members may ask questions about the report, or for the organisation to fill in gaps in information. During these meetings, organisations have the opportunity to suggest critical interventions members may pose, as well as make suggestions for Concluding Observations useful on the ground for strengthened implementation. Civil society then sits in the session room to observe State delegates interactions with the Committee.

Depending on financial availability, NGO representatives, representing significant and diverse issues, are physically present during the Constructive Dialogue for presenting their perceptions before the Committee. They can also brief the concerned CEDAW Committee members during the informal NGO briefing.

In Nepal, the Forum for Women Law and Development (FWLD) coordinates the NGO CEDAW Monitoring Committee. This Committee is comprised of a diverse group of organisations working on different issues of rights for women, as are relevant to the different Articles of CEDAW. The Committee prepares a Shadow Report containing information on all 16 Articles of CEDAW, as well as any emerging issues in the country. For example, the Alternative Report FWLD submitted to the Committee in 2016 included chapters on critical issues such as Women, Peace and Security, Women in Disaster and Women’s Access to Information. The Shadow Report is submitted to the CEDAW Committee for their review and use during the Constructive Dialogue, and subsequently, the formulation of the COBs.

FWLD and the NGO CEDAW Monitoring Committee in Nepal have, after each Constructive Dialogue, raised greater awareness on the Concluding Observations amongst the civil society by translating the document into many languages and organising consultations in many parts of the country. The Concluding
Observations have been intensively used to strengthen advocacy in Nepal. This has led to the adoption of Domestic Violence Legislation, the amendment of discriminatory laws, legalisation of abortion, engendering the Constitution development process, increased support services for survivors of violence and formulation of many policies related to gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls.

International Women’s Rights Action Watch Asia Pacific (IWRAW) is an Asian NGO that works with human rights organisations from State Parties to use the Convention as a tool in their home country. Besides supporting members of CSOs to be the most effective during meetings with Committee members, IWRAW provides information on their website to support organisational use of the Convention and processes. Additionally, they provide online access to reports, many of which are specific to the Asian context, on CEDAW mechanisms, and other topics relevant to human rights (IWRAW Asia Pacific Reports 2017). IWRAW is a valuable resource for CSOs that want to become more engaged with the Convention and its application domestically.

NGOs are uniquely positioned to promote their home State to ratify the Optional Protocol. This tool, one of the Committee’s most foremost instruments to uphold, fulfil and protect women’s rights, has the added benefit of working in communities to demonstrate appropriate standards for the rights of women and girls. A decision made by CEDAW through the Optional Protocol sets a standard for the government to respond to similar situations in a similar way. It is by taking this kind of precedent setting step and the proper addressing of issues that the Committee creates change worldwide.

**Conclusion**

The function of CEDAW is to uphold the rights of women and girls everywhere the Convention is ratified. This is done through several mechanisms, including promotion of State accountability and their role in ensuring the Convention’s implementation, the Constructive Dialogue process, issuance of Concluding Observations, individual/group complaints, subsequent inquiries, and General Recommendations.

General Recommendation 19 made several specific recommendations to states. Implementation of these recommendations is very much a process. However, it is unfortunate that problems with implementation frequently arise during country reviews. Countries need to do more to adopt the recommendations from GR 19 into the function of the State, in order to be in compliance with GR 19, and
willingly identify shortcomings during the Constructive Dialogue. Civil society, as a domestic advocate for CEDAW implementation, should put pressure on their governments to adopt recommendations.

The recent update of GR 19 and GR 35 made several additional recommendations that require states to take a victim-centred approach that considers the capacity of girls of all ages (GR 19, 1992, para 28). Recommendations focus on general legislative measures, prevention, protection, prosecution and punishment, reparations, coordination, monitoring and data collection, and international cooperation (UN Women 2009b). This tool:

… urges States to use this new guidance to design both gender and age sensitive policies that tackle the root causes of violence and discrimination against girls and women’ and has the unique approach to ‘fighting toxic masculinities and bringing boys and men to the table should spark the end to violence against women and girls (UN Human Rights 2017).

States need to invest in civil society, and provide support for the work they carry out. CSOs must focus on the implementation of CEDAW Articles, and provide aid to governments, in terms of working together to progress towards ending VAW. All countries, especially those that have yet to have a candidate nominated to the Committee, should become involved in the international dialogue of CEDAW and strive to nominate a candidate during the next election. Hina Jilani (2017, pers. comm., 14 November), an international lawyer and activist in Pakistan’s women’s movement, at the launch of GR 35 in Geneva 2017, said that we need to:

… invest in civil society movements… these movements have given legitimacy to [women’s] right to dignity and their right to live without fear or violence.
References
CEDAW 2017, ‘Concluding Observations Sri Lanka’, CEDAW/C/LKA/CO/8, United Nations, Geneva, paras 5; 5(c); 6(c); 14(c); 15(c); 23(f).

CEDAW 2016a, ‘Concluding Observations Bangladesh’, CEDAW/C/BDG/CO/8, United Nations, Geneva, paras 4(c); 5(f); 5(g)-(i); 19(d); 19(a).

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CEDAW 2015, ‘Concluding Observations Maldives’, CEDAW/C/MDV/CO/4-5, United Nations, Geneva, paras 13(b); 23(d).

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CEDAW 2013, ‘Concluding Observations Pakistan’, CEDAW/C/PAK/CO/4, United Nations, Geneva, para 4(c); 6(c); 6(d).


CEDAW: A TOOL FOR ADDRESSING VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN


Appendix 1:

Glossary of Key Terms

**The Committee** – The elected group of individual experts tasked with monitoring the compliance and implementation of the Convention in State Parties.


**State Parties** – Individual States that have signed and ratified the Convention.

**Discrimination Against Women** – ‘Any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women, irrespective of their marital status, on a basis or equality of men and women’ (CEDAW Article 1).

**General Recommendation** – An elaboration on the contents of an Article of the Convention.

**United Nations** – An international organisation made up of 193 Member States, founded in 1945 (UN Overview).

**Civil Society** – Non-government operated organisations that work for a cause of the public.

**Optional Protocol** – The procedure that governs an individual’s ability to submit an individual claim to the Committee and have that claim be reviewed, decided upon, and a potential remedy suggested.

**Constructive Dialogue** – The process by which States appear in front of Committee members to provide an update and receive suggestions on best practices.

**Shadow Report** – Updates on State compliance and progress submitted to the Committee by civil society organisations.

**Gender Based Violence** – Violence that disproportionately affects women because of their status as women.

**Concluding Observations** – The final findings of the Committee that provide a comprehensive review of an individual State’s progress with regard to implementation of the Convention, and recommendations on how the State should move forward.
Five Configurations of Climate Compatible Development for Poor Natural Resource Dependent Communities in Pakistan

Maaz Gardezi** and Sana Illahe***

Abstract

Global climate change is a serious threat to agrarian societies in the Global South. Previous research has examined the discourse on poverty and climate vulnerability, development and growth, and combatting climatic risks. However, there has been no concerted effort to understand these discourses in a holistic manner. Thus, limited attention has been given to understand how specific development pathway for communities can serve the dual purpose of poverty-reduction and climate risk management. This chapter seeks to present several important configurations of Climate Compatible Development (CCD) that can provide policymakers with ideas and pathways for dealing with both climatic and development challenges.

* This chapter has been approved as a Research Report by the referee.
** Dr Maaz Gardezi is Assistant Professor, Sociology and Rural Studies, South Dakota State University, USA.
*** Ms Sana Illahe is a PhD student, Sociology and Rural Studies, South Dakota State University, USA.
Introduction

The Paris Agreement 2015 and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) both highlight achieving the goals of development as a prerequisite for climate risk management. For poor countries, the risks of climate change have been pushed so far that delivering on SDGs is indeed a prerequisite to success in the Paris Agreement. This situates developing countries on a precarious path to development. On the one hand, national and sub-national policies must grapple with climatic change and variability, such as floods and droughts, and consequently, establish risk management mechanisms. On the other hand, countries must deal with profounder socioeconomic, political, and environmental concerns that can exacerbate poverty and vulnerability for the poor. In recent years, Climate Compatible Development (CCD) has been considered a worthy development objective that aims to ‘minimize the harm caused by climate impacts, while maximizing the many human development opportunities presented by a low emission, more resilient, future’ (Mitchell and Maxwell 2010:1). CCD has been widely regarded as a plausible solution to mainstreaming climate change adaptation into development thinking (Ellis, Cambray, and Lemma 2013).

Achieving SDGs through implementing CCD often requires dealing with multiple trade-offs, such as conservation versus development and competing interests such as short-term versus achieving longer-ranging development objectives (Ayers, Huq, Wright, Faisal, and Hussain 2014). Although the SDGs have unified priorities of the global communities’ toward specific and measurable development goals, the road to implementation is still fraught with serious sociopolitical challenges. In recent years, there has been a concerted effort to make national and local policies for safeguarding the rights of the poor (Banerjee and Duflo 2012; Hahn, Riederer and Foster 2009; Pouliotte, Smit and Westerhoff 2009; Sachs 2005). But this research is splintered across various social and environmental science disciplines – each with its unique epistemic values and beliefs regarding what ‘development ought to be’. Thus, there is little theoretically informed investigation on how poor countries such as Pakistan should develop policies to allocate limited resources between managing generic risks associated with poverty and dealing with specific risks as a result of climatic change and variability.

Against this background, this chapter proposes some elements of development thought that highlight climate as a risk multiplier, especially for individuals and communities already vulnerable and dependent on natural resources for their livelihood. Specifically, it provides a heuristic that can be used by Pakistan’s policymakers to answer the following question: How to allocate limited resources effectively to focus on two biggest socioecological challenges of the 21st Century:
poverty and climate? Of interest to national and sub-national governments of developing countries (including Pakistan) is deciding how to allocate scarce resources for public goods that can simultaneously deal with poverty eradication and climate change vulnerability. This chapter aims to provide some possible solutions to these sustainable development pathways.

**Climate Change Vulnerability in Poor Natural Resource Dependent Communities**

The threat of climate change poses significant challenges to agrarian societies in the Global South. These threats are especially striking for climatically defined countries such as Pakistan. The Indus Basin of Pakistan lies in a sub-tropical region, with arid to semi-arid climate. With low and variable rainfall and a predominantly dry climate, the Indus Basin Irrigation System provides water for 90 percent of food produced in the country, which feeds 190 million people. Approximately 70 percent of this water originates from snow pack and glacial melt in the Hindu-Kush and Karakoram Ranges, with the remainder falling in the form of rainfall, particularly during the monsoon season. According to the Pakistan Economic Survey 2016-17, agriculture makes up 19.5 percent of Pakistan’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and employs 42.3 percent of the labour force (GoP 2017). The closely coupled human-natural systems within Pakistan means that climate change-related impacts, including variability in water availability and flow, rise in terrestrial temperatures, and climate extremes, such as floods and droughts are likely to exacerbate other stressors, for example, changes in livelihoods, decrease in crop yields and indirectly impact individuals through irregular fluctuation in food prices. These impacts are most devastating for those already living in poverty (Parry et al. 2007).

Pakistan is a socially, politically and economically vulnerable country, where one of the most common and important conditions that drive climate-related vulnerability is multidimensional poverty (Anderson, Morton and Toulmin 2009; Ribot 2010). Pakistan’s Multidimensional Poverty Index for 2014-15, which measured poverty across three dimensions, education, health, and standard of living, estimated that 39 percent of the population is poor. Lack of education, poor access to health, and deteriorating living standards contributed 43 percent, 31 percent, and 26 percent, respectively, to the overall poverty rate (UNDP 2016). Thus, a substantial proportion of the population lacks access to fundamental rights of education and health.

In Pakistan, where much of the population is below the poverty line, it becomes imperative to develop policies and programmes that can simultaneously address climatic and development risks. The dilemma for policymakers is to decide whether
some pathways to CCD for natural resource dependent communities are more sustainable than others. In view of this, this chapter examines four configurations of CCD:

1. poverty-vulnerability trap;
2. safety-first approach to development;
3. development with a capital ‘D’; and,
4. adaptive development.

This chapter also adds a fifth dimension to these configurations called ‘agency-centric adaptive development.’ Although some of these elements have been more heavily criticised than the others, there are lessons in each one of them that can be used for future policymaking. This chapter aims to generate conversations around these themes with the aim of providing a heuristic that can help policymakers allocate limited resources effectively for people and communities that need them the most.

Four Configurations of Climate Compatible Development (CCD)

Poverty-Vulnerability Trap
The first configuration of CCD is the poverty-vulnerability trap. This is the least integrative form of sustainable development, where the vulnerable population has extremely limited resources to manage risks effectively (Eakin, Lemos and Nelson 2014). For Pakistan, a primarily agrarian society, small farm holders are most vulnerable to climatic shocks, as their crop health depends on the water/rain and their expected outputs are entirely dependent on the expected weather and water conditions; a slight shift from these expectations can have debilitating effect on their crop productivity, livelihood, and food availability (Yang, Ringler, Brown, and Mondal 2016). In the environmental change literature, the concept of vulnerability tends to focus on the distributional implications of climate impacts. It is a function of the exposure and sensitivity to climate change as well as the adaptive capacity of social-ecological systems to cope and adapt to it (Adger 2003; Brooks, Adger and Kelly 2005; Parry, Canziani, Palutikof, van der Linden, and Hanson 2007). Vulnerability to climate change-related risks and extreme events not only depend on the frequency and intensity of these hazards, but also rest on peoples’ and communities’ experience of deprivation, as a result of poor health, low education, unemployment, poor governance, violence and disengagement. The poverty-climate vulnerability trap literature has found the former as a risk multiplier (Leichenko and Silva 2014; Munasinghe 2011). Thus, strategies to deal with the impacts of climate change must deal directly with challenges associated with poverty and deprivation.
The poverty-vulnerability traps highlight important lessons for achieving more equitable structure and function of CCD. For example, the poverty trap concept suggests that multiple steady states of poverty may exist within an economic development framework. In this conceptualisation, the goal of poverty alleviation is essentially to lift people out of persistent poverty, often focusing only on the assets owned by and available to the poor (Barrett, Garg and McBride 2016; Kraay and Raddatz 2007). In this development thought, excessive focus on asset inputs, such as technology and finance are considered as a panacea for ‘pushing’ the poor over the boundary between poverty and economic growth. Yet, poverty is a multifaceted concept and research has identified several dimensions of vulnerability, many that go beyond the monetary perspective (Bourguignon and Chakravarty 2003). For example, the capabilities of individuals or groups, the differences in their power structure and social exclusions, and the lengths of time they have spent being socially and economically excluded, along with the relatively newer but more serious dimension of climate risks can alter life outcomes for poor communities (Leichenko and Silva 2014).

Thus, an important lesson from the poverty-vulnerability trap research has been to emphasise that:

...excessive focus on asset inputs, risks ignoring well-established knowledge about endogenous and inclusive poverty alleviation pathways can lead to increased resource degradation or the loss of biological or cultural diversity (Lade, Haider, Engström and Schlüter 2017:1).

Moreover, reliance on using external assets pushing strategy, for providing safety nets have worked in reducing poverty through a multifaceted approach (Banerjee and Duflo 2012), but has also exacerbated poverty in different contexts (Easterly 2006). For example, Banerjee et al. (2015) used a robust sample of 10,000 poor households in six countries to highlight that poverty-reduction programmes are more likely to be successful if coupled with information and incentive-based programmes, such as life skills coaching and access to services. Therefore, in a climatically insecure world, climate change adaptation policies must be connected to the deeply rooted social vulnerabilities of the people.
The ‘Safety-First’ Approach to Development

The second configuration of CCD is the ‘safety-first’ approach. This form of development thinking originated within human geography and natural hazard research and acknowledges the debilitating role of natural disasters, such as floods and tropical storms on communities and ecosystems (Fussel 2007). The key vulnerability frameworks in this literature borrow concepts from risk-hazard (RH) and pressure-and-release (PAR) models (Binder, Hinkel, Bots and Pahl-Wostl 2013). The RH approach assumes that all hazards are physical in nature. Only biophysical processes contribute to system vulnerability (Fussel 2007). The RH model does not, however, recognise that people and nature reciprocally interact and form complex feedback loops. As a result, the RH approach fails to highlight the importance of institutions, culture, and society in determining peoples’ and social groups’ climate change-related vulnerabilities (Dunlap and Brulle 2015). The RH model has also been criticised for neglecting the capacity of people and social groups to moderate their vulnerabilities to natural hazards (Turner et al. 2003).

Enduring the strong criticism, the concept of vulnerability has evolved over time. Wisner, Blaikie, Cannon, & Davis (2004) are credited with the development of the pressure and release (PAR) model in disaster research. The PAR model considers risk to be a product of hazard and vulnerability. This model uses concepts from political economy to characterise vulnerability as a result of multi-scale social, political, and economic causes and conditions (Adger 2006; Brooks et al. 2005). For example, in one application of this framework, Adger and Kelly (1999) conceptualise social vulnerability to climate change as being dependent on the availability of resources and the ability of people and groups to access resources necessary for adaptation. The PAR model is an important approach to understanding the root causes of vulnerability and its multiple dimensions (social, environmental, political and economic) (Birkmann 2006). However, the PAR model does not fully capture the dynamic interactions of social and biophysical vulnerability at different scales (Turner 2010).

The Turner et al. (2003) vulnerability framework is an important socio-ecological systems (SES) framework for analysing how multiple environmental and social changes and location-specific hazards can exacerbate vulnerability for individuals and communities. In their seminal work, they responded to the criticism of the RH and PAR model by emphasising that people and nature interact reciprocally, at different spatial and temporal scales, giving vulnerability an interactive and dynamic form. Hence, vulnerability is not only influenced by climatic factors and weather extremes on nations, sectors, communities and individuals, but is also dependent on the role and capacities of heterogeneous institutional and socioeconomic contexts.
which may make some individuals or communities more or less vulnerable than others (Parry et al. 2007). The safety-first approach provides valuable insight for identifying the key elements of climatic exposure that may be experienced by marginalised rural communities in Pakistan. While the policy response places climatic risk at front and centre of national development, little is explained how peoples’ and communities’ capacities can be developed and nurtured to overcome not just the exposures to climatic shocks, but also to non-climatic shocks (such as abject poverty).

‘D’ for Development

The ‘D’ for development has been the story of world development of the last century. The focus of development over the last 50 years has been on achieving economic and social goals, such as reducing inequality, poverty, and environmental degradation. The options that have been put forward include increasing assets and livelihoods, developing better and sustainable resource practices, and enabling population control (Agrawal and Lemos 2015). Although these tasks have improved the level of development in some countries, communities and households, they have not specifically included policies and plans for reducing the risks associated with climate change. Recent research that has examined the intrinsic link between poverty, development, and climate change has found climate to be a risk multiplier. The risk is not only a result of social, economic, and political deprivations, but also from the additional vulnerabilities posed by changes in climate and weather. Thus, development policies that only focus on generic forms of development, such as those associated with illiteracy and health can still increase vulnerability of the poor to climatic risks (Ibid.).

While the above mentioned form of development focused on the instrumental value of progress, often measured in monetary terms, the impact of poverty on those under its umbrella is observed in more than just monetary terms. An example can be mental stress caused by uncertainty in income. The good news is that within the conventional ‘D’evelopment paradigm concept of multidimensional poverty has gained traction (Alkire and Santos 2010). This development thinking highlights the need to examine poverty-vulnerability traps as a dynamic and multidimensional force. If poverty is multidimensional, then along with lack of assets (mainly income), other factors such as poor health and discrimination can be relevant too (Ibid.).

The relevance and application of resilience thinking in climate change adaptation literature has provided a unique perspective for thinking about developing rural communities in the Global South. Resilience is defined as the ability of social-
ecological systems to cope, adapt and respond to change (Folke 2006). Some properties of resilient socio-ecological systems include adaptability, flexibility and preparedness for change and uncertainty (Eakin et al. 2016; Gunderson 1999; Hughes et al. 2005). Specifically, three system characteristics are at the core of resilience theory: (1) the amount of disturbance a system can absorb while retaining its original structure and function; (2) the capability of the system to self-organise; and (3) the degree to which the system can build the capacity for adaptation and learning (Carpenter and Gunderson 2001; Folke 2006; Holling 1973).

To understand the relevance of resilience theory for CCD, it is necessary to differentiate between vulnerability and resilience. Vulnerability tends to focus on the distributional implications of climate impacts, while resilience approach is about thinking much more in the longer term and on a broader scale. Therefore, moving toward a resilience approach requires the focus of policy to shift from equalising differential impacts and trying to enhance the capacity of particular groups or sector to building more long-term sustainable solutions.

In the context of rural agricultural communities in the Global South, resilience thinking provides three approaches or pathways for socio-ecological changes that can alleviate poverty and help countries achieve the first goal of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs): (1) providing a rapid external push in the form of assets, such as farming equipment, to push people over the poverty-development barrier; (2) reduce the barriers by introducing changes in social and biophysical processes, such as soil fertility management that can improve savings from agricultural production; and, (3) moving toward transformation by intentionally doing (1) and (2) and led by ‘actors endogenous to the system being transformed’ (Lade et al. 2017). An example of the transformative pathway is ‘agroecological farming that improved production by combining modern farming techniques with traditional cultivation practices, when combined with farmer choice over whether and how to interact with global food markets, could lead to transformation that achieve more social justice and reduced poverty’ (Lade et al. 2017; Gliessman 2014). Thus, it is difficult to understand persistent poverty traps without explicitly accounting for the interactions between the multiple dimensions of social-ecological systems.

Reducing vulnerability to climate change in poor countries not only requires building adaptive capacity to address climate-related risks but also the structural deficits, such as illiteracy and lack of health that are at the root of poverty and deprivation (Lemos et al. 2016). Although adaptive capacity has been touted as a potential policy goal for linking development policy with climate risk management
(Eakin et al. 2014; Lemos et al. 2016), little is known whether its determinants (e.g. social and technological resources) can remain relevant for poor households within the same community, country, or even across different social-ecological contexts.

**Adaptive Development**

Recently scholarship has pushed forward a new agenda for CCD — adaptive development — that makes risk management the central focus of development (Agrawal and Lemos 2015). Being based on the ideas of vulnerability reduction and resilience, the adaptive development agenda highlights the need to understand how different combinations of adaptive capacities are important for managing multi-level and cross-scalar risks in social-ecological systems (Lemos et al. 2016).

Based on vulnerability and resilience literature, adaptive capacity describes the ability of groups and systems to respond to climate change positively (Eakin et al. 2014; Nelson, Adger and Brown 2007). In the context of climate and environmental change, scholars conceptualise adaptive capacity as ‘the ability of a socio-ecological system, group, or individual to mobilize resources to prepare and respond to current or perceived stresses’ (Lemos et al. 2013: 4). Adaptive capacity includes three distinct, but related, parts: a resource system, the ability of individuals to access those resources, and the governance system that structures and mediates the management of resources and systems of access (Gardezi and Arbuckle 2017).

The resources often assumed to increase adaptive capacity include: natural, financial, social, human and productive capital. Natural capital refers to the flow of services that ecosystems provide to humans (Millenium Ecosystem Assessment 2003). Just a few examples of natural capital include: fertile agriculture land, marine ecosystems and wetlands that filter water. Productive capital refers to the set of man-made goods, infrastructure, and technologies available to those within a particular system. These could include the ability to sell crops in the market and being able to use technology for anticipating price fluctuations. Social capital refers to the level of trust, confidence and embeddedness within a community or social network. Financial capital refers to wealth. Human capital refers to both the level of literacy and the quality of healthcare available to individuals and communities. Since drawing upon these resources is necessary for building adaptive capacity for reducing vulnerability to climate-related risks, government policies focusing on achieving CCD can potentially focus on developing these capitals, and thus, increase adaptive capacity of people and natural resource dependent communities (Agrawal 2008).

Specifically, public policies can focus on two types of adaptive capacities: generic and specific. Conditions of health, governance, political rights, literacy, and
economic well-being, determine generic adaptive capacity (Lemos et al. 2013). Specific adaptive capacity is determined by risk management activities that address specific types of environmental perturbations, such as adaptation technology for water management or drought control, pre-disaster alert system to cyclones, risk-management institutions such as insurance and disaster response (Ibid.). Both generic and specific adaptive capacity are crucial for reducing vulnerability and enhancing development. Thus, specific capacity refers to the capabilities that can help manage the climate risk in particular, while generic capacity addresses basic human development goals, e.g., health and education, etc. Both are vital to the adaptive development of the poor (Eakin, Lemos and Nelson 2014).

The generic-specific capacity matrix (Figure 1) shows the hypothetical variation in development resulting from differential levels of resources allocated for building communities' generic and specific capacities. This matrix can be applied to communities of farmers and fisherfolk whose livelihoods are dependent on access and availability of natural resources. It is also a useful depiction of the four configurations of CCD that formed the main synthesis piece of this chapter. As shown in Figure 1, a community with low levels of both generic and specific capacity may be confined within a poverty-vulnerability trap. Communities that face social and economic deprivation as a result of poverty, illness, and persistent climatic stressors, such as drought and famine are more likely to be trapped here.

With support from specialised public policies that target specific climatic risks, some communities may be able to transition to the ‘safety-first’ quadrant. Here communities may be prepared to withstand climatic shocks to their assets and livelihoods, but they may still lack progress on indicators related to health, income, and well-being. On the contrary, communities in poverty-vulnerability traps may mobilise support (through public and private agencies) for allocating resources on policies that push for generic forms of development, such as protecting livelihoods, building schools, roads, and health institutions. Such allocation of resources can assist some communities to transition toward the ‘development only’ stage. Here the community has been able to build its generic resource at the expense of giving up allocation for building specific capacity. Thus, so far, each configuration of the development focused on either one or the other form of capacity, but not both.

The fourth configuration of development is achieved with relatively higher levels of public investment into building generic and specific capacity. This stage is ‘adaptive management’ (Figure 1) and is preparing people and communities to cope, adapt, and respond to not just current climatic change and variability, but also future local and global social and environmental change. In this CCD configuration, public
policies are developed by focus on (1) adaptation by promoting the importance of equality, growth, and sustainability, and, (2) development by highlighting the importance of risk management (Agrawal and Lemos 2015).

Figure 1: Adaptive Development

Source: Adapted from Eakin et al. 2014.

Fifth Configuration of CCD: Agency-Centred Adaptive Development

The central idea of this chapter is to create a heuristic that can guide and encourage policymakers to differentiate between specific and objective adaptive capacities to achieve dual goals of climate change adaptation and sustainable development. Here, we add the fifth stage to these development configurations that fundamentally shapes the well-being of the people who are the beneficiaries of CCD policies. This configuration requires one to expand the definition of adaptive capacity, by also thinking of peoples’ agency and capabilities.

Adaptive capacity represents the main socioeconomic and political mechanisms for reducing vulnerability and regulating system resilience (Engle 2011). This study defined adaptive capacity as the ‘ability of a system to adjust to climate change to moderate potential damages, to take advantage of opportunities, or to cope with the consequences’ (Parry et al. 2007: 20). Most empirical studies have focused on the external or objective dimensions of adaptive capacity, i.e., ‘the material and immaterial resources and the assets and entitlements that predetermine the decision options available to an actor at any point in time to cope with losses and to anticipate future harm’ (Eakin 2014: 228). Thus, objective adaptive capacity links individuals or societies’ ability to adapt to change with the overall availability of financial, technical, and institutional resources. Studies that investigate and model...
the interaction between the social and the ecological systems often assume that individuals will have more opportunities to cope, adapt, and respond to the negative effects of climate change if they have adequate access to financial resources, knowledge, and suitable institutional arrangements (Smit and Wandel 2006).

At the same time, other studies in social and behavioural sciences have found that perceived adaptive capacity can be equally important for preparing people to cope and adapt to changes in weather and climate (Gardezi and Arbuckle 2017). This is the internal dimension of adaptive capacity, i.e., the individual’s perception of the suitability of available resources (financial, technical, institutional, etc.) needed for facilitating adaptation (Eakin et al. 2016; Grothmann and Patt 2005; Seara, Clay and Colburn 2016). In other words, perceived adaptive capacity highlights ‘…the extent to which people feel they are prepared to endure changes or impacts and undertake steps to cope with them’ (Seara et al. 2016: 50).

In the capabilities approach, Sen (1987: 16) writes that for developing human well-being, ‘the focus has to be on what we can or cannot do, can or cannot be.’ Thus, the central focus of the capabilities approach is that peoples’ well-being improves with better opportunities and freedoms, especially the ones that they themselves value (Sen 1999). Individual well-being does not only improve through better ‘functioning’ as a result of possession of material resources or objective attributes of adaptive capacity, such as income, but also through the ‘capabilities’ that provide necessary levels of freedom to achieve a desirable and valuable life (Graham and Nikolova 2015). Hence, if human development and well-being are ultimately about enlarging individual choices and opportunities, then climate-compatible policies must be addressing these choices directly and with urgency. Of interest for policymaking is to identify how individual well-being can be enhanced through CCD.

Here, this study postulates that developing policies enhancing specific and generic capacities can essentially tap into an individual’s potential capabilities that they may have never realised before. The realisations of these capabilities, in turn, develop an individual’s agency to a newer level. When the individual is able to manage their risks better, they perceive themselves to be resilient, and they are able to make better choices. The generic capacity takes care of the overall well-being of the individual, lifting their concerns and worries off their hunger, incomes and health. On the other side, the specific capacity enables the individual to withstand most climatic stressors, and thus enabling them to live in a relatively worry-free environment.
Figure 2 displays the idea of building agency from specific and generic adaptive capacities for an actor, such as a smallholder farmer. The curved line shows the possibility frontier of all specific and generic capacities that may be available to that actor. Thus, any point on the curve provides an ‘optimal’ level of sharing between generic and specific resources. It is assumed that an individual is currently at point A1. Here, he or she has SA1 level of specific capacity and GA1 level of generic capacity. At this level of allocation, targeted policy intervention can be developed for catering to the needs of this person/community. The goal is to move the individual’s level of capacity from SA1, GA1 to SA3, GA3:

![Figure 2: Agency and Adaptive Development](source)

At the improved level of capacity (SA3, GA3), the individual is not only able to choose from a wider range of development options for improving their life outcomes but have also – as a result of this process – enhanced their agency. The lesson for policymakers is, thus, to develop policies that advance agency opportunities and minimise discrimination and unfairness in society (Hojman and Miranda 2018). Policies are meant to be developed at multiple levels. For example, such as at the micro-level including family and work, meso-level including neighbourhood and community, and the macro-level including political institutions. With regards to macro-level changes, some studies have shown that political institutions associated with better ‘voting rights, freedom of speech, freedom of religion, among others— are positively associated with perceptions of self-determination and happiness measures’ (Ibid.:10). Similarly, a study conducted in Sri Lanka has empirically
shown that peoples’ capabilities and well-being are themselves the end result of improved public services provision, despite having little or no impact on incomes (Anand and Ravallion 1993). Thus, policies and practices that can enhance specific capacities for managing climatic change and generic capacities for improving traditional development outcomes may also open more possibilities for individuals to exercise their freedom to choose among options that they most value in their lives (see Figure 2).

**Conclusion: From Configuration to Implementation**

The artful balance between sustainable development and climate change adaptation is possible, but fraught with multiple challenges. First, there is little agreement in the social and environmental literature about what sustainable development is and how climate change adaptation should be implemented. Second, with limited resources, it is challenging to prioritise and allocate scarce resources for 169 development indicators that constitute the SDGs. Finally, implementing CCD often requires dealing with trade-offs, such as conservation versus development, livelihood creation versus perpetuating inequality, and prioritising short-termism versus longer-ranging development policies. Despite these challenges, CCD still offers potential avenues for successfully achieving the dual goals of climate risk management and sustainable development.

This chapter presented a conceptual framework that synthesised the five stages of CCD to present pathways for harnessing prosperity for poor natural resource dependent communities in Pakistan. First, it examined the relationship between the four stages of development using the policy-centred metrics provided by the concepts of generic and specific capacity. It showed that each stage of development focused on either one or the other form of capacity, but not both. Next, it added the important contribution of literature on human agency and well-being that highlighted the need to develop policies that enhance agency and reduce discrimination and unfairness. The study developed simple (but not too simplified) heuristics to explain the relationship between development policy, climate change adaptation, and agency.

Of course, there are several limitations of this study. First, it is proposing for a policy shift in the focus from equalising differential impacts on communities to building more long-term sustainable solutions. For policymakers, this transition is difficult for two reasons. Firstly, there is a trade-off between their responsibilities to particular constituents versus thinking about the bigger picture to which they may not have a mandate in terms of their decision-making responsibility. Secondly, they may find it difficult to separate events caused by climate variability from those that
are an outcome of deeply rooted social vulnerabilities. Thus, it is equally important to identify win-win situations that can make the political process more amenable to CCD. Second, while adaptive capacity is a handy tool for policymakers, measuring it is challenging for two reasons: (1) it is latent in nature, meaning that an event has to occur in order to measure adaptive capacity; and (2) it can be difficult to clearly demarcate the level and scale of analysis as well as to fulfil information requirements for conducting empirical analysis (Engle 2011). Nevertheless, conceptually the heuristics provides a better tool to implement policies that can reduce both vulnerability to existing social, as well as future climate-related perturbations.

On the whole, focus on increasing the total amount of adaptive resources in a system, such as the total food supply or water availability, while ignoring individuals’ entitlements to resources comprising adaptive capacity, could leave disadvantaged groups vulnerable. Thus, the focus of CCD must be on building agency. In Pakistan, shifting focus on expanding entitlements for vulnerable individuals and groups is a political process. Often times, it is mistaken that the total pie of adaptive capacity can be increased for everyone as long as resources in the system increase. Moreover, Pakistan’s experience with agricultural development suggests that increase in productivity and food supply may not be translated into better food access and food utilisation for many individuals. Focusing on short-term gains over longer ranging sustainable development goals have weakened governance and deteriorated human and social development conditions. Thus, CCD in Pakistan is achievable by combining both generic capacities, determined by health, governance, political rights, literacy, and economic well-being and specific adaptive capacities, determined by risk management activities and early warning systems in a way that can also enhance agency of people. The hope is that this analysis will provide a fresh perspective to Pakistani academics and policymakers for better understanding the human and social dimensions of climate. Specifically, it is hoped this chapter inspires development thinking on two important fronts: development and risk management.
References


Five Configurations of Climate Compatible Development for Poor Natural Resource Dependent Communities in Pakistan


Maaz Gardezi and Sana Illahe

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Understanding El-Niño: Tracing its Impacts in Sindh, Pakistan

Ghamz E Ali Siyal,** Syed Mohsin Ali Kazmi*** and Mahreen Zahara****

Abstract

The impacts of weather phenomenon, El-Niño, are undeniable. Pakistan Meteorological Department (PMD) provides prediction of weather patterns, along with El-Niño, which are known to impact Pakistan’s weather. This chapter analyses El-Niño impacts on the farming community of Mirpurkhas district in the province of Sindh, Pakistan. It is based on the farming community’s perception to investigate its evidences and share their experience. The methodology is based on quantitative and qualitative measures. The quantitative analysis is based on a farming community survey of 104 small farmers from four Union Councils (UCs) of Mirpurkhas district, namely, Chitrori, Doulatpur, Kak, and Kheerao. The qualitative analysis is based on a panel discussion of experts at the Twentieth Sustainable Development Conference (SDC) of the Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, organised in December 2017. The evidence of El-Niño provided by farmers are linked with rainfall variability, climatic changes and climatic-induced disasters over the past ten years. The changes recognised by farmers include decrease in rainfall, increase in temperature and humidity, change in number of hot and cold days, irregular rainfall, reduction in the length of the seasons, and increase in uncertainty associated with weather prediction. These conditions have severely impacted livelihoods of farmers by influencing agriculture productivity, orchard production and livestock. The experts on climate change and El-Niño agreed on its direct and indirect impacts. There is need for enhancing resilience and reducing vulnerability of the farming community in Sindh, Pakistan.

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* This chapter has been approved as a Policy Brief by the referee.
** Mr Ghamz E Ali Siyal is a Research Assistant on Pathways to Resilience in Semi-Arid Economies (PRISE) at the Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, Pakistan.
*** Mr Syed Mohsin Ali Kazmi is Senior Data Manager and Research Associate (PhD Scholar) at the Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, Pakistan.
**** Dr Mahreen Zahara is serving at the National Rural Support Programme (NRSP), Islamabad, Pakistan since 2007. She plays a key role in monitoring and implementation of ongoing activities with respect to environment and natural resource management.
Understanding El-Niño: Tracing its Impacts in Sindh, Pakistan

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Introduction

El-Niño/Southern Oscillation\(^1\) is a global phenomenon in which warming of sea surface water occurs near the equator zone of central and eastern Pacific Ocean. It influences atmospheric circulation of trade winds throughout the world (FAO 2014). Although such changes occur in the tropical Pacific, nevertheless, it influences climate and weather globally. The time period of this phenomenon ranges from three to seven years. The evidence of El-Niño phenomenon can also be evident through socioeconomic changes. Its impacts include drought, storms, hurricanes, and erratic rains in different parts of the world. These outcomes of El-Niño are not just limited to agriculture and food security conditions, but it also influences industries (Cashin et al. 2016).

The continental highlights of El-Niño validates its significant negative and positive impacts on Central and South America, West Africa, East Africa, Indian subcontinent, South Asia, and Africa (WFP 2015). The impacts of El-Niño phenomenon are traced through annual rainfall variability which has wide impacts on the overall economy, especially agriculture, followed by food and social security (Fer et al. 2017). Historically, FAO (2014) reports record episodes of El-Niño from 1986 to 2006 with a periodic variation in intensity. The moderate intensity of El-Niño episodes were found in the years 1986-88 (January to March), 1994-95 (August to October), 2002-03 (April to June) and 2009-10 (June to August). The strong intensity of El-Niño episodes was observed in 1986-88 (July to September) and 1997-98 (April to June). While weaker intensity of El-Niño episodes were found in 2004-05 (June to August) and in 2006-07 (August to October).

In case of Pakistan, impacts of El-Niño were felt in 1986, 1987, 1991, 1992, 1997, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2009, and 2010. In these years, El-Niño was found to be affecting first and second crop seasons (Ibid.). Pakistan, being an agrarian country, is highly dependent on monsoon rainfall. The impact of El-Niño was found on monsoon rainfall patterns in various regions, namely, Punjab, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Kashmir from 1960 to 2008. The probability of rainfall during months of April and May was above average. Comparatively, it was below average rainfall during months of June, July and September (Zawar and Zahid 2013). Another study confirmed higher rainfall variation before and after the monsoon time period rather than in winter and monsoon season. Provincially, coefficient of rainfall variability was higher in Balochistan followed by Sindh and Punjab regions in the pre-monsoon and post-monsoon season (Naheed and Rasul 2011). Further,

\(^{1}\) El Niño is a Spanish word for Christ Child.
another study was conducted to understand the relationship between summer monsoon and El-Niño. This study was based on summer rainfall data of Sindh and Balochistan province collected from 16 meteorological stations spanning 1950 to 2000. It found changes in monsoon during the warming period of eastern and central Pacific Ocean. However, the exact level of relationship remains uncertain (Bhutto and Ming 2013). This chapter specifically tries to:

- Trace out the impact of El-Niño on small farmers of Mirpurkhas district, Sindh province.
- Engage policymakers and experts for understanding impacts of El-Niño throughout Pakistan.

Global Highlights of El-Niño in 2015
The highlights of El-Niño globally can be found in different regions for 2015. Its impacts were found in Central America and Caribbean, South Sudan, Ethiopia, Uganda, Horn of Africa, Southern Africa and South-East Asia. Central America and the Caribbean, Sudan, South of Sudan, Uganda, Ethiopia, Southern Africa and South-East Asia faced drier conditions in first and second season of cropping which had negative impacts. Only Horn of Africa faced severe wetter conditions which led to flooding risks, especially in Kenya and Somalia. However, it benefitted the pastoral areas in some regions (WFP 2015). Historically, prevalence of El-Niño globally has resulted in recurring drought conditions from 1984 to 2013. During the first and second crop seasons, El-Niño has influenced every specific region of almost every continent (Ibid.). In Pakistan, the latest El-Niño episode ended in 2016, but its influence was felt throughout the year. The snowfall in February and March, heavy rains in March and April, heat waves before the monsoon, flooding during monsoon and fog phenomenon in November and December occurred due to El-Niño in 2016 (Wasif 2017).

Data and Methodology
This research was based on mixed method (qualitative and quantitative) approach. A structural questionnaire was used to collect quantitative data from 104 small farmers (including male and female) from four Union Councils (UCs) of district Mirpurkhas in Sindh province. The selected UCs included Chitrori, Doulatpur, Kak, and Kheerao. The small farmers are defined as ‘farmers who own land less than 12.5 acres’. This project was conducted by SDPI in collaboration with the National Rural Support Program (NRSP).

A Simple Random Sampling (SRS) technique was employed for selection of the target population. The qualitative data is based on expert opinions presented at a
panel organised at the Twentieth Sustainable Development Conference in December 2017. The experts in the panel came from government and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), namely, Pakistan Meteorological Department (PMD), University of Veterinary and Animal Sciences, National Rural Support Program (NRSP) and Pakistan Council of Research in Water Resources (PCRWR). It provided key points about El-Niño and its solutions in the form of recommendations.

**Study Site**
The district of Mirpurkhas is located in the province of Sindh, Pakistan. The total area of the district comprises of 2,925 sq. kms. The district is rich not only in agriculture productivity but also in orchard farming of mangoes. The crop irrigation is based on Nara Canal and Jamrao Canal (west branch). This district shares boundaries with five others, namely, Sanghar (north), Hyderabad (west), Badin and Tharparkar (south), and Umerkot (east).

The district is a highly vulnerable since it faces extreme poverty. According to the Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI), Mirpurkhas was ranked 86th with an index value of 0.401. The MPI is based on conditions of overall health, education and standard of living. Based on MPI, Mirpurkhas district was selected to further analyse the impacts of El-Niño and suggest coping measures and adaptation strategies to reduce its climatic vulnerability.

**Results and Discussion**
This section discusses climate change, El-Niño and risk mitigation strategies. The next section provides viewpoint of experts and policymakers about overall outcomes of El-Niño on Pakistan and their key suggestions.

**Climate Change**
The impacts of El-Niño are evident from the climate-induced disasters (like droughts, heat stress and floods) and rainfall variability. Both severely influence the livelihood of farmers. The farming community reported (Figure 1) that there was decrease in rainfall (28 percent), increase in temperature (26 percent), increase in humidity (13 percent), change in the number of hot and cold days (13 percent), irregular rainfall (7 percent), change in length of growing period (5 percent), and uncertainty in weather prediction (4 percent). On the contrary, very few farmers indicated that there had been increase in rainfall (1 percent), decrease in temperature (2 percent), and less humidity (1 percent).
The adaptive measures taken by farmers included adopting new cropping calendars (28 percent), using variety of crops (26 percent), changing watering methods for crops (22 percent), changing usage of fertilizers or pesticides (20 percent), and using more crop loan insurance schemes (4 percent).

**El-Niño**

Results from the farmers’ survey found traces of El-Niño that can be linked with rainfall variability, climatic changes and disaster results (like decrease in rainfall, increase in temperature, irregular rainfall, uncertainty in predicting weather conditions accompanying floods, droughts and heat stress). The respondents agreed that very dry and below average rainfall conditions were observed during winter season in 2016 and summer season in 2017 (Figure 2).

**Figure 1: Climatic Changes in Mirpurkhas**

- Increase in rainfall
- Decrease in rainfall
- Irregular rainfall (Change in timing)
- Increase in temperature
- Decrease in temperature
- More humidity
- Less humidity

**Figure 2: Rainfall Variability**

Rainfalls in Winter Season 2016

- Above Average: 64%
- Normal: 25%
- Below Average: 13%
- Very dry: 2%

Rainfalls in Summer Season 2017

- Above Average: 66%
- Normal: 13%
- Below Average: 19%
- Very dry: 2%

*Source: Authors’ compilation.*
Similarly, rainfall trends were described by farmers for winter season in 2015 and summer season in 2016 (Figure 3).

![Figure 3: Rainfall Variability in Past Years](image)

Rainfalls in Winter Season 2015

- Above Average: 11%
- Normal: 21%
- Below Average: 19%
- Very dry: 49%

Rainfalls in Summer Season 2016

- Normal: 33%
- Below Average: 23%
- Very dry: 44%

Source: Authors’ compilation.

A majority of the farmers (84 percent) faced drought conditions in Mirpurkhas. The farmers described that drought affected agriculture crops, livestock, human health and mango orchards. It impacted agriculture by decreasing crop productivity and quality and led to rise in pest attacks. Farmers adapted to the drought by looking for new wells, increased the use of pesticides and reduced usage of fertilizers. The impacts of drought were also faced by households which led to anxiety and depression about economic losses, health problems related to low and poor quality water flow. Few households also described that health problems increased with prevailing dust, threat to public safety from fire incidents in forests/crops, loss of human life and reduction of recreational activities. Households adapted by using alternate water available, drilled new bores in search of water, fetched water from nearby wells or streams, preserved cereal and other food items, saved money for difficult times, purchased livestock, prayed for rains, and migrated permanently to
Due to such stress of drought, few respondents also described that they went to find alternate livelihoods for earning an income.

The drought affected livestock by increasing disease and death incidents followed by decrease of fodder for livestock and rise of fodder prices. Farmers coped with drought conditions by storing fodder, drilling new wells or fetching water from nearby tubewells, temporary migration to other grazing areas in nearby towns, and increasing vaccination for viral diseases. Few farmers sold livestock or permanently migrated livestock to areas rich in fodder. Droughts also impacted mango orchards by affecting quality and productivity and increase in pest attacks. Farmers coped with such conditions by using wet dung fertilizer on trees, cutting dry trees, and spraying pesticides for drought-induced viral diseases.

Goats and buffaloes are the main livestock that the households possess. Livestock is reared for household consumption (43 percent) and for selling (12 percent). The majority (91 percent) of farmers did not purchase fodder, but the remaining few did. The easy access to forage or fodder, either from their crops or grazing grounds reduced the need for purchasing fodder. For grazing of livestock, majority of them (77 percent) relied on nomadic movements within the district. In case of lack of availability of fodder within the district, they moved livestock in trucks to neighbouring districts. The average expense for purchasing fodder was approximately PKR 4,911 (USD 40 approximately) on average per season. The role of women was crucial in livestock rearing and care management. They processed milk, cleaned animals/sheds and helped in disease control.

The farmers frequently faced natural disasters and used numerous risk mitigation strategies. These strategies included accumulation of livestock and other assets (14 percent), internal migration (14 percent), paying attention to climate forecasts/early warnings (12 percent), prayers/ceremonies (12 percent), seeking alternate income (11 percent), and shifting livestock to their relatives living in other areas (11 percent). A few of them dealt with crop cultivation for pure pastoralists, use of pesticides/fertilizers, supplementary feeding, and expansion of cultivated land for agropastorals (Figure 4):
In order to improve effectiveness of early warning system, farmers stressed on receiving early warnings at least two weeks before any uncertain condition (like rainfall). Some of them considered provision of information about early warning as more beneficial if given two months in advance as it helped in preparation and implementation of risk mitigation strategies. Farmers stressed on forecast about when rains are expected to start and end. Similarly, few of them, asked for early warning about trend of rains in comparison with past rains, and expected amount of rains every month.

**Experts’ Views on El-Niño in Pakistan**

In this section, qualitative data was collected by organising a panel at the Twentieth SDC. The policymakers and field experts of climate science and environment discussed El-Niño in the overall context of Pakistan. Few insights from the panel findings are summarised here:

1) Dr Inam Ur Rahim, Chief Research Officer, Center for Applied Policy Research in Livestock (CAPRIL), University of Veterinary & Animal Sciences, Lahore, Pakistan

El-Niño is responsible for disasters in South Asia and South-East Asia. Earlier, people did not know about El-Niño. However, after the floods of 2010 in South Asia, this phenomenon became common discussion. Climate change, global
warming and El-Niño have resulted in the rise of sedimentation in dams, rivers and lakes, soil erosion, landslides, Glacial Lake Outburst Flow (GLOF), floods, and hurricanes. These conditions have affected people living in rural areas or riverine plains due to loss of agricultural land and yield which are ultimately resulting in poor economic growth. Therefore, there is a need to differentiate between climate change and El-Niño and trace their impacts (Rahim 2017).

2) Dr Ghulam Rasool, Director General, Pakistan Meteorological Department (PMD), Islamabad, Pakistan

ENSO (El-Niño Southern Oscillation) is occurring in the South Asian region. These Arctic oscillations influenced Tibet Plateau and weather patterns are getting disturbed in Pakistan causing unusual monsoon season. These changes have resulted in delayed monsoon, lower rainfall and water scarcity. There is a need to develop a mechanism, especially by Indus River System Authority (IRSA) to deal with it since deforestation and lack of institutional capacity can lead to disastrous impacts of El-Niño on Pakistan in the future (Rasool 2017).

3) Dr Rashid Bajwa, CEO, National Rural Support Program (NRSP), Pakistan

Pakistan needs to learn from capacity building strategies of farmers in Netherlands who are quite successful and have produced efficient results over the past few years. In case of Pakistan, neither people nor institutions are ready to address these challenges collectively through implementation strategies. Along with impacts of climate change and El-Niño, issue of overpopulation has further aggravated conditions which can be addressed with inter-connectivity among regions (Bajwa 2017).

4) Dr Muhammad Ashraf, Chairman, Pakistan Council of Research in Water Resources (PCRWR), Lahore, Pakistan

Climate change is an ambiguous term and its impacts are still not fully understood even by scientists. He stressed better understanding to improve policies related to climate change mitigation. Moreover, global warming, rising urbanisation along with massive deforestation are creating disasters for Pakistan. Further, Pakistan needs an Integrated Flood Management System so that it does not lose its water and agricultural resources (Ashraf 2017).
Policy Recommendations

Developing Climate Smart Villages (CSVs)
In order to address rising climate risks and environmental degradation, there is a need to develop integrated coordination systems, i.e., CSVs. Through this system, policymakers, farmers, governmental organisations and other relevant stakeholders can engage to develop effective community plans against climate change and weather phenomenon like El-Niño. The CSV communities can also help to identify interventions for capacity building and awareness campaigns for farmers.

Plantation of Drought and Saline Resistant Orchards and Plants
Mirpurkhas district of Sindh particularly faces land degradation because of consistent droughts and saline conditions. In order to cope with it, there is a need for planting orchards like ‘Berry’ and ‘Sapodilla’ on saline-affected farms. Similarly, plantation of ‘Sindhri’, ‘Chaunsa’ and ‘Roto’ varieties of mangoes in drought-affected farms of Mirpurkhas is also needed. It is important to increase fodder for animals by planting drought-resistant plants and trees (like ‘Devi’ and ‘Babur’). Such plantation will secure food supply for livestock.

Investing in Infrastructure for Small Storage Reservoirs
While building large dams has become a political issue, investing in small dams can become a possible solution for drought in the Sindh province. It can ensure consistent supply of water to benefit the overall agriculture sector and livelihood of farmers. Along with that, there is a need for addressing loopholes of Regional Integrated Flood Management System to reduce water and agriculture resource losses in the future.

Enhancing Early Warning System
In order to cope with uncertain conditions, farmers rely on early warning systems which reduce risks and help to preparing for coping measures. Therefore, there is a need to enhance their effectiveness.

Increasing Access to Crop Loan Insurance Schemes
The government should increase access of farmers to the Crop Loan Insurance Scheme (CLIS) by reducing documentation requirements. This scheme will not only be helpful through credit, but also provide insurance premium against natural calamities, like floods and droughts.
References


Internal Migration and Urbanisation: A Case Study from Semi-arid Regions of Pakistan
Ghamz E Ali Siyal,** Imran Saqib Khalid*** and Ayesha Qaisrani****

Abstract
The chapter analyses the determinants of urbanisation in semi-arid regions and the role of institutions in dealing with the issue. Focusing mainly on three semi-arid districts of Pakistan, i.e., Mardan, Faisalabad, and Dera Ghazi Khan (D.G. Khan), the study draws on qualitative information gathered through in-depth interviews of rural-to-urban migrants and key stakeholders. The push factors described by majority of urban respondents in all three districts are mainly economic - lack of employment and business opportunities in rural areas. Although socioeconomic factors were the primary cause of migration, climate change was not considered a direct reason. Nevertheless, a few respondents agreed that climate change had an indirect effect on their decision to migrate. According to development authorities, major reasons for unplanned urbanisation and slum creation include lack of internal migration monitoring policy and coordination gaps between service providers and concerned authorities. Furthermore, stakeholders emphasised the need for immediate attention on overall agriculture sector development, including climate resilient and agriculture smart policies to lower the push factors of migration in rural areas.

* This chapter has been approved as a Research Paper by the referee.
** Mr Ghamz E Ali Siyal is a Research Assistant on Pathways to Resilience in Semi-Arid Economies (PRISE) at the Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, Pakistan.
*** Dr Imran Saqib Khalid is a Research Fellow at the Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, Pakistan. He heads the Environment and Climate Change Unit at SDPI. Dr Khalid holds a PhD in Environmental and Natural Resources Policy from SUNY College of Environmental Science and Forestry, Syracuse, New York.
**** Ms Ayesha Qaisrani is Research Associate at the Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, Pakistan. She holds a MS degree in Economics from the National University of Science and Technology, Pakistan. She has research experience in gender issues, climate change and poverty and has several publications to her name.
Introduction

Urbanisation is the redistribution of population from rural-to-urban settlements with the passage of time (Peng et al. 2011). It involves push and pull factors,¹ which force people to migrate. Urbanisation, on the one hand, provides opportunities for growth, and on the other, it gives rise to problems such as high population density, inadequate infrastructure, lack of affordable housing, pollution, slums’ creation, crime, congestion, and poverty (GoP 2015).

Apart from aforementioned push and pull factors, forced migration is also a factor which contributes to internal migration. The lack of management in conflict zones is the root cause of increase in refugees and migrants (Mehdi 2007). The number of households displaced due to conflict between Pakistani forces and militant groups in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) is 74,826. The repatriation programmes initiated by the Government of Pakistan (GoP) have helped approximately 94 percent of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) to return to FATA (Yousafzai 2017; and USAID 2017).

Another important reason for migration is climate change (Torres 2015; Sattar 2014). Climate change refers to:

...a change in the state of climate that can be identified (e.g. using statistical tests) by making changes in the mean and/or the variability of its properties, and that persist for an extended period, typically decades or longer (IPCC 2007).

The problem of climate change supplements challenges that occur due to urbanisation, especially in the developing countries. The rising losses in agriculture productivity force people to look for alternate modes of livelihoods. Therefore, migration is considered to be one of the various adaptation strategies that rural inhabitants employ to avoid loss of life and damage to property as a result of climate-related natural disasters (Saeed et al. 2016). The urban areas of Pakistan are also facing various issues that force people to migrate. These include urban drainage problems, inadequate potable water supply, and increased number of mortality rates due to natural disasters (Asian Development Bank 2017).

The climate-induced migration is faced by people in various regions of Pakistan (Sandeelo 2017). During the past few years, unpredictable extreme weather

¹ Push and pull factors are those factors which force or attract migrants.
conditions resulted in torrential rains, flash floods and landslides across Pakistan. In 2015, a heat wave caused 1,200 deaths (GoP 2015) and forced others to move during summers in Karachi. Below average rainfall during the monsoon season in 2016 brought drought and decreased crop production, which forced hunger affected people to migrate to other areas for food (Ijaz 2017). The people residing near the Indus Delta have also witnessed large-scale migration because of sea intrusion, coastal floods and rainfalls. Along with that, climate change has affected agriculture, the business sector, water, health, biodiversity, forest and socioeconomic conditions in Pakistan’s semi-arid regions. Climate change has also affected farm and non-farm livelihoods, which resulted in migration of farmers and others from rural-to-urban areas (Ijaz 2017; Rasul et al. 2012).

The climate-induced migration process may be temporary (as in the case of displacement of people for a short period of time) or permanent, depending upon the severity of natural disasters (Ijaz 2017). For example, one of the studies found that climate change was responsible for the permanent migration of farmers in Gujrat district to the urban areas of Pakistan (Abid et al. 2016). Heat stress is another climatic shock that has significantly affected Pakistan’s economy (Mueller et al. 2014). Interestingly, heat stress is more responsible for permanent migration as compared to floods. Other climatic changes include cyclones, desertification, and floods which cause rural-to-urban migration. These changes have increased land degradation and lead to a shortfall in food production, which increases rural poverty and urban turmoil (Asian Development Bank 2012).

In light of the above scenario, this study aims to contextualise rural-to-urban migration in terms of the contemporary push and pull factors in semi-arid regions of Pakistan. It also aspires to understand the institutional gaps that can be bridged to foster a more planned approach towards urbanisation. The main objectives are to:

- describe the main push and pull factors behind rural-to-urban migration in semi-arid regions, and explore if climate change plays a role in the respondents’ decision to migrate.
- investigate outcomes of rural-to-urban migration in terms of stresses and opportunities; and,
- analyse institutional gaps in dealing with the issue of urbanisation.

**Rationale of Study**

Numerous studies have been conducted to analyse the reasons behind internal migration. However, reasons of migration along with post-migration issues and role of institutions in semi-arid regions of Pakistan are less explored. This study adds to
the literature on urbanisation by focusing on pre- and post-migration issues, along with institutional vulnerabilities in addressing them.

**Context and Background**

**Outcomes of Unplanned Urbanisation**

Unplanned urbanisation is the outcome of rapid rise of rural-to-urban migration (Government of Punjab 2014), as well as lack of consistent planning and execution (GoP 2015). During the planning process of cities, a number of master plans are designed, yet only a few of them are implemented properly (Hussain 2013). This results in negative outcomes such as the inability of the cities to absorb, accommodate and provide employment opportunities to the rising inflow of people. The lack of urban planning forces almost 27.5 million people to deal with lower level of living standards (Government of Punjab 2014). Moreover, there is a reduction in agricultural and forest land, food insecurity, exploitation of aquifers, poor water and sanitation services, lack of infrastructure, poor public transport, weak traffic management, urban encroachment, and increased demand for electricity (Ibid.).

The historical trend of population growth (percentage) provides evidence of rapid urbanisation in major cities of Pakistan (Table 1):

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<td>Karachi</td>
<td>0.387</td>
<td>1.913</td>
<td>5.208</td>
<td>9.339</td>
<td>4.94</td>
<td>2.72</td>
<td>2.66</td>
<td>2.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Faisalabad</td>
<td>0.070</td>
<td>0.425</td>
<td>1.104</td>
<td>2.009</td>
<td>6.07</td>
<td>2.60</td>
<td>2.44</td>
<td>1.91</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Jan and Iqbal 2008; GoP 2017.*

According to statistics, the trend of migration can be assessed by the rising population in urban areas (GoP 2016a). The population in rural areas decreased
from 61.4 percent to 60.1 percent during 2015-16. However, urban population increased from 38.5 percent to 40 percent between 2014-16. Furthermore, migration to urban areas can be evidently seen by population projections made for urban areas till 2030 in Table 2:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>32.52</td>
<td>36.99</td>
<td>39.89</td>
<td>42.56</td>
<td>45.04</td>
<td>47.33</td>
<td>49.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Punjab</td>
<td>31.27</td>
<td>36.31</td>
<td>39.56</td>
<td>42.54</td>
<td>45.27</td>
<td>47.78</td>
<td>50.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sindh</td>
<td>48.75</td>
<td>52.00</td>
<td>54.07</td>
<td>55.97</td>
<td>57.70</td>
<td>59.28</td>
<td>60.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khyber Pakhtunkhwa</td>
<td>16.87</td>
<td>23.40</td>
<td>27.62</td>
<td>31.50</td>
<td>35.07</td>
<td>38.34</td>
<td>41.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balochistan</td>
<td>23.89</td>
<td>29.70</td>
<td>33.44</td>
<td>36.87</td>
<td>40.02</td>
<td>42.91</td>
<td>45.56</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Jan and Iqbal 2008.

Increasing population rise in major cities of Pakistan is the outcome of rural and urban development gap which is putting further pressure on urban areas. The lack of development, i.e., services improvement in rural areas, has triggered internal migration from rural-to-urban areas (Ibid.). This is supported by the 2016 Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) Report (2014/2015), which depicts that poverty in rural areas is higher than the urban areas (Figure 1):

Figure 1: Multidimensional Poverty in Rural and Urban Areas of Pakistan

Source: GoP 2016b.

Owing to increase in rural poverty, Pakistan’s major cities are facing increase in kachi abadis (informal settlements). For example, Karachi city houses 500; and Lahore has 300 such informal settlements (Hussain 2013). In Islamabad, 21 kachi

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2 MPI is based on three dimensions: education, health and living standards.
abadis are located near urban peripheries and remaining three are in rural areas. Approximately, 13,521 families live in these slums with more than 80,000 population (Hussain 2014).

Salik et al. (2017) analysed destination of migrants from similar semi-arid regions, namely, D.G. Khan, Faisalabad and Mardan. The internal migration (rural-to-urban areas) pattern showed 16 percent in D.G. Khan, 64 percent in Faisalabad and 15 percent in Mardan. The remaining migrants went to Karachi, Quetta, Lahore, Swabi, Rawalpindi, Sialkot, and Peshawar. Appendices 1, 2 and 3 highlight these destinations.

Outcomes of Internal Migration on Urban Growth
According to UN-Habitat report III, conglomerations of metropolitan population are significantly rising because of rural-urban migration. By 2025, almost 50 million more people will become part of urban areas. This rapid migration has added to the urban population, which has reached density threshold in almost every province of Pakistan. These shifts have raised many problems as cities can neither absorb this huge number of people nor provide employment opportunities. These changes have increased social and ethnic tensions between migrants and non-migrants in cities. Along with this, increase in size of cities, congestion, inflated prices of lands, illegal encroachment, lack of infrastructure and services, environmental degradation, terrorism, crime, man-made disasters, diseases and associated issues are equally challenging for urban developers. These challenges can be met by upgrading urban planning expertise and training urban planners, engineers, architects, land managers to follow smart city strategic plans (GoP 2015).

Similarly, vision 2025 endorses significance of urban development, as one percent increase in urbanisation can increase economic growth rate over one percent. However, horizontal expansion of cities abuses usage of space in urban centres. It not only requires vertical expansion of cities, but also requires cities to be ‘smart’ i.e., digitally connected for proposing solutions to rising urban challenges (GoP 2014).

Government Initiatives
The Punjab Agriculture Department has devised a strategy to control rapid urbanisation by focusing on higher investment in agriculture. Such an investment has the potential to increase returns and employment in agriculture reducing rural-urban migration. Similarly, Pakistan’s Intended Nationally Determined Contribution (Pak-INDC) Report also highlights the need for resilient infrastructure, improved solid waste management and public transportation facilities to cope with rising population in urban areas (GoP 2016c). Furthermore, sectorial
policies should also incorporate climate resilience to cope with climate change (Saeed et al. 2016).

In order to improve the living standard of people, the provincial governments have already initiated cheap and better housing schemes in their respective provinces. In 2016, the Punjab Chief Minister launched Apna Ghar scheme for low cost house purchase on easy instalments. Similarly, in Sindh province, Behan Benazir Basti (Benazir housing programme) in 2009 and Shaheed Benazir Bhutto housing scheme in 2013 were launched (GoP 2015). Recently, the government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa announced a housing scheme for low-paid government employees and low income general public through bank home finance. This scheme comprises 5 to 10 marla and one kanal houses that will be equipped with basic services. The housing scheme was launched to fill the demand and supply gap, which increased unplanned housing schemes. Further to this, two mega housing schemes, Peshawar Model Town, and China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) city, will be launched by the provincial government (Buneri 2017). In Balochistan, Zarghoon housing was proposed in 2008. However, there has been no housing scheme launched after it (GoP 2013).

In addition, the government is in the process of developing a national policy on slums and illegal settlements, urban renewal and slum upgradation. Town planning is also considered one of the measures recommended in the National Climate Change Policy report for urban areas. Other options are reduction in rural-to-urban migration, development of infrastructure and support to facilities in smaller agro-based and periphery of urban areas. However, problems in the implementation of such policies shows weak urban governance, which is due to lack of financial resources and weak administrative functioning of local governments (GoP 2015).

Methodology
This section outlines the target site, sample size and estimation techniques used in this study.

Study Sites
For the study, three districts namely Mardan, Faisalabad, D.G. Khan, from the semi-arid region of Pakistan were selected. The rationale was that they are considered to be facing rapid climate change, including water stress (Farooqi et al. 2005). In fact, the semi-arid regions are in the phase of development since many decades which is further aggravated by climate change and extreme events (Arab Water Council 2009). Therefore, semi-arid regions were chosen for observation pre-
and post-internal migration issues, and the role of institutions in addressing urbanisation and internal migration in these districts.

**Figure 2: Urban Areas of Study Site**

Source: Authors’ own.

**Data Collection**

The study is based on a sample of 45 migrants, comprising 9 females and 36 male respondents, now living in cities. In each district, 15 interviews of migrants belonging to different occupation groups were conducted. The selection criteria of these migrants was based on two components. First, they should have migrated recently (i.e., less than 5 years). Secondly, they should have migrated from rural area of the same district, which is in line with internal migration. Moreover, in order to get a detailed idea of the issue, migrants were selected from different professions such as labour, business and job-holders. The study was based on qualitative tools: in-depth interviews of urban respondents and five Key Informant Interviews (KII).
The length of in-depth interviews was almost 30-45 minutes. These were transcribed and then analysed through thematic content analysis.

**Key Informant Interviews (KIIs)**
In total, eight KIIs were conducted from representatives of Faisalabad Development Authority (FDA), Mardan Development Authority (MDA), Ministry of Climate Change (MoCC), Ministry of Planning, Development and Reform, District Office Agriculture (DOA), and Pakistan Institute of Development Economics (PIDE). These multiple interviews were conducted to get updated information about initiatives of government departments in the rural economy and issues related to internal migration.

**Results and Discussion**
This section discusses the push-pull factors of migration, highlighting issues and opportunities introduced by migration, and institutional gaps in dealing with the management of urbanisation.

**Push Factors for Urbanisation**
The major push factors for migration were lack of suitable employment opportunities and educational facilities in rural areas. Other important factors included lack of infrastructure, health facilities, business opportunities, conflicts, and death of family members:

![Figure 3: Push Factors for Migration (%)](image)

Source: Study findings.
Results show that in Faisalabad, lack of business and employment opportunities in rural areas was the major push factor behind migration. Other push factors responsible for migration included lack of educational facilities and death of a family member. In D.G. Khan, lack of suitable employment/job opportunities and business opportunities were the major push factors. Other factors were lack of educational and health facilities. In Mardan, both lack of educational and employment opportunities were major push factors. Another reason for migration was conflict, which forced people to migrate to urban areas. The major push factor described by development authorities for rapid urbanisation was lack of access to basic facilities such as access to education, health services and employment.

**Climate-Induced Migration**
Apart from the aforementioned factors, climate change was found to be an emerging push factor responsible for migration of people, albeit indirectly. As such, climate change has increased stress on income sources:

![Figure 4: Impact of Climate Change on Migration Decision](image)

*Source: Study findings.*

Among these districts, respondents from D.G. Khan reported climate-induced migration as compared to the other districts. Climate change was found to be negatively affecting income sources and health of individuals. Agriculture was adversely affected by it due to changes in rainfall schedules. Irregular rain events destroyed wheat crop during harvesting time. Another negative impact was lack of rains which increased pest attacks. This change especially affected cotton crops, reduced productivity and raised the cost of cropping inputs.

Apart from crops, limited rainfall also caused reduction in fodder, which negatively affected livestock. This situation resulted in increased nomadic trips to feed...
animals. Another change was an increase in the number of hot days and heat stress. In order to cope, families shifted to larger houses from smaller ones. Along with that the respondents, who laboured in factories, said that they were unable to continue their jobs due to the heat stress, therefore, they quit their professions and switched to businesses or comparatively less heat-stress options.

Incidences of climatic-induced disasters like floods have also reportedly increased, therefore, resulting in heavy losses to crops, infrastructure, and private property. An urban respondent from D.G. Khan said:

Owing to floods, salinity increased in soil, which diminished its productivity, so I had the only choice, i.e., to switch over a new profession and migrate to the city area.

Extreme climate events have also affected the business sector, including small businesses and construction industry. Moreover, changes in the monsoon season have resulted in fewer rainy days and as such have increased the number of working days available for businesses and labourers.

Agriculture and business sectors of Faisalabad district were also negatively affected by climate change. Increase in heat and reduction in rainfall were reported to be responsible for lower crop productivity. Similarly, business sectors were also affected by climate change in different ways. The pharmaceuticals business sale increased with lower rainfall because of increased health viral issues in the community such as flu, cough and fever. Contrary to pharmaceuticals, labour involved in fabric industries said their working hours had reduced after the demand for warm clothes decreased, ultimately resulting in financial stress on the labour class.

In Mardan, climate change was reported by very few urban respondents as a driver of migration. Some respondents mentioned indirect pathways through which climate change impacted their livelihoods. For instance, a rickshaw driver (respondent) said that due to excessive or uncertain rains, travel to his village had reduced. Rains have become responsible for commutation problems and increased the cost of vehicle maintenance. Therefore, it was also one of the reasons for migration to urban areas by the respondent for avoiding such disturbances. Other respondents said that these climatic changes were considered very sensitive for casual agriculture labour and that associated with plant nurseries. Owing to consistent impact, they highlighted its influence on migration decision in terms of search for better employment opportunities in the cities.
The issue of climate change was also discussed with key representatives of concerned governmental organisations. The acceptance of stakeholders vis-à-vis impact of climate change on the economy proves it to be one of the emerging push factors for internal migration. The viewpoints of experts from District Office Agriculture (DOA) of Mardan, Faisalabad, and D.G. Khan also support existence of this issue in influencing the migration decision of people. According to them, climate change has affected the agriculture sector, which is responsible for changes in crop productivity. Increase in unseasonal or lack of rains especially caused loss to crops, such as cotton and wheat. Additionally, drought has further reduced crop yield in past five to six years in all these districts. Another challenge is water shortage which is also affecting wheat crop in rain-fed areas. Lack of variety of seeds or fertilizers has aggravated the coping mechanisms to deal with climatic changes.

The viewpoint of DOA was supported by the representative of Urban Unit in the Federal Ministry of Climate Change (MoCC), who said that climate change has significantly affected the whole economy, especially agriculture. The KIIs, with academicians from the Pakistan Institute of Development Economics (PIDE), further strengthened the aforementioned stakeholder responses. They confirmed the existence of climate-induced migration in Pakistan, especially in arid areas like Tharparkar, Sindh.

The representative of Population Unit of Ministry of Planning, Development and Reform reported that there are two major reasons for rapid urbanisation in the world, namely, natural birth rate and rural-to-urban migration. Out of these two, rural-urban migration is a major contributor. The push factors for such rise of urbanisation, as described by the Development Authority include lack of basic facilities, especially health, education and transportation, in rural areas that force people to migrate to cities, creating negative pressure on urban areas. The solution lies in the provision and improvement of basic facilities in rural areas. Faisalabad Development Authority (FDA) is in the implementation phase of such a master plan which started in 2015 and will be completed in 2035. This master plan has been developed by the Urban Unit for planning. This project defines structure of peri-urban, and urban areas implemented by the City District Development authorities in Punjab. Similarly, Mardan Development Authority shared that the number of government housing schemes and private towns has increased due to increase in population during the past ten years.

In the context of agriculture, representative of the DOA said the determinants of rapid urbanisation force people in rural areas to migrate. Marketing issues are common for farmers as cost of production is rising which reduces their earnings. For
example, farmers are unable to recover their cost of sugarcane from sugar-mills on time. Other negative issues are saline soil, scrap reclamation, poor quality of underground or tube-well water, limited availability of canal water, and limited agricultural land due to rapid industrialisation. Similarly, representatives from PIDE said that lack of facilities in rural areas has triggered urbanisation. Permanent migration occurs due to search for employment or opportunities to start a new business, while temporary migration is occurring due to conflicts or security issues. In addition, there are many people who are unable to migrate due to lack of affordability since they are unable to live in central city areas which are too expensive for them.

**Pull Factors for Urbanisation**

The major pull factors for migrants were access to basic facilities, better employment or business opportunities, proximity to village, presence of social networks like friends, family members or relatives, and secure jobs in cities. Figure 5 highlights the major and minor pull factors for migrants:

![Figure 5: Pull Factors for Migration (%)](chart.png)

Source: Study findings.

The pull factors as described by the respondents were similar across all the select districts. In Faisalabad, access to basic facilities (road, transport), proximity to village, and availability of jobs were major pull factors. Other factors included presence of family relatives, and friends, and better employment opportunities. In
D.G. Khan, access to basic facilities, presence of both relatives and friends, and availability of better employment opportunities were the main reasons for migration. In Mardan, proximity to village and better employment/business opportunities were considered major pull factors. Availability of better education institutes was also cited as an important reason. From the data, it is clear that push factors are more than pull factors which means that the former are forcing people living in rural areas to migrate to urban areas.

**Outcomes of Migration**

A majority of migrants (87 percent) agreed that they have faced certain hurdles after migration. Figure 6 provides details of migration hurdles that were major causes of lack of satisfaction in the selected districts:

![Figure 6: Problems Faced after Migration (%)](source: Study findings)

- Dera Ghazi Khan
- Faisalabad
- Mardan
Urban residents reported that major problems after settling in cities were lack of proper accommodation and social networking. Other issues included were job search, lack of access to clean drinking water, homesickness, asymmetric information about access to other services, pollution and increased responsibilities for managing home.

For D.G. Khan, a majority of urban residents described the same problems after migration as faced by urban residents of Faisalabad: lack of proper accommodation, social networking, homesickness, guarantor issues for residence, congested city environment, loadshedding, high rents, limited income, poor sanitation and drainage services, shifting luggage due to lack of transportation and road facilities in rural areas. Figure 6 indicates that some respondents of Mardan faced no issue after settlement in urban areas. Apart from those, few respondents mentioned lack of proper accommodation, higher house rents, homesickness and social networking issues in setting up business, and job search as problems faced by them. Along with that, migrants said providing guarantor was a big issue while trying to rent a house. Owing to lack of social networking, this was reported as a major issue in settlement in urban areas. Despite facing such difficulties, all the respondents saw improvement in their overall living standards after migration.

The major reason for migration problems was lack of urban planning. This argument was supported by KIIIs who discussed significance of planned and unplanned migration. The academicians from PIDE explained that mega cities are an outcome of rapid urbanisation which requires effective governance. The existence of unplanned urbanisation can be seen in the form of environmental degradation, lack of proper services provision such as sanitation and solid waste management services. Along with these problems, another research highlights unplanned urbanisation increasing problems like poor housing quality and affordability, transport, health, education, and land management (Shaikh and Nabi 2017).

The reasons for lack of better services provision was explained by the development authorities of Faisalabad and Mardan. First, there is a lack of internal migration policy for managing and controlling rapid urbanisation. The Ministry of Overseas Pakistanis only deals with international migration and has nothing to do with internal migration. Management of migration requires a platform that can regularise private construction and builders under development authorities. The major barrier behind planned urbanisation is the lack of coordination between development authorities and other service providers for electricity, gas, water and sanitation. The major reasons for lack of coordination were absence of mandate, political support, resource insufficiency and lack of authority. These contribute to inefficiency of
development authorities in dealing with planned urbanisation. Therefore, this lack of coordination within development authorities is one of the major reasons for unplanned urbanisation or creation of slums. A representative of the development authority said:

Earlier, No Objection Certificate (NOC) from Taluka/Tehsil Municipal Administration was a must for an organisation (such as Water and Power Development Authority, Communication and Works, Public Health, and others) before it started development works. Nowadays, these service providers donot get NOCs as there is a lack of coordination among different departments which results in financial losses. We are trying to regulate them but there is no control on people and service providers. For example, one of the duties of the development authority is to construct roads, whereas Water and Sanitation Authority (WASA) is excluded from the process. So, roads are dug up to inlay sanitation and drinking water pipelines without consulting the development authority. This lack of coordination results in heavy financial losses.

Such concerns of development authorities are important to address rapid and haphazard settlement of migrants from rural-to-urban areas. If these concerns are properly addressed they can reduce institutional vulnerabilities and improve urban planning.

**Conclusion and Recommendations**

This study was conducted to understand internal migration through push and pull factors, outcomes of internal migration and institutional vulnerability in dealing with urbanisation problems. The results show that common push factors are lack of employment and business opportunities in rural areas. Minor push factors are lack of infrastructure for sanitation, drainage system, roads, and transport. A few also reported deaths of family/relatives, conflict with other tribes and lack of health facilities as push factors in Faisalabad, Mardan, and D.G. Khan, respectively. Apart from common push factors, climate change was cited as an indirect reason which influenced the decision to migrate. Climate change negatively impacted agriculture and non-agriculture income of individuals, which ultimately forced people to migrate and find alternate means of income in urban areas. The number of respondents from D.G. Khan was higher than the remaining districts who reported that climate change impacted their decision to migrate in some way. The pull factors reported by urban migrants were almost common in all districts: better employment opportunities, proximity to their village (hometown) and access to
basic facilities (educational facilities, hospitals, road and transport and sanitation, etc.).

The negative outcomes of internal migration include congested environment of cities, lack of proper accommodation, impure drinking water, guarantor issues, employment/setting up business and lack of availability of information about public services. Amid such issues, urban migrants still consider significant improvement in their living standard after migration. These urban problems occur due to unplanned urbanisation, lack of internal migration policy for monitoring issues of new rural-to-urban settlers and lack of mandate to development authorities for taking action against service providers and private builders for not following urban planning. In the light of above discussion, the government needs to consider the following recommendations:

- Initiate rural development and capacity building programmes on agriculture smart practices.
- Develop a joint coordination unit at the district level for removing coordination gaps between public service providers and development authorities for appropriate land use.
- Develop an institution to register rural-to-urban migrants that may help them provide information related to employment or business setup. It should also focus on reasons, dynamics and solutions for internal migrants.
- Set up new industrial units in peri-urban areas near villages that will reduce pressure on urban areas by rural employment seekers.
References


GoP 2016c, ‘Pakistan’s Intended Nationally Determined Contributions, PAK-INDC’, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad, <http://www4.unfccc.int/Submissions/INDC/Published%20Documents/Pakistan/1/PAK-INDC.pdf> [Accessed 5 October 2017].


Appendix 1:

Migration Destinations of Faisalabad’s Migrants

Appendix 2:

Migration Destinations of Mardan’s Migrants

Appendix 3:

Migration Destinations of D.G. Khan’s Migrants

Pakistan and the Digital Economy: Future Directions*
Parvez Iftikhar**

Abstract
While there are a number of aspects that should be addressed to use Information Communication Technologies (ICTs) to serve society as a whole, this chapter focuses on how Pakistan can achieve its share in the rapidly growing pie of Digital Economy (DE), which is a transition of the traditional economy to one which uses digital technologies for the same purpose. It is not just part of the economy, it is the economy now. It is also called the ‘Internet Economy’ because everything happens over the Internet with the help of smartphones, computers, applications and software. The services created through the Internet revolution are creating new businesses, including the largest businesses of our times like Amazon, Facebook, Google, Netflix, Uber, Alibaba, etc. The arrival of Internet of Things (IOT), Artificial Intelligence (AI), and 3D printing have further brought the DE out in the open.

Pakistan’s current ranking at 147 in the World Bank’s (2017) Ease of Doing Business does not inspire a lot of confidence among overseas investors, which has a lot to do with lack of digitalisation of the country’s economy. Unfortunately, no authentic data is available regarding the size of Pakistan’s digital economy, but rough estimates place it at USD 100 million, which is pitifully small. This chapter will attempt to suggest what policies will have to be re-shaped, and what steps need to be taken so that ICTs play their role in overcoming the challenges confronting Pakistan that are preventing the country from joining the developed world in enjoying the benefits of the DE.

* This chapter has been approved as a Working Paper by the referee.
** Mr Parvez Iftikhar has over 40 years of experience in Information Communication Technologies (ICTs). He is presently working as an ICT consultant advising the administration and regulators of various countries in Asia and Africa on ICT policy and regulatory issues. He has also been the country head of Siemens Pakistan Telecom.
Introduction
The President of Internet Society, Kathryn Brown, blogged on 7 April 2017:

The Internet is set to contribute USD 6.6 trillion a year, or 7.1 percent of the total GDP in the G20 countries.

The Digital Economy (DE) is the transition of traditional economy to one which uses digital technologies for the same purpose. The arrival of Internet of Things (IOT), Artificial Intelligence (AI), and 3D printing have further brought the DE to the forefront. Its contribution to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of countries where the Internet is extensively used in businesses is rapidly increasing. According to E-commerce Foundation (2016) and the World Bank, the global eGDP’s contribution rose from 1.34 percent in 2011 to 3.11 percent in 2015 (Figure 1):

![Figure 1: Contribution of eGDP to the Global GDP (%)](source:E-commerce Foundation 2016:7)

A study by KPMG-India\(^1\) and Google (2017) shows that higher uptake of digital technologies by small businesses could help increase their contribution to India’s GDP by 10 percentage points, taking it up to 46 – 48 percent by 2020. Such an economy is also called the ‘Internet Economy’ as everything happens over the Internet, with the help of smart phones, computers, software and applications. The services, which are being created through the Internet revolution, are creating new businesses, including the largest businesses of our times, like Amazon\(^\text{TM}\), Facebook\(^\text{TM}\), Google\(^\text{TM}\), Alibaba\(^\text{TM}\), Apple\(^\text{TM}\), etc. Thanks to the Internet, even the smallest enterprises can become global now. E-commerce is facilitating global

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\(^1\) KPMG (Klynveld Peat Marwick Goerdeler) is one of top four accounting firms in the world, dealing with audit, tax and advisory services.
businesses in a way that borders are becoming irrelevant. According to a report, ‘Currently, there are 360 million people that take part in cross-border e-commerce’ and tens of millions of small and midsize enterprises worldwide have become exporters through e-commerce marketplaces such as Alibaba™, Amazon™, eBay™, Flipkart™ and Daraz™ amounting to 12 percent of the global trade. Some 86 percent of tech-based start-ups surveyed by the McKinsey Global Institute are involved in some type of cross-border trade. As a result of this, the Internet bandwidth that is used across the borders grew 45 times from 2005 to 2014 (McKinsey & Company 2016: 48):

Figure 2: Internet Bandwidth across Borders in 2005 and 2014

Transitioning to digital or ‘digitalisation’ means that enterprises conduct their businesses electronically – starting with such basics as spreadsheets for accounts, word processors for correspondence, and emails for communications. It also means using instant communication applications like WhatsApp™, and Skype™, browsing the net and downloading useful information about products, markets and technologies, etc., and filling out electronic forms to apply for permissions/visas and
taxes/customs, etc. This does not stop here. Digitalisation goes far beyond helping in performance of everyday tasks. It also makes geographical boundaries irrelevant and helps expanding new businesses at a much higher speed and far beyond the home base. It has been established that 51 percent small enterprises expand their businesses beyond their hometowns if they are digitally enabled – as against 28 percent if they remain off-line (KPMG-India and Google 2017:18). The study also shows that Internet adoption and digitalisation helps small businesses grow up to two times faster.

**Why Transition to Digital Economy?**

Digitalisation allows creation of entirely new business models, involving very little or no capital. An example of such a new e-business model is Airbnb™, which is the world’s largest hospitality service that enables people to rent online, lodgings for short-term stay. The company does not own any lodging of its own, it is just a broker and gets percentage service commissions from both the owners of the places as well as the guests. Same is the case with the world’s largest ride-hailing service Uber™ that does not own any vehicles of its own; and the world’s largest movie distributor Netflix™ that does not own any movie houses, and so on.

Digitalisation of an enterprise, through the always-on connectivity of broadband Internet allows monitoring of enterprise workers almost on a minute-to-minute basis. This is important when workers have to be tracked and managed in real-time, with location tracking and geo-fencing to match any business needs – for instance, if the customers expect immediate response, like in the case of travel agents, or where the worker health and safety is an issue. It also eases implementation and use of modern business tools like Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) and Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP). Digitalisation of processes integrates development of the product right from the start, through production, supply chain and aftersales. This enables real-time availability of the data regarding operations and quality management to customers and all key value chain partners. A digital enterprise attracts the best available talent and retains it. This is because the brightest minds, coming out of colleges and universities, are used to – and therefore like to - work with digital tools.

Another important benefit is that digitalisation makes it possible for the buyers to instantly post reviews of the product/service whenever something is bought online. A cursory glance at the large number of reviews posted by buyers against products in online stores shows that this instant review system is immensely popular in online buyers. It is more believable for potential customers as the reviews come directly from fellow customers. For enterprises, this is a way of marketing products at
practically no cost. There are numerous other benefits of transitioning to digitalisation apart from the ones discussed above.

Isn’t Digitalisation Financially Burdensome?
Not too long ago, Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) were constrained by financial considerations and lack of in-house technical expertise to transform. Therefore, they could not convert their businesses to digital. An enterprise had to first procure computer servers and software programmes, and then employ skilled IT human resource to operate and maintain all of that. In addition, there used to be unpredictable recurring software upgrade costs. All that has changed. Now the enterprises do not have to make any upfront capital expenditures, neither do they have to hire full-time expensive technical hands. The application software packages run on computer platforms of specialised service providers at remote locations, to which access is possible over broadband Internet. The enterprise may even store its data on the data storage space available with the same, or another, service provider. This arrangement overall is known as Cloud Computing.

Figure 3: Different Elements of Cloud Computing

Source: Author’s own compilation.
Using cloud computing, the enterprise pays a fixed (therefore, predictable) amount on a monthly or quarterly basis to the specialised Cloud service provider. For any seasonal expansions in the system, or in the data storage capacity, one pays as one needs. The software and any other services (like data storage) become available to the enterprise over the Internet as if it was residing in-house. Using services from the Cloud eliminates the need of having any in-house installations, therefore, no upfront Capital Expenditure (CAPEX) investments are required. Enterprises can access these services from anywhere, over broadband via laptops, tablets and smart phones.

Just a few years ago, most enterprises (even in more developed economies) were hesitant to change and start relying upon the Cloud – particularly in storing their vital data at remotely located infrastructures. However, with increasingly reliable ICT systems, modern enterprises are adapting to cloud-based systems faster than ever. According to IDG’s Enterprise Cloud Computing Survey, at least 70 percent of American organisations use cloud-based applications. In November 2016, International Data Corporation (IDC) predicted:

By 2020, 67 percent of all enterprise IT infrastructure and software spending will be for cloud-based offerings (Gens et al. 2016: 7).

Figure 4: Year-on-Year Growth of Fully Engaged Enterprises vs. Offline Enterprises (%)


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2 International Data Corporation (IDC), and its off-shoot International Data Group (IDG) are among the most prominent and prestigious market intelligence firms for IT and Telecom services, with hundreds of analysts all over the world.
The reason due to which so many enterprises worldwide are adopting digitalisation is that it results in massive gains. According to an analysis of Information Technology Operations and Services (ITOPS) with primary data collected by Kantar IMRB, carried out in 2016, typically year-on-year growth of an enterprise that is digitally engaged is nearly twice as compared to one that is not (i.e. is offline).

Isn’t there a Dark Side of the Internet?

Trusting third parties with one’s valuable assets is never easy. Rural people still have problems with the idea of keeping their savings in banks. In case of the Cloud, it is even more critical because of the dark side of the Internet, which relates to security and privacy. With increasing number of cyberattacks, the growing expertise of hackers and the thriving black market for stolen data are all big barriers against going digital. Keeping data as ‘ransom’ is a new addition to all this. The virus that was unleashed in May 2017, in nearly a 100 countries, locked data stored on computers of hundreds of companies, only to release it after getting a ransom paid by the owners of the data.

Figure 5: Media Headlines of Ransomware Cyberattacks (May 2017)

Source: Author’s own compilation.

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Kantar IMRB (Indian Market Research Bureau), modeled on lines of the British Market Research Bureau, is a renowned market research and survey firm having operations in 15 countries.
As demonstrated by several studies, such challenges have failed to subdue the rapid adoption of digital technologies. It is apparent that digitalisation is not just a ‘good-to-have’ anymore, it is a ‘must-have’.

Where Does Pakistan Stand?
Unfortunately, no authentic data is available regarding the size of Pakistan’s DE, but rough estimates by experts place it at USD 100 million, which is pitifully small. However, as far as digital connectedness is concerned, there are healthy signs. As given by Pakistan Telecommunications Authority (PTA), there were 58 million broadband Internet subscriptions in June 2018 (PTA 2018). With rapid growth of connectedness, DE has the potential of jumping to USD 2-5 billion by 2020 (Hamid and Khalid 2016: 273-312).

How to Get There?
The World Economic Forum (2016a) assesses factors, policies and institutions that enable a country to leverage IT for increased competitiveness. WEF calls it ‘Network Readiness’. Pakistan’s network readiness score given by WEF is 3.4 (out of 7), and the sub-indices that relate to technology adoption/usage by the government and the enterprise sector are 3.3 and 3.2, respectively (Figure 6):

![Figure 6: Pakistan’s Network Readiness Index](image)

Source: WEF 2016a.

When Pakistan’s sub-index of usage/adoption is seen against some comparable countries, the country shows a lag in usage of technology in government and
Enterprises. Refer to the comparison in Table 1 which also includes the top-rated country, i.e., Singapore:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Overall Rank</th>
<th>Overall Readiness Index</th>
<th>Digital Adoption/Usage Sub-Indices</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: WEF 2016b.

The above mentioned potential can only be realised if business operations are transformed to digital, and IT is adopted by enterprises. This has to be led by the government itself. This does not seem to be the case in Pakistan.

Coming to the enterprises, the bigger ones have more exposure and opportunities, and thus, they are not only aware but also have the necessary resources to transform. It is the SMEs that lag behind in making use of digital tools in their businesses - other than social media, email and spreadsheets. The impact of SMEs on the nation’s economy is huge. According to Small and Medium Enterprises Development Authority (SMEDA), SMEs constitute nearly 90 percent of all the enterprises in Pakistan; employ 80 percent of the non-agricultural labour force; and their share in the annual GDP is approximately 40 percent (GoP n.d.). According to the 2005 Economic Census of Pakistan, there were around 3 million small private enterprises - in the industrial, services and trade sectors. This number is well above that now.

The Government of Pakistan (GoP) created SMEDA over a decade ago to foster growth of SMEs by skill development through training, industry support for productivity enhancement, and business development services. However, there has been no change in its priorities to include digitalisation. The Pakistan Economic
Pakistan and the Digital Economy: Future Directions

Survey 2017 concedes:

In Pakistan, lack of infrastructural development and technology are the major constraints that hinder SME productivity and competitiveness (GoP 2017: 54).

Unfortunately, if the projects that SMEDA has been implementing lately across the country are checked, digitalisation is not on the list. The result is that most SMEs are not even aware as to what benefits the adoption of digital technology could bring them. Lack of awareness is not unique to Pakistan. It is a global phenomenon. According to a 2016 analysis, 92 percent of SMEs are victims of some kind of lack of awareness about digitalisation (KPMG–India and Google 2017):

![Figure 7: Enterprises Reasons for Non-Adoption of DE (%)](image)


In October 2016, Pakistan’s Ministry of Science and Technology launched a project with SMEDA called ‘Certification Incentive Program for SMEs under Productivity, Quality and Invention (PQI) Initiative 2025’ (GoP 2016), consisting of a series of awareness seminars and consultative meetings and workshops with stakeholder trade associations. But, there are no programmes visible that target awareness about ICTs or digitalisation by the SMEs.

Once there is awareness among a certain critical number of SMEs, many others are likely to start picking up from each other. A January 2017 survey found that in India, 38 percent of SMEs indicated that they rely on each other to learn (Facebook, OECD and WB 2017).
It is not that the decision-makers in Pakistan are unaware of this. In the National Financial Inclusion Strategy (NFIS), this was recognised way back in May 2015. The Framework of Action, given in the NFIS, declares ICT infrastructure as one of the enablers, and digitising payments as one of the drivers (see ‘DRIVER 1’ and ‘ENABLER 4’ in Figure 8):

Figure 8: Drivers and Enablers of Pakistan’s National Financial Inclusion Strategy

Are Cloud-based Services Available in Pakistan?
In order to provide Cloud services, there are professional System Aggregator companies which offer packages of collaboration software tools over the Cloud to business verticals like clinics, travel agencies, schools, retail outlets, small-scale manufacturers, restaurants, and workshops, etc. Some of the service providers of such cloud-based services in Pakistan are Cisco, Insyabi (formerly Siemens Enterprise Solutions), Microsoft, etc. Firms like these also customise those software packages according to individual requirements, and even help the SMEs run them.

Similarly, to connect the SMEs over the Cloud, there are the last-mile Internet access providers - the Fixed Internet Service Providers and the Mobile Broadband

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4 The NFI Strategy was adopted by the Government of Pakistan with the objective to set a national vision for achieving universal financial inclusion in the country.
Operators. With access to more than 47 million broadband subscribers, which obviously include all the SMEs, the mobile broadband operators could also create mass awareness relatively easily. With dwindling revenues from voice calls, and the tariffs of consumer data also not promising reasonable returns, delivering cloud-based services is definitely worthy of serious consideration.

**Conclusion and Recommendations**

The Digital Economy is the future and Pakistan needs to start preparing for it. As to catering for cyber security, compared with the rest of the world, Pakistan belongs to that set of 10 percent countries which do not have the necessary legislation for data protection and privacy (57 percent countries do have such legislation). This was reported in the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) November 2017 Report (Figure 9):

![Figure 9: Worldwide Data Protection and Legislation](source)

Cyber security is important for many other reasons too, as any slackness here can jeopardise working of power plants, power transmission systems, telecommunication networks, airports, and the electronic media, etc. In conclusion, some essential recommendations are as follows:

1. **The Government** must lead the way by increasing its own use of IT. The step will not only encourage private businesses, but also increase the size of the domestic market of digital products and services, thus, creating more businesses and employment opportunities.
2. **Awareness** of SMEs needs to be raised - that transforming their businesses to digital has significant advantages, and is also not financially challenging. Organisations like SMEDA, Chambers of Commerce, and most importantly, mobile broadband operators need to create the necessary awareness.

3. **Mobile Broadband Operators** need to be encouraged to make it part of their business strategies to become conduits and facilitators between SMEs and cloud-based digital services. They have to start by creating awareness, as stated above. Any obstacles (like high and unpredictable taxation) in achieving this goal will need to be rectified by the government.

4. **Skill Development** organisations like the Technical Education and Vocational Training Authority (TEVTA) should be equipped for imparting ICT skills necessary for the SMEs to adopt digitalisation. Similarly, FinTech-related enterprises like Karandaaz could play their role.

5. **Cyber security** is an area where policy level work still needs to be done in Pakistan. The government, with all stakeholders, should develop a comprehensive Cyber Security Policy and strategy together with an implementation plan.

6. **Tax incentives** always play a significant role in shaping the way the economy functions. The federal and provincial governments may find it difficult initially as it appears to be a losing proposition, but as various studies quoted above demonstrate, any transformation to digitalisation will help the economy, and bridge any temporary deficits.

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5 Karandaaz Pakistan (karandaaz.com.pk), a not-for-profit development finance company established in 2014 promotes access to finance for small businesses through commercially directed investments.
References


Information and Telecommunications Journey in Pakistan: Looking Ahead
Manzoor Ahmad

Abstract
Information Communication Technologies (ICTs) have revolutionised the way modern societies work and live. ICT has helped many developing countries tackle their health, education and governance challenges. During the last 70 years, there have been periods when Pakistan made strides in promoting the use of ICT. These include deregulation of telecom services, opening up of the cellular mobile services to new players in 2003-04; and introduction of mobile broadband 3G/4G technologies in 2014. Each time such measures were taken, the ICT sector attracted substantial Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). However, there have also been periods when the government’s policy of standing still or even retrogressive policies as happened from 2008 to 2013 had a rather negative impact on ICT development, and consequential FDI. This chapter analyses the past, present and future journey of ICT in Pakistan. Overall, Pakistan seems to have made good progress, but when compared with other developing states, the country is seriously lagging behind. This chapter suggests some steps such as rationalisation of taxes on ICT goods and services and other regulatory measures that can be taken to enable Pakistan to catch-up with its peers.

* This chapter has been approved as a Policy Brief by the referee.
** Dr Manzoor Ahmad is Senior Fellow, International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development, Geneva, Switzerland; and also served as Pakistan’s Ambassador to the World Trade Organization (WTO) from 2002-08.
Introduction
If Pakistan’s ICT journey so far was to be described in a chronological order, it will fall into six major phases with certain overlaps. The first is from 1947 to 1965. During these 20 years, ICT was restricted to a limited number of telephone lines and telex machines. Telephone connections were very scarce and only available to highly influential people. There were quotas for certain sectors and professions, such as hospitals, police, fire stations, and parliamentarians, etc. The next 20 years or the second phase was from the mid-1960s to mid-1980s. It started with the appearance of second generation mainframe computers. Major public companies such as Pakistan International Airlines (PIA), Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA), commercial banks and a few leading universities installed IBM 360. During this period, not only were computers very expensive, the import license procedure was also cumbersome. There used to be an import committee of three ministries which scrutinised each application and determined whether or not the concerned organisation really needed a computer.

During the third phase starting from early 1990s, there was considerable liberalisation. Import restrictions were removed and import taxes on computers were decreased. During this time, desktops, pagers and mobile phones started making inroads. Dial-up internet services were launched. Pakistan Telecommunication Company Ltd (PTCL) began offering access via the nationwide local call dialup network in 1995. This may be considered the first major step towards entering the Information Technology (IT) age.

The big jump came in the next or the fourth phase starting from 2003-04. It began with the deregulation of telecom services. This was followed by opening up of the cellular mobile services to new players and announcement of a new Broadband Policy. Earlier in 2001, the government had also removed all import duties on IT products. As a result, telecom became the fastest growing sector in Pakistan. Within the next five years, teledensity figures jumped from 4 percent in 2003 to over 50 percent by 2008 (PTA 2010). Similarly, coverage of telecommunication services increased to around 70 percent of the population during this period. As a result of this, it is estimated that contribution of the telecom sector to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) reached 2 percent.

Unfortunately, there was limited progress during the fifth phase or the period from 2008-13. FDI, which had been climbing gradually reached a low of USD 813 million in 2011-12. During these years, most countries moved on to 3G and 4G technologies. Thus, the gap between Pakistan and other developing countries for applicability of Internet services further widened. Some other retrogressive steps
such as establishment of an International Clearing House (ICH) in August 2012 for all incoming international calls to Pakistan through a single gateway exchange, eliminated competition from the market. Because of this measure, not only did the call rates to Pakistan increase several folds, but it also led to an unprecedented rise in grey traffic. ‘The legal traffic that stood at almost two billion minutes per month immediately before introduction of ICH regime, dropped to less than 400 million minutes per month by June 2014.’ According to a government estimate, this resulted in an estimated loss of USD 4 billion to the national exchequer (The News 2015).

The sixth or the current phase started with the introduction of mobile broadband 3G/4G Long Term Evolution (LTE) technologies in 2014. Over the past three years, this has enabled Pakistan to catch up with other countries. The number of cellular subscribers increased from 120 million in 2012-13 to over 141 million in 2017 with a teledensity of 70 percent (PTA 2017). Similarly, the number of broadband subscribers increased and reached 48 million with a teledensity of 22 percent, having risen from a mere three percent in 2014.

**Present Status**

Although there has been a sharp increase in the number of global Internet users since the beginning of the millennium, having jumped from 134,000 or less than 0.1 percent of the population to over 40 million (25 percent), Pakistan still lags behind the Asian average of 45.6 percent. Even compared to other South Asian states, the country’s performance is much lower. For example, the comparative figure of Internet users for Bangladesh is 38.9 percent and India is 36.5 percent (Internet World Stats 2017).

Pakistan is ranked at 148 out of 175 countries in the ICT Development Index (ITC 2017) - the lowest ranking among South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) countries and lower than many Least Developed Countries such as Lesotho (133), Zimbabwe (136) and Sudan (145). Similarly, Pakistan is ranked at 156 out 192 countries for mobile broadband subscriptions per 100 capita.

If one looks at the readiness to engage in online commerce, Pakistan is ranked 105th out of 137 countries on the 2016 UNCTAD’s B2C E-Commerce Index. This is actually a drop in Pakistan’s position compared to the rank of 86 in 2014’ (UNCTAD 2016).
Pakistan’s e-commerce industry is valued at a mere USD 100 million, whereas India’s e-commerce transactions are valued at USD 12 billion, China’s at USD 466 billion and the European Union’s at USD 487 billion (Aziz 2017).

There is a World Trade Organization (WTO) Plurilateral Agreement, known as Information Technology Agreement (ITA), which obliges elimination of tariffs on all IT-related products for its members. This agreement was concluded in 1996 by 29 countries, but now 82 countries, including most Islamic countries (who were late comers to the WTO regime) are parties to the ITA that covers over 97 percent of world trade of IT products (WTO n.d.). Pakistan is one of the few developing countries that have continued to stay away from this international club of IT promoters. The reason cited is ‘loss’ of some customs duties approximately USD 400 million per annum which is collected on computers and other IT goods. What is not being realised is the losses being incurred and opportunity being lost by not being a part of the global IT club. For example, a recent study by the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation (ITIF) concluded that if Pakistan were to join the ITA, its ITC exports would increase by 37 percent, its share in the economy would increase, and make the country an attractive location for ICT goods and services producers and exporters. The study further estimates that over a ten-year period, joining the ITA would bolster Pakistan’s economic growth by an estimated 1.30 percent.

**Looking Ahead**

Pakistan is committed to making Internet available to every other person over the next three years in conformity with ITU Connect 2020 Resolve. The question is whether or not Pakistan will meet this target. While there are many challenges, the laying down of the Pakistan-China Fibre Optic Project under the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) project will give a big boost in achieving this commitment. Already work on the 820-kilometre long optical fiber cable from Khunjerab Pass to Islamabad has been completed at an estimated cost of USD 44 million. The cable will be further extended to Gwadar and will connect with the Transit Europe-Asia Terrestrial Cable Network. This will considerably improve Internet penetration and increase its speed, especially in Balochistan and Gilgit-Baltistan regions where Internet connectivity has ranged from poor to non-existent. It should also reduce the cost of Internet connections. Also, if Pakistan can improve its utilisation of the Universal Service Fund (USF), which was established through the contribution of telecom networks, it could also greatly improve connectivity in rural and remote areas. The Fund has been very successful in implementing various
projects serving underprivileged areas. However, since 2008, there have not been any worthwhile schemes under this programme.

It seems that the telecom sector is being treated like the proverbial hen that laid golden eggs and was slaughtered by the greedy farmer to get all the eggs in one go. Already mobile operators in Pakistan pay more than USD1.2 billion in taxes each year, representing about 30 percent of total revenues in the sector. In a survey in Pakistan, which is the third highest level of taxation found in a sample of 111 countries (Deloitte 2015).

**Conclusion and Recommendations**
The Internet, which is often hailed as ‘The Great Equalizer’, offers a great opportunity. With several forward-looking policy goals in the new Telecom Policy approved in 2017, Pakistan has an opportunity to catch up. The government should ensure that its commitment to International Telecom Union Connect 2020 Resolve is not treated the way that the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) were. Unfortunately, the government does not consider telephone service a basic necessity rather a luxury, and has a tax structure reflecting this philosophy. Whenever it picks any items for additional luxury import tax, mobile phones are on top of the list. Also, Pakistan is perhaps the only country in the world, which is charging taxes on accessing data.

What should be the next steps to close the gaps with other developing countries? The Government of Punjab has already taken a lead and made good progress in several of these areas. There is an urgent need to close the digital gap with other provinces. Here are a few suggestions:

1. Availability of affordable access to equipment and ICT services should be ensured to all sections of the economy. Tax policy for ICT should be rationalised. Currently, there is an anti-ICT bias which should be removed.
2. ICT infrastructure should be developed by enhanced investment through Public-Private Partnership (PPP) infrastructure.
3. A regulatory and legal framework should be formulated. Uncertainty in government policies should be removed.
4. Computer literacy rates should be improved. ICT should be introduced at all educational levels, especially in primary schools.
5. The disparity between urban and rural areas should be removed.
6. ICT should be introduced in the agriculture sector.
7. E-government should be strengthened, with land records and tax administration fully computerised.
8. Pakistan should capitalise on the opportunities arising from CPEC and become a hub for providing international bandwidth to its landlocked neighbours.
References
Aziz, S. 2017, ‘Pakistan’s E-Commerce Industry is Worth Just $100m and India’s is a Whopping $12b’, Friday Times, 16 September, <https://blogs.thefridaytimes.com/pakistans-e-commerce-industry-100m-indias-12b/> [Accessed 15 October 2018].


Annexure: SDC 2017 Conference Agenda

SDPI’s Twentieth Sustainable Development Conference

Seventy Years of Development:
The Way Forward
5 – 7 December 2017

Organised by:
Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, Pakistan

Venue: Islamabad Marriott Hotel, Aga Khan Road,
Shalimar 5, Islamabad, Pakistan
### DAY: Tuesday, 5 December 2017

**9:00am – 11:30am**

**SDC Opening Plenary:**
- **Guests to be seated:** 8:45am
- Welcome Address: Ambassador Shafqat Kakakhel, Chairperson, Board of Governors, Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, Pakistan
- **Introduction to the SDG:** Mr. Abid Qayyum Suleri, Executive Director, Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, Pakistan
- **Guest of Honour:** Prof. Ahsan Iqbal, Federal Minister for Interior and Narcotics Control, Government of Pakistan
- **Keynote Speech:** Dr. Ishrat Husain, Former Dean and Director, Institute of Business Administration (IBA), Karachi, Pakistan
- **Plenary Title:** Development Beyond 70 and the Way Forward

**Launch of Publications:**
- 1. SDPI's Journal of Development Policy, Research and Practice
- 2. SDC Anthology: “Sustainable Development: Envisioning the Future Together”
- 4. Pakistan’s Agenda for Economic Reforms
- 5. PolicyBriefs on Sustainable Development in Pakistan

**Plenary Organisers:** Dr. Sajid Amin and Ms. Samavia Batool (SDPI)

**Concurrent Session A-1:**
- **Title:** Improving Connectivity and Regional Integration in Central and South Asia
- **Panel Organisers:** Mr. Guntur Sugiyarto, Asian Development Bank (ADB), Dr. Vaqar Ahmed, Mr. Wasif Naqvi

**Concurrent Session A-2:**
- **Title:** Women’s Access to Justice: Ending Violence against Women (VAW)
- **Panel Organisers:** Ms. Aisha Malik and Ms. Imranat Niazi

**Concurrent Session A-3:**
- **Title:** Challenges and Potential of SME Sector Financing in Pakistan and a Way Forward through CFIC
- **Panel Organisers:** Dr. Nadia Fanooq (PIDE), Dr. Sajid Amin and Mr. Fatima Ranaa (SDPI)

**Concurrent Session A-4:**
- **Title:** Political Economy of South Asia: Stories from Pakistan, India and Bangladesh
- **Panel Organisers:** Mr. Ahmad Salim, Dr. Humaira Ishfaq and Mr. Shahbaz Tufail (SDPI)

**Concurrent Session A-5:**
- **Title:** Harnessing Private Sector Role for Sustainable Development Roundtable
- **Panel Organisers:** UNDP – Pakistan, Mr. Shahed Ramay (SDPI), and Mr. Waqar Ahmed (SDPI)

**Session AA-1:**
- 12:00 noon – 5:00pm
- **Innovative Climate Finance Mechanism for Financial Institutions Roundtable (By Invitation Only)
- Opening Remarks:** Mr. Abid Qayyum Suleri, Executive Director, Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, Pakistan

**Session AA-2:**
- 11:00am – 2:00pm
- **Panel Organisers:** Mr. Michael Williamson (UNESCAP) and Dr. Shehryar Toru (SDPI)

**Session AA-3:**
- 2:00pm – 5:00pm
- **Panel Organisers:** Mr. Enrique Blanco Armas (World Bank), Dr. Vaqar Ahmed, Mr. Abid Niazi and Mr. Abbas Murtaza Maken (SDPI)

**Session AA-4:**
- 2:00pm – 5:00pm
- **Panel Organisers:** Ms. Ehsa Tawfeen and Mr. Uzma T. Hanum (SDPI)

**Session AA-5:**
- 2:00pm – 5:00pm
- **Panel Organisers:** Dr. Sajid Amin and Ms. Yamna Arshad (SDPI)

**Session AA-6:**
- 2:00pm – 5:00pm
- **Panel Organisers:** Mr. Michael Williamson (UNESCAP) and Dr. Shehryar Toru (SDPI)

**Session AA-7:**
- 2:00pm – 5:00pm
- **Panel Organisers:** Ms. Ehsa Tawfeen and Mr. Uzma T. Hanum (SDPI)

**Session AA-8:**
- 2:00pm – 5:00pm
- **Panel Organisers:** Dr. Sajid Amin and Ms. Yamna Arshad (SDPI)

**Session AA-9:**
- 2:00pm – 5:00pm
- **Panel Organisers:** Mr. Michael Williamson (UNESCAP) and Dr. Shehryar Toru (SDPI)

**Session AA-10:**
- 2:00pm – 5:00pm
- **Panel Organisers:** Ms. Saida Razzaq and Mr. Nabi (SDPI)
## Inaugural Plenary

**Welcome Address:** Ambassador Shafqat Kakakhel, Chairperson, Board of Governors, Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, Pakistan

**Introduction to the SDC:** Dr. Abid Qaiyum Suleri, Executive Director, Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, Pakistan

**Guest of Honour:** Prof. Ahsan Iqbal, Federal Minister for Interior and Narcotics Control, Government of Pakistan

**Keynote Speech:** Dr. Ishrat Hussain, Former Dean and Director, Institute of Business Administration (IBA), Karachi, Pakistan

**Plenary Title:** Development Beyond 2030 and the Way Forward

**Launch of Publications:**
1. SDPI’s Journal of Development Policy, Research and Practice
2. SDC Anthology: “Sustainable Development: Envisaging the Future Together”
3. SDPI’s Annual Report 2016 – 2017
4. Pakistan’s Agenda for Economic Reforms
5. Policy Briefs on Sustainable Development in Pakistan

**Plenary Organisers:** Dr. Sajid Amin and Ms. Samavia Batool, Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, Pakistan

**Rapporteurs:**
- Ms. Zainab Naeem
- Ms. Nageen Sohail

**Refreshments**

9:00 am – 11:30 am

11:30 am – 12 noon
## Tuesday, 05 December 2017

### Day One

### Concurrent Session A-1

**Title:** Improving Connectivity and Regional Integration in Central and South Asia  
**Chair:** Mr Sartaj Aziz, Deputy Chairman, Ministry of Planning, Development and Reform, Government of Pakistan  
**Moderator:** Mr Amer Durrani, CEO, Reenergia-Enhar, Islamabad, Pakistan  
**Discussants:**  
- Mr Imran Shaukat, Chairman, Jobs Group, Islamabad, Pakistan  
- Dr Safdar Sohail, Former Director, CPEC Center of Excellence, Islamabad, Pakistan  
**Panel Organisers:** Mr Guntur Sugiyarto, Asian Development Bank, Islamabad, Pakistan; Dr Vaqar Ahmed and Ms Rabia Manzoor, Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, Pakistan  
**Rapporteurs:** Ms Yamna Arshad  
Mr Shujaat Ahmed  

### Speakers

- Mr Safdar Parvez, Director for Regional Cooperation, Asian Development Bank, Manila, Philippines  
- Ms Farzana Noshab, Economist, Asian Development Bank, Pakistan  

### Discussion

### Lunch

**Lunch**

2:00 pm - 3:00 pm
# Concurrent Session A-2

**Title:** Women’s Access to Justice: Ending Violence against Women (VAW)

**Chair:** Ms Khawar Mumtaz, Chairperson, National Commission on the Status of Women (NCSW), Pakistan

**Discussant:** Ms Maliha Hussain, Mehergarh, Islamabad, Pakistan

**Panel Organisers:** Ms Aisha Mukhtar, UN Women, Ms Imran Niazi and Mr Shahid Minhas, Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, Pakistan

**Rapporteurs:** Ms Sadaf Liaquat  
Ms Ayesha Qaisrani

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Speaker</th>
<th>Presentation Titles</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ms Bandana Rana, Member, UN CEDAW Committee, Nepal</td>
<td>CEDAW: Tool for Addressing Violence against Women (VAW)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mr Pranav Adhikari, Senior Research Officer, Nepal Institute for Social and Environmental Research, Nepal</td>
<td>Changing Trends of Intimate Partner Violence against Women in Nepal</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dr Nargis Asad, Associate Professor, Department of Psychiatry and Chair, Working Group for Women (WGW), Aga Khan University, Karachi, Pakistan</td>
<td>Drivers of Intimate Partner Violence: Understanding from Pakistan</td>
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**Discussion**

**Lunch**  
2:00 pm - 3:00 pm
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<tr>
<th>Tuesday, 05 December 2017</th>
<th>Day One</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Concurrent Session A-3</strong></td>
<td><strong>12 noon – 2:00 pm</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Title:</strong> Challenges and Potential of SME Sector Financing in Pakistan and a Way Forward through CPEC</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Guest of Honour:</strong> Dr Miftah Ismail, Special Assistant to Prime Minister on Economic Affairs and Former Chairman, Federal Board of Investment, Karachi, Pakistan</td>
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<td><strong>Chair:</strong> Mr Shahid Rashid, Centre of Excellence-CPEC, Pakistan Institute of Development Economics (PIDE), Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
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<td><strong>Moderator:</strong> Dr Sajid Amin, Research Fellow, Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
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<td><strong>Panel Organisers:</strong> Dr Nadia Farooq, Pakistan Institute of Development Economics (PIDE), Islamabad, Pakistan; Dr Sajid Amin and Mr Faizan Rasool, Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
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<td><strong>Rapporteurs:</strong> Mr Faizan Rasool, Ms Rija Hafeez, Ms Rabia Tabassum</td>
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<td>Dr Ishrat Hussain, Former Dean and Director, Institute of Business Administration (IBA), Karachi, Pakistan</td>
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<td>Dr Daniel Poon, Economic Affairs Officer, Division on Globalization and Development Strategies, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Geneva, Switzerland</td>
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<td>Mr Wang Ziahi, President, Pak-China Chambers of Commerce and Industry, Lahore, Pakistan</td>
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<td>Mir Salman Ali, Vice President, UNISAME, Co-Founder - Director (Strategy &amp; Operations), South Asian Resources Group, Karachi, Pakistan</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Discussion</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Lunch</strong></td>
<td><strong>2:00 pm - 3:00 pm</strong></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Tuesday, 05 December 2017

**Concurrent Session A-4**  
12 noon – 2:00 pm

**Title:** Political Economy of South Asia: Stories from Pakistan, India and Bangladesh

**Chair:** Mr Afrasiab Khattak, Former Senator, Awami National Party, Islamabad, Pakistan

**Moderator:** Dr Humaira Ishfaq and Mr Shahbaz Tufail, Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, Pakistan

**Panel Organisers:** Mr Ahmad Salim, Dr Humaira Ishfaq and Mr Shahbaz Tufail, Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, Pakistan

**Rapporteurs:**
- Ms Kainat Javed
- Ms Isha Tir Razia

**Book Launch**

**Speakers**
- Mr Ahmad Salim, Director, Urdu Publications, Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, Pakistan
- Mr I.A. Rehman, Director, Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, Lahore, Pakistan
- Dr Anwaar Ahmad, Director, Bahauddin Zakariya University, Multan, Pakistan

**Discussion**

**Lunch**  
2:00 pm - 3:00 pm
## Tuesday, 05 December 2017

Concurrent Session A-5  
**Title:** Harnessing Private Sector Role for Sustainable Development  
**Roundtable**

**Chair:** Mr Syed Yawar Ali, Chairman, Nestle-Pakistan Limited, Lahore, Pakistan

**Panel Organisers:** Mr Shakeel Ramay, Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, Pakistan; Engr. Jabbar, Automotive MFG (Pvt) Ltd, Karachi, Pakistan; and Mr Waqar Ahmed, Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, Pakistan

**Rapporteurs:**  
Mr Waqar Ahmed  
Ms Shakira Mukhtar  
Ms Urva Akmal

**Speakers**  
Mr Shakeel Ahmad, United Nations Development Programme, Islamabad, Pakistan  
Mr Michael Williamson, Head, South and South-West Asia Office, United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP), New Delhi, India  
Mr Shakeel Ramay, Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, Pakistan  
Mr Zubair Tufail, President, Federation of Pakistan Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FPCCI), Karachi, Pakistan  
Mr Fuad Hashmi, Executive Director, Centre of Excellence in Responsible Business, Pakistan Business Council, Karachi, Pakistan

### Discussion

**Lunch**  
2:00 pm - 3:00 pm
| Title: Pakistan @100: Envisioning Reforms to Accelerate and Sustain Inclusive Growth |
| Chair: Mr Daniyal Aziz, Minister for Privitization, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad, Pakistan |
| Moderator: Ms Samar Hasan, Co-founder, Epiphany, Islamabad, Pakistan |
| Panel Organisers: Mr Enrique Blanco Armas World Bank, Dr Vaqar Ahmed, Mr Ahad Nazir, Mr Abbas Murtaza Maken, Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, Pakistan |
| Rapporteurs: Mr Ahmad Durrani Mr Ahmad Awais Khawer |
| Presentation: Mr Enrique Blanco Armas, Lead Country Economist, Macroeconomics & Fiscal Management, World Bank |
| Speakers: Dr Nadeem-ul-Haque, Former Deputy Chairman, Planning Commission, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad, Pakistan Mr Nadeem Javed, Chief Economist, Planning Commission, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad, Pakistan Engr. Abdul Jabbar, Chief Executive Officer, Automotive MFG (Pvt) Ltd, Karachi, Pakistan Ms Rubia Manzoor, Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, Pakistan |

Discussion
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Members</th>
<th>Presentation Titles</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dr Humaira Ishfaq, Urdu Editor / Research Fellow, Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
<td>Moving Forward from Diversity to Pluralism: The Gender Aspect</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dr Ayesha Leghari, Assistant Professor, National Defence University, Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
<td>Beyond Pluralism: Oneness through Multiplicity</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ms Maryam Ifikhar, University of Management and Technology, Lahore, Pakistan</td>
<td>Promoting Pluralism-led Interfaith Harmony on Campus: Students’ Perspective</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Tuesday, 05 December 2017

Concurrent Session A-8

Title: Structural Inequalities in South Asia: Issues, Challenges and Policy Solutions

Chair: Ms Najma Afzal, Member Provincial Assembly (MPA), Government of Punjab, Pakistan

Moderator: Dr Sajid Amin, Research Fellow, Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, Pakistan

Discussants:
- Dr Sachin Chaturvedi, Director General, Research and Information System for Developing Countries, New Delhi, India (via Skype)
- Mr Shakeel Ahmad, Assistant Country Director, Development Policy Unit, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Islamabad, Pakistan

Panel Organisers: Dr Sajid Amin and Ms Yamna Arshad, Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, Pakistan

Rapporteurs:
Mr Faizan Rasool
Ms Yamna Arshad

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<th>Speakers</th>
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<tr>
<td>Dr Rafi Amir-ud-Din, COMSATS Institute of Information Technology, Lahore, Pakistan</td>
<td>How Inclusive is Growth in Pakistan? A Multilevel Analysis over 20 Years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr Aneel Salman, Head of Management Science Department, COMSATS Institute of Information Technology, Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
<td>Economic Growth and Social Inclusion in Pakistan: Separating Wheat from the Chaff</td>
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</table>

Discussion
**Tuesday, 05 December 2017**  
**Day One**

**Concurrent Session A-9**  
3:00pm – 5:00 pm

**Title:** Sustainable Development Goals: Keeping the Promise Alive

**Chair:** Dr Tariq Banuri, Executive Director, Global Change Impact Studies Centre, Islamabad, Pakistan

**Moderator:** Dr Shehryar Toru, Research Fellow, Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, Pakistan

**Discussant:** Mr Michael Williamson, United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP), New Delhi, India

**Panel Organisers:** Mr Michael Williamson, United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP), New Delhi, India; Dr Shehryar Toru and Ms Rubab Syed, Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, Pakistan

**Rapporteurs:**  
Ms Zainab Naeem  
Ms Nageen Sohail

**Speakers:**  
Mr Matthew Hammill, Economist, United Nations ESCAP, ESCAP South and South-West Asia Office, New Delhi, India  
Ms Samanthi Bandara, Institute of Policy Studies, Colombo, Sri Lanka  
Mr Rolf Pasch and Mr Abdul Qadir, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES), Islamabad, Pakistan

**Presentation:** Linking Trade and Decent Work in Global Supply Chains – Four Case Studies in Asia

**Discussion**
**Tuesday, 05 December 2017**

**Concurrent Session A-10**  
3:00pm – 5:00 pm

**Title:** Pathways to Realize Health-related Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)

**Chair:** Dr Mohammad Assai Ardakani, WHO Representative (WR), World Health Organization (WHO), Pakistan

**Guest of Honour:** Dr Sania Nishtar, President, Heartfile, Islamabad, Pakistan

**Moderator:** Ms Saadiya Razaq, Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad, Pakistan

**Panel Organisers:** Ms Saadiya Razaq and Ms Nabila Kanwal, Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, Pakistan

**Rapporteurs:**  
Ms Rabia Tabassum  
Mr Ghamz E Ali Siyal

**Speakers**  
- Dr Sajjad Akhtar, Member Economic Statistics, Pakistan Bureau of Statistics, Government of Pakistan  
- Dr Zeba Sathar, Country Director, Population Council, Pakistan  
- Dr Abdul Baseer Khan Achakzai, National Program Manager, National AIDS Control Program (NACP) and Director Malaria Control Program, Pakistan  
- Dr Kartigya Regmi, Communication Officer, Health Research and Social Development Forum, Kathmandu, Nepal  
- Prof. Mehtab Karim, Vice Chancellor and Executive Director of Centre for Studies in Population & Health, Mair University of Science & Technology (MUST), Karachi, Pakistan

**Discussion**
Session AA-1  

**Introductory Remarks:** Dr Abid Qaiyum Suleri, Executive Director, Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, Pakistan  
Dr Muhammad Saleem Zia, Chief Operating Officer, Pakistan Mortgage Refinance Company  
Topic: Normative Frameworks for Green Banking in Pakistan - Circular on Green Banking Guidelines, State Bank of Pakistan  
Ms Aneta Nikolova, Environmental Officer, UNESCAP  
Topic: Findings from National Scoping Studies in Indonesia, Sri Lanka and Philippines  
Mr Bjoern Dransfeld, Founding Partner, the greenwerk, Climate Advisory Network, Germany  
Topics: i - Introduction to Climate Finance: Overview, Access, Sources and Design  
i - Addressing Challenges for Green Banking in Pakistan  
Mr Irfan Ahmad Chatha, Research Assistant, Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad, Pakistan  
Topic: Findings from the National Scoping Study in Pakistan: Climate Finance in Pakistan and the Way Forward  
Mr Nalin Karunatilleka, Vice President, DFCC Bank, Sri Lanka (via Video Message)  
Topic: Regional Perspectives: Climate Finance Regulation in Sri Lanka  

**Way Forward and Wrap-up:** Mr Shakeel Ahmad Ramay, Head Centre for Future Policy; and Head, Research Coordination Unit, Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, Pakistan  

**Rapporteur:**  
Ms Maryam Shabbir
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>Tuesday, 05 December 2017</td>
<td><strong>Dinner Plenary: Regional and Global Realignment in Pakistan’s Foreign Policy</strong></td>
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<td><strong>7:00pm - 9:00pm</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Guest of Honour:</strong> Mr Khawaja Muhammad Asif, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Government of Pakistan</td>
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<td><strong>Moderator:</strong> Dr Abid Qaiyum Suleri, Executive Director, Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
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<td><strong>Plenary Organisers:</strong> Ms Sadaf Liaquat and Mr Shafqat Munir, Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
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<td><strong>Silver Jubilee Celebrations</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Rapporteurs:</strong> Mr Wasif Naqvi, Mr Shafqat Aziz, Mr Awan Bhatti, Mr Shahbaz Tufail</td>
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## DAY 2: Wednesday, 6 December 2017

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<th>Concurrent Session B-2</th>
<th>Concurrent Session B-3</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Panel Organisers:</strong> Ms Sofia Shakil, The Asia Foundation (TAF), Mr Ahad Nazir, Dr Vaqar Ahmed and Ms Yamma Arshad (SDPI)</td>
<td><strong>Panel Organisers:</strong> Dr Nathalie Reynolds, Mr Muhammad Tahmem, and Ms Shazia Ahmed (SDPI)</td>
<td><strong>Panel Organisers:</strong> Ms Benazir Jatoi, Aurat Foundation and Mr Waqar Ahmed (SDPI)</td>
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<tr>
<th>Concurrent Session B-4</th>
<th>Concurrent Session B-5</th>
<th>Concurrent Session B-6</th>
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<tr>
<td>Pakistan’s Energy Future: Governance and Transformation</td>
<td>Independent Think Tanks: Challenges in Shrinking Spaces</td>
<td>Integrated Context Analysis on Food Insecurity and Natural Hazards</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Panel Organiser:</strong> Dr Imran Khalid (SDPI)</td>
<td><strong>Dedicated to:</strong> Late Dr Saman Kelegama, Institute of Policy Studies, Sri Lanka</td>
<td><strong>Panel Organisers:</strong> Mr Qasim Shah, World Food Programme (WFP), Ms Meheran Iqbal and Dr Sajid Amin (SDPI)</td>
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<th>Concurrent Session B-7</th>
<th>Concurrent Session B-8</th>
<th>Concurrent Session B-9</th>
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<tr>
<td>Art as Resistance against Political Tyranny in South Asia</td>
<td>Information and Telecommunications Journey in Pakistan: Future Directions</td>
<td>Migration, Water Management and Climate Change in Glacier River Basin and Semi-arid Regions in Pakistan: Key Linkages and Policy Options</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Panel Organisers:</strong> Mr Ahmad Salim, Dr Humaima Isfah and Mr Shahzad Tufail (SDPI)</td>
<td><strong>Panel Organisers:</strong> Brig. (R) Mohammad Yasin and Mr Hanan Mustafa (SDPI)</td>
<td><strong>Panel Organisers:</strong> Mr Kahsh Salik, Ms Ayesha Quresi and Mr Bashir Ahmed (SDPI)</td>
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<th>Concurrent Session B-10</th>
<th>Concurrent Session B-11</th>
<th>Concurrent Session B-12</th>
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<tr>
<td>Leaving No One Behind: South Asia’s Biggest Development Opportunity</td>
<td>Achieving a Food Secure and Nutritious Pakistan: Identifying Practical Pathways Forward</td>
<td>Promoting Gender Equality: Icons of Feminism in South Asia</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Panel Organisers:</strong> Mr Anis, Dr Muhammad Iqbal and Mr Afsifi Javed (SDPI)</td>
<td><strong>Panel Organisers:</strong> Prof. Stephen Davies, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) and Ms Mehreen Iqbal (SDPI)</td>
<td><strong>Panel Organisers:</strong> Dr Nathalie Reynolds and Mr Afsifi Javed (SDPI)</td>
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<th>Concurrent Session B-13</th>
<th>Concurrent Session B-14</th>
<th>Concurrent Session B-15</th>
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<tr>
<td>Migration, Water Management and Climate Change in Glacier River Basin and Semi-arid Regions in Pakistan: Key Linkages and Policy Options</td>
<td>Towards a Resilient Future: Adapting to Climate Change in Pakistan</td>
<td>Public-Private Dialogue on Economic Agenda for Elections 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Panel Organisers:</strong> Mr Kashif Salik, Ms Ayesha Quresi and Mr Bashir Ahmed (SDPI)</td>
<td><strong>Panel Organisers:</strong> Dr Imran Khalid and Mr Khawar Ahmed (SDPI)</td>
<td><strong>Panel Organisers:</strong> Dr Vaqar Ahmed, Mr Ahad Nazir, Mr Ahmad Shah Durani, and Ms Wasif Naqvi (SDPI)</td>
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<td>Time</td>
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<td>9:30am – 11:30am</td>
<td><strong>Concurrent Session B-1</strong>&lt;br&gt;Title: Designing Better Federal and Provincial Tax Reforms&lt;br&gt;Chair: MNA Rana Muhammad Afzal Khan, Parliamentary Secretary for Finance, Government of Pakistan&lt;br&gt;Welcome Remarks: Ms Sofia Shakil, Country Representative, The Asia Foundation, Islamabad, Pakistan&lt;br&gt;Moderator: Mr Khayam Mushir, Partner EY Chartered Accountants, Islamabad, Pakistan&lt;br&gt;Panel Organisers: Ms Sofia Shakil, The Asia Foundation, Mr Ahad Nazir, Dr Vaqar Ahmed, and Ms Yamna Arshad, Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, Pakistan&lt;br&gt;Rapporteurs: Mr Ahmad Durrani, Mr Muhammad Talal Akhtar&lt;br&gt;Technical Presentation: Mr Ahad Nazir, Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, Pakistan&lt;br&gt;Speakers: Dr Waqar Masood Khan, Former Finance Secretary, Government of Pakistan, Mr Ehsan Malik, CEO, The Pakistan Business Council, Karachi, Pakistan, Mr Adnan Jilji, Former Vice President, Federation of Pakistan Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FPCCI), Peshawar, Pakistan, Mr Syed Wajid Bukhari, Resident Director, Amreli Steel (Pvt.) Pakistan Limited, Islamabad, Pakistan&lt;br&gt;Discussion&lt;br&gt;Refreshments</td>
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<tr>
<td>Concurrent Session B-2</td>
<td>9:30am – 11:30am</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Title:</strong> Peace and Security in South Asia: The Way Forward</td>
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<td><strong>Chair:</strong> Prof. (R) Dr Dushka H. Saiyid, Editor Youlin Magazine, Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
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<td><strong>Moderator:</strong> Mr Mohammad Tahseen, Executive Director, South Asia Partnership Pakistan (SAP-PK), Lahore, Pakistan</td>
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<td><strong>Discussants:</strong> Dr Sarfraz Khan, Director, Area Study Centre (Russia, China and Central Asia), University of Peshawar, Pakistan; and Mr Zulfqar Gilani</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Panel Organisers:</strong> Dr Nathalène Reynolds, Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Mr Muhammad Tahseen, SAP-PK, Lahore; Mr Shujaat Ahmed and Mr Wasif Naqvi, Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
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<td><strong>Rapporteurs:</strong> Ms Shakira Mukhtar, Ms Urva Akmal</td>
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<td><strong>Speakers</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Dr Nathalène Reynolds, Independent Researcher, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia; and Visiting Research Fellow, Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Presentation:</strong> Origins of Indo-Pakistan Antagonism: Tribal Invasion of the Princely State of Jammu and Kashmir (October 1947)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ms Mariam Safi, Executive Director, Organization for Policy Research and Development Studies, Afghanistan</td>
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<td>Dr Muhammad Shoaib Suddle, Senior Fellow, Global Think Tank Network, National University of Sciences and Technology (NUST), Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
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<td>Mr Saleem Malik, Chief Executive, Strengthening Participatory Organization, Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Discussion</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Refreshments</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Wednesday, 06 December 2017</td>
<td>Day Two</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Concurrent Session B-3</strong></td>
<td><strong>9:30am – 11:30am</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Title:</strong> Feminist Agenda from Beijing Platform for Action (BPfA) 1995 to the Sustainable Development Goals 2015: A Step Forward or Two Steps Back?</td>
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<td><strong>Chair:</strong> Ms Romina Khurshid Alam, Member National Assembly, Government of Pakistan</td>
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<td><strong>Moderator:</strong> Ms Benazir Jatoi, Lawyer, Aurat Foundation, Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Panel Organisers:</strong> Ms Benazir Jatoi, Aurat Foundation, Islamabad, Pakistan; and Mr Waqar Ahmed, Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
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</table>
| **Rapporteurs:** | Mr Waqar Ahmed  
Mr Jawad Khalid | |
| **Speakers** | |
| Dr Madhuri Singh, Founding Member, SAATHI, Nepal | |
| Dr Yasmin Zaidi, Director, Center of Gender and Policy Studies (CGaPS), Islamabad, Pakistan | |
| Ms Shazia Shaheen, Manager Programmes, Strengthening Participatory Organization (SPO), Islamabad, Pakistan | |
| **Discussion** | |
| **Refreshments** | |
**Wednesday, 06 December 2017**

**Concurrent Session B-4**

**Title:** Pakistan’s Energy Future: Governance and Transformation  

**Chair:** Sardar Awais Ahmad Khan Leghari, Federal Minister for Power, Government of Pakistan  

**Moderator:** Dr Imran Khalid, Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, Pakistan  

**Panel Organisers:** Dr Imran Khalid and Mr Ahmed Khaver, Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad, Pakistan  

**Rapporteurs:** Ms Zainab Naeem  
Ms Nageen Sohail  

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dr Bilal Khan, Dean, US-Pakistan Center for Advanced Studies in Energy (USPCAS-E); Member National Steering Committee on Sustainable Energy for All, Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
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<td>Engr. M. A. Jabbar, CEO, Qaim Automotive MFG (Pvt) Ltd, Karachi, Pakistan</td>
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<td>Mr Ahsanul Mustafa, Former Federal Secretary, Water and Power, Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mr Muhammad Riazuddin, CEO, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Oil and Gas Company Limited (KPOGCL), Peshawar, Pakistan</td>
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**Discussion**
### Wednesday, 06 December 2017

**Concurrent Session B-5**  
*Title:* Independent Think Tanks: Challenges in Shrinking Spaces  
*Dedicated to:* Late Dr Saman Kelegama, Executive Director, Institute of Policy Studies, Sri Lanka  
**Moderator:** Dr Abid Qaiyum Suleri, Executive Director, Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, Pakistan  
**Panel Organisers:** Mr Shakeel Ahmad Ramay and Mr Irfan Chatha, Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, Pakistan  
**Rapporteurs:**  
- Ms Maryam Shabbir  
- Mr Irfan Chatha  

**Speakers**  
- Mr Uday Singh Mehta, Deputy Executive Director, CUTS International, India  
- Dr Paras Kharel, Research Director, South Asia Watch on Trade, Economics and Environment (SAWTEE), Kathmandu, Nepal  
- Ms Jia Jinghang, External Relations Division, International Economics and Finance Institute, Ministry of Finance, Government of China  
- Mr Sachin Chaturvedi, Director General, Research and Information System for Developing Countries (RIS), India (via Skype)  
- Mr Ajaya Dixit, Institute for Social and Environmental Transition, Nepal  
- Ms Samanthi Bandara, Research Officer, Institute of Policy Studies, Sri Lanka  
- Mr I.A. Rehman, Director, Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, Lahore, Pakistan  
- Dr Nadeem-ul-Haque, Former Deputy Chairman, Planning Commission, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad, Pakistan

**Discussion**  

**Refreshments**
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<th><strong>Day Two</strong></th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Title:</strong> Integrated Context Analysis on Food Insecurity and Natural Hazards</td>
<td><strong>Chair:</strong> Brig. Mukhtar Ahmed, Member Operations, National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA), Government of Pakistan</td>
<td><strong>12noon – 2:00pm</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Discussants:</strong> Ms Mewish Ali, GIS Analyst, UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), Islamabad, Pakistan and Mr Iftikhar Abbas, Programme Officer, World Food Programme, Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
<td><strong>Panel Organisers:</strong> Mr Qasim Shah, World Food Programme (WFP), Dr Sajid Amin and Ms Mehreen Iqbal, Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
<td><strong>Rapporteurs:</strong> Ms Kainat Javed Ms Isha Tir Razia</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Speakers</strong></td>
<td><strong>Speakers</strong></td>
<td><strong>Discussion</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ms Thi Van Hoang, Head, Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping (VAM), World Food Programme, Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
<td>Mr Syed Muhammad Ayub Shah, ICT Head, National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA), Government of Pakistan</td>
<td><strong>2:00 pm – 3:00 pm</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Lunch</strong></td>
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2:00 pm – 3:00 pm

### Concurrent Session B-7

**Title:** Art as Resistance against Political Tyranny in South Asia  
*Rounded by*

**Moderator:** Dr Humaira Ishfaq, Research Fellow, Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, Pakistan

**Panel Organisers:** Mr Ahmad Salim, Dr Humaira Ishfaq and Mr Shahbaz Tufail, Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, Pakistan

**Rapporteurs:**  
Mr Waqar Ahmed  
Ms Rubab Syed

**Distinguished Panellists**  
Mr Raza Naeem, Instructor, Beaconhouse School Systems, Lahore, Pakistan  
**Presentation:** *Pakistan’s Gramsci: The Life and Legacy of Sibte Hasan (1916-1986)*  
Dr Anwaar Ahmad, Director, Bahauddin Zakariya University, Multan, Pakistan  
Ms Sheema Kermani, Tehrik-e-Niswan, Culture Action Group, Karachi, Pakistan  
Ms Naseem Ahmed, Member, National Commission on the Status of Women, Islamabad, Pakistan  
Mr Jamal Shah, Executive Director, Pakistan National Council of the Arts (PNCA), Islamabad, Pakistan  
Mr Hafiz Khalique, Team Leader AAWAZ – Voice and Accountability Programme, Islamabad, Pakistan  
Ms Shireen Najeeb Gheba, Artist and Writer, Islamabad, Pakistan  
Capt. (R) Aftab M. Khan, Head, Alhamra Arts Council, Lahore, Pakistan  
Ms Kishwer Naheed, Poet / Writer, Islamabad, Pakistan

**Discussion**

**Lunch**

---

**Wednesday, 06 December 2017**  
**Day Two**  
**Concurrent Session B-7**  
**12 noon – 2:00 pm**

**Title:** Art as Resistance against Political Tyranny in South Asia  
*Rounded by*

**Moderator:** Dr Humaira Ishfaq, Research Fellow, Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, Pakistan

**Panel Organisers:** Mr Ahmad Salim, Dr Humaira Ishfaq and Mr Shahbaz Tufail, Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, Pakistan

**Rapporteurs:**  
Mr Waqar Ahmed  
Ms Rubab Syed

**Distinguished Panellists**  
Mr Raza Naeem, Instructor, Beaconhouse School Systems, Lahore, Pakistan  
**Presentation:** *Pakistan’s Gramsci: The Life and Legacy of Sibte Hasan (1916-1986)*  
Dr Anwaar Ahmad, Director, Bahauddin Zakariya University, Multan, Pakistan  
Ms Sheema Kermani, Tehrik-e-Niswan, Culture Action Group, Karachi, Pakistan  
Ms Naseem Ahmed, Member, National Commission on the Status of Women, Islamabad, Pakistan  
Mr Jamal Shah, Executive Director, Pakistan National Council of the Arts (PNCA), Islamabad, Pakistan  
Mr Hafiz Khalique, Team Leader AAWAZ – Voice and Accountability Programme, Islamabad, Pakistan  
Ms Shireen Najeeb Gheba, Artist and Writer, Islamabad, Pakistan  
Capt. (R) Aftab M. Khan, Head, Alhamra Arts Council, Lahore, Pakistan  
Ms Kishwer Naheed, Poet / Writer, Islamabad, Pakistan

**Discussion**

**Lunch**
### Concurrent Session B-8

**Title:** Information and Telecommunications Journey in Pakistan: Future Directions  
**Chair:** Mr Syed Ismail Shah, Chairman, Pakistan Telecommunication Authority, Islamabad, Pakistan  
**Panel Organisers:** Brig. (R) Mohammad Yasin and Mr Hassan Murtaza, Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, Pakistan  
**Rapporteurs:** Mr Muhammad Talal Akhtar  
Ms Rija Hafeez  
Mr Hassan Murtaza

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<tr>
<td>Dr Manzoor Ahmad, (Hon) President, Policy Research Institute of Market Economy, Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
<td>Information and Telecommunications Journey in Pakistan: Future Directions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr Parvez Iftikhar, ICT Consultant, Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
<td>Future Directions: Pakistan and the Digital Economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr Naveed Haq, Regional Development Manager, Asia-Pacific Regional Bureau, Internet Society, Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
<td>The Internet and Sustainable Development Goals</td>
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**Discussion**

**Lunch**  
**Time:** 2:00 pm – 3:00 pm
Wednesday, 06 December 2017

Concurrent Session B-9 12 noon – 2:00 pm

**Title:** Migration, Water Management and Climate Change in Glacier River Basin and Semi-arid Regions in Pakistan: Key Linkages and Policy Options

**Chair:** Engr. Shams ul Mulk, Former Chairman, Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA); and, Former Chief Minister, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Government of Pakistan

**Guest of Honour:** Mr Nisar Memon, Former Information Minister, Government of Pakistan

**Moderator:** Dr Imran Khalid, Research Fellow, Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, Pakistan

**Panel Organisers:** Mr Kashif Salik, Ms Ayesha Qaisrani and Mr Bashir Ahmad, Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, Pakistan

**Rapporteurs:** Ms Samavia Banool
Mr Ghamz E Ali Syed

**Speakers**
- Dr Kallur S. Murali, Senior Programme Officer, International Development Research Centre (IDRC), India (Via Skype)
- Ms Ayesha Qaisrani, Research Associate, Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, Pakistan
- Mr Awais Umer, Research Assistant, Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, Pakistan
- Dr Bashir Ahmad, Principal Scientific Officer, Pakistan Agricultural Research Council (PARC), Islamabad, Pakistan

**Discussion**

Lunch 2:00 pm – 3:00 pm
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<td><strong>Concurrent Session B-10</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Title:</strong> Leaving No one Behind: South Asia’s Biggest Development Opportunity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chair:</strong> Ms Marvi Memon, Chairperson, Benazir Income Support Programme, Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Moderator:</strong> Mr M. Ali Kemal, Research Economist, Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Discussants:</strong> Mr Shakeel Ahmad, Assistant Country Director, Development Policy Unit, UNDP, Islamabad, Pakistan; Dr Abid Q Suleri, Executive Director, Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, Pakistan; Mr Mazhar Siraj, Department for International Development (DFID), Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Panel Organisers:</strong> Ms Amina Khan, Overseas Development Institute (ODI), London, UK; Dr Vaqar Ahmed, Mr Asif Javed, Mr Ahad Nazir, and Mr Abbas Maken, Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rapporteurs:</strong> Mr Shujaat Ahmad; Mr Asif Javed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Speakers:</strong> Ms Amina Khan, Research Associate, Overseas Development Institute (ODI), London, UK; Dr Shehryar Toru, Research Fellow, Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, Pakistan; Mr Ali Khizar Aslam, Head of Research, Business Recorder, Lahore, Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Discussion</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Lunch</strong></td>
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</table>
### Concurrent Session B-11

**Title:** Achieving a Food Secure and Nutritious Pakistan: Identifying Practical Pathways Forward

**Chair:** Dr. Mary Hobbs, Director, Economic Growth and Agriculture Office, USAID Pakistan

**Moderator:** Mr. Ehtesham Ul Haq, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), Islamabad, Pakistan

**Discussants:**
- Mr. Shaukat Ali, Secretary Food Department, Government of Punjab, Lahore, Pakistan
- Dr. Aamer Irshad, Chief, Food Security and Climate Change, Planning Commission, Government of Pakistan
- Mr. Imran Shauket, Chairman, Jobs Group, Islamabad, Pakistan
- Dr. Tausif Akhtar Janjua, Technical Director, Food Fortification Programme, Nutrition International, Islamabad, Pakistan

**Panel Organisers:** Prof. Stephen Davies, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), Islamabad, Pakistan and Ms. Mehreen Iqbal, Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, Pakistan

**Rapporteurs:** Mr. Faizan Rasool and Ms. Mehreen Iqbal

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<tr>
<th>Speakers</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prof. Stephen Davies, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
<td>Key Messages from the IFPRI/AKU Food Security and Nutrition Strategic Review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Mubarak Ali, Former Member (Food Security and Climate Change Unit) Planning Commission, Government of Pakistan</td>
<td>Potential of Commercialization of Pakistan’s Agriculture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Muhammad Azeem Khan, Director General, National Agricultural Research Centre (NARC), Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
<td>Developing Better Policies to Ensure Food Security in Pakistan</td>
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**Discussion**
**Wednesday, 06 December 2017**  
**Day Two**

**Concurrent Session B-12**  
3:00 pm – 5:00 pm

**Title:** Promoting Gender Equality: Icons of Feminism in South Asia

**Chair:** Ms Sheema Kermani, Tehrik-e-Niswan, Culture Action Group, Karachi, Pakistan

**Discussant:** Ms Bandana Rana, Member, UN CEDAW Committee, Nepal

**Panel Organisers:** Dr Nathalène Reynolds, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia; and Mr Asif Javed, Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, Pakistan

**Rapporteurs:** Mr Muhammad Talal Akhtar  
Ms Rubab Syed

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<tr>
<td>Dr Nathalène Reynolds, Independent Researcher, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia and Visiting Fellow, Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
<td>On Malala Yousafzai’s Contribution to Improving the Situation of Pakistani Women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ms Nazima Shaheen, Environment Specialist, Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
<td>Role of Positive Deviants in the Journey of Feminism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ms Shireen Gheba, Artist and Writer, Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
<td>Icons of Feminism in Pakistan during the 70 Years: Suggestions for the Future</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr Raza Naem, Instructor, Beaconhouse School Systems, Lahore, Pakistan</td>
<td>Half-Women or Half-Dreams? The Lives and Afterlives of Ismat Chughtai’s Women in Pakistan</td>
</tr>
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**Discussion**
Title: Role of Women and Youth in Achieving SDGs

Moderator: Dr. Abid Qaiyum Suleri, Executive Director and Mr. Moazzam Bhatti, Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, Pakistan

Panel Organisers: Ms. Romina Khurshid Alam, Member National Assembly (MNA), Islamabad; Mr. Moazzam Bhatti, and Mr. Ghamz E Ali Siyal, Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, Pakistan

Rapporteurs: Ms. Nageen Sohail
Ms. Zainab Naem

Speakers
Ms. Romina Khurshid Alam, Member National Assembly (MNA), Islamabad, Pakistan
Mr. Ejaz Ahmed Hafeez, Deputy Mayor, Lahore, Pakistan
Professor Nasrem Khan Adakzai, Director, University of Management and Technology, Lahore, Pakistan
Ms. Maria Bastos, Assistant Professor, University of Management and Technology, Lahore, Pakistan
Ms. Malika Ali, Member Provincial Assembly, Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Pakistan
Dr. Noushen Hamid, Member of Provincial Assembly, Punjab, Pakistan

Discussion
Title: Towards a Resilient Future: Adapting to Climate Change in Pakistan

Chair: Mr Syed Abu Ahmed Akif, Secretary, Ministry of Climate Change, Government of Pakistan

Discussants: Ms Simi Kamal, Sr. Group Head, Pakistan Poverty Alleviation Fund, Islamabad; and Ambassador Shafqat Kakakhel, Chairperson, Board of Governors, Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, Pakistan

Guest of Honour: Gen. Aighar Nawaz, Former Chairman, National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA), Islamabad, Pakistan

Panel Organisers: Dr Imran Khalid and Mr Khaver Ahmed, Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, Pakistan

Rapporteurs:
Mr Muhammad Awais Umar
Ms Ayesha Qaisrani

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<tr>
<td>Dr Imran Khalid, Research Fellow, Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
<td>Pathways to Resilience: Nexus between Floods, Cotton Value Chain and Migration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr Maaz Gardezi, Assistant Professor, Department of Sociology and Rural Studies, South Dakota State University, Brookings, USA</td>
<td>Climate-Compatible Development: Assessing Generic and Specific Adaptive Capacity of Farm Households in Pakistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ms Dur-e-Shahwar, Department of Rural Sociology, Institute of Agricultural Extension and Rural Development, Faisalabad, Pakistan</td>
<td>Impact of Human Migration on Climate Change Resilience and Agriculture Productivity: A Case Study in District Jhang</td>
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Discussion
**Wednesday, 06 December 2017**

**Concurrent Session B-15**

**Title:** Public-Private Dialogue on Economic Agenda for Elections 2018

**Roundtable Meeting (By Invitation Only)**

**Welcome Remarks:** Mr Hammad Siddiqui, Country Director Pakistan, Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE), Karachi, Pakistan

**Moderator:** Mr Ahad Nazir, Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, Pakistan

**Panel Organisers:** Mr Hammad Siddiqui, Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE), Karachi, Pakistan; Dr Vaqar Ahmed, Mr Ahad Nazir, Mr Ahmad Shah Durrani, and Mr Wasif Naqvi, Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, Pakistan

**Rapporteurs:**
- Ms Yamna Arshad
- Mr Abbas Murtaza

**Speakers**

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dr Vaqar Ahmed, Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
<td>Draft Economic Agenda 2018</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mr Sakib Sherani, Chief Executive Officer, Macroeconomics Insights (Pvt.) Ltd, Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
<td>Institutional Reform in Pakistan: The Missing Piece of the Development Puzzle</td>
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**Distinguished Panellists**

- Mr Fareed Paracha, Secretary General, Jamat-i-Islami, Pakistan
- Ms Naima Kishwar, Member National Assembly, JUI-F, Mardan
- Dr Shazia Aslam, Member National Assembly, PPP, Sukkur
- Mr Jan Achakzai, PML (N), Advisor to Chief Minister, Balochistan, Quetta
- Mr Ali Khizar Aslam, Head of Research, Business Recorder, Lahore, Pakistan
- Dr Saira Ahmed, Assistant Professor, Capital University of Science and Technology (CUST), Islamabad, Pakistan
- Mr Yawar Ali, Chairman, Nestle-Pakistan, Lahore, Pakistan
- Mr Ehsan Malik, CEO, The Pakistan Business Council, Karachi, Pakistan
- Mr Shah Saud Sahibzada, Co-Founder, Epiphany, Pakistan
- Mr Ahmad Qadir, Competition Commission of Pakistan, Islamabad, Pakistan
- Mr Naveed Iftikhar, Consultant, PRIME Institute, Islamabad, Pakistan
- Ms Ayesha Bilal, COO, PRIME Institute, Islamabad, Pakistan
- Mr Imran Jattala, Director, Hult Prize Pakistan
- Ms Samar Hasan, Co-founder, Epiphany, Pakistan
- Mr Asim Ghaffar, Vice President, LMKR, Islamabad, Pakistan

**Discussion**
Journalism Awards Plenary Dinner

Wednesday, 6 December 2017

7:00pm – 9:00pm

Guest of Honour:
Ms Maryam Aurangzeb, Minister of State for Information and Broadcasting, Government of Pakistan

Summary of Two Days: Dr Abid Qaiyum Suleri, Executive Director, Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, Pakistan

Vote of Thanks: Ms Uzma T. Haroon, Director, SDC Unit, Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, Pakistan

Plenary Organisers: Ms Sadaf Liaquat and Mr Shafqat Munir, Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, Pakistan

Rapporteurs:
Mr Shafqat Aziz
Mr Salim Khilji
Mr Ghamz E Ali Siyal
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<tr>
<td>Panel Organisers: Ms Sadia Razzaq and Mr Rabia Tahir (SDPI)</td>
<td>Panel Organisers: Mr Shahid Minhas (SDPI)</td>
<td>Panel Organisers: Mr Karamat Ali (PILER) and Mr Shafqat Munir and Ms Sadaf Liquat (SDPI)</td>
<td>Panel Organisers: Mr Shafee Khan and Mr Waqar Ahmed (SDPI)</td>
<td>Panel Organisers: Mr Robert Carl Michael Beyer, Mr Martin Rama (World Bank) and Dr Vaqar Ahmed, Mr Shujaat Ahmed, and Mr Rabia Minasser (SDPI)</td>
<td>Panel Organisers: Mr Shafqat Munir and Mr Ijazul Zaib (SDPI)</td>
<td>Panel Organisers: Dr Insham Khalid and Mr Ahmed Khayer (SDPI)</td>
<td>Panel Organisers: Mr Moazam Bhatti and Mr Shabbir Tufail (SDPI)</td>
<td>Panel Organisers: Dr Abdul Quayyum Suleri and Mr Waqar Ahmed (SDPI)</td>
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**Day 3: Thursday, 7 December 2017**

- **9:30am – 11:30 am**
  - Concurrent Session C-1
  - Concurrent Session C-2
  - Concurrent Session C-3
  - Concurrent Session C-4

- **12 noon – 2:00pm**
  - Concurrent Session C-5
  - Concurrent Session C-6
  - Concurrent Session C-7
  - Concurrent Session CC-1

- **3:00pm – 5:00pm**
  - H.U. Beg Memorial Lectures
  - Concurrent Session CC-2

**Panel Organisers:**
- Ms Sadia Razzaq and Mr Rabia Tahir (SDPI)
- Mr Robert Carl Michael Beyer, Mr Martin Rama (World Bank) and Dr Vaqar Ahmed, Mr Shujaat Ahmed, and Mr Rabia Minasser (SDPI)
- Dr Insham Khalid and Mr Ahmed Khayer (SDPI)
- Mr Moazam Bhatti and Mr Shabbir Tufail (SDPI)

**Panel Organisers:**
- Ms Sadia Razzaq and Mr Rabia Tahir (SDPI)
- Mr Robert Carl Michael Beyer, Mr Martin Rama (World Bank) and Dr Vaqar Ahmed, Mr Shujaat Ahmed, and Mr Rabia Minasser (SDPI)
- Dr Insham Khalid and Mr Ahmed Khayer (SDPI)
- Mr Moazam Bhatti and Mr Shabbir Tufail (SDPI)
Concurrent Session C-1 9:30am - 11:30am

Title: The Role of Social Protection in Eradicating Poverty: Policy and Practices

Guest of Honour: Ms Shehnaz Wazir Ali, President, Shaheed Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto Institute of Science & Technology, Karachi, Pakistan

Moderator: Syed Muhammad Mustafa, Junior Advisor, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit GmbH (GIZ), Islamabad, Pakistan

Panel Organisers: Ms Saadiya Razaq and Ms Rabia Tabassum, Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, Pakistan

Rapporteurs: Ms Nabila
Ms Mehran Iqbal

Speakers
Mr Zafar-ul-Hasan, Project Director, SDGs Unit and Focal Person on Social Protection, Ministry of Planning, Development and Reform, Government of Pakistan

Mr Manzoor Memon, Social Policy and Development Centre (SPDC), Karachi, Pakistan

Presentation: Vulnerability and Capacity Assessment: A Study of Selected Districts of Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa

Dr Shouhrar Toru, Research Fellow, and Ms Rabia Tabassum, Project Associate, Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, Pakistan

Presentation: Social Protection Scheme (SPS): Knowledge Deficiencies and Operational Impediments

Mr Syed Saad Hussain Gilani, Sr. Programme Officer, International Labour Organization (ILO), Pakistan

Presentation: Global Consensus on Social Protection

Dr Sohail Anwar, CEO, Punjab Social Protection Authority (PSPA), Lahore, Pakistan

Discussion

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<td>9:30am - 11:30am</td>
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**Title:** Transforming Higher Education in South Asia: A Journey of 70 years

**Chair:** Prof. Dr. Zia Ul-Qayyum, Vice Chancellor, University of Gujrat, Gujrat, Pakistan

**Discussant:** Prof. Dr. Samina Qadir, Vice Chancellor, Fatima Jinnah Women University, Rawalpindi, Pakistan

**Panel Organiser:** Mr. Shahid Minhas, Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, Pakistan

**Rapporteurs:** Ms. Nageen Sohail, Ms. Zainab Naeem

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<td>Dr. Fatima Sajjad, Assistant Professor, Dept. of Political Science, University of Management and Technology, Lahore, Pakistan</td>
<td>Critical Pedagogy, Higher Education and Extremism in Pakistan: Policy Review and Recommendations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Faheem Uddin Khushik, PhD student, University Clermont Auvergne, France</td>
<td>Critical Analysis of Education Policies of Pakistan: A Sustainable Development Perspective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ms. Amna Tauhidi, Research Scholar, National Defence University, Islamabad, Pakistan; and Mr. Shahid Minhas, Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
<td>The Significant Transformation of Higher Education in South Asia: A Cross-Cultural Comparative Study of India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka from 1947-2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amb. Thettali Parameswaran Pillai Sreenivasan, Director &amp; Chairman, Academic Council, NSS Academy of Civil Services, Kerala, India</td>
<td>Higher Education in South Asia: Reflections on Higher Education Reform in India</td>
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**Discussion**

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<td><strong>Title:</strong> Compliance of International Human and Labour Rights Conventions in Pakistan in the Context of GSP+</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Moderator:</strong> Mr Karamat Ali, Executive Director, Pakistan Institute of Labour Education and Research (PILER), Karachi, Pakistan</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Discussant:</strong> Mr Khursheed Ahmed, Secretary General, Pakistan Workers Federation (PWF)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Panel Organisers:</strong> Mr Karamat Ali, Pakistan Institute of Labour Education and Research (PILER), Karachi, Pakistan; Mr Shafqat Munir and Ms Sadaf Liaquat, Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Rapporteurs:</strong> Mr Faizan Rasul, Ms Sadaf Liaquat</td>
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<td><strong>Speakers:</strong> Mr Rolf Paasch, Country Director, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES), Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
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<td>Mr Abdul Qadir, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES), Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
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<td>Dr Khalida Ghaus, Managing Director, Social Policy and Development Centre (SPDC), Karachi, Pakistan Via Skype</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mr Chaudhry Manzoor, Member Central Executive Committee, Pakistan People's Party (PPP), Lahore, Pakistan</td>
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<td>Mr Latif Anjari, President, Labour Qauomi Movement, Pakistan</td>
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<td>Mr Hidayat Ullah Khan, President, Peoples' Unity PIA, Pakistan</td>
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**Discussion**

**Refreshments**
**Thursday, 07 December 2017**

**Concurrent Session C-4**

**Climate Change-Driven Migration and Regional/Global Security Roundtable**

**Chair:** Mr Malik Muhammad Uzair Khan, Member National Assembly, Government of Pakistan

**Discussants:** Mr Irfan Tariq, Ministry of Climate Change, Government of Pakistan; and Ms Anam Zeb, Civil Society Coalition for Climate Change (CSCCC), Islamabad, Pakistan

**Panel Organisers:** Mr Shakeel Ramay, Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, Pakistan; and Mr Waqar Ahmed, Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, Pakistan

**Rapporteurs:**
- Mr Waqar Ahmed
- Mr Muhammad Awais Umar

**Speakers**
- Mr Shakeel Ramay, Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, Pakistan
- Mr Nisar Memon, Former Information Minister, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad, Pakistan
- Mr Iqrar Ahmed Khan, Chief of Party/Director, USPCAS-AFS, University of Agriculture, Faisalabad, Pakistan
- Dr Pervaiz Amir, Environmental Expert, Islamabad, Pakistan
- Dr Wasem Ishaque, Assistant Professor, Department of International Relations, National Defence University, Islamabad, Pakistan

**Discussion**

**Refreshments**
Thursday, 07 December 2017
Day Three

**Concurrent Session CC-1**  
9:30am - 11:30am

**Title:** Citizen-Centric Health Initiative

**Roundtable**

**Moderator:** Dr Abid Qaiyum Suleri, Executive Director, Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, Pakistan

**Panel Organisers:** Mr Moazzam Bhatti and Mr Shahbaz Tufail, Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, Pakistan

**Rapporteurs:** Ms Hajirah Junaid  
Ms Maryam Shabbir

**Distinguished Panellists**

- Mr Rana Muhammad Afzal Khan, Member National Assembly, Parliamentary Secretary for Finance, Government of Pakistan
- Ms Romina Khurshid Alam, Member National Assembly, Government of Pakistan
- Ms Tankeen Akhtar Niazi (PML-N) Standing Committee on Health, Government of Punjab, Pakistan
- Dr Najma Afzal (PML-N) Standing Committee on Health, Government of Punjab, Pakistan
- Mr Mehmood Jan, Chairperson, Standing Committee on Health, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Assembly, Peshawar, Pakistan
- Ms Nabila Hakim Ali Khan, Member Provincial Assembly, Government of Punjab
- Mr Shazia Sohail Mir, Member National Assembly, Government of Pakistan
- Mr Ejaz Ahmed Hafeez, Deputy Mayor, Lahore, Pakistan
- Dr Nosheen Hamid, Member Provincial Assembly, Government of Punjab, Pakistan
- Mr Ihtesham Akram, Akram, Director Advocacy, Palladium, Islamabad, Pakistan

**Discussion**

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<td>12 noon-2:00 pm</td>
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<tr>
<td>Title: <strong>Improving Data Foresight for Economic Policy Decisions</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Chair: Dr Ashfaque Hasan Khan, Principal and Dean, School of Social Sciences &amp; Humanities, National University of Sciences &amp; Technology (NUST), Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>Panel Organisers: Mr Robert Carl Michael Beyer, Mr Martin Rama, The World Bank, Pakistan Office, Islamabad; Dr Vaqar Ahmed and Ms Rabia Manzoor, Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rapporteurs: Mr Abbas Maken, Mr Shujaat Ahmed, Ms Rabia Tabassum</td>
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<tr>
<td>Technical Presentation: Mr Robert Carl Michael Beyer and Mr Martin Rama, The World Bank, Pakistan Office, Islamabad</td>
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<td>Distinguished Panellists: Prof. Usman Mustafa, Pakistan Institute of Development Economics (PIDE), Islamabad, Pakistan; Mr Umer Ikhlause, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Islamabad, Pakistan; Dr Bushra Yasmin, Associate Professor, Department of Economics, Fatima Jinnah Women University, Rawalpindi, Pakistan; Mr Attiq ur Rehman, Pakistan Bureau of Statistics, Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
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<td>Lunch: 2:00 pm – 3:00 pm</td>
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### Thursday, 07 December 2017

**Concurrent Session C-6**

**Title:** REDD+ for Sustainable Management of Forests and Societies

**Roundtable**

**Moderator:** Mr. Shafqat Munir, Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, Pakistan

**Discussants:** Mr. Syed Mahmood Nasir, Inspector General of Forests, Government of Pakistan

**Panel Organisers:** Mr. Shafqat Munir and Mr. Junaid Zahid, Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, Pakistan

**Rapporteurs:** Ms Kainat

Ms Isha

**Speakers**

- Mr. Paul Hyun Chung, Chief Operating Officer, Coalition for Rainforest Nations, New York, USA
- Mr. Jamie Severino, Team Leader, REDD+ Strategy, Indufor, Finland Via Skype
- Ms Minahil Khan, Research Associate, Research Society of International Law (RSIL), Islamabad, Pakistan
- Dr. Waheed Chaudhry, Social Expert, Climate Law & Policy, Islamabad, Pakistan
- Syed Mujtaba Hussain Zadi, Director Forestry & CORA, Peshawar, Pakistan
- Ms Fauzia Hameed, Member National Assembly (MNA), Government of Pakistan
- Mr. Anish Joshi, International GIS/MRV Expert, World Wildlife Fund (WWF), Regional Office, Islamabad, Pakistan
- Ms Aisha Sajjad, Student, Environmental Sciences, Islamabad, Pakistan
- Mr. Iqbal Muhammad, Deforestation Expert, Pakistan
- Mr. Kamran Hussain, Former Forest Inventory Expert, Ministry of Climate Change, Islamabad, Pakistan

**Discussion**

**Lunch**

2:00 pm – 3:00 pm
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<th>Day Three</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Concurrent Session C-7</strong></td>
<td>12 noon – 2:00 pm</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Title:</strong> Water Stewardship and Collective Action</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Podium Discussion</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Chair:</strong> Dr Tariq Banuri, Executive Director, Global Change Impact Studies Centre, Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Moderator:</strong> Dr Imran Khalid, Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Discussant:</strong> Mr Ajaya Dixit, Institute for Social and Environmental Transition, Kathmandu, Nepal</td>
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<td><strong>Panel Organisers:</strong> Dr Imran Khalid and Mr Ahmed Khaver, Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Rapporteurs:</strong> Ms Ayesha Qasmani, Mr Ahmad Awais Khaver</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Speakers</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Dr Malik Inayatullah Jan, Assistant Professor, Institute of Development Studies (IDS), The University of Agriculture, Peshawar, Pakistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ms Aatekah Ahmad, Corporate Media Relations Manager, Corporate Affairs, Nestle, Lahore, Pakistan</td>
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<td>Ms Rina Saeed, Journalist, Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
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<td>Dr Abdul Majed, Water Energy and Climate Change Expert, International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN), Karachi, Pakistan</td>
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<td>Dr Munir Ahmad, Member (Natural Resources), Pakistan Agricultural Research Council (PARC), Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
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<td><strong>Discussion</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Lunch</strong></td>
<td>2:00 pm – 3:00 pm</td>
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Thursday, 07 December 2017

Concurrent Session C-8 12 noon - 2:00pm

Title: Understanding El-Niño and its Impacts on South Asia

Roundtable

Chair: Mr Shoaib Sultan Khan, Chairman, Rural Support Programmes Network, Islamabad, Pakistan

Moderators: Dr Inam ur Rahim, Chief Research Officer, Center for Applied Policy Research in Livestock (CAPRIL), University of Veterinary & Animal Sciences, Lahore, Pakistan

Panel Organisers: Mr Mohsin Ali Kazmi and Mr Ghamz E Ali Siyal, Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, Pakistan

Rapporteurs: Ms Nageen Sohail
Ms Zainab Naeem

Speakers

Dr Inam ur Rahim, Chief Research Officer, Center for Applied Policy Research in Livestock (CAPRIL), University of Veterinary & Animal Sciences, Lahore, Pakistan
Dr Sajjad Khan, Pakistan Agriculture and Research Council (PARC), Islamabad, Pakistan
Mr Ghulam Rasool, Director General, Pakistan Meteorological Department (PMD), Islamabad, Pakistan
Dr Jabir Hussain Syed, Assistant Professor, COMSATS Institute of Information Technology (CIIT), Islamabad, Pakistan
Dr Muhammad Ashraf, Chairman, Pakistan Council of Research in Water Resources (PCRWR), Lahore, Pakistan
Dr Rashid Bajwa, CEO, National Rural Support Programme (NRSP), Pakistan
Mr Sanjay Vashist, Climate Action Network South Asia (CANSI), Delhi, India
Dr Ghulam Mustafa, Consultant, Asst Director, Directorate of Agriculture Extension, Pakistan
Mr Muhammad Zawar Khan, Senior Meteorologist, Pakistan Meteorological Department (PMD), Pakistan
Dr Muhammad Mansir Ahmad, Director Climate Change, National Agricultural Research Centre (NARC), Islamabad, Pakistan
Dr Bashir Ahmad, National Coordinator Climate Change, National Agricultural Research Centre (NARC), Islamabad, Pakistan

Discussion

Lunch 2:00 pm – 3:00 pm
Thursday, 07 December 2017

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<tr>
<th>Concurrent Session CC-2</th>
<th>Day Three</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Title:</strong> Charter of Economy: Moving towards a Consensus on Socioeconomic Agenda</td>
<td>12 noon - 2:00 pm</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Moderators:</strong> Dr Abid Qayyum Suleri, Executive Director, Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, Pakistan and Mr Haroon Sharif, Senior Economist, Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Panel Organisers:</strong> Mr Shafqat Aziz and Mr Shahbaz Tufail, Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
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<td><strong>Rapporteurs:</strong> Ms Hajirah Junaid and Mr Jawad Khalid</td>
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<td><strong>Distinguished Panellists</strong></td>
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<td>Syed Naveed Qamar, Former Minister for Defense, Government of Pakistan</td>
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<td>Senator Shibli Faraz, Government of Pakistan</td>
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<td>MNA Rana Muhammad Afzal Khan, Parliamentary Secretary for Finance, Government of Pakistan</td>
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<td>Mr Afrasiab Khattak, Former Senator, Awami National Party, Islamabad, Pakistan</td>
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<td>Ms Nafisa Shah, Member National Assembly, Karachi, Pakistan</td>
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<td>Senator Noman Wazir, Government of Pakistan</td>
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<td>Dr Miftah Ismail, Former Chairman, Federal Board of Investment, Karachi, Pakistan</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Discussion</strong></td>
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Thursday, 07 December 2017  Day Three

SDC Closing Plenary  3:00pm-5:00pm

H.U. Beg Memorial Lectures

Title: Development beyond 70 and the Way Forward

Introduction of Keynote Speakers & Welcome to Chief Guests: Dr Abid Qaiyum Suleri, Executive Director, Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, Pakistan

Keynote Speakers:
Dr Shamshad Akhtar, Under Secretary General, United Nations; Executive Secretary of Economic and Social Commission for Asia and Pacific, Bangkok, Thailand (via Skype)

Senator Mushahid Hussain, Chair of Defense Standing Committee of Parliament, Government of Pakistan

Remarks by Chief Guest: Honourable Syed Khurshid Ahmed Shah, Leader of the Opposition, National Assembly, Government of Pakistan

Launch of Publications:
1. SDPI's Journal of Development Policy, Research and Practice
2. SDC Anthology: “Sustainable Development: Envisaging the Future Together”
3. SDPI’s Annual Report 2016 – 2017
4. Policy Briefs on Sustainable Development in Pakistan

Summary of Three Days: Dr Abid Qaiyum Suleri, Executive Director, Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, Pakistan

SDPI’s Lifetime Achievement Award

Vote of Thanks

Plenary Organisers: Dr Sajid Amin and Ms Samavia Batool (SDPI)

Rapporteurs:
Mr Ahmed Durani
Ms Rabia Manzoor
Mr Wasif Naqvi
71 years into Pakistan’s independence, this book with its renowned and inspiring constellation of scholars makes it clear that the Partition of 1947 was a revered and historic starting point which set the guiding principles for this state and it is those very principles that the country and its people need to re-focus and return to. The authors agree that while Pakistan’s democracy may be struggling in the face of many challenges, it remains alive, vibrant, diverse and perseverant. Some of the reflections, recommendations, aspirations and ideas of Pakistan’s present and future thought leaders included in this book include:

South Asia, once a political wasteland of the past is an incubator of change today, the stagnant economic conditions of the pre-independence era for nearly all SAARC countries have now transformed into an economic dynamism that is impossible to ignore. — Dr Abid Quayum Suleri

The existing asymmetric power relationship between the military and the civilian sectors needs to be reversed. Pakistan can become a democratically governable state by rebuilding vibrant, agile and effective institutions of democratic governance. — Dr Ishrat Husain

Pakistan must go beyond setting up task forces, implement deeper structural reforms, scale up social safety nets, have more effective vertical and horizontal federal-provincial-local fiscal arrangements, fully leverage regional cooperation for enhanced seamless and multimodal transport and IT connectivity, and sharpen its response to climate change. — Dr Shamshad Akhtar

The weak performance of Pakistan’s economy has occurred in the context of a broad atrophy of the country’s institutional framework and lack of transition to institutional democracy. The absence of a genuine reform constituency in the country – one that is aware, politically mobilised and sufficiently large – is a critical hurdle in the path of reforms. — Mr Sakib Sherani

The tax policies formulated and the administration of taxation in Pakistan is patchy and needs the creation of an agency that collectively oversees the work being done by the federal and provincial governments to enhance coordination and cooperation among them. — Engr Ahad Nazir, Mr Abbas Maken and Dr Vaqar Ahmed

Like Malala Yousafzai, Pakistan is home to many social workers and human rights activists, usually operating in difficult circumstances. Their dedication and courage would turn them into icons of feminism the country could be proud of, were it not for the lack of media coverage. — Dr Nathalène Reynolds

The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) is an international treaty of the United Nations which comprehensively addresses women’s rights within all aspects of life, while providing opportunities to each state to address its shortcomings. — Ms Bandana Rana and Ms Victoria Perrie

Climate Compatible Development in Pakistan is achievable by combining both generic capacities, determined by health, governance, political rights, literacy, and economic well-being; and specific adaptive capacities, determined by risk management activities and early warning systems in a way that can also enhance the agency of people. — Dr Maaz Gardezi and Ms Sana Illahe

In order to address rising climate risks and environmental degradation in Pakistan, there is a need to develop integrated coordination systems like Climate Smart Villages. While building large dams has become a political issue, investing in small dams can become a possible solution for drought. — Mr Ghamz E Ali Siyal, Mr Syed Mohsin Ali and Dr Mahreen Zahara

Pakistan has made good progress in Information and Telecommunications, but when compared with other developing states, the country is seriously lagging behind. Rationalisation of taxes on ICT goods and services and other regulatory measures could enable the country catch-up with its peers. — Dr Manzoor Ahmad

For digitalisation of Pakistan’s economy, it is the Government which must lead the way by increasing its own use of IT to encourage private businesses, and increase the size of the domestic market of digital products and services. It should also develop a comprehensive Cyber Security Strategy together with an implementation plan. — Mr Parvez Iftikhar

To understand rural-to-urban migration, in terms of the contemporary push and pull factors in semi-arid regions of Pakistan, there is need for immediate attention on overall agriculture sector development, including climate resilient and agriculture smart policies to lower the push factors of migration in rural areas. — Mr Ghamz E Ali Siyal, Dr Inran Saqib Khalid and Ms Ayesha Quaisrani

PKR. 2400.00